Books by Vincent Buskens
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We lend money to a friend or an expensive tool to a neighbor without bothering about writing expl... more We lend money to a friend or an expensive tool to a neighbor without bothering about writing explicitly down when we expect the money or tool to be returned. When we ask a gardener to remodel our garden, we require a contract detailing out costs for different parts of the job. And if we buy or sell a house, a very detailed contract and the services of a notary are involved to make sure that the deal runs according the relevant rules and regulations. All three situations refer to trust situations, but they are managed with very different informal or formal institutions. One important question is why these different trust problems or transactions are managed in different ways: apparently, we are more likely to trust that a neighbor will not act opportunistically towards us than a gardener. A second question is whether the arrangements chosen are efficient: are there transactions in which contracting is more or less extensive than necessary
to discipline actors in the relevant trust situations? Is the explicit involvement of the government in certain transactions necessary and sufficient? I argue that answers to these questions are not straightforward, and depend on many aspects of the transaction.
Research on trust problems shows that the extent to which actors use contracts and other forms of regulation depends on economic, psychological, social, and legal aspects of the transaction. I illustrate some of the main determinants of trust in transactions, and how they affect the use of contracting and other forms of regulation. In addition, I show how complementary empirical research designs enlarge our knowledge about how transactions can be handled efficiently. I demonstrate why legal scholars need to incorporate an interdisciplinary approach in order to better understand the effects of changes in regulation. In addition, I discuss some methods that can be used to obtain empirical evidence for theoretically-derived relations between regulation and the efficiency of transactions.
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There is one thing that moves online consumers to click “add to cart,” that allows sellers to acc... more There is one thing that moves online consumers to click “add to cart,” that allows sellers to accept certain forms of online payment, and that makes online product reviews meaningful: trust. Without trust, online interactions can’t advance. But how is trust among strangers established on the Internet? What role does reputation play in the formation of online trust? In eTrust, editors Karen Cook, Chris Snijders, Vincent Buskens, and Coye Cheshire explore the unmapped territory where trust, reputation, and online relationships intersect, with major implications for online commerce and social networking.
eTrust uses experimental studies and field research to examine how trust in anonymous online exchanges can create or diminish cooperation between people. The first part of the volume looks at how feedback affects online auctions using trust experiments. Gary Bolton and Axel Ockenfels find that the availability of feedback leads to more trust among one-time buyers, while Davide Barrera and Vincent Buskens demonstrate that, in investment transactions, the buyer’s own experience guides decision making about future transactions with sellers. The field studies in Part II of the book examine the degree to which reputation facilitates trust in online exchanges. Andreas Diekmann, Ben Jann, and David Wyder identify a “reputation premium” in mobile phone auctions, which not only drives future transactions between buyers and sellers but also payment modes and starting bids. Chris Snijders and Jeroen Weesie shift focus to the market for online programmers, where tough competition among programmers allows buyers to shop around. The book’s third section reveals how the quality and quantity of available information influences actual marketplace participants. Sonja Utz finds that even when unforeseen accidents hinder transactions—lost packages, computer crashes—the seller is still less likely to overcome repercussions from the negative feedback of dissatisfied buyers.
So much of our lives are becoming enmeshed with the Internet, where ordinary social cues and reputational networks that support trust in the real world simply don’t apply. eTrust breaks new ground by articulating the conditions under which trust can evolve and grow online, providing both theoretical and practical insights for anyone interested in how online relationships influence our decisions.
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Social Networks and Trust discusses two possible explanations for the emergence of trust via soci... more Social Networks and Trust discusses two possible explanations for the emergence of trust via social networks. If network members can sanction untrustworthiness of actors, these actors may refrain from acting in an untrustworthy manner. Moreover, if actors are informed regularly about trustworthy behavior of others, trust will grow among these actors.
A unique combination of formal model building and empirical methodology is used to derive and test hypotheses about the effects of networks on trust. The models combine elements from game theory, which is mainly used in economics, and social network analysis, which is mainly used in sociology.
The hypotheses are tested (1) by analyzing contracts in information technology transactions from a survey on small and medium-sized enterprises and (2) by studying judgments of subjects in a vignette experiment related to hypothetical transactions with a used-car dealer.
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Transactions often differ on important dimensions from spot exchanges on perfect neo-classical ma... more Transactions often differ on important dimensions from spot exchanges on perfect neo-classical markets. Information is seldom complete and instantaneous exchange is just as rare as full competition. The authors in this volume extend the standard economic model stressing the proposition that the social context is an important determinant of the governance of transactions. To foster the development of a body of cumulative knowledge in the new economic sociology, this approach is consistently applied to a diversity of topics including purchase relations, strategic alliances, and relations among lawyers and clients as well as employers and employees. This volume is divided in three parts. The first part surveys purposive behaviour models in research on governance as well as theoretical work extending these models. The contributions in the second and third part all have an empirical component and deal with governance in the various phases of exchange relations: search and selection, negotiating and contracting, contract execution and performance, and conflict regulation. The second part focuses on governance in markets, while the third part discusses governance in organizations.
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Papers by Vincent Buskens
Rationality and Society, 2009
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... Uiteraard hechten we weinig belang aan theorieën die niet aan de werkelijkheid getoetst (kunn... more ... Uiteraard hechten we weinig belang aan theorieën die niet aan de werkelijkheid getoetst (kunnen ... wel degelijk een cruciale bouwsteen vormen in de toetsing van theorie en waarom experimenten ... ook specifieke toetsing nodig is om deze delen van de theorie te ondersteunen. ...
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Social Networks, 2015
ABSTRACT Social capital theory assumes that information is valuable. However, only rarely is this... more ABSTRACT Social capital theory assumes that information is valuable. However, only rarely is this value explicitly modeled, and there are few examples of empirical tests of mechanisms that connect social network structure to valuable information. We model an individual decision problem in which individuals make choices that yield uncertain outcomes. The individuals can learn about the profitability of options from their own choices and from the network. We generate computer-simulated data to derive hypotheses about the effect of network characteristics on making profitable choices. We conduct a laboratory experiment to empirically test these hypotheses and find that, at the individual level, degree centrality has a positive effect on making profitable choices whereas betweenness centrality has no effect. At the network level, density has a positive effect on making profitable choices, whereas centralization does not have an effect.
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Books by Vincent Buskens
to discipline actors in the relevant trust situations? Is the explicit involvement of the government in certain transactions necessary and sufficient? I argue that answers to these questions are not straightforward, and depend on many aspects of the transaction.
Research on trust problems shows that the extent to which actors use contracts and other forms of regulation depends on economic, psychological, social, and legal aspects of the transaction. I illustrate some of the main determinants of trust in transactions, and how they affect the use of contracting and other forms of regulation. In addition, I show how complementary empirical research designs enlarge our knowledge about how transactions can be handled efficiently. I demonstrate why legal scholars need to incorporate an interdisciplinary approach in order to better understand the effects of changes in regulation. In addition, I discuss some methods that can be used to obtain empirical evidence for theoretically-derived relations between regulation and the efficiency of transactions.
eTrust uses experimental studies and field research to examine how trust in anonymous online exchanges can create or diminish cooperation between people. The first part of the volume looks at how feedback affects online auctions using trust experiments. Gary Bolton and Axel Ockenfels find that the availability of feedback leads to more trust among one-time buyers, while Davide Barrera and Vincent Buskens demonstrate that, in investment transactions, the buyer’s own experience guides decision making about future transactions with sellers. The field studies in Part II of the book examine the degree to which reputation facilitates trust in online exchanges. Andreas Diekmann, Ben Jann, and David Wyder identify a “reputation premium” in mobile phone auctions, which not only drives future transactions between buyers and sellers but also payment modes and starting bids. Chris Snijders and Jeroen Weesie shift focus to the market for online programmers, where tough competition among programmers allows buyers to shop around. The book’s third section reveals how the quality and quantity of available information influences actual marketplace participants. Sonja Utz finds that even when unforeseen accidents hinder transactions—lost packages, computer crashes—the seller is still less likely to overcome repercussions from the negative feedback of dissatisfied buyers.
So much of our lives are becoming enmeshed with the Internet, where ordinary social cues and reputational networks that support trust in the real world simply don’t apply. eTrust breaks new ground by articulating the conditions under which trust can evolve and grow online, providing both theoretical and practical insights for anyone interested in how online relationships influence our decisions.
A unique combination of formal model building and empirical methodology is used to derive and test hypotheses about the effects of networks on trust. The models combine elements from game theory, which is mainly used in economics, and social network analysis, which is mainly used in sociology.
The hypotheses are tested (1) by analyzing contracts in information technology transactions from a survey on small and medium-sized enterprises and (2) by studying judgments of subjects in a vignette experiment related to hypothetical transactions with a used-car dealer.
Papers by Vincent Buskens
to discipline actors in the relevant trust situations? Is the explicit involvement of the government in certain transactions necessary and sufficient? I argue that answers to these questions are not straightforward, and depend on many aspects of the transaction.
Research on trust problems shows that the extent to which actors use contracts and other forms of regulation depends on economic, psychological, social, and legal aspects of the transaction. I illustrate some of the main determinants of trust in transactions, and how they affect the use of contracting and other forms of regulation. In addition, I show how complementary empirical research designs enlarge our knowledge about how transactions can be handled efficiently. I demonstrate why legal scholars need to incorporate an interdisciplinary approach in order to better understand the effects of changes in regulation. In addition, I discuss some methods that can be used to obtain empirical evidence for theoretically-derived relations between regulation and the efficiency of transactions.
eTrust uses experimental studies and field research to examine how trust in anonymous online exchanges can create or diminish cooperation between people. The first part of the volume looks at how feedback affects online auctions using trust experiments. Gary Bolton and Axel Ockenfels find that the availability of feedback leads to more trust among one-time buyers, while Davide Barrera and Vincent Buskens demonstrate that, in investment transactions, the buyer’s own experience guides decision making about future transactions with sellers. The field studies in Part II of the book examine the degree to which reputation facilitates trust in online exchanges. Andreas Diekmann, Ben Jann, and David Wyder identify a “reputation premium” in mobile phone auctions, which not only drives future transactions between buyers and sellers but also payment modes and starting bids. Chris Snijders and Jeroen Weesie shift focus to the market for online programmers, where tough competition among programmers allows buyers to shop around. The book’s third section reveals how the quality and quantity of available information influences actual marketplace participants. Sonja Utz finds that even when unforeseen accidents hinder transactions—lost packages, computer crashes—the seller is still less likely to overcome repercussions from the negative feedback of dissatisfied buyers.
So much of our lives are becoming enmeshed with the Internet, where ordinary social cues and reputational networks that support trust in the real world simply don’t apply. eTrust breaks new ground by articulating the conditions under which trust can evolve and grow online, providing both theoretical and practical insights for anyone interested in how online relationships influence our decisions.
A unique combination of formal model building and empirical methodology is used to derive and test hypotheses about the effects of networks on trust. The models combine elements from game theory, which is mainly used in economics, and social network analysis, which is mainly used in sociology.
The hypotheses are tested (1) by analyzing contracts in information technology transactions from a survey on small and medium-sized enterprises and (2) by studying judgments of subjects in a vignette experiment related to hypothetical transactions with a used-car dealer.