The Canadian Journal for Middle East Studies Vol2 (1) July 2017 The Canadian Journal for Middle East Studies July 2017, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 43- 76 ISSN: 2369-5986 (Print), 2369-5994 (Online) Copyright © The Author(s). 2017. All Rights Reserved Published by Institute for Middle East Studies, Canada DOI: Arab States and the Alienation of the Masses: Pre and post Arab Spring Fadi Farasin Researcher, The Statistical, Economic and Social Research and Training Centre for Islamic Countries (SESRIC) farasin@yahoo.com Cihat Battaloglu Researcher Assistant, The Statistical, Economic and Social Research and Training Centre for Islamic Countries (SESRIC) cihatbattaloglu@gmail.com Abstract State polices and the strategic choices of the ruling elite have alienated the Arab people. This paper analyzes the source of the Arab masses alienation by the state using the Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (BTI) and the World Wide Governance Indicators along the following dimensions: lack of political participation; unstable democratic institutions; lack of political and social integration; socioeconomic deprivation; and poor governance. The analysis shows that the source of alienation of the Arab masses before the Arab Spring and after the Arab Spring are the same, indicating that the grievances of the Arab masses have not been addressed. Keyword: Democratic Transition, Arab Spring, Political Participation, Socio-economic Deprivation, Governance *Corresponding author: Farasin,F. The Statistical, Economic and Social Research and Training Centre for Islamic Countries (SESRIC) farasin@yahoo.com Received March 29, 2017; Accepted Jul 17, 2017; Published 24, August 2017 Citation: Farasin, A. and Battaloglu, C(2017) Arab States and the Alienation of the Masses: Pre and post Arab Spring. CJMES 2:61-76. doi: Copyright: © 2017 Farasin, A. and Battaloglu, C. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. 61 Farasin, A. and Battaloglu, C. Introduction was to weather this wave of democratization while retaining their thrones. The matter of fact Waves of democratization swept many parts of is that democracy did not materialize in Arab the world; however the Arab world seemed to countries. No state made significant, un- be one of the holdouts, thus giving rise to the retracted “steps toward freedoms [2]. The Arab notion of “Arab Exceptionalism.” In the Arab world, undemocratic rule endured people become disillusioned! Without the and prospect of participating in politics and with authoritarianism showed remarkable resilience, the absence of conduits to implement change, in spite of internal and external pressure. the masses poured to the streets and the Arab Internally, the Arab masses have aspired for Spring ensued. political reform and voiced demands for democratic transition. Externally, western pressure was placed on Arab regimes to democratize (albeit, this pressure has now receded as western powers prioritize security over the promotion of democracy). Western pressure intensified after 9/11 and the introduction of the Bush Administration so called “freedom Agenda.” The US state Department “Middle launched the East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) in 2002”, this was followed by the US proposal for the “The Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI) in 2004”. Both had the goal of “promoting democracy in the region and accelerating reforms in governance, education, the economy, technology, development and the role of women” [1]. At the same time, radicalism and terrorist organizations were on the rise in the Arab world. This new wave of radicalism and terrorism was different from the previous waves the world had experienced before. Previous waves of radicalism and terrorism leaned on ideological and nationalistic motivations; in contrast, the new wave of radicalism and terrorism utilized narratives. These narratives were more than just “misused, misinterpreted, and instrumentalized” religious narratives. A close look at the narratives utilized by Al-Qaida and ISIS reveals that political and socioeconomic grievances are effectively utilized to discredit the legitimacy of Arab regimes, influence public opinion, and acquire new followers. These narratives are commonly combined with distinctive terms seated in matters Arab regimes did not remain unresponsive; they had to bow to the internal and external pressure. However, the political reforms they of political oppression, state corruption, ineffective governance, inequality and socioeconomic deprivation. initiated remained limited, cosmetic, and with a top down approach. The Arab regimes had no intention of conceding power or being fully accountable to the people; their main objective 62 The failure of Arab countries to make the transition to democracy and the rise of radicalism cannot be solely thrown on the The Canadian Journal for Middle East Studies Vol2 (1) July 2017 shoulders of Arab regimes. A reductions Arab regimes have managed to hold onto approach is misleading and leads to invalid power, but at the same time have managed to conclusions. is alienate the Arab masses. According to the extremely complex and implies more than one 2016 Arab Public Opinion Survey; 55% of the nominal multiple respondents had negative views of their home characteristics and different variables [3]. The countries’ political situations, furthermore, literature explaining transition to democracy Arab public attitudes towards the government can different as a whole were overwhelmingly negative [6]. approach, The nature of this alienation is basically the institutional same before the Arab Spring and after it. be Democratic change and categorized approaches: transition period, into four structure-oriented process-oriented approach, political Before the Arab Spring the majority of the economy approaches [4]. From analyzing these people in the Arab streets would voice their approaches, it becomes clear that the strategic discontent choices of the ruling elite in Arab countries, governments and demand freedom, dignity, although not the sole factor, are very critical in better governance, accountability and greater hindering transition to democracy. political participation. In short they were context-oriented approach and with the policies of their asking for a new social contract. A minority What is said about democratic transition can went or was driven down the path of also be said about the rise of radicalism and radicalization. After the Arab Spring; with the terrorist organizations in the Arab world. unfolding tragic events and the bloodshed, Radicalism is not a simple reality, it is destruction and the atrocities committed by multidimensional and its causes are varied and terrorist intertwined, thus a reductionist approach fails determined to hold onto power at all cost, a to account for the complexity of the issue [5]. portion of those who were calling for political Cause of radicalism in the Arab world include reform among others: socio-economic root causes; demands preferring to priorities security and demographic pressure and the youth bulge; safety above all. This is true even among youth political root causes, western intervention, and who were the most vocal and the most active the unhealed rift between modernity and during the days of the Arab Spring. According traditional societies. Here again, Arab states are to the 2016 Arab Youth Survey, more than half not the sole root cause, yet, their contribution of youth surveyed agreed with the statement: to the rise of radicalism cannot be denied. “Given the current circumstances in the Middle organizations and democracy and by regimes abandoned their East, promoting stability in the region is more 63 Farasin, A. and Battaloglu, C. important than promoting democracy” [7]. the people, rather, they are shows put to However their silence is not a sign of demonstrate regime legitimacy. satisfaction with the policies of their governments. Their alienation is genuine but Political participation allows for superior policy masked by fear. choices and outcomes due to pooling of knowledge and information [8]. In addition, participating in politics is beneficial for both the Alienation of Arab Masses: Drivers The following sub-sections are devoted to explaining how Arab states have managed to alienate the masses. The policies and the performances of the Arab States are analyzed and compared with developing countries and countries in transition in order to identify drawback in the Arab region and how they moral and civic health of the individual, and the nation alike. Theoretical literatures on procedural utility and the psychological benefits of political participation suggest that people who participate in political activities will be more satisfied with their lives because of the resulting feelings of autonomy, competence and relatedness [9]. contribute to the alienation of the Arab masses. In this regard, the Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (BTI) is used to paint a broad picture of: political participation; stability of democratic institutions; political and social integration; and level of socioeconomic development. In addition, the World Wide Governance Indicators are used to determine the quality governance of Arab States along the following dimensions: control of corruption; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; and rule of law. The Arab public believes in and demands political systems that allow them to opportunity to participate in politics. In the 2016 Arab Public Opinion Survey, 77% of Arabs believe that democracy is the most appropriate system of government for their home countries when asked to compare democracy to other types of rule, such as authoritarian regimes or representative democracies where electoral competition is limited to either Islamist or non-Islamist/secular political parties, or to theocracies. More importantly, the majority of Arabs believe that Lack of Political Participation their society is prepared for democracy [10]. Political participation is basically the voice and influence of citizens in politics. In authoritarian states, political participation is exclusive to the ruling elite. Elections in authoritarian states, if held at all, are neither fair nor free. These elections do not reflect the voice and the will of Political participation in Arab countries in comparison to other developing and in transition countries is depicted in Figure 1. The score on the political participation indicator is based on the following criteria: to what extent are political representatives determined by general, free and 64 The Canadian Journal for Middle East Studies Vol2 (1) July 2017 fair elections; to what extent do democratically civic groups, to what extent can these groups elected political representatives have the effective operate and assemble freely; and to what extent power to govern, or to what extent are there veto can citizens, organizations and the mass media powers and political enclaves; to what extent can express opinions freely [11]. individuals form and join independent political or Figure 1: Political Participation 10 Arab Countries 9 8 7 East-Central and Southeast Europe 6 5 4 3 3,1 3,4 3,4 3,4 3,9 3,3 Latin America and the Caribbean 2 Source: Author’s calculation based on the BTI Index, 2016 As the Figure reveals, the level of political implement change. Some of the frustrated turn to participation in Arab countries is lower than all radicalism and violent extremism believing it is other country groups, indicating that the Arab the only available option to induce change. The people do not decide who rules and that they do majority of people suffer from sub-optimal not enjoy political freedoms. Although political outcomes due to policies and choices by the ruling participation in Arab countries did register an elite. Many are stripped of life satisfaction and improvement in the years leading to the Arab happiness Spring and peaked in 2014, it has now receded to participation. The end result is people alienated by levels below that achieved in 2008. the that State is and associated the with ruling political elite The lack of political participation in Arab countries deprives people from means to . Unstable Democratic Institutions Democratic institutions are a perquisite for the Arab Spring demonstrates that without stable consolidation of democracy. The failure of Arab democratic institutions, democratic transition will countries to transition to democratic rule after the be weak and open to interventions by actors such 65 Farasin, A. and Battaloglu, C. as the military. Since the 1970s, some Arab institutions. The result has been that political countries initiated political reforms and embarked reforms and democratization efforts remained on efforts to democratize. However, this was done cosmetic with a top down approach thus failing to without building strong and effective democratic meet the expectation of the Arab public. The factors that facilitate or hinder the building of parliament, effective democratic institutions in Arab countries administration) exist and are they capable of are varied and can be located at different levels: performing international, state, and society. Although states counterproductive friction; and, to what extent are are not the sole factor when it comes to building democratic institutions accepted as legitimate by democratic institutions, their role cannot be the relevant actors. The relevant actors are all emphasized enough. The stability of democratic individuals and organizations that are able to institutions in Arab countries in comparison to concentrate other developing and in transition countries is government bodies, political parties, associations, depicted in Figure 2. The score on the stability of interest groups and civic organizations, as well as democratic institutions indicator is based on the groups with potential veto powers, such as the following criteria: Do democratic institutions military or the clergy [12]. the judiciary effectively political and free power. the from This public extensive, includes (national, regional and local governments, the Figure 2: Stability of Democratic Institutions 10 Arab Countries 9 8 East-Central and Southeast Europe 7 6 5 Latin America and the Caribbean 4 3 2 2,3 2,4 2,4 2,4 1,7 1,9 1 African Countries 200620082010201220142016 Source: Author’s calculation based on the BTI Index, 2016 As the figure shows, the stability of democratic has institutions in Arab countries is very weak, improvement registering dismal scores before and after the Arab demonstrates that Democratic institutions in Arab Spring. In addition, the Arab countries’ score on countries are not capable of performing, and that the stability of democratic institutions indicator they are not adequately accepted and supported by 66 stagnated and since failed 2012. to record The any analysis The Canadian Journal for Middle East Studies Vol2 (1) July 2017 the state and the actors possessing political power. expectation of the Arab public. This has led to the The result has been, as mentioned earlier, that emergence of a gap between the state and the political reforms and democratization efforts in people thus paving the way for the alienation of Arab countries remained cosmetic with a top the masses by the states. down approach thus failing to meet the Lack of Political and Social Integration Arab countries have to deal with issues of and aggregate societal interests; to what extent is tribalism, sectarianism, and ethnic nepotism. In there a network of cooperative associations or this regard, political and social integration interest groups to mediate between society and the becomes highly critical as it has the potential to political system; how strong is the citizens’ transfer people loyalties from tribes, ethnicities, approval of democratic norms and procedures; to and sects to a larger political system. Political and what extent have social self-organization and the social integration in Arab countries in comparison construction of social capital advanced [13]. As to other developing and in transition countries is seen from the criteria, two elements are directly depicted in Figure 3. The score on the political related to the State; which are the State’s attitudes and social integration indicator is based on the and policies towards political parties, associations following criteria: to what extent is there a stable and interest groups. and socially rooted party system able to articulate Figure 3: Political and Social Integration 8 7 Arab Countries 6 5 4 3,5 3 3,6 3,5 3,2 3,5 3,5 East-Central and Southeast Europe 2 200620082010201220142016 Source: Author’s calculation based on the BTI Index, 2016 The figure illustrates the low level of political and equivalent to that in 2006. Arab regimes possess social integration in Arab countries. Furthermore, excessive powers. In some Arab countries, political and social integration has not improved political over the last decade, registering a score in 2016 government policies designed to marginalize parties are rendered weak with 67 Farasin, A. and Battaloglu, C. them. For example; in Jordan elections are based establishment of parties, while in Algeria the on the single vote, an electoral system designed to electoral process is dominated by regime-aligned encourage citizens to vote based on tribal parties. In the Gulf countries, political parties are affiliations and not along party lines. In Egypt, the banned all together and there is no sign that this parties’ ban law imposes high barriers for will be lifted anytime soon. Where political parties are weak, associations fill Under the above described circumstances, stable part of the gap thus giving them the opportunity to and strong patterns of representation for mediating influence politics. The “engineers”, “lawyers”, between society and the state cannot emerge. The and “doctors” associations in Jordan are good lack of proper meditation between the state and examples of influential associations. Nonetheless, society leaves people frustrated and forces them to associations in Arab countries do not fair much put their loyalty in their tribes, ethnicities, and better than political parties and are subject to sects rather than the state. The end result is that marginalization by government policies. In the people do not develop a common sense of Gulf countries the picture is gloomier. The few belonging interest group and NGO that exist are under the protective of the state and society alike. and become alienated and less direct control of government or part of the regime. Socioeconomic Deprivation Poverty, inequality, and low levels of human revolt against the state. Figure 4 shows the level development lead people to feelings of socio- of socioeconomic development in Arab countries economic Soci-oeconomic in comparison to other developing and in deprivation is a main cause of people’s exclusion transition countries. The score on the level of from their socioeconomic development level is based on the governments for their deprivation and exclusion, following criterion: To what extent are significant they become alienated. In its extremes cases, this parts of the population fundamentally excluded alienation leads to political violence, uprisings and from society due to poverty and inequality [14]. The figure demonstrates that in the years Arab World were not satisfied with this preceding the Arab Spring, the level of socio- improvement in their socioeconomic development economic development in Arab countries was levels and continued to feel that they are socio- improving, surpassing the Post-Soviet Eurasia economically deprived. The 2011 Arab Public countries and largely closing the gap with Asia Opinion Survey revealed that the overwhelming and Oceania countries and with Latin America majority of Arab people were dissatisfied with the and the Caribbean countries. Yet, the people in the economic situation of their countries (39% 68 society. deprivation. When people blame The Canadian Journal for Middle East Studies Vol2 (1) July 2017 completely dissatisfied, 28% somewhat Arab Spring was ‘bread’, ‘freedom’, ‘social dissatisfied vs. 8% very satisfied, 20% somewhat justice’. This slogan leaves no doubt that the satisfied, and 6% who did not know or declined to feelings of socio-economic deprivation were at the answer) [15]. Furthermore, one slogan that was heart of people alienation and frustration. frequently heard in demonstrations during the Figure 4: Level of Socioeconomic Development 8 7 Arab Countries 6 5 4 4,0 4,4 4,6 4,5 4,4 4,1 EastCentral and Southeast Europe 3 2 Source: Author’s calculation based on the BTI Index, 2016 On the one hand, the socio-economic development actually receive. People in the Arab world believe level in Arab countries was improving in the days that they deserve to enjoy high levels of preceding the Arab Spring, yet the people were socioeconomic feeling socioeconomically deprived to the extreme realities on the ground fall short of meeting these degree that led them to revolt and take to the expectations. streets. This presents a contradiction; however, This begs the question: why do people in the Arab it’s a contradiction on the surface and a deep World analysis reveals that what is at play in this case is socioeconomic development? The answer to this not absolute deprivation but rather relative question lies in social imaginary. Social imaginary deprivation. Relative deprivation as a concept has can be defined as: “patterned convocations of the been used by social scientists to explain feeling of social whole. These deep-seated modes of frustration by people, as a source of social understanding movements, and in extreme cases as a source of parameters within which people imagine their political violence such as revolts [16]. Simply put social existence—expressed, for example, in relative deprivation refers to the gap between what conceptions of ‘the global,’ ‘the national,’ ‘the people believe they deserve and what they moral order of our time’ ” [17]. The social feel development; entitled provide to whereas, high largely levels the of pre-reflexive 69 Farasin, A. and Battaloglu, C. imaginary of the Arab people is deeply shaped by This disappointment and frustration is transformed their history. The Arab people perceive their into resentment towards the state elites that they history as being full of glory, conquests, and blame for the misery and deprivation. The feelings advancements in the sciences and arts. The Arab of resentment are both political and socio- people yearn to the times they established the economic in nature. great empires of Umayyad and Abbasid when they were leaders of the world. They remember with Social imaginary of the Arab people shapes their great pride the magnificent cities of Damascus, perception of themselves (themselves in a Baghdad, Córdoba, and Granada when they were previous glorious history as compared to current at the center of human civilization. The Arab times). But this is not the only way social people have grown up with the legends of Umar imaginary works. Social imaginary shapes the bin Khattab, Khalid bin Waleed, Umar bin Arab people’s perception of the ‘other’. The other Abdullaziz and Harun al-Rashid, and their stories here is no other than the ‘West’. The history of the of great heroism, justice, integrity, and defense of Arab people is deeply entangled with the West. It human dignity. It is this history that has shaped is a long history characterized by competition. the Arab people’s perception of themselves, When others, and the place and status they deserve in socioeconomic this world. When the Arab people compare their comparison with the West. In such a comparison, current status with what they believe they deserve, the they can only feel disappointed and frustrated. socioeconomically deprived. the Arab Arab status, people people evaluate they evaluate cannot help but their it in feel Poor Governance It has become increasingly accepted that peace, As poor governance lays at the heart of many of security and development are decisively shaped the Arab World problems, good governance has by good governance and institutions [18]. A 2016 been prescribed as the cure. Consequently, it is no Carnegie Endowment for International Peace surprise that the Arab people have vented anger Survey of 105 of the most accomplished thinkers and frustration with the state of poor governance in the Arab World revealed a broad consensus that in their countries and have always demanded good poor governance is the root cause of many of the governance. Governance has many dimensions Arab World problems [19]. This is not new and this article analyzes governance in the Arab information. The Arab Spring uprisings brought to World the fore the inadequacy of the region’s outdated Indicators along four dimensions: control of social contracts in the face of current political and corruption, government effectiveness, regularity economic challenges. Yet, Arab governments still quality, and rule of law. The measures of seem not to have gotten the message [20]. governance are in units of a standard normal 70 using the Worldwide Governance The Canadian Journal for Middle East Studies Vol2 (1) July 2017 distribution, with mean zero, standard deviation of Figure 5 (upper left side) shows the control of one, and running from -2.5 (weak governance corruption indicator in Arab countries. The performance) governance indicator captures perceptions of the extent to performance). The aggregate score for Arab which public power is exercised for private gain, countries along the four dimension of governance including both petty and grand forms of is shown in Figure 5. corruption, as well as the "capture" of the state by Corruption can be simply defined as the “abuse of elites and private interests [25]. As the figure public office for private gain” [21]. The impact of reveals, perception of corruption in Arab countries corruption on development, is in negative territory indicating that the bureaucratic effectiveness, democratic perception of corruption is high. Whatever transition can be an area of debate and improvements achieved in the area of control of disagreement; however, overwhelming evidence corruption in the years prior to the Arab spring shows that corruption negatively affects people’s have perception of state legitimacy. Numerous research corruption in the Arab world is higher than it was points out that corruption is a root cause of a decade ago. This leads the Arab masses to people’s distrust in the state leading to issues of distrust the ruling elite and question their state legitimacy [22] [23] [24]. legitimacy. to +2.5 (strong economic and been erased. Today’s perception of Figure 5: Governance Performance in Arab Countries Source: Author’s calculation based on the Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2016 update. 71 Farasin, A. and Battaloglu, C. Government ineffectiveness in providing public The services (i.e. health, education) is a major source perceptions of the ability of the government to of people’s dissatisfaction with their governments. formulate and implement sound policies and The consequences of government ineffectiveness regulations that permit and promote private sector however go beyond people dissatisfaction to development [27]. Arab countries performance on include When this indicator is shown in Figure 5 (lower left governments fail to provide services effectively, a side). As the figure reveals, Arab countries have void is created which is then filled by non state historically performed poorly on this indicator actors despite the temporarily improvement experienced other serious including ramifications. radical and terrorist regulatory quality indicator captures organizations. By filling the void left by states and before the Arab Spring. by providing services to the population, radical A high quality regulatory environment is a and terrorist organizations gain a footing in prerequisite for entrepreneurship and the growth society and an audience to propagate their views and proliferation of Small and Medium Size and ideology. People dissatisfaction with their Enterprises (SMEs); key areas for the employment government coupled with the rise of radical and and empowerment of youth in particular. Without terrorist organizations create a gap between the a high quality regulatory environment and without people and the state. the potential to realize their business ideas and Figure 5 (upper right side) shows the government dreams, effectiveness indicator in Arab countries. The economy. In the Arab World, young males need indicator captures perceptions of the quality of to demonstrate some economic assets such as a public services; the quality of the civil service and place of accommodation, a vehicle, and a stable the degree of its independence from political source of income before they can get married. pressures; the quality of policy formulation and Economic exclusion thus leads to social exclusion. implementation; and the credibility of the Being excluded from society altogether leaves government's commitment to such policies [26]. youth alienated from the state. The figure shows that governments in the Arab People are more content and society is better off world have not been effective in providing when the political system establishes rules for all services an to abide by. Dicey described the rule of law as improvement in government effectiveness was acting in three ways: the predominance of regular observed in the years 2009 and 2010, all law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary improvements have been wiped out and the power; equality before the law; and, that current score of Arab governments on the constitutional laws are not the source but the government effectiveness indicator has regressed consequence of the rights of individuals [28]. to their population. Although to record low values not seen in the past decade. 72 youth become excluded from the The Canadian Journal for Middle East Studies Vol2 (1) July 2017 Although Arab governments are rhetorically As the figure makes clear, the rule of law is weak supportive of the concept, what counts are the in Arab countries. Arbitrary rule has long plagued practices of the governments and the application the Arab world. Its attendant consequences— of the concept. The rule of law in Arab countries injustice, cruelty, corruption, and degradation— is presented in Figure 5 (lower right side). Rule of have cultivated a deep sense of political anger and law captures perceptions of the extent to which resentment among the people of the region. In agents have confidence in and abide by the rules fact, outrage over such arbitrary rule proved to be of society, and in particular the quality of contract one of the primary triggers for the spate of enforcement, property rights, the police, and the uprisings that seized the region in 2011– 2012 courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and [29]. In light of this, it is unfortunate that the rule violence. of law has deteriorated further after the Arab Spring. Conclusion The Arab masses are not satisfied with the state of the Arab people. Unfortunately as the analysis in affairs in their countries. The governments and the this paper shows, Arab countries have not ruling elite are the target of their frustration and recorded any improvement in the areas of: anger. State polices and the strategic choices of allowing more political participation; building the ruling elite have caused the Arab masses stable democratic institutions; enhancing political alienation by the state. The drivers of this and social integration; elimination socioeconomic alienation before the Arab Spring and after the deprivation, and improving governance. On the Arab Spring are the same and include: lack of contrary, in all of these areas a regression has political occurred after the Arab Spring. participation; unstable democratic social A wise saying proclaims: “The definition of integration; socioeconomic deprivation; and poor insanity is doing the same thing over and over governance. Although it is unfair to blame all the again and expecting a different result.” The root mentioned shortcomings on the state, the role of causes of the Arab masses alienation that led to the state in the alienation of the Arab masses the Arab Spring have not been addressed. New cannot be ignored. uprisings and more instability and violence in the When the uprisings of the Arab Spring took place, Arab World are thus not farfetched scenarios. This the hope was that Arab regimes will hear the necessitates that actor at the: state, society, and messages sent by the people and embark on a international level adopt a new approach. At the reform process that will address the grievances of state level, the ruling elite must realize that the institutions; lack of political and 73 Farasin, A. and Battaloglu, C. traditional tools they have deployed to quell traditionally supported autocratic and oppressive dissent are running their course and a paradigm regimes in Arab countries who were willing to shift is need. Democratization, socioeconomic secure Western economic and strategic interests. development and good governance are not The rise of ISIS and the instability in the region escapable. At the society level, the tragic events have proven this policy to be short sighted and and the humanitarian suffering that unfolded in contrary to Western interest on the long run. 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