Analytical Sociology

Zusammenfassung:
Im Längsschnitt einer Kohorte ehemaliger Gymnasiasten zwischen dem 15. und 43. Lebensjahr wird gezeigt, dass Lehrerurteile mit prognostischem Anspruch vermittelt über die Erfolgserwartungen der Schüler deren Entscheidungen bezüglich ihres weiteren Bildungsverlaufs zu beeinflussen vermögen und dadurch zu einer Self-Fulfilling Prophecy im Sinne Mertons (1948) werden können. Ursprünglich unzu-treffende Lehrerurteile können durch die Pfadabhängigkeit und Kumulativität des Ausbildungs- und Berufsverlaufes indirekt noch das Berufsprestige im 43. Lebensjahr beeinflussen. Die hier vor¬legten Analysen belegen zugleich, wie sich die Längsschnittperspektive der Lebens¬ver¬laufs¬for¬schung frucht¬bar mit der handlungstheoretischen Perspektive einer Wert-Erwartungstheorie ver¬knüpfen lässt.

Teachers’ Evaluations over the Life Course: Valid Prognosis or Self-Fulfilling Prophecy?
Abstract:
In a longitudinal study of former German high school students between age 15 and 43 it is shown that teachers' evaluations with prognostic claims may influence the students' educational decisions by shap-ing their success expectations. Thus initially false teacher evaluations may work like a self-fulfilling prophecy in the sense of Merton (1948). Because of the path dependency and cumulativity of educa-tional and occupational career processes they still affect the occupational prestige at the age of 43 indi-rectly. Finally, the following analyses offer prospects in terms of fruitfully connecting the longitudinal perspective of life course research to the action-theoretical perspective of a theory of subjective expected utility.

This paper proposes a computer simulation framework for investigating the role of built form – specifically physical venues-in the dynamics of neighborhood integration and segregation. Looking to Schelling's classic work (1971) and the subsequent literature, we note, however, that with few exceptions 'form' in these models is reduced to an agent's capacity to 'see' nearby grid-cells of the simulation world: an agent's neighbourhood is its Moore neighbourhood. In this research, we argue that an analytically meaningful simulation of neighbourhood formation – or more specifically of integration and segregation dynamics – must acknowledge the role of built form. To do so, we introduce physical venues into the classic Schelling model in order to reconsider the simulation's dynamics as influenced by both the spaces where agents live and the spaces of their activities. Our analysis proceeds through a series of four case studies of increasing sophistication, considering the impact of different spatial configurations as well as different kinds of venue. We articulate a simple but powerful generative model of urban social formations that also may offer insight into the conditions under which sedimented patterns of segregation may become unsettled.

Power is often taken to be a central concept in social and political thought that can contribute to the explanation of many different social phenomena. This article argues that in order to play this role, a general theory of power is required to identify a stable causal capacity, one that does not depend on idiosyncratic social conditions and can thus exert its characteristic influence in a wide range of cases. It considers three promising strategies for such a theory, which ground power in (1) the ability to use force, (2) access to resources, or (3) collective acceptance. It shows that these strategies fail to identify a stable causal capacity. The lack of an adequate general theory of power suggests that the concept lacks the necessary unity to play the broad explanatory role it is often accorded.

Drawing extensively on the research findings of natural and social sciences both in America and Europe, Reframing the Social argues for a critical realist and systemist social ontology, designed to shed light on current debates in social theory concerning the relationship of social ontology to practical social research, and the nature of "the social." It explores the works of the systems theorist Mario Bunge in comparison with the approach of Niklas Luhmann and critical social systems theorists, to challenge the commonly held view that the systems-based approach is holistic in nature and necessarily downplays the role of human agency.

Theoretically sophisticated and investigating the work of a theorist whose work has until now received insufficient attention in Anglo-American thought, this book will be of interest to those working in the field of social theory, as well as scholars concerned with philosophy of social science, the project of analytical sociology, and the nature of the relationship between the natural and social sciences.


Reviews:

“This is the clearest and most comprehensive discussion of contemporary social ontology. The author's definitions and illustrations of such key concepts as those of system, process, mechanism, and emergence, often used sloppily, are lucid. And his evaluation of the competing theories is magisterial. This book should greatly help any social theorists and philosophers seeking clarity and depth.” (Mario Bunge, McGill University, Canada)
 
“Poe Yu-ze Wan has produced an impressive book that brings social systems theory into the twenty-first century. In a beautifully well-judged argument that deserves to be widely read, he shows how social theorists are moving towards mechanismic explanation and ‘emergentist systemism’ – and why they are right to do so.” (Dave Elder-Vass, Loughborough University, UK)

“Every scholar interested in this literature needs to read this book simply to be able to claim that he or she is acquainted with the state of the art and with the now staggering breadth of writings on the various inter-related subjects.” (Omar Lizardo, University of Notre Dame, US)

“Whoever wishes to become introduced to the contemporary philosophical debate on causality (with special reference to social causality) cannot do better than studying this book.” (Wolfgang Krohn, University of Bielefeld, Germany)

“…dieses Klar gegliederte und flüssig geschriebene Buch…. Auch kann dieses Buch jedem zu Diensten sein, der sich einen konzisen Überblick über die Probleme und Argumente zu verschaffen sucht, welche die Entwicklung einer wissenschaftstheoretisch informierten „erklärenden Soziologie“ nicht erst seit jüngster Zeit begleiten.” (Michael Schmid, Bundeswehr University Munich, Germany)

During the past decade, social mechanisms and mechanism-based ex- planations have received considerable attention in the social sciences as well as in the philosophy of science. This article critically reviews the most important philosophical and social science contributions to the mechanism approach. The first part discusses the idea of mechanism- based explanation from the point of view of philosophy of science and relates it to causation and to the covering-law account of explanation. The second part focuses on how the idea of mechanisms has been used in the social sciences. The final part discusses recent developments in analytical sociology, covering the nature of sociological explananda, the role of theory of action in mechanism-based explanations, Merton’s idea of middle-range theory, and the role of agent-based simulations in the development of mechanism-based explanations.

In a longitudinal study of former German high school students between age 15 and 43 it is shown that teachers' evaluations with prognostic claims may influence the students' educational decisions by shaping their success expectations. Thus initially false teacher evaluations may work like a self-fulfilling prophecy in
the sense of Merton (1948). Because of the path dependency and cumulativity of educational and occupational career processes they still affect the occupational prestige at the age of 43 indirectly. Finally, the following analysis offer prospects in terms of fruitfully connecting the longitudinal perspective of life course research to the action-theoretical perspective of a theory of subjective expected utility.

Terror started a war in 2001 as it did in 1914. Likewise are economic crises, waves of globalizations and of democratizations, increases in inequalities and shifts in the global resource distribution recent phenomena which have parallels roughly a century ago. This book shows that this is no coincidence. Instead, it is a key for understanding world history from 1750 to 2050.

There are Two Steps to Modernity: Industrial society introduced principles of modernity as rationality and deliberation only around organizations. Examples are social innovations as the introduction of romantic love, of compulsory schooling, of bureaucratic organizations, of parties and nation states.

Modernization within organizations is a second step which started in 1968, and social innovations as the acceptance of diversity in intimate relations, the expansion of tertiary education, boundaryless organizations and careers, of advocacy organizations and multilevel governance are examples for this second part of the process.

This second transition is, however, not yet completed. But while it took World War II to secure the general acceptance of competitive organizations in democracy and labor relations which established the stable „golden age“ of industrial society and post-War growth, this time understanding the parallel nature of the two steps allows to see what will be needed to overcome the current state of a world in crisis.

Analytical sociology, an intellectual project that has garnered considerable attention across a variety of disciplines in recent years, aims to explain complex social processes by dissecting them, accentuating their most important constituent parts, and constructing appropriate models to understand the emergence of what is observed. To achieve this goal, analytical sociologists demonstrate an unequivocal focus on the mechanism-based explanation grounded in action theory. In this article I attempt a critical appreciation of analytical sociology from the perspective of Mario Bunge’s philosophical system, which I characterize as emergentist systemism. I submit that while the principles of analytical sociology and those of Bunge’s approach share a lot in common, the latter brings to the fore the ontological status and explanatory importance of supra-individual actors (as concrete systems endowed with emergent causal powers) and macro-social mechanisms (as processes unfolding in and among social systems), and therefore it does not stipulate that every causal explanation of social facts has to include explicit references to individual-level actors and mechanisms. In this sense, Bunge’s approach provides a reasonable middle course between the Scylla of sociological reification and the Charybdis of ontological individualism, and thus serves as an antidote to the untenable “strong program of microfoundations” to which some analytical sociologists are committed.

The DBO (Desires, Beliefs and Opportunities) theory of action proposed by analytical sociologists aims to provide an action-theoretical basis for building explanatory theories in sociology. Peter Hedström claims that the DBO theory is realistic because it does not make assumptions that are known to be false or seriously incompatible with the current scientific understanding about the nature of human action and cognition. This article nevertheless aims to show that the DBO theory is not only incomplete but also that its background assumptions are unrealistic, in the sense that they do not fit with the distributed nature of action-related cognition, which has recently become a growing topic of interest in cognitive sciences. The author also indicates that the neglect of the distributed and embodied aspects of cognition in the DBO theory leads to various biases in the process of constructing mechanism-based explanations in social sciences. Finally, an alternative approach to action theory is sketched on the basis of this critique.

Review of P. Demeulenaere (ed.), Analytical Sociology and Social
Mechanisms. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Why should we introduce the notion of ‘analytical sociology’ into the field of sociology, and why should it be linked to the concept of ‘mechanism’? With these two principal questions, Pierre Demeulenaere, Professor of Sociological Theory and Philosophy of the Social Sciences at the University of Paris-Sorbonne, opens his Analytical Sociology and Social Mechanisms, a collection of thirteen papers written by social scientists and philosophers of the social sciences. Not every contributor should be considered an analytical sociologist. Rather than being a manifesto either pro or contra analytical sociology and the use of mechanisms, it is an attempt to reflect upon the key issues involved in sociological explanation. Even though several chapters raise very interesting points, the overall impression one gets from this book is that analytical sociology fails to redeem its main promise, viz. to add clarity, precision, and conceptual rigor to sociology, especially regarding one of its most central concepts: ‘mechanism’.

University rankings have led to the following paradox. On one hand, global and national university rankings have an increasing impact on scientific research and higher education. On the other hand, a growing number of researchers have argued that university rankings are biased and methodologically flawed as well as documented their unintended consequences that are counterproductive to education and research activities in universities. In this article, I combine sociological and cognitive perspectives to develop a theoretical framework for explaining this paradox. The theoretical framework has four interrelated parts. The first is a distinction between three temporal stages through which university rankings commensurate universities. The second consists of an account of the social mechanisms through which university rankings generate reactive outcomes that tend to transform universities instead of just measuring their quality. The third is a league table metaphor that links the conceptual domain of team sports and the conceptual domain of universities and, I argue, provides a cognitive mechanism that shapes how many extra-academic actors, such as prospective students and policymakers, understand the results of university rankings. The fourth focuses on the affordances of the published league tables of university rankings that many extraacademic actors use for outsourcing part of their decision-making to the league tables. As a whole, this framework allows us to understand how the interrelated and materially mediated actions of different groups of actors give rise to and sustain the paradox of university rankings.

The first part of the paper develops the argument that geographers should learn to decompose human memory into its constituent parts because then and then alone will we become attuned to the full range of ways in which we incorporate places into our beings. The second part of the paper articulates Stephen Hill's comments on episodic memory with my recent work on wisdom.

This paper arises from the need to explain expert decision-making in professional environments from a plural and interdisciplinary perspective. An extended review of Rational Choice Theory (RCT) from its first developments to current trends makes explicit the mismatch between RCT and empirical work settings. A review of recent theories on the cognitive abilities of agents makes clear the lack of integration between findings in evolutionary psychology, cognitive science, perceptual psychology and neurology, and those proposed by RCT. We will examine the causes for the failure of Good Old Fashioned Artificial Intelligence (GOFAI), the strongest empirical program for testing RCT premises. Contributions from the cognitive and social sciences put forward the weaknesses of analytical sociology at all four levels: the biological, the psychological, the epistemological, and the ontological. Alternative explanations from contemporary cognitive science will be put forward.

What kind of thing, as it were, is power and how does it fit into our understanding of the social world? I approach this question by exploring the pragmatic character of power ascriptions, arguing that they involve fictional expectations directed at an open future. When we take an agent to be powerful, we act as if that agent had a robust capacity to make a difference to the actions of others. While this pretense can never fully live up to a social reality whose future is open, acting on such expectations helps constitute social order. Fictional expectations are thus built into the material practices that constitute power. This account, I argue, helps us make sense of some of the deep disagreements about the nature of power. I develop the account by drawing on Thomas Hobbes’s myth of an original institution of sovereign power before expanding it to other forms of power.

本研究從分析社會學（analytical sociology）的取徑出發，從三個相互關聯的面向說明跨領域研究可能對社會理論工作帶來的啟發。首先，以晚近關於「社會突現」（social emergence）的研究為例，說明受認知神經科學影響的心靈哲學可以如何幫助社會理論工作者處理涂爾幹以降的重大問題：個人與社會、個體主義與整體主義、社會複雜性與化約的關係。其次，說明認知神經科學可以如何為社會理論中的重要理論概念或因果解釋提供微觀基礎（microfoundations），也因此有助於支持、擴充、修正或拒絕這些概念與解釋。最後，以晚近關於「強相互性」（strong reciprocity）的研究為例，說明實驗經濟學、人類學、社會心理學、倫理學正如何與認知神經科學等學科密切合作，探討社會理論歷久不衰的問題，即Talcott Parsons所謂的「霍布斯式（社會）秩序問題」。本研究主張，社會理論研究者應留意這些跨領域的研究動態，且社會理論其中一項值得追求的發展方向，在於充分吸收自然科學與人文社會科學的跨領域研究成果。

From the perspective of analytical sociology, this article attempts to illustrate the ways in which interdisciplinary studies can inform social theorizing by way of three examples. First, it demonstrates how the neuroscientifically-based philosophy of mind can be instrumental in addressing such core issues in social theory as the individual-society and individualism-collectivism dilemma and the problem of social emergence, complexity, and reduction. Second, it argues that the findings of cognitive neuroscience, seen in light of analytical sociology that highlights the importance of microfoundations for social research, are valuable in so far as they can support, enrich, or modify the concepts, theories, and causal explanations provided by social theorists. Third, it draws heavily on the recent interdisciplinary research into “strong reciprocity,” thereby illustrating how the classical issue in social theory, i.e., what Talcott Parsons calls the Hobbesian problem of (social) order, is being dealt with collectively by cognitive neuroscience, experimental economics, social psychology, moral philosophy, and anthropology. This article submits that instead of staying insulated from these interdisciplinary efforts, social theorists would be well-advised to keep abreast of their research findings.

Cet article analyse les rapports entre individualisme méthodologique (IM) et réductionnisme, tels qu'ils sont traités dans la littérature contemporaine en langue anglaise. Il s'articule autour de trois points clés. Premièrement, il montre qu'il existe deux types d'interprétations réductionnistes de l'IM : celle en termes de réductionnisme psychologique et celle en termes de réductionnisme sémantique, en précisant que cette dernière interprétation présente une variante nominaliste et une variante anti-nominaliste. Deuxièmement, l'article explique que ces différents types d'interprétations réductionnistes de l'IM sont incorrects. Troisièmement, l'article analyse et critique la thèse selon laquelle il faudrait remplacer l'IM par une nouvelle approche antiréductionniste considérée comme une troisième voie entre holisme et IM. Mots-clés.-Individualisme méthodologique ; réductionnisme ; émergence ; survenance ; individualisme structurel ; sociologie analytique. Abstract.-This article analyses the relationship between methodological individualism (MI) and reductionism as understood within the contemporary literature in English. Three points are developed. First, the article argues that two different kinds of reductionist interpretation of MI can be distinguished: one in terms of psychological reductionism and the other in terms of semantic reductionism, the latter of which has a nominalist and an anti-nominalist variant. Second, the article explains that these different reductionist interpretations of MI are mistaken. Third, the article analyses and criticizes the view that MI must be replaced by a new anti-reductionist approach understood as a middle ground between holism and MI.

Decimos no porque queremos decir sí, y decimos sí a pesar de que un no se quiere imponer como única palabra real y posible. Y en este marco es que suceden una infinidad de luchas que construyen alternativas ciudadanas que hacen frente a muy diversas y complejas situaciones problemáticas. El presente trabajo, coordinado por José Guillermo Díaz Muñoz, recoge este proceso de diálogo y confrontación en la construcción de múltiples sí, es decir, se trata de diversas respuestas en contextos específicos que muestran que es posible construir más allá de ciertos modos de actuar que se han pretendido imponer como únicas vías de acción e inacción (los no). En un paisaje así, en donde se imbrican alternativas y problemáticas, se encuentran naturalmente un sinfín de claro oscuros, de avances y retrocesos, de esfuerzos y fatigas, de sueños y abandonos, de preguntas, respuestas y nuevas preguntas. En este paisaje el presente documento resalta la interacción de dos actores: la Alianza Ciudadana para el Desarrollo Regional Alternativo en el Sur de Jalisco (ACDRA – SURJA) y el Programa de Desarrollos Regionales Alternativos (PDRAS) del Centro de Investigación y Formación Social (CIFS) del ITESO y su decisión de caminar construyendo un proyecto como horizonte, procesos y acciones compartidos y compartibles también con otros muchos actores que construyen los más variados sí. En su caminar, por una parte, la ACDRA – SURJA se constituye como la búsqueda permanente (pasado, presente y futuro) de personas y grupos que comparten la profunda esperanza de lograr cuidar la dignidad de la vida de todo, todas y todos. Se reconoce a sí misma como una organización de ciudadanos autónomos e independientes, generadora de procesos alternativos para la transformación en el Sur de Jalisco, inspiradora, exigente consigo misma, formadora de sujetos sociales conscientes y comprometidos y articuladora de organizaciones ciudadanas desde una visión crítica de la realidad y una perspectiva de derechos. El ACDRA - SURJA se propone impulsar procesos de una vida buena a través de proyectos productivos solidarios, de gestión sustentable del medio ambiente, de la promoción de una educación integral e integradora y de la acción cívico política, esfuerzos en los que pueda fortalecer la capacidad de acción colectiva y habilitar su construcción como sujeto de su propio desarrollo, en las escalas local, regional, nacional y global.

espanolResumen Se presenta un modelo computacional sobre la generacion y propagacion del miedo al crimen, basado en los impactos creados por la victimizacion criminal. El objetivo: es evaluar y describir los efectos que pueden tener en la propagacion del miedo al crimen un conjunto de determinantes relacionados con la victimizacion (directa e indirecta): tamano de la red social, tasa de victimizacion y tiempo de recuperacion en victimizados. El metodo: utilizado fue la simulacion computacional, en la cual se trabajo con cuatro combinaciones de parametros que representan diferentes situaciones. Los resultados: permiten describir la dinamica de interaccion entre los factores determinantes considerados, y reflejan que estos influyen de manera no lineal en la propagacion del miedo al crimen. EnglishAbstract A computational model of the generation and propagation of fear of crime is offered, based on impacts created by criminal victimization. The objective: consists of evaluating and des...

According to the dominant view, analytical sociology is largely incompatible with the deductive-nomological (D-N) model because the latter allows neither for accurate and precise explanations, nor for explanations that give individuals and their actions a privileged role. This view neglects two relevant facts about the D-N model as understood by Hempel and Popper and some of their precursors such as J. S. Mill and Weber. The first is the relationship between this model, situational analysis and the use of probabilistic laws in explanation. The second is that, from the standpoint of the D-N theory, it is possible to make sense of social mechanisms in terms of Weber’s ideal-typical models. Like these models, mechanisms are functional for the development of concrete empirical sociological hypotheses that, without covering generalizations, lack explanatory power.

The article makes four interrelated claims: (1) The mechanism approach to social explanation does not presuppose a commitment to the individual-level microfoundationalism. (2) The microfoundationalist requirement that explanatory social mechanisms should always consists of interacting individuals has given rise to problematic methodological biases in social research. (3) It is possible to specify a number of plausible candidates for social macro-mechanisms where interacting collective agents (e.g. formal organizations) form the core actors. (4) The distributed cognition perspective combined with organization studies could provide us with explanatory understanding of the emergent cognitive capacities of collective agents.

This article describes a vignette experiment on the effects of temporal embeddedness and network embeddedness in trust situations. The experiment uses a setting in which a buyer wants to buy a used car from a car dealer. We distinguish between effects on trust of the past relation and the effects of the expected future relation between the buyer and the dealer. A buyer can learn about the trustworthiness of the dealer from past transactions of the dealer. Moreover, the buyer can control the dealer if the buyer and the dealer expect more transactions in the future, because the buyer may sanction the dealer if the dealer would act untrustworthy in the present transaction, for example, by refraining from future transactions. Temporal embeddedness facilitates learning and control through the bilateral relation of the buyer and the dealer, while network embeddedness facilitates learning and control through third parties. In the experiment, subjects are asked to compare different settings for buying a used car, while the relation between the buyer and dealer is varied in these settings. We conclude that both learning and control affect trust at the level of the dyad (temporal embeddedness) as well as at the group-level (network embeddedness).

Using Coleman's well-known scheme as an anchor, we review key features of explanations of social phenomena that employ micro-macro models. Some antecedents of micro-macro models and of Coleman's scheme as well as some paradigmatic examples of micro-macro links are sketched. We then discuss micro-level assumptions in micro-macro explanations and the robustness of macro-level implications to variations in micro-level assumptions. We conclude with an overview of some recent developments in micro-macro modeling and of the contributions to the special issue.

Environmental hazards and disaster researchers have demonstrated strong associations between sociodemographic indicators, such as age and socio-economic status (SES), and hazard exposures and health outcomes for individuals and in certain communities. At the same time, behavioral health and risk communications research has examined how individual psychology influences adaptive strategies and behaviors in the face of hazards. However, at present, we do not understand the explanatory mechanisms that explain relationships between larger scale social structure, individual psychology, and specific behaviors that may attenuate or amplify risk. Extreme heat presents growing risks in a rapidly warming and urbanizing world. This dissertation examines the social and behavioral mechanisms that may explain inequitable health outcomes from exposure to concurrent extreme heat and electrical power failure in Phoenix, AZ and extreme heat in Detroit, MI. Exploratory analysis of 163 surveys in Phoenix, AZ showed that age, gender, and respondent’s racialized group identity did not relate to thermal discomfort and self-reported heat illness, which were only predicted by SES (StdB = -0.52, p < 0.01). Of the explanatory mechanisms tested in the study, only relative air conditioning intensity and thermal discomfort explained self-reported heat illness. Thermal discomfort was tested as both a mechanism and outcome measure. Content analysis of 40 semi-structured interviews in Phoenix, AZ revealed that social vulnerability was associated with an increase in perceived hazard severity (StdB = 0.44, p < 0.01), a decrease in perceived adaptation efficacy (StdB = -0.38, p = 0.02), and an indirect increase (through adaptive efficacy) in maladaptive intentions (StdB = 0.18, p = 0.01). Structural equation modeling of 244 surveys in Phoenix, AZ and Detroit, MI revealed that relationships between previous heat illness experience, perceived heat risk, and adaptive intentions were significantly moderated by adaptive capacity: high adaptive capacity households were more likely to undertake adaptive behaviors, and those decisions were more heavily influenced by risk perceptions and previous experiences. However, high adaptive capacity households had lower risk perceptions and fewer heat illness experiences than low adaptive capacity households. A better understanding of the mechanisms that produce social vulnerability can facilitate more salient risk messaging and more targeted public health interventions. For example, public health risk messaging that provides information on the efficacy of specific adaptations may be more likely to motivate self-protective action, and ultimately protect populations.

The importance of social theory in empirical research has been seriously challenged by the advent of Big Data and their massive application to the study of social reali- ty. This essay aims to highlight, firstly, why the «Theory vs. Big Data» confrontation is meaningless, since the latter are primarily methodological/procedural in nature. Stressing the significance of the Mertonian distinction between substantive issues of theoretical relevance on one hand, and operative problems of methodology on the other, we wish to show how – from a logical point of view – the coming of Big Data will not mark «the end of theory» in any way. In the second part of the essay we therefore examine a specific (and quite different) sociological tradition: a distinctive approach that not only considers theory as a matter of crucial importance, but that also undertakes to develop top-level social theory.