Asian security

This essay proposes a new theoretical framework for analyzing the rise of China and its impact on Asian security order. While the rise of China is reshaping Asia's military balance, the region has also witnessed equally important and longer-term changes, especially economic interdependence, multilateral institutions and domestic politics. The implications of these changes are not fully accounted for by the different types of security orders proposed by analysts to describe the implications of China's rise, such as anarchy, hierarchy, hegemony, concert, and community. This essay presents an alternative conceptualization of Asian security order, termed consociational security order (CSO) that draws from different theoretical lenses: defensive realism, institutionalism, and especially consociational theory in comparative politics. Specifying the conditions that make a CSO stable or unstable, the essay then examines the extent to which these conditions can be found in Asia today. Aside from offering a distinctive framework for analyzing China's rise, the CSO framework also offers an analytic device for policymakers and analysts in judging trends and directions in Asian security.

Wspólnota Niepodległych Państw, aby zagwarantować własne bezpieczeństwo, podjęła inicjatywę powołującą do życia Organizację Układu o Bezpieczeństwie Zbiorowym. Autorzy artykułu zapoznają czytelników z jej głównymi celami oraz zadaniami. Zwracają uwagę na podejmowane inicjatywy zbliżenia z NATO. Jednocześnie materiał pozwala poznać historię i dotychczasowe osiągnięcia organizacji we
współpracy wojskowej.

The Commonwealth of Independent States, in order to guarantee its own security, established the Collective Security Treaty Organization. The writers acknowledge the readers with its main objectives and tasks. They also point to other initiatives about closer relations with NATO. The article also recalls some history and achievements of the organization in military cooperation.

This chapter provides an overview of the India-Pakistan relationship in three parts. First, it examines the historical roots of the India–Pakistan rivalry, which include identity-based differences, territorial conflict, external great-power involvement, and domestic politics within both countries. Second, it studies the contemporary dynamics of the relationship in terms of economic capabilities, military capabilities, and societal perceptions. Finally, by way of  conclusion, it assesses the future trajectory of the relationship based on contemporary trends. In particular, it asks what conditions would need to hold in order for peace to break out between India and Pakistan.

Since the 2008–2009 financial crisis, the international community has witnessed an escalation of the U.S.-China rivalry. Moreover, the present-day COVID-19 pandemic, which began in China in late 2019, seems to have transformed the two great powers’ strategic and economic rivalry into an ideological one. Such intensification of the U.S.-China rivalry is likely to bear largely on the world community, as did the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Reflecting on these circumstances for our 2020 issue, seven strategic thinkers scrutinize various dimensions of the U.S.-China rivalry and share their insights.

Min Ye closely examines central discourses regarding the U.S.-China rivalry in the academic and policy communities, such as the Thucydides Trap, clash of civilizations, and divided peace. Based on her critical assessment of such preexisting approaches, she provides an alternative lens on the roles domestic and international agencies have played in reducing tensions between the two superpowers. While presenting the detailed empirical evidence of the increasing China-Russia military cooperation, Lyle Goldstein and Vitaly Kozyrev offer a number of practical policy recommendations for U.S. national security to deter the strengthening of China-Russia military ties and maintain a certain level of cooperation with the two nations on such global issues as climate change and nuclear non-proliferation. Krista Wiegand and Hayoun Ryou-Ellison analyze U.S. and Chinese strategies concerning the South China Sea through an international law framework, illuminating that both powers have often utilized their own legal interpretations to support their claims on the area, as opposed to simply resorting to military force. By exploring policy positions of Israel, one of America’s closest allies, vis-à-vis the U.S. and China, Zhiqun Zhu reveals a common dilemma that many world nations have faced—i.e. they want to work with both great powers for their security and economic interests, rather than choosing either the U.S. or China, but the rising U.S.-China rivalry tends to force the latter option. Dawn Murphy thoroughly traces the evolution of U.S.-China economic competition during the Trump administration, implying that it might be difficult for the current trend to get reversed considering the transition of economic rivalry to strategic and ideological realms after the COVID-19 pandemic. On top of these scholarly articles, four Norwich University students—John Hickey, Shayla Moya, Kathryn Preul, and Faith Privett—explain America’s foreign policy blunders in Afghanistan utilizing the Just War theory. They also suggest political, economic, and military approaches that could bring stability in conflict-stricken Eastern Ukraine.

Southeast Asia is arming massively. In the past decade, military spending by the region’s states has risen by 57 percent on average. China’s increasingly aggressive behaviour in the Pacific is frequently cited as the trigger for this leap in arms purchases. However, as this study will show, domestic and foreign-policy factors other than the ‘China factor’ have also been decisive for the increase: lasting territorial conflicts, domestic militant revolutionary movements and the powerful political influence of the military. Even if no direct link can be shown to exist between an arms race and an increasing likelihood of violent conflict breaking out, this does not mean that Southeast Asia is gaining in stability through the current arms build-up. On the contrary, the quantitative and qualitative expansion of military capacities has increased both threat perceptions and distrust in the region. In this context, Germany and many of its European neighbours would be well-advised to rethink their role as central arms suppliers to Southeast Asia more strategically and critically. Germany and the EU currently view the arms trade with Southeast Asian customers primarily from an economic perspective. What is needed, however, is a political and strategic discourse on the impact of their arms exports.

Overlapping sovereignty claims at sea constitute one of the major sources of diplomatic tensions in East Asia, with repercussions for the security environment in the broader Asia Pacific. Given the importance of the region’s maritime realm for the functioning of the global economy, any instability caused by the possible escalation of these disputes also poses a threat to Europe, a major trading partner, which relies on its sea lines of communication (SLOCs) for the export and import of goods. The three concrete cases addressed in this report include the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea – administered by Japan and laid claim to separately by the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan); the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands in the Japan Sea/East Sea – administered by South Korea and claimed by Japan; and the Southern Kurils/Northern Territories in the Sea of Okhotsk – administered by the Russian Federation and claimed by Japan.

The re-emergence of the Indo-Pacific as a strategic concept guiding the foreign policies of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India—the so-called Quad—has raised concerns in Southeast Asia about ASEAN becoming less central in a region increasingly at risk of being dominated by dynamics reminiscent of the Cold War. However, one Quad member—India—is pushing for a more inclusive Indo-Pacific, one that would include both China and ASEAN. India’s different approach stems from New Delhi’s need to ‘manage’ Beijing through a mix of economic and diplomatic cooperation on the one hand and military deterrence on the other. Consequently, the Indo-Pacific as the conceptual basis for a potential China-focused containment strategy makes little sense to Indian policymakers. Instead, they prefer to dilute the threat to Beijing by involving more states in key regional discussions, and ASEAN is a logical candidate. However, Southeast Asian states looking for a major power that can support Washington’s declining ability to underwrite regional order cannot rely on New Delhi, which still pursues an ingrained foreign policy of strategic autonomy.

The Geopolitics of East Asia:
New Geometries of Competition and Cooperation

The present study aims to develop an analysis of how the fast-changing geopolitics and geoeconomics of East Asia impacts current and potential trends in cross-regional economic cooperation, with a focus on Latin America. The paper revolves around three anchor trends: i. The Economic Transformation of East Asia; ii. Security and Cooperation in the Pacific; and iii. Mega-Agreements. For each of these areas, the study provides a succinct yet analytical overview of current debates by incorporating both Western and non-Western perspectives from academe and policy.
East Asia finds itself at a crossroads. Along with its transformation and emergence as the new economic powerhouse, new sources of uncertainty are emerging, as are novel patterns of cooperation. China remains the central element shaping the region’s economic, political and security dynamics, but it is by no means the only important actor. The ways in which China opts to interact with other states within the region—and, conversely, the response of Asian actors to China’s continuing rise—shapes patterns of cooperation, competition, and contestation in the region that reach far beyond the area conventionally known as East Asia.
The three anchor trends analyzed provide the basis for three prospective scenarios, in which different configurations of power are laid out for East Asia over the next two decades. The first entails regional hegemony by China; the second, regional bipolarity with China and Japan as the main actors; and the third, regional multipolarity marked by shifting centers of gravity and changing alignments. In turn, each of these scenarios has a particular set of implications for Latin American actors, from states to private sector firms and non-governmental organizations.
The complexity of the scenarios prompt more questions than allow for fixed conclusions. These changing geometries of competition and cooperation in East Asia (and more broadly, in Asia as a whole) are important to Latin American actors not only because they will shape opportunities in trade and investment, but also because new sectors and market niches will open up (or, in some cases, close down). The paper intends to launch deeper debates about how East Asia’s rapidly changing landscape of power may translate into opportunities and challenges for Latin America. It thus closes with a set of key questions for further discussion and research as follows:
How does Latin America view the interests and cooperation styles of their Asian counterparts, and how do they understand the relevance of the geopolitical and geoeconomic transformations in shaping ties between Latin America and East Asia?

East Asian states infrequently seek peaceful dispute resolution through binding methods of international law. What is puzzling is why states seek one particular dispute resolution method or another, and in the specific case of the Philippines, why the government chose to pursue arbitration against China regarding the maritime boundaries of the disputed Spratly Islands, knowing that China would not agree to participate. In this article, we theorize that the Philippine government chose to pursue arbitration against China for three strategic reasons: 1) to counterbalance China’s military actions in the South China Sea, 2) because of the strong benefits to the state resulting from using arbitration, and 3) the probability of winning the case using arbitration was perceived by the Philippines as strong. To test our hypotheses, we use interviews and process tracing, through which we find evidence for our suppositions, primarily the last hypothesis.

Although the US and its Western allies had long relationship with Africa in various categories of aid and development, China’s recent entry into the Dark Continent caused huge displeasure to the traditional donors. The Asian giant’s economic investment in Africa was so huge that it engaged scholars to analyze the trend from various perspectives including politics, economics, commerce, governance, human rights as well as security. The move also became an awakening or a reawakening for the US and its think tank in that, with the magnitude of rich resources under its soil, Africa is to be redefined in a more appealing fashion very unlike the Dark Continent the West had misinterpreted it for calculated hidden interests. It is based on this background that this study problematises the nature of the competition between the two giants and the implications it may hold for Africa.

La forte dynamique d’acquisition d’équipements militaires observable en Asie depuis plus de dix ans est généralement perçue comme une course aux armements. La région compte, il est vrai, les premières économies mondiales avec les Etats-Unis, une Chine portée par une croissance évoluant entre 6,5 et 7%, le Japon, l’Inde et la Corée du Sud (1). Ces pays consacrent une large part de leurs revenus à leur sécurité. Selon les chiffres du rapport annuel Jane’s Defense Budget publié le 18 décembre 2017 (2), les Etats-Unis représentent un volume de 40% des dépenses militaires mondiales avec un budget de défense de 642 milliards de dollars, suivis par la Chine et l’Inde avec, respectivement, 192 et 52 milliards de dollars. Le Japon occupe pour sa part la 8e place avec 44 milliards de dollars et la Corée du Sud la 10e place avec 34 milliards de dollars. Pour leur part, le Vietnam et l’Indonésie ont plus que doublé leurs dépenses de défense entre 2005 et 2015 (3). Ces budgets relativement élevés et la recherche de la sécurité par des voies militaires ne sont pourtant pas le reflet de sociétés « en armes », même si, dans certains pays, les élites militaires sont très proches des cercles du pouvoir (Thaïlande, Myanmar, Indonésie, Corée du Nord). On peut y voir l’existence d’un dilemme de sécurité sur lequel on peut s’interroger, mais aussi une culture stratégique marquée par une approche réaliste des relations internationales privilégiant défense de la souveraineté, logiques de puissance et compétition interétatiques.

This article traces East Asia's evolving multilateralisms and role in transitioning East Asia away from "US hub-and-spokes" bilateralism toward a more networked system of security arrangements. Drawing on the English School, it argues for revisiting multilateralism's diplomatic foundations as a way to direct attention to (1) the practice's region-specific content and (2) the ways that multilateralism has introduced system-transitioning changes that include system-level dynamics associated with membership, actor hood, and the types of security at stake. The result is a more complex security environment and normative context that calls for more multifaceted responses from all, including the United States and China whose current multilateral diplomacies both draw from and challenge the multilateral norms and practices that have been created. Theoretically, re-attention to multilateralism's diplomatic foundations also offers the English School an opportunity to make more distinctive contributions to ongoing debates about East Asia's networking processes and security arrangements.

There is a growing view that the emerging brand of Chinese regional diplomacy in recent years is increasingly assertive. This article attempts to make better sense of this perceived more forceful Chinese diplomacy. It argues that Chinese regional behavior is more profitably understood through the lens of a two-pronged foreign policy strategy that combines two particular aspects. One is a tougher and more uncompromising approach toward issues that China regards as concerning its core interests. The other is a more flexible and cooperative position
toward interests that, while significant, are of secondary importance.

The mini-thesis is an independent geo-strategic analysis of (ongoing) Taiwan - China frictions--which was due to being awarded a Fellowship by Taiwan, ROC, Ministry of Foreign Affairs during 2018. The thesis comprises a short history of Taiwan and China in relation to  the machinations; a discussion of the way in which a war will break out; the 'type' of war that will take place; and crucially, a forecast of when (and why) it will happen.

In the wake of North Korea's progressive missile testing that set even the usually stoic Japanese people into a panic mode, Japan has found itself at the mercy of its former enemies. In an ironic twist of fate, Tokyo's security outlooks seem to have become hostage to the strategic calculations of its fiercest nemesis in the past. This paper asks whether Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's desire for constitutional change is precipitated mainly by the resurgence of Japanese nationalist sentiments as what many of his critics claim, or if there are genuinely rational justifications for revising the country's 72-year old Constitution. And if so, why has it been so elusive for many Japanese leaders? Using neoclassical realism theory, I analyze the structural contexts and domestic intervening variables that simultaneously drive and prevent the realization of constitutional change in Japan. I argue that state leaders like Abe and those who have come before him have always been prone to acquiring flawed and inaccurate perceptions of the systemic stimuli; susceptible to making irrational and unsound decisions; and ineffective at mobilizing the national resources demanded by their preferred policies and strategies. Thus, despite having rational justifications, the quest for constitutional change has remained elusive for many Japanese leaders. Success will require Abe to carefully harmonize domestic and international expectations; prudently balance Japan's benign security intentions and hawkish military strategies; and shift away from his pragmatic-ambivalent style of domestic politics.

Why do hedging strategies appear so pervasive in Asia? This article argues that hedging – not balancing or bandwagoning – is the central tendency in Asian international relations, offering three different lenses for making sense of this phenomenon, focusing in particular on the third: power transition theory, mistrust under multipolarity, and complex networks. Each perspective highlights different factors that explain the incentives for Asian states to hedge, what hedging looks like, and how long hedging is likely to endure. Power transition theory tells us that hedging is the result of uncertainty about a possible power transition between the United States and China. Multipolarity points us to uncertainty about the intentions of a growing number of states. And the logic of complex networks explains hedging as a response to the topology of Asia's complex network structure – consisting of sensitivity, fluidity, and heterarchy – which makes it difficult for Asian-foreign policy elites to assess the future consequences of present day commitments.

This essay proposes a new theoretical framework for analyzing the rise of China and its impact on Asian security order. While the rise of China is reshaping Asia's military balance, the region has also witnessed equally important and longer-term changes, especially economic interdependence, multilateral institutions and domestic politics. The implications of these changes are not fully accounted for by the different types of security orders proposed by analysts to describe the implications of China's rise, such as anarchy, hierarchy, hegemony, concert, and community. This essay presents an alternative conceptualization of Asian security order, termed consociational security order (CSO) that draws from different theoretical lenses: defensive realism, institutionalism, and especially consociational theory in comparative politics. Specifying the conditions that make a CSO stable or unstable, the essay then examines the extent to which these conditions can be found in Asia today. Aside from offering a distinctive framework for analyzing China's rise, the CSO framework also offers an analytic device for policymakers and analysts in judging trends and directions in Asian security.

While there has been much discussion about China’s openly aggressive behavior in the South China Sea (SCS), these potential gray zone actions in the IOR deserve attention and can have long-term strategic implications for IOR littoral states in South and Southeast Asia.

This thesis uses articles from Chinese and Indian defense publications to analyze how the Chinese People’s Liberation Army-Navy and the Indian Navy view each other’s modernization. This thesis argues that the Chinese and Indian Navies view each other’s development through defensive realism and will take steps in accordance to their view of development. This thesis predicts that the Indians will focus on developing a navy that can defeat the PLA-N in Indian dominated waters, while the PLA-N will develop anti-submarine assets and refueling assets to counter the Indian nuclear triad, which according my analysis of the Chinese defense press, is the part of the Indian Navy that the Chinese Navy views as the biggest menace of the Indian Navy to Chinese survival.

This chapter examines the drivers behind the remarkable upswing in India–Japan relations over the last two decades. It does so primarily from the Indian perspective, asking what factors have driven the India–Japan rapprochement. Contrary to the claims of many scholars and analysts, its main driving forces are subtle, longterm, and less glamorous than the so-called containment of China (though it is certainly driven by the threat of a rising China). Based on the framework offered in the introduction to this volume, this chapter discusses if India’s growing alignment with Japan is an effort of balancing against China or if it should rather be understood as part of a more mixed strategy of cooperation and confrontation toward China.

This special issue of Asia Policy scrutinizes the Indo-U.S. strategic partnership by examining the prospects for bilateral cooperation in Asia. Although peacetime foreign policy collaboration between major powers is a rarity, China’s rapid rise in the international system appears to have forced the United States and India into unusually close consultation on regional security issues. Will this consultation mature into active cooperation? To answer this question, this introductory essay first examines the concept of strategic partnership—a nebulous type of political relationship that has proliferated since the end of the Cold War. It then highlights the obstacles to peacetime cooperation between major powers in other regions of the world. Following this, attention turns to the articles in this special issue, which examine the history of Indo-U.S. cooperation in various subregions of Asia. Collectively, these articles challenge misperceptions and misunderstandings of each country’s policies and past behavior, as well as identify the differing understandings they have of both the bilateral relationship and the region. Taken together, they provide a clearer sense of the geopolitical scope and depth, as well as the important limitations, of the Indo-U.S. strategic partnership. This essay concludes by identifying the key insights that come from this collection and offers some thoughts on the overall trajectory of bilateral relations.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Bilateral Indo-U.S. cooperation in Asia is often hindered by an “absent dialogue” between the two sides, highlighting the need for constant communication between officials in both countries.
Although there is an apparent congruence of interests in the countries’ regional and foreign policy objectives, sustaining and developing the Indo-U.S. strategic partnership will require considerable attention and imagination.
India and the United States urgently need to focus on developing infrastructure and enhancing connectivity in Asia.

Policy Report; Page 5-10;
This article highlights Taiwan’s diversification strategy to overcome economic and political challenges from
China. Concerns over economic reliance on China and Taiwan’s geostrategic location are the main drivers for
this strategy (Taiwan News, September 17, 2020). It concludes with initial thoughts on establishing a trade pact
in the Asia-Pacific region to counter China’s unilateral economic sanctions.

Policy Report;

In recent years, three major protests took place along
mainland China’s immediate periphery: most recently the Hong Kong anti-extradition bill protests in 2019, as well as the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong and the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan, both in 2014. Slogans such as “Today Hong Kong, Tomorrow Taiwan” (今日香港，明日台灣) and “Hong Kong and Taiwan, we are together” (香港台灣，我們在一起) were frequently heard among activists in these movements and were widely reported on in the media. They became common reference points in the broader political discourse about the future of China’s relations with Hong Kong and Taiwan and Taiwan-Hong Kong ties. This report offers a brief comparative and contemporary analysis of the role that social movements play in the Taiwan-Hong Kong-China triangle. Based on academic survey results, news articles, and public statements, this study offers a preliminary argument for explaining how identity narratives in Taiwan and Hong Kong emerged and converged in recent years. Furthermore, it examines the demonstration effects in Taiwan and Hong Kong on one another in terms of political mobilization and narrative framing strategy. Additionally, it contends that the convergence of political discourse in Taiwan and Hong Kong is significantly challenging the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) legitimacy. It concludes by outlining the implications of these movements for US, Taiwan, and Chinese foreign policy in Asia and beyond.

The end of the Western military presence in Central Asia will mean the West’s influence on the security sphere in the region will be marginalised and it will also actually withdraw from the geopolitical rivalry. With regard to the architecture of security, a more active stance from China should not be expected, as it is unwilling to confront Russia, is aware of its own limitations in this sphere and views the United States as its main global rival. In a timeframe of the next few years, Russia’s policy will be the decisive factor influencing the security system in the region. One of its goals will be a drive to strengthen its military presence and to widen cooperation within the Collective Security Treaty Organisation. Although it is likely that Russia will dominate the dimension of Central Asia’s security architecture, this will not be synonymous with Russia taking over actual responsibility for security and certainly not with it undertaking efforts to solve regional problems.

Аннотация: В статье рассматривается современное состояние китайско-американских отношений с точки зрения сочетания элементов соперничества и сотрудничества двух стран в Азиатско-Тихоокеанском регионе. Автор полагает, что отношения КНР и США все сильнее оказываются связанными с трудно предсказуемой и меняющейся ситуацией в регионе. Столкнувшись с ограниченными возможностями прямого военного сдерживания Китая, США проявляют определенную гибкость в отношениях с Пекином. Китай, создавая элементы альтернативной системы глобального управления, не готов немедленно менять сложившийся кодекс поведения. Для прогнозирования перспектив китайско-американских отношений решающее значение приобретает анализ обстановки в Южно-Китайском море. Вектор развития отношений двух держав в решающей степени определяется сферами, в которых Китай расстается со своим прошлым статусом, постепенно обретая качества будущего регионального и глобального лидера. Ключевые слова: АТР, КНР, США, Южно-Китайское море, глобальное лидерство, соперничество.
The article discusses modern state of Chinese-US relations under the conditions of simultaneous
existence of rivalry and cooperation between two countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Up to the author’s
view relations between China and USA depend increasingly on poor-predictable and fast-changing situation
in the region. Facing difficulties in direct military containment, USA reveal certain flexibility in building
relations with China. While establishing mechanisms of global control, China is not ready to change the mode
of conduct immediately. For forecast of the future Sino-American relations the analysis of situation in the
South China sea is of crucial importance.
Keywords: Asia-Pacific region, PRC,USA, South China sea, global leadership, rivalry.

The Indian Ocean, often referred to as the ‘cradle of globalisation’, has been the main link between east and west for centuries. Half of all the world’s trade and two-thirds of its oil pass through its busy waterways, connecting booming East Asian economies to Middle Eastern oil terminals and European markets. Despite its enormous economic and strategic importance, however, the third-largest ocean in the world remains largely ungoverned. The emergence of piracy off the Horn of Africa demonstrated the fragility of the security situation in the Indian Ocean and attracted the interest and presence of all major regional and extra-regional powers. While counter-piracy efforts have been successful and provided a great opportunity for navies to foster international cooperation, the resulting increased military presence has also exacerbated existing power rivalries and transformed the Indian Ocean into the next arena of strategic competition between India, China, and the US.

Czy dotychczasowej dominacji Rosji w krajach Azji Centralnej zagrażają działania Stanów Zjednoczonych i Chin? Autorzy uważają, że Rosja utrzyma wpływy w tym regionie. Umożliwią to wieloletnie dwustronne umowy gospodarcze, kontrola rurociągów i szeroki dostęp do rynków rosyjskich, także do miejsc pracy. Istotne znaczenie będą miały również rozumienie uwarunkowań regionu i umiejętność współpracy z jego państwami. Jednak wewnętrzne problemy Rosji mogą negatywnie wpłynąć na kształtowanie się i ciągłość jej polityki
zagranicznej w tym obszarze Azji.

Is a domination of Russia in Central Asia countries threatened by the United States and China? In the authors’ opinion, Russia maintains its influence in this region mainly due to the multi-year mutual economic agreements, pipeline control
and a wide access to Russian market, including job positions. The understanding of the region’s conditions and skillful cooperation with its states can also be quite significant. However, internal problems of Russia can negatively affect the
shape and continuity of foreign policy in that area of Asia.

Resumen La estructura de seguridad asiática ha experimentado grandes cambios, al evolucionar de las alianzas bilaterales de Estados Unidos —un sistema que fue diseñado para la contención de la Unión Soviética y China durante la Gue-rra Fría—, a una arquitectura más compleja, a la que se ha incorporado una sucesión de instituciones multilaterales creadas durante los últimos veinte años. El marco resultante carece, sin embargo, de la capacidad para resol-ver los conflictos que dividen a las grandes potencias, en un contexto de transición estratégica marcado por el ascenso de China. La definición de una nueva arquitectura de seguridad en Asia se ha convertido de hecho en uno de los elementos centrales de la competencia en curso por renegociar las bases del orden regional. Palabras clave Estados Unidos, China, ASEAN, sistema de San Francisco, seguridad asiática.