Choice-of-Court Agreements

Due to the fact that matrimonial property and inheritance issues are closely intertwined, in some situations the determination of rules which should be applicable to particular relationships seems problematic. This fully applies to marriage contracts which cover both types of issues.  The presence of a cross-border element in such contracts raises the question of the delineation of the legal regimes of the Matrimonial Property Regulation and the Succession Regulation applicable to matrimonial property and succession issues respectively. This paper analyses the rules which should be applicable to choice-ofcourt agreements for matters arising out of marriage contracts which cover both matrimonial property and inheritance issues and include a cross-border element. For this reason, the paper reveals the interaction between the regimes of the Matrimonial Property Regulation and the Succession Regulation, and the requirements of choice-ofcourt agreements under both regulations. Some of the requirements of these regulations of choice-of-court agreements coincide (eg formal requirements), while others differ. The main differences include: the precondition for the conclusion of a choice-of-court agreement under the Succession Regulation, which is not required under the Matrimonial Property Regulation; the courts which may be chosen; and the circle of matters which can be resolved by the courts on the basis of the choice-of-court agreement.  It is concluded that a choice-of-court agreement, included in the marriage contract, can meet the requirements of both the Succession Regulation and the Matrimonial Property Regulation if: the dispositions upon the death of a spouse, included in the marriage contract, are an  ‘agreement as to succession’ in the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Succession Regulation; the marriage contract includes a choice-of-law agreement in favour of the law of the Member State whose nationality a deceased spouse possessed when the choice-of-law agreement was concluded; this choice of law agreement covers the succession of the deceased spouse ‘as a whole’; the choice-of-court agreement grants jurisdiction to the courts of the Member State whose nationality a deceased spouse possessed at the time of the conclusion of the choice-of-law agreement; it provides the
jurisdiction of ‘the courts’ of a Member State (not ‘a court’).

En este libro se realiza un análisis comparado de la regulación de los acuerdos de elección de foro en el Convenio de La Haya de 2005 y en el Reglamento 1215/2012. El análisis parte de una serie de reflexiones sobre las ventajas que ofrecen en términos de previsibilidad y seguridad jurídica este tipo de acuerdos, para reflejar después los mecanismos existentes para proteger la eficacia de estos acuerdos frente a estrategias procesales, más o menos oportunistas, consistentes en acudir a tribunales distintos de los acordados. La obra prosigue con un análisis de cuándo debe aplicarse uno u otro instrumento internacional para regular los efectos de prórroga y derogación propios de este tipo de acuerdos, que se acompaña de referencias a  otros instrumentos internacionales que también pueden resultar relevantes, a fin de ofrecer una panorámica completa de su regulación. Tras ello, el lector encontrará un análisis detallado de los requisitos de forma y fondo que deben revestir los acuerdos de elección de foro para ser válidos, donde se ponen de manifiesto las similitudes y diferencias que presentan el Reglamento 1215/2012 y el Convenio de La Haya de 2005 a este respecto. En la última parte del libro se desarrolla pormenorizadamente cómo debe procederse en el caso de que, a pesar de existir un acuerdo de elección de foro, se hubiera iniciado el proceso ante unos tribunales distintos de los acordados. El análisis se detiene especialmente en la regla particular en materia de litispendencia que se ha introducido en el Reglamento 1215/2012, que difiere de la solución, más abierta y flexible, que se ofrece en el Convenio de La Haya, que también es objeto de estudio.

The Recast of the Brussels I Regulation (1215/2012/EC) reforms EU law on jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters and includes long-awaited changes designed to prevent the use of the abusive tactic known as the Italian Torpedo to frustrate choice-of-court agreements. The new rules give priority in determining jurisdiction to a court designated by a prima facie valid agreement, even if litigation underway elsewhere was first in time. While this development has been broadly welcomed, it is unclear if the Recast’s solution applies to related actions underway in other states as well as identical actions. Using a recent case from the Irish Supreme Court, in this article, we highlight that this possible omission could create significant problems, and calls into question the comprehensiveness of the Recast’s solution to the problem of the Italian Torpedo.

El art. 10 del Reglamento 2019/1111 supedita la elección de foro en materia de responsabilidad parental al cumplimiento de una serie de condiciones, que son objeto de análisis en este trabajo: el menor debe estar estrechamente relacionado con el Estados miembro, cuyos órganos jurisdiccionales son elegidos, en especial por alguna de las circunstancias que se enumeran en el propio precepto; es necesario el acuerdo de las partes, así como de cualquier otro titular de la responsabilidad parental, que debe hacerse cumpliendo unos determinados requisitos formales y temporales; y el ejercicio de la competencia debe responder al interés superior del menor. El trabajo toma como referencia el art. 12 del Reglamento 2201/2003 y la jurisprudencia del TJUE sobre este precepto, para explicar el sentido de los cambios que se introducen. Las relaciones entre las normas de competencia judicial internacional del Reglamento 2019/1111 y del Convenio de La Haya de 1996 también son objeto de análisis en este trabajo.

The acceptance by the EU of the Hague Convention of 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements will allow the entry into force of the Conventions since Mexico has already ratified it. In this work we deal with the fundamental issues of the Convention and also with the particularities linked to the participation in the Convention of the EU and its Member States

This article examines the recent significant ruling of the English Court of Appeal on jurisdiction to adjudicate upon a claim for damages for the tort/delict of inducing breach of an English exclusive choice of court agreement against a claimant’s legal advisers. The determination of the issue of jurisdiction hinges on whether England is the place where the economic loss occurred pursuant to Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation. It will be argued that the CJEU authorities on allocation of jurisdiction in tort/delict claims lend support to the conclusion that Germany was the place where the ‘harmful event’ occurred and the damage suffered was the cost and expense caused by the litigation, which was also suffered in Germany. Therefore, it is submitted that the veracity of the Court of Appeal’s decision may be verified by reference to established EU private international law rules of allocation of jurisdiction. A more pragmatic approach to the jurisdictional issue premised on the private law rights and obligations of the parties to the choice of court agreement may end up compromising these principles by according dubious jurisdictional precedence to the place where the indirect consequences of the economic loss occur. Moreover, if it was held that the English courts possess jurisdiction over the matter then the legality and legitimacy of the damages remedy in light of the principle of effectiveness of EU law (effet utile) and the principle of mutual trust would be implicated which may have necessitated a reassessment of Longmore LJ’s controversial decision in [2014] EWCA Civ 1010.

Διεθνής δικαιοδοσία σύμφωνα με τον Καν. 1215/2012: Θεμελίωση διεθνούς δικαιοδοσίας δυνάμει συνάφειας (λόγω παθητικής απλής ομοδικίας)∙ συμφωνία παρέκτασης.

Εφαρμοστέο δίκαιο στις συμβατικές ενοχές σύμφωνα με τον Καν. 593/2008: Ρήτρα επιλογής εφαρμοστέου δικαίου.

Un’indagine empirica condotta nell’ambito del progetto di ricerca di Ateneo «Il Business Network Internationalization Process nell’era digitale: una prospettiva integrata giuridico-economica» ha dimostrato la riluttanza delle piccole e medie imprese italiane, anche le più vocate all’internazionalizzazione, a instaurare legami forti e formali con i partner esteri. Le imprese considerano “rischiosa” la stipula di contratti scritti, da un lato, e mostrano scarso interesse alla predisposizione di strumenti di dispute resolution, dall’altro.
In realtà, nell’attuale scenario globale e ancor più in quello europeo la litigation è sempre più una questione di scelte strategiche su dove, quando e come promuovere una lite giudiziaria. Molto spesso le parti promuovono una causa davanti ai giudici di un Paese solo per impedire alla controparte di agire altrove, nella consapevolezza che l’esito del giudizio dipende fortemente dal foro adito e dalla legge applicabile. Per altro verso, rifuggendo dal contratto scritto l’impresa non si sottrae affatto al vincolo giuridico, in favore di un legame di altra natura, ma semplicemente rinuncia a dettare essa stessa la regolamentazione ritenuta più appropriata del rapporto giuridico comunque in essere con le controparti straniere; regolamentazione pattizia che può riguardare, per quanto qui interessa, anche la scelta del giudice davanti al quale proporre eventuali liti, attraverso le c.d. clausole di scelta del foro. Contrariamente a quello che pare essere il comune sentire, quindi, la mancata pattuizione di un accordo sul foro adeguatamente redatto non scongiura affatto il ricorso al giudice, ma semmai accentua i rischi di esito sfavorevole del contenzioso.
Il presente lavoro affronta questi delicati temi analizzando il quadro normativo, dettato dal regolamento (UE) n. 1215/2012 c.d. Bruxelles I-bis, nel quale essi devono necessariamente collocarsi, focalizzandosi in particolare sulla disciplina degli accordi di scelta del foro e testandone l’efficacia nelle situazioni di litispendenza. Si cercherà di illustrare come le norme vigenti diano alle parti ampio margine di manovra, consentendo così alle parti meglio attrezzate un approccio in termini di litigation strategy al problema del contenzioso cross-border.

Optional choice of court agreements, referred to in Australia as "non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements", feature in Australian court decisions. A clear distinction is drawn between exclusive choice of court agreements, on the one hand, and optional agreements, on the other. The principles applicable to exclusive agreements and the policies informing them are, however, better developed than those applicable to optional agreements. This chapter argues that the legal treatment of optional agreements under Australian law is deficient in multiple ways. Chief among them is that optional agreements nominating forum courts and optional agreements nominating foreign courts are treated inconsistently: at the time of writing in March 2018, in only one published case in which a forum court had been nominated in an optional agreement did an Australian court stay its proceedings. In no published case in which a foreign court had been nominated in an optional agreement did an Australian court stay its proceedings. There is also a marked difference in how judges perceive parties' intentions in concluding an optional agreement in intra-national as compared with international cases. In the former, an optional agreement is said to be "a strong indication" by the parties as to where litigation should occur; in the latter, it is said not to indicate any "preference" as to where litigation should occur.

Comment on the judgment of the Court of Justice (Third Chamber) of 12 November 2014, C-656/13, L v M: Reference for a preliminary ruling — Area of freedom, security and justice — Judicial cooperation in civil matters — Jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility — Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 — Article 12(3) — Child whose parents are not married — Prorogation of jurisdiction — No other related proceedings pending — Acceptance of jurisdiction — Challenge to the jurisdiction of a court by a party who has made an application to that court.

Non di rado una complessa transazione finanziaria, o commerciale, prende forma giuridica in distinti ma collegati contratti, ciascuno dei quali contenente la propria previsione sul giudice munito di competenza esclusiva. Accordi di scelta del foro siffatti, potenzialmente confliggenti, possono essere forieri di incertezze e difficoltà. Un caso di questo genere è al centro della battaglia giudiziale in corso tra la banca francese BNP Paribas s.a. e una società italiana. Quest’ultima ha incardinato in Italia una causa risarcitoria, per violazione di obblighi di legge o derivanti da un contratto di finanziamento stipulato con la banca, invocando l’accordo di elezione del foro torinese ivi contenuto. La banca, però, ha precedentemente promosso a Londra un’azione di accertamento negativo relativa al contratto Swap stipulato per coprire il detto finanziamento, facendo valere la clausola di scelta del foro inglese contenuta nel modello ISDA Master Agreement, ampiamente utilizzato dalla prassi finanziaria internazionale per la stipula di derivati.
In vicende complesse come questa, sempre più ricorrenti nella prassi giudiziaria, l’attribuzione di competenza esclusiva a giudici diversi solleva due ordini di problemi: da un lato, di interpretazione delle diverse clausole di elezione del foro, per definirne l’esatta portata materiale e stabilire, quindi, se esse si escludano a vicenda oppure siano effettivamente confliggenti; dall’altro lato, di efficace gestione dei procedimenti simultaneamente pendenti davanti ai fori putativamente designati. Da questo punto di vista, queste fattispecie sono un banco di prova per il nuovo meccanismo speciale di litispendenza istituito dall’art. 31 parr. 2 e 3 del regolamento (UE) n. 1215/2012 nell’intento di trovare un giusto equilibrio tra la prevenzione dei procedimenti paralleli e il rispetto della volontà delle parti.

This article deals  with the regulation of the derogatio fori in Spain after the amendment of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial (Judiciary Organization Act). The article focuses on the way Spanish tribunals should act to verify that the parties have agreed to submit the dispute to a foreign tribunal and that such agreement is valid from a formal and substative perspective, in order to stay the proccedings in Spain