Basic Human Needs

It is now widely understood that neoliberalism came to be entrenched in the legal systems of many states after the effective collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary order in the early 1970s. What is not widely understood, though, are the relations between this turn to neoliberalism and the contemporaneous success of international human rights movements. Many scholars now regard the 1970s as critical for the operational “breakthrough” of individualistic human rights. Yet work on the political economy of this “breakthrough,” especially its relation to the consolidation and concomitant normalization of neoliberalism, is still in its infancy. This article attempts to develop a finer understanding of the relationship between neoliberalism and human rights by examining the “North-South Commission,” chaired by former German Chancellor Willy Brandt during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Established with the aim of facilitating “dialogue” between the “First World” and the “Third World,” the Group of 7 and the Group of 77, the commission sought unsuccessfully to win support for a model of global political economy in which enhanced aid, lending, debt-relief, investment, and technology transfer would foster economic growth and meet “basic needs” in the South while countering inflation and unemployment in the North. While the commission’s work has generally been understood as a form of global Keynesianism, and is sometimes linked to the New International Economic Order project of the 1970s and early 1980s, I argue that the commission articulated a broadly rights-friendly form of economic development that accommodated certain elements of the neoliberal movement. 

This is my PhD thesis.  its an attempt to understand the forces that shaped the form of the Islamic traditional cities. The Islamic theory of the Basic Human Needs has its impact on the Islamic traditional cities forms. The thesis tries to understand the theory and find its applications in the contemporary urban forms. although the theory is about basic human needs, but it has never been presented as such. Maqasid Al sharia (Sharia Objectives) is the common name.

Needs theorists from various academic fields have suggested that intrapersonal and/or interpersonal conflicts stem from a depletion or threat to basic human needs (BHN). If all needs are met, peace is a natural consequence; if needs are not all met, conflict is the natural consequence. Based on a plethora of human needs research, I propose there are six core psychological needs ubiquitous to human beings, which I label the 6-Needs System: care, stimulation, significance, safety, self-determination, and progress. Once these core psychological needs are understood and examined, conflict resolution scholar-practitioners can more effectively analyze a conflict and construct the resolution processes.

One particular conflict resolution process, which became especially popular among those interested in BHN, is the Problem-Solving Working (PSW), which is a “Track II” or unofficial process. In this paper, I propose a list-building and brainstorming methodology that more pointedly applies BHN theory within the PSW framework. Should practitioners more adequately assess which needs in any particular conflict are being affected and how, there ought to be great benefit from a system which more directly focuses on addressing those specific needs within a larger conflict resolution process.

Foot argues that there are certain things that all human beings - perhaps all rational agents - need.  This gives a sense in which certain values and disvalues can be called 'objective'.  I suggest that, with certain relatively minor adjustments, her argument can be made cogent but that it cannot be used to show that there are objective answers to questions about what one should do when values conflict.  If Foot's own virtue ethics, utilitarianism, Kantian ethics or any other first-order moral system were to be established as objectively valid, this would require some completely different form of argumentation. 


Almost sixty years ago Philippa Foot published an article that began: To many people it seems that the most notable advance in moral philosophy during the past fifty years or so has been the refutation of naturalism; and they are a little shocked that at this late date such an issue should be reopened. It is easy to understand their attitude: given certain apparently unquestionable assumptions, it would be about as sensible to try to reintroduce naturalism as to try to square the circle. Those who see it like this have satisfied themselves that they know in advance that any naturalistic theory must have a catch in it somewhere, and are put out at having to waste more time exposing an old fallacy. This paper is an attempt to persuade them to look critically at the premises on which their arguments are based. 1 The paper in question was one of a number written by Foot around the time that were highly successful in reopening the issue of naturalism in ethics. Nowadays no one can just take it for granted that naturalism has been refuted, that there is a sharp distinction (or indeed any clear distinction) between fact and value or that it is impossible to derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. This is not to say that the naturalists have been completely victorious, of course; only that naturalism is today a live option. I shall argue that Foot's paper contains an important insight and an equally important mistake; and that the insight and the mistake are linked. I believe that the thinking behind it has influenced the subsequent course of moral philosophy to a quite remarkable extent and that this has been in some ways beneficial and in some ways harmful – not surprisingly, if I am right in seeing it as containing both truth and error. I do not want to exaggerate the influence of this one paper 2 but I do not know of any other that so neatly encapsulates the coupled insight and mistake. The anti-naturalism that Foot is attacking she characterises as follows: It would not be an exaggeration to say that the whole of moral philosophy, as it is now widely taught, rests on a contrast between statements of fact and evaluations, which runs something like this: The truth or falsity of statements of fact is shewn by means of evidence; and what counts as evidence is laid down in the meaning of the expressions occurring in the statement of fact … It follows that no two people can make the same statement and count completely different things as evidence; in the end one at least of them could be convicted of linguistic ignorance. It also follows that if a man is given good evidence for a factual conclusion he cannot just refuse to accept the conclusion on the ground that in his scheme of things this evidence is not evidence at all. 3 But, on the view she is criticising, [w]ith evaluations, however, it is different. An evaluation is not connected logically with the factual statements on which it is based. One man may say that a thing is good because of some fact about it, and another may refuse to take that fact as any evidence, for nothing is laid down in the meaning of 'good' which connects it with one piece of 'evidence' rather than another. It follows that a moral eccentric could argue to moral conclusions from quite idiosyncratic premises; he could say, for instance, that a man was a good man because he clasped and unclasped his hands and never turned NNE after

Almost sixty years ago Philippa Foot published an article that began: To many people it seems that the most notable advance in moral philosophy during the past fifty years or so has been the refutation of naturalism; and they are a little shocked that at this late date such an issue should be reopened. It is easy to understand their attitude: given certain apparently unquestionable assumptions, it would be about as sensible to try to reintroduce naturalism as to try to square the circle. Those who see it like this have satisfied themselves that they know in advance that any naturalistic theory must have a catch in it somewhere, and are put out at having to waste more time exposing an old fallacy. This paper is an attempt to persuade them to look critically at the premises on which their arguments are based. 1 The paper in question was one of a number written by Foot around the time that were highly successful in reopening the issue of naturalism in ethics. Nowadays no one can just take it for granted that naturalism has been refuted, that there is a sharp distinction (or indeed any clear distinction) between fact and value or that it is impossible to derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. This is not to say that the naturalists have been completely victorious, of course; only that naturalism is today a live option. I shall argue that Foot's paper contains an important insight and an equally important mistake; and that the insight and the mistake are linked. I believe that the thinking behind it has influenced the subsequent course of moral philosophy to a quite remarkable extent and that this has been in some ways beneficial and in some ways harmful – not surprisingly, if I am right in seeing it as containing both truth and error. I do not want to exaggerate the influence of this one paper 2 but I do not know of any other that so neatly encapsulates the coupled insight and mistake. The anti-naturalism that Foot is attacking she characterises as follows: It would not be an exaggeration to say that the whole of moral philosophy, as it is now widely taught, rests on a contrast between statements of fact and evaluations, which runs something like this: The truth or falsity of statements of fact is shewn by means of evidence; and what counts as evidence is laid down in the meaning of the expressions occurring in the statement of fact … It follows that no two people can make the same statement and count completely different things as evidence; in the end one at least of them could be convicted of linguistic ignorance. It also follows that if a man is given good evidence for a factual conclusion he cannot just refuse to accept the conclusion on the ground that in his scheme of things this evidence is not evidence at all. 3 But, on the view she is criticising, [w]ith evaluations, however, it is different. An evaluation is not connected logically with the factual statements on which it is based. One man may say that a thing is good because of some fact about it, and another may refuse to take that fact as any evidence, for nothing is laid down in the meaning of 'good' which connects it with one piece of 'evidence' rather than another. It follows that a moral eccentric could argue to moral conclusions from quite idiosyncratic premises; he could say, for instance, that a man was a good man because he clasped and unclasped his hands and never turned NNE after

This article presents an original needs-based partial theory of human injustice and shows its relationship to existing theories of human need and human liberation. The theory is based on an original typology of three social structural sources of human injustice, a partial theorization of the mechanisms of human injustice, and a needs-based theorization of the nature of human injustice, as experienced by individuals. This article makes a sociological contribution to normative social theory by clarifying the relationship of human injustice to human needs, human rights, and human liberation. The theory contends that human injustice is produced when oppression, mechanistic dehumanization, and exploitation create systematic inequality in opportunities to address human needs, leading to wrongful need deprivation and the resulting serious harm. In one longer sentence, this needs-based theory of the sources, mechanisms, and nature of human injustice contends that three distinct social syste...

This entry aims to acquaint the reader with the diverse conceptualizations of well-being and human needs theory in development. Section 1 will cover the origins of well-being as a concept in development. Section 2 presents the central theoretical approaches to well-being, the most central classifications and new trends in conceptualization. Section 3 examines the human needs discourse and shows why and how an account of human needs can be interpreted as an approach to well-being. The conclusion presents three issues, which should be researched further in development ethics: securing well-being over time, the social dimensions of well-being, and the interconnectedness of elements of well-being. Author information

This edited volume examines Basic Human Needs (BHNs) theory in terms of theory and practice by examining new concepts and recent developments to determine how BHNs has been affecting the post-Cold War conflict and peacebuilding efforts as well as contemporary conflicts of the twenty-first century. The volume provides a comprehensive overview of the core concepts, theories, approaches, processes, and intervention designs about Human Needs theory in the conflict resolution field. The main theme is the analysis of HNs theory with multidisciplinary approaches. The book moves from the study of theoretical and analytical approaches for explaining the deep-rooted causes of conflict with HNs theory to HNs-based third-party intervention approaches to resolving and transforming conflict.

Addressing the continuous need for new growth sectors in post-industrial cities, this book considers the economic significance of wellness from a development policy perspective. The author goes beyond personal health discourse to conceptualise wellness as an emerging industry, presenting empirical cases of community, attraction, and export-orientated strategies around the world. Combining holistic health, urban governance and economic development, this book will provide valuable reading for those studying policy, tourism and the wellness sector as well as business entrepreneurs within this evolving industry.

One of the central claims of democratic theory is that the institutional features of democracy systematically cause government to respond to the people’s needs. In fact, however, democracy might logically be expected to be especially responsive only to the people’s desires, not their needs. Responses to people’s objective needs can be substantially different from responses to their subjective desires. Democratic institutions therefore cannot guarantee (and may even hamper) responsiveness to basic human needs. Democracy, should, at least in principle, thus be confined to the sphere of wants rather than needs.

Dacă în primii ani de viață ai individului uman, procesul de învățare este preponderent dat de trăirile, experiențele de viață și interacțiunea sa cu ceilalți semnificativi, ulterior procesul de școlarizare ajută persoana să învețe într-un mediu dirijat/controlat, prin metode didactice specifice procesului de învățare. Parcurgerea traseului școlar, urmată ulterior de formarea profesionala continuă asigură individului o adaptare și evoluție treptată, atât pe plan personal, cât și în plan social. [...]

The traditional approach of landscape architecture has always focused on the aesthetic and visual aspects of landscapes while giving less attention to other aspects. This view has limited the benefits that can be derived from designed landscapes, despite the wide-ranging potential they carry for humans; socially, environmentally and economically. As a result, many researchers and practitioners are currently challenging this view to develop a more holistic and multidimensional approach. The present research therefore aims at proposing a new perspective for public designed landscapes based on fundamental human needs. The study methodology was comprised of critical content analysis for three main domains: sustainable development, human needs in specific relation to public landscapes, and significant approaches to fundamental human needs. Reconciliation among these domains was achieved based on a modified version of Max-Neef’s matrix of fundamental human needs. Human needs in public landscapes were merged into the matrix to reach a comprehensive yet specific perspective. The study concluded with a conceptual framework that can provide a wider perspective to human needs in designed landscapes. It proposes a new tool for the analysis of the benefits of public landscapes and their value for humans, which can be further used in various applications.

This article presents an original needs-based partial theory of human injustice and shows its relationship to existing theories of human need and human liberation. The theory is based on an original typology of three social structural sources of human injustice, a partial theorization of the mechanisms of human injustice, and a needs-based theorization of the nature of human injustice, as experienced by individuals. This article makes a sociological contribution to normative social theory by clarifying the relationship of human injustice to human needs, human rights, and human liberation. The theory contends that human injustice is produced when oppression , mechanistic dehumanization, and exploitation create systematic inequality in opportunities to address human needs, leading to wrongful need deprivation and the resulting serious harm. In one longer sentence, this needs-based theory of the sources, mechanisms, and nature of human injustice contends that three distinct social systemic sources-oppression, mechanistic dehumanization, and exploitation produce unique and/or overlapping social mechanisms, which create

The subject matter elaborated in this paper is human right to water, from both international and national legal standpoints. The scope of the paper is limited to respective international law developments and the national legal sistems of the countries of the South Easter Europe (SEE). The paper contains a brief review of a current state of thisngs regarding and access to safe drunking water and providing of basic asnitary conditions in the world, core features of UNGA Resolution 64/292 which has recognized the human right ot water and sanitation, a historic review of the legal provisions in the SEE countries regarding freedom of general use of water, and finally a short indication of the relations between state sovereignty and human right to water. In concluding part of the paper the authors point out a potential need of the SEE countries to revisit the realisation of the human right to water guarantied to their citizens in their legal system and to broaden the guarantied realisation of that human right up to full scope and content.

In this article the author reviews needs theory as a field of research and scholarship, examines seven needs theories (including Nussbaum's capabilities approach), and synthesizes elements of all of these into a list he used tentatively and speculatively to analyze two common instructional practices in music education. The author's intent is to give an idea of how needs theory might be applied, not to prescribe specific practices. It speaks to the need for a more reflective practice in music education on all levels. By providing ways to understand student resistance and to imagine practices that are more acceptable, needs theory has helped him explore alternatives to various institutionalized practices. Used this way, in the spirit in which it was conceived, needs theory is a potentially useful tool, a way of directing teachers and policy-makers away from habitual adherence to institutionalized standards and methods, and towards cooperative efforts with students, parents, an...

Despite a considerable amount of research over the last three decades, an unequivocal conclusion regarding democracy’s impact on social outcomes has not been reached. This paper attempts to enhance understanding of the impact of political regimes on social outcomes by applying a dimensional approach. Unlike previous studies, which have focused on the overall effect of democracy, this paper separates the dimension of elite competition from the dimension of popular participation and tests their relative effects on the satisfaction of basic needs. Cross-national statistical tests demonstrate that effective participation has a positive effect on need satisfaction, whereas excessive competition has a negative impact. Theoretical explanations of these different impacts are provided. It is argued that the best way to understand the relationship between democracy and social outcomes is to realize that democracy’s overall effect might conceal the existence of opposing effects of its component parts. This finding suggests more nuanced ways of reforming political systems that bypass the possible trade-off between democratization and social development.

This study employs a qualitative approach to inform the development of effective Roma inclusion policies and programs in Bulgaria. The Roma are currently among the least integrated minority group in Bulgaria. This study investigates the key factors and mechanisms that promote or inhibit social inclusion of the Roma with the wider Bulgarian society by examining their social norms, agency, and strategic life choices from a gender perspective. The study pursues three research questions to deepen the understanding of Roma communities and their inclusion. These are: (i) what are the key gender-related social norms that influence agency in the Roma communities included in the research, and how do they vary across and within these communities?; (ii) what does agency mean in respect to making strategic life choices, and how does if differ in terms of women and men, and across the communities?; and (iii) what can be drawn from understanding of norms, agency, and life choices that can inform ...

Представлен ряд понятийных конструкций (концептов-медиаторов): габитусы (П. Бурдье), понятые как комплексы управляющих поведением установок, вызовы и ответы (А. Тойнби), интерактивные ритуалы с эмоциями и символами (традиция Дюркгейма – Гофмана – Коллинза), со-стояния комфорта и дискомфорта с принципами оперантного обусловливания (Б. Ф. Скиннер), структуры взаимодействий (отношения, группы, организации, движения), функциональная модель (А. Стинчкомб) и ее расширения, а также охватывающие среды экономических и социальных обменов, коммуникаций (Дж. Хоманс, П. Блау), включающие рынки, дискурсы и сети. Отождествление ключевых понятий в этих концептах позволяет получить богатую и гибкую конструкцию, предназначенную для формулирования теоретических гипотез, эмпирическая проверка которых становится возможной благодаря накопленному опыту исследований по каждому концепту в связующем ряде.

The article presents a number of notional frameworks (concepts-mediators): habitus (P. Bourdieu), challenges and responses (A. Toynbee); interactive rituals with emotions and symbols (the tradition of Durkheim-Hoffman-Collins); the comfort and discomfort with the principles of operant conditioning (B. Skinner); the structures of interactions (relationships, group, organization , movement); the functional model (A. Stinchcombe), and its extensions, as well as covering spheres of economic and social exchanges and communication (J. Homans, P. Blau), including economic and social markets, discourses and networks. The equation of the key concepts of these mediators provides a rich and flexible structure designed for the formulation of theoretical hypotheses. The article presents a number of notional frameworks (concepts-media-
tors): habitus (P. Bourdieu), challenges and responses (A. Toynbee); interactive rituals with emotions and symbols (the tradition of Durkheim-Hoffman-Collins); the comfort and discomfort with the principles of operant conditioning (B. Skinner); the structures of interactions (relationships, group, organization, movement); the functional model (A. Stinchcombe), and its extensions, as well as covering spheres of economic and social exchanges and communication
(J. Homans, P. Blau), including economic and social markets, discourses and networks. The equation of the key concepts of these mediators provides a rich and flexible structure designed for the formulation of theoretical hypotheses and their empirical testing which becomes possible due to the accumulated experience of studies of every concept in the linking chain.

The present study explores the sources and consequences of fulfilling six fundamental human needs, namely Autonomy, Relatedness, Competence, Stimulation, Influence, and Security, through using interactive products and media. Each need refers to a distinct set of issues, such as according product attributes (e.g., "flexibility") and experiential consequences (e.g., "freedom of choice"). Besides the need-specific content, which helps to characterize and differentiate user experiences, the study reveals the close relation between needs and according product attributes as their mirror images.

Abstract. The present study explores the sources and consequences of fulfilling six fundamental human needs, namely Autonomy, Relatedness, Competence, Stimulation, Influence, and Security, through using interactive products and media. Each need refers to a distinct set of issues, such as according product attributes (eg," flexibility") and experiential consequences (eg," freedom of choice"). Besides the need-specific content, which helps to characterize and differentiate user experiences, the study reveals the close relation ...

In 1941 the mathematician Luigi Fantappiè discovered that the negative solution of the fundamental equations of the universe which unite quantum mechanics and special relativity and which physicists had rejected as impossible, describes a world made of matter and energy which move backwards in time. By listing the mathematical properties of this solution Fantappiè was faced with the mysterious properties of life and came to the conclusion that life is caused by attractors which retroact from the future.

The theory of vital needs starts from the assumption that life originates at the quantum level of matter, but when it grows into the macroscopic level it conflicts with the law of entropy that leads to the destruction of any form of organization. Living systems would be in a constant state of struggle with the law of entropy and, in order to survive, several conditions must be met, for example material conditions such as drinking, food, shelter, and intangible conditions such as the need for meaning and the need for cohesion and love. These conditions are vital, since when they are not met the living system dies.

When a vital need is met only partially an alarm bell is triggered. For example, when the need for water is unsatisfied thirst is felt and when the need for food is unfulfilled hunger is felt. The same applies for intangible needs, for example, depression is the alarm bell which has the function to inform that the vital need for meaning is not met and anguish and anxiety are the alarm bells which tell that the vital need for cohesion and love is unsatisfied.

The theory of vital needs, describes and explain material needs (food, water, housing and hygiene) and postulates the existence of immaterial needs such as the need for meaning and the need for love, which would be as vital and important as material needs. In addition, it postulates the existence of attractors which guide life and individuals to evolve towards goals. When our life is not oriented towards the attractor depression, anxiety and anguish arise and, at the broader level of society, economic and social crises take place.

The theory of vital needs identifies a series of principles which help in the development of effective and efficient policies which can increase welfare and at the same time reduce costs and debts.