Other titles in the Democracy and Terrorism Series,
Edited by Peter R. Neumann
DEMOCRACY AND TERRORISM
Leonard Weinberg
CONFRONTING TERRORISM
Peter R. Neumann
New York London
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Contents
Editors
vii
Contributors
ix
Foreword
xi
1. The Roots of Terrorism: An Overview
1
Louise Richardson
Individual and Psychological Roots
2. The Psychological Dynamics of Terrorism
17
Jerrold M. Post
3. Suicide Terrorism
29
Nasra Hassan
Political Roots
4. Democracy and Terrorism
45
Leonard Weinberg
5. Counterterrorism and Repression
Michael S. Stohl
57
The Roots of Terrorism
vi
6. The Causes of Revolutionary Terrorism
71
Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca
Economic Roots
7. Economic Factors
85
Ted Robert Gurr
8. Terrorism and Globalization
103
Atanas Gotchev
9. Diasporas and Terrorism
117
Gabriel Sheffer
Culture and Religion
10. Religion as a Cause of Terrorism
133
Mark Juergensmeyer
11. Terrorism and the Rise of Political Islam
145
John L. Esposito
12. Terrorism and Deculturation
159
Olivier Roy
Recommended Readings
171
About the International Summit on Democracy,
Terrorism, and Security
175
About the Club de Madrid
187
Index
191
Editors
Book Editor
Louise Richardson is executive dean
of the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced
Study at Harvard University, Cambridge.
She coordinated the working groups on
the underlying factors of terrorism at the
International Summit on Democracy,
Terrorism, and Security, and lectures
widely on terrorism and counterterrorism to a wide range of international and
domestic media and political, military,
intelligence, academic, community, and
alumni organizations.
Dr. Richardson holds positions on
numerous international advisory boards
including Club de Madrid, in Spain;
Humanities Institute of Ireland; and the National Academy of Sciences
Study Committeee on Technical and Privacy Dimensions of Information for Terrorism Prevention. Authoring over 20 monographs, edited
volumes, articles, and chapters, she has written for New England Journal of Medicine and Harvard International Review. Her most recent
book is What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy Containing
the Threat (Random House, 2006).
A lecturer on law at Harvard Law School, Dr. Richardson is also
a senior lecturer in government at Harvard University. She has won
various awards for her teaching including Award for Teaching Excellence from the Bok Center, as well as awards from the American Political Science Association and Pi Sigma Alpha, the Levenson Prize, and
the Abramson Award, all from Harvard University. Dr. Richardson has
viii
The Roots of Terrorism
also received various research and travel awards from the Ford Foundation, The Milton Fund, and The United States Institute of Peace.
Dr. Richardson holds a Ph.D. and M.A. in government from Harvard University, an M.A. in political science from the University of California, Los Angeles, as well as a B.A. and M.A. in history from University of Dublin, Trinity College, Ireland.
Series Editor
Peter R. Neumann is director of the Centre
for Defence Studies at King’s College London.
Prior to this appointment, he was the Leverhulme research fellow in international terrorism at the Department of War Studies at
King’s College. He served as academic director of the Club de Madrid’s International
Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security in Madrid in March 2005, and acted as
senior advisor to the National Policy Forum
on Terrorism, Security and America’s Purpose, which took place in Washington, D.C.
in September 2005.
Dr. Neumann authored Britain’s Long
War (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), the most comprehensive assessment
of British strategy in the Northern Ireland conlict, and has written
numerous articles on strategic terrorism, intelligence and counterterrorism in some of the foremost academic journals, including The Journal
of Strategic Studies, Orbis, Studies in Conlict and Terrorism, and Terrorism and Political Violence. Shorter pieces have been published in the
International Herald Tribune, the New York Times, the Baltimore Sun,
and many others.
Currently working on a book on counterterrorism provisionally
entitled Democracy’s Dilemma, which will be released with IB Tauris in
early 2007, Dr. Neumann is a member of the Club de Madrid’s advisory
board, and holds a Fellowship of the British Royal Society of Arts.
He obtained a Ph.D. in war studies from King’s College London, and an
M.A. in political science from the Free University of Berlin.
Before becoming an academic, Dr. Neumann worked as a journalist, serving as the London bureau chief of Germany’s main radio news
network, BLR. He was a news editor and reporter for Berlin’s two most
popular radio stations, RTL and RS2 radio.
Contributors
John L. Esposito is professor of religion and international affairs and
founding director of the Center for Muslim–Christian Understanding at
Georgetown University in Washington, D.C.
Atanas Gotchev is professor of international relations at the University
of National and World Economy in Soia, Bulgaria. Currently, he is a
World Bank consultant on governance issues in the Caucuses Republics
of the Russia’s Southern Federal District.
Ted Robert Gurr is distinguished professor at the University of Maryland. He was founder of the Polity project, tracking democratization
worldwide, and the Minorities at Risk project, monitoring 300 communal groups in conlict.
Nasra Hassan was born in Pakistan and, having worked in the Middle
East, the Balkans, and Central Asia, is currently based with an international organization in Vienna, Austria.
Mark Juergensmeyer is professor of sociology and religious studies and
director of the Orfalea Center of Global and International Studies at the
University of California, Santa Barbara.
Jerrold M. Post is professor of psychiatry, political psychology, and
international affairs and director of the Political Psychology Program at
George Washington University in Washington, D.C.
Louise Richardson is executive dean of the Radcliffe Institute for
Advanced Study at Harvard University, Cambridge. She coordinated the
working groups on the underlying factors of terrorism at the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism, and Security.
x
The Roots of Terrorism
Olivier Roy is professor at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences
Sociales in Paris. He is the author of Globalized Islam (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2004).
Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca is associate professor of political science and
sociology at the Juan March Institute and the Universidad Complutense,
both in Madrid, Spain.
Gabriel (Gabi) Sheffer is professor of political science at the Hebrew
University of Jerusalem. He was also director of the Leonard Davis
Institute for International Relations at Hebrew University, and editor of
the Jerusalem Journal of International Relations.
Michael S. Stohl is chair and professor in the Department of Communication at the University of California, Santa Barbara. His research
focuses on political communication with special reference to terrorism,
human rights, and global relations.
Leonard Weinberg is Foundation Professor of Political Science at the
University of Nevada and served as a consultant to the United Nations
Ofice for the Prevention of Terrorism. He is senior editor of the journal
Democracy and Security.
Foreword
When the Club de Madrid hosted the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism, and Security in Madrid in March 2005, the aim was to
bring together the most important stakeholders in the debate about how
democracies should confront the threat of terrorism. We believed that
the debate among political leaders, policymakers, and expert practitioners had been incomplete at best and that it was important to provide a
global forum in which all those who had something to contribute could
sit around the table and talk to each other.
A irst result of this process of dialogue was what we called the
Madrid Agenda, released on the last day of the conference. Drawing on
the various contributions made by the summit’s participants, the document outlined the principles and ideas around which a pragmatic consensus in the ight against terrorism could be built. I was heartened by the
fact that even the most hard-nosed antiterrorism practitioners—senior
members of the intelligence services, army generals, and police chiefs—
agreed that maintaining the rule of law, respecting human rights, and
promoting democracy were all essential in making the struggle against
terrorism effective in the long run.
Another point that came across very clearly was the need for our
response against terrorism to be comprehensive. Even though law
enforcement agencies have to be given the powers required to prevent
terrorist attacks and to protect the lives of innocents, the summit participants were unanimous in their view that we must go further. As
the Madrid Agenda states, “International institutions, governments and
civil society should also address the underlying risk factors that provide
terrorists with support and recruits.”
Looking at the root causes of terrorism, however, is not as uncontroversial as it seems. Some dismiss it as simplistic; others even believe
it is an effort to justify terrorism. I could not disagree more strongly.
As the various contributions in this volume show, those who research
the roots of terrorism are conscious that no single cause exists; instead,
we are dealing with a complex, multifaceted problem that requires an
xii
The Roots of Terrorism
equally sophisticated response. Indeed, if our attempts at addressing the
roots of terrorism have been simplistic, it is probably because we have
not done enough to understand them.
Furthermore, inding out why people become terrorists has nothing
to do with excusing their crimes. On the contrary, to better appreciate
the roots of terrorism strikes me as the most obvious starting point for
how to construct our range of responses. It is about mapping what Louise Richardson once described as the “enabling environment” in which
terrorism thrives. Doing so will allow us to draw on a much wider range
of resources and will enable us to employ these in a more targeted way.
In other words, rather than undermining it, such work will help to make
the ight against terrorism more effective.
The Madrid Summit was held on the irst anniversary of the train
bombings in Madrid in 2004, and it was the memory of those terrible
attacks that spurred our efforts. Even back then, I was convinced that
the process of global engagement, dialogue and action that was begun
in Madrid must continue. Following the recent bombings in London,
Sharm-el-Sheikh and Bali, it is more necessary than ever. This book is
an important part of that effort. I strongly commend it to every serious
student of the topic.
Mary Robinson
Vice President of the Club de Madrid
Former President of Ireland
1
The Roots of Terrorism: An Overview
Louise Richardson
In June 2005 White House advisor Karl Rove criticized what he
described as the effort of liberals after the attacks of September 11,
2001, to understand the terrorists.1 In so saying, Rove was relecting a
common predilection to equate understanding terrorism with sympathy
for terrorists. Like the sixty-ive academics who deliberated together on
the underlying causes of terrorism for several months and who convened
in Madrid on the irst anniversary of the Atocha train bombings, I reject
this view. We believe that only by understanding the forces leading to
the emergence of terrorism—the root causes, in other words—can we
hope to devise a successful long-term counterterrorist strategy.
As the contributions to this volume demonstrate, the search for the
underlying causes of terrorism is a complicated endeavor. The dificulty of the task must serve as an inducement to sustained and rigorous
research on the subject—not as invitation to throw in the towel and deal
simply with the symptoms that present themselves. Policy makers, faced
with pressures for immediate action to deal with a formidable threat,
can be forgiven for seeking a rapid reaction plan. The role of academics,
on the other hand, is to ensure that the plans they reach for are based on
a deep-seated understanding of the nature of the threat they face.
The search for the cause of terrorism, like the search for a cure for
cancer, is not going to yield a single deinitive solution. But as with any
disease, an effective cure will be dependent on the accurate diagnosis of the multiplicity of risk factors as well as their interactions with
one another. The cure is likely to be almost as complicated as the disease, entailing a combination of alleviating the risk factors, blocking
The Roots of Terrorism
the interactions between them, and building the body’s resilience to
exposure. Above all, it will focus irst and foremost on preventing the
spread of the disease.
The working deinition of terrorism employed by this group—in
the absence of an agreed international deinition—is contained in the
U.S. Code: “Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated
against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to inluence an audience.”2 Terrorism, in
fact, is a complex and multivariate phenomenon. It appears in many
different forms in many parts of the world in pursuit of many different objectives. It occurs in democracies, autocracies, and transitional
states and in developed, underdeveloped, and developing economies.
It is practiced by adherents of many religions and by adherents of
none. What all terrorist groups have in common is that they are
weaker than their enemies and that they are prepared deliberately to
murder noncombatants in furtherance of their objectives. The adoption of terrorism as a tactic to effect political change is, therefore, a
deliberate choice.
Terrorist groups differ from one another in important ways.
They differ in the nature of their ideology and in the speciicity of
their political objectives. They differ in their relationship to religion
and to the communities from which they derive support. They also
differ in the trajectory of their violence. Historically, for example,
most terrorist groups were domestic, and others started locally and
went global; recently, however, global conlicts seem to inspire local
groups to terrorism.
One of the most obvious dificulties in identifying a cause or
causes of terrorism is that terrorism is a microphenomenon. Metaexplanations cannot be used successfully to explain microphenomena.
Take the case of social revolutionary movements in Europe in the
1970s for example. Their behavior was attributed to the alienation of
the young whose postwar idealism was thwarted by capitalist materialism. But if this alienation was the cause, then why were there
not many more terrorists? Alienation was widespread, but terrorism,
fortunately, had relatively few adherents. Alienation alone, therefore,
cannot stand as the cause of their terrorism.
Nationalist terrorism, on the other hand, has been more broadly
based. Ethnonationalist groups have resorted to terrorism all over the
world from Northern Ireland, Spain, and Corsica to Turkey, Chechnya, Sri Lanka, India, and the Middle East. But if nationalism were
the cause of their terrorism, then why have other ethnic and nationalist groups—who do not occupy a territory consistent with their sense
of identity—not also resorted to terrorism? Nationalism can provide
The Roots of Terrorism: An Overview
a sense of grievance and a unifying and legitimizing aspiration, but it
cannot alone explain why a group seeks to realize their nationalist goal
through terrorist violence as opposed to other forms of political action.
The contributors to this volume relect a range of academic disciplines from psychologist to sociologist, from economist to political scientist and historian. None claim for their ields a monopoly
on insight into the root causes of terrorism. On the contrary, each
concedes the need for several approaches to the problem. Different
ields, however, tend to focus on particular levels of analysis. These
have been broadly divided into individual, political, economic, and
cultural factors. I irst review the arguments made by the contributors and then extrapolate the policy prescriptions from their analysis
before spelling out a research agenda that would advance our understanding of the crucial question of the roots of terrorism.
Underlying Causes of Terrorism
At the level of the individual, psychologists have long argued that
there is no particular terrorist personality and that the notion of terrorists as crazed fanatics is not consistent with the plentiful empirical
evidence available. Jerrold Post points out that terrorists are psychologically normal in the sense of not being clinically psychotic; they
are neither depressed nor severely emotionally disturbed. Instead,
he advocates an analysis of the crucial concept of collective identity
where group, organizational, and social psychology provide more
analytical power than individual psychology. He argues that the
sociocultural context determines the balance between collective and
individual identity and in particular the manner in which terrorist
recruits subordinate their individual identity to that of the collective.
He points to the importance of distinguishing leaders from followers and of understanding the crucial role of the leader in providing a
sense-making message to the followers. Post also stresses the importance of group dynamics and the manner in which groups may make
riskier decisions than individuals. He points out that if the path to
leadership in an organization is through violence, then the group will
be pushed inexorably toward greater and greater levels of violence
irrespective of what individuals may think.
Nasra Hassan also focuses on individuals and in particular on
individual suicide jihadis. She interviewed the families and friends
of 250 suicide bombers from a variety of conlicts and compares
the appeal and the implementation of the tactic among the different
religious and secular groups who employ it. Like other contributors
to this volume she challenges the view that madrassa and mosque
schools are the chief generator of suicide jihadis, suggesting instead
The Roots of Terrorism
the broader environment and the volunteers selected for the special
training camps. Though she cites certain essential elements like loyalty to a charismatic igure and preexisting grievances against an outgroup, by examining the many differences among the various suicide
terrorist campaigns, the mixture of religious and political motive and
rhetoric, and the style of training and method of deployment Hassan
implicitly challenges the notion that there is any one simple cause
of even this particular terrorist tactic or even a shared proile of the
suicide jihadist.
Where psychologists and writers seek explanation at the individual and group level, political scientists bring the tools of their trade to
bear in attempting to establish lines irst of correlation and then causation between the outbreak of terrorism and the nature of the political environment in which the violence takes place. Recognizing the
myriad different types of terrorism, Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca focuses
his analysis on revolutionary movements. These were the movements
that bedeviled several wealthy western democracies in the mid-1970s
and early 1980s. They include the Red Brigades and Prima Linea in
Italy, the Red Army Faction in Germany, First of October Antifascist
Resistance Group (GRAPO) in Spain, the Revolutionary Organization 17 November in Greece, FP 25 Abril in Portugal, and Action
Directe in France. In a multivariate analysis with twenty-one countries, Sánchez-Cuenca inds that by far the most powerful predictor
of the lethality of violence is past political instability. He uses what
he terms a political selection model to demonstrate why revolutionary violent groups emerged in many developed countries in the ’70s
and ’80s but only evolved into terrorist groups in a handful of cases.
He found that terrorist groups emerged in states that had experienced past political instability and had powerful social movements
in the ’60s, had engaged in counterproductive repression, and had
also seen an emergence of fascist terrorism. While Sánchez-Cuenca
believes this model could probably also explain the emergence of ethnonationalist terrorism in Spain and Northern Ireland, he has no illusions that it could be employed convincingly in cases of international
terrorism in which the unit of observation is not a clearly deined
state. His analysis speaks to the wisdom of disaggregating the very
broad concept of terrorism and focusing instead on particular types
of terrorist groups.
Leonard Weinberg also chooses to narrow his analysis. He examines the political sources of terrorism in democracies. In thinking
about the domestic political causes he retains political scientist Martha Crenshaw’s distinction between permissive and instigating factors. 3 The weakness of analyzing along the lines of permissive causes
The Roots of Terrorism: An Overview
is demonstrated implicitly by Sánchez-Cuenca: The same permissive
factors can exist in several states but only produce terrorism in some.
Another weakness correctly identiied by Weinberg is that, thanks to
new forms of technology, behavior can be quickly diffused and terrorist campaigns can spread from one country to another in spite of
differences in the political conditions of those countries.
Weinberg subjects to empirical testing several arguments found in
the literature on the relationship between terrorism and democracy.
He inds that outbreaks of terrorism are not the exclusive preserve of
transitional democracies. He points out that in fact, although terrorism
can be present at the creation of democracy, the failure of democracies
to respond forcibly also has brought about their demise, as in Uruguay,
Argentina, and Turkey. He also demonstrates that longevity in no way
insulates democracies from outbreaks of domestic terrorism.
After exploring the explanatory power of temporal permissive
explanations Weinberg turns to structural ones. He refers to data
analysis—again limited to western democracies—indicating that the
greater the degree of ethnic diversity and the greater the degree of
political fragmentation in the polity, the higher the incidence of terrorism. Conversely, the more evenly distributed the income and the
better the record in protecting civil rights, the lower the incidence of
terrorism. He recognizes the problems of causality here, of course,
as states that have had fewer threats from terrorists may have better
protections for civil liberties as a consequence, not a cause. He concludes that instigating factors like radicalization and their interaction
with the behavior of the state are more likely to be helpful in understanding outbreaks of terrorism.
The relative recency of transnational terrorism means that data
collection is at a much more rudimentary stage. Nevertheless, Weinberg believes that broad-based explanations such as the structure of
the international system or globalization are not consistent with the
evidence. The unipolar system as an explanatory variable is undermined by the presence of terrorism under multipolar as well as unipolar international distributions of power. He also uses empirical
analysis to challenge the explanatory power of globalization, arguing that an examination of terrorist incidents suggests that more
incidents take place among those at the bottom of the globalization
scale, secondly among those at the top and the least between those
at opposite ends. That is, most terrorist attacks are committed by
citiens of countries a the bottom of the globalization index against
citizens of countries also at the bottom of the index. When citizens
of highly globalized countries are victims their attackers tend to
come from other highly globalized societies. Attacks by citizens of
The Roots of Terrorism
countries at the bottom of the index against citizens of countries at
the top are less common. These indings, however, again speak to
the need to disaggregate among different types of groups because
the incidence of Islamist terrorism suggests a different result, as
seen in the contribution of Atanas Gotchev.
Gotchev, an economist, explores the downside effects of globalization as a cause of terrorism. He shows how the inequitable distribution of the positive effectives of globalization across countries
provides both incentives and opportunities to organize, inance, and
carry out terrorist acts. He does not argue that globalization causes
terrorism but rather that it too can creative a permissive environment
for its occurrence. He points out that globalization has increased
inequalities and social polarization both within and between states
and that this in turn leads to demands for political change. Moreover,
the spread of western culture and the need to adapt to take advantage
of the beneits of globalization provoke political and cultural resistance and an emphasis on differences. Gotchev argues that globalization also fosters the development of new minorities by facilitating the
movement of labor. These in turn may provide both logistical and
inancial support as well as human capital for the terrorist groups.
He goes on to argue that globalization diminishes the power of the
nation state by constraining the state’s ability to control its economy
and by enabling a proliferation of nongovernmental organizations.
Finally, he argues that globalization provides both new methods and
new easily accessible targets for terrorists.
Gotchev does not argue, contra Weinberg, that globalization
causes terrorism but rather that it facilitates its emergence. Globalization then falls into Crenshaw’s category of a permissive cause of terrorism. Gabi Sheffer takes this argument a step further by examining
this other that is produced by globalization. He explores the diaspora
and offers a classiication of the various components of the other. He
explores the many behavioral and organizational differences among
different elements of the diaspora and assesses the degree of intensity
of their violence both in their adoptive and originating countries.
The link between diasporas and terrorism is not hard to ind. He
argues that twenty-seven of the ifty most active contemporary terrorist organizations are either part of a diaspora or are supported by
one—though he would not, of course, challenge the view that most
members of diaspora communities utterly reject the use of terrorism
to redress their grievances.
Sociologist Ted Gurr also explores some of the many complex
linkages between economic factors and terrorism. Arguing that terrorism is a choice made by groups waging conlict rather than an
The Roots of Terrorism: An Overview
automatic response to deprivation, he points out that the perpetrators
of the September 11, 2001, atrocity in the United States were middle
class and well educated. They were also products of societies undergoing profound socioeconomic changes in which opportunities for
political expression were sharply curtailed. In addition, they were all
recruited by Islamists committed to jihad against the West.
Gurr contends that objective poverty is not a direct cause of terrorism, though it can contribute indirectly to the outbreak of terrorism in many ways. He argues quite convincingly that inequalities,
or relative deprivation, are more important than poverty as a source
of terrorism. This also helps to account for the common observation that leaders of terrorist movements, like leaders of organizations,
generally tend to be more highly educated and of a higher socioeconomic status than their followers and those in their communities.
Ethnonationalist terrorism in particular can be linked to discrimination on the basis of ethnic identity, though not all instances of ethnic
discrimination lead to terrorism. Rapid socioeconomic change also
serves as a risk factor for terrorism. This is because of the instability
it generates and the associated dislocations produced.
His argument then is that, rather than poverty, structured
inequalities within countries facilitate the emergence of terrorism
and that rapid socioeconomic change feeds this process. When these
factors interact with the restrictions on political rights, disadvantaged groups are what Gurr calls “ripe for recruitment.” As Weinberg
and Michael Stohl also notice, semirepressive state reactions often
contribute to the evolution from political mobilization to terrorism
because of their inconsistent mix of repression and reform. Finally,
like Sheffer, Gurr explores the relationship between terrorism and
conventional crime as the need to inance the former often draws the
terrorist toward the latter.
Turning away from an examination of economic and political to
explore cultural and religious causes, our authors focus on Islam and
jihad. John Esposito provides a historical analysis of the emergence
of what he calls political Islam, more often referred to as Islamism or
Islamic fundamentalism, and in so doing makes the crucial distinction between mainstream and extremist movements. He concludes
that terrorists like Osama bin Laden are driven not by religion but by
political and economic grievances; however, they draw on a tradition
of religious extremism to legitimize their actions. They ignore classical Islam’s criteria for a just war, recognizing no limits but their own.
They also reject classical Islam’s regulations regarding a valid jihad
with its insistence on the protection of noncombatants and the proportionate use of violence. Esposito argues that the primary causes—
The Roots of Terrorism
which are socioeconomic and political to varying degrees in different contexts—are obscured by the religious language and extremism
used by extremists.
Olivier Roy explores the explanatory issue of deculturation as
a cause of Islamic terrorism. An empirical examination of the perpetrators of Islamic violence in Western Europe, he argues, suggests
they are part of a broad supranational network operating in the West
that is disconnected from any discrete territorial base. Contrary to
popular opinion Roy points out that their backgrounds have little to
do with traditional religious education or even particular conlicts in
the Middle East: They became born-again Muslims in the West—not
in radical mosques but rather in the framework of a group of similarly uprooted local friends. They have very little connection to the
real Muslim world or to the world of their parents. They were in
effect rebels in search of a cause when Islamism presented itself. He
concludes that their radicalization has nothing whatever to do with
Islam as a culture and everything to do with “deculturation and individualization.” He sees them, in essence, as another example of religious revivalism with a global perception of the state of the ummah,
that is, the global community of Islam. If Roy is correct, then the task
of governments is to accept Islam as a Western religion among many
others and not as the expression of an ethnocultural community. It
means working to undermine foreign connections and instead integrating Muslims and community leaders on a pluralist basis.
Mark Juergensmeyer looks more broadly at all religions and their
relationship to terrorism. He agrees with Esposito that underlying
economic social and political grievances—rather than religion—are
the initial problem but points out that these secular concerns are now
being expressed through rebellious religious ideologies, which makes
then more intractable. These grievances provide a sense of alienation,
marginalization, and social frustration but they are being articulated
in religious terms, are being seen through religious images, and are
being organized by religious leaders through religious institutions.
Religion then brings new aspects to the conlict. It provides personal
rewards, vehicles for social mobilization, organizational networks,
and, more importantly, a justiication for violence. Juergensmeyer
argues that religion does not cause terrorism but problematizes
it because it absolutizes the conlict, thereby making its resolution
enormously more dificult.
The contributors to this volume do not produce a set of causes to
be ixed so as to end terrorism. Rather, through an analysis of speciic
cases, concepts, and raw data they indicate a set of risk factors for
the emergence of terrorism. The risk factors alone will not cause ter-
The Roots of Terrorism: An Overview
rorism; they need to be ignited by particular events, policies, or leaders that mobilize the disaffection they generate into violent action.
Ameliorating these risk factors is not a short-term process and so is
unlikely to have immediate results in the campaign against terrorism,
but over the longer term this action is likely to have signiicant beneits throughout these societies and indirectly to reduce support for a
resort to terrorist action.
Policy Recommendations
Effective counterterrorist policies likely will address both the underlying and the proximate causes of the violence and will combine long-term
developmental strategies with short-term and often coercive responses.
It is imperative, however, that in their haste to secure short-term success against terrorists, governments should not lose sight of the longerterm goals—that the implementation of the short-term measures does
not undermine the achievement of the long-term objectives.
The long-term goal is to delegitimize the resort to terrorism as
a means of effecting political change and to reduce the opportunities and incentives for doing so. It is to channel the effort to redress
grievances into conventional politics. Action in furtherance of this
aim is unlikely to appeal to currently practicing terrorists but over
the long term is likely to undermine their ability to win recruits for
their cause. A more immediate and closely related goal is to separate terrorists from the communities from which they derive support,
to deny them means of recruiting new members, and to prevent the
appeal of their ideology and their actions from spreading
An essential goal of long-term counterterrorism policy must be to
reduce the reservoir of resentment that breeds support for the resort
to terrorism. In working toward this goal, it is crucial to remember
that the majority of the populations, and even the majority of political activists in societies that produce terrorism, are among the most
powerful forces for securing stable and safe societies. Punitive policies, therefore, must be focused on the perpetrators of the violence.
Esposito points out, for example, that a zero-tolerance approach to
mainstream political Islamic movements not only will undermine
civil society and the credibility of the West’s commitment to democracy but also will produce the alienation that feeds the growth of
terrorism. Mainstream movements, he argues, require engagement,
whereas zero tolerance should be reserved for extremists. Stohl also
reminds us how repressive action and denial of human rights on the
part of the state can precipitate outbreaks of terrorist violence and
that counterterrorist action, taken without regard for democratic
principles and the rule of law, can serve to generate more terrorism.
10
The Roots of Terrorism
Among the longer-term economic responses to terrorism are mitigating the impact of globalization or rapid socioeconomic change on
vulnerable segments of the population in developing countries. Aid
and investment, therefore, should be targeted to those most directly
affected to enable them to inluence the nature and pace of development. Those attempting to counter terrorism should be prepared
to help inance socioeconomic policies that promote the growth of
a middle class and women’s literacy and education. A burgeoning
middle class and the political and economic participation of women
can serves as breaks on the development of extremism. Governments must be encouraged to reduce gross inequalities and group
discrimination and to integrate marginalized groups into political
and economic activity. Educational opportunities must be enhanced,
but this must go hand in hand with economic development to ensure
that employment opportunities are available for those so educated.
The West should be prepared to provide alternatives to traditional
Islamic education that fails to provide the tools for participation in
modernizing societies. The need to integrate marginalized groups is
not, however, limited to developing countries. On the contrary, the
alienation of diaspora communities in the wealthiest countries in the
world remains a real vulnerability and must be addressed.
Finally, those of us in the U.S. must engage in a war of ideas with
the extremist ideologies. We should be able to mobilize local moderates to our side in this campaign, but we will only be able to do so
successfully if our rhetoric at home is matched by our action on the
ground. In this effort we should be prepared to support moderate
Islamic scholarship and political parties even when they are critical
of our actions. We need to engage in a vigorous campaign of public
diplomacy to make our case to the populations that produce terrorists. We are only likely to be successful in the effort if we can demonstrate that our commitment to liberal ideals and the rule of law is
consistently applied and that we hold ourselves and our allies to the
same standards as we hold others. We need to exploit new media
technologies to engage in what Post calls a strategic communications
program to address systematically the arguments against us and to
counter the avenues through which extremists win recruits.
We should not have any illusions that success will come quickly.
Many terrorist groups have ended their campaigns fairly quickly,
but these were small isolated movements like the Red Army Faction (RAF), or movements effectively destroyed by police action like
Revolutionary Organization 17 November or by ruthless suppression
by the state, as in several Latin American countries. Other movements—especially those with close ties to their communities—have
The Roots of Terrorism: An Overview
11
lasted a very long time. In societies in which, in Post’s words, “hatred
has been bred in the bone” and in which socialization begins at an
early age and is reinforced and consolidated into an essential element
of collective identity, no short-term solution exists. The goal, however, is not to turn the world into American cheerleaders. The only
threshold the U.S. needs to reach will come from people not employing terrorism as a means to voice their frustrations, their objections
to American policies or American inluence on their societies.
Of course, more immediate steps can be and are being taken.
These entail reducing the inancial, material, and political resources
of terrorist organizations and inhibiting their ability to move freely
through enhanced border and customs controls. Several contributors
speak to the need to investigate fraudulent charities and to otherwise
disrupt the low of money to terrorist groups. To these suggestions
I add the need to review the foreign policies of governments with
global inluence with a view of how they advance a broader deinition of the state’s national interest. Westerners should be prepared to
incorporate into the evaluation of our policies how they are perceived
on the ground and whether, in the eyes of the populations whose
conidence we are trying to acquire, our policies appear to be more
consistent with our ideals than with the motives attributed to us by
the extremists.
A concerted effort on our part to redress political conlicts that
have been exploited by extremists will again undermine their efforts
to win recruits. A resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian dispute or the
dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir will not satisfy the
extremists, but it will reduce the reservoir of resentment on which
they feed. One of the big advantages of following these policy recommendations is that they have a myriad of beneits. Even if generous and strategically distributed development aid and a resolution of
political conlicts did not undercut terrorism, as I have argued they
would,4 they have many other quite tangible beneits in the improvement to the quality of life of those affected.
Research Agenda
This book is far from being the last word on understanding the root
causes of terrorism. As each of the contributors makes clear, there
remains a great deal that we do not know and yet we need to know
if we care to understand the terrorist threat. This book provides a
detailed account of the permissive factors facilitating the emergence
of terrorism. The proximate causes of terrorism are more obvious
and are regularly stated publicly by the perpetrators of the violence.
We know much less about the way the proximate and the permissive
1
The Roots of Terrorism
causes interact with one another. We know they interact through the
leaders and their followers, but we have a lot to learn about how this
happens. In this sense, a great deal of research needs to be done on the
terrorist life cycle. In order to disrupt the path into terrorism and to
devise policies that inhibit potential recruits from joining, encourage
experienced recruits to leave, produce dissent within the group, and
undermine the internal authority of the leaders, we need to gather a
great deal more information about how the groups operate internally.
There is no substitute for primary research in this endeavor.
The proliferation of terrorist attacks and growing lethality of
terrorist violence inclines others to see terrorism as an ideology and
terrorists as a uniform mass of evildoers. They cannot usefully be
understood in this way. Each terrorist group must be understood in
its own context; the most successful counterterrorist strategy is likely
to be particularly geared to that group. That said, we need to have a
keener understanding of how groups are similar and how they are not.
Detailed, structured, focused comparisons based on intensive analysis of a range of movements are likely to enhance our understanding
both of individual groups and of the phenomenon more generally.
In this book we demonstrate that terrorism is not caused by
religion, globalization, political structures, or psychopaths. We do
argue, however, that political and economic inequalities and social
alienation are risk factors for the emergence of terrorism. Religion
can exacerbate the problem, as it can be used to legitimize the use
of violence to redress these political and socioeconomic grievances.
Once grievances are expressed in religious terms the conlict becomes
altogether more dificult to resolve. There is a lot we do not know
about the underlying causes of terrorism, but everything we do
know points to the importance of developing a long-term coordinated strategy that is consistent with our democratic principles and
in which short-term objectives are integrated with long-term goals. It
is both unwise and unnecessary to sacriice liberal democratic values
to secure short-term security. On the contrary, the strongest weapons in our arsenal against terrorism are precisely the facets of our
society that appeal to the potential recruits for terrorists. And these
potential recruits—who come from the communities from which terrorists derive their support—should become the focus of counterterrorist policies. If we can help to redress the rampant economic inequities and sociopolitical marginalization in these communities we will
reduce both the opportunities and the incentives for the resort to terrorism, thereby constraining the growth and increasing the isolation
of terrorist groups. We can then focus our coercive policies on these
perpetrators of violence. These directed policies are far more likely
The Roots of Terrorism: An Overview
1
to be successful if they are based on a thorough understanding of the
nature of the group being faced. A plan of action that involves mobilizing the moderates while integrating the marginalized and isolating
the extremists is entirely consistent with the principles of democracy
our governments were designed to defend in the irst place.
Endnotes
1. Karl Rove (speech, Conservative Party of New York State, June 22,
2005).
2. U.S. Code, title 22, sec. 2656f(d).
3. Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism” Comparative Politics, Volume 13, No. 4, (July 1981) pp 379-400.
4. Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Terrorist Threat, John Murray, London, 2006.
Individual and
Psychological Roots
2
The Psychological Dynamics
of Terrorism1
Jerrold M. Post
Since the beginning of the modern era of terrorism, represented by the
iconic event of the seizure of the Israeli Olympic village at the 1972
Munich Olympics by Black September terrorists, behavioral scientists
have sought the holy grail of the terrorist personality. But these efforts
have proven fruitless, for the label terrorism refers to an extremely complex and diverse phenomenon. In considering the psychology of rightwing, nationalist-separatist, social revolutionary, and religious fundamentalist terrorists—given how different their causes and perspectives
are—these types are expected to differ markedly. So we should discuss
terrorisms—plural—and terrorist psychologies—plural—rather than
searching for a uniied general theory explaining all terrorist behavior.
In other words, there is not a one-size-its-all explanation: The leadership and follower, group and organizational dynamics, and decision
patterns will differ from group to group. And although psychology plays
a crucial role in understanding terrorism, a comprehensive understanding of this complex phenomenon requires an interdisciplinary approach,
incorporating knowledge from political, historical, cultural, economic,
ideological, and religious scholarship. It is important to consider each
terrorism in its own political, historical, and cultural context, since terrorism is a product of its own place and time. It is an attractive strategy
to a diverse array of groups that have little else in common otherwise.
Explanations of terrorism at the level of individual psychology are
insuficient in helping to understand why people become involved in
1
The Roots of Terrorism
terrorism. Indeed, it is not going too far to assert that terrorists are
psychologically normal—that is, not clinically psychotic. They are
not depressed and not severely emotionally disturbed, nor are they
crazed fanatics. In fact, terrorist groups and organizations regularly
weed out emotionally unstable individuals. They represent, after all,
a security risk. Indeed, there is a multiplicity of individual motivations. For some, revenge is a primary motivation; for others, it is to
give a sense of power to the powerless; for still others, it is to gain a
sense of signiicance. Within each group can be found motivational
differences among the members, each of whom is motivated to differing degrees by group interest versus self-serving actions, as well as
by ideology.
There is a clear consensus that group, organizational, and social
psychology—and not individual psychology—provide the greatest
analytic power in understanding this complex phenomenon where
collective identity is paramount. For some groups, especially nationalist-separatist terrorist groups, this collective identity is established
extremely early so that hatred is bred in the bone. The importance
of collective identity and the processes of forming and transforming
collective identities cannot be overstated. This, in turn, emphasizes
the sociocultural context, which determines the balance between collective and individual identity. Terrorists subordinate their individual
identity to the collective identity so that what serves the group, organization, or network is of primary importance. Some of the themes
following from this idea are explored in this chapter. In particular, I
highlight a number of key dynamics and structures that are signiicant in understanding the psychological bases of terrorism and then
outline a series of policy recommendations based on these insights.
Social and Generational Dynamics
The irst important area of consideration is the social and generational
dynamics of terrorist groups. The dynamics of nationalist-separatist
terrorist groups, such as Euzakadi ta Askabasuna–Basque Fatherland
and Liberty ETA of Spain’s Basque region or the Palestinian group
Fatah, differ dramatically from those of social-revolutionary terrorist groups, such as the Red Army Faction in Germany or Italy’s Red
Brigades. This is illustrated in a generational matrix (Figure 2.1). 2
The X in the upper left-hand cell indicates that individuals who are
at one with parents loyal to the regime do not become terrorists. The
lower left-hand cell shows individuals rebelling against their parents
who are loyal to the regime. One of the Baader-Meinhoff terrorists
once sardonically remarked, “This is the generation of corrupt old
men who gave us Auschwitz and Hiroshima.” One can make a case
The Psychological Dynamics of Terrorism
1
Parents’ Relationship to Regime
Youth’s
Relationship to
Parents
L
D
L
oyal
oyal
X
isloyal
Social
Revolutionary
Terrorism
D
isloyal
amaged
issident
NationalistSeparatist
Terrorism
Figure 2.1
that these dynamics apply to Osama bin Laden, who—in striking
out at the Saudi regime, criticizing them for accepting occupation by
the U.S. military of “the land of the two cities”—was striking out at
the generation of his family that was loyal to the regime. So although
bin Laden is a religious fundamentalist terrorist, he has the dynamics
of a social revolutionary as well. In contrast, in the upper right-hand
cell are the nationalist-separatist terrorists, carrying on the mission
of their parents who are disloyal to, dissident to, or damaged by the
regime. Whether in the pubs of Northern Ireland or the coffee houses
in the Palestinian territories, they have heard of the economic injustice or of the lands stolen from their parents and grandparents. They
are loyal to parents disloyal to the regime. For these groups in particular, hatred has been transmitted generationally.
The theme of loyalty to a family that has been damaged by the
regime is well illustrated by Omar Rezaq, an Abu Nidal Organization terrorist tried in the federal district court in Washington D.C.
in 1996. 3 I had the opportunity of interviewing Rezaq during my
service as expert on terrorist psychology for the Department of Justice in connection with his trial for the federal crime of skyjacking.
It was Rezaq who played a central role in seizing the Egypt Air plane
that was forced down in Malta in 1985. He shot ive hostages—two
Israeli women and three Americans—before a botched SWAT team
0
The Roots of Terrorism
attack by Egyptian forces led to more than ifty casualties. Convicted of murder in a Malta court, Rezaq was given amnesty and was
released after seven years of imprisonment. Subsequently, though, he
was arrested by U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation agents.
Rezaq epitomized the life and psychology of the nationalistseparatist terrorist. On the basis of some eight hours of interviews
and the review of thousands of pages of documents, a coherent story
emerged. The defendant assuredly did not believe that what he was
doing was wrong: From boyhood on Rezaq had been socialized to
be a heroic revolutionary ighting for the Palestinian nation. Demonstrating the generational transmission of hatred, his case can be
considered emblematic of many from the ranks of ethnic–nationalist
terrorist groups, from Northern Ireland to Palestine, from Armenia
to the Basque region of Spain.
Rezaq’s mother was eight years old and living in Jaffa when the
1948 Arab–Israeli War broke out, forcing her family to lee their
home for the West Bank. The mother’s displacement by Israel from
her ancestral home was an event of crucial importance and became
a key element in the family legend. Born in 1958, Rezaq spent his
childhood in the West Bank village where his grandfather was a
farmer. In 1967, the year he turned eight, the Arab–Israeli Six Day
War broke out, and the family was forced to lee once again—this
time to a refugee camp in Jordan. There, young Rezaq attended a
school where his teachers were members of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). In 1968, the battle of Karameh occurred,
in which Yasser Arafat led a group of Palestinian guerrillas in ighting a twelve-hour battle against superior Israeli forces, galvanizing
the previously dispirited Palestinian population. The spirit of the
revolution was everywhere, especially in the refugee camps, and the
PLO became a rallying point. In Rezaq’s words, “The revolution was
the only hope.”
In school, Rezaq was taught by a member of the PLO whom he
came to idolize, that the only way to become a man was to join the
revolution and to regain the lands taken away from his parents and
grandparents. In the morning, he was exposed to a basic elementary
school curriculum, and starting at age nine, in the afternoon he was
given paramilitary training and ideological indoctrination. He joined
Fatah when he was seventeen and subsequently became a member of
the Abu Nidal Organization. When he carried out the skyjacking,
it was the proudest moment of his life. He was fulilling his destiny.
He was carrying on his family’s cause—a cause that had been bred
in the bone.
The Psychological Dynamics of Terrorism
1
This, incidentally, is also true for many militant Islamists, whose
hatred often was steeped from childhood on in the mosques. Consider the following statement from an incarcerated Hamas terrorist:
I came from a religious family which used to observe all the
Islamic traditions. My initial political awareness came during the prayers at the mosque. That’s where I was also asked
to join religious classes. In the context of these studies, the
Sheik used to inject some historical background in which he
would tell us how we were effectively evicted from Palestine.
The Sheik also used to explain to use the signiicance of the
fact that there was a military outpost [of the Israeli Defense
Forces] in the heart of the camp. He compared it to a cancer in
the human body, which was threatening its very existence.4
It could be argued, therefore, that—whether they profess to be revolutionaries, to be religiously motivated or to be nationalist-separatists—the generational and social dynamics of potential terrorists have
an important bearing on their attitudes and overall development.
Leaders and Followers
In addition to understanding the social dynamics of terrorist groups,
it is important to distinguish leaders from followers. The role of the
leader is crucial in drawing together alienated, frustrated individuals
into a coherent organization. They provide a sense-making unifying
message that conveys a religious, political, or ideological goal to their
disparate followers. The leader plays a crucial role in identifying the
external enemy as the cause, and drawing together into a collective
identity otherwise dissimilar individuals who may be discontented
and aggrieved, but who, without the powerful presence of the leader,
would remain isolated and individually aggrieved. Hoffer, in The
True Believer, speaks of the capacity of the hate-mongering leader
to manipulate “the slime of discontented souls.”5 The hate-mongering leader—or political entrepreneur—also plays a crucial organizing
role, as exempliied by bin Laden who has become a positive identiication object for thousands of alienated Arab and Muslim youth.
For them, he serves as the heroic avenger with the courage to stand
up against the superpower. And in following his lead, the individual
group member is seen as unselish, altruistic, and heroic to the point
of self-sacriice. Equally signiicant—though less well understood—is
the process by which followers enter the leadership echelon, because
this dynamic is critical to the viability of the group. Systematic study
The Roots of Terrorism
of autobiographical accounts may help identify the salient features of
this dynamic, which will be expected to differ from group to group.
Though it is easy to understand how a religious fundamentalist
leader can use his religious authority to justify extreme acts to his followers, charismatic leaders can persuade their true-believer followers
to carry out such acts in pursuit of a secular cause as well. This has
been demonstrated by the willingness of members of the Kurdish separatist PKK (The Kurdistan Workers’ Party) or the Sri Lankan Tamil
Tigers (LTTE) to commit suicide terrorism for a nationalist cause. If
anything, these examples reveal that the sway of a destructive charismatic leader is such that his followers uncritically accept the leader’s
views and follow his directions without further questioning.
In this context it is useful to look briely at the dynamics of
suicide terrorism, which is a function of a culture of martyrdom,
the leader’s decision to employ this tactic, and a supply of recruits
willing to give their lives6 in a “martyrdom operation” (see Nasra
Hassan’s contribution in this book). Social psychological forces are
particularly important, leading Ariel Merari to speak of the “suicide
terrorist production line” with irst, the social contract established,
and then the identiication of the “living martyr,” who accrues great
prestige within the community, and, then in the culminating phase,
the production of the inal video.7 After passing through these three
phases, to back away from the inal act of martyrdom would bring
unbearable shame and humiliation. Thus, as with terrorist psychology in general, suicide terrorism is very much a function of group
and collective psychology, not individual psychopathology. Furthermore, the case of suicide terrorism illustrates that the power of group
dynamics cannot be overemphasized. As demonstrated by Semel and
Minnix in their article on the so-called risky shift, a group can make
a riskier decision than any individual in the group might make. If the
path to leadership in the group is through extremism and violence,
this inexorably pushes the group in that direction.8
The Terrorist Life Cycle
Terrorists differ according to their motivation, and their behavior
also may vary according to the stage of their terrorist career. It is
necessary, therefore, to unpack the life course of terrorists to consider
the psychological processes they are undergoing at different points in
their evolution as group members. What initially attracts a potential
terrorist to the terrorist group differs from what he or she experiences
within the group regarding radicalization and consolidation of group
and collective identity; this in turn differs from what leads the terrorist to carry out acts of violence and—inally—from what leads a
The Psychological Dynamics of Terrorism
terrorist to become disillusioned, thus prompting him or her to leave
the group.
The process of becoming a terrorist involves a cumulative, incrementally sustained, and focused commitment to the group. For the
majority of contemporary terrorists—whether religious or secular—
there is an early entrance onto the pathway into terrorism with many
stations along the way. Also, as we have seen, there is a continuing
reinforcement by manipulative leaders by consolidating the collective identity and by externalizing, justifying, and requiring violence
against the enemy. This implies that early intervention is required, for
once a youth is embedded within the group his or her extremist psychology is continually reinforced and any doubts diminished. Given
that the attraction to, and entrance into, the terrorist path is a gradual
process—which for some groups begins in early childhood—changing the inluences on this pathway necessarily occur over an extended
time frame. In other words, generational change is necessary, which
will require a sustained effort over decades.
As important as understanding what leads youth into the path
of terrorism is understanding what leads terrorists to leave—especially the processes that occur within the group or organization at
this crucial juncture. Again, these will differ from group to group
and from terrorist type to terrorist type. Identifying them, however,
has important implications for counterterrorist policy. Indeed, John
Horgan pointed out that by understanding group exit we can identify
and articulate speciic themes that may help to weaken the attractions of the group.9
Organization and Structure
Like the terrorist life cycle, organizational structure has an important
impact on terrorist behavior, particularly on decision making within
the group. For example, groups may adhere to the same underlying ideology but may differ remarkably in organizational structure.
Thus, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Al-Qaeda all ind justiication in
the Koran for killing in the name of God, but the organizational form
of both Hamas and Islamic Jihad is traditionally more hierarchical
and authoritarian, with followers in action cells directed from higher
organizational levels to carry out an action and having only limited
say in the conduct of operations.
In contrast, Al-Qaeda has a much looser organizational form
with distributed decision making, relecting the leadership style of
bin Laden. The decentralization of decision making was intensiied
after the effective destruction of Al-Qaeda command and control in
Afghanistan in 2001, leading some terrorism experts to conclude that
The Roots of Terrorism
Al-Qaeda as it was before the U.S. attacks of September 11, 2001,
is now functionally dead as an operational organization. What has
been termed the new Al-Qaeda is considered by many to be more
an ideology than an organization. The successor, the global Salai
jihad network, is widely distributed and semi-autonomous, operating
more out of hubs than nodes, with wide latitude to plan and execute
operations. The Madrid train bombings of March 11, 2004, relect
this emerging network.10
Furthermore, although most Muslim immigrants and refugees
are not stateless, many suffer from an existential sense of loss, deprivation, and alienation from the countries where they live. They are
often exposed to extreme ideologies that radicalize them and can
foster entering the path of terrorism. The disapora has been identiied
as particularly important for the global Salai jihad, with a large percentage—up to 80 percent—of recruits joining and becoming radicalized there. The London transit system bombings of July 7, 2005,
can be traced to this diaspora (see Olivier Roy’s and Gabriel Sheffer’s
contributions in this book).
Areas of Debate
Two speciic areas of contemporary debate exist in which a full
understanding of terrorist psychology may be of signiicance. The
irst concerns terrorists’ potential use of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), such as devices involving chemical, biological, and nuclear
materials. There is a broad consensus among scholars of terrorism
that, for most terrorist groups, the use of such weapons would be
counterproductive. Most terrorist groups seek to inluence the West
and to call attention to their cause; mass casualty terrorism would be
contrary to their aims. It is crucial, however, to distinguish between
discriminate and indiscriminate terrorism, for some terrorist groups
would entertain the use of such weapons on a tactical basis if they
could guaranteed they would not injure their own constituents.
Furthermore, exceptions in terms of motivation are fundamentalist
Islamist terrorists, especially the Salai jihadists who are not interested in inluencing the West but want to expel its corrupt modernizing values, and right-wing terrorists, who often seek revenge. For
example in contrast to the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, because the Salai
jihadists are not embedded in a particular nation they are therefore
particularly dangerous. It needs to be emphasized, though, that in
addition to motivations and psychology, resource and expertise are
required; it also can be argued that the assistance of states would be
necessary for terrorist groups to produce effective WMD, especially
in relation to nuclear terrorism. Without such assistance, biological
The Psychological Dynamics of Terrorism
terrorism is the most threatening WMD terrorism in which substate
groups might become engaged.11
A second area of debate is the psychological effects of the new
media. Identifying these effects—especially the impact of the 24/7
cable news environment and the Internet—and grappling with the
approaches to countering them is a serious challenge. The new media,
particularly the Internet, play an increasingly important role in establishing a sense of community among otherwise widely dispersed alienated youth. The danger in this is that the community is driven and
uniied by an increasingly radical anti-Western ideology. In terms of
counterterrorist policy, terrorist communiqués, ideological writings,
hate speech, and Internet propaganda should not go unanswered but
should be responded to by well-reasoned counterargumentation.
Policy Implications
Having outlined some of the key structures and processes, it is possible to derive some policy recommendations that would enhance current efforts in the war on terrorism. This so-called war is unlike other
wars, and it will require concerted efforts over decades. Just as the
terrorists’ collective identity has been shaped gradually over many
years, the attitudes at the foundation of terrorism will not quickly be
altered. When hatred has been bred in the bone—when socialization
to hatred and violence begins early and is reinforced and consolidated into a major theme of the collective identity—there can be no
short-term solution.
Research
Interventions designed to break this cycle must begin early—that is,
before that identity is consolidated. The nature of those interventions
should be informed by the systematic study of the lives of terrorists; by differentiating among terrorist types in general and groups
in particular; and by understanding each terrorism in a nuanced
manner within its own particular cultural, historical, and political
context. Given the different demographic, pathways, attitudes, and
motivations, this makes it necessary to conduct ield work, including
interviews with captured or defected terrorists. One cannot counter
a group that one does not understand
Furthermore, if the goal of terrorism is to terrorize, terror is
the property of the terrorized. Programs that reduce vulnerability
to terror and promote societal resilience represent a key component
of antiterrorism. Such programs require research designed to understand what steps can immunize society against terror and can promote societal resilience.
The Roots of Terrorism
Society and Governance
As mentioned previously, it will require decades to change the culture
of hatred and violence. In this struggle, the moral high ground needs
to be maintained, for example by strengthening the rule of law and
by exemplifying good governance and social justice. To depart from
these standards is to lower ourselves to the level of the terrorists and
to damage liberal democracy.
Early interventions are required to inhibit entrance onto this violent path. Such interventions should involve educational, religious,
and social organization as well as the media, providing opportunities
for integration and countering message of hatred against the minority. Such interventions should be based on social science research, as
are the successful programs designed to curb youth gang violence.
All this highlights the fact that the struggle against terrorism is
by no means a responsibility for the security services alone. This is
not to say, however, that the military has no role to play in countering terrorism. The use of armed forces can be highly signiicant in
relation to sanctuary denial: Without the existence of sanctuaries like
Afghanistan, the training and planning required to support complex
operations like the September 11 attacks will be extremely dificult.
Diaspora Communities
Considering the growing number of vulnerable individuals in émigré
and diaspora communities, interventions that respect cultural differences while helping to integrate the refugees with the recipient society
will be important. Western governments should directly support the
development and implementation of community-based interventions
aimed at promoting community- and individual-level changes that
support greater incorporation and integration of refugees and diaspora youth into the political culture of Western liberal democracies.
Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication
Given that terrorism is a vicious species of psychological warfare
waged through the media, it cannot be countered with smart bombs
and missiles: psychological warfare must be countered with psychological warfare. Each phase of the terrorist life cycle is a potential
focus of intervention. In other words, counterterrorist measures must
be designed to:
• Inhibit potential terrorists from joining the group. Once inside
the group, the power of group dynamics is immense, continu-
The Psychological Dynamics of Terrorism
ally conirming the power of the group’s organizing ideology
and reinforcing the member’s dedication to the cause.
• Produce dissension in the group.
• Facilitate exit from the group. It is important to stimulate
and encourage defection from the group. A number of states
with signiicant terrorism problems—Italy, Spain in the
Basque region, and Great Britain in Northern Ireland—have
creatively employed amnesty programs to facilitate terrorists
leaving the group.
• Reduce support for the group and its leader. If for every terrorist killed or captured, ten more are waiting in line, it is
critical to marginalize the group and to deromanticize and
delegitimate the leader. In the case of radical Islamist terrorism, this can only be done from within Islam, with moderate
Arab political leaders and moderate Muslim clerics taking on
the extremists in their midst who have hijacked their nations
and their religion. The goal is to alienate the terrorist organization from its constituency, which plays a crucial role in providing a reservoir of new recruits. This, in turn, will inhibit
potential terrorists from joining the group or organization in
the irst place. 12
However, all these measures—however much needed—assume an
understanding of the signiicance of psychological dynamics on the
behavior of individual terrorists or terrorist groups. Unfortunately, in
many cases, counterterrorist policies demonstrate no such awareness,
and the irst challenge therefore lies in increasing the knowledge and
consciousness of these mechanism and dynamics among oficials and
decision makers.
Endnotes
1. This essay is based on a chapter titled “The Mind of the Terrorist,”
in Post, Leaders and Their Followers in a Dangerous World (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 2004) [Chapter 6, pg. 123-161]. It also
draws on the inal paper of recommendations released by the Psychology Working Group, International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism
and Security, Madrid, March 2005, http://www.clubmadrid.org.
2. See Post, “Notes on a Psychodynamic Theory of Terrorism,” Terrorism 3 (1984) [pg. 241-256].
3. This summary is drawn from Post, “Mind of the Terrorist.”
4. Post, Ehud Sprinzak, and Laurita M. Denny, “Terrorists in Their
Own Words: Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists,” Terrorism and Political Violence 15, no. 1 (2003) [pg.
177].
The Roots of Terrorism
5. See Eric Hoffer, The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass
Movements (New York: Harper, 1951).
6. Hafez, Muhammed Manufacturing Human Bombs, US Institute of
Peace (in press).
7. Ariel Merari, personal communication with author, Fall 2003.
8. Dean A. Minix and Andrew Semmel, “Group Dynamics and RiskTaking: An Experimental Examination,” Experimental Study of
Politics 6, no. 3 (1978) [pg. 1-36].
9. John Horgan, “Disengaging,” in The Psychology of Terrorism, ed.
Horgan (New York: Routledge, 2005) [pg. 140-168].
10. For the idea of netwar, see John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and
Michele Zanini, “Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism,” in Countering the New Terrorism, ed. Ian O. Lesser and others (Washington, DC: RAND, 1999) [pg. 45-56].
11. See Post, “Psychological and Motivational Factors in Terrorist Decision-Making: Implications for CBW Terrorism,” in Toxic Terror:
Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, ed.
Jonathan B. Tucker (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000) [pg. 11-12].
12. For an extended discussion of the role of psychological operations
in countering terrorism, see Post, J. “Psychological Operations and
Counter-terrorism,” Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 2005.
3
Suicide Terrorism
Nasra Hassan
“Preparing and carrying out a suicide operation is neither dificult nor
expensive,” I hear repeatedly during my research on Islamist militancy.
“However, the recipe must not be used carelessly, but only for maximum impact, or when other avenues are not available.” A suicide bombing is never a spontaneous act by an individual; instead, it is the result
of planning and execution by a sponsoring group. It has become terrorists’ preferred method, because a determined suicide bomber has a
better chance than other operatives of reaching the target, and the psychological trauma inlicted by a suicide operation increases the impact
and raises the proile of its sponsors in addition to causing death and
injury.
My interest in human bombs started in the 1990s, when I worked
and lived in the Middle East. As a Muslim woman from Pakistan, I
could not comprehend how and why people blow themselves up in
the name of a higher cause, whether it be Islam or the homeland. My
research, which continues, has yielded a data bank of over 300 proiles
of Palestinian, other Arab, Pakistani, Afghan, Kashmiri, and Bangladeshi suicide bombers and their sponsors. The proiles are based on
detailed information from families, friends, sponsoring groups, militants, jihadis, and security oficials, as well as from documents given to
me. In some cases, however, the information is sketchy.1
Very useful material has emerged from interviews—conducted over
many years—with leaders, planners, and trainers of groups that sponsor suicide operations. In my research I also document the adoption
and adaptation of suicide tactics and evolution in the types of groups
0
The Roots of Terrorism
and individuals involved. In this chapter, I focus on Pakistani suicide
squads because relatively little is known about them. Most suicide
operations in the Islamic world differ only slightly from a blueprint
which contains a set of essentials that is then adapted to the respective local circumstances. First, I outline this blueprint, then provide
an overview of my indings in the case of Pakistan, and inally compare the Pakistani case to suicide operations sponsored by Palestinian
groups.
The Blueprint
The timing and decision to include suicide bombings in the arsenal
of resistance operations usually result from a considered agreement
at the highest levels of a militant group. It is often initiated by the
impassioned plea of supporters who point to its success elsewhere.
After the start of the irst Palestinian Intifada (uprising) in December
1987, for example, it took six years and a long internal debate before
the strategy was adopted, following a great deal of discussion among
the leaderships in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the Palestinian
diaspora. On the other hand, a jihadi leader told me that the decision
to launch suicide operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan was taken
at a single meeting in Karachi in November 2001, six weeks after the
start of the post-September 11, 2001, bombing of Afghanistan.
Religion-based sponsoring groups say that the intention in carrying out a suicide operation is important: The act must be for Allah
alone—never for personal gain. Whereas nationalist groups refer to
freedom and ighting occupation, many Palestinian and Iraqi nationalists used Islamic terminology in their last will and testament. Hamas,
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Al-Qaeda afiliates in the Middle East
have begun to insert homeland reasons in theirs. Suicide jihadis in
Pakistan and, increasingly, in Iraq set their reasoning in sectarian
terms and in the wider context of the Muslim ummah (nation).
Irrespective of the use of religious rhetoric, which generally should
not be dismissed, suicide attacks are considered military operations
by their sponsors. As such, they are driven by military-type considerations, as are operations by other nonstate and substate actors such
as insurgents, guerrillas, and rebels. Factors enabling the adoption
of, and support for, suicide operations are causes and grievances that
deeply and emotionally affect the world of Islam and Muslims—even
the secular ones. Such issues are generally clear cut between Muslim and non-Muslim and have an undeniable resonance and consensus, regardless of religiosity, nationalist fervor, upbringing, or social
background. The resonance ensures not only a ready supply of sui-
Suicide Terrorism
1
cide operators but also vocal or silent support from communities that
may otherwise oppose attacks whose victims are mainly Muslim.
A charismatic igure is a key ingredient in inspiring martyrdom
(see Jerrold Post’s contribution in this book), whereas television and
the Internet bring distant causes into real time and immediacy. Fatwas (religious edicts) give legitimacy, but the “okay to do” edicts are
taken more seriously than the “don’t do” ones, especially since the
former outrank and outnumber the latter, appear to have weightier
religious sanction and ind greater resonance. The edicts that prohibit
are too cautiously worded to have the same impact and often contain
too many exclusionary clauses to have much effect. The fatwa issued
in May 2005 by ifty-eight Pakistani clerics from major schools of
Islamic thought banned suicide bombings in Pakistan and Kashmir
and in places of worship and where the victims are likely to be Muslims; Iraq and Palestine were excluded from the ban. A counter-fatwa
by forty religious parties permitted suicide attacks in Palestine, Kashmir, Iraq and Afghanistan, but not in Pakistan.
Sponsoring groups are helped by neural pathways, which connect
networks of families, clans, tribes, and friends. The more extremist
militants are, the more likely they are to marry into a family that
shares their views; in some cases, marriage into an extremist family
increases their militancy. For example, the sister of a major militant
in the Balochistan province of Pakistan is married to Ramzi Yusuf,
who is serving a life sentence in the United States for plotting the
1993 Twin Towers bombing in New York City. The sympathizers
of suicide terrorism, on the other hand, are a mix of pious Muslims,
supporters of jihad, fanatics, militants, and sectarian haters. Defense
of Islam and of Muslims—as deined by them—is the political ideology and justiication for suicide and related terrorism by the groups,
operators, and supporters. Clandestine support from oficial structures is often available, either as an oficially sanctioned but deniable
rogue operation or as silent policy.
The targets are, irst and foremost, enemy structures and authorities: their own, if considered un-Islamic or tyrannical; or external
ones such as occupation troops, external or internal allies of the
enemy (the latter represented by the army, police, or civilian oficials),
and sectarian or ideological enemies. “It is not our intention to kill
innocent civilians, but we are in a state of war,” the jihadis have told
me. “And the majority of civilians killed by the enemy are Muslims.”
Lists are drawn up of optimal targets, locations, and timing. The goahead is based on opportunity and feasibility, and the funds required
are minimal.
The Roots of Terrorism
The objectives are many. In addition to wreaking loss, destruction, and havoc, suicide operations carry actual and symbolic messages for different audiences: the world at large, enemy governments
and peoples, the Islamic world, and their own comrades. Other
than revenge and retaliation—measured by the actual devastation
caused—suicide attacks contain an explicit or implicit warning to
potential targets. They are a show of deiance and strength on the
jihadi battleield. “Sometimes we send a suicide bomber even if we
could use a timer or remote detonator,” a Palestinian planner told
me in the Gaza Strip. “The human element creates much more panic
among the people, which is an important military goal in itself.”
Importantly, the sponsors gauge the fallout, especially among
those who support their cause or are neutral on the issue. “We value
life, which is why we are willing to face death. Since Paradise awaits
the martyr, exchanging a temporary life for an immortal one is
a good bargain,” I have been told. The reaction of Muslims is an
important consideration in the decision-making process, as is the
inevitable reprisal. “Our operation is a balm for the aching hearts
of our ummah and brings them some relief,” I have heard. Unlike
the public manifestation of joy at the attacks on the U.S. on September 11, 2001, the reaction to the July 7, 2005, bombings in London
was deliberately muted. “We were expecting something to happen,
so when it did, we did not clap and dance, especially for television,
as we did in September 2001. But we felt a great satisfaction, since
far more oppression has been visited on the ummah everywhere after
9/11 than deaths caused by Muslims,” a Pakistani jihadi leader told
me in summer 2005.
Suicide Operations in Pakistan
Although Pakistanis are relative newcomers to suicide terrorism
involving explosives, they have quickly become adept at it. Terrorism
in Pakistan is polygonal, with each side of a loose structure itting
into a template belonging to another set-up, whether religious extremist, sectarian, nationalist, criminal, or mercenary. The suicide squads
display a wide range of ideologies and motivations. They mutate
rapidly, hide inside other groups, disappear, dissolve, and reappear.
Sometimes members of different groups carry out an operation under
a name not belonging to an established entity. Indeed, it is dificult to
track down a ghost group, as the experience of Lebanon in the 1980s
demonstrates. Their targets are multiple, and their wings and cells
are led by an inordinately large number of young, educated, middleclass professionals who have little reason to be alienated or enraged
to the extent of adopting suicide terrorism as a profession.
Suicide Terrorism
The origins of Pakistan’s suicide terrorism lie in a sectarian jihad:
against fellow Muslims, the Shias. It has been waged by Lashkar
e Jhangvi (LeJ), a militant Sunni organization that has attracted to
its ranks the most extreme elements from other jihadi groups. Prior
to September 11, 2001, LeJ used the elasticity and osmosis afforded
by cross-membership in groups associated with Al-Qaeda and the
Taliban to ind an early foothold in Afghanistan. Since then, it has
reinvented itself as the purveyor of suicide terrorism in Pakistan.
Despite LeJ’s sui generis character, its hybrid aspects and mutation
offer a useful comparison with terrorist groupings and their modus
operandi elsewhere in the Islamic world—in particular in Iraq—and
to Islamist militants in the West.
In late 1999, jihadi groups introduced suicide attacks in Kashmir,
with young men detonating themselves against enemy targets. After
the post 9/11 bombing of Afghanistan and the fall of the Taliban
regime, this modus operandi began to ind favor in an environment
of humiliation and resulting rage, encouraged in sermons by Arab
militants leeing from Afghanistan, in endorsement by Pakistani
clerics, and in immediate acceptance by hardened jihadi cadres who
were familiar with traditional martyrdom operations in which survival was a priori ruled out. As of end-December 2005, 139 Muslim
human bombers had blown themselves up in 115 suicide operations
in Pakistan, Kashmir, India, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh.
The methodology of Lashkar e Jhangvi and its associated cadres
underwent an evolution, becoming more sophisticated. Starting with
an individual human bomb carrying explosives, the suicide squads
graduated to the use of explosives-laden vehicles and then to complex attacks in which they use, in sequence: (1) hand grenades to
create panic and to kill; (2) gunire to block escape and to kill; (3)
time bombs to create additional victims among those who rush to
the scene for rescue work; and, inally, (4) the self-detonation of the
two- or three-member team. Sometimes the sequence in the detonation of time bombs and human bombs is reversed. The plastic explosives used are powerful enough to split open a cupola roof and to
ling body parts twenty meters into the air. Despite oficial attempts
to ascribe foreign origins to them, the vast majority of the suicide
bombers were locals. Half the suicide attacks have been in or near a
place of worship, and creating fear and terror is as much part of the
operation as is death and destruction. If the primary target is inaccessible, a proxy target is selected—for example, Christian victims in
churches and schools, if Western oficials are too well protected.
Pakistan’s sprawling jihadi networks are based on national,
regional, and international contacts, cooperation, and operations.
The Roots of Terrorism
The groups work closely with each other. Cooperation takes many
forms, from a loan or barter of militants, expertise, supplies, and
funds to an alliance or friendly exchange of causes and targets. Members from different groups come together for a suicide operation or
cross over from a defunct group into an active one. This constant
movement makes it dificult for the authorities to trace the real sponsors. Lashkar’s ranks are swollen with militants who are overtly afiliated with other jihadi groups such as Jaish e Mohammad but who
secretly retain membership in LeJ. Many start out as nonmilitants
who, after being brutalized in prison, join LeJ following escape or
release. To survive, they become underground killers, as normal life
and a fair judicial process are a distant dream. It is almost impossible
to separate junior-level jihadi extremists from different groups; they
only assume a distinct identity when they reach senior positions.
The link among militancy, madrassas, and jihad is the subject
of much attention. My research shows that madrassas and mosque
schools are not the major producer and vector of suicide jihadis. Since
the emphasis of the curricula is on Islam, jihad and martyrdom are
naturally favored subjects, and some students go on to adopt jihad as
a vocation, part- or full-time profession, or mission. A suction system
attracts future operators not only from the large reservoir of sympathizers found all over the country but also from secular state and
private schools; universities; professional institutions; the business,
trade, and bazaar sectors; as well as from government ranks, including the armed forces. Prior to September 11, 2001, camps inside Pakistan provided training mainly for action in Kashmir. Afghan jihadis
and their Pakistani, Arab, and Central Asian comrades essentially
learned on the job in Afghanistan or received rudimentary lessons
in the refugee camps in Pakistan. Novices were assigned to veteran
groups and either learned quickly or were killed. Many were autodidacts. Training camps and the jihad in Afghanistan brought Pakistani militants into a network, which has grown tighter as traditional
safe havens have disappeared.
The jihadis I have interviewed in Pakistan since 1998 told me
about their most potent weapon: the squads of martyr commandos,
who received martyrdom training in special camps. They were eighteen to thirty years old; most were middle or lower middle class,
although some were the sons of rich men and even government oficials. About half were married. The majority were students who
enrolled for jihad training and fought during vacations; the rest had
jobs, some in lower-government echelons.
R. was a typical jihadi militant I met in an industrial town in
the Punjab. He graduated from a training camp with distinction.
Suicide Terrorism
With skills honed on the battleield, he became a part-time recruiter,
fundraiser and trainer—in between taking turns with his brothers in
running the large family business. He described to me the training,
which was based on a percolation system. The twenty-one-day basic
training class contained about twenty youths; the boys were taught
to clean and to assemble light weapons and received lessons on Islam,
jihad, and Paradise. Three-quarters of the spiritual training took
place in this initial period. About eight boys made it into the threemonth training and ive into the nine-month training, and maybe two
graduated from the two-year training course. “Those who graduated
after two years were explosives experts and were the most valuable.
Although it is a waste of investment, the best of the best go for suicide
attacks, because it has become exceedingly dificult to pull off any
other kind of major operation, except a inal mission. Only the best
have the iron resolve to complete it,” R. told me.
The training covered weaponry, including small missiles; underwater skills; motorbike stunts such as iring with both hands while
driving; trapping and attacking larger, better-armed military units;
and practicing ambushing and hijacking with elaborate mock-ups.
And students were trained to martyr themselves or to be martyred
while inlicting maximum loss. Like their Muslim counterparts
elsewhere, the trainees, all of whom had code names, made regular
ablutions to be in a constant state of purity for sudden entry into
Paradise.
K., a graduate from an English language school in Lahore with
a Western curriculum and who became a writer and journalist,
described for me a typical day at his camp. “We woke up two hours
before sunrise for prayers and spiritual exercises. We prayed ive times
a day. Twice a day we heard lectures on jihad by mullah commandos,
who drew lessons from the Quran and the sayings of the Prophet
Muhammad and told us of the forty grades of martyrdom. During the
two daily breaks, we listened to tapes of jihad chants and sermons.”
Those in the martyr squads prepared a last will and testament using
special texts. Occasionally, famous jihad veterans visited from across
the border to train, to inspire, and to select commandos.
The number of martyrdom trainees normally did not exceed 50
at any given point, with 100 an exceptional peak. The numbers were
replenished as the need arose, with need often being related to government liquidation. “This does not mean that there will be 50 or
100 suicide operations,” I was told. “Maybe up to 5 in a year, based
on an assessment of requirement and feasibility. It means that at any
given time 50 or 100 are ready to die.” While they are waiting to
be summoned, the martyr-commandos are ordered to live normally
The Roots of Terrorism
and to do nothing to attract attention. They are advised to take off
their beards; to switch from traditional clothing to pants and shirts;
to maintain a neat, everyday appearance; to avoid their usual hangouts; and to carry documents—real ones issued to fake names—at all
times. They are forbidden even to run a red light and are told to pay
their bills on time and to do nothing out of the ordinary.
However, in my research I also encountered cases of suicide
bombers who had only a week between their recruitment, training,
and detonation. When Lashkar e Jhangvi’s operational structure was
still centralized, before the arrest and liquidation of its leaders, its
cells were small—between three and ive members each. Later, having
had to assume greater decentralized responsibility, the cells became
larger and all-purpose. They now disband after each operation and
regroup for the next one. Traditionally, the key components of a cell
are (1) the leader, (2) the suicide bomber and suicide gunman, and
(3) the linkman in charge of logistics, communications, and arrangements. With decentralized networks and cells, linkmen are the most
critical ield operatives and are the bridge between sponsors and the
cell leaders. They transmit instructions and funds, organize the raw
materials, arrange for the explosives, advise among options, and convey the go-ahead. Seasoned linkmen are considered a jihadi group’s
most important resource, as they usually initiate the establishment of
multiple cells unconnected to each other for simultaneous, consecutive, or delayed use. They are not in the most senior echelons of the
group and often play a similar role in more than one jihadi outit.
At present, most cells need to be capable of providing one-stop
services. They are stand alone structures in terms of on-the-ground
planning, reconnaissance, and execution of a suicide attack. In view
of the Pakistani government’s counterterrorism efforts, the cells are
encouraged to self-inance, which they increasingly do through armed
robbery and kidnappings. The commands, which emanate from a
higher level of the organization, relay the timing, target, and location
of a suicide operation. These are based on a set of factors, such as
the immediate reason for a suicide operation, location of the nearest
bomber, ease of access to the target, and whether the sponsors can
afford yet another severe crackdown by the authorities. LeJ recruits
hitmen and operatives with care, looking for strong conviction and
steady nerves. In the beginning, a novice is paired with a veteran
and drives the motorbike while the assassin takes out the target. An
LeJ trainee code-named “Ghaddai” lost his nerve and was captured
by the police. On his way to liquidation, he asked why he was being
removed from his cell at midnight. “We are putting you on the fast
train to Paradise,” he was told, echoing an extremist slogan: Kill a
Suicide Terrorism
shia, and go to Paradise. As a warning, his body was dumped in the
militants’ belt in the southern Punjab.
The selection of the suicide team and the availability of suicide
bombers do not pose a serious problem. Since supply continues to
exceed demand, the cell leader considers only men who are ready to
go. Depending on the speciics of the planned operation, the wing or
cell leader sifts out volunteers considered unsuitable or not yet prepared, refuses to accept highly trained cadres whose expertise—for
example, in explosives—is indispensable for the group, places the
names of suitable and ready candidates in a box, and pulls out ive or
six names. Two are the suicide bombers, one is a gunman who will
also die, and two are back-ups. Once a suicide team is ready, it is considered necessary to dispatch them sooner rather than later. “Young
suicide bombers don’t have a long shelf life, and the cell leader also
blows himself up in a future operation, since his capture is only a
question of time,” an LeJ militant told me.
The leadership is careful not to select many attackers from the
same community, since too many losses and too tough a crackdown
by the authorities would provoke too furious a backlash against the
jihadi group. “A measured suicide operation and a response within
expected parameters ills our ranks,” an experienced jihadi told me.
“This is not child’s play. We must consider our tactics within the
group’s long-term strategy. We know the level of losses we can afford,
but too much would be counterproductive in the longer term.”
When two suicide operations are scheduled to take place in the
same town, the cell leaders bring in bombers from different areas,
preferably distant ones. The suicide candidates are generally not fugitives, though some may have been detained in an arrest campaign or
in connection with petty crime. It is preferred that they not be wanted
by the authorities or known LeJ militants with a price on their heads.
In contrast, cell and wing leaders—by virtue of years spent in operations—are on oficial wanted lists and carry large bounties for information leading to their capture. Cell operations have acquired an
assembly-line character, different from the theatrical productions of
earlier times when militants watched Hollywood ilms for ideas on
stunts and scenarios. In its heyday, Lashkar e Jhangvi’s commander
in chief, Riaz Basra, ran an elaborate system of area chiefs, who were
responsible for recruitment; coordination; identiication and reconnaissance of targets; logistics; execution of operations; intimidation
of oficials, judges, lawyers, and witnesses, for which there was a special section; iniltration into lower-government echelons; and a media
and information wing. Financing came from donations based on conviction or coercion and from charity and alms mandated by Islam.
The Roots of Terrorism
The families of martyred militants received a monthly stipend. The
highest amount was set aside to purchase weapons, explosives, and
unlisted telephone numbers of oficials who were targeted for assassination or intimidation. There is no organized communal postmartyrdom industry to glorify suicide bombers: They are commemorated
within the organization but not in the community at large. When,
where, and how a suicide operation can be mounted determine its
execution. However, where the exact timing is not dependent on the
agenda and movement of the target, LeJ prefers to time a suicide
operation to catch the evening news and the press deadline. A militant often dictates details to a newspaper reporter on the phone; if
the event goes unpublished, a threatening call is made to ind out why
the item was not released.
Four factors complicate the task of isolating the DNA of Pakistani suicide operatives—that is, special characteristics that might set
them apart from thousands of other jihadis and militants:
Individually, their roots in Pakistan’s provincial, ethnic, sectarian, class, and cultural divides—that is, their very ordinariness and similarity to millions of Pakistani males.
Organizationally, their sequential or simultaneous membership
in multiple groups and their deliberate interchangeability.
Ideologically, their mutation from sectarian zealots to cross-border jihadis.
The dynamics of shifting motivations and motives for suicide
operations.
The following typology of Pakistani suicide bombers and volunteers developed from my research shows that, similar to suicide
bombers elsewhere, there is no single proile or mind of the terrorist
and that their characteristics match those of the general population.
1. Age: The majority of the suicide bombers were between eighteen and thirty; the volunteers were all in their mid- and late
thirties.
2. Education: Less than half had attended madrassas or mosque
schools, especially if no other schooling was available; the
rest went to government schools, and half had higher schooling, including university.
3. Socioeconomic situation: 50 percent were middle or lowermiddle class, 30 percent were upper class or rich, and 20 percent were poor.
Suicide Terrorism
4. Marital status: The majority of suicide bombers were single;
of the volunteers, about half were married.
5. Family and community: Normal in the local context.
6. Family militancy: About one-third belonged to jihad-afiliated families.
7. Personality: Almost all were described as courageous, resolute, and serious with no evidence of brainwashing, coercion,
or psychological problems.
8. Religious practice: About one-third were described as very
religious; the rest observed obligatory practices only.
9. Intention: Only for a higher cause, never for personal gain.
10. Paradise as motivation: Less than 20 percent cited this.
11. Importance of martyrdom: All referred to this.
12. Mosque afiliation: The majority did not pray regularly in a
mosque.
13. Charismatic inluence: Well-known cleric leaders, especially
those who had engaged in jihad (dissemination via speeches,
sermons, and cassettes), imams, jihadi heroes.
14. Hero: Osama bin Laden cited by all.
15. Enabling factors: Causes and grievances that deeply and emotionally affected the bombers and their communities, or were
presented as such by the sponsors.
16. Resonating factors in decision to volunteer for suicide operation: Defense of Islam, retaliation for betrayal of Al-Qaeda
and Taliban, revenge on authorities for bowing to external
pressure, sectarian issues, ratcheted-up need and desire for
retaliation. The resonance not only ensures a ready supply
of suicide bomber recruits but also swells the ranks of the
sponsoring group and creates support in the community.
17. No special resonance: For example, Palestine, Jerusalem,
Iraq, and Chechnya not cited.
18. Training: The majority of the suicide bombers had received
training in special camps or had fought in either Afghanistan
or Kashmir or both; almost all the volunteers were repeat
jihadis; that is, they had returned to militancy after a period
of dormancy.
19. Work: The majority were gainfully employed or had a source
of income, except those who were students or underground.
Pakistani Suicide Bombers in Comparison
Although two sets of proiles I have developed—of Palestinian and
Pakistani suicide bombers and their sponsoring groups—are unequal
in numbers, some characteristics of the Pakistani suicide bombers
0
The Roots of Terrorism
match their counterparts from Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad,
and other traits match those of suicide bombers from the al Aqsa
Martyrs Brigade and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP).
General similarities in the environment that have an impact on
the individual include the Islamic religion and culture; a premium on
martyrdom; deliberate retention and cultivation of memory, passed
down and resurrected in each new generation of recruits; breakdown
in law and order; a charismatic igure in the immediate environment
of the individual; a history of jihad or resistance or both; presence
of sponsoring groups and ready-made networks that encourage,
enable, and ennoble suicide operations; ease of joining the groups
at the periphery and traveling the jihadi path toward a progressively
inal destination; a tight and strong group culture, rituals, language,
and lifestyle; a neuralgic point when suicide terrorism is introduced
and is enthusiastically accepted and adopted; and easy availability
of volunteers, with supply exceeding demand. Poverty, dislocation,
and psychopathology were not found to be causal factors in creating
suicide terrorists.
At the individual level, the similarity relates to there being no
set psychological, social, or militant type, per se. In both sets, there
is strong anecdotal evidence of potent feelings of humiliation and
rage, of a strong desire to do something about the actual or perceived
grievances of their group or ummah, of membership in a group, and
of lack of conidence in authorities and the judicial system. The individuals in each set were described as serious, quiet, determined, committed, generous, helpful, and kind. Although not explicitly voiced,
evidence exists of a desire to overcome the passive victim role by
assuming a proactive one: We will die anyway, so why not go in a
noble manner at a time of our choosing? There is a clear understanding of the inality and consequences of the contemplated act; one
Pakistani militant interviewed stated that he wished to explode only
against a really important target.
There are also general differences in the environment. In Pakistan, there is no clear conlation of religion and nationalism in suicide
terrorism—for example, a double suicide bombing targeted President
Pervez Musharraf in December 2003 for his pro-U.S. and anti-AlQaeda and Taliban stand; no foreign occupation or troops; easy
access to explosives and expertise and freedom to move, hide, and
melt away; and, so far, no purely nationalist insurgent group involved
in suicide bombings.
A number of ongoing armed insurgencies and conlicts muddy the
picture versus a clear Palestinian–Israeli issue. In Pakistan, few robust
Suicide Terrorism
1
and sustained voices are raised on the unlawfulness of suicide attacks.
Some who oppose these inside Pakistan favor them in Kashmir, Iraq,
and in the Palestinian territories—wherever non-Muslim authorities
are present in superior strength. Despite the harrowing 1947 partition
of British India into two independent states—India and Pakistan—
and the resulting forced or voluntary movement of persons across
borders, there is no systematic inherited communal cultivation of the
national memory of lost rights and homes, except in the case of Kashmir. A major reason for this is that, unlike the case of the Palestinians,
there were no continuing generations of oficially recognized refugees
after the displaced acquired an accepted homeland.
At the individual level, the Pakistani suicide operators were older
and less articulate, displayed a less deined purpose and a less coherent worldview; used less political and more religious and sectarian arguments, had a less developed and less enunciated language
of Paradise and martyrdom that stemmed from lack of knowledge
of religious texts, and possessed a strong sectarian but no nationalist lavor. Membership in the most extremist and militant group,
Lashkar e Jhangvi, was important for them. Postmartyrdom glory
and gloriication of suicide martyrs is not a developed industry in
Pakistan, and the Palestinians leave behind much more materials
and memories—oral, written, pictorial, and legendary—than do the
Pakistanis.
*****
The internal and external evolution in the sponsoring groups and
in the proiles of its suicide squads continue, as do the expansion
and adaptation of suicide terrorism. No sooner do researchers and
terrorism experts begin to consolidate their indings than new manifestations and forms emerge. The latter do not necessarily negate the
earlier indings but instead demonstrate that the phenomenon of suicide terrorism is not receding and has not yet been fully understood.
We still cannot properly explain, for example, unexpected targeted
locations (e.g., London), home-grown Western suicide bombers,
active but clandestine recruitment at universities and among middleclass professionals, and the rapid mutations in terrorism. One thing,
though, is for certain: as one LeJ militant—who has since been liquidated—told me in 2003, “Our operations are never random. We
have no problem with shedding the blood of those whom it is a duty
to kill.”
The Roots of Terrorism
Endnotes
1. All interviewees provided information on condition of strict anonymity, covering up names, locations, dates, or other references
which could identify them. This was done both for their protection
and for my own. The material in this chapter was taken from my
unpublished book on Muslim suicide bombers, as well as from an
unpublished study of Lashkar e Jhangvi.
Political Roots
4
Democracy and Terrorism
Leonard Weinberg
Repression works: Brutal dictatorships rarely suffer campaigns of terrorist violence—at least not for very long. In the Middle East the record
seems clear. When challenged by religiously inspired terrorist bands in
the 1980s, the Baathist regimes of Syria and of Iraq under Saddam Hussein employed the tools of their trade (e.g., secret police surveillance,
mass arrests, torture, summary executions) and brought these challenges to a speedy conclusion. The same may be said about the conduct
of the revolutionary theocracy in Iran. In 1980–81 the anti-Khomeini
Mujaheddin and Fedayeen launched a particularly ferocious terrorist
campaign aimed at toppling the new government in Tehran, including
the assassination of the country’s newly elected president. In response
the government unleashed the revolutionary guards and other forces
and managed to bring an end to the violence, along with many of its
perpetrators, within a few months. Over the years, the few democracies
in the region—Turkey, Israel, and Lebanon—have been much less successful. In fact, as recent events in New York City, Madrid, and London
suggest, terrorism seems largely, though not exclusively, a problem for
democracies. I intend the following comments to answer two questions:
First, what are the sources of terrorism within democracies? Second,
why are democracies, or at least some of them, targeted for attack by
international terrorist organizations?
The Roots of Terrorism
Sources of Terrorism in Democracies
Thinking about terrorism’s domestic political causes, the highly
regarded analyst Martha Crenshaw1 suggests we distinguish between
permissive or facilitating causes and direct or instigating factors and
also among the sources of terrorism within democracies. Identifying
these causes is obviously no easy task, but it nevertheless offers an
easy way out: We may be tempted to generalize so broadly that we
speak only platitudes. I may not be able to avoid this pitfall but will
at least try.
Two problems stand out when we consider permissive conditions
making for terrorism within democracies. First, what appear to be
the same political conditions may give rise to terrorism in one place
or at one time but not another. During the late 1960s mass student
protests against the Vietnam War and the repressive atmosphere and
overcrowded classrooms of universities gave rise to widespread terrorist activity in Italy but not in France. A second problem is that thanks
to the mass media, the Internet, and other means by which behavior
can be diffused and copied, terrorist campaigns within democracies
may spread from one country to another even though political conditions within those countries differ signiicantly. As a consequence,
the predictive capacity of background conditions is now limited. We
may observe little beyond certain tendencies. Despite these dificulties, a number of permissive conditions receive considerable commentary in the literature, categorized as either (1) temporal conditions or (2) structural elements. Tore Bjorgo and others suggest that
transitional democracies or countries in which such transitions are
being attempted are substantially more susceptible than long-standing democracies to outbreaks of terrorist violence, especially where
the rules of the game are not clear or—as in some cases—are not
accepted by the various players. 2
Certain ethnic groups, for example, may not accept the fact that
they belong to the political community undergoing the transition. If
group members participate fully in and identify themselves with the
old order they may want out of the new order because their leaders
believe they are likely to suffer a diminution of power and status.
For such groups acts of terrorism may signal their desire to exit the
system or may serve as symptoms of their refusal to settle for less.
Transitional democracies often face the problem of holdovers from
a previous authoritarian regime; some holdovers are prepared to use
terrorist violence to make the transition process as dificult as possible—for example, the Sunni minority in Iraq at the time of this
writing. Even Spain experienced such terrorism during its own highly
successful transition following the death of Francisco Franco.
Democracy and Terrorism
Other research suggests that long-standing, or consolidated,
democracies are about as susceptible to terrorism as new ones. 3
India, with a practically uninterrupted democratic experience since
its achievement of national independence in 1947, has experienced
terrorist activity over much of this history. Likewise, despite decades
of uninterrupted democratic rule, Colombia continues to suffer bouts
of terrorism from both the left and the right. Jan Oskar Engene’s
analysis of terrorist events in Western Europe identiies the United
Kingdom—surely one of the world’s premier examples of democratic
continuity—as that region’s most frequent site of internal terrorist
violence from 1950 to 1995.4
If terrorism is present at the creation of democratic polities, it
sometimes occurs at and contributes to their collapse as well. In some
instances terrorist violence is directly related to the end of democracy.
In the 1970s democratically elected governments in both Argentina
and Uruguay were victims of military coups as a result of their apparent inability to defeat the challenges posed by various urban guerrilla
groups. The military’s seizure of power in Turkey at the end of the
1970s provides another example. Even though new and long-standing democracies may experience some variation in the numerical frequency of terrorist events, overall it seems fair to say that longevity by no means insulates democracies from outbreaks of internally
driven terrorism.
If the duration of democracies is not the most powerful permissive condition, or of only limited explanatory power, what about the
structure of democratic polities? Do variations in structure matter?
If so, how great a difference do they make? Engene used his Terrorism in Western Europe, event data database, which covers domestic
terrorist events in Western European democracies between 1950 and
1995, to consider a number of possibilities, both societal and governmental. Engene reported modest but meaningful statistical associations between ethnic diversity and the incidence of terrorist violence.
The more ethnically diverse the country, the more terrorism it experiences, especially when the violence is motivated by ethnic grievances. 5
Given the majority principle, democracies that include permanent
ethnic minorities are especially vulnerable. Socially homogeneous
countries are much less vulnerable: Scandinavian countries show
very low frequencies. The inclusion of Norway, Denmark, Sweden,
and Iceland in Engene’s analysis also helps to explain another linkage: income distribution. The more unevenly distributed the income,
the greater is the frequency of terrorist events, especially when perpetrated by ideologically motivated groups.
The Roots of Terrorism
Certain features of a country’s political system make a difference in the frequency of terrorist events. In Engene’s study, democracies with better records in protecting civil rights and civil liberties
were somewhat less likely to experience a high frequency of terrorist
attacks.6 The problem with this inding concerns causality. It may
very well be the case that sustained terrorist attacks caused democratic governments to reduce the privacy and due process rights of
their citizens rather than these restrictions causing the terrorism.
Certainly this pattern was at work in Italy and the United Kingdom
during the 1970s as both governments grappled with serious challenges posed by terrorist or paramilitary organizations.
Engene makes a more compelling case for the impacts of legitimacy and continuity on the frequency of terrorist events. Western
European democracies, where extremist political parties—which did
not accept the prevailing constitutional order—had done well at the
polls and been a signiicant presence in their respective parliaments,
also suffered more terrorist violence. The same holds true for countries whose twentieth-century histories have been marked by serious
discontinuities: Germany, Italy, and Spain, by contrast with Luxembourg and the Scandinavian democracies. In short, Western European countries where Engene found terrorism to be most prevalent
tended to be noisy and highly contentious democracies.7 In a comparative analysis of terrorism and party politics, William Eubank and
I reported analogous indings. In Europe as well as Latin America,
South Asia, and elsewhere, where multiple political parties achieved
parliamentary representation and where parliaments displayed substantial partisan divisions, democracies were more likely to experience serious terrorism than other democracies.8 The underlying conditions seemed to be extreme social and political fragmentation.
Associations among various permissive conditions mentioned in
the literature, though statistically signiicant, are rarely very strong,
which should lead us to pay particularly close attention to what Martha Crenshaw identiied as the direct, instigating conditions that trigger terrorist campaigns. In the case of the Israeli–Palestinian struggle, certain conditions (e.g., the Israeli occupation of the West Bank
and Gaza Strip) were present for years before the outbreak of the
irst Intifada in 1988. At irst, the Intifada was not characterized by
much terrorist activity. The irst suicide bombing, for example, only
occurred in 1993. Rather, the Israeli authorities confronted a relatively spontaneous series of violent protests involving rocks, Molotov
cocktails, and burning tires.9 Some time elapsed before the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), headquartered in Tunis, and the
new Palestinian organizations Hamas and Islamic Jihad were able to
Democracy and Terrorism
transform the conlict into a terrorist campaign. And of course in this
endeavor they achieved the unintentional cooperation of the Israeli
authorities who responded to their challenge with moderate brutality
and mass arrests, enough to inlame the protestors but not enough
to stop their protests. Periods of coninement in Israeli jails had the
effect of producing a new generation of Palestinian terrorists.
What lessons can we derive from this tale? Is it a parable from
which general principles can be learned and applied elsewhere?
Though the Israeli–Palestinian conlict may be sui generis in some
respects, the answer to this question is yes, because we see in it three
instigating conditions also found elsewhere. First, the immediate condition is one of radicalization. Social and political events occur that
crystallize long-standing grievances. “Attention must be paid,” to
quote Arthur Miller’s Death of a Salesman. The 1968 Catholic civil
rights marches in Northern Ireland might also serve as an example.
Second, an occasion then arises for small entrepreneurial bands whose
repertoire of political actions includes terrorism. Third, whether, or
the extent to which, this opportunity is characterized by a sustained
campaign of terrorism either against the government or other segments in the population—for example, rival ethnic or ideological
groups—most likely depends on the behavior of the authorities.
In democracies at least, repression—as in the case of Russian conduct in Chechnya—has often produced Beslan or its equivalent. This
can be compared to when India’s government inadvertently sparked
Sikh terrorism in the Punjab by its invasion of the Golden Temple.
Also of note, Timothy McVeigh’s detonation of a truck bomb in
front of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995 was,
so he said, a response to the assaults on the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas, by federal agencies two years earlier. Even
what amounts to normal police conduct can, on occasion and quite
unintentionally, intensify terrorist violence. The arrest and extradition to Turkey of Kurdish chieftain Abdallah Ocalan sparked a new
wave of terrorism against Turkish targets throughout Europe. The
killing by Israeli security services of Palestinian bomb-maker Radwan Abu Ayyash, known as “The Engineer,” set off a new wave of
suicide attacks that helped derail already fragile efforts at Middle
East peacemaking. These examples are given recognizing that normal police conduct requires a certain poetic license when speaking
of the Arab–Israeli conlict.
But goodwill and a desire to compromise on the part of the
authorities may not work either. Since the leaders of terrorist organizations are typically radicals who regard compromise as a form
of betrayal, they may react accordingly and intensify terrorism as
0
The Roots of Terrorism
parties to a conlict near a settlement. In the mid-1970s, the willingness of Italy’s ruling Christian Democrats to reach a historic compromise with the Communist Party led the country’s Red Brigades to
escalate their violence and to strike at the heart of the state. The 1998
Good Friday agreement over Northern Ireland prompted the real
Irish Republican Army (IRA) to detonate a bomb in Armagh that left
dozens dead. In the context of the Middle East peace process, experience suggests that the closer Palestinian and Israeli negotiators come
to an agreement, the more terrorism intensiies. In Colombia in 1985
members of the revolutionary M-19 organization greeted presidential
offers of amnesty and an opportunity to participate in the peaceful
political process by invading the palace of justice in Bogota. Eleven
members of the country’s Supreme Court were killed in the ensuing shootout. And the urban guerrillas who took advantage of the
opportunity to come in from the cold and then to run for parliament
as reform-minded candidates were often gunned down by members
of right-wing death squads during their campaign appearances.
If all these observations about internal sources of terrorism bear
a reasonably close resemblance to the realities involved, what policy
recommendations emerge? Let us assume that whether or not a terrorist campaign begins and, if it does, how long it lasts are more
likely to be a result of instigating rather than permissive conditions. If
this inference is correct, then very close attention should be given to
the radicalization of the political arena and responses to this development by enterprising individuals—by small groups for whom terrorism represents an option and by the forces of order in the country.
Citizens of Iceland, Luxembourg, Norway, New Zealand, and a
handful of other democracies may live out their lives without fearing their countries will be convulsed by political turmoil. Politics in
those countries does not take place in the streets. But most democracies, especially those Zimmermann labels noisy democracies, experience periods of mass protest and spirals of radicalization, or episodes
where outsiders directly challenge those in positions of power. The
outsiders, who use unconventional means or direct action to pose
their challenge, seem to play a perfectly normal part in the democratic experience.
Terrorism is a different matter. Authorities in democracies can do
little to prevent a small band of radicalized individuals from carrying
out a handful of terrorist attacks as an experiment to see what reactions their exemplary deeds elicit from their potential constituents
and from the forces of order. At such times the conduct of the authorities becomes crucial. Calibrating the right response no doubt requires
considerable skill. It is clear that the right response must (1) be aimed
Democracy and Terrorism
1
at separating the small band from its potential mass constituency; (2)
deny it the means of recruiting new generations of members; and (3)
prevent it from spreading to other locations in the country.
International Terrorism and Democracies
We do not need to be reminded that democracies are also vulnerable to international terrorism. The United States and its allies seem
especially attractive targets. Martha Crenshaw suggests we consider
the structure of the present international system as an explanation
for international terrorism against the United States and its allies,
speciically that the United States is the hegemon—the unchallenged hyperpower—of the post-cold war era.10 A self-congratulatory “We’re number one” status often evokes feelings of contempt,
thinly disguised envy, and unlimited hatred across the world. All
three are surely among the most important motivations for terrorism. The trouble with using the present structure of the international
system to explain why international terrorists target the United States
is that terrorist violence against the United States and its allies also
occurred when other structures prevailed. The United States and its
institutions, representatives, and citizens were frequent targets of terrorist attacks when the international system was bipolar, especially
during the latter decades of the cold war when Latin American urban
guerrillas, European social revolutionaries, and various PLO-related
organizations all found the United States to be an attractive target.
The multipolarity of the international system during the last
decades of the nineteenth century and in the years leading up to
World War I, as well as during the interwar period, may have meant
that America was less frequently targeted by international terrorists
during the period, but it hardly meant that international terrorism
was absent. Virtually all the major powers of the era were subject
to terrorist attacks either by international anarchists or by nationalist groups hoping to achieve the liberation of their nations from the
imperial domination of one empire or another.
Globalization is another characteristic of our current condition
that some believe arouses international terrorist violence. The logic
here is that regions of the world where globalizing trends are felt most
acutely in economic, social, and cultural terms are most likely to
experience a political backlash. International terrorism, then, is one
expression of such a backlash, as people most troubled by globalization lash out against the country or countries perceived as instigating
it. More generally, international terrorists attack the United States and
Western European countries because they oppose the economic and
cultural penetration of their homelands by the West. A correlative
The Roots of Terrorism
contention about the terrorism-inducing impact of globalization concerns the immigration of large numbers of Middle Eastern and North
African Muslims to the countries of Western Europe. Living among
non-Muslims in such cities as Amsterdam, Hamburg, and London
causes a number of stresses and strains, making young men in particular vulnerable to the appeals of Al-Qaeda and its various cells and
networks.
After the bombings in Madrid March 11, 2004, and in London July 7–21, 2005, it is dificult to deny that the presence of an
alientated immigrant population provided a pool from which terorists were recruited. Immigrant populations have frequently provided
large pools from which so-called terrorist mosquitoes have appeared
for many years. At the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the
twentieth centuries, groups of Italian and, to some extent, Russian
immigrants living in Argentina, France, Spain, and the United States
contributed a meaningful number of violent anarchists to the historical moment, who waged terrorist campaigns against capitalism and
the bourgeois state. The phenomenon thus predates the current era of
globalization by close to a century.
If promoting and beneiting from globalization were a signiicant
cause of international terrorism, then Japan, South Korea, Taiwan,
and the People’s Republic of China should be among the most frequent targets. But, of course, this is hardly the case. In fact, evidence
points in another direction. Eubank and I compared the rankings of
sixty-two countries on a recently developed index of globalization
and then evaluated those rankings with the rankings of the same
countries on measures of international terrorism drawn from the
ITERATE III and the Rand-St. Andrews Chronologies.11 It was discovered, in general, that a high proportion of international terrorist
events occur in the world’s least globalized countries. The most common type of international terrorist attack was one involving perpetrators from a country ranking low on the index of globalization who
employed violence against victims or targets from another country
also ranking low on this index. To the extent that citizens of countries ranking high on the measure of globalization have been victimized by international terrorism, the perpetrators of the attacks tended
to come largely from other countries also ranking high on this measure. The level of lethality was not taken into consideration. But if
the analysis from this study were conined to the simple frequency of
international terrorist events, then it seems clear that an explanation
for the current wave of international terrorism based on a reaction
against globalization and countries identiied as globalization’s sponsors and beneiciaries is not supported by the available evidence.
Democracy and Terrorism
To the degree that an explanation can be found or a lesson
learned from the attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001,
in Madrid on March 11, 2004, and in London in July 2005, it will
unlikely be found in general statements about the structure of the
international system or globalization. Such statements and criteria
are too broad to do much good. Rather, in the search for meaning,
the best explanations likely will be found in the speciic expressions of
those doing the killing and some features about the countries whose
citizens have been targeted for murder.
If such a search is conducted while listening to what the terrorist chieftains have to say, it is not hard to identify particular foreign
policies that have made the United States, along with some other
democracies, targets for attack by international terrorist organizations. In the case of the United States and Al-Qaeda—and groups
linked to it—the policies involved seem clear cut. Osama bin Laden
and his followers were infuriated in August 1990 when the Saudi
Arabia government agreed to allow the irst George Bush administration to station American troops there to protect against a possible invasion by the Iraqis following Saddam Hussein’s invasion of
Kuwait.12 The presence of non-Muslims inside the House of Islam—
including Somalia in 1993—in addition to American support for the
non-Islamic regimes in Cairo and Riyadh were the principal reasons
bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri (usually identiied as Al-Qaeda’s second in command), and their followers offered for launching terrorist
attacks inter alia on the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es
Salaam, the USS Cole, and the World Trade Center. The U.S. decision to invade Iraq in March 2003 provided an additional rationale
for more terrorism against American targets.13 Concomitantly, the
murderous terrorist attacks on commuter trains in Madrid and the
London Underground have been linked by both the terrorist groups
and their academic observers to the support the Spanish and British
governments provided for the American initiative in Iraq.
Other democracies have been targets of international terrorism for reasons unrelated to their relationship to the United States.
France was the site of multiple terrorist attacks during the 1990s by
the Armed Islamic Group because of the French government’s support
for the Algerian regime, which is in the process of repressing various
insurgent Islamist organizations on its own territory. Likewise, in
recent years India has been struck repeatedly by such jihad groups
as Lashkar e-Tayba and Harakat ul Mujahadin over its continued
control of Jammu/Kashmir, a state with a Muslim majority.14 The
intractable conlict between Israel and the Palestinians also must be
considered. Al-Qaeda and its various offspring have repeatedly cited
The Roots of Terrorism
Washington’s support for Israel—deined as an outpost of unbelief
inside the House of Islam—as a reason for staging terrorist attacks
against American targets throughout the world. It is worth noting
that the principal Palestinian groups—Hamas, Palestinian Islamic
Jihad, and the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade—presently engaged in jihad
against Israel have chosen not to attack American targets. Their terrorism has been directed locally, not globally. The older and largely
secular groups under the PLO umbrella (e.g., the Popular Democratic
Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, Fatah) carried out attacks
against American targets in Europe and the Middle East during the
late 1960s and 1970s. The context for these attacks was not global
jihad but the Cold War struggle between the Soviet Union and the
United States for power and inluence in the Middle East; Palestinian
groups received support from and often acted on behalf of the Soviet
Union. In fact, Al-Qaeda is a latecomer to the struggle against Israel.
Its pronouncements on the linkage between the sufferings of the Palestinians and American support for Israel followed the outbreak of
the Al Aqsa Intifada in fall 2000 and the subsequent display by alJazeera and other Arab mass media of the Israeli military’s attacks on
various Palestinian targets in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
Particular foreign policies in general and the United States in
particular have made democracies the targets of international terrorism. But there is more to the story. Democracies possess certain
attributes that make them vulnerable to attack. First and foremost is
their deining characteristic: rule by the people. Or, to quote Osama
bin Laden’s November 2002 “Letter to America,” “By electing these
leaders, the American people have given their consent to the incarceration of the Palestinian people, the demolition of Palestinian homes,
and the slaughter of the children of Iraq. The American people have
the ability and choice to refuse the policies of their government, yet
time and again, polls show the American people support the policies
of the elected government…This is why the American people are not
innocent.”15 Since the United States is a democracy, American citizens
may be held collectively responsible for the actions of their government. The same logic then applies to the Spanish, British, Australian,
and other democracies as well. Where the people rule, the people
should be held not merely morally but also physically accountable for
the actions of their governments.
Democracies also possess well-known qualities that enhance
their vulnerability to international terrorist attack. Unlike, for
example, the People’s Republic of China or North Korea, their borders are usually permeable, making entry and exit relatively easy.
Democracy and Terrorism
Those seeking sanctuary are usually treated humanely even when
they express hatred and loathing for the very countries in which they
have come to reside. Aliens usually enjoy the protection of the law.
It was reported, for example, that a small military intelligence unit
identiied Mohammad Atta and three other 9/11 terrorists in summer 2000 and suspected them of planning attacks. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation was informed of these suspicions, but it
refused to pursue an investigation on the grounds these individuals
held valid visas, making their stay in the country perfectly legal.16
Democratic ofice-holders are sensitive to public concerns about the
loss of human life. The right to privacy, the freedoms of worship and
personal association, the freedom to move from one place to another
within a country—in short, many values citizens prize about life in
democratic countries—make them vulnerable to international terrorists who are able to exploit these values for their own ends. I am not
saying that open societies and open borders make for international
terrorism. Rather I assert that international terrorist bands such as
Al-Qaeda’s various offspring have found it relatively easy to conduct
operations in democracies whose foreign policies are in conlict with
their fundamental aims.
*****
In concluding this short chapter, sweeping generalizations about root
causes of terrorism are of limited value. If anything, democracy seems
to be a root cause in the sense that open societies and transparent
governments provide conditions in which those prepared to wage terrorist campaigns may operate at least for a while. The response of the
authorities within democracies requires the closest attention. At the
domestic level, how they respond to a radicalized political environment and a handful of terrorist events may determine if they will then
confront a large-scale and protracted terrorist campaign or simply a
minor annoyance. The situation that policymakers in democracies
face in dealing with international terrorist attacks poses a serious
dilemma. If these attacks are triggered not by the structure of the
international system in general but by speciic foreign policies—for
example Spanish or Australian military involvement in Iraq or French
support for the Algerian government—then the solution seems easy
enough. Do what the terrorists want, and their attacks will stop.
Two problems arise with this acquiescent response. First, the
attacks may not stop. The departure of American forces from Somalia following the Black Hawk down incident in 1992, for example,
emboldened Al-Qaeda to carry out more lethal attacks on U.S. targets: Witness the bombings of the American embassies in Nairobi
The Roots of Terrorism
and Dar es Salaam. Second, if blackmail works in one instance—if
a small band of terrorists is able to compel a major power to change
its foreign policy by setting off a few bombs—then other small bands
with other foreign policy goals may very well do likewise. The result
will not be an end to terrorism but instead an escalatory spiral involving growing violence. Acquiescing to the demands of international
terrorists may perhaps yield short-term beneits, but its long-term
consequences may prove another matter.
Endnotes
1. Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics 13:4 (1981): 379–91.
2. Tore Bjorgo (ed.), The Root Causes of Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2004), 234–5.
3. Leonard Weinberg and William Eubank, “Does Democracy Stimulate Terrorism?” Terrorism and Political Violence 6, no. 4 (1994):
417–35.
4. Jan Oskar Engene, Terrorism in Western Europe (Northampton,
MA: Edward Elgar, 2004).
5. Ibid., 79–98.
6. Ibid., 99–164.
7. Ekkart Zimmermann, “Political Unrest in Western Europe,” West
European Politics 12, no. 3 (1989): 179–96.
8. Weinberg and Eubank, “Terrorism and Changes in Political Party
Systems,” in Political Parties and Terrorist Groups, ed. Weinberg
(London: Frank Cass, 1992), 125–39.
9. Ze’ev Schiff and Ehud Ya’ari, Intifada (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 51–78.
10. Martha Crenshaw, blog circulated to members of the work group on
the political causes of terrorism for the Madrid Summit on Democracy, Terrorism, and Security, March 8–11, 2004.
11. Weinberg and Eubank, “Terrorism, Globalism, and Democracy,”
in Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures, ed.
Andrew Silke (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 91–103.
12. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (New
York: Random House, 2003), 108–9.
13. Jean Charles Brissard, Zarqawi (New York: The Other Press, 2005),
126–27.
14. Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God (New York: Harper Collins, 2003), 32–84.
15. Quoted in Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedu, Non-linearity
of Engagement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2005), 4.
16. See New York Times, August 9, 2005, A1.
5
Counterterrorism and Repression
Michael S. Stohl
Through acts of violence, whether perpetrated or threatened, terrorists
seek to create fear or compliant behavior in a victim or an audience
for the act or threat. Counterterrorism actions therefore must always
address not simply the treatment of and response to actions that have
taken place and the prevention of future acts of terrorism but also the
reactions of the audience to the acts or threats. Authorities must thus
not only make the public more secure; they must also make the public
subjectively believe that they are more secure and must create conidence that the authorities are acting toward that end. Such communicative actions are necessary not only at the epicenters of terrorist activity
but also in seemingly peripheral locations where the public experiences
a shared empathic identity and collective loss with those stricken and
also a sense of vulnerability in potentially being future victims.
The failure on the part of the authorities to make the public more
secure—or at least to create a sense of security—amounts to a victory
for the terrorist. But as a process, failing to create a sense of security
for the public and not demonstrating that the political authorities are
doing what they should often present more of a threat to the political system than particular security lapses. The fact that many terrorist
threats originate outside the geographic boundaries of a particular state
and that the scope of possible operations and targets may be found
anywhere on the globe means that public and governmental perceptions
and actions within the international community are also important.
Thus, countering terrorism involves the use of all the security forces
of the state within the context of a political process. It is not simply
The Roots of Terrorism
about destroying the threat; consideration should also be given to the
means with which to get rid of the threat, as well as how it and the
counterterror involved are perceived.
To understand the requirements of an effective counterterrorism policy we must understand that terrorism is different from other
forms of violence or its threat. As dificult as it is for us to accept
in the immediate aftermath of an attack with victims in plain view,
terrorists are primarily interested in the audience, not the victims.
Terrorism is designed to have direct and indirect victims, and it is
crucial to understand that how the audience reacts is as important as
the act itself and the instrumental victims who are its direct casualties. Therefore, counterterrorism policy must address not only the
violence of the terrorist actor but also the multiple audiences of the
violence, which may be local, national, regional, or global.
Identifying the Purposes of Counterterrorism
Counterterrorism is not as simple as winning military battles,
destroying a network structure, preventing particular acts, or capturing particular terrorist actors. There is a constant interplay of fear,
anger, and uncertainty that terrorists try to produce in their potential target victim audience while they also attempt to create support
for their actions from those for whom they purport to speak. Counterterrorism requires authorities to attempt to provide security and
reassurance that they can protect the population, can eliminate the
future threat, and can discourage potential supporters of the terrorists. This process also focuses on the social identity of the audience,
presenting the challenge to decide if they align with the terrorists and
their government or against them; with a potential target, victim, or
a bystander; with a supporter or opponent. Terrorists seek through
their actions to generate responses that in addition to creating fear
will induce potential recruits, will provide safe havens, will provoke a
response to inancial requests, and will cause support from authorities
to be withdrawn. Through their counterterrorism policies authorities
intend that both government supporters (and potential supporters)
will provide information, back their policies and actions, and will
trust that their future will be more secure by doing so. At the same
time authorities intend that opponents (and potential opponents) of
the government will fear that continued withholding of support for
the government through their silence or continued support of the terrorists will bring them harm.
What complicates the efforts of counterterrorist agents in the contemporary global media environment is that both a state’s and terrorists’ actions are in public view. Terrorists do not need to attack in a
Counterterrorism and Repression
particular location—although some locations are clearly better than
others—to broadcast their message to audiences both near to and far
from the terrorist event. Likewise, the actions of governments against
terrorists, their supporters, and potentially innocent bystanders are
also liable to be broadcast both at home and abroad. Counterterrorist
strategy must be sensitive to, and must accommodate, the reactions
of multiple publics; it also needs to exhibit a better understanding of
how different segments of the community will respond to different
types and locations of events, to different victims, and to potential
targets. Counterterrorist strategy must therefore also be established
on an understanding of how social identity affects the processing of
messages of fear and security and whether such messages produce
fear or anger and a greater or lesser sense of risk and uncertainty.
Such understanding will aid the development of credible messages of
trust and reassurance, which ideally will ind expression in resilient
and productive community initiatives central to success.
Terrorists also understand this, which is demonstrated in a letter published in July 2005 by Ayman al-Zawahiri, purportedly AlQaeda’s second in command, to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of
the organization now named Al-Qaeda in Iraq.
In the absence of this popular support, the Islamic mujahed movement would be crushed in the shadows, far from
the masses who are distracted or fearful, and the struggle
between the Jihadist elite and the arrogant authorities would
be conined to prison dungeons far from the public and the
light of day. This is precisely what the secular, apostate forces
that are controlling our countries are striving for. These forces
don’t desire to wipe out the mujahed Islamic movement,
rather they are stealthily striving to separate it from the misguided or frightened Muslim masses.... Therefore, the mujahed movement must avoid any action that the masses do not
understand or approve, if there is no contravention of Sharia
in such avoidance, and as long as there are other options to
resort to, meaning we must not throw the masses—scant in
knowledge—into the sea before we teach them to swim.1
The implementation of counterterrorist policy is also directly inluenced by the existing relationship between the public and the police
and other counterterrorist agencies, as well as the public’s appraisal
of other governments and ethnic and religious groups. Building and
maintaining trust in the agents and agencies of counterterror is a key
component in the process. This involves how different communication
0
The Roots of Terrorism
processes are likely to affect the ability of law enforcement to successfully carry out its counterterrorism role—that is, to affect the public’s
actual security—and how such communication processes may affect
the public’s sense of security, which terrorists seek to undermine.
When shaping counterterrorism policy, states must also remember that the reactions of the audiences are as important as their shortterm elimination of particular terrorists or their capacities to act.
Terrorists recognize the potential for states to overreact by ignoring
their own legal requirements and norms of behavior; indeed, Carlos
Marighela argued that by their actions opposition groups should try
to provoke repressive and reactionary responses to demonstrate the
true nature of the “oppressive regime.”2
Counterterrorism at Home
At the Madrid Summit, a number of suggestions were made for countering and combating insurgent terrorism. Underlying the recommendations was the conviction that democracy and democratic processes
were at the heart of both the terrorist threat and core components of
a successful response. The general view also emerged that whatever
action needed to be taken should fully apply democratic principles
and absolute respect for the rule of law. These evaluations were based
not just on a normative preference for democracy but also on the
conviction that the underlying principles of democracy and the rule
of law provide the best foundation for policy choices. An expected
utility approach provides important insights into how democratic
processes will contribute to successful counterterrorism policies and
how ignoring democratic norms and process will—particularly in the
longer term—harm counterterrorism efforts by democratic states.
The expected utility approach locates counterterrorism as a set of
strategic actions in a conlict situation. Within this frame, authorities
and terrorists calculate the beneits they would accrue by choosing
particular policies and weigh them against the probability of success
and the costs of undertaking the policy so as to determine if the beneits exceed the risks. The policy choices may be directed at eliminating, quieting, or mitigating an actual or perceived potential challenge
or threat on the part of some identiiable terrorists, either domestic or
international. Repression and other forms of human rights violations
may be part of the set of choices—the tool box from which authorities may choose. As Christian Davenport argued, when repression
and human rights violations are calculated as relatively more effective means of governance, then the government might choose repressive behaviors “when the value for quiescence and the probability of
success are high and the costs are low. Governments are less likely
Counterterrorism and Repression
1
to violate human rights, however, when the value of quiescence and
the probability of success are low and the costs are high.”3 The same
logic applies when states conduct operations beyond their borders.
Ted Gurr outlined three sets of conditions, which affect the decision-making calculus of threatened elites: situational, structural, and
dispositional.4 Situational conditions include the political traits of
challenges—the status and strategies of challengers—and the elites’
own political resources for countering those challenges—regime
strength and police apparatus. Structural conditions deine elites’
relations with their opponents and determine or constrain their
response options. These include states’ position in the international
system and the nature of social stratiication and elites’ position
within it. Dispositional conditions can be expected to inluence how
elites regard the acceptability of strategies of violence and terrorism.
Norms supporting the use of violence are shaped by elites’ direct or
mediated experience with violent means of power and are inhibited
by democratic values.
A signiicant aspect of the debate within democracies as to the
approach to take to responding to terrorism concerns the capacity of
the state to withstand the threat. The debate is long-standing. Paul
Wilkinson argued that the threat to order presented by terrorists
necessitates strong measures that will protect the rule of law and
societal order. J. Bowyer Bell responded that a democratic society’s
refuge was in the rule of law and warned to beware of “apostles of
order” as special pleaders with other motives in mind. Simplifying
greatly, Bell and Wilkinson may represent the two competing tensions within the liberal approach to politics: law and order. Bell seeks
order through established law; Wilkinson sees law established by an
initial establishment of order. 5
Bell suggested that an appropriate response to the further threat
of terrorism consists of a scrupulous reliance on the law, taking care
not to overreact nor to violate or to dispense with civil liberties. Ultimately it means not only recognizing but also accepting that no way
exists to protect open societies at all times from violent individuals. Wilkinson concluded that “the government has a duty to invoke
special powers to protect the community, restore order, and reestablish the rule of law.” Bell countered that “if we cannot tolerate the
exaggerated horror lashed on the evening news or the random bomb
without recourse to the tyrant’s manual—then we do not deserve to
be free.”6 The Wilkinson–Bell debate is mirrored in the recent past
in the work of Philip Heymann and Alan Dershowitz, among many
others, and the debates within democratic societies about the need
The Roots of Terrorism
for additional powers, special powers, or the suspension of long-held
constitutional principles or guarantees or both.7
Using State Power
Even though the choices are dificult when arguing about the part of
the counterterrorism process involving managing the threat of attack
and the tactical response, it is important to remember that it is just
one part of the counterterrorist strategic requirements. As indicated
previously, it is also important to manage the issues of identity, trust,
support, and fear and to understand how the use, misuse, and perceptions of misuse, of state power affect the responses of the counterterrorism audiences.
The expected utility approach suggests that the management of
terrorism should be based on increasing the costs and on reducing
the beneits of the option. Jeffrey Ross and Gurr discuss four general kinds of conditions that can contribute to the decline of political
terrorism: preemption, deterrence, burnout, and backlash. “Preemption and deterrence are counterterrorist policies and actions which
can reduce or eliminate the terrorists’ coercive capabilities. Burnout
and backlash are general conditions which reduce the political capabilities of groups using terrorism.”8 Thus far the focus of much of
the post-September 11, 2001, counterterrorism response has been
heavily military and has focused on the production side of the equation— that is, on the preemption and deterrence options identiied by
Ross and Gurr. I suggest that increasing the response cost part of the
equation, including burnout and backlash, is of equal and perhaps
potentially greater beneit in the long run.
Burnout refers to members’ declining commitment to the group
and its purposes, an effect more frequently seen and pronounced in
ideological movements. As in all militant organizations, it is reinforced over time by the aging of members of the terrorist organization.
The greatest numbers are recruited in their teens and twenties and
begin departing in their thirties as they lose hope in “making a difference” and seek to “live their life”.9 In ideological networks, organizational members are far less likely to be embedded in a homophilous
multiplex set of familial, or kinship, relations that socializes, reinforces, and supports or even is aware of the terrorist organization.
Therefore, it is far more likely that discrepant messages, alternative
interpretations, and diverse options will become visible and viable
for the organizational member. Thus, policies that can contribute to
burnout by providing economic incentives and alternatives should be
of great utility, although they will not be as useful against organizations based on family, clan, or other strong ties.10
Counterterrorism and Repression
A successful counterterrorism policy creates backlash against
actors who choose to employ terrorism. Backlash refers to actions
that antagonize and alienate the terrorist organizations from the
larger sociopolitical context in which they are embedded and are
interdependent. These strategies seek to delegitimize the actions of
terrorists. Accommodative political strategies initiated by governments as a response to terrorist threats or actions may serve to reduce
the acquiescence of societies to terrorists in their midst if organizational leaders do not respond positively or accept the gains offered
by authorities. Accommodative offers, as minimal as they might be,
may offer the hope of a continued presence in the political agenda.
They force populations not directly linked to the organization but
whose support or acquiescence is vital to the organizations’ survival
to consider whether continued adherence to the ultimate goals of the
organization or continuing tolerance for the right to exist is worth
the everyday effects of the continued presence of terrorists. Such a
rational calculation brought on by oficial governmental action is
more likely to create backlash from the wider society undermining
the political capabilities of doctrinal terrorist movements than those
of clan or ethnonationalist organizations. Within such a communicative context, it is easier for governmental actions to isolate the
organization—but only if it does not engage in activities characterized by opponents as terrorist. Ethan Bueno de Mesquita sounded a
cautionary note that concessions may bring initial escalation because
more extreme elements are the only ones remaining but that “the
beneits of counterterrorism aid from former terrorists may outweigh
the costs of heightened militancy.”11
Hence, it is not surprising that terrorist movements showing
decline—and in many cases disappearance altogether—over the past
thirty years have been the ideologically based movements such as the
Red Army Faction; Action Directe in France; and the Red Brigades
of Germany, France, and Italy. In contrast, terrorist groups that have
shown the greatest resilience are the ethnonationalist movements
such as the Basque Fatherland and Liberty, the Sri Lankan-based Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the Irish Republican Army, and the
numerous Palestinian groups. In the former, a combination of successful intelligence and police work, the ability to isolate the terrorists from the population, inducements to encourage disengagement,
and burnout all worked together to end the movements. In the latter, the continued political stalemates and the ability of the terrorists
to maintain their reservoir of support within the communities they
attempt to represent has meant that they have been able to continue
The Roots of Terrorism
to recruit and to ind a safe haven there; over time, they also develop
fuller organizational presences.
Backlash
When considering the process of backlash, it is important to recognize that we are also attempting to delegitimize the terrorist option. It
is necessary to tear away at the protective clothing that allows oppositional organizations, their publics, and the states that support them
to ignore the human consequences such terrorist behavior generates.
If such behavior is delegitimized, the psychological production costs
are increased for decision makers and for those who support them.
By challenging the behavior and by raising public awareness at home
and abroad we increase the possibilities of bystanders of the terrorism challenging terrorist behaviors and support for them. Examining
political organizations in different geographic, cultural, and historic
settings considering the wide variance in circumstance and contending political and social groupings, and employing an expected utility
approach forces us to contend with the willingness of many different
political organizations to use not just violence but also victims instrumentally. By thinking about the processes and structures that constrain such behaviors, it is clear that calculations about the response
by enemies as well as supporters are a key component in restraining
the instrumental use of victims. As Jack Goldstone suggested, “The
actions and reactions of regimes, regime opponents, counter-movements, and the broader public all reshape the processes of group identiication, perceptions of the eficacy and justice of the regime and its
opponents, and estimates of what changes are possible.”12
Counterterror strategies need to address the response of the communities terrorists purport to represent and to choose tactics that
encourage backlash against—rather than further support for—terrorists. One such strategic response that is always tempting for governments is repression. Policies of repression employ the use of or
the threat of coercion against opponents and potential opponents to
prevent or weaken their capability to oppose the authorities and their
policies. This coercion may use the full machinery of the state, including the judiciary as well as the police and military. The state may
also deny social and economic privileges to whole classes of people,
thereby also preventing the enjoyment of basic human rights outlined
in the Universal Declaration. There is no question that in the short
term governmental repression can produce reluctance on the part of
the audience to support terrorism conducted in its name. Repression
raises the costs for known supporters and creates much greater caution in acquiescing to the violent claims. However, increased repres-
Counterterrorism and Repression
sion over time may actually generate increased collective actions.
Often, paradoxically, ierce repression is unable to daunt—or even
inlames—revolutionary opposition.13
To illustrate, David Mason and Dale Krane, based on their analysis of El Salvador, argued that indiscriminate repression may increase
opposition to the regime. Violent repression erodes the popular legitimacy of the regime, precludes the use of more conventional nonviolent modes of participation, and thereby compels the opposition to
resort to violence intended not simply bring about changes in government policy or personnel but also to force a revolutionary change
of regime.14 Likewise, Peter Chalk in his examination of Southeast
Asia argued that the repression conducted by the governments has
compounded the sense of dissatisfaction and has fueled separatist
movements and created greater support.15 Likewise, Bruno Coppieter stressed that “from the perspective of legitimate authority, the
indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force and repression by
the Russian authorities, and the lack of criminal proceedings against
those who perpetrated war crimes, undermine the legitimacy of the
Russian government and the authority of those Chechens who are
ready to cooperate with the Russian government.”16 Examining the
behavior of Hamas, Saul Mishal compared Hamas’s response to the
repression under Israeli hands to the behavior of other Islamic movements, such as the Muslim Brothers groups in Jordan and Sudan,
which tend to be reformist rather than revolutionary, generally preferring to operate overtly and legally “unless forced to go underground
and use subversive or violent methods in response to severe repression.17 Commonality seems to exist across cultures, time, and space
so that one long-term result of repressive policies is a continuation
of support for violence committed in the name of groups mobilizing against terrorism. Repression, though often apparently successful
in the short run, can serve to ill the very reservoirs of support it is
designed to empty.
Building Transnational Counterterrorism Networks
When we move beyond the conines of individual states these same
principles still apply. States confronted by the threat of transnational
insurgent terror recognize the need to collaborate with other states
to eliminate safe havens, to control inancial resources, and to guard
and to prevent the sales of weapons and explosives. After September
11, for example, the U.S. government, using both igurative carrots
(e.g., resources, aid, weapons) and sticks (e.g., threats to withhold
inancial aid), put pressure on numerous governments to connect terrorists acting within their borders to the global terror network.
The Roots of Terrorism
However, one of the problems for democracies engaged in attempting to build transnational counterterrorism networks is that many of
the nations whose assistance was thought necessary in the global war
against terror were not democracies, and were engaged in the systematic violation of their citizens’ human rights and often used repression
against their citizens to maintain their regimes. Amnesty International
and Human Rights Watch have documented numerous abuses in
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia within the Central Asian region. These regimes
routinely suppress internal dissent, arrest political opponents, and
censor the media. Political dissent of any kind is harshly suppressed,
and beatings and torture of detainees is commonplace.
Additionally, some nations sought entrance into the coalition for
their own domestic purposes as well. China, for example, lobbied for
ten months to have the East Turkistan Islamic Movement added to
the U.S. list of terrorist organizations linked to Osama bin Laden’s
global terror network.18 To many external observers, as well as to the
populations within these new allies, the actions of the democracies’
new partners appear purely opportunistic, declaring their intention
to ight the global terror network merely to aid in their elimination of
unconnected challenges to their own regimes.
However, the problem is not just that these governments will
repress their own people. It is also important to recognize in a globally
capable information society that a strategy of delegitimization is connected to counterterrorism policies and partnerships as well. Counterterrorism policies and coalitions that involve assisting or enlisting
so-called bad governments—that is, governments that repress their
populations or use their powers to discriminate with respect to the
distribution of goods and opportunities across ethnic divides—might
not always create dissonance across the entire audience in the nations
engaged in the global war on terror. However, these counterterrorism
policies are bound to create the wrong kind of backlash in societies
mirroring the conditions that support organizations using terror in
their homeland or abroad. Just as the black–white mentality of the
cold war created pressures to support bad governments on “our” side
and thus condemned populations within those societies to repression
and underdevelopment, the War on Terror has the potential to do the
same in the west, central, and inner Asian former Soviet republics
and elsewhere.19 However, in today’s globalized media environment
the results are shared not only on CNN and the BBC but also on
Al Jazeera and on the web in front of the populations shielding, or
acquiescing to, the terrorists in their midst. Any counterterrorism
policy or action that lowers the response costs for terrorist organizers
Counterterrorism and Repression
and their supportive populations reduces the potential effectiveness
of the policy or action.
Thus when states sell, grant, and otherwise provide favorable
terms by which their coalition partners, allies, client states (and at
times neutrals and even adversaries) obtain equipment which enables
regimes to continue and/or expand practices of repression and terrorism, or engage in training the personnel that conducts the terror
operations, audiences both in their own states and in these nations
are witness to these policy choices. As the Madrid discussions emphasized, democracies need to undermine the terrorist appeal to the populations of countries from whom they need to draw their support
and/or acquiescence if insurgent terrorists are to have fewer places
in which to ind safe haven. They will ind this more dificult if they
appear to support policies of repression and terror by governments
against the populations to whom they are appealing.
In the interconnected global environment in which transnational
terrorism is confronted, a counterterrorist coalition seeking to mobilize multiple populations must have trust as an important component.
In a general sense it is always important for democracies to show the
utmost respect for the principles on which they stand, including truth
and justice. In that context the abuses of Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo, the policy of rendition, all reduce the respect of the populations within the historically democratic nations and feed into the
propaganda of Al-Qaeda about the willingness of the United States
and the West to systematically deny the same rights and respect to
the people Al-Qaeda purports to represent. U.S. leadership in the
global war on terror is accompanied by arguments built on American
Exceptionalism. This exceptionalism is exempliied, for example, by
the doctrine of preemption introduced in the 2002 National Security
Strategy and in the refusal to join the International Criminal Court.
This assertion of exceptionalism may undercut the ability to counter
the message of the terrorists and fracture the support of the populations with other democratic partners as well. As Darren Davis and
Brian Silver noted, trust in government is a resource on which governments may draw. 20 Indeed, low levels of trust make it more dificult
for governments to succeed. The populations of the democratic states
must trust that the governments of the counterterrorism network will
act in good faith. Heymann, addressing an American audience, suggested that “we must learn never to react to the limited violence of
small groups by launching a crusade in which we destroy our unity
as a nation or our trust in the fairness and restraint of the institutions of the U.S. government that control legitimate force.”21 This is
advice a counterterrorism coalition of democratic nations must heed.
The Roots of Terrorism
However serious the threat of terrorism they must not yield the rule
of law to combat it.
In closing, it is useful to ponder the observations of Jeffrey Goldfarb, codeveloper with Adam Michnik, of the “Democracy Seminar
which takes place twice a year in Krakow and Cape Town and brings
together students and activists to discuss the creation and sustenance
of democratic structures.” He reports on the reactions of students—
the very ones he says should be the best allies the United States has in
the long run—to the development of the counterterrorism network.
These students say:
It is the war on terrorism that is being used as cover by dictators around the world to justify crackdown on democracy
advocates. Suddenly the rights of Muslims in the Philippines
and Indonesia—or the democratic critics of the authoritarian “Asian way” in Singapore, Malaysia and Burma—are not
important to the Bush administration. Suddenly the strategic
resources of Central Asian dictatorships are more important than the lives of human rights activitists. Suddenly the
defense of the American way of life and our democracy seems
to be predicated upon a lack of concern for the democratic
rights of people in less advantage countries. 22
If the policies of the counterterrorism coalition and the disregard of
the United States for the audience of those policies have created such
views in potential friends of the United States, the long-term success
of a strategy that does not place its adherence to its most basic principles at its core is much in doubt. Repression and the denial of human
rights will only harm the counterterrorism struggle. Democracy and
democratic processes must be the core components of a successful
counterterrorism strategy and coalition.
Endnotes
1. For the full text, see http://www.dni.gov/letter_in_english.pdf.
2. Carlos Marighela, For the Liberation of Brazil (Harmondsworth,
UK: Penguin, 1971), 113.
3. Christian Davenport, “Human Rights and the Democratic Proposition,” Journal of Conlict Resolution 43, no. 1 (1999): 92–116.
4. Ted Robert Gurr, “The Political Origins of State Violence and Terror: A Theoretical Analysis,” in Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for Research, ed. Michael Stohl and George Lopez
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986), 62–7.
5. See Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State (London: Halstead, 1977); and John B. Bell, A Time of Terror: How Democratic
Counterterrorism and Repression
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
Societies Respond to Revolutionary Violence (New York: Basic
Books, 1978).
Wilkinson, Terrorism, 156; Bell, Time of Terror, 279.
Philip B. Heymann, Terrorism and America: A Commonsense Strategy for a Democratic Society (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998);
and Alan M. Dershowitz, “Is There a Tortuous Route to Justice?”
Los Angeles Times, November 8, 2001.
Jeffrey Ian Ross and Gurr, “Why Terrorism Subsides: A Comparative Study of Canada and the United States,” Comparative Politics
21, no. 4 (1989): 408.
Charles A. Russell and Bowman Miller, “Proile of a Terrorist,” Terrorism 1, no. 1 (1977): 18; and Neil Livingston, The War against
Terrorism (Lexington, MA: Heath Lexington, 1982), 43–5.
Stohl, “Is the Past Prologue? Terrorists and WMD,” International
Studies Review 7, no. 1 (2005): 146–8.
Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, “Conciliation, Counterterrorism, and
Patterns of Terrorist Violence,” International Organization 59, no.
1 (2005): 146.
Jack A. Goldstone, “Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory,” Annual Review of Political Science 4, no. 1 (2001):
139–87.
See Davenport, “Human Rights.”
David Mason and Dale Krane, “The Political Economy of Death
Squads: Toward a Theory of the Impact of State-Sanctioned Terror,”
International Studies Quarterly 33, no. 2 (1989): 192.
See Peter Chalk, “Separatism and Southeast Asia: The Islamic Factor in Southern Thailand, Mindanao, and Aceh,” Studies in Conlict
& Terrorism 24, no. 1 (2001): 241–69.
Bruno Coppieter, “Secession and War: A Moral Analysis of the Russian–Chechen Conlict,” Central Asian Survey 22, no. 4 (2003):
393.
See Shaul Mishal, “The Pragmatic Dimension of the Palestinian
Hamas: A Network Perspective,” Armed Forces and Society 29, no.
4 (2003): 569–90.
“American Gives Beijing Good News: Rebels on Terror List,” New
York Times, August 27, 2002.
Anatol Lieven, “The Secret Policemen’s Ball: The United States,
Russia, and the International Order after Sept. 11,” International
Affairs 78, no. 2 (2002): 250.
Darren W. Davis and Brian Silver, “Civil Liberties vs. Security: Public Opinion in the Context of the Terrorist Attacks on America,”
American Journal of Political Science 48 (2004): 30.
Heymann, Terrorism in America, 158.
“Losing Our Best Allies in the War on Terror,” New York Times,
August 21, 2002.
6
The Causes of Revolutionary Terrorism
Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca
Speculation about the origins of terrorism is risky, if only because the
role of contingency is bigger than in other forms of political violence,
such as interstate or civil wars. Given the fact that they are clandestine
organizations, terrorist groups are smaller in size than national armies
or guerrillas. The creation of a terrorist organization may be decided by
a handful of people, and a hundred volunteers may be more than enough
to launch a terrorist campaign. Whether the decisions of such a small
number of people can be explained along similar lines to other, more
systematic, political events—for example, the relationship between electoral rules and the number of political parties or economic development
and the survival of democratic regimes—is a contentious issue.
As a result of the contingent nature of terrorism, it is probably futile
to expect that the social sciences can establish some combination of necessary and suficient conditions that bring about terrorism. Yet I suggest
that we can gain some useful insights if we accept that this form of political violence is—to borrow a biological analogy—a mixture of chance
and necessity. More speciically, I argue that the formation of terrorist
organizations is a random mutation that occurs within societies but
that some political conditions ilter or select which of these mutations
survive and reproduce, thus creating a serious challenge to the political
system. According to this model of political selection, the formation of
terrorist groups is a contingent event, but their survival or extinction is
determined by conditions that can be worked out systematically.
To illustrate how chance and necessity are related in the production
of terrorism, this chapter focuses on the wave of terrorist activity that
The Roots of Terrorism
started in the late ‘60s and early ‘70s in the developed world. Many
countries at that time had to face the terrorist challenge. There was
nationalist terrorism like in Northern Ireland or the Basque Country,
revolutionary terrorism like in Italy, Germany, Japan, and Spain, and
fascist, or black, terrorism like in Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Moreover, many countries did not have any terrorism at all, or had very
little, like in the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, Belgium,
France, Canada, the United States, and Australia. There is a signiicant variation, therefore, which I try to explain by using the political
selection model.
My approach is slightly different from that of Jan Oskar Engene,
who in 2004 published a study of terrorism in Western Europe.1 First,
I deal only with revolutionary terrorism, for different types of terrorism require different conditions to survive and reproduce. Second, my
analysis includes all the countries in the developed world, whereas
Engene’s analysis was restricted to Western Europe. And third, and
most importantly, I provide more accurate igures about numbers of
fatalities drawn from my own data set. 2
Terrorism can be understood in at least two different ways: as
an action-based concept or as one that focuses on the actors. In the
action sense, terrorism is a form of violence—mainly against civilians, often in indiscriminate attacks, trying to instill fear in a wider
audience—that can be carried out by different actors, such as terrorist organizations, guerrillas, or armies. In the actor sense, terrorism
is the activity displayed by terrorist organizations. Terrorist groups
are different from other insurgencies because they do not control any
territory, act within the enemy’s territory, and hence have to be secret
or underground. Guerrillas, by contrast, liberate some territory from
the state’s control and act in this territory like a protostate (e.g.,
extracting rents, imposing order). In this chapter I refer to terrorism
exclusively in the actor sense. I am interested in understanding the
conditions under which these organizations emerge.
In the following, I irst show that the terrorist mutation of the ’70s
was all pervasive: small groups in favor of armed struggle could be
found in almost every country in the developed world. I then examine
the factors, both contingent and structural, that could explain why
terrorism was more widespread in some countries than in others.
Finally, there is a brief discussion about the possibility of extending
the model to other instances of terrorism.
Mutation
The political mobilization of students and workers in many countries
of the developed world during the second half of the ’60s gave rise—
The Causes of Revolutionary Terrorism
in some of them—to a wave of terrorist political violence that lasted
for thirty years or even longer. Most of this violence was inspired
by extreme left-wing ideology. Violence was believed to serve as an
inspiration: The masses would follow the path set by the vanguard
and take up arms. Even the nationalist terrorist organizations that
emerged at that time—the ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna, Basque
Homeland and Freedom) in the Basque country or the Provisional
Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in Northern Ireland—incorporated
Marxist jargon into their discourse.
In fact, the irst instances of revolutionary terrorism took place in
Latin America. The Tupamaros in Uruguay were the irst to theorize
and to put into practice the kind of urban guerrilla associated with
the terrorism of that period. The Tupamaros attempted to emulate
other Latin American guerrillas, but the absence of both mountains
and jungle in their country persuaded them that it was impossible to
start their rebellion in the countryside. Consequently, they concluded
that their only chance was to utilize the urban environment. 3 Their
example was followed by the Montoneros and other groups in Argentina. The doctrine behind this form of terrorism was systematized by
the Brazilian terrorist Carlos Marighella in his Minimanual of the
Urban Guerrilla.4 These Latin American experiences were a source
of inspiration for many revolutionary movements in Europe. A case
in point is the Red Army Faction, also known as the Baader-Meinhoff group, which explicitly tried to reproduce in West Germany the
urban guerilla example set forth by the Tupamaros.
In Europe, the irst organizations that turned to violence were
nationalist ones: The ETA killed its irst victim in 1968; the schism
within the IRA took place at the end of 1969; and the PIRA began to
carry out assassinations in 1970. 5 The two organizations, ETA and
PIRA, have lasted longer than any other and have killed far more
than their contemporaries. The ETA has cost the lives of 773 people,
and the PIRA 1,778.6 Still, nationalist organizations are somewhat
peculiar for a general cross-country comparison, as they only emerge
in countries where regions have territorial claims. Instead of restricting the analysis to countries with this territorial cleavage, I focus
mainly on left-wing, revolutionary terrorism, for this kind of terrorism—unlike the nationalist one—depends on a political cleavage
present in every country of the developed world.
As mentioned before, two stages of terrorism seem to be of relevance: mutation and selection. Regarding mutation, it is possible
to show that even in the countries that did not suffer from serious
revolutionary terrorism from 1970-1990, there were some terrorist
groups that had the same political preferences and organizational
The Roots of Terrorism
resources of those found in Italy, Spain, or Greece, yet they refused
to kill people or—even if they did— were quickly disbanded by the
police because of their lack of social support.
Let us examine four countries that did not suffer lethal revolutionary terrorism: Great Britain, the United States, Belgium, and the
Netherlands. In each of these cases, it is possible to ind a terrorist
mutation that soon became extinct. In Great Britain, an underground
group called the Angry Brigade was active during the early ’70s. It
fully rejected capitalism and imperialism and believed in revolution
and armed struggle, but its members attacked property rather than
people. They were easily neutralized by the police. In one of their
communiqués, commenting on nonlethal attacks against four different persons, they felt it was necessary to explain that their targets
“would all be dead if we had wished.”7 The question is why they did
not wish to kill them.
The United States has several of these mutations in its history.
The best known is the Weather Underground, a clandestine group of
young people that had strong revolutionary preferences but decided
not to kill anyone after the death of three of their own activists who
were manipulating an explosive device in New York City in 1970.
Another group, the Symbionese Liberation Army, killed two people,
but its members were quickly captured by the police; the United Freedom Front killed one person.8 None of these organizations became a
source of serious concern for the United States.
In Belgium, the Communist Combatant Cells, a small, violent,
revolutionary group that acted in the ’80s, did not want to assassinate anyone either, though in 1985 they killed two ireighters accidentally. In the Netherlands several ultra leftist groups, like the Red
Youth or its successor the Red Resistance Front, held radical views
and were inluenced by Carlos Marighella’s writings on the urban
guerrilla but did not evolve into lethal terrorism.
These examples reveal that some individuals and groups in these
countries possessed strong antisystem preferences and were willing to
employ violent tactics but fell short of full terrorism or were quickly
disbanded after the irst killings. Similar groups in other countries
had a very different trajectory: bloodier and longer. The difference
between the revolutionaries in the Netherlands and Italy does not lie
in ideological preferences or in the organizational features of these
groups but rather deals with the political system. For reasons still
needing to be disentangled, the conditions of Italian politics favored
the development and reproduction of these leftist, underground organizations, whereas Dutch politics constituted a hostile environment.
The Causes of Revolutionary Terrorism
Political Selection
It is important to distinguish terrorist revolutionary organizations
according to their degree of lethality. It would be odd to count France
and Italy as having gone through the same experience: Action Directe
in France assassinated twelve people, whereas the Red Brigades in
Italy killed ifty-three. Table 6.1 divides countries into three categories: those that had very little revolutionary terrorism or none at all
(no group killed more than ive people); those with groups that killed
between ive and twenty people; and those where terrorist groups
killed more than twenty people. Note that the criterion is not the
aggregate number of fatalities in the country overall but the presence
of at least one terrorist group that killed with a certain intensity.
For instance, in the case of France, I take into account only Action
Directe’s killings in the ’80s without considering the killings in the
’70s by minor organizations like the Brigates Internationales (International Brigades) (two killings) or the Noyaux Armés pour l’Autonomie
Populaire (Armed Nuclei for Popular Autonomy) (one killing).
Table 6.1
The impact of revolutionary terrorism in the developed world
Degree of revolutionary terrorism
None (Less than 5
Fatalities)
Some (Between 5 and
20 Fatalities)
Intense (More than 20
Fatalities)
Australia
France
Germany
Austria
Japan
Greece
Belgium
Portugal
Italy
Canada
Denmark
Finland
Great Britain
Ireland
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland
United States
Spain
The Roots of Terrorism
Excluding small countries (Iceland, Luxembourg) and Latin
America, Table 6.1 contains twenty-one countries of the Western,
developed world. Revolutionary terrorism was an important phenomenon in seven countries—that is, one-third of the sample. It was
particularly worrisome in Italy, Spain, and Germany, in terms both
of fatalities and the political strain it produced. Greece also appears
in the group of countries aflicted by intense terrorism: The Revolutionary Organization 17 November killed twenty-two people during
a long span of twenty-ive years, though arguably it did not have as
much political impact as the Red Brigades in Italy, Grupo de Resistencia Antifascista Primero de Octubre (First of October Antifascist
Resistance Group) (GRAPO) in Spain, or the Red Army Faction
(RAF) in Germany.
Table 6.2 contains a more detailed impression of the terrorist organizations that acted in these seven countries. The GRAPO,
a Maoist group very active during the transition to democracy in
Spain, is the deadliest organization, followed by the Red Brigades.
Terrorism in Italy was extremely fragmented—just like the party system—and the Red Brigades and Prima Linea [Front Line] were the
two main groups, with ifty-three and sixteen fatalities, respectively,
out of a total of 149 fatalities caused by the extreme left.
To account for the fact that the terrorist mutation found a niche
in seven of the twenty-one countries, it is convenient to separate contingent and structural factors. Contingent factors are such things as
the size of the popular mobilization of the late ’60s and early ’70s, the
presence of extreme right-wing terrorism, or the response of the state.
Structural factors refer to more permanent features of the country,
like economic development or the political nature of the state. Of
course, the combination of contingent and structural factors requires
statistical analysis. In this contribution, though, I limit myself to discussing this issue in a conventional comparative way, drawing on
some of the indings of my own statistical research.
Contingent factors
Regarding the cycle of political mobilization, it is apparent from Table
6.1 that almost all of the countries where demonstrations were massive and occasionally violent ended up with revolutionary terrorism
(e.g., France, Italy, Japan, Germany). The important exception is the
United States, where the student movement was extremely powerful,
galvanized by the Vietnam War, but where terrorism did not become
an issue at all. The case of France, on the other hand, is intriguing.
The 1968 mobilization was enormous, to the point that when workers joined students the country was paralyzed; however, terrorism
The Causes of Revolutionary Terrorism
Table 6.2
Main revolutionary terrorist organizations
Name
Country
Total Number
of Fatalities
Year of First
Fatality
Year of Last
Fatality
GRAPO
Spain
79
1975
2000
Brigate
Rosse
Italy
53
1974
1981
RAF
Germany
34
1971
1993
17
November
Greece
22
1975
2000
Prima Linea Italy
16
1976
1981
FP 25 Abril
Portugal
15
1980
1986
Action
Directe
France
12
1980
1986
Note: The Japanese Red Army was not included given the difficulties of
providing accurate figures about its activity. First, most of their
killings took place outside of Japan. Second, on Japanese soil they
killed more of their own members than other people. It is not clear
whether internal killings should be included.
was absent in the ’70s. It only emerged in the ’80s, with Action
Directe, and it was a rather marginal event. If political mobilization
during the ’60s was a relevant factor, France and the United States
are two countries expected to have more terrorism, yet little to none
can be found.
It cannot be by chance that Italy and Spain—the two countries
where revolutionary terrorism was more lethal—are the countries
where fascist terrorism was important.9 I do not mean the kind of
xenophobic, neo-Nazi violence that spread during the ’80s and ’90s
but instead the strategy of tension oriented toward the breakdown
of the democratic system. This type of violence was intended to create a situation of chaos that would offer a pretext for the army to
launch a coup. In Italy two coup attempts, organized by a coalition
of fascist groups and elements of the army, failed in 1970 and 1973.
The tension that was to justify the coup was created through indiscriminate attacks against civilians. The bloodiest of these attacks
were the Piazza Fontana bomb in Milan in December 1969, producing seventeen fatalities, the bomb explosion on the Italicus train in
1974, causing twelve fatalities, and the Bologna train station bomb
in 1980, responsible for eighty-three fatalities. During these years,
there were also many selective attacks against activists of ultra leftist
The Roots of Terrorism
groups. In Spain, on the other hand, the fascist attacks were mainly
selective. Particularly shocking was the killing of four labor lawyers
of the Communist union, the Comisiones Obreras, in January 1977,
just a few months before the irst democratic elections after the end
of Francisco Franco’s dictatorship.
The existence of fascist violence triggered the emergence of leftist
organizations. It created a visible aggressor and lent credibility to the
thesis held by the extreme left that Western democracies were only
a facade of authoritarian regimes. The Italian terrorists of the ’70s
saw themselves as the heirs of the Resistance. One of the irst groups
that emerged in the early ’70s was Grupo d’Azione Partigiana (Group
of Partisan Action), created by the famous publisher Giangiacomo
Feltrinelli, who—following the Piazza Fontana attack—thought that
only armed struggle could prevent the return of fascism. In Spain, the
GRAPO frequently justiied its attacks by referring to the ongoing
fascist nature of the Spanish state. For them, the connections between
the security forces and fascist groups proved that despite elections
Spain was still a dictatorial, oligarchic regime. Still, although fascist terrorism may have intensiied leftist terrorism, it can hardly be
the whole story, for we can observe revolutionary violence in other
countries like Germany or Greece where fascist terrorism was absent.
This suggests that, apart from political mobilization and fascism, the
state’s response to the cycle of popular mobilization was important
as well.
The pattern of repression at the beginning of the conlict may
help to account for variations in the degree of lethality.10 Indiscriminate or excessive repression (e.g., random detentions, states of emergency, torture, excessive use of force in demonstrations and street
ights) may backire, inducing people to join terrorist organizations;
this was clearly the case for nationalist terrorism. The strength of
the ETA was derived to a large extent from the police repression of
Basque nationalists under Franco, especially after the irst killing in
1968. Likewise, in Northern Ireland, the PIRA emerged in the middle of harsh police repression and harassment by Protestants against
Catholics who participated in the civil rights movement. In Italy, the
police killed many students in demonstrations. The death of the anarchist Pino Pinnelli in prison in 1970, who was falsely accused of the
Piazza Fontana bomb, was crucial in the perception among radicals
that the state was going to use any means to put an end to the revolutionary movements. Also, during the Spanish transition many people
died in ights with security forces.
The police displayed a very different behavior both in France
and in Great Britain, where very little to no revolutionary terrorism
The Causes of Revolutionary Terrorism
is observed. Thus, in France no one was killed during spring 1968;
consequently, in the following years not even the most radical groups
thought killing was justiied. And if we leave aside the Troubles in
Northern Ireland, the fact is that both the demonstrations and the
police response were quite peaceful in Great Britain.
There seems to be, therefore, some association between repression and the emergence of terrorism. However, it is dificult to test
this idea rigorously without some quantitative measurement of
repression. And there are some noteworthy exceptions. For example,
in the United States repression was higher and more indiscriminate
than in, say, Germany, but terrorism did not spread. Events like the
killing of four unarmed students at Ohio’s Kent State University by
the National Guard, or the killing of another two students at Jackson
State University in Mississippi by the police, both in 1970, did not
induce terrorist organizations to launch violent campaigns.
This brief overview of contingent factors—political mobilization,
fascist terrorism, state repression—shows that none of them can be
taken as either necessary or suficient. Exceptions can be found in
each case: Political mobilization was low in Spain or Greece during
the late ’60s; there was no fascist terrorism in Germany; and repression was high in the United States. Yet Spain, Greece, and Germany
had important revolutionary terrorism, but the United States did not
have any. These factors should therefore be regarded as independent
variables, increasing the probability that the terrorist mutation will
survive and expand in certain countries, rather than as necessary or
suficient conditions.
Structural factors
Two structural factors can explain why terrorism inds a niche in
some countries: the level of economic development and the nature
of the state. With regard to economic development, a quick glance
at Table 6.1 reveals that there is no obvious relationship between
terrorism and per capita income. Among the countries that suffered
revolutionary terrorism, some were clearly poorer than the average
(e.g., Greece, Portugal, Spain), whereas others were quite wealthy
(e.g., France, Germany, Japan). It is true, however, that poorer countries—with the exception of the Republic of Ireland—had revolutionary terrorism. Statistically, the correlation is 0.4, signiicant at 10 percent. Importantly, though, the correlation disappears once we control
for the nature of the state. The classiication of countries in Table
6.1 suggests a strong association between the emergence of revolutionary terrorism and countries with a dictatorial past. Of the seven
countries with revolutionary terrorism, six went through right-wing
0
The Roots of Terrorism
authoritarian regimes during the twentieth century. France is the
only exception, unless we consider, as some people do, that the Vichy
years were an authoritarian parenthesis.11 And among the countries
that did not have revolutionary terrorism, all were democracies without any breakdown except Austria.
Why would countries with a dictatorial past provide a niche for
the terrorist mutation? In some of the cases, the authoritarian past
was very recent—in Greece and Portugal until 1974 and in Spain until
1975—and it is only logical, therefore, that it could have played a decisive role. For example, it seems obvious that the creation of the Revolutionary Organization 17 November had something to do with the
deaths of thirty-four students killed by the police during the occupation of the Polytechnic University in Athens on November 17, 1973—
hence the group’s name. However, in the cases of Germany, Italy, and
Japan, where the fascist regime was over in 1945, why was this episode
of history so crucial for the emergence of revolutionary terrorism?
Engene interpreted this inding in terms of legitimacy: “If there
are elements of non-democratic periods in the near past, this may contribute to the raising of questions about the true character and legitimacy of the state in the present.”12 But legitimacy is a loose concept,
and it is not obvious why legitimacy problems of the past are automatically transmitted to the new regime. Peter Katzenstein offered a
more interesting interpretation, based on a comparison of the United
States, Germany, Italy, and Japan. On the one hand, politicians of the
new regime react with greater fear and harsher repression to the challenge of collective protest, making it easier for terrorist organizations
to ind recruits and support and to sustain a campaign of violence.
On the other hand, terrorists fear the recurrence of authoritarian
experiences and intensify the violence of their protest.13
There is yet a third explanation, rooted in the literature on comparative politics. Adam Przeworski and his collaborators showed
that past instability is a powerful predictor of the survival of the
regime.14 Regimes that have suffered several transitions in the past
are less likely to survive. The mechanism is quite simple: People learn
from history that the regime can be overthrown and therefore can
imagine its demise. Although the Weathermen would not seriously
believe that the democratic system could collapse in the United States
because of the killings of some police oficers, both fascists and revolutionaries in Italy believed that democracy was fragile and could be
brought down with some violence. Terrorists tried to end the system
because they knew this had happened before. An immediate implication of this hypothesis is that transitions to democracy, when everything is in a state of lux, offer good chances for the emergence of
The Causes of Revolutionary Terrorism
1
revolutionary terrorism, as can be seen in Greece, Spain, and, to a
lesser extent, Portugal.
In a multivariate analysis with the twenty-one countries, the most
powerful and robust predictor of the lethality of violence is by far
past political instability. It works much better than the size of political mobilization in the ’60s or than economic development.15 Fascist
terrorism is also an excellent predictor, but it does not constitute an
independent variable. There is an obvious problem of endogeneity
in the sense that fascist terrorism could develop in those countries
where the extreme left turns violent.
*****
We may conclude, therefore, that whereas revolutionary violent
groups emerged in most countries of the developed world in the ’70s
and ’80s, these groups evolved into fully ledged terrorist groups in
only a handful of countries; there was a process of political selection.
Terrorist groups emerged in countries with past political instability,
with powerful social movements in the ’60s, with counterproductive
repression, and with fascist terrorism.
In principle, the model of political selection could be applied to
other forms of domestic terrorism. For instance, a sample of countries with conlicting territorial claims could be built to ind the factors that account for the presence of nationalist terrorism in some of
these, but not in others. There is ample evidence that in most of them,
there were radical groups in favor of violent politics, but only in a few
cases did they evolve into lasting and powerful terrorist organizations such as the ETA, the Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries in
Northern Ireland, and Hamas and other groups in Palestine.
The whole idea of political selection, however, is problematic in
the case of international terrorism. The argument could be applied
to terrorist organizations that have a territorial base in a particular
country—for example, Palestinian organizations—but it seems much
harder for nonterritorial organizations like Al-Qaeda or the anarchist organizations in Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. If the unit of observation is not a country, it is dificult
to think of explanatory factors that could answer the question of why
some organizations are more successful than others. If contingency
plays a signiicant role in the occurrence of terrorism, there is no
doubt that this holds true for international terrorism without a territorial base. In any case, it is worth reminding ourselves that until
the emergence of Al-Qaeda, international terrorism represented only
a very small fraction of all terrorism.
The Roots of Terrorism
Endnotes
1. Jan Oskar Engene, Terrorism in Western Europe: Explaining the
Trends since 1950 (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2004).
2. Engene’s data set is based on Keesing’s Record of World Events,
whereas my own draws on local sources in each country, including country-based chronologies, data gathered by associations of
victims or by the terrorist organizations, local newspapers, oficial
statistics, and many secondary sources. The results are rather different: For instance, Engene reported four fatalities caused by Action
Directe in France, but there were in fact twelve.
3. Jorge Torres, Tupamaros: La derrota de las armas (Montevideo,
Uruguay: Fin de Siglo, 2002), 345–9.
4. Carlos Marighella, Urban Guerrilla Minimanual (Vancouver: Pulb
Press, 1974).
5. The Quebec Liberation Front, another nationalist group, began its
campaign in 1963, but it never became a very dangerous organization.
6. For a comparison between the ETA and the IRA, see Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, “Terrorism as War of Attrition: ETA and the IRA”
(Working Paper 204, Juan March Institute, Madrid, Spain, 2004).
7. Tom Vague, Anarchy in the UK: The Angry Brigade (London: AK
Press, 1997), 40.
8. See Christopher Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism in America:
From the Klan to Al Qaeda (London: Routledge, 2003).
9. There was also fascist terrorism in Portugal during the late ’70s.
Although it is not entirely clear, it seems that the strategy of tension
was also attempted in Belgium between 1982 and 1985 (i.e., the
Brabant crimes) when a mysterious organization that never claimed
their attacks put several bombs in supermarkets, killing almost
thirty civilians. See Philip Jenkins, “Strategy of Tension: The Belgian Terrorist Crisis, 1981–1986,” Terrorism 13 (1990): 299–309.
10. See Peter J. Katzenstein, “Left-Wing Violence and State Response:
United States, Germany, Italy and Japan, 1960s–1990s” (working
paper, Institute for European Studies, Cornell University, Ithaca,
NY, 1998).
11. This is a dificult issue, as France was occupied by a foreign power.
Engene, Terrorism in Western Europe, includes France among the
countries with a discontinuous democratic past.
12. Ibid., 38.
13. Katzenstein, “Left-Wing Violence,” 4.
14. Adam Przeworski and others, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 127.
15. No measure of police repression has been included in the analysis
for lack of comparable data.
Economic Roots
7
Economic Factors
Ted Robert Gurr
In the aftermath of the U.S. September 11, 2001, attacks, many U.S.
oficials and observers linked poverty to terrorism. President George W.
Bush remarked, “We ight against poverty because hope is an answer
to terror.”1 Yet few of the attackers were poor. Muhammad Atta, their
leader, was the son of a lawyer and attended graduate school in Germany.
Similarly, many Al-Qaeda suspects identiied after the attacks were well
educated and of middle-class origin. However, they had three other
traits in common: (1) most grew up in societies undergoing wrenching
socioeconomic changes; (2) their opportunities for political participation were suppressed or sharply restricted by governments; and (3) they
were recruited by Islamists committed to jihad against the West.
This chapter surveys some of the complex linkages between economic factors and terrorism, drawing on a report prepared for the Club
de Madrid by the Economics Working Group I convened. Group members contributed working papers which provided key inputs for our
report and for this chapter. Other scholars’ publications also are cited. 2
Working group members share the assumption that terrorism is a
tactic, sometimes a primary strategy, in which armed attacks on civilians are designed to achieve political ends. Terrorism is a choice made
by groups waging conlict, not a hard-wired response to deprivation or
injustice. The perpetrators justify their decision to use terrorism, rather
than other political strategies, by a mix of rational calculation about
its costs and beneits plus their ideologically driven pursuit of revolutionary, ethnonational, or religious objectives. Four kinds of connections between economic factors and terrorism are considered here. First,
The Roots of Terrorism
evidence and theory is reviewed about how poverty, relative deprivation, and rapid socioeconomic change can create incentives, or
motivations, for people to engage in political violence. Second, two
critical intervening variables are examined that shape the political
outcomes of these incentives: the political circumstances that dispose
militants to use violence and the ideologies used to justify terror. The
inal topic of discussion is the terrorism-crime nexus, with particular
attention to the circumstances in which the objectives of terrorist
movements shift from the provision of public, or political, goods to
the pursuit of private material beneits.
The analysis is informed throughout by a basic insight from economic—or rational actor—analysis: It is essential to analyze incentives
and disincentives that affect militants’ decisions to choose terrorist tactics and individual decisions to join, to avoid, or to oppose such groups.
As David Gold observed in his working paper for the group, “Economics is not just about whether economic variables can help explain
observed outcomes. It is most fundamentally about how human behavior is shaped by the interaction of incentives and constraints.”
Poverty, Inequalities, and Socioeconomic
Change As Causes of Terrorism
Poverty per se is not a direct cause of terrorism
Macro studies show that terrorism can occur anywhere but is more
common in developing societies rather than in the poorest countries
or in the developed West and is especially likely to emerge in societies characterized by rapid modernization and lack of political rights. 3
Studies of participants in terrorist organizations demonstrate that
militants tend to be better educated and are more likely to be of middle-class background than the populations from which they come.
Krueger and Malečková’s careful analysis of 1990s data on Hizballah
ighters in Lebanon supports this conclusion. Jeroen Gunning said in
his working paper for the Economics Working Group that the principle holds whether the terrorist organization in question has ideological or ethnonational motives, religious or secular orientations. Groups
as diverse as Hamas, Hizballah, Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) in the
Basque country, the Red Army Faction in Germany, the Tamil Tigers
in Sri Lanka, and Al-Qaeda all share this characteristic: that is, organizers and militants are likely to be recruited from the better-educated
and more advantaged members of their respective group.
Poverty nonetheless contributes indirectly to the potential for
political violence. David Keen has proposed that a country’s failure
to create a viable economy is one of the root causes of civil war.
Economic Factors
Low levels of development create masses of young people with few
alternatives—people with essentially zero opportunity costs—who
become natural recruits for rebel and terrorist groups.4 Gunning
observed in his working paper that terrorist groups operating from
rural areas, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC), are likely to recruit rank-and-ile members from poor and
badly educated backgrounds, even if their leaders have more advantaged backgrounds. In their detailed study of the economics of civil
war in Congo, Léonce Ndikumana and Kisangani Emizet have
documented their argument that in Congo, as elsewhere in Africa,
“low-level income and low growth rate reduced the cost of organizing rebellions and also reduced the government’s ability to ight a
counterinsurgency.”5 This analysis should apply terrorism as well as
to rebellion terrorism—all the more so because in Central Africa, as
Lyubov Mincheva pointed out in her working paper for the Economics Working Group, rebellions entail a great deal of indiscriminate
violence against civilians that would be labeled as terrorism if they
occurred elsewhere.
Inequalities are more important than poverty as a source
of terrorism
Poverty is seldom invoked by militants to justify their actions. Rather,
they claim to act on behalf of groups that are repressed or marginalized by dominant groups. Such claims echo the essential insight
of the relative deprivation theory of political violence, which is that
people become resentful and disposed to political action when they
share a collective perception that they are unjustly deprived of economic and political advantages or opportunities enjoyed by other
groups.6 The groups that support and give rise to terrorist movements usually are relatively disadvantaged because of class, ethnic,
or religious cleavages. Terrorism in nineteenth-century Europe took
root among marginalized urban workers. In the modern world, as
Gunning pointed out in his working paper, “the FARC drew, and
continues to draw, much of its support from impoverished peasant
farmers in Colombia. The Provisional IRA (Irish Republican Army)
was, and is, in part motivated by the socioeconomic marginalization
of Catholics in Northern Ireland. The same can be said of Hizballah
and the socioeconomic marginalization of the Shi’a in Lebanon, the
Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, and the Brigate Rosso and the working
classes in Italy.”
Tore Bjørgo has contended that discrimination on the basis of
people’s ethnic or religious origin is the chief root cause of ethnonationalist terrorism such as the campaigns of the Provisional IRA in
The Roots of Terrorism
Northern Ireland, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, and the Kurdish
Workers’ Party, known as the PKK, in Turkey. When sizeable minorities are systematically deprived of rights to equal social and economic
opportunities or are obstructed from expressing their cultural identities—for example, by being forbidden to write or publish in their
language or to practice their religion—this often leads to the rise to
self-determination movements. If they are also barred from political
access, they are likely to choose violent forms of struggle including
terrorism. This is particularly the case, Bjørgo suggested, when the
conlict becomes longstanding and bitter, with few prospects for a
mutually acceptable solution.7
The resentment of inequalities created and maintained by dominant groups helps explain the indings reported by Krueger and
Malečková. Public opinion polls taken in 2001 in the West Bank and
Gaza showed that the more educated Palestinians are, the more they
support armed attacks against civilians inside Israel. From a relative
deprivation perspective, we would expect educated Palestinians to be
more resentful of their status as an occupied people and thus more
supportive of terrorism—especially in a political context where nonviolent political means have been largely closed to them. The authors
of this study also noted that a sharp increase occurred in educational
attainment of Palestinians in the 1980s, followed by a marked deterioration in their employment prospects.8 This is consistent with a classic relative deprivation argument: Increasing expectations followed
by declining attainments—in the economic or political sphere—create intense grievances and support for political action.
The relative deprivation argument also helps account for the
common observation that the leaders of political, ethnic, and sectarian movements usually are better educated and of higher status than
most of the population from which they come—something that is
true of leaders of almost all political organizations, as Ekkart Zimmermann noted. They are most likely to have had personal experience of class or ethnic or religious barriers to upward mobility and
thus have greater incentives to organize political action. But why
should terrorism be their strategy of choice? Recall the indings, cited
previously, that terrorism is most common in countries with sharply
restricted political rights. This means high opportunity costs for
conventional political action and relatively lower costs for political
violence generally and terrorism speciically. Moreover, in relatively
poor countries, as noted already, governments have limited resources
to redress grievances or to ight counterinsurgency campaigns.
Economic Factors
Rapid socioeconomic change increases the risks of terrorism
Evidence cited previously suggests that terrorism is most common in
countries in the middle range of economic development. This is so,
the Working Group concluded, because economic change creates conditions conducive for instability and the emergence of militant movements and ideologies, as Mancur Olson pointed out in the 1960s.
Different aspects of the growth process have reinforcing effects. One
is the likelihood that some groups will gain much more advantage
from economic development than others. If inequalities increase
along preexisting lines of class or ethnic cleavage, the incentives for
revolutionary or separatist movements increase markedly. Another is
that large numbers of people are uprooted from traditional life patterns, moving into cities and occupations where they are exposed to
discrimination and become susceptible to new ideologies and new
forms of political organization.
Some observers emphasize the social trauma that accompanies
this process. Rik Coolsaet has argued that terrorism is born not out
of religion or poverty but out of marginalization. Anarchist terrorists
of the nineteenth century found an audience among the marginalized
working classes. Fascists in the 1930s appealed to nationalists but
also to people living in the personal uncertainty caused by the Great
Depression.9 Yigal Carmon’s comments for the Economics Working
Group parallel Coolsaet’s interpretation that rapid modernization in
the contemporary Islamic world threatens traditional people. Those
disoriented by sweeping socioeconomic change are especially susceptible to movements that provide explanations and a program of
political action.
Empowerment of women may reduce incentives for terrorism
Although women have occasionally been recruited as suicide bombers—among Palestinians, Sri Lankan Tamils, and Chechens—in general they seldom support terrorism. Cross-national studies show that
the higher women’s relative educational status and political participation, the less common are political violence and instability.10 Three
causal processes may be at work. First, educated and empowered
women may socialize youth in ways that inhibit their susceptibility
to recruitment by violent organizations. Second, they may also help
strengthen civil society organizations that provide alternatives to
political militancy. And third, in the longer run, women’s education
contributes to declining birth rates, leading to a reduction in the risks
posed by large youth populations.
The general conclusion of the Economics Working Group is that
structured inequalities within countries—not poverty per se—are
0
The Roots of Terrorism
breeding grounds for violent political movements in general and terrorism speciically. Rapid socioeconomic change feeds this process. The
growth of inequalities across the interdependent global system has similar consequences (see Atanas Gotchev’s contribution in this book).
Political Choices of Terrorism
When systematic economic and political inequalities across groups
coincide with sharp restrictions on political rights, disadvantaged
groups are ripe for recruitment by political movements. Ethnonationalist and revolutionary movements like those of Kosovar militants,
Chechen rebels, and Colombia’s Marxist FARC usually emerge in the
context of larger political conlicts centered on the demands of disadvantaged groups. Militants have choices. They can organize strikes,
demonstrations, political agitation, economic boycotts, sabotage, or
guerrilla warfare. Their resort to terrorism is often a tactic in a larger
campaign that leaders choose and then discard depending on opportunities and costs. A recent study shows that 124 out of 399 terrorist
groups are afiliates of, or splits from, political parties. 11
In what circumstances do political movements shift to terrorist strategies? A general principle cited in working papers by Zimmermann and Michael Stohl, among others, is that semirepressive
regimes contribute to the escalation of political conlicts to terrorism by relying on an inconsistent mix of repression and reform.
The prospect of reform increases militants’ incentives for political
action; the regime’s use of repression reduces the opportunity costs of
oppositional violence, including terrorism; and inconsistency signals
regime weakness. Another general principle, mentioned by Alexander Schmid and Joshua Sinai in their working papers, is that some
leaders choose terror tactics in expectation that governments will
increase repression, leading to a shift in public support from the government to the terrorists’ cause. Other, more speciic mechanisms are
also identiied. Radicalization and a wave of terrorist attacks may
result when militants capitalize on popular outrage about a speciic
hostile event—for example the Bloody Sunday massacre by British
soldiers in Londonderry in 1972, Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple
Mount/al-Aqsa Mosque in 2000, and the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq
in 2003. In other cases radicalization is the result of spillover from
conlicts in neighboring states.
Diasporas also may promote terrorist tactics (see Gabriel Sheffer’s contribution in this book). Sheffer observes that twenty-seven of
the ifty most active contemporary terrorist organizations are either
segments of ethnonational or religious diasporas or are supported
by them. Members of diasporas of Kurds, Palestinians, Sikhs, Tam-
Economic Factors
1
ils, and many others are motivated by discrimination and repression
against kindred in their homelands—and elsewhere—to organize
and to support violent resistance. Diaspora activists are “sensitive
to the miseries of their brethren in hostlands, homelands, and third
or fourth countries of residence,” he observed in his working paper
for the Economics Working Group. When they see that nonviolent
protest is ineffective, “they tend to become more aggressive and form
cells and networks for planning and executing violent and terrorist
activities.” They do not expect to win by such tactics but rather to
dramatize injustices and to create imperatives for reform.
The policy challenge is how to reduce the incentives for groups in
conlict to choose terrorist tactics and how to increase the incentives
to give it up. I have advocated the general principle that democratic
rights and institutions give activists incentives to participate in conventional rather than violent politics. Stohl observed that if governments follow strategies of political accommodation in response to
terrorist threats, they may not deter active terrorists but are likely to
undermine support for them in the larger population—who no longer
see a rationale for terrorism. Just as provocative actions by governments can cause a backlash that precipitates terrorism, accommodation by governments can cause a backlash against terrorists.12
Ideologies of Terrorism
Ideologies are key to the rise of political terrorism. Radical doctrines
profoundly affect how people interpret their situation, respond to
efforts to mobilize them, and choose among alternative strategies of
political action. Bjørgo observed in his working paper that “the presence of charismatic ideological leaders able to transform widespread
grievances and frustrations into a political agenda for violent struggle
is a decisive factor behind the emergence of a terrorist movement.”
Militant and exclusionary ideologies—extreme nationalism, jihadist
doctrines, militant Hinduism—all frame disaffected people’s ideas
about what is possible, permissible, and required. Zimmermann
noted that such ideologies can shift cost–reward ratios by convincing
people induced into terrorist acts that their sacriices will have payoffs—if not in this life then in the next.
People whose lives are disrupted by rapid modernization, for
example when sudden oil wealth precipitates a change from tribal to
high-tech societies in one generation or less, are especially susceptible to radical ideologies. When traditional norms and social patterns
become irrelevant, people are ripe for conversion to new ideologies
based on religion or nostalgia for a glorious, mythic past. Ideologies
derived from Islamic principles are powerful because, for traditional
The Roots of Terrorism
people in Arab societies, religion covers all aspects of life and gives
meaning, counsel, and justiications for action. Depending on the
content of ideologies and the objectives of those who propagate them,
they may create a potential for political violence and terrorism. Rapid
political change and insecurity can have similar consequences, for
example opening opportunities for protagonists of militant nationalism in East Central Europe in the 1990s.
In a transnational world, ideologies also help members of farlung groups coordinate action. Ideologies of Palestinian or Kurdish
or Chechen nationalism connect dispersed communities in support of
a common objective and also facilitate the provision of international
support. Similarly, jihadist doctrine helps Islamist militants connect
with marginalized people throughout the Muslim world who experience what Coolsaet in his recent book called “a persistent climate of
humiliation and oppression.”13
Ideologies differ in both type and function. They may be used to
justify nationalist aspirations, calls for revolution, cultural puriication, or a mix of these and other goals. Sheffer and Gunning both
pointed out in their working papers that only some Muslim activists
are concerned about jihad; others have more limited political and
welfare goals. Thus, Islamist doctrine can be used to promote both
violent action and provision of welfare goals. Gold noted in his working paper that Hamas has become a successful social service agency,
whereas the Taliban irst achieved prominence by providing security
on trade routes between Afghanistan and Pakistan. He suggested this
interpretation: Militant groups that supply local public goods require
mechanisms that allow them to control access to the goods and services being supplied. The need to control access helps explain their
resort to violence. Participation in violence helps to binds members to
the group and makes it dificult for them to leave, thereby providing a
solution to the free-rider problem inherent in all production of public
goods. In brief, the provision of welfare goods and terrorist action
jointly contribute to maintenance of the organization as well as to the
long-run pursuit of leaders’ political objectives.
Gunning offered an important qualiication of the assumption
that ideologies determine political action. The content of ideology is
in part a product of socioeconomic and political changes. He used
Hamas’s advocacy of radical solutions as an illustration. Its constituency includes a high percentage of refuges and a signiicant percentage
of highly educated people. Politically, Hamas members have had little
trust in the eficacy of those in power in the Palestinian Authority
and even less conidence in dialogue with Israel. Its doctrine of violent struggle, including support of suicide operations during the Sec-
Economic Factors
ond Intifada, was a relection of these traits. The advent of contested
elections in the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli withdrawal from
Gaza evidently are prompting a shift in Hamas doctrine away from
suicide bombing and towards conventional politics. If the argument
is correct, Hamas’ accession to the power in the Palestinian Authority in Spring 2006 likely will reinforce this shift, though probably
without a formal break from Hamas’ core ideological commitment to
Israel’s destruction. The general point, according to Gunning is that,
“ideology is not an eternal given; it is molded and re-molded by the
life experiences of those inventing, adopting and advocating it.”14
Alexander Schmid offered one other qualiication in his working papers: Ideology is not always necessary for terrorist activity. A
collective or individual desire for revenge against acts of repression
may be motivation enough. Similarly, he noted that criminal groups
like the Colombian drug cartels have engaged in terrorism to prevent extraditions to the United States without any gloss of ideology.
Indeed, the terrorism–crime connection is discussed at greater length
in the next section.
Financing Terrorism
Under what circumstances do militants shift from using terrorism in
pursuit of ethonational, religious, or revolutionary objectives to selfserving material gain? Jessica Stern has quoted a disillusioned jihadist: “Initially I was of the view that [the leaders] were doing jihad,
but now I believe that it is a business and people are earning wealth
through it…I thought [the leaders] were true Muslims, but now I
believe that they are fraud, they are selling Islam as a product…First
I was there for jihad, now I am there for my inancial reasons.”15 This
sharply illustrates one terrorist’s agenda shift, motivated by disillusion with corrupt leaders and his own self-interest. The more general
question is whether and why leaders and entire movements choose to
seek private gain.
A strong argument has been made that rebellions are motivated
by greed rather than grievance. Paul Collier and collaborators have
interpreted rebellion as an industry that generates proits from looting, especially of primary commodity exports, and have reported
econometric models and case studies generally consistent with the
theory.16 The question is whether a similar model could be proposed
for political terrorism. If consistent with empirical evidence, this theory would imply a much closer connection between economic conditions and terrorism than the evidence surveyed at the outset of this
chapter about the weak and indirect links among poverty, discrimination, and terrorism.
The Roots of Terrorism
But I doubt that “terrorism as greed” is a sustainable general
argument. Leaders of terrorist movements are more plausibly conceived as political entrepreneurs motivated by personal and ideologically driven political ambition. Shared ideology and social pressures
motivate most rank-and-ile, unless and until they become disillusioned like the jihadist quoted earlier. Schmid cited a study of the
recruitment motives reported by violent activists in Kashmir. Of
them, approximately one-third were either jobless or classiied as
opportunists; another third joined out of religious and political conviction or because of attraction to the movement; and a third were
responding to peer pressure, persuasion, or threats.17
The linkage between terrorism and crime is mainly a functional
one. Although political terrorism is often characterized as rebellion
on the cheap, it does require resources for arms, logistics, and sustenance and shelter for activists. Consequently, terrorist movements
frequently engage in criminal activity to inance their activities, relying on robbery; kidnapping for ransom; extortion; and traficking
in drugs, scarce commodities, or consumer goods. They also may
receive funds and arms from diasporas, private sympathizers, and
foreign governments. Alternatively, they cooperate or form alliances
with preexisting criminal networks. If the proceeds of criminal activity are substantial and secure, they provide incentives for agenda
shifts by some militants and in some cases for entire movements.
The Provisional IRA had an estimated $10 million per annum
in funding, according to a 1990s study, some of it from abroad but
mostly gained from robberies and racketeering as well as extortion
and kidnapping, welfare fraud, and running illegal drinking clubs.
The IRA also branched out into legitimate businesses including construction irms, shops, and pubs.18 Some IRA members made their
livelihood by such activities; indeed some may have joined to pursue
private gains, but the movement as a whole never lost its primary
focus on gaining political ascendancy.
The main Colombian Marxist insurgent movement, the FARC,
has long had a close relationship with drug cartels that some have
labeled narcoterrorism. By most accounts the linkage is a sometime
alliance based on interests that may or may not coincide at any given
time and place. The FARC’s inancial basis rests on kidnapping and,
especially, extortion of both legal and illicit businesses in areas under
its control. In 1977 the “narcos” decided to locate processing facilities in FARC-controlled areas and relied on the guerrillas to maintain
order and security in exchange for paying production taxes. Subsequently, however, as the “narcos” developed their own paramilitaries,
this marriage of convenience broke down, and paramilitaries fought
Economic Factors
with guerrillas for local control. The FARC reportedly continues to
extract signiicant revenue from the coca trade but is not directly
engaged in growing, processing, or traficking.19 The FARC’s oficial position is that drugs should be legalized, yet the organization’s
inancial drug dependence presumably affects leaders’ estimates of
the costs and beneits of continuing their insurgency despite recurrent
government peace initiatives. Bjørgo suggested as a general principle
that “leaders or factions within the militant movement sometimes
oppose political solutions to the conlict because it would undermine
their vested ‘business interests.’ Why should the Colombian FARC
guerrillas seriously support a peace solution when they run a highly
successful ransom-for-money business and collect protection taxes
from drug barons?”
Algeria’s Islamist insurgents offer a contrasting example. In Miriam Lowi’s view “a politically motivated insurgency quickly turned
into an instrument of predation.” At the outset in 1992 the insurgents
sought inancing through raids and armed robberies but soon shifted
to extortion and pillaging of commercial trafic, seizing property,
and taxing local populations. Their next step was involvement in the
parallel economy and illicit trade in hashish, vehicles, and food products. Algeria has a vast number of unemployed young men, many of
whom were attracted to the insurgency by economic opportunity. “As
the violence became increasingly articulated with the microeconomy,
the interest in capturing the state gave way to looting it and, eventually, to holding the state at bay so as to focus squarely on gaining and
maintaining access to resources. Violence and the Islamist insurgency
provided a cover for corruption and contraband.”20
A transnational example comes from the Balkans. Citing the
collaboration between the Kosovar ethnonationalists who operate
throughout Albanian populated areas in the Balkans on the one
hand and the fares—the Albanian criminal clan network that smuggles arms, drugs, and people across borders of Kosovo, Albania, and
Macedonia on the other hand—Mincheva contended in her working
paper that cross-border identity networks and shared ideology are
key conditions for the establishment of terrorist–criminal alliances.
She noted that transborder ethnonational movements provide the
settings in which such linkages develop, though the movements are
not directly responsible for the cross-border export of terrorism,
nor do they directly engage in cross-border drugs and weapons traficking. Rather the diffusion of militarized conlict across borders
from the movement’s more mobilized to less mobilized segments,
and worse yet, the new conlict generated in neighboring territory
makes political enterpreneurs professional “weekend warriors” and
The Roots of Terrorism
turns criminal clan activities into a weapons supply enterprise for
rebels. 21
In summary, the examples suggest four different kinds of connections between terrorist organizations and economic crime. Economic
crime may be strictly functional, as it was for the IRA, with little
effect on the IRA’s pursuit of its political objectives. The FARC case
illustrates how availability of illegal inancing may lead to strategic
change: in this case, hypothetically, to sustain the insurgency rather
than to give up rents. Islamists in Algeria have largely abandoned
their revolutionary objectives and have become political bandits. In
the Balkans transborder ethnic ties provide the basis for collaboration between militants and international criminal networks. It is
speculated that Islamist doctrine similarly facilitates transstate linkages between jihadists and criminals in Central Asia and elsewhere.
In these cases political and material incentives become inextricably
connected: Today’s terrorists probably are tomorrow’s trafickers,
and vice versa.
International and Domestic Response Strategies
The analyses in this chapter suggest a number of long-term strategies
that should reduce the incentives and opportunities for all violent political movements. They are not likely to dissuade currently active groups
from using terrorism but in the long run should dry up their support
and should channel future grievances into conventional politics.
The irst set of recommendations addresses the socioeconomic
environments that breed terrorism:
1. The creation of strategies to mitigate the impact of rapid
socioeconomic change on vulnerable segments of the population in poorer countries—more speciically, the implementation of international aid and investment policies that help
empower groups most directly affected to control or inluence
the nature and pace of development. It is especially important
to promote participation and opportunities for groups left
behind in rapid development. Redistribution of new wealth
among the population in the form of education and corresponding job opportunities is important. Education without
opportunities is an explosive combination. Even more explosive is expansion of traditional Islamic education that provides no skills for participation in modernizing societies but
sanctions jihadist resistance to modernization and its agents.
2. The promotion of women’s literacy, education, and economic
and political participation. Almost everywhere women are
Economic Factors
less likely to join or support militant political movements
than men and, to the extent they are empowered, can provide
a domestic constraint on terrorist recruitment and action.
3. Encouraging governments of heterogeneous societies to
reduce group discrimination and barriers to domestic socioeconomic mobility by promoting international norms of
equal rights, supporting small-scale private enterprise, and
offering inducements such as conditional economic assistance and favorable trading partnerships to governments that
implement such policies.
4. Enlisting the cooperation of the private sector in long-run
socioeconomic reform efforts, for example by designing
investment and employment strategies that help incorporate disadvantaged and marginalized groups. International
corporations and investors are in a strong position to inluence the policies of governments in host countries in ways
that minimize risks of terrorist attacks on their facilities and
personnel.
The second set of strategies deals with the political environments
that facilitate terrorism, on the principle that political development is
an essential complement to socioeconomic improvements:
5. Promoting the growth of the middle and professional classes
and their organizations. Middle-class, civil society groups
usually have strong incentives to support nonviolent politics
and to discourage militants from terrorist actions. Terrorist
campaigns have well-documented adverse effects on economic performance.
6. In countries where political militants are active but have
not yet resorted to terrorism, encouraging governments to
design opportunities—political and economic ones—that
alter cost–beneit calculations for political activists in ways
that discourage recruitment to and support for terrorism.
Promote political compromise with dissident groups, particularly those that have broad-based support. International
engagement in such situations should be done in agreement
with local governments and social groups; otherwise it may
worsen the conlicts.
7. Countering the propagation of extremist ideologies, especially but not only jihadist doctrines, and encouraging the
international media, local schools, and public igures to
challenge and to provide alternatives to hate propaganda.
The Roots of Terrorism
Supporting mainstream Islamist scholarship, media, and
reform programs. Devising programs that increase Muslims’ favorable exposure to Western societies, for example by
sponsoring short-term visits of Muslim students to Western
communities.
Long-run socioeconomic and political policies to reduce the risks of
terrorism are easier to implement in democracies than autocracies.
Western-style democracy is not a magic bullet, however. In some
societies, transitions to democracy prompt cultural resistance and
may create short-term opportunities for violent political movements.
International support for speciic reforms like those listed above is a
irst step. Achieving those reforms will contribute over the longer run
to the emergence of strong and stable democracies.
It is also important, however, to address the proximate causes
of terrorism. The third set of recommendations, therefore, aims to
reduce the material and political resources of militant organizations,
and calls for the adoption of the following proposals:
8. Interrupting the low of inancial resources to militant groups
is already being pursued by the international community but
has limited effectiveness because (1) most terrorism is low
cost; and (2) militants have recourse to alternative remittance
systems, use of couriers, and fund-raising locally through
crime. Attempting to cut off all international funds is impossible, and for policies not to be counterproductive, new methods are needed to focus on informal methods. Many charity
groups are, irst and foremost, engaged in activities whose
purposes are to enhance the cultural, civic and economic
well-being of their own communities. Thus it is important
to allow charities suspected of having funded terrorism to
continue helping ordinary people within a system of “robust
checks and balances, as exempliied by the approach adopted
by the UK Charity Commission” (according to Jeroen Gunning’s working paper).
9. Undermining political support for militants may be a more
potent strategy. Internationally, diaspora groups—especially
those in Western societies—can bring pressure to bear on
activists in their homelands to follow more moderate strategies, especially if it can be shown that the alternatives have
potential payoffs for reducing their grievances. Domestically,
militants always face risks of defection and loss of support
from their potential supporters. Offers of amnesty and eco-
Economic Factors
nomic incentives to ighters who give up armed struggle have
long been used to help defuse rebellions, and are equally
applicable to terrorist movements. Governments also should
play up the negative consequences of terrorist acts, aiming to
delegitimate terrorists in the eyes of their support groups.
10. Better international coordination and joint action are essential. Regional and international organizations should take
the lead in containing cross-border terrorism generated by
regional conlicts in the Balkans, Central Africa, the Middle
East, and elsewhere, provided this is done in cooperation
with the authorities and civil society organizations of countries in each region in conlict. In addition, all governments
should create central authorities for international coordination against international terrorism and crime that are capable of taking swift, joint action with counterparts in other
countries. The creation and networking of such authorities
should help compensate for the fact that judicial and law
enforcement systems are still mainly national, whereas borders have become much more porous in ways that facilitate
international terrorism and crime.
Endnotes
1. Quoted in Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Malekčová, “Education, Poverty, Political Violence and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, no. 4 (2004): 119–44.
2. Working group members are listed below. Their working papers
are included in the Club de Madrid’s Document Library at http://
summit.clubmadrid.org/info/document-library.html.
Alberto Abadie, Harvard University
Jose Antonio Alonso, Universidad Complutense de Madrid
Tore Bjørgo, Norwegian Police University College
Yigal Carmon, Middle East Media Research Institute, USA
Sue Eckert, Brown University
David Gold, New School University, New York
Atanas Gotchev, University of National and World Economy,
Bulgaria
Jeroen Gunning, University of Aberystwyth, Wales
Jitka Malečková, Russell Sage Foundation, New York (withdrew)
Lyubov Mincheva, University of Soia, Bulgaria
Alex Schmid, United Nations Ofice for the Prevention of
International Terrorism (advisory member)
Gabriel Sheffer, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Joshua Sinai, independent researcher, USA
100
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
The Roots of Terrorism
Michael Stohl, University of California at Santa Barbara
Ekkart Zimmermann, Dresden University of Technology.
See Alberto Abadie, “Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of
Terrorism” (working paper 10859, National Bureau of Economic
Research, http://www.nber.org/papers/w10859); and Krueger
and Malekčová, “Education, Poverty,” 137–41. Other evidence is
reviewed in Tore Bjørgo (ed.), Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths,
Realities, and Ways Forward (London: Routledge, 2005).
David Keen, “The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil War”
(Adelphi Paper no. 320, International Institute of Strategic Studies,
1998).
Léonce Ndikumana and Kisangani F. Emizet, “The Economics
of Civil War: The Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo,”
in Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis, Volume 1:
Africa, ed. Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis (Washington, DC:
World Bank, 2005), 63.
Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), chs. 1–5.
Bjørgo, Root Causes, ch. 20.
Krueger and Malekčová, “Education, Poverty,” 125–9.
Rik Coolsaet, Al-Qaeda: The Myth. The Root Causes of International Terrorism and How to Tackle Them (Ghent, Belgium: Academia Press, 2005).
See Mary Caprioli, “Primed for Violence: The Role of Gender
Inequality in Predicting Internal Conlict,” International Studies
Quarterly 49 (2005): 161–78.
Ami Pedahzur and Leonard Weinberg, Political Parties and Terrorist Groups (London: Routledge, 2003).
See Jeffrey Ian Ross and Gurr, “Why Terrorism Subsides: A Comparative Study of Canada and the United States,” Comparative Politics 21, no. 4 (1989): 405–26.
Coolsaet, Al-Qaeda.
Quotations are from Jeroen Gunning’s working paper for the Economics Working Group. Also see his “Peace with Hamas? The Transforming Potential of Political Participation,” International Affairs 80,
no. 2 (2004): 233–56; and John Tirman and Marianne Heiberg (eds.),
Turning the Tables on Terrorism: Understanding Protracted Conlicts (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, in press).
Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants
Kill (New York: Harper Collins, 2003), 213–7.
The argument and evidence were irst presented in Collier and Anke
Hoefler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War” (working paper 2355,
World Bank Policy Research, Washington, DC, World Bank, 2001).
The argument has now been evaluated in a series of comparative
case studies in Collier and Sambanis (see note 5). Support for the
general argument is qualiied at best.
Economic Factors
101
17. Citing Paul Medhurst, Global Terrorism: A Course Produced by
UNITAR (New York: UNITAR, 2000), 68.
18. John Horgan and Max Taylor, “Playing the ‘Green Card’—Financing the Provisional IRA: Part I,” Terrorism and Political Violence
11, no. 2 (1999): 1–38.
19. Information in this paragraph is drawn from Jennifer S. Holmes,
Sheila Amin Gutiérrez de Piñeres, and Kevin M. Curtin, “A Subnational Study of Insurgency: FARC Violence in the 1990s.” This text
can be viewed at http://usregsec.sdsu.edu/docs/holmes3.
20. Miriam R. Lowi, “Algeria, 1990–2002: Anatomy of a Civil War,”
in Collier (see note 5), 232–3.
21. These links are explored in Lyubov Mincheva, “Cross-Border Terrorism: Economic and Related Causes” (working paper for the Economics Working Group). They are now the basis for a joint research
project with the author of this chapter.
8
Terrorism and Globalization
Atanas Gotchev
Following the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States and
the subsequent war on terrorism, some of the debate focused on the
root causes of terrorism and possible response strategies. Part of this
debate addressed globalization and whether it provides incentives and
facilitates international terrorism. Though no empirical studies provide conclusive evidence that globalization creates terrorism, some of
the literature implies that certain aspects of this phenomenon may create incentives for terrorism and suggests that in a globalized world it
becomes much easier to organize, to inance, and to sustain terrorist
tactics and activities. The purpose of this contribution is to explain the
dynamics behind the relationship between terrorism and globalization
and to show how some of its malign effects could be addressed.
Over the past twenty-ive years, globalization has been a hotly
debated phenomenon. Most commonly, it is associated with the development of global production and markets and their social, political, and
cultural consequences. The majority of analyses take an economic perspective and associate it with increased economic integration, growth
of international exchange, and interdependence.1 From this perspective,
globalization implies liberalization—that is, the elimination of state
restrictions on trade and foreign exchange as well as the reduction of
controls on movements of capital, labor, knowledge, and technology.
Globalization is, however, also regarded as a phenomenon brought
about by technological and social change, furthering the links of human
activities across regions and continents. 2
10
The Roots of Terrorism
The globalization discourse cuts across the ideological spectrum
and academic disciplines. It is very heated, contentious, and polarized.
Proponents of globalization regard it as a panacea, promoting economic growth and prosperity and spreading the values of democracy,
restricting governmental interference in the international economy,
and enhancing the ease with which labor, ideas, capital, technology,
and proits can move across borders. The defenders of globalization
also argue that it has provided opportunities for enormous economic
and social beneits, particularly for countries that have managed to
use the opportunities provided by global markets.
Opponents of globalization regard it as a thoroughly negative
process, increasing the domination and control of developed nations
of the poor and less developed ones. As observed by Douglas Kellner,
for critics globalization is a cover for global capitalism and imperialism and is condemned as another form of imposition of the logic of
capital and the market on more regions of the world. 3 For instance,
James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer contended that “although globalization is presented as an economic process, a paradigm for describing and explaining worldwide trends, it is better viewed as a political project, a desired outcome that relects the interplay of speciic
socio-economic interests.”4 They argued that globalization provides
an inadequate description and understanding of worldwide trends
and that the concept of imperialism is more suitable in this regard.
From this perspective, globalization can be regarded as a new form
of imperialism, suggesting power struggles, the domination of the
stronger, and—therefore—a sequence of conlicts.
This brief outline of the opposing perspectives demonstrates that
globalization has to be regarded as a complex and contradictory process with positive and negative attributes. According to the advocates
of globalization, interdependence should result in a dynamic and
constantly modernizing world of prosperous nations. 5 However, it
must be taken into account that integration in the world economy has
been uneven, with the effects of globalization differing from nation
to nation. The consequences of globalization are mainly positive for
the developed countries of the West and the newly industrialized
nations—the so-called true globalizers—and largely negative for the
weak globalizers from the less developed world.
A World Bank study on globalization, growth, and poverty
suggested that weak globalizers increasingly diverge from the
global econonomic decline. 6 In the context of the global economy, such countries tend to be economically marginalized. Weak
globalizers become less competitive, incomes fall or stagnate,
absolute poverty grows, social stratiication increases, and—in
Terrorism and Globalization
10
many cases—life expectancy declines. The social consequences are
unemployment, political tension, and the growth of religious fundamentalism. Large strata of the population in such countries regard
globalization as imposed from the hegemonic capitalist countries and
international inancial institution. This, indirectly, creates an environment that can facilitate violent behavior and acts of terrorism.
The group of weak globalizers largely comprises African and
Muslim countries, some of which have been strongly associated with
terrorism. In fact, as Edward Gresser noted, most of the Muslim
countries were steadily deglobalized over the last twenty-ive years.
Unlike East Asia, the growing share of young people, especially men,
in relation to the overall population—the demographic bulge—and
urbanization in the Muslim world have been accompanied by shrinking shares in world trade and investment. In 1980, about 13.5 percent
of world exports came from these countries, whereas in 2002 the igure was about 4 percent. In 2001 the Muslim world—with a population of 1.3 billion people—received barely as much foreign direct
investment as Sweden, a country with a population of nine million
people. Deglobalization made many Muslim countries poorer—the
per capita gross domestic product of Arab countries, for instance,
has shrunk by nearly 25 percent since 1980, falling from $2,300 to
$1,650.7
Though the review of the globalization debate presented here is
far from comprehensive, it suggests that globalization has resulted
in uneven development and inequitable distribution of the positive
effects of globalization across countries. As noted by Veltmeyer,
Robert Kapstein, then director of the Council on Foreign Relations,
pointed out as early as 1996 that neoliberal capitalism bears a tendency toward excessive social inequalities in the distribution of global
resources and income. This, he continued, led to “social discontent
the forces of which could be mobilized politically in ways that are
destabilizing for the democratic regimes and the system as a whole.”8
The deepening division between true and weak globalizers in the
2000s can thus be seen as creating a permissive environment for terrorism. This environment includes both incentives and opportunities
to organize, inance, and carry out terrorist acts.
Globalization As a Cause and Motivation
for Terrorist Activities
Globalization has increased inequalities and social polarization
within and between nations. Although different studies fail to provide
conclusive evidence that poverty and inequality are directly linked to
10
The Roots of Terrorism
terrorism, it is evident that economic deprivation increases the
demands for political change. Economic disparities usually lead to
political upheavals and could invite interested groups to resort to terrorism as a method of achieving the desired goals. As Tore Bjørgo
noted, poverty has frequently been used as justiication for violence
by social revolutionary terrorists, who claim to represent the poor and
marginalized strata without being poor themselves.9 Such terrorism
is more commonly associated with countries with a medium level of
development and whose societies are characterized by rapid modernization and transition (see Ted Robert Gurr’s contribution in this
book).
The current unequal status quo of wealth and capital accumulation in developed countries could provoke waves of terrorist acts justiied by the cause for fairer distribution of global wealth. The 2000–
2001 World Bank Development Report indicated that 2.8 billion of
the world’s six billion people are living on less than two dollars a day
with limited access to education and health care and lack of political
power and voice, leaving them therefore extremely vulnerable to ill
health, economic dislocation, personal violence, and natural disasters.10 Sustaining this world order only by means of military power
and without long-term eficient developmental strategies is bound to
provoke resistance. Militant groups could justify terrorism as a last
resort, excusing it as a tactical response of the weak. In other words,
the cause of a just distribution of global wealth may become one of
the contributing factors for cycles of asymmetrical warfare against
the richer countries and their allies.
The United Nations has recognized the importance of addressing the issues of poverty and terrorism in a comprehensive way. The
aftermath of the September 11 attacks and the subsequent war against
terrorism suggest that confronting terrorism only with military force,
while failing to deal with the issues of poverty and inequality, is
bound to create weak client regimes that are unable to withstand the
pressures of globalization. Such states cannot apply the principles
of good governance, they experience poverty and instability, which
leads to opposition and violence and thus creates the breeding ground
for terrorism.
Globalization, however, also fosters political and cultural resistance. The development of global markets for goods, services, and
capital compels societies to alter their cultural practices. Globalization brings about cultural Westernization and destroys traditional
ways of life. In response, this provokes opposition of broad segments
in the affected societies, providing another justiication for terrorism.11 Indeed, the iniltration of a supposedly alien and corrupt
Terrorism and Globalization
10
culture is used by nationalist and radical religious movements as a
way of explaining their campaigns. They claim that their violence
has the purpose of cleansing their societies and culture from foreign
inluence. In reality, these are often mere excuses, yet it is also true
that the “threat to the local way of life” has become a convenient
motivation and justiication for terrorist activities.12
Globalization and the Development of New Minorities
There are, however, even more tangible ways that globalization has
created conditions in which terrorism can lourish. Wage differentials, differences in career opportunities, and the provision of public services across countries coupled with the availability of global
transportation and communication networks have brought about
unprecedented global migration to countries which provide better
opportunities in terms of human development. This has led to the
development of new minorities in settled societies, many of which
are linked to kindred groups elsewhere. A similar process occurred in
the 1960s and 1970s when as a result of decolonization new minority groups appeared in countries like France and Britain. Because of
differentials in incomes and standards of living, migration streams
from the less developed world low toward not only the most developed industrial countries but also the emerging market economies
and to medium-income countries in Central, Eastern, and Southern
Europe. Moreover, processes of migration also occur among the less
developed countries and in the Arab world—for instance, from Iraq
to Jordan or from Egypt to Jordan.
This process and its implications can be illustrated by looking at
the Bulgarian border statistics for the years 2002 and 2003. This data
indicate that the difference between recorded arrivals and departures
is approximately 300,000 people annually. One of the assumptions is
that a large percentage of these people stay in Bulgaria in an effort to
explore opportunities for moving further west into the enlarged European Union (EU) zone. Indeed, a similar situation can be observed in
other EU accession countries, such as Romania. The issue of concern
is that, for a country like Bulgaria with a population of around eight
million, the igure is substantial. If one assumes that all of the illegal
immigrants stay in Bulgaria, then the size of this new community
may soon become equal to that of the Roma minority in Bulgaria.
Segments of these minorities participate in criminal activities,
and this can help to facilitate terrorism, especially since the distinction between political and criminal is becoming increasingly blurred.
As Lyubov Mincheva observed, the Serbian criminal maia, the Albanian drug maia, and Bosnian Muslims terrorists frequently act in
10
The Roots of Terrorism
concert and engage in “marriages of convenience” not to promote
Wahhabism but to pursue their shared interest in making money. Likewise, criminal groups like the Colombian drug cartels have engaged
in terrorism to prevent extradition to the United States without any
gloss of ideology. Such malign connections are evident not only in
the Balkans but also in the Caucuses and in Latin America. These
linkages often arise from what could be described as the political
economy of conlict. Even if the initial motivation of militant groups
to turn to crime was to inance their political activities, over time
politics tends to become a mere excuse for crime for proit. Bjørgo
points out that leaders or factions within militant movements sometimes oppose political solutions to conlict because this would undermine their vested business interests. Why should there be a political
solution of the Transnistrian conlict in Moldova or of the conlicts
in the Caucuses, when the opposing parties can take advantage of
smuggling alcohol, tobacco, consumer goods, weapons, and drugs
and can seize the opportunity that exists simply because the area of
the conlict is out of the control of tax and customs authorities?13
More speciically, the involvement of the new minorities in these
networks could be said to facilitate international terrorism in three
related ways. First, it improves terrorists’ logistical support. Organized
crime and terrorist groups frequently use similar—sometimes the
same—means and routes for moving materials, people, and funds
across boundaries. The so-called Informal Value Transfer Systems
(i.e., underground banking networks) were originally designed to
serve the needs of minority groups who wanted to send to or receive
funds from their families. The improved versions of such systems,
however, were developed by criminal groups and are now also used
by terrorist groups.
Second, new minorities provide additional sources of funding.
Some of the proceeds originating from the illegal businesses of members of the new minorities end up funding terrorist groups. These can
be either payments for protection and taxes imposed by terrorists, a
good will gesture of prosperous members of the community, or a split
of proits of a joint criminal–terrorist operation. It should be noted
that it is not only illegal businesses that secure funds. Legitimate
business operations run by new minority groups—usually small and
medium-sized businesses—could also be tracked as sponsors of terrorism.14 Furthermore, in many developed countries, new minority
groups have established cultural institutions, which operate as charities and have been implicated in the donation of millions of dollars
to various terrorist organizations.15 The signiicance of the different
funding schemes in which new minority groups are involved varies,
Terrorism and Globalization
10
and not all of them are a major funding source of terrorism. However,
this type of funding is an important enabler of terrorist activities, as
it diversiies funding and makes it more dificult to track. Last but not
least, it should be pointed out that even relatively small amounts—for
instance, earned in single smuggling or a legitimate business operation—can be used to cause disproportionate damage.
Third, new minorities are a source of human capital for international terrorism. In Sheffer’s contribution in this book, he points
out that twenty-seven of the ifty most active terrorist organizations
today are either segments of ethnonational or religious diasporas or
are supported by them. Minorities’ attraction to participate in terrorism may result from ideological or religious sentiments. On the other
hand, terrorist organizations actively recruit members of minority
communities who reside in the industrialized world, particularly in
their Western host countries. From the terrorists’ perspective, the
minorities’ education, training, and living experience in the West
increases the chances for success in carrying out a terrorist act, especially compared to a terrorist who is residing in a less developed part
of the world.
Globalization and the Power of the Nation State
Another aspect worthy of consideration is the consequences of globalization for the nation state. The debate about the fate of the nation
state is highly polarized and draws on various changes in governance
that may accompany the processes of globalization. Diverging views
range from the position that globalization has eliminated state sovereignty or—at best—diminished it in favor of global corporate power
to the position that globalization has not undermined statehood at
all. A different, and perhaps more promising, approach is to focus
not so much on the power of contemporary states but rather on how
its functions have changed.
There can be no doubt, for example, that as a result of globalization governments have experienced a decline in their capacity to
control their economies. In the 1990s and early 2000s, the volatility
of global foreign exchange markets has triggered waves of inancial
crises affecting even the developed economies of Britain, Italy, and
Sweden. In less developed countries, the diminished power of the state
to control the economy has led to governmental collapse and state failure. In postcommunist countries, the spin-off effects of the transition
toward democratization, economic restructuring, and reintegration in
the global economy have weakened the economic and political control
of the state, resulting in the failure of law enforcement and the growth
of crime as well as deepening income stratiication. Furthermore, the
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The Roots of Terrorism
fact that international inancial institutions grant inancial support
based on a number of conditionalities also restrict policy options of
beneiciary governments. Taking into account that developed countries dominate these institutions, foreign aid policies based on neoliberal recipes and unpopular austerity measures, implemented by beneiciary governments, have provoked popular protests and have led
to different forms of mobilization, particularly in the less developed
world. The diminished capacity of the less developed countries to control their economies, the weakened capacity of law enforcement, the
imposition of Western market values and institutions through the programs of the international inancial institutions and other donors are
phenomena, at least in part associated with globalization. Although
these phenomena should not be regarded as a prime factor, they have
provided justiications for extremist movements to resort to violence
as a tactical weapon.
The growth of nonstate actors is another argument used to
explain the diminished role of the state in the era of globalization.
This process has a wide range of implications, both related to the
functioning of the international system and state governance. One
of these is that the increasing prominence of the nonstate sector has
created opportunities for terrorist organizations to avoid direct links
with the state and, in particular, with states sponsoring terrorism.
Terrorist groups have increasingly begun to rely on amorphous supporters and inancial sources. One of the consequences, as pointed
out by Matthew Morgan, is that when terrorists do not rely on direct
state sponsorship, they become less accountable and harder to track.
At the same time, states sponsoring terrorism exercise less control
over and have less of an interest in maintaining comprehensive intelligence on radical terrorist organizations.16 This outcome of globalization makes contemporary international terrorism more dificult
to monitor and to predict and limits the utility of traditional political and diplomatic instruments, which cannot be applied effectively
against elusive and obscure nonstate actors.
Moreover, though the spread of new technologies has produced
considerable beneits in terms of productivity growth, it has also
increased the destructiveness and effectiveness of weapons. In turn,
global trade and transportation have proliferated new weapons and
have made them more readily accessible. As a result, globalization
has provided new opportunities for terrorist organizations to acquire
and to use more eficient and deadlier weapons and to perform more
spectacular and destructive terrorist acts. It has also beneited terrorist groups in terms of targeting.17 Faster travel and better communication technologies facilitate the operations of terrorist groups and also
Terrorism and Globalization
111
make it easier to spread radical ideas that may inlame large constituencies. This assists terrorists in fund-raising, in recruiting followers,
and in mobilizing support for terrorist groups. At the same time,
the sinews of globalization—from pipelines and electricity grids to
nuclear power plants and communication networks—provide a range
of soft targets for international terrorism.
Finally, globalization has caused changes in the organizational
behavior structures of terrorist organizations. The global operations
of transnational corporations have provided a good example to terrorist groups for how to plan, to organize, and to accomplish their
objectives at the international level. Much like these corporations, terrorist groups have evolved organizationally. As pointed out by Morgan, terrorist groups have moved from strict hierarchical, or vertical, structures to more horizontal and more lexible organizational
arrangements.18 The capacity to adapt to changes copied from the best
practice models of transnational corporations has allowed a number
of terrorist groups to recruit supporters, to secure funds, and to conceal operations in spite of global efforts to curb terrorist activities.
Response Strategies
There is no easy answer to the question of what our response should
be to the developments caused by globalization. Globalization is only
one of many factors that inluence the development of terrorism.
Indeed, as highlighted throughout this book, terrorism is a complex,
multifaceted phenomenon and obviously requires a comprehensive
and consistent response strategy. To be effective, such a strategy
needs to be based on a wide international consensus, including the
deinition of terrorism, both academic and legal; appropriate antiterrorist policies, strategies, and tactics; as well as the methods of their
implementation. Response strategies also require a comprehensive
coordination of multilateral, bilateral, and national efforts.
Any attempt to design antiglobalization measures is unrealistic
and likely to fail. At the same time, policies to mitigate some of the
downside effects of globalization may restrict the base of terrorism in
terms of motivation and justiication of terrorist activities. These are
long-term developmental strategies, which do not aim at the eradication of terrorism but at developing a social and economic environment that will discredit terrorism as a means to achieve political
ends. In this respect, strategies to reintegrate weak globalizers into
the world economy are an important part of the long-term developmental response to terrorism. Such strategies are likely to curb grievances arising from global inequalities, to decrease anti-Western sentiments, and to curb religious fundamentalism. Moreover, although the
11
The Roots of Terrorism
integration in the global economy is a process that can be controlled
by governments only to a limited extent, multilateral efforts by industrialized countries may facilitate the access of weak globalizers to
world markets. For example, developing a duty-free regime for their
products and facilitating their membership in international trade
organizations is one of the possible approaches. This could be accompanied by subsidized transfer of key inputs and technologies.19
Cragin and Chalk pointed out that the success of developmental policies in countering terrorism is strongly related to the type of
projects and the mode of implementation. They are correct in saying
that underfunded and poorly executed developmental projects could
“act as a double-edged sword by precipitating a revolution of rising
(and unfulilled) expectations.”20 This observation can be conirmed
by the experience of developmental projects in countries in transition.
There is abundant evidence indicating that inappropriately designed
projects aimed at alleviating the situation of minority and underprivileged groups in transition economies lead to higher levels of discontent and tension once the funding is exhausted. Such projects tend
to be perceived by the beneiciaries as a permanent solution, giving
rise to unjustiied expectations for a quick and long-lasting improvement. Developmental projects should therefore have the appropriate
level of funding commitment, and the projects should be sustained
for a relatively long period of time. Governments willing to implement developmental projects should be encouraged and should receive
appropriate technical assistance and positive inducements, such as
conditional economic assistance. However, economic incentives and
conditionalities need to be linked very carefully to avoid possible antiWestern sentiments.
Bjørgo points out that education and related opportunities are
an important element in changing the socioeconomic environments
that breed terrorism.21 It is important to consider, however, that different age groups respond to education differently, and it is therefore
important to tailor these initiatives carefully. For example, educational programs targeting early age education (i.e., preschool and primary school) tend to be more effective in the longer run. Experience
suggests that stronger and more sustainable long-term impacts are
achieved if early age education is coupled with women’s education
and empowerment (see Ted Robert Gurr’s contribution in this book).
This can be one of the possible approaches to counter the expansion
of extremist fundamentalist ideologies.
A number of short-term and coercive measures should be taken.
Curbing terrorist inancing, for example, could be more eficient if
there is a coordinated effort to ight both terrorism and organized
Terrorism and Globalization
11
crime. Since terrorism and organized crime develop linkages which
help them resist international action, it is necessary to design and
coordinate strategies aimed at both terrorism and crime. Though
international cooperation in the ight against crime has a long history, international cooperation against terrorism is still in its nascent
stage. The creation of a new international regime, for instance, should
aim to compensate for the situation that judicial and law enforcement
systems are national, whereas terrorism and crime are increasingly
internationalized. The effort to restrict the funding sources of terrorism should also consider enhanced border and customs controls
aimed at restricting illegal transfers of weapons, drugs, and people,
particularly in cases in which transfers originate from destinations
suspected to have linkages with terrorist groups. These have to be
complemented by the development of more sophisticated mechanisms
aimed at preventing money laundering. Although dificult to accomplish, serious attention should be given to money transfers by couriers
and informal value transfer systems. Furthermore, there are strong
indications that some terrorist groups use charities as an important
funding source. A system of enhanced control of such activities,
while guaranteeing the freedom of such organizations to attain their
charitable missions, should be developed. Finally, although terrorism
has evolved and relies less on open state sponsorship, it is premature
to regard state sponsored terrorism as an unimportant factor. Better international coordination and joint action are essential for constraining this type of terrorism.
Endnotes
1. See Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, “Globalization: What’s New
and What’s Not? (and So What?),” Foreign Policy 118, no. 2 (2000),
pp. 104-119.
2. See, for example, Keohane, “The Globalization of Informal Violence, Theories of World Politics, and the ‘Liberalism of Fear,’”
International Organization 52, no. 1 (2002): 29–30. Jan Aart
Scholte argued that the ideational and material drivers of globalization are codetermining and that globalization can be explained with
reference to trends in production, governance, identity, and knowledge. See Scholte, Globalization: A Critical Introduction (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), esp. pp. 20–2, and ch. 4.
3. Douglas Kellner, Globalization, Terrorism and Democracy: 9/11 and
Its Aftermath in http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/essays/
globalizationterroraftermath.pdf.
4. James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer, “World Development: Globalization or Imperialism?” in Globalization and Antiglobalization:
Dynamics of Change in the New World Order, ed. Henry Velt-
11
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
The Roots of Terrorism
meyer (Hants, UK and Burlington, VT, USA: Ashgate Publishing,
2004), 11.
Ibid., 23.
See David Dollar and Paul Collier, Globalization, Growth, and Poverty: Building an Inclusive World Economy, A World Bank Policy
Research Report. A co-publication of the World Bank and Oxford
University Press (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2002), esp. the
overview (pp. 3-18) and ch. 1 (pp. 31-53).
See Edward Gresser, “Blank Spot on the Map—How Trade Policy
Is Working against the War on Terror,” Progressive Policy Institute
Policy Report, February 2003, 1.
See Veltmeyer, “The Antinomies of Antiglobalization,” in Veltmeyer
(see note 4), 171.
See Tore Bjørgo, Root Causes of Terrorism: Findings from an International Expert Meeting in Oslo, Norwegian Institute of International
Affairs, http://www.nupi.no/IPS/ilestore/Root_Causes_report.pdf.
See World Bank, World Development Report 2000–2001: Attacking Poverty (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
See Dani Roderik, Has Globalization Gone too Far? (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1997), 1; see also
Scholte, Globalization, 26.
Diverse political movements such as hard-core communists in Russia and Islamic fundamentalists in Turkey can display striking commonalities rooted in a backlash against globalization, see Roderik,
Has Globalization Gone too Far, 1. Scholte asserted that micronationalist and religious revivals—encouraged in part by globalization—have promoted a substantial rise in intrastate warfare outside
the North, such as in Afghanistan, Angola, Indonesia, Russia, and
the former Yugoslavia. See Scholte, Globalization, 283.
This paragraph is based on discussions, Working Group on the Economic Causes of Terrorism, International Summit on Democracy,
Terrorism, and Security (hereafter referred to as Working Group),
Madrid, Spain, March 2005.
Matthew Levitt, “Blood Money,” Wall Street Journal, June 4,
2003.
See, for instance, U.S. General Accounting Ofice, Terrorist Financing, GAO-04-15, November 2003; and Levitt, “The Political Economy of Middle East Terrorism,” Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal 6, no. 4 (2002), pp. 49-65.
This and the following two paragraphs draw on Matthew Morgan’s
analysis. See Matthew J. Morgan, “The Origins of the New Terrorism,” Parameters 34, no. 1 (2004): 37.
Ibid, 38. See also Paul R. Pillar, “Terrorism Goes Global: Extremist
Groups Extend their Reach Worldwide,” The Brookings Review, 19
(Fall 2001), 34-37.
Ibid, 38.
Terrorism and Globalization
11
19. Discussions, Working Group. See also Addressing the Causes
of Terrorism: The Club de Madrid Series on democracy and
Terrorism, Volume 1, pp 24-25, http://www.safe-democracy.
org/docs/CdM-Series-on-Terrorism-Vol-1.pdf.
20. Kim Cragin and Peter Chalk, Terrorism and Development—Using
Social and Economic Development to Inhibit Resurgence of Terrorism (Washington, DC: RAND, 2003), 33.
21. Discussions, Working Group.
9
Diasporas and Terrorism
Gabriel Sheffer
Like most minorities’ members and leaders, individuals belonging to
internationally dispersed groups and movements—namely, to diasporas—such as Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, Basque Fatherland and Liberty
(ETA), Hamas, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE), vehemently reject their characterization as terrorists and of their violent
actions as terrorism. They claim that in view of their pure motivations
and noble and highly justiied goals they should be considered as freedom ighters; cultural, political, and civil rights activists; protectors of
their religions; or anticolonialists and antiglobalizationists. Yet most
of these entities’ violent activities it widely accepted views of terrorism
and some of its deinitions.1
Insuficient attention has been given to the differentiated involvement
of the various categories of “others,” and particularly of diasporans, in
the execution of extreme acts of violence and terrorist attacks. In most
studies and evaluations, all these groups are lumped together, with no
suficient theoretical, analytical, or empirical distinctions of their varied
origins, connections, motivations, capabilities, resources, and contributions to the exacerbation of the conlicts in which they are engaged
and to the nature of their related violent or terrorist acts. Thus, there
is a need for comparative studies and analyses of the diverse purposes,
involvement, and roles of members of such groups and their organizations in violent and terrorist campaigns. This contribution, therefore,
offers a classiication of these others; it focuses on the motivational,
organizational, and behavioral differences among the various entities
that use radical violent strategies and tactics; it assesses the degree of
11
The Roots of Terrorism
the intensity of the use of violence by the various types of others both
in their countries of residence and in their perceived or actual homelands; and, inally, it offers some policy-oriented proposals.
A Short Review of Others
It needs to be stressed that diasporic terrorism is not a postmodern phenomenon primarily related to the breakdown of the cold war
regime, the so-called weakening of the nation state, the expansion
of economic and cultural globalization, the spread of, or distance
shrinking, communication technologies, or the increase in global
migration. 2 Even a brief and cursory historical review shows that the
phenomenon of diaspora support for terrorism has existed as long
as modern terrorism and that more fundamental causes should be
explored. 3 Indeed, one of the most signiicant common feature of the
various perpetrators and supporters of terrorism—new and old—is
that they are others in their hostlands. They are, however, not all the
same. Indeed, it is useful to differentiate among the various types
these entities represent.
The rapidly growing antiglobalization movement—which during
the last decade has been gathering momentum and has proved willing
and capable to launch and execute both violent and peaceful protests,
demonstrations, and resistance to police forces—is mainly composed
of tourists rather than of permanently settled diasporans. Usually,
after participating in violent and nonviolent activities such as those in
Seattle, Genoa, and Durban, they return to their countries of origin
or move to other host countries to launch protests there. Likewise,
some of the most blatant terrorist attacks launched by diasporans are
executed by hard-core terrorists who reside in other countries and
come and leave the host country where they either accomplish, or fail
at, their missions. The wish to prevent these acts has been the main
driver behind the introduction of radical changes in visa granting and
border control in many countries.
The second group is composed of refugees and asylum seekers.
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNCHR), more than twenty million people fall into these categories. Whereas twelve million qualify as refugees, the remaining nine
million are asylum seekers and returnees to their homelands that
have not been fully reintegrated into their original societies. Also, the
majority are internally displaced persons, which makes it inappropriate to regard them as diasporans. According to the UNCHR, the main
countries hosting refugees leeing from dificulties in their homelands
are Burundi, Sudan, Somalia, Angola, Sierra Leone, Eritrea, Congo,
Diasporas and Terrorism
11
Liberia, Rwanda, Lebanon, and Jordan; all are countries that have
recently experienced internal turmoil, insurgency, or terrorism.4
The third category contains legal and illegal, nonorganized,
newly arrived migrants—mostly guest workers or students. Though
most, but not all, host countries record the numbers and identities
of newly arrived legal migrants, which globally number tens of millions, by deinition no reliable igures exist about illegal migrants.
Attractive political, economic, and educational conditions lead most
of these migrants to try to enter developed and mostly democratic
countries, including Australia and Japan. Following the attacks on
September 11, 2001, in the United States, most host countries have
attempted to limit and control the low of migrants to prevent both
terrorism and worsened economic conditions. Nevertheless, most
borders, especially in the European Union and the United States,
are porous, and such trafic can hardly be controlled entirely. In this
respect, of course, democratic and democratizing states are disadvantaged, as they encounter immense ideological, legal, and practical
inhibitions when handling immigration. As a result, many terrorist
activities have been carried out by this category of people in more
developed democratic states.
Fourth, there are members of organized transstate ethnonational
diasporas. These are dispersed persons in various hostlands. The
members of these entities are of the same ethnic and national origins, permanently residing in their host countries, and are integrated
but not assimilated into their host societies. Core members of these
groups are organized and maintain contacts with their homelands.
According to current estimates, there are more than 300 million such
people worldwide. 5 Some of these organized diasporas are historical, veteran, and established; the Jewish, Armenian, Greek, Indian,
and Chinese are obvious examples. Some are relatively new and
were established in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—for
instance, the Italians, Irish, and Polish. Some are incipient diasporas—that is, entities in the early stages of formation and organization—such as the post-1948 Palestinian dispersion, the Russians in
the former Soviet Union empire, and the Chechens. Members of both
established and incipient diasporas have supported violent and terrorist activities in either their homelands, host countries, or third and
fourth countries. Therefore, special attention should be paid to these
entities, which is why this contribution focuses on this category.
The inal category could be labeled as cultural and religious
transnational dispersals. As in the fourth category, these are dispersed groups residing out of their homelands. They share the same
beliefs, yet each of them is composed of persons from different ethnic
10
The Roots of Terrorism
and national backgrounds. Examples of these dispersals are the Muslim, African, and Latino diasporas. As a result of terrorist activities
launched by Al-Qaeda and other dispersed Sunni and Shiite Muslim
transnational groups and organizations, observers have referred to
these groups as homogeneous diasporas. In reality, though, the latest wave of terrorism and other violent actions has been carried out
not by highly organized and homogeneous Muslim or North African
diasporas but rather—separately and autonomously—by members
of older organized and incipient transstate ethnonational diasporas,
whose members’ only common characteristic is that their religion is
Islam. Indeed, much closer attention should be paid to the motivations and purposes of various Muslim, Latino, and African groups,
whose origins are in different nation states.
Generally, it is extremely dificult to attribute exact numbers of
terrorist activities to each of these categories of others. This is for
several reasons:
1. Lack of accurate data
2. The sensitive situation of guest workers and other legal and
illegal migrants in their host countries
3. The secrecy surrounding the preventive and secret intelligence activities of various governments
4. The uncertain assimilation and integration rates of such
groups that in turn determine the size and inluence of the
core members in each diaspora.
Yet based on reliable estimates, it is possible to approximately rank
these groups according to the intensity and rates of their participation
in terrorism. Tourists and refugees are increasingly involved in terrorist activities. At the same time, there is almost no doubt that most
of those who carry out terrorist activities are members of transstate
ethnonational diasporas and of transnational religious dispersals. A
recent study claims that 32.3 percent of all acts of mass casualty terrorism (MCT)—which over the past decade have caused about 1,670
deaths—have been performed by members of what might be called
pure ethnonational groups, that is, groups whose most prevalent common characteristic is their belonging to the same ethnic nation; 23.5
percent of MCT—amounting to 5,000 deaths, including September
11—have been performed by so-called pure religious groups, that is to
say, people whose group membership is determined by their religious
beliefs; and 14.7 percent of MCT—835 deaths—have been performed
by mixed ethnoreligious groups, for example, Sunnis or Protestants.6
Diasporas and Terrorism
11
Currently, twenty-ive groups have been involved in conlicts or
rebellions in either their homelands or host countries, which have
espoused terrorism. All these groups have been linked to transstate
ethnonational diasporas, and all have performed terrorist acts in
addition to their involvement in nonviolent tactical activities, such
as propaganda campaigns and legal protest marches and demonstrations.7 Furthermore, of the ifty most active terrorist organizations
and groups, twenty-seven either constitute segments of ethnonational
diasporas or are supported by them.8 Insurgents in Egypt, India (i.e.,
in the Punjab and Kashmir), Indonesia (i.e., Aceh), Azerbaijan, Sri
Lanka, Ireland, Kosovo, Lebanon, Palestine, Israel, Pakistan, Algeria, Turkish Kurdistan, Iraqi Kurdistan, Iran, Greece, the Philippines,
and Russia all have received various kinds of support—whether
inancial, political, diplomatic, or psychological—from their respective diasporic communities.
Among the organizations using terrorism that have proven
links to ethnonational diasporic entities are the Palestinian Hamas,
Islamic Jihad, and Fatah-Tanzim; the Lebanese Hezbollah; the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Islamic Group; the Irish Republican Army;
the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA); the Indian Barbar Khalsa
International; the Sri Lankan LTTE; the Turkish Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK); and Al-Qaeda, who is connected to and cooperates
with various ethnic–religious diasporas.9
Regarding the state sponsors of terrorism—according to the
United States State Department, these are Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq,
Syria, Libya, Cuba, North Korea, and Sudan—some of these not only
supported activities of their own diasporans in host countries but also
supported various types of subversive actions carried out by persons
of other nationalities and ethnoreligious backgrounds who are temporary or permanent residents in host countries. It is true that some
of the aforementioned governments stopped doing so—the cases of
Iraq and Libya are pertinent here—and others have declared that
they had taken steps to cooperate in the global campaign against terrorism, such as Iran, Syria, and North Korea. Apparently, however,
these latter states, and probably also Sudan, have persisted with the
very actions that had led international organizations, other national
governments, and academic analysts to regard them as state sponsors
of terrorism.
Distinctions and Debates
Although certain similarities exist between the various diasporas and
their organizations that use violence and terrorism, three essential
distinctions must be made between them.
1
The Roots of Terrorism
The irst distinction, which has already been mentioned, is
between terrorist actions carried out by pure ethnonationalists who
pursue nationalist goals in their homelands or host countries and
pure religionists who aim to achieve religious objectives. This distinction is essential for understanding current terrorism and, more
particularly, for accurately grasping diasporas’ varying motivations
for employing such violence.10 This, however, is far from simple. For
example, when considering the motivations of Muslim fundamentalist groups in Europe, such as those comprising Middle Eastern
Palestinians and Kurds, North African Moroccans, and Asian Pakistanis residing in Britain, France, Germany, and Belgium, it is hard
to determine whether their members are motivated by pure religious
sentiments or whether they are mainly concerned with the political
and cultural rights of their conationals in their homelands and host
countries. This observation is particularly pertinent in view of the
recent tendency to lump together all Muslim diasporic communities
and to attribute solely ultra religious motivations and purposes to
their violent actions.11
This dificult distinction is related to the debate about the role
of religion in shaping the identity and behavioral patterns of ethnic
entities in general and that of diasporic groups in particular. The
argument here is that no totally homogeneous and coherent religious
transnational entities act as fully uniied collectives in launching violent and terrorist activities to pursue only Muslim ideas. Rather, most
of the movements and organizations formed by diasporas like those
mentioned previously—including some Al-Qaeda-linked groups—are
closely connected to their respective ethnonational homelands and
act in accordance with their perceived grievances.
The second distinction sets apart groups whose violent and terrorist activities are targeted at their homelands and those acting against
their hostlands. Thus, Al-Qaeda, the Chechens and Pakistanis, for
example, mainly target their host countries. The Basques, Palestinians, and Turkish Kurds, on the other hand, mostly support violent
actions carried out by their brethren in their homelands and only
occasionally support terrorism in their hostlands or other states. The
differences between the terrorist activities these groups either initiate
or support do not merely lie in their geographical locations but in the
reasons, dynamics, and consequences that characterize their actions.
These differences are discussed further later in the chapter.
Another distinction is between state-linked and stateless diasporas. Whereas the former maintains contacts and shares interests with
the independent states in their homelands, such as the Jewish, Armenian, Iranian, and Pakistani diasporas, the latter group constitutes
Diasporas and Terrorism
1
segments of nations who have not succeeded to establish a state of
their own or whose homelands are dominated by other nation states,
like the Palestinians, Kurds, and Tibetans. It seems clear that as a
result of their full or partial integration into their host societies; their
tendency to observe the law; and their inclination to protect and promote multiple cultural, political, and economic interests in their host
countries, most diasporas in the irst category are more reluctant to
use violence and terrorism to promote their interests. These diasporas
refrain to use terrorism also because of the restraint imposed on them
by their homelands’ governments. On the other hand, stateless diasporas are more prone to be engaged in violent and terrorist activities.
Causes and Motivations
The deeper causes and the more immediate motivations that lead ethnonational diasporic entities and their supporters to launch or to support violent and terrorist activities have not changed much throughout the last few decades. This is still the case in the aftermath of the
collapse of the Soviet Union, which marked the end of the Cold War
era, and during the recent period of globalization and glocalization.
One of the most prevalent causes and motivations for diasporic
terrorism is a group’s expulsion from its country of origin. Some, but
not all, of the various Palestinian organizations serve as examples
in this category. This includes, for instance, the Abu Nidal Organization, which is a stateless, transstate diasporic organization that
carried out terrorist attacks in twenty countries killing or injuring
almost 900 people and was supported by individuals and groups
within the Palestinian diaspora in the West. Other Palestinian organizations established as a reaction to their expulsion from parts of
Palestine in 1948 and then in 1967 are the Palestine Liberation Front
and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. It is important
to note that, because of Israeli control over the Palestinian-occupied
territories, the headquarters of these and other Palestinian organizations are outside Palestine, such as in Syria.
Another common cause is the existence of struggles for separation and independence in one’s homeland. One of the best-known
organizations in this category is the ETA, which is supported by
segments of the Basque diaspora. Palestinian organizations, such as
Hamas, receive funding from Palestinian expatriates in the diaspora,
from Iran, and from private benefactors in Saudi Arabia and in other
Arab states. Some fund-raising and propaganda activities on behalf
of Hamas take place in Western Europe and in both North and South
America. Likewise, the PKK received a safe haven and modest aid
from Syria, Iraq, and Iran, as well as inancial and psychological
1
The Roots of Terrorism
support from the Kurdish diaspora. The LTTE, on the other hand, is
closely connected to Tamil communities in North America, Europe,
and Asia. Through these networks, some of which are involved in
smuggling narcotics, the Tamil Tigers raise funds and supply their
ighters in Sri Lanka.
A further motivation is the systematic discrimination of a group
in its homeland. The Lebanese radical Shiite movement Hezbollah,
for example, exists mainly to protect Shiite interests in Lebanon.
However, because it also opposes Israel and is against peace negotiations with that state, it is regarded as a transnational diaspora. It has
established cells in Europe, Africa, South America, North America,
and Asia, and it receives substantial amounts of training; weapons;
explosives; and inancial, political, diplomatic, and organizational aid
from Iran, Syria, and the Lebanese Shiite diaspora. Similar dynamics
can be found in the case of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan; the
Egyptian Islamic Jihad; the National Liberation Army of Iran; and
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.
Equally, discrimination in the diasporas’ host countries can also
become a cause or motivation for supporting terrorism. Examples
include the Harakat ul-Mujahidin, an Islamic militant group based
in Pakistan that operates primarily in Kashmir. Leaders of this organization have been linked to Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda and have
signed his fatwa calling for attacks on U.S. and Western interests. It
obtains donations from Saudi Arabia and other Islamic states, as well
as from Pakistanis and Kashmiris in the diaspora. Another group
in this category is the Jaish-e-Mohammad [Army of Mohammad], a
Muslim group based in Pakistan that has also established connections
to Al-Qaeda and to a number of Pakistani diasporic communities.
Legal and political persecution in the homeland is yet another
related motivation for supporting terrorism. For example, Algerian
expatriates, many of whom reside in Western Europe and especially
in France, used to provide inancial and logistic support to the GIA.
The Egyptian Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya has a diasporic external wing
that displays a worldwide presence. The Revolutionary Organization
17 November is purported to have received assistance from groups in
the Greek diaspora. Kach and Kahane Chai, two groups active in the
struggle of ultra religious and nationalist Israeli Jews, were founded
by a radical Israeli–American rabbi named Meir Kahane in the United
States and are supported mainly by sympathizers in that country.
Other reasons for diasporic involvement with terrorism include
blatant racism, religious and antireligious denigration, as well as connections to organized crime (see Atanas Gotchev’s contribution in
this book). Indeed, if we review the full list of these movements and
Diasporas and Terrorism
1
organizations and examine quantitative data about the length and
intensity of their campaigns as well as the volume of their violent
and terrorist activities, it seems that except for Al-Qaeda and a few
other culturally and religiously motivated organizations, the most
active supporters of terrorism are ethnonational stateless diasporas.
The second most relevant category appears to be those attempting
to improve the cultural, political, and economic conditions in their
homelands. These indings are further elaborated in the following
section.
Dynamics
Since the 1990s, a clearer picture has emerged of the various diasporic entities’ motivations, strategies, tactics, resources, means, and
modes of operation. According to the expanding literature on diasporas, the most evident background factors that have not created
but nevertheless have further motivated and facilitated the violent
and terrorist activities of such entities are connected to the current
trends of globalization, regionalization, glocalization, liberalization,
and democratization. More speciically, the involvement of diasporas
in subversive actions is facilitated by the increasing ease of transportation; the lack of control at most states’ borders; the growing
demand for foreign workers; the ramiications of pluralism, liberalization, democratization, and multiculturalism, mainly in democratic
and democratizing host countries; and the widespread use of global
means of communication.12
The most important characteristic of the diasporas’ “hard cores,”
who use or support violence or terrorism, is the renewed substantial signiicance of the ethnonational identity, which in certain cases
is enhanced by religious feelings. In all the cases presented earlier,
including the Palestinians, Jews, Irish, and Tamils, identity is shaped
and maintained as a result of the impact of strong primordial and
mythical factors that are inseparably intertwined with the somewhat
less important instrumental considerations.
Even if most of the existing ethnonational diasporas do not constitute tightly knit traditional communities and although they may
be inluenced by modern developments, their members’ deeply rooted
identities—and, more recently, their readiness to publicly identify as
members of such entities—generate higher levels of cohesion and solidarity among the activist core members of these entities. In turn, the
cohesion and solidarity of such entities are directly linked to their
members’ strong attachment to and contacts with their ethnonational
homelands or to their venerated religious centers. In various cases,
the religious beliefs, whether moderate or fundamentalist, held by
1
The Roots of Terrorism
individuals and core groups augment the mobilization of members,
their dedication, and consequently their readiness either to carry out
or to support insurgent actions. Whenever members of these core
groups show strong commitment to follow their emotional and cognitive inclinations, they tend to develop ambiguous, dual, or divided
loyalties to their host countries. As a consequence, some of them
would be more inclined to perform terrorist acts or to support them.
Generally, stateless diasporas ighting for secession or independence in their homeland, such as the Palestinians, Irish, Turkish
Kurds, and Kashmiris, have shown the greatest commitment and
dedication to the support of insurgency in their homelands and on
some occasions also in the hostlands. Likewise, such diasporas have
been more active in aggressive publicity campaigns on behalf of their
brethren in their homelands or in other host countries.
To make mobilization and insurgent activities effective, such
groups must be highly organized and led by dedicated people. Both
proletarians, such as the Kurds in Germany and the Algerians in
France, and richer diasporas, such as the Jews and the Irish in the
United States, have engaged in or have supported such insurgencies. However, though it is evident that the latter—who are better
organized and have access to more economic, political, and other
resources—can be more effective, they may at the same time be less
committed to the cause of the entire dispersed nation. This has been
the case with the Armenian and Greek diasporas when full independence of their homelands was achieved.
Resources
Except for diasporic maias and criminal groups, and apart from the
poorest and most deprived groups in both their host countries and
homelands, pure economic interests or goals do not serve as the critical motivational factors or causes for terrorism. In fact, many of the
activists and terrorists are educated and comparatively well off. Still,
the mobilization of manpower, funds, and other resources are signiicant aspects of the phenomenon. In this respect, better educated and
moderately wealthy diasporans have better chances to succeed.
Again, these are hardly new issues. Palestinians been engaged
in these activities for decades, as have the Turkish Kurdish, Armenians, and, of course, the Jews. When the funding by homelands or
by other states ceases, or when it becomes unobtainable or inaccessible, the importance of diasporic entities in mobilizing inancial and
other resources is considerably enhanced.13 In the early 1990s, for
example, the end of the Soviet Union’s inancial and military sponsorship caused the collapse of a number of insurgent and terrorist
Diasporas and Terrorism
1
groups that had previously been dependent on Moscow. The same
applies to all the groups that had received inancial and other kinds of
support from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. At the same time, the increase
in the number of ethnic or communal insurgencies has heightened the
relative signiicance of ethnonational diaspora support. For obvious
reasons, accurate data on the volume of the various resources supplied to, and used by, terrorist groups are unavailable or extremely
dificult to access. Neither the terrorist organizations and movements
nor the relevant governments are ready to supply such data.14
Policy Implications
As the groups’ reasons for using terrorism are irmly linked to their
ideational and cultural aspirations as well as their ethnonational and
religious beliefs and needs, the most essential and obvious policy suggestion is that all involved parties should try to solve the very basic
conlicts and tensions among these groups. Genuine and systematic
efforts directed at the resolution of such conlicts, including the most
dificult task—the establishment of independent sovereign states for
stateless nations and their diasporas—can meaningfully reduce the
inclination to use terrorism. The case of the Irish is a good example
of such a development.
It is clear that some of these conlicts, such as the Israeli–Palestinian or the Kurdish–Turkish confrontations, are impossible
or extremely dificult to solve. Therefore, at the very least, honest
attempts should be made at conlict management. For example, during various stages of the Israeli–Palestinian conlict this was successfully tried and led to a temporary reduction in terrorism. It is
extremely important, for example, to reduce structural inequalities
in homelands and host countries by eliminating minorities’ discrimination, barriers to sociopolitical and socioeconomic mobility, deprivation, and the possession of full rights. Equally important is the
need to mitigate the impact of rapid sociopolitical and socioeconomic
changes. This should be done through long-term social, political, and
economic aid and investments that would contribute to sustainable
development and empower marginalized groups and individuals,
especially women and young persons (see Ted Robert Gurr’s contribution in this book).
It is important to try to ameliorate, even partially, the immediate social, political, and economic conditions that lead to terrorism by promoting political compromises and by providing opportunities for individual and collective disengagement from terrorism.
Regional unions, nongovernmental organizations, the corporate sector, private inancial institutions, and civil society generally should
1
The Roots of Terrorism
be encouraged to lead the formulation of strategies and should invest
in plans aimed at reducing inequalities and discrimination affecting
minorities and diasporas.
As we have seen, most existing diasporas are not tightly knit
homogenous entities that collectively pursue a single strategy, especially not when it comes to terrorism. Nobody should postulate,
therefore, that entire diasporic entities partake in terrorist activities
or support them. In fact, in most cases—the Irish, Jewish, Turkish,
Basque, or Kurdish diasporas spring to mind—only relatively small
number of individuals and small groups of core members support
such activities. In most cases, terrorism does not constitute a permanent strategy but rather a temporary tactic, which is intended to
achieve social and political goals, and once these are achieved the
diasporas’ tactics change. It is also true that, historically, the use of
terror as a tactic is conined to relatively short periods of crisis in
the homelands, host countries, or in other states where their brethrens reside. Hence, the use of terror and violence does not transform
entire communities into warrior communities.
Finally, it should be remembered that many of these groups are
engaged in activities intended to enhance the cultural, civic, and economic well-being of their own communities, their host countries, and
their homelands. Therefore, we should be careful not to stigmatize
entire diasporic entities, thereby creating a permanently hostile environment that can make the lives of diasporans and diasporas even
harder than they usually are and can push these people to use even
more dangerous tactics and means.
Endnotes
1. Gerhard Mueller, “The Nature, Deinition, and Uses of Terrorism,
and the Range of Rational Options to Deal with It: A Summary,” in
Meeting the Challenges of Global Terrorism. Prevention, Control
and Recovery, ed. Dunn Dilip and Peter C. Kratcoski (New York:
Lexington Book, 2003); and “The War for Islam’s Heart,” Economist, September 18, 2004.
2. Walter Laqueur, “Postmodern Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 5,
pp 24-36, (1996).
3. Yehezkel Dror, Crazy States: A Counter Conventional Strategic
Problem (Lexington, MA: Heath, 1974); see also Alex Schmid
and Albert Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors,
Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature (New
York: Transactions Publishers, 2005).
4. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 56th General
Assembly, Third Committee, November 19, 2001.
Diasporas and Terrorism
1
5. See Gabriel Sheffer, Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), ch. 4.
6. Victor Asal and Andrew Blum, “Holy Terror and Mass Killings?
Mass Casualty Terrorism,” International Studies Review 7, no. 1,
pp. 153-155,, (2005).
7. For a list of these organizations, see for example, the Center of
Defense Information at www.cdi.org.
8. U.S. State Department Counterterrorism Ofice, Patterns of Global
Terrorism, Ofice of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2005,
www.state.gov.
9. Rand Corporation Policy Resources for Congress, Terrorism: Current and Long Term Threats. Testimony presented to the Senate
Armed Services Committee on Emerging Threats, Nov. 15, 2001.
10. Sheffer, Diaspora Politics, chap. 3.
11. Rivka Yadlin, “The Muslim Diaspora in the West,” in Middle
Eastern Minorities and Diasporas, ed. Moshe Maoz and Sheffer,
pp.219-230 (Brighton, UK: Sussex Academic Press, 2002); see also
Riva Kastoryano, “The Reach of Transnationalism,” in Critical
Views of September 11, ed. Eric Hershberg and Kevin Moore, pp.
209-223 (New York: New Press, 2003).
12. See Michael Dahan and Sheffer, “Ethnic Groups and Distance
Shrinking Communication Technologies,” Nationalism and Ethnic
Politics 7, no. 1, pp. 85-107, (2001).
13. See Aline Angoustures and Valerie Pascal, “Diasporas et Financement des Conlits,” in Economie des Guerres Civiles, ed. Francois Jean Ruin and Jean-Christophe Ruin, pp. 495-542, (Paris:
Hachette, 1996).
14. Lawrence Malkin and Yuval Elizur, “Terrorism’s Money Trail,”
World Policy Journal 18, no. 1,; pp. 60-70,. (2001).
Culture and Religion
10
Religion as a Cause of Terrorism
Mark Juergensmeyer
The subway attacks in London in July 2005 brought back bitter memories of the Madrid train bombings in 2004, the World Trade Center
assault in 2001, and the many suicide bombings in Iraq and Israel in
recent years. In the wake of any terrorist attack the immediate questions
are who and why: Who would do such a thing, and why would they
want to do it? When religion is a part of the picture, the questions are
compounded. This is the case whether the perpetrators are the Muslim
activists in the London and Madrid bombings, jihadi resistance ighters in Iraq, Christian abortion clinic bombers in the United States, or
violent Israeli settlers whom Prime Minister Ariel Sharon called Jewish
terrorists during the dismantlement of settlements in Gaza and the West
Bank in August 2005.
One of the enduring questions is what religion has to do with this—
with them and what they did. Put simply, does religion cause terrorism?
Could these violent acts be the fault of religion—the result of a dark
strain of religious thinking that leads to absolutism and violence? Or
has the innocence of religion been abused by wily political activists who
twist religion’s essential message of peace for their own devious purposes? Is religion the problem or the victim?
Each case in which religion has been linked to violence is different.
So one could be justiied in saying there is no one simple answer. Yet this
has not stopped the media commentators, public oficials, and academics whose generalizations about religion’s role abound. Their positions
may be found in the assumptions lurking behind policy choices and
news media reports and within the causative theories about terrorism
1
The Roots of Terrorism
that the academics propose. Curiously, their positions are sometimes
diametrically opposed. An example of the diversity of opinions may
be found in two widely discussed books published in 2005: Dying
to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism by Robert A Pape
and Fighting Words: The Origins of Religious Violence by Hector
Avalos.1
The Argument That Religion Does Cause Terrorism
Avalos’s book, Fighting Words, posits that religious terrorism is
indeed caused by religion or, rather, that religion creates an imaginary supply of sacred resources over which humans contend. Avalos
regards all forms of social and political conlict to be contests over
scarce resources. The ones who do not have the scarce resources want
them, and the ones that have them want to keep them. In the case of
religious conlict the scarce resources are things that religion speciically supplies: the favor of God, blessings, and salvation. By deinition
these are not equally bestowed on everyone and must be earned and
protected. When Rabbi Meir Kahane challenged Jews to restore God’s
honor, it was God’s favor to the Jews that he wished to restore. Hence
an ordinary battle is a conlict to earn the highest heavenly rewards.
From Avalos’s point of view, moreover, the necessity of violence
is often built into the very structure of religious commitment. The act
of atonement in Christianity, the sense of revenge in Judaism, and the
martial triumphalism of Islam all require violent acts to fulill their
religious images of the world. And in each case the result of violence
is to bring the beneits of the scarce resources of spiritual blessings to
the grateful perpetrator of the religious violence.
Avalos’s position is controversial even in the academic community. Many observers have pointed out that current religious conlicts
are seldom about religion per se—they are about national territory,
political leadership, and socioeconomic control all cast in a religious
light. Within the wider public there is perhaps even less support for the
notion that religion in general leads directly to violent acts. Despite
the rise of religious violence in recent years most people still regard
religion—at least their own religion—as something benign. This attitude is prevalent even among members of religious communities from
which violence has originated. Most Muslims regard Islam as a religion of peace, and Christians and Jews regard their own religion in
the same way. Most of the faithful in these religions refuse to believe
that their own beliefs could have led to violence.
Yet when one looks outside one’s faith it is easier to blame religion. In the current climate of Muslim political violence, a signiicant sector of the American and European public assumes that Islam
Religion as a Cause of Terrorism
1
is part of the problem. Despite the cautionary words of President
George W. Bush imploring Americans not to blame Islam for the
September 11, 2001, attacks, a certain Islamophobia has crept into
public conversation.
The implication of this point of view is the unfortunate notion
that the whole of Islam has supported acts of terrorism. The inevitable attachment of Islam to terrorism in the ubiquitous phrase Islamic
terrorism is one example of this habit of thinking. Another is vaunting the term jihad to a place of supreme Islamic importance, as if all
Muslims agreed with its militarized usage by unauthorized extremist groups. The most strident expositions of this way of thinking are
found in assertions of Christian televangelists such as Pat Robertson
and Jerry Falwell that the Prophet himself was a kind of terrorist.
More moderate forms are the attempts by political commentators and
some scholars to explain—as if there was need for it—why Islam is so
political. Even Connecticut’s liberal senator Christopher Dodd, in a
television interview in November 2003, cautioned Americans not to
expect too much tolerance from Islam given its propensity for ideological control over public life. He referenced a book by historian Bernard
Lewis for this point of view, which he recommended to the viewers.2
The assumption of those who hold the “Islam is the problem”
position is that the Muslim relationship to politics is peculiar. But
this is not true. Most traditional societies have had a close tie between
political leadership and religious authority, and religion often plays
a role in undergirding the moral authority of public life. In Judaism
the Davidic line of kingship is anointed by God; in Hinduism the
kings are thought to uphold divine order through the white umbrella
of dharma; in Christianity the political history of Europe is rife with
contesting and sometimes merging lines of authority between church
and state. At the turn of the twenty-irst century, violent Jewish,
Hindu, and Christian activists have all, like their Muslim counterparts, looked to traditional religious patterns of politicized religion
to justify their own militant stance.
The public life of contemporary America is no exception. It is
one in which religion is very much involved with politics and politics
with religion. The evangelical professions of faith of President Bush
and advisers such as former attorney general John Ashcroft fuel the
impression that U.S. foreign policy has a triumphant agenda of global
Christendom. This characterization of religion’s hand in U.S. politics
is often exaggerated by foreign observers in Europe and the Middle
East, but the Christian rhetoric of some members of the George W.
Bush administration has been undeniable and lends credibility to
such a view.
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The Roots of Terrorism
Even more troubling are strands of Christian theocracy that have
emerged among extreme groups in the United States. Some employ
violence in their opposition to secular society and their hatred of a
globalized culture and economy. A neo-Calvinist theology of a religious state lies behind the bombing of abortion clinics and the shooting of abortion clinic staff by Lutheran and Presbyterian activists in
Maryland and Florida. The Christian identity philosophy of race war
and a government enshrining a white Christian supremacy lies behind
Eric Robert Rudolph’s attack on the Atlanta Olympic Park, other
bombings of gay bars and abortion clinics, the killing of a Denver
radio talk-show host, an assault on a Jewish day-care center in Los
Angeles, and many other incidents—including Ruby Ridge—perpetrated by Christian militia in recent years. The so-called “Cosmotheism,” based on Christianity, that was espoused by William Pierce
and embraced by Timothy McVeigh was the ideological justiication
for McVeigh’s bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal Building. In
fact, there have been far more attacks by Christian terrorist groups
on American soil in the last ifteen years than Muslim ones. Aside
from September 11 and the 1993 attempt to destroy the World Trade
Center, almost all of the other terrorist acts have been perpetrated by
Christian theocracy.
Yet somehow, despite evidence to the contrary, the American
public labels Islam as a terrorist religion rather than Christianity. The
arguments that agree or disagree with this position often get mired
in the tedious task of dredging up scriptural or historical examples
to show the political and militant side of Islam—or contrarily, of
other religions like Christianity, Judaism, or Hinduism. Then opponents challenge the utility of those examples, and the debate goes
on. The arguments would not be necessary, however, if one did not
assume that religion is responsible for acts of public violence in the
irst place.
The Argument That Religion Does Not Cause Terrorism
The position that religion is not the problem is taken by observers on
the other side of the public discussion over religion after September
11. In some cases they see religion as an innocent victim; in other
cases they see it as simply irrelevant. In Dying to Win, Robert Pape
argued that religion is not the motive in most acts of suicide bombing.
Looking at a broad swath of cases of suicide activists in recent years,
Pape concluded that they are not motivated by a blind religious fervor
as much as a calculated political attempt. The primary motive is to
defend territory. Pape accurately pointed out that until 2003 the most
Religion as a Cause of Terrorism
1
suicide bombings were conducted not by a religious group but by a
secular ethnic movement: the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka.
Pape based his conclusions on an analysis of the database maintained by the Chicago Project of Suicide Terrorism. He provided a
demographic proile of over 460 men and women, though they are
mostly men. They are not, he argued, “mainly poor, uneducated,
immature religious zealots or social losers,” as they have sometimes
been portrayed. 3 What they have in common is the sense that their
territory or culture has been invaded by an alien power that cannot
easily be overthrown. In this desperate situation of social survival
they turn to the simplest and most direct form of militant engagement: using their own bodies as bombs. Contrary to the perception
of many, suicide bombers are not religious loners but are usually part
of large militant organizations with well-honed strategies aimed at
ousting foreign control from what they consider their own territory.
The concessions made to such organizations in the past by the governments who have been opposed to them have given the organizations behind suicide bombings the conidence that their strategies
work and are worth repeating.
Little is said about religion in Pape’s book. Pape does devote a
chapter describing how religion can intensify the main motivation
of defending one’s territory. But in general, in Pape’s analysis, religious motives are beside the point. For this reason there is no attempt
to explain the extraordinarily ubiquitous role of religion in violent
movements around the world, from Sikh activists in India to Christian militia in Idaho to Muslim jihadis from Morocco to Bali. Nor
is there any attempt to explain what difference religion makes when
it enters into a conlict and religionizes the struggle, as both Muslim
and Jewish extremists did in the Israel–Palestine dispute—a conlict
that prior to the 1990s was largely a secular struggle over territorial control. One is left with the impression that, although Pape’s
study is useful in reminding us that acts of violence are about real
things—such as the defense of culture and territory—it still does not
explain why religion has become such a forceful and dificult vehicle
for framing these concerns in recent years.
Nonetheless, appreciation for Pape’s position has been widespread, in part because it appears to contradict the U.S. administration’s position that Islamic militants are opposed to freedom. Pape
argued that, to the contrary, freedom is precisely what they are ighting for. Moreover, his arguments buttress the position of two other,
quite different camps: religious defenders eager to distance religion
from the violent acts with which religion has recently been associated; and secular analysts who have always thought that secular
1
The Roots of Terrorism
factors, particularly economic and political concerns, are the main
ingredients of social conlict.
This secular perspective is the one that lies behind the phrase
commonly found in the news media and in the statements of political
leaders, “the use of religion for political purposes.” When this phrase
is employed religion is dismissed of any culpability in creating an
atmosphere of violence. A U.S. State Department oficial once told
me that religion was being used throughout the Middle East, masking problems that were essentially economic in nature. He assured me
that if jobs were to be had by unemployed Egyptians and Palestinians the problem of religious politics in these impoverished societies
would quickly vanish. From his point of view it was unthinkable that
religious activists would actually be motivated by religion, or at least
by ideological views of the world that were framed in religious language. Similarly, Michael Sells’s study of the role of Christian symbolism in resurgent Serbian nationalism, The Bridge Betrayed, was
ridiculed by a reviewer for the Economist who saw the conlict as
purely a matter of secular nationalism in which religion played no
role.4 The assumption of the reviewer, like that of the State Department oficial with whom I spoke, was that religion was the dependent
variable, a rhetorical gloss over the real issues that were invariably
economic or political.
From the perspectives of Pape and the State Department economist, religion is essentially irrelevant to the motivations of terrorism. Religious defenders agree and take this point of view a step further. They state that religion is not just neutral about violence; it is
opposed to it, and thus it is an innocent victim of political activists.
In some cases these religious defenders do not deny that there may be
religious elements in the motives of violent activists, but they claim
that these extreme religious groups do not represent the normative
traditions. Most Buddhist leaders in Japan, for instance, distanced
themselves from what they regarded as the pseudo-Buddhism of the
Aum Shinrikyo sect implicated in the nerve gas attack on the Tokyo
subways. Most Muslims refused to believe that fellow members of
their faith could have been responsible for anything as atrocious as
the September 11 attacks—and hence the popular conspiracy theory
in the Muslim world that somehow Israeli secret police had plotted
the terrible deed. Most Christians in America saw the religiosity of
Timothy McVeigh as anti-Christian, even antireligious, and refused
to describe him as a Christian terrorist, despite the strong Christian
subtext of the novel The Turner Diaries, which McVeigh regarded as
his Bible.5
Religion as a Cause of Terrorism
1
Some scholars have come to the defense of religion in a similar
way, by characterizing the religion of activists groups as deviant from
the religious norm and therefore uncharacteristic of true religion. This
is essentially the stance that Bruce Lawrence took in defending Islam
in Shattering the Myth.6 The term fundamentalism—applied not just
to Christianity but to a whole host of religious traditions—is another
way of excusing so-called normal religion and of isolating religion’s
problems to a deviant form of the species. It is used sometimes to
suggest an almost viral spread of an odd and dangerous mutation of
religion that if left on its own naturally leads to violence, autocracy,
and other extremes. Fortunately, so this line of thinking goes, normal
religion is exempt. Recently, however, Islam and fundamentalism
are tied together so frequently in public conversation that the term
fundamentalism has become a way of condemning all of Islam as a
deviant branch of religion. But even in this case the use of the term
fundamentalism allows for the defenders of other religions to take
comfort in the notion that their kind of nonfundamentalist religion is
exempt from violence or other extreme forms of public behavior.
These various points of view present us with two or perhaps three
or four different answers to the question, Is religion a cause of terrorism? Avalos says yes, religion in general is a cause of terrorism. The
Islamophobes say yes, Islam in particular is a problem. Pape says no,
religion is irrelevant to the ight to defend territory. Other religious
defenders say no, ordinary religion is innocent of violence, but some
odd forms of religion might contribute to it.
The Argument That Religion Is Not
the Problem but That It Is Problematic
It seems to me that it is not necessary to have to make one choice
among these options. As anyone who has ever taken a multiple-choice
test knows, there is a dilemma when presented with such absolute
differences. The most accurate responses are often found in the gray
categories: (c) none of the above; or (d) all of the above. In the case of
the question regarding the involvement of religion in contemporary
public life, the answer is not simply a matter of peculiar religion gone
bad or of good religion being used by bad people. We know that there
are strata of religious imagination that deal with all sides and moods
of human existence—the peace and the perversity, the tranquility
and the terror.
In my own studies of cases of religious violence, I have found
that religious language and ideas play an important role, though
not necessarily the initial one. The conditions of conlict that lead
10
The Roots of Terrorism
to tension are usually economic and social in character—and often,
as Pape described them, a defense of territory or culture perceived to
be under control by an outside power. At some point in the conlict,
however, usually at a time of frustration and desperation, the political contest becomes religionized. Then what was primarily a secular
struggle takes on the aura of sacred conlict. This creates a whole
new set of problems.
Beginning in the 1980s, I have studied a variety of cases of contemporary religious activism. I started with the situation involving
the Sikhs in the Punjab, a region in which I lived for some years
and know fairly well. I have also observed the rise of Hindu political
violence; the Muslim separatist movement in Kashmir; the Buddhist
antigovernment protests in Sri Lanka; the Aum Shinrikyo movement
in Japan; the Islamic revolution in Iran; Sunni jihadi movements in
Egypt, Palestine, and elsewhere in the Middle East; militant Messianic Jewish movements in Israel; Catholic and Protestant militants in
Northern Ireland; and the Christian militia in the United States.7
I found in all of these cases an interesting replication of a central
thesis. Though each group was responding to its own set of local
social, economic, and political factors, in all cases there was a common ideological component: the perception that the modern idea of
secular nationalism was insuficient in moral, political, and social
terms. In many cases the effects of globalization were in the background as global economic and communications systems undercut
the distinctiveness of nation-state identities. In some cases the hatred
of the global system was overt, as in the American Christian militia’s
hatred of the new world order and the Al-Qaeda network’s targeting
of the World Trade Center. Thus, the motivating cause—if such a
term can be used—was the sense of a loss of identity and control in
the modern world.
This sense of social malaise is not necessarily a religious problem,
but it is one for which ideologies, both secular nationalist and religious transnational, provide ready responses. Hence, in each of the
cases I examined, religion became the ideology of protest. Particular religious images and themes were marshaled to resist what were
imagined to be the enemies of traditional culture and identities: the
global secular systems and their secular nation-state supporters.
There were other similarities among these cases. In each case
those who embraced radical antistate religious ideologies felt personally upset with what they regarded as the oppression of the secular
state. They experienced this oppression as an assault on their pride
and identity and felt humiliated as a result. The failures of the state—
Religion as a Cause of Terrorism
11
though economic, political, and cultural—were often experienced in
personal ways as humiliation and alienation, as a loss of selfhood.
It is understandable then, that the men—and they were usually
men—who experienced this loss of pride and identity would lash out
in violence the way that men often do when they are frustrated. Such
expressions of power are meant to at least symbolically regain their
sense of manhood. In each case, however, the activists challenged
these feelings of violence through images of collective violence borrowed from their religious traditions: the idea of cosmic war.
The idea of cosmic war was a remarkably consistent feature of
all of these cases. Those people whom we might think of as terrorists
regarded themselves as soldiers in what they imagined to be sacred
battles. I call such notions of warfare cosmic because they are larger
than life. They evoke great battles of the legendary past, and they
relate to metaphysical conlicts between good and evil. Notions of
cosmic war are intimately personal but can also be translated to the
social plane. Ultimately, though, they transcend human experience.
Often activists employ images of sacred warfare that are found in
every religious tradition—such as the battles in the Hebrew Bible
(i.e., the Old Testament), the epics of Hinduism and Buddhism, and
the Islamic idea of jihad. What makes religious violence particularly savage and relentless is that its perpetrators have placed such
religious images of divine struggle—cosmic war—in the service of
worldly political battles. For this reason, acts of religious terror serve
not only as tactics in a political strategy but also as evocations of a
much larger spiritual confrontation.
This brings us back to the question of whether religion is the
problem. In looking at the variety of cases, from the Palestinian
Hamas movement to Al-Qaeda and the Christian militia, it is clear to
me that in most cases there were real grievances: economic and social
tensions experienced by large numbers of people. These grievances
were not religious. They were not aimed at religious differences or
issues of doctrine and belief. They were issues of social identity and
meaningful participation in public life that in other contexts were
expressed through Marxist and nationalist ideologies. But in this
present moment of late modernity, these secular concerns have been
expressed through rebellious religious ideologies. The grievances—
the sense of alienation, marginalization, and social frustration—are
often articulated in religious terms and seen through religious images,
and the protest against them is organized by religious leaders through
the medium or religious institutions. Thus, religion is not the initial
problem, but the fact that religion is the medium through which these
issues are expressed is problematic.
1
The Roots of Terrorism
What Religion Brings to a Violent Conlict
What is problematic about the religious expression of antimodernism,
anti-Americanism, and antiglobalization is that it brings new aspects
to conlicts that were otherwise not a part of them. For one thing,
religion personalizes the conlict. It provides personal rewards—for
example, religious merit, redemption or the promise of heavenly luxuries—to those who struggle in conlicts that otherwise have only
social beneits. It also provides vehicles of social mobilization that
embrace vast numbers of supporters who otherwise would not be
mobilized around social or political issues. In many cases, it provides
an organizational network of local churches, mosques, temples, and
religious associations into which patterns of leadership and support
may be tapped. It gives the legitimacy of moral justiication for political encounter. Even more importantly, it provides justiication for violence that challenges the state’s monopoly on morally sanctioned killing. According to the familiar sociological dictum attributed to Max
Weber, the state’s authority is always rooted in the social approval of
the state to enforce its power through the use of bloodshed—in police
authority, punishment, and armed defense. Religion is the only other
entity that can give moral sanction for violence and is therefore inherently at least potentially revolutionary.
Religion also provides the image of cosmic war, which adds further complications to a conlict that has become baptized with religious authority. The notion of cosmic war gives an all-encompassing
world view to those who embrace it. Supporters of Christian militia movements, for instance, described their “aha” experience when
they discovered the world view of the Christian identity totalizing
ideology that helped them make sense of the modern world, of their
increasingly peripheral role in it, and of the dramatic actions they
can take to set the world right. It gives them roles as religious soldiers
who can literally ight back against the forces of evil.
The image of cosmic war is a potent force. When the template
of spiritual battle is implanted onto a worldly opposition it dramatically changes the perception of the conlict by those engaged in it
and vastly alters the way that the struggle is waged. It absolutizes the
conlict into extreme opposing positions and demonizes opponents
by imagining them to be satanic powers. This absolutism makes compromise dificult to fathom and holds out the promise of total victory
through divine intervention. A sacred war waged in a godly span of
time need not be won immediately, however. The timeline of sacred
struggle is vast, perhaps even eternal.
I once had the occasion to point out the futility—in secular military terms—of the Islamic struggle in Palestine to Abdul Aziz Ran-
Religion as a Cause of Terrorism
1
tisi, the late leader of the political wing of the Hamas movement. It
seemed to me that Israel’s military force was such that a Palestinian military effort could never succeed. Rantisi assured me that that
“Palestine was occupied before, for 200 years.” He explained that he
and his Palestinian comrades “can wait again—at least that long.”8
In his calculation, the struggles of God can endure for eons. Ultimately, however, they knew they would succeed.
So religion can be a problematic aspect of contemporary social
conlict even if it is not the problem, in the sense of the root causes
of discontent. Much of the violence in contemporary life that is perceived as terrorism around the world is directly related to the absolutism of conlict. The demonization of enemies allows those who
regard themselves as soldiers for God to kill with no moral impunity.
Quite the opposite is true: They feel that their acts will give them
spiritual rewards.
Curiously, the same kind of thinking has crept into some of the
responses to terrorism. The war on terrorism launched by the U.S.
government after September 11 is a case in point. To the degree that
the war references are metaphorical and are meant to imply an all-out
effort in the manner of previous administrations’ war on drugs and
war on poverty, it is an understandable and appropriate response.
The September 11 attacks were, after all, hideous acts that deeply
scarred the American consciousness, and one could certainly understand that a responsible government would want to wage an all-out
effort to hunt down those culpable and to bring them to justice.
But among some who espouse a war on terrorism the militant
language is more than metaphor. God’s blessing is imagined to be
bestowed on a view of confrontation that is, like cosmic war, all
encompassing, absolutizing, and demonizing. What is problematic
about this view is that it brings an impatience with moderate solutions that require the slow procedures of systems of justice. It demands
instead the quick and violent responses of war that lend simplicity to
the confrontation and a sense of divine certainty to its resolution.
Alas, such a position can fuel the ires of retaliation, leading to more
acts of terrorism instead of less.
The role of religion in this literal war on terrorism is in a curious
way similar to religion’s role in the cosmic war imagined by those
perpetrating terrorism. In both cases religion is a problematic partner of political confrontation. Religion brings more to conlict than
simply a repository of symbols and the aura of divine support. It
problematizes a conlict through its abiding absolutism, its justiication for violence, and its ultimate images of warfare that demonize
opponents and cast the conlict in transhistorical terms.
1
The Roots of Terrorism
Endnotes
1. See Hector Avalos, Fighting Words: The Origins of Religious Violence (New York: Prometheus Books, 2005); and Robert A. Pape,
Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York:
Random House, 2005).
2. Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror
(New York: Random House, 2003).
3. Pape, Dying to Win, 32.
4. Michael A. Sells, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in
Bosnia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).
5. Andrew Macdonald [William Pierce], The Turner Diaries (Hillsboro, WV: National Vanguard Books, 1978).
6. Bruce Lawrence, Shattering the Myth: Islam Beyond Violence
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).
7. See Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global
Rise of Religious Violence, 3d ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); and Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War? Religious
Nationalism Confronts the Secular State (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1993).
8. Abdul Aziz Rantisi (cofounder and political leader of Hamas), interview with author, Khan Yunis, Gaza, March 1, 1998.
11
Terrorism and the Rise of Political Islam
John L. Esposito
As the U.S. attacks of September 11, 2001, and the war on global terrorism have tragically demonstrated, understanding the relationship of
Islam to terrorism is critical to national and international security in
the twenty-irst century. Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda symbolize a
global jihad, a network of extremist groups threatening Muslim countries and the West, whose roots have proved deeper and more pervasive internationally than most had anticipated. This new global threat,
which emerged from the jihad against the Soviet Union’s occupation
of Afghanistan, has exploded across the Muslim world from Central,
South, and Southeast Asia to Europe and America.
Since the late twentieth century, political Islam, often also referred
to as Islamic fundamentalism and Islamism, has been a signiicant factor
in the politics of predominantly Muslim countries as well as the primary
language of political discourse and mobilization from North Africa to
Southeast Asia. Islamic republics or governments were created in Sudan,
Iran, General Zia ul-Haq’s Pakistan, and the Taliban’s Afghanistan.
Muslim rulers have appealed to Islam to enhance their legitimacy, rule,
and policies; mainstream movements and political parties have appealed
to Islam for legitimacy and to mobilize popular support. Islamists have
been elected president, prime minister, or deputy prime minister and to
parliament and have served in cabinets in countries as diverse as Sudan,
Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Kuwait, Bahrain, Yemen,
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia.
At the same time, extremist organizations have used violence
and terrorism in the name of Islam to threaten and to destabilize
1
The Roots of Terrorism
governments and to attack government oficials, institutions, and
ordinary citizens in Muslim countries and the West. In discussing political Islam, however, it is important to distinguish between
mainstream and extremist movements. The former participate
within the political system, whereas the latter engage in terrorism
in the name of Islam. Both have roots in a broader religious revival
that has touched all major faiths in the past few decades, and both
draw—to differing degrees depending on time and place—on
interpretations of Islam. However, to understand them both and
in particular to combat religious extremism and terrorism, it is
important to recognize their relationship to one another and, more
importantly, how they differ. These distinctions have serious implications on policy approaches. A strict military and security and
law enforcement zero-tolerance approach to terrorism is necessary,
though it will never be completely successful because open societies can always be iniltrated. Conversely, a zero-tolerance approach
to mainstream movements will not only undermine civil society
and the credibility of the West’s commitment to democratization
but will also produce the alienation and resentment that feeds the
growth of terrorism.
Origins and Nature of Political Islam
Political Islam is in many ways the successor of failed nationalist ideologies and projects in the 1950s and 1960s, from the Arab nationalism and socialism of North Africa and the Middle East to the Muslim nationalism of post-independence Pakistan. Indeed, the founders
of many modern Islamic movements were formerly participants in
nationalist movements: the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s founder,
Hasan al-Banna; Tunisia’s Rashid Ghannoushi of the Renaissance
Party; Algeria’s Abbasi Madani of the Islamic Salvation Front; and
Turkey’s Ecmettin Erbakan, founder of the Welfare (Refah) Party.
The reassertion of Islam in politics is rooted in a contemporary
religious revival or resurgence beginning in the late 1960s and 1970s
that affected both personal and public life. On the one hand, many
Muslims became more religiously observant, as demonstrated by
their emphasis on prayer, fasting, dress, family values and by the revitalization of Islamic mysticism or Suism. On the other hand, Islam
reemerged as an alternative religiopolitical ideology to the perceived
failures of more secular forms of nationalism, capitalism, and socialism. Islamic symbols, rhetoric, actors, and organizations became
major sources of legitimacy and mobilization, informing political
and social activism. Whereas governments and Islamic movements
appealed to Islam, the authoritarian nature of many governments in
Terrorism and the Rise of Political Islam
1
the Arab and Muslim world made political organizing and meetings
dificult, if not impossible. The mosque was the one institution the
state had the most dificulty dominating or controlling. Religion,
mosques, and mullahs became a rallying point when there was no
space allowed for any other. The use of the mosque–mullah network
was critical in the Iranian revolution as have been private (nongovernmental) mosques and their imams in Egypt and many other countries.
The importance of clergy–mosque networks (Shii and Sunni) have
been seen most recently in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq and among Shii
throughout the Gulf. State-asserted authority over mosques and religious leaders has fed the radicalization of religio-political movements
who saw the religious establishment co-opted, intertwined, and thus
discredited as representative of true Islam.
More often than not, faith and politics have been intertwined
causes or catalysts. And though they vary by country and region,
there are common threads: a widespread feeling of failure and loss
of self-esteem in many Muslim societies. Issues of political and social
injustice, such as authoritarianism, repression, unemployment, inadequate housing and social services, maldistribution of wealth, and
corruption, combined with concerns about the preservation of religious and cultural identity and values became prominent themes in
Muslim discourse. Many blamed Western models of political and
economic development for these failures. Once enthusiastically pursued as symbols of modernity, these models increasingly came under
criticism as sources of moral decline and spiritual malaise. Consequently, many became disillusioned with the West and particularly
with the United States. However, outside forces and petrodollars also
served as catalysts for Islamic movements. Countries like Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Libya as well as wealthy individuals used their petrodollars to extend their inluence internationally, to promote their
religious–ideological worldviews and politics, and to support government Islamization programs as well as Islamist movements, both
mainstream and extremist. By the late 1980s and 1990s international
issues and actors increasingly played important roles in Muslim politics: the Soviet–Afghan War; sanctions against Hussein’s Iraq; and
the oppression and liberation of Muslims in Bosnia, Kashmir, and
Chechnya.
Though the majority of Islamists have worked to bring about
change through social and political activism within their societies,
participating in electoral politics and civil society where permitted, a
signiicant and dangerous minority of extremists—jihad groups from
Egypt to Indonesia, Al-Qaeda, and other terrorists—believe they have
a mandate from God. Their war is against rulers in the Muslim world
1
The Roots of Terrorism
and their societies whom they believe to be authoritarian, oppressive,
corrupt, and un-Islamic, as well as the West. For extremists, Islam is
not simply an ideological and political alternative but an imperative.
Since it is God’s command, implementation must be immediate, not
gradual, and the obligation to implement is incumbent on all true
Muslims. For these extremists, Muslims who remain apolitical or
resist—individual Muslims or governments—are no longer regarded
as Muslims but rather as atheists or unbelievers, or enemies of God,
against whom all true Muslims must wage holy war, or jihad. Moreover, acts normally forbidden—such as stealing, murdering noncombatants, and terrorism—against Muslim and non-Muslim enemies
alike are seen as required. They are religiously legitimated in what is
portrayed as a cosmic war between good and evil, between the army
of God and the forces of Satan. One man, Sayyid Qutb, stands out as
the ideologue of militant Islam. Though executed in 1966, his worldview has both directly and indirectly inluenced extremist groups and
movements for half a century.
Sayyid Qutb: Ideologue and Martyr of Islamic Radicalism
It would be dificult to overestimate the role played by Egypt’s Sayyid
Qutb (1906–66) in the rise of political Islam and in particular in the
ideology of militant jihad. He has been both a respected intellectual
and religious writer whose works include an inluential commentary
on the Quran and the ideologue for Muslim extremist movements
around the globe. His journey from educated intellectual, government oficial, and admirer of the West to militant ideologue and
activist who condemned both the Egyptian and American governments and defended the legitimacy of militant jihad inluenced and
inspired many militants from the assassins of Anwar Sadat to the
followers of Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda.
Qutb had a modern education and became an oficial in the Ministry of Public Instruction as well as a poet and literary critic. Qutb’s
visit to America in the late 1940s proved to be a turning point in
his life, transforming him from an admirer into a severe critic of the
West. His experiences in America provided a culture shock that made
him more religious and convinced him of the moral decadence of the
West. Shortly after he returned to Egypt, Qutb joined the Muslim
Brotherhood. He quickly emerged as a major voice in the Brotherhood and its most inluential ideologue amid the growing confrontation with the Egyptian regime. Imprisoned and tortured for alleged
involvement in a failed attempt to assassinate Gamal Abd al-Nasser,
he became increasingly militant and radicalized, convinced that
the Egyptian government was un-Islamic and must be overthrown.
Terrorism and the Rise of Political Islam
1
Qutb’s revolutionary vision is set forth in his most inluential tract,
Milestones.1 His ideas have reverberated in the radical rhetoric of
revolutionaries from Ayatollah Khomeini to bin Laden.
Qutb sharply divided Muslim societies into two diametrically
opposed camps: the forces of good and of evil, those committed to
the rule of God and those opposed, the party of God and the party
of Satan. There was no middle ground. He emphasized the need to
develop a special group—a vanguard—of true Muslims within this
corrupt and faithless society. Since the creation of an Islamic government was a divine commandment, he argued, it was not an alternative to be worked toward. Rather, it was an imperative Muslims
must strive to implement or must impose immediately. Indeed, given
the authoritarian and repressive nature of the Egyptian government
and many other governments in the Muslim world, Qutb concluded
that jihad as armed struggle was the only way to implement the new
Islamic order. For Qutb, jihad, as armed struggle in the defense of
Islam against the injustice and oppression of anti-Islamic governments and the neocolonialism of the West and the East (i.e., Soviet
Union), was incumbent on all Muslims. Those who refused to participate were to be counted among the enemies of God and should be
excommunicated or declared unbelievers, or takir, and fought and
killed along with the other enemies of God. Qutb’s radicalized world
view became a source for ideologues from the founders of Egypt’s
Islamic Jihad to bin Laden and Al-Qaeda’s call for a global jihad.
The Globalization and Hijacking of Jihad
In the late twentieth and early twenty-irst centuries, because of Muslim politics and global communications, jihad has become even more
widespread and complex in usage. 2 The importance of jihad is rooted
in the Quran’s command to struggle—the literal meaning of the word
jihad—in the path of God and in the example of the Prophet Muhammad and his early Companions. In its most general meaning, jihad
refers to the obligation incumbent on all Muslims, individuals, and
the community to follow and realize God’s will: to lead a virtuous
life and to spread Islam through preaching, education, example, and
writing. Jihad also includes the right, indeed the obligation, to defend
Islam and the Muslim community from aggression.
These two broad meanings of jihad—as spiritual–moral and as
armed struggle—are contrasted in a prophetic tradition in which
Muhammad is reported to have said, “We return from the lesser jihad
[warfare] to the greater jihad [the personal struggle to live a moral
life].” Historically jihad has been subject to many interpretations and
usages: spiritual and political, peaceful and violent, legitimate and
10
The Roots of Terrorism
illegitimate. Jihad has been interpreted and misinterpreted to justify
resistance and liberation struggles, extremism and terrorism, and
holy and unholy wars. In addition to historic battles and wars to protect Muslim peoples and lands, rulers from early caliphs to heads of
modern states like Hussein have used jihad to legitimate campaigns
that could spread the boundaries of their states or empires. Extremists past and present—from the Kharajites who assassinated the
fourth caliph Ali to the assassins of Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat,
bin Laden, and Al-Qaeda, and a host of extremist movements from
Morocco to Indonesia—have justiied their acts of violence and terror by calling them acts of jihad.
In recent decades, jihad’s primary Quranic religious or spiritual
meanings, the struggle or effort to follow God’s path and to build
a just society, became more multifaceted and contemporary in its
applications—for example, leading to a jihad to create a more just
society or to engage in educational, community, and social service
projects. At the same time, in response to authoritarian regimes and
political conlicts, jihad became a clarion call used by resistance, liberation, and terrorist movements alike to legitimate their cause, to
mobilize support, and to motivate their followers. The Afghan Mujahiddin, the Taliban, and the Northern Alliance each waged a jihad
in Afghanistan against foreign powers and among themselves; Muslims movements in Kashmir, Chechnya, Daghestan, and the southern Philippines, Bosnia, and Kosovo have fashioned their struggles as
jihads; Hizbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad Palestine characterized
war with Israel as a jihad; Algeria’s Armed Islamic Group engaged in
a jihad of terror against the government and their fellow citizens; and
bin Laden and Al-Qaeda waged a global jihad against Muslim governments and the West. The terms jihad and martyrdom, or shahid,
gained such currency and proved to be such powerful symbols that
they were also used by nationalist, or secular, leaders and movements
such as Yasser Arafat and the secular Palestinian National Authority
and its military wing the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades.
The Soviet–Afghan war marked a new turning point as a jihad
armed struggle went global to a degree never seen in the past. The
mujahidin holy war drew Muslims from many parts of the world and
support from Muslim and non-Muslim countries and sources. Those
who fought in Afghanistan, called Afghan Arabs, moved on to ight
other jihads in their home countries and in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Central Asia. Others stayed on or were trained and recruited in the new
jihadi madrasas [religious schools] and training camps, joining in bin
Laden’s global jihad against Muslim governments and the West.
Terrorism and the Rise of Political Islam
11
Although the distinction is often made between Quranic prescriptions about just war versus unjust war, many and conlicting
interpretations of the verses have been made over time. At issue are
the meaning of terms like aggression and defense and questions about
when the command to sacriice life and property to defend Islam
is appropriate and how to deine the enemies of Islam. For example, the Quran speaks repeatedly of the “enemies of God” and the
“enemies of Islam,” often deining them as “unbelievers.” Although
other Quranic verses appear to make it clear that such people should
be physically fought against only if they behave aggressively toward
Muslims, some Muslims have interpreted the call to struggle or strive
against such enemies to be a permanent engagement required of all
Muslims of every time and place until the entire world is converted
to Islam. A major example of this kind of thinking would be those
responsible for the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in the United States on September 11, 2001.
Terrorists like bin Laden and others have gone beyond classical
Islam’s criteria for a just jihad and recognize no limits but their own,
employing any weapons or means. Adopting Qutb’s militant world
view of an Islam under siege, they ignore or reject Islamic law’s regulations regarding the goals and means of a valid jihad: that violence
must be proportional; that only the necessary amount of force should
be used to repel the enemy; that innocent civilians should not be targeted; and that jihad must be declared by the ruler or head of state.
Moreover, extremists have departed from the traditional Muslim
view of armed jihad as a collective community responsibility and have
asserted that jihad is an individual duty required of every Muslim.
Suicide Bombing and Terrorism
The most controversial and increasingly widespread form of jihad
has been suicide bombing. The use of suicide terrorism has become a
weapon of choice. It was used in the September 11 attacks against the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and subsequently in extremist
attacks globally, in particular in its widespread use in post-Hussein
Iraq. Historically, Sunni and Shii Muslims have forbidden religious
suicide and acts of terrorism. The Nizari Ismailis, popularly called
the Assassins, who in the eleventh and twelfth centuries were notorious for sending suicidal assassins against their enemies, were rejected
by mainstream Islam as fanatics. However, in the late twentieth century, the issue resurfaced as many, Shii and Sunni alike, engaged in
suicide bombings, legitimating their actions religiously with terms
like jihad and martyrdom. Although the origins of suicide attacks
are often equated with Hamas in the Israeli–Palestinian conlict, in
1
The Roots of Terrorism
fact suicide bombings in the Muslim world irst occurred in Lebanon,
used by Hizbollah and al-Jihad in attacks such as those against the
U.S. Marine barracks and French military headquarters in Beirut in
1983 in which 241 American troops were killed.
Suicide bombing later became the weapon of last resort in the
Israel–Palestine conlict, often associated with Hamas, a religious,
social, political, and military movement that emerged in late 1987
and was the product of Israeli occupation of the West Bank and
Gaza. The combination of political and social activism with guerrilla
warfare won inancial and moral support from many Palestinians
and sympathetic supporters in the broader Arab and Muslim world. 3
However, the actions of the Qassim Brigade, the Hamas military
wing, earned Hamas its reputation for terrorism. Created in 1991,
the brigade initially engaged in well-planned selective attacks against
Israeli military and police. Organized into small clandestine cells, it
used guerrilla warfare, not random acts of violence, to respond to
Israeli policies and actions.
This position changed dramatically after the Oslo Accords in
1993. Responding to speciic events in Israel and the West Bank and
Gaza, in what they claimed was an escalation of Israeli repression
of targeted assassinations, mass detentions, and deportations, the
Qassim Brigade undertook direct attacks outside the heart of Israel
against civilian as well as military targets. It adopted a new type of
warfare: suicide bombing. Its deadly attacks increased exponentially
after a Jewish settler killed twenty-nine worshippers during the Friday congregational prayer at the Mosque of the Patriarch in Hebron
on February 25, 1994. The brigade promised swift revenge and
retaliation for the massacre and undertook ive anti-Israeli operations within Israel itself in cities like Galilee, Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv.
The use of suicide bombing by Hamas further increased during the
Second Intifada, which began in 2000, and also became more indiscriminate. Suicide bombing was justiied by Hamas as a weapon of
last resort in response to the Israeli military’s overwhelming military
superiority. They believed that suicide bombers were committing not
an act of suicide but one of self-sacriice, engaged in political resistance and retaliation against Israeli occupation and oppression.
Hamas provides an excellent example of diverse strategic
responses to a complex and changing political context. It has had a
strong political wing that has engaged in political opposition to Israel
and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and has participated in university student elections and, more recently, municipal
elections. At the same time, it spawned a militia that initially engaged
the Israeli military with conventional weapons. Hamas turned to sui-
Terrorism and the Rise of Political Islam
1
cide bombing in response to what it perceived as a changing context
in which suicide bombers were its most effective weapon, especially
in striking terror in the hearts of Israel’s citizens with the hope that
this would pressure the Israeli government to withdraw its military as
it had done in Lebanon in May 2000. The attitude of Hamas toward
the use of violence is a reminder of the pattern of many groups and
movements. Whereas mainstream Islamic activists operate within the
system, extremists believe that the nature of the particular political
context is such that violent opposition is required—indeed, divinely
mandated. At the same time, Hamas demonstrated in 2005-2006, the
extent to which some movements adapt their strategies and policies in
light of experiences and changing political contexts. While refusing
to surrender its arms, Hamas did decide to participate as a political
party in the January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections. In a
stunning victory, Hamas swept the elections, winning a majority of
the parliamentary seats and the right to form a government.
Hizbollah, which initiated the use of suicide bombing in the Middle East in 1983, provides another important and inluential example
of the tendency of movements to deine and to adjust their strategy
in response to political contexts. Hizbollah began as an Iranian-supported militia movement in Lebanon in response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. It used guerilla warfare and in 1983 turned to suicide bombing to drive the American and French military forces out of
Lebanon. When the political context changed after the Taif Accords
in 1989, Hizbollah became a major player in electoral politics as a
political party and signiicant presence in the Lebanese parliament.
However, it refused to lay down its arms in the south of Lebanon
where it continued to ight what it regarded as an Israeli occupation.
Indeed, the Israeli pullout in 2000—after twenty-two years of occupation—was widely seen by many, in particular militant Islamists, as
vindicating the tactical use of violence and suicide bombing.
Suicide bombing has precipitated a sharp debate in the Muslim world, garnering both support and condemnation on religious
grounds, with prominent religious leaders differing sharply in their
legal opinions (fatwa). Sheikh Ahmad Yasin, the late religious leader
and founder of Hamas, and Akram Sabri, the mufti, or legal expert,
of Jerusalem, as well as many other Arab and Palestinian religious
leaders argued that suicide bombing is necessary and justiied. Other
religious leaders and scholars condemned suicide bombings—in particular those that target civilians—as terrorism. Sheikh Abdulaziz
bin Abdallah Al-Sheikh, Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, condemned
all suicide bombing as suicide and therefore un-Islamic and forbidden
by Islam. However, Sheikh Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi, the former
1
The Roots of Terrorism
grand mufti of Egypt and current rector of Al-Azhar University, drew
a sharp distinction between suicide bombings that are acts of selfsacriice and self-defense and the killing of noncombatants, women,
and children, which he has consistently condemned. Sheikh Yusuf
al-Qardawi, among the most inluential religious authorities in the
world, has given fatwas that recognize suicide bombing in Israel–Palestine as an act of self-defense, the giving of one’s life for God with
the hope that God will grant Paradise. Qardawi has legitimated the
killing of civilians, arguing that Israel is a militant and military society in which both men and women serve in the military and reserves
and that if an elderly person or a child is killed in such acts, it is an
involuntary killing. At the same time, he has denounced acts of terrorism elsewhere as un-Islamic or against the teachings of Islam.
Osama bin Laden and the Spread of Global Terrorism
The suicide attacks of September 11, 2001, were a watershed in the
history of political Islam and global terrorism, signaling the magnitude of the threat of bin Laden and Al-Qaeda and the globalization
of jihad.4 Bin Laden, the educated, wealthy son of a prominent Saudi
family with close ties to the House of Saud, had fought against the
Soviets in Afghanistan. The struggle allied him with a cause supported by the United States, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and many others. However, after the war he became radicalized by the prospect of
an American-led coalition in the 1991 Gulf War and the subsequent
increased presence and inluence of America in Saudi Arabia and the
Gulf. His opposition to the war escalated rapidly, resulting in his
loss of Saudi citizenship, his move to Sudan, and then his return to
Afghanistan, which became the primary training base for Al-Qaeda
and its global jihad against Muslim governments as well as America
and the West.
Bin Laden became the godfather of an emerging global terrorism,
a major funder of terrorist groups, and a suspect in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, of the slaughter of eighteen American
soldiers in Somalia, and of bombings in Riyadh in 1995 and in Dhahran in 1996. He threatened attacks against Americans who remained
on Saudi soil and promised retaliation internationally for cruise missile attacks against Sudan and his reported base in Afghanistan. 5 In
February 1998, bin Laden and other militant leaders announced the
creation of The Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders, a
transnational coalition of extremist groups. Al-Qaeda was linked to
a series of acts of terrorism: the truck bombing of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on August 7, 1998, that killed 263 people
and injured more than 5,000, followed on October 12, 2000, by a
Terrorism and the Rise of Political Islam
1
suicide bombing attack against the USS Cole, which killed seventeen
American sailors.
Osama bin Laden’s message was primarily political rather than
theological; he appealed to the grievances and popular causes of
many in the Arab and Muslim world. A sharp critic of American
foreign policy, he denounced the substantial American military and
economic involvement and presence in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf,
which he dismissed as Zionist crusaders; U.S. support for Israel;
sanctions against Saddam’s Iraq that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilians; Saudi Arabia; and other un-Islamic
governments. To these were added other populist causes like Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, and Kashmir. Bin Laden’s intentions were
forcefully stated in “A Declaration of War against the Americans” in
1996. Bin Laden declared he was ighting U.S. foreign policy in the
Middle East and, in particular, American support for the House of
Saud and the state of Israel. His goal, he said, was to unleash a clash
of civilizations between Islam and the Zionist crusaders of the West
to provoke an American backlash that would radicalize the Muslim
world and would topple pro-Western Muslim governments.
Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda represented a new international brand
of Sunni militancy and terrorism associated with the Afghan Arabs—
those who had come from the Arab and Muslim world to ight alongside the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviets. The sources and
growth of extremism and acts of terrorism were not conined to the
Middle East but also encompassed Central, South, and Southeast
Asia and later spread to America and Europe. Bin Laden and his chief
of staff, Ayman al Zawahiri, were committed to a global jihad.
*****
There can be no doubt that religion provides a powerful source of
authority, meaning, and legitimacy. Religiously motivated or legitimated violence and terror adds the dimensions of divine or absolute
authority buttressing the authority of terrorist leaders, religious symbolism, moral justiication, motivation and obligation, certitude, and
heavenly reward that enhance recruitment and a willingness to ight
and die in a sacred struggle (see Mark Juergensmeyer’s contribution in
this book). Thus, even more secular movements have appealed to and
have used religion. The power of religious symbolism could be seen,
for example, when Arafat, leader of the secular nationalist movements
PLO and then PNA, used the terms jihad and shahid to describe his
situation when he was under siege in Ramallah. The Palestinian militia—not just the Islamist Hamas—appropriated religious symbolism,
choosing to call itself the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade and drawing on
1
The Roots of Terrorism
the symbols of jihad and martyrdom. Moreover, though religious and
nonreligious organizations and movements, whether Al-Qaeda or the
Marxist Tamil Tigers, share a common strategy, Muslims often identify their goal as Islamic: to create an Islamic government, a caliphate, or simply a more Islamically oriented state and society.
However, Muslim political terrorism can boomerang and alienate
segments of a society that might otherwise be sympathetic. A major
turning point in the Egyptian government’s war against extremists
like Al-Jihad and the Gamaa Islamiyya occurred when the attacks in
Luxor and elsewhere indiscriminately slaughtered innocent foreigners
and civilian Egyptians. Similarly, despite the fact that the vast majority of those responsible for attacks against the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon were Saudis, both the Saudi government and the
populace became concerned and aggressive in combating Al-Qaeda
and terrorism only after major attacks in Saudi Arabia targeted and
killed Saudis, including women and children.
A critical issue in the war against global terrorism is the issue of
legitimate versus illegitimate uses of violence. The problem is compounded by religious authority. Islam lacks a central authority: a single religious authority, hierarchy, or board of senior clergy. This can
be a source of healthy diversity and lexibility. For example, based on
jurist interpretations of texts and social contexts, muftis can render
differing opinions, or fatwas, in such cases as contracts, marriage,
divorce, and maintenance. This lack of a central authority, however,
has also led to a war of fatwas. The problem can be seen in the diverse
and conlicting rulings regarding suicide bombing in general and its
use in the Israeli–Palestinian conlict; the sharp differences between
mainstream religious leaders like Ayatollah Sistani and the actions
of militants like Moqtedar al-Sadr or Abu Musab al-Zarqawi; the
rulings of the mufti of Saudi Arabia; and the actions of al-Qaeda in
Saudi Arabia.
The war against global terrorism will continue to challenge European and American policymakers as well as Muslim governments
not only to use military and economic means but also to emphasize
public diplomacy. The military can kill, capture, and contain terrorists, but, as we have seen, this has not lessened the growth of Muslim extremism and terrorism. Terrorists must be marginalized and
delegitmated. Attempts to win the hearts and minds and to wage an
ideological counteroffensive in this war of ideas require substantive
foreign policy reforms. The primary causes or motivations of terrorism—the political and economic conditions and grievances that feed
anger, alienation, and rage—must be addressed and ameliorated.
Terrorism and the Rise of Political Islam
1
Drawing a sharp distinction between mainstream and extremist movements remains critical. Whereas terrorists require a security
policy with zero tolerance, mainstream Islamists, especially political parties, require engagement by their governments and Western
governments. If they are not allowed to vote or be in positions of
political power but are banned or repressed, the risk of alienation
and radicalization is signiicant. As we have seen, terrorists can be
killed and captured but not completely eliminated. Post-September
11, many major terrorist leaders remain at liberty, and the numbers
of terrorists and groups continue to grow. The greater challenge is to
limit the growth of global terrorism, to address critical political and
ideological factors, and thus to drain the fuel that ignites and the theologies of hate that reinforce and legitimate global terrorism.
Muslim religious leaders and intellectuals play a critical role in
the ideological war against Muslim extremism and terrorism, which
is the struggle for the soul of Islam. They bring to bear a religious
authority and interpretations of Islam that discredit theologies of
hate. They formulate and seek to implement doctrinal and educational reforms—in schools, madrasas, and universities—that more
effectively respond to the challenges of globalization in the twentyirst century with its need for all religious faiths to emphasize inclusive rather than exclusive theologies that foster mutual understanding, religious pluralism, and tolerance. Finally, it is important to
remember that Muslim societies have long been the most frequent
victims of religious extremism and terrorism. The vast majority of
Muslims and the majority of Islamic movements and activists desire
and are one of the most important forces for securing stable and safe
societies, representative governments, and the rule of law.
Endnotes
1. Milestones (Cedar Rapids, Iowa: United Publications, nd). See also
John L. Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam, ch. 2
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), and Ahmad Moussalli,
Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyid Qutb (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1993).
2. For this discussion, I drew from John L. Esposito, Unholy War:
Terror in the Name of Islam (New York: Oxford University Press,
2003); and Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? 3rd ed.
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
3. Among the better studies of Hamas as well as its use of suicide are
Shaul Mishal and Avraham, Sela Palestinian Hamas (New York:
Columbia University Press 2000); Khaled Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine
Studies, 2000); Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic
1
The Roots of Terrorism
of Suicide Bombing (New York: Random House, 2005); and JeanFrancois Legrain, “Hamas: Legitimate Heir of Palestinian Nationalism?” in Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism, or Reform? ed.
John L. Esposito (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997).
4. For perceptive discussions of Osama bin Laden, see Peter L. Bergen,
The Osama bin Laden I Know (New York: Free Press, 2006); Holy
War Inc. (New York: Free Press, 2002); Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: The
True Story of Radical Islam (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004); Ahmed
Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 2001); and J. K. Cooley, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America
and International Terrorism (London: Pluto Press, 2000).
5. Transcript of Osama bin Laden Interview, CNN/Time, August 25,
1998.
12
Terrorism and Deculturation
Olivier Roy
A popular view among journalists and experts is that of Islamic terrorism as an expression of the Muslim wrath. According to this notion, a
minority vanguard—the terrorists—uses unacceptable means to express
a whole community’s grievances. It is a reaction of a community that
feels under threat: a response to Western encroachments in the Middle
East and the imposition of Western values on Muslims living in the
West. In reality, although it is obvious that many Muslims do react
negatively to what they see as both a political and a cultural aggression,
a closer analysis of the Islamic terrorists who struck the West in 2001
and continue to commit terrorist activity in presently seems to largely
debunk the idea that their struggle has something to do with a clash of
culture or civilizations or religions—even if they sometimes use such
terms.
Where Do They Come From?
If we analyze the violent Islamic militants who have operated in Western Europe since the early 1990s, a clear pattern emerges. These individuals, even when they have a Middle Eastern familial background,
do not come from the Middle East to perpetrate terrorist attacks in
the West, nor are they sent by a Middle Eastern terrorist organization
with a local agenda, such as the liberation of Palestine.1 They are part
of the deterritorialized, supranational Islamic networks that operate in
the West and at the periphery of the Middle East. Their backgrounds
have little to do with Middle Eastern conlicts or traditional religious
10
The Roots of Terrorism
education, except the few Saudis and Yemenis who carried out the
September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States. On the contrary,
they are based in Europe, luent in Western languages, and Western
educated: None of them underwent a religious curriculum in Islamic
madrassas, or religious schools. Some were born in Europe; others
came as children, students, or political refugees; many even possessed Western citizenship. All of the September 11 pilots and their
accomplices, except the Saudis’ muscle, left their countries of origin to study abroad, especially scientiic or technical subjects. They
all have secular backgrounds with Western habits like drinking and
dating girls until the days of their return, or conversion, to Islam.
All broke with or dissociated themselves from their families. Though
they were settling in the West, they were never involved in the local
Muslim community life or with any religious congregation. Almost
none of them made endogamic marriages with cousins or those from
the same villages. In fact, many married non-Muslim Europeans,
who, in many cases, converted to Islam.
In other words, they were cultural outcasts, living at the margin
of society in either their countries of origin or their host countries.
More interestingly, all of them—following normal lives in their countries of origin or in Western Europe—became born-again Muslims
in Europe. The mosques of Hamburg, al-Qods, London, Finsbury
Park, Marseilles, and even Montreal played a bigger role than a Saudi
madrassa in the process of their radical Islamization. More recently,
in 2004 to the present, the radicalization is happening outside the
mosque, such as within a group of local friends, or indeed in jail. In
any case, the main point is that they are Westernized and deterritorialized, meaning that they are not linked with a given country, including their family’s country of origin. Their groups are often mixes of
educated middle-class leaders and working-class dropouts, a pattern
common to most of the West European radicals of the 1970s and
1980s; these groups include the German Red Army Faction, the Red
Brigades in Italy, and Action Directe in France.
In almost every Al-Qaeda cell in Europe, we now ind converts.
They share many common patterns with the born-again Muslims.
A few are middle class—usually the leaders, like Christian Caze
in France who was a medical doctor killed in action against the
police in Roubaix in 1996—whereas many are dropouts from working class, such as the American “dirty bomber” José Padilla, “shoe
bomber” Richard Reid, London subway attacker Germaine Lindsay,
and Frenchman Lionel Dumont who fought in Bosnia. Twenty years
ago, such individuals would have joined radical leftist movements,
but these have disappeared from the spaces of social exclusion or
Terrorism and Deculturation
11
have become bourgeois like the Revolutionary Communist League in
France, which took 5 percent in the last presidential election. Now
only two movements of radical protest in the West claim to be internationalist: the antiglobalization movement and radical Islamists. To
convert to European Islam is a way for a rebel to ind a cause. It
follows that the second generation of Al-Qaeda militants, who were
recruited after 1992, is characterized precisely by the breaking of
their ties with the allegedly “real” Muslim world they pretend to represent. Clearly, they are all far more a product of a Westernized Islam
than of traditional Middle Eastern politics. However “old time” their
theology may sound to Westerners, and whatever they may think of
themselves, they are clearly more a postmodern phenomenon than a
premodern one.
Thus, far from representing a traditional religious community
or culture, these militants broke with their own past, and with traditional Islam, and experienced an individual re-Islamization in a
small cell of uprooted fellows, where they forged their own Islam.
This is illustrated vividly, for example, by Mohammed Atta, who
stated that he did not want to get buried according to Egyptian tradition, which he dubbed un-Islamic. These militants do not follow
any school or notable cleric in Islam and often live according to nonMuslim standards. Indeed, though taqiya, or hiding one’s ideas, is a
popular explanation for such behavior, it is hard to see how drinking
and trying to hire prostitutes the night before a terrorist act—as did
some of the September 11 terrorists—would be a good way to deceive
the enemy. After all, secret agents are supposed to know how not to
attract attention. Moreover, taqiya is a Shi’a notion and is considered
an innovation in the Sunni world.
Whom Do They Fight?
Terrorists’ conception of space has little to do with the defense of
Darul Islam, the traditional territory where Muslims live under Muslim rulers. First, they usually do not consider that the present rulers
are legitimate, yet they do not ight to replace them by true Islamic
leaders. Al-Qaeda—from Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya to
New York and Fallujah—is ighting irst of all against the West or
its supposed allies (e.g., Jews and Shi’as) but not against the present regimes. Al-Qaeda has been involved in attacks against Jewish
targets but almost never against Israeli targets. And even in Saudi
Arabia, they are targeting foreigners rather than local government
oficials. In fact, this is precisely because they see Darul Islam as a
deterritorialized concept: wherever Muslims are under pressure is a
good place to ight.
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The Roots of Terrorism
Al-Qaeda’s ight started long before any Western military
encroachment in the Middle East or Afghanistan. The predecessor of
Osama bin Laden—Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian Muslim brother—
gave up the ight to free Palestine, because in his view this was a
nationalist struggle rather than a purely religious jihad. No European Al-Qaeda member left Europe or the United States to ight for
Islam in his or his family’s country of origin, except some Pakistanis.
They preferred Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Kashmir. For example, all
the Algerians involved in Al-Qaeda came from Europe—or, like Ressam, became radicalized in Europe—and none was ever found in the
strongholds of the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA). The foreigners sentenced in Yemen in January 1999 for taking hostages were
six British citizens of Pakistani descent, including the son-in-law of
Sheykh Hamza, the Egyptian-born former imam of Finsbury Park,
and two Algerians. Sheykh Saïd Omar, sentenced in Pakistan for the
kidnapping of Daniel Pearl, is a British citizen born in the United
Kingdom. The two young Muslims sentenced in Morocco for iring
on tourists in a Marrakesh hotel in 1994 were from French Algerian
families. In other words, in many cases the Islamic violence in the
Middle East is imported from recommunalized Western Muslims.
The born-again Muslims of Europe are ighting at the frontiers
of their imaginary ummah, and what agitates them is a consequence
of their Westernization rather than any spillover from Middle Eastern conlicts. All the literature and websites linked with Al-Qaeda
stress the peripheral jihad from Bosnia to the Philippines, whereas
the struggles in Palestine and Iraq are not considered central—an
emphasis that has been noted and criticized by some Arab militants
like the Saudi Sheykh Abu Ayman al Hilali. Unsurprisingly, most of
the jihadi websites are based in the West or in South Asia. This is not
only because of censorship; it is also, and most importantly, because
the people who are behind them are based in the West.
What Kind of Islam?
The radicalism of the terrorists has nothing to do with Islam as a culture. Neither is it the expression of the collective identity of a Muslim community. Deculturation and individualization are the two key
issues in the process of radicalization, and Islam is the expression of a
reconstructed self in reference to a virtual ummah. Indeed, the Islam
with which such young people identify is not the cultural Islam of
their parents or home countries. It is both Salai and jihadist. Salaists
seek to purge Islam of all outside inluences, starting with the cultures and traditions of Muslim societies, and to restore it to the letter
of the Koran as well as to the tradition of the Prophet Muhammed.
Terrorism and Deculturation
1
Salaism is fundamentally opposed to all cultural or national forms
of Islam. By no means are all Salaists jihadists. But today’s terrorists
are also jihadists, since they have opted from the outset for armed
struggle, which has essentially taken over the targets of the far left
in the 1970s, such as United States imperialism instead of genuine
support for speciic national liberation movements. In fact, for many
radicals, and especially the converts, activism seems to supersede religious convictions.
As mentioned already, radicalization is a consequence of the
Westernization of Muslims being born and living in Europe. It is
linked with a generational gap and a depressed social status, and it
perpetuates a preexistent tradition of leftist, Third Worldist, antiimperialist youth protest. Notwithstanding such radicalization, most
European Muslims have found a way to conciliate faith and a nonMuslim environment in a practical, if sometimes makeshift, manner.
The problem is that this de facto liberalism is not yet embedded or
expressed in theological terms. This means that such liberalism is not
bound into a socialization mechanism that can be transmitted easily
to subsequent generations, suggesting that the present generation will
remain open to radicalization.
Religion or Culture?
Neofundamentalism does not target communities with ties to a
culture of origin but instead seeks out individuals in doubt about
their faith and identity. It appeals to an uprooted, often young, welleducated, but frustrated and already disgruntled youth. No wonder
Salaism attracts the losers of deculturation. But loser should not be
understood in economic terms: It is not a matter of poverty but of
self-identity. Salaism even made a breakthrough among an educated
middle class that is not revolutionary and is looking for respectability
while experiencing some sort of acculturation. In Egypt and Pakistan, for example, Salaism reaches many workers returning from the
Gulf States. 2 For such uprooted individuals—whether in the West or
in the Middle East—fundamentalism offers a system for regulating
behavior that can it any situation, from Afghan deserts to American
college campuses. Indeed, Islam—as preached by the Taliban, Saudi
Wahhabis and bin Laden’s radicals—is hostile even to culture that is
Muslim in origin. Whatever it has destroyed, whether Mohammad’s
tomb, the Buddhist Bamiyan statues in Afghanistan, or the World
Trade Center, it expresses the same rejection of material civilization
or culture, with Muslim cultures the irst target and Western culture
second. In doing so, the West is not rejected in favor of any sort of
Islamic culture. Salaists do not consider Islam as a culture but as
1
The Roots of Terrorism
a mere religion that would lose its purity and holistic dimension if
embedded in a speciic culture. This is why it appeals to an unmoored
second-generation youth in Europe.
Salaists dream of a tabula rasa. They do not value the classical great Muslim civilizations, such as the Umayyad or the Ottoman
Empire. They reject the different religious schools as well as Suism,
which have been so instrumental in the nativization of Islam. How
can we study Yemen without considering the rift between Zaydism
and Shafeism or Central Asia without taking into account the role of
Hanaism and Suism? Salaists reject local Islams and wage a relentless war on folk customs and even learned traditions, religious or
secular. For instance, they oppose any cult of the saints—zyarat in
Central Asia and moussem in North Africa, which is a religious pilgrimage in which people come to pray to the local patron saint—and
even the celebration of the Prophet’s birthday, known as mawlud. 3
They reject Suism and mystical practices, called zikr, and any form
of artistic performance associated with a religious practice, such as
qawwali music in Pakistan, with some exceptions, such as religious
songs unaccompanied by musical instruments.4 They reject speciic
burial rituals. 5 Quite evidently they also forbid participation in pagan
or secular celebrations. For example, the popular Persian Nawruz
festival on April 21 was banned by the Taliban; the Saudi Council of
Fatwa ruled against a traditional festivity, Grayqaan or Quraiqa’an,
in which children from the Gulf Coast used to knock on doors and
collect treats.6
The Taliban, for example, went very far in their struggle against
traditional Afghan culture. As is the practice of all Salaists, they
irst targeted bad Muslims, whereas Western culture came only second. They had rather good relations with the United States until fall
1997 and did not bother to expel Western nongovernmental organizations. Instead they took a hard line against Afghan customs and
culture. They banned music, movies, dancing, and kite lying, the
latter because someone climbing a tree to remove a kite might end
up watching, even inadvertently, unveiled women inside the adjacent
house garden. Pet songbirds were outlawed because they might have
voided a believer’s prayer by distracting him. The Taliban destroyed
the statues of the Buddhas, not in opposition to Buddhism but—apart
from Islam forbidding representation of the human form—because
these statues were not linked with the current religion in Afghanistan. Even if such statues had no religious meaning, or a negative
religious meaning, they would still have had to be destroyed. For the
Taliban, religion should have the monopoly of the symbolic sphere.
Life should be entirely devoted to prepare the individual for the here-
Terrorism and Deculturation
1
after, and this can be done only through abiding by a strict code of
conducts and rituals.
A good example of the opposition between code and culture is
food versus cuisine. Salaists do not care about cuisine. Anything that
is halal is good—whatever the basic ingredients and the recipe. When
they open a restaurant in the West, it never promotes Ottoman or
Moroccan cuisine but instead halal food and most often will simply
offer the usual Western fast food products. Similarly, halal dress can
be based on Western raincoats, gloves, fashionable scarves, and so on.
Halal, therefore, is a code adaptable to any culture. Objects cease to
have a history and to be culturally meaningful; once chosen because
they meet a normative requirement they do not refer to a speciic culture. Such a view probably creates the great divide between Salaists
and European opponents of American cultural hegemony. For Salafists the hamburger is seen as culturally neutral as long as it is made
along the lines of a religious norm.7 For instance, in 2003 a successful Muslim business executive in France launched a soft drink called
Mecca-Cola, whose foremost quality is that it looks and tastes almost
exactly like Coca-Cola, except that the marketing appeals explicitly to
Islamic values and is aimed at providing support for the Palestinians.8
Likewise, in 2004, a new fashion brand has appeared on the European market: dawa-wear, which put an Islamic logo, the stylization of
a man praying, on clothes adapted to the urban youth culture.
A Religious Revival?
Salaists therefore are not interested in creating or asserting a Muslim
culture. They reject the concept, even if they sometimes end up using
the term to ind a common language with Western societies, where
the language of multiculturalism is the main idiom to deal with otherness. There is no Salaist novelist, poet, musician, ilmmaker, or
comedian. By stressing the gap between culture and religion and by
striving to establish a pure religion separated from secular and lay elements, Salaists contribute to the paradoxical secularization of modern society, because they isolate religion from the other dimensions of
social life that they would like to—but cannot—ignore or destroy. At
the same time, contemporary forms of religiosity among second-generation Muslims outside the Middle East are closer to those of their
nineteenth- and twentieth-century American Christian counterparts
than to medieval Islam. In short, they are examples of revivalism.
Religious revivalism, after all, is centered not in traditions and familial values but on individuals who experience a crisis of identity and
the discontinuity of familial and communal ties. It accords with individualism; the reconstruction of an imagined community, which is
1
The Roots of Terrorism
the faith community or the ummah; a crisis of authority and knowledge, or deiance toward legitimate holders of religious knowledge;
self-teaching; and insistence on code, values, and emotional faith
more than on philosophy or abstract theology. In our time, religious
revivalism is almost always socially conservative, from the American
Bible Belt to the Lubavitch movement to Pope John Paul II’s assault
on liberation theology, a leftist and revolutionary interpretation of
the Gospels. Conservative religious leaders rail against what is perceived as corruption and a loss of values. In that sense transnational
European Islam is becoming a logical part of the European debate
on values. Many imams preach about regaining happiness, recovering from destitution, afirming a categorical difference between right
and wrong, making a good life, and so on—no different, in essence,
from what Christian and Jewish clergy of orthodox orientation say
to their congregations. But the people involved in global terrorism
are Muslims.
It is not argued here that other religions do also produce political
violence (see Mark Juergensmeyer’s contribution in this book). It is
clear that there is no real symmetry among Western religions, including Islam, in the translation of religious radicalism into political violence. But the speciicity of Islam does not come from the Koran or
from traditional Muslim political culture. It comes from contemporary Muslims, and factors pertaining to Islam are clearly linked with
the social conditions of Muslims in Western Europe. For instance,
almost no terrorists can be found among American second-generation Muslims.9 This lack of radicalism is obviously linked with the
difference between the two Western Muslim populations in terms of
status, representation, and expectations. The Muslims in the United
States are just part of a wider immigration movement of people who
intend to settle in the America, whereas second-generation Muslims
in Europe are the offspring of a misunderstanding: Their parents
never really intend to become Europeans. In the United States Muslims are mainly middle and even upper class—the median income is
higher than that of the U.S. population—whereas in Europe the rate
of unemployment among second-generation Muslims is higher than
the average. By the same token people with a Muslim background
are overrepresented among prison inmates.10 The U.S. radicals are
mainly converts, such as Jose Padilla, the U.S. convert who was
indicted in 2005 for giving support to Al Qaeda, and these converts
it precisely into the same categories of their European counterparts:
racial minorities or outcasts.
Terrorism and Deculturation
1
A Clash of Civilizations?
The consequence is that we can speak neither of a clash nor of dialogue of cultures, because the very notion of culture is in crisis.
Nevertheless, the current debate on Islam—already heavily loaded
with security consideration—is still waged under the paradigm of
clash–dialogue of civilizations, cultures, or religions, with all three
terms largely equated. Roughly, the debate on how to ight terrorism
offers two conlicting views: (1) Islam is the issue, and we are heading toward a clash of civilizations unless an in-depth reformation of
Islam occurs; or (2) Islam is not the issue, and we must turn the clash
into a dialogue among civilizations to address the roots of the Muslim wrath. Both positions are based on common premises: Religion
is embedded in a culture, and a culture is rooted in religion, which
means that the social and political behavior of believers is determined
by the theological tenets of their religion. Calling for a religious reformation ignores the way believers adapt and experience their faith
through practices and not through theological debates. Calling for
community leaders to police their lock ignores the process of deculturation. Addressing the Middle East issues, which is a positive step
in itself, ignores the deterritorialization of contemporary Islam. There
is no such a thing as a Muslim community but instead a population
of Muslims who have a different experience of what it means to be a
Muslim—even if they share the same creed.
In Europe it is a common view to contrast two approaches, especially the British multiculturalism, where Muslims are deined by a
distinct ethnocultural identity, and the French assimilation, where
Muslims may become full citizens only by shedding away their pristine
identity. Yet paradoxically, both approaches share the same assumptions: Religion is embedded into a culture, so that Muslims belong to
a different culture. Interestingly, though, the level of radicalism has
little to do with government policy: There has been as much of a terrorist threat in Great Britain, France, Spain, Belgium, and Holland,
though in each of these cases the policy toward Islam is very different.
The explanation is that radicals do not answer to a speciic national
policy but to a global perception of the state of the ummah.
In any case, both multiculturalism and assimilation failed for the
same reason: Muslims in the West do not push for an ethnocultural
identity but want to be recognized as a mere faith community. In Great
Britain, born-again Muslims do not care about traditional culture
and, thus, do not answer to traditional community leaders. Secularist
France, on the other hand, was very surprised to see that the fading
away of traditional Muslim culture went hand in hand with a strong
religious assertiveness: the sudden veiling of some French school girls
1
The Roots of Terrorism
in the ‘90s (the “scarf affair”) is not the result of an imported culture
but is a consequence of the construction of a purely religious identity
among educated and integrated school girls. The dominant idea in
French public opinion was that cultural assimilation will go along
with secularization. The concept of a noncultural religious revival
was seen as unthinkable, but it happened. By creating a French Council of Muslim Faith, the government reluctantly acknowledged the
existence of Islam as a mere religion.
*****
So what are the answers to the current crisis? The issue is not solving
the crisis in the Middle East but accompanying the process of deculturation and assertion of Islam as a mere religion. It means making
room for Islam in the West as a Western religion among others—not
as the expression of an ethnocultural community. This is the real
process of secularization, which has nothing to do with theological
reformation but could entail a theological debate as an almost forced
secularization did for the Catholic Church in continental Western
Europe: The emergence of the Christian democracy—that is, the
Church’s full acceptation of democracy—is a consequence and not
a prerequisite of the process of secularization. Political authorities
should not look for traditional moderate religious thinkers from the
Middle East to appease Western Muslims, nor should they spend subsidies to promote civil or liberal Islam. They should simply make
room for Islam without changing laws or principles. Genuine pluralism is the best way to avoid confrontation with a Muslim population
that is very diverse and that could feel coerced into a ghettoized community. As demonstrated by a host of Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish cases, conservative and even fundamentalist views of religion are
manageable in a plural environment. Indeed, a pluralistic approach
allows civil society to reach the youth who could be ideal targets for
radicals and Salaist groups. State policy should therefore be based
on integration of Muslims and community leaders on a pluralistic
basis. The priority should be to weaken the links with foreign elements by pushing for the nativization of Islam and for preventing the
deepening of the ghetto syndrome. Transparency and democracy are
the aims.
Endnotes
1. The exception is the Kelkal networks that operated in France in
1995. They were undoubtedly linked to and manipulated by the
Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) (with or without some interference from the Algerian Military Security). If we consider the
Terrorism and Deculturation
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
1
motivations of the arrested militants, however, they had little to do
with national solidarity with Algeria but more with a call for an
overall jihad against France and the West.
See Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary
Islam: Custodians of Change (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2002), 148.
See Imaam Abdul-Azeez bin Baaz, “Fataawaa al-Islaamiyyah,” the
Salai Society of North America, http://www.al-manhaj.com/Page1.
cfm?ArticleID=131.
In Iraqi Kurdistan, the group Ansar al-Islam desecrated the graves
of Sheikh Husam al-Din, Sheikh Baha al-Din, and Sheikh Siraj alDin, known guides of the Naqishbandi order, in July 2002. The
head of the group, Mullah Krekar, is a permanent resident of Norway—another good example of the relation between neofundamentalism and globalization.
Among others, the Pakistani custom of reciting the Koran at certain
time periods after a person’s death is dismissed as non-Muslim.
The council considered this to be a Shi’a celebration. Perhaps some
of the explanation can be found in the fact that the celebration is
too close to Halloween; the fact that it is more and more widely
observed is another sign of globalization. It is interesting to note
that the Islamic regime in Iran never banned traditional culture or
nowruz, even if it demoted them in favor of religious ceremonies.
After some debates, for example, Ferdowsi Street in Tehran was not
renamed. In general, all Islamists acknowledge the concept of culture even if they stress its religious dimension.
For Muslim organizations’ request to be included in a protocol of
agreement with McDonald’s see http://www.soundvision.com/
info/mcdonalds/. For radicals’ protest against the Islamic Food and
Nutrition Council of America for allegedly declaring McDonald’s
halal, see “IFANCA Puts Label of ‘Halal’ on McDonald’s Exports
to Muslim World,” New Trend Magazine, September 21, 2003.
It is interesting that one of the few attacks from Islamic militants
against McDonald’s did not originate with neofundamentalists
but—on the contrary—from political Islamists, who still retain the
concept of national heritage. Qazi Husseyn Ahmed, the leader of
the Pakistani Jama’at-i Islami, said in a speech, “We will boycott
them, the Pepsi and Coca Cola, and McDonald burger. This is forbidden—the Kentucky chicken and the McDonald burger is forbidden for the Muslims. There are people present here who can make
such foods which are better than this McDonald burger and Kentucky chicken. Why should we allow from abroad these things?”
http://www.mecca-cola.com/fr/index2.php.
Some of them have been indicted for their support of Hamas or Hezbollah. To me, however, there is a big difference between these two
forms of political violence. Hamas and Hezbollah are Islamonationalist movements, ighting for territory and statehood. Their supporters
10
The Roots of Terrorism
in the United States have a more diasporic attitude and do not act as
global jihadists (see Gabriel Sheffer’s contribution in this book).
10. See Farhad Khosrokhavar, L’Islam dans les Prisons (Paris: Balland,
2004).
Recommended Readings
Avalos, Hector. Fighting Words: The Origins of Religious Violence.
New York: Prometheus Books, 2005.
Bell, John B. A Time of Terror: How Democratic Societies Respond to
Revolutionary Violence. New York: Basic Books, 1978.
Bergen, Peter. Holy War Inc. New York: Free Press, 2002.
Bjørgo, Tore (ed.). Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities, and
Ways Forward. New York: Routledge, 2005.
Crenshaw, Martha. Terrorism in Context. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995.
Crenshaw, Martha. “The Causes of Terrorism.” Comparative Politics
13, no. 4 (1981): 379–99. Engene, Jan Oskar. Terrorism in Western
Europe. Explaining the Trends since 1950. Cheltenham, UK: Edward
Elgar, 2004.
Esposito, John L. The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? New York:
Oxford University Press, 1999.
Esposito, John L. Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2003.
Fuller, Graham E. The Future of Political Islam. New York: Palgrave
MacMillan, 2003.
Gambetta, Diego (ed.). Making Sense of Suicide Missions. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2005.
Heymann, Phil. Terrorism Freedom and Security: Winning without
War. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003.
Horgan, John. The Psychology of Terrorism. New York: Routledge,
2005.
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The Roots of Terrorism
Juergensmeyer, Mark. Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise
of Religious Violence. 3d ed. Berkeley: University of California Press,
2003.
Kaldor, Mary and Diego Muro. “Religious and Nationalist Militant
Groups,” in Global Civil Society 2003: Yearbook, ed. Mary Kaldor,
Helmunt Anheier, and Marlies Glasius. London: LSE, 2004.
Krueger, Alan B. and Jitka Malekcová. “Education, Poverty, Political
Violence and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?” Journal of
Economic Perspectives 17, no. 4 (2004): 119–44.
Lodge, Juliet (ed.). The Threat of Terrorism. Brighton, UK: Weatsheaf, 1988.
Mamdani, Mahmood. Good Muslim, Bad Muslim. New York:
Columbia University Press, 2004.
McCormick, Gordon H. and Guillermo Owen. “Revolutionary Origins and Conditional Mobilization.” European Journal of Political
Economy 12 (1996): 377–402.
Pape, Robert A. Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. New York: Random House, 2005.
Post, Jerrold M. Leaders and Followers in a Dangerous World: The
Psychology of Political Behavior. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 2004.
Post, Jerrold M., Ehud Sprinzak, and Laurita Denny. “The Terrorists
in Their Own Words: Interview with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists.” Terrorism and Political Violence 15, no. 1 (2003):
171–84.
Ross, Jeffrey Ian and Ted R. Gurr. “Why Terrorism Subsides: A
Comparative Study of Canada and the United States.” Comparative
Politics 21, no. 4 (1989): 405–26.
Roy, Olivier. Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah. New
York: Columbia University Press, 2004.
Sageman, Marc. Understanding Terror Networks. University Park:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.
Schmid, Alex and Albert Jongman. Political Terrorism: A New Guide
to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature.
New York: Transactions Publishers, 2005.
Shcholte, Jan Art. Globalization: A Critical Introduction, 2d ed.
New York: Palgrave Palgrave MacMillan, 2005.
Sheffer, Gabriel. Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad. Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Recommended Readings
1
Sheffer, Gabriel. “Ethno-national Diasporas and Security.” Survival
36, no. 1 (1994).
Veltmeyer, Henry (ed.) Globalization and Antiglobalization: Dynamics of Change in the New World Order. Hants, UK and Burlington,
VT, USA: Ashgate, 2004.
Wardlaw, Grant. Political Terrorism. 2d ed. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 1989.
Weinberg, Leonard and Ami Pedahzur. Political Parties and Terrorist Groups. New York: Routledge, 2003.
Weinberg, Leonard and William Eubank. “Does Democracy Stimulate Terrorism?” Terrorism and Political Violence 6, no. 4 (1994):
417–35.
Wilkinson, Paul. Terrorism and the Liberal State. New York: New
York University Press, 1979.
About the International Summit on
Democracy, Terrorism, and Security
March 11, 2004
Ten bombs exploded on four trains during rush hour in Madrid. More
than 190 people died, almost 2,000 were injured. It was one of the
most devastating terrorist attacks in Europe in recent history. As in the
United States of America on September 11, 2001, it was an attack on
freedom and democracy by an international network of terrorists.
One year on, Madrid was the setting for a unique conference, the
International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism, and Security. Its purpose was to build a common agenda on how the community of democratic nations can most effectively confront terrorism, in memory of its
victims from across the world.
Objectives
The Madrid Summit aimed to promote a vision of a world founded on
democratic values and committed to effective cooperation in the ight
against terrorism. It brought together the world’s leading scholars, practitioners, and most inluential policymakers. It was the largest gathering
of security and terrorism experts that has ever taken place:
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Twenty-three serving Heads of State and Government.
Thirty-four former Heads of State and Government.
Oficial Delegations from more than sixty countries.
Heads of inter-governmental and international organizations
including the United Nations, the European Parliament, Council
and Commission, NATO, Interpol, the League of Arab States,
and many others.
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The Roots of Terrorism
• 200 experts on terrorism and security.
• 500 representatives from non-governmental organizations
and civil society.
Results
The principal legacy of the Madrid Summit is an innovative plan of
action, the Madrid Agenda, which was adopted by an Extraordinary General Assembly of the Club de Madrid on March 11, 2005.
It draws on the contributions made at the Summit, in particular the
speeches given by the leaders of oficial delegations, the discussions
that took place during more than twenty panel sessions, and—most
importantly—the papers delivered by members of the expert working
groups.
The Working Groups
In the months leading up to the Madrid Summit, more than200 of the
world’s leading scholars and expert practitioners explored the issues
of democracy, terrorism, and security in an unparalleled process of
scholarly debate. The discussions were conducted through a system
of password-protected web-logs. On the irst day of the summit, the
groups met in closed sessions to conclude their discussions.
Of the seventeen working groups, ive dealt with the causes and
underlying factors of terrorism. Some of the most noteworthy papers
produced by individual members of these groups are reproduced in
this book.
Psychology
• Jerrold Post, George Washington University, USA
(coordinator)
• Scott Atran, University of Michigan, USA, and Centre
National de la Recherche Scientiique, France
• Dipak Gupta, San Diego State University, USA
• Nasra Hasan, United Nations Information Service
• John Horgan, University College Cork, Ireland
• Ariel Merari, Tel Aviv University, Israel
• Marc Sageman, Foreign Policy Research Institute, USA
• Alex Schmid, United Nations Ofice for Drugs and Crime
• Chris Stout, University of Illinois, USA
• Jeff Victoroff, University of Southern California, USA
• Stevan Weine, University of Illinois, USA
About the International Summit
1
Political Factors
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Martha Crenshaw, Wesleyan University, USA (coordinator)
Rogelio Alonso, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Spain
Mohamed Fared Azzi, Oran University, Algeria
Ronald Crelinsten, University of Ottawa, Canada
José Luis Herrero, FRIDE Foundation, Spain
Barbara Lethem Ibrahim, Population Council, Egypt
Saad Eddin Ibrahim, American University Cairo, Egypt
Fernando Reinares, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Spain
Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, Instituto Juan March, Spain
Ekaterina Stepanova, Russian Academy of Sciences
Mario Sznajder, Hebrew University, Israel
Leonard Weinberg, University of Nevada, USA
Economic Factors
• Ted Gurr, University of Maryland, USA (coordinator)
• Alberto Abadie, Harvard University, USA
• Jose Antonio Alonso, Universidad Complutense de Madrid,
Spain
• Tore Bjorgo, Norwegian Police University College (deputy
coordinator)
• Yigal Carmon, Middle East Media Research Institute, USA
• Sue Eckert, Brown University, USA
• David Gold, New School University, New York, USA
• Atanas Gotchev, University of National and World Economy, Bulgaria
• Jeroen Gunning, University of Aberystwyth, Wales
• Jitka Maleckova, Charles University, Czech Republic
• Lyubov Mincheva, University of Soia, Bulgaria
• Alex Schmid, United Nations Ofice for the Prevention of
International Terrorism (advisory)
• Gabriel Sheffer, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel
• Joshua Sinai, independent researcher, USA
• Michael Stohl, University of California at Santa Barbara, USA
• Ekkart Zimmermann, Dresden University of Technology,
Germany
Religion
• Mark Juergensmeyer, University of California at Santa Barbara, USA (coordinator)
• Jalal Al-Mashta, Al-Nahdhah newspaper, Iraq
• Azyumardi Azra, State Islamic University, Indonesia
The Roots of Terrorism
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Dalil Boubaker, French Muslim Council
Antonio Elorza, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain
John Esposito, Georgetown University, USA
Dru Gladney, University of Hawaii/ East-West Center, USA
Samuel Peleg, Strategic Dialogue Centre Israel
Harish Puri, Guru Nanak Dev University, India
Ian Reader, Lancaster University, England
David Rosen, American Jewish Committee
Behzad Shahndeh, Tehran University, Iran
Susumu Shimazono, Tokyo University, Japan
Shibley Telhami, University of Maryland, USA
Bassam Tibbi, Göttingen University, Germany
Culture
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Jessica Stern, Harvard University, USA (coordinator)
Nabi Abdullaev, The Moscow Times, Russia
Hassan Abbas, Harvard Law School, USA
Haizam Amirah Fernandez, Real Instituto Elcano, Spain
Mark Beissinger, University of Wisconsin, USA
Ejaz Haider, The Friday Times, Pakistan
Gilles Kepel, Institut d’Etudes Politiques, France
Jean-Luc Marret, Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique, France
Andres Ortega, El Pais, Spain
Gardner Peckham, BKSH, USA
Olivier Roy, Centre National de la Recherche Scientiique,
France
Giandomenico Picco, GDP Associates, USA
The Madrid Agenda
To remember and honour the victims of the terrorist attacks of
March 11, 2004, the strength and courage of the citizens of Madrid,
and through them, all victims of terrorism and those who confront
its threat.
We, the members of the Club de Madrid, former Presidents and
Prime Ministers of democratic countries dedicated to the promotion
of democracy, have brought together political leaders, experts, and
citizens from across the world.
We listened to many voices. We acknowledged the widespread
fear and uncertainty generated by terrorism. Our principles and policy recommendations address these fundamental concerns.
About the International Summit
1
Ours is a call to action for leaders everywhere. An agenda for action
for governments, institutions, civil society, the media, and individuals.
A global democratic response to the global threat of terrorism.
The Madrid Principles
Terrorism is a crime against all humanity. It endangers the lives of
innocent people. It creates a climate of hate and fear. It fuels global
divisions along ethnic and religious lines. Terrorism constitutes one
of the most serious violations of peace, international law, and the
values of human dignity.
Terrorism is an attack on democracy and human rights. No cause
justiies the targeting of civilians and non-combatants through intimidation and deadly acts of violence.
We irmly reject any ideology that guides the actions of terrorists.
We decisively condemn their methods. Our vision is based on a common set of universal values and principles. Freedom and human dignity. Protection and empowerment of citizens. Building and strengthening of democracy at all levels. Promotion of peace and justice.
A Comprehensive Response
We owe it to the victims to bring the terrorists to justice. Law enforcement agencies need the powers required, yet they must never sacriice
the principles they are meant to defend. Measures to counter terrorism should fully respect international standards of human rights and
the rule of law.
In the ight against terrorism, forceful measures are necessary.
Military action, when needed, must always be coordinated with law
enforcement and judicial measures, as well as political, diplomatic,
economic, and social responses.
We call upon every state to exercise its right and fulill its duty
to protect its citizens. Governments, individually and collectively,
should prevent and combat terrorist acts. International institutions,
governments, and civil society should also address the underlying
risk factors that provide terrorists with support and recruits.
International Cooperation
Terrorism is now a global threat. We saw it not only in Madrid, New
York, and Washington, but also in Dar-es-Salaam, Nairobi, Tel Aviv,
Bali, Riyadh, Casablanca, Baghdad, Bombay, and Beslan. It calls for a
global response. Governments and civil society must reignite their efforts
at promoting international engagement, cooperation, and dialogue.
International legitimacy is a moral and practical imperative. A
multilateral approach is indispensable. International institutions,
10
The Roots of Terrorism
especially the United Nations, must be strengthened. We must renew
our efforts to make these institutions more transparent, democratic,
and effective in combating the threat.
Narrow national mindsets are counterproductive. Legal institutions, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies must cooperate and
exchange pertinent information across national boundaries.
Citizens and Democracy
Only freedom and democracy can ultimately defeat terrorism. No
other system of government can claim more legitimacy, and through no
other system can political grievances be addressed more effectively.
Citizens promote and defend democracy. We must support the
growth of democratic movements in every nation, and reafirm our
commitment to solidarity, inclusiveness, and respect for cultural
diversity.
Citizens are actors, not spectators. They embody the principles
and values of democracy. A vibrant civil society plays a strategic role
in protecting local communities, countering extremist ideologies,
and dealing with political violence.
A Call to Action
An aggression on any nation is an aggression on all nations. An injury
to one human being is an injury to all humanity. Indifference cannot
be countenanced. We call on each and everyone. On all States, all
organizations—national and international. On all citizens.
Drawing on the deliberations of political leaders, experts, and citizens, we have identiied the following recommendations for action,
which we believe should be extended, reviewed, and implemented as
part of an ongoing, dynamic process.
The Madrid Recommendations
Political and philosophical differences about the nature of terrorism
must not be used as an excuse for inaction. We support the Global
Strategy for Fighting Terrorism announced by the Secretary General of the United Nations at the Madrid Summit on March 10. We
urgently call for:
• the adoption of the deinition proposed by the United
Nations High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change.
• the ratiication and implementation of all terrorism-related
conventions by those states which have not yet done so.
About the International Summit
11
• the speedy conclusion of the Comprehensive Convention on
International Terrorism.
And we believe it is a moral and practical necessity to address the
needs of terrorist victims. We therefore recommend:
• the exploration of the possibility of creating high commissioners for victims both at the international and the national
level, who will represent the victims’ right to know the
truth, as well as obtain justice, adequate redress, and integral reparation.
International Cooperation
The basis for effective cooperation across national borders is trust
and respect for the rule of law. Trust is built through shared norms,
reciprocity and the practical experience of effective collaboration. To
encourage this sense of mutual conidence, we propose:
• the establishment of regular, informal forums for law
enforcement and intelligence oficials, which may grow
from bilateral consultations into a formalized structure for
multilateral cooperation.
• the strengthening of regional organizations, so that measures
to combat terrorism are tailored to local needs and beneit
from local knowledge and networks.
• the effective coordination of these mechanisms at the global
level.
International collaboration in the ight against terrorism is also a
question of human and inancial capital. We call for:
• the establishment of an international mechanism—including states, non-governmental organizations, and the private
sector—to help link states that are in need of resources with
those that can provide assistance.
• the creation of a trust fund for the purpose of assisting governments that lack the inancial resources to implement their obligations, as proposed by the United Nations High-Level Panel.
Underlying Risk Factors
Terrorism thrives on intimidation, fear, and hatred. While authorities
have a responsibility to ensure freedom, including religious freedom,
leaders, including religious leaders, have a responsibility not to abuse
1
The Roots of Terrorism
that freedom by encouraging or justifying hatred, fanaticism, or religious war. We propose:
• the systematic promotion of cultural and religious dialogue
through local encounters, round tables, and international
exchange programs.
• the continuous review by authorities and the mass media of
their use of language, to ensure it does not unwittingly or
disproportionately reinforce the terrorist objective of intimidation, fear, and hatred.
• the creation of programs, national and international, to
monitor the expression of racism, ethnic confrontation, and
religious extremism and their impact in the media, as well as
to review school textbooks for their stance on cultural and
religious tolerance.
While poverty is not a direct cause of terrorism, economic and social
policy can help mitigate exclusion and the impact of rapid socioeconomic change, which give rise to grievances that are often exploited
by terrorists. We recommend:
• the adoption of long-term trade, aid, and investment policies that help empower marginalized groups and promote
participation.
• new efforts to reduce structural inequalities within societies
by eliminating group discrimination.
• the launch of programs aimed at promoting women’s education, employment, and empowerment.
• the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals
by 2015.
Terrorists prosper in societies where there are unresolved conlicts
and few accountable mechanisms for addressing political grievances.
We call for:
• new initiatives at mediation and peace-making for societies
which are marked by conlict and division, because democracy and peace go hand in hand.
• a redoubling of efforts to promote and strengthen democratic
institutions and transparency within countries and at the
global level. Initiatives such as the Community of Democracies may contribute to this goal.
About the International Summit
1
Confronting Terrorism
Democratic principles and values are essential tools in the ight
against terrorism. Any successful strategy for dealing with terrorism
requires terrorists to be isolated. Consequently, the preference must
be to treat terrorism as criminal acts to be handled through existing
systems of law enforcement and with full respect for human rights
and the rule of law. We recommend:
• taking effective measures to make impunity impossible
either for acts of terrorism or for the abuse of human rights
in counter-terrorism measures.
• the incorporation of human rights laws in all anti-terrorism
programs and policies of national governments as well as
international bodies.
• The implementation of the proposal to create a special rapporteur who would report to the United Nations Commission
on Human Rights on the compatibility of counter-terrorism
measures with human rights law, as endorsed by the United
Nations Secretary General in Madrid.
• the inclusion and integration of minority and diaspora communities in our societies.
• the building of democratic political institutions across the
world embodying these same principles.
In the ight against terrorism, any information about attacks on
another state must be treated like information relating to attacks on
one’s own state. In order to facilitate the sharing of intelligence across
borders, we propose:
• the overhaul of classiication rules that hinder the rapid
exchange of information.
• the clariication of conditions under which information will
be shared with other states on the basis of availability.
• the use of state-of-the-art technology to create regional and
global anti-terrorism databases.
The principle of international solidarity and cooperation must also
apply to defensive measures. We recommend:
• the creation of cross-border preparedness programs in
which governments and private business participate in
1
The Roots of Terrorism
building shared stockpiles of pharmaceuticals and vaccines,
as well as the seamless cooperation of emergency services.
Solidarity must be enhanced by new efforts at coordinating the existing instruments of anti-terrorist collaboration. We propose:
• the streamlining and harmonization of national and international tools in the ight against terrorism.
• the creation of clear guidelines on the role of the armed
forces in relation to other agencies of law enforcement at the
national level.
• the drawing up of national plans to coordinate responsibilities in the ight against terrorism, allowing for agencies or
organizations with special skills to contribute to a comprehensive effort.
The threat from terrorism has made efforts to limit the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction even more urgent. We call for:
• the United Nations Security Council to initiate on-site
investigations where it is believed that a state is supporting
terrorist networks, and if necessary to use the full range of
measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
• the conclusion of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and the strengthening
and implementation of the biological weapons convention.
• the continuation of innovative global efforts to reduce the
threat from weapons of mass destruction, such as the Global
Threat Reduction Initiative and the Global Partnerships.
Terrorists must be deprived of the inancial resources necessary to conduct
their campaigns. To curb terrorist funding networks, we recommend:
• increased and coordinated law enforcement and political
and civic education campaigns aimed at reducing the traficking of illegal narcotics, revenues from which are used to
inance terrorism.
• the creation of an international anti-terrorist inance center,
which furthers research, trains national enforcement oficials,
and serves as a source of coordination and mutual assistance.
• the development of tools to increase the transparency of
fundraising in the private and charitable sectors through the
exchange of best practices.
About the International Summit
1
• the expansion of ‘inancial intelligence units’, which facilitate
the effective corporation between government agencies and
inancial institutions.
Civil Society
The process of building democracy as an antidote to terrorism and
violence needs to be supported by the international community and
its citizens. We propose:
• The creation of a global citizens network, linking the leaders of civil society at the forefront of the ight for democracy
from across the world, taking full advantage of web-based
technologies and other innovative forms of communication.
• An ‘early warning system’ as part of this network, helping to
defuse local conlicts before they escalate, as well as providing a channel for moral and material support to civil society
groups facing repression.
Club de Madrid
Madrid, March 11, 2005
About the Club de Madrid
Mission
The Club de Madrid is an independent organization dedicated to
strengthening democracy around the world. It launches global initiatives, conducts projects, and acts as a consultative body for governments, democratic leaders, and institutions involved in processes of
democratic transition. The personal practical experience of its members—ifty-seven former heads of state and government—in processes of
democratic transition and consolidation is the Club de Madrid’s unique
resource. Along with the experience and cooperation of other high level
political practitioners and governance experts, this resource is a working tool to convert ideas into practical recommendations.
Programs and Activities
The Club de Madrid brings three major resources to its work:
• A unique mix of former heads of state and government.
• A committed focus on democratic transition and consolidation.
• Programs with a practical approach and measurable results.
The Club de Madrid undertakes projects related to its core mission
of promoting and defending democracy. One of the Club de Madrid’s
major assets is the ability of its members to offer strategic advice and
peer-to-peer counsel to current leaders striving to build or consolidate
democracy. The organization also plays an advocacy role in promoting
democratic principles in certain country, regional, or thematic cases,
such as with the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and
Security.
1
The Roots of Terrorism
To learn more about the Club de Madrid’s mission and activities, please go to its website—www.clubmadrid.org—or contact the
Club directly:
Club de Madrid
Felipe IV, 9 – 3º izqda.
28014 Madrid
Spain
Tel: +34 91 523 72 16
Fax: +34 91 532 00 88
Email: clubmadrid@clubmadrid.org
Members of the Club de Madrid
Adamkus, Valdas (on leave) President of Lithuania
Aho, Esko Former Prime Minister of Finland
Ahtisaari, Martti Former President of Finland
Alfonsín, Raúl Former President of Argentina
Al Mahdi, Sadig Former Prime Minister of Sudan
Arzú, Alvaro Former President of Guatemala
Aylwin, Patricio Former President of Chile
Aznar, José María Former Prime Minister of Spain
Betancur, Belisario Former President of Colombia
Bildt, Carl Former Prime Minister of Sweden
Birkavs, Valdis Former Prime Minister of Latvia
Bondevik, Kjell Magne Former Prime Minister of Norway
Brundtland, Gro Harlem Former Prime Minister of Norway
Calvo Sotelo, Leopoldo Former Prime Minister of Spain
Campbell, Kim Former Prime Minister of Canada; Secretary-General
of the Club de Madrid
Cardoso, Fernando Henrique Former President of Brazil; President of
the Club de Madrid
Cavaco Silva, Aníbal Former Prime Minister of Portugal
Chissano, Joaquim Former President of Mozambique
Clinton, William J. Former President of the United States of America,
Honorary Co-Chair of the Club de Madrid
Delors, Jacques Former President of the European Commission
Dimitrov, Philip Former Prime Minister of Bulgaria
El Eryani, Abdulkarim Former Prime Minister of Yemen
Fernández, Leonel (on leave) President of the Dominican Republic
Figueres, José María Former President of Costa Rica
Finnbogadottír, Vigdís Former President of Iceland
Frei Ruiz-Tagle, Eduardo Former President of Chile
Gaviria, César Former President of Colombia
González Márquez, Felipe Former Prime Minister of Spain
About the Club de Madrid
1
Gorbachev, Mikhail Former President of the Soviet Union
Gujral, Inder Kumar Former Prime Minister of India
Guterres, António Former Prime Minister of Portugal
Havel, Václav Former President of Czechoslovakia and of the Czech
Republic
Hurtado, Osvaldo Former President of Ecuador
Jospin, Lionel Former Prime Minister of France
Kohl, Helmut Former Chancellor of Germany
Kok, Wim Former Prime Minister of the Netherlands
Konare, Alpha Oumar Former President of Mali
Kučan, Milan Former President of Slovenia
Lacalle Herrera, Luis Alberto Former President of Uruguay
Lagos, Ricardo President of Chile (after completion of mandate)
Lagumdžija, Zlatko Former Prime Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Lee, Hong Koo Former Prime Minister of Korea
Major, John Sir Former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
Mascarenhas Monteiro, Antonio M. Former President of Cape Verde
Masire, Ketumile Former President of Botswana
Mazowiecki, Tadeusz Former Prime Minister of Poland
Meidani, Rexhep Former President of the Republic of Albania
Meri, Lennart Former President of Estonia
Mkapa, Benjamin President of Tanzania (after completion of
mandate)
Paniagua, Valentín Former President of Peru
Panyarachun, Anand Former Prime Minister of Thailand
Pastrana, Andrés Former President of Colombia
Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier Former Prime Minister of Peru
Prodi, Romano Former President of the EC, Former Prime Minister
of Italy
Quiroga, Jorge Former President of Bolivia
Ramos, Fidel Valdes Former President of the Republic of the
Philippines
Rasmussen, Poul Nyrup Former Prime Minister of Denmark
Robinson, Mary Former President of Ireland, Vice-President of the
Club de Madrid
Roman, Petre Former Prime Minister of Romania
Sampaio, Jorge Fernando Branco de President of Portugal (after completion of mandate)
Sánchez de Lozada, Gonzalo Former President of Bolivia
Sanguinetti, Julio María Former President of Uruguay
Shipley, Jennifer Mary Former Prime Minister of New Zealand
Soares, Mario Former President of Portugal
Suárez, Adolfo Former Prime Minister of Spain
10
The Roots of Terrorism
Suchocka, Hanna Former Prime Minister of Poland
Uteem, Cassam Former President of Mauritius
Zedillo, Ernesto Former President of Mexico
Honorary Members
Aguirre, Esperanza President of the Regional Government of Madrid
Carter, Jimmy Former President of the United States of America
Rodríguez Zapatero, José Luis Prime Minister of Spain
Ruiz Gallardón, Alberto Mayor of the City of Madrid
Index
1993 Twin Towers bombing, 31
2002 National Security Strategy, 67
9/11, 1, 7, 32, 45, 53, 85, 151, 154, 177
background of terrorists involved in
attacks, 160
counterterrorism measures
following, 65
A
Abortion clinic bombings, 133, 136
Abu Ayyash, Radwan, 49
Abu Ghraib, 67
Abu Nidal Organization, 19
Accommodative political strategies, 63
Action Directe, 4, 63, 75, 160
Activism, 147
Afghanistan, 26, 145, 150
Islamic government in, 145
suicide operations in, 30
targeting of Muslims by Taliban in,
164
terrorist groups in, 33
Africa, 87
African diaspora, 120
Aggression, Quranic interpretation of,
151
Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, 54, 85, 155
Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, 40
Al Hilali, Sheykh Abu Ayman, 162
Al Jazeera, 66
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, 150
Al-Banna, Hasan, 146
Al-Gama’s al-Islamiyya, 124
Al-Jihad, suicide bombings by, 152
Al-Nasser, Gamal Abd, 148
Al-Qaeda, 33, 39, 52, 55, 59, 67, 81,
86, 117, 120, 121, 140, 145,
147, 149, 154, 160
organizational structure of, 23
suicide bombers, 30
targets of, 161
Al-Qardawi, Sheikh Yusuf, 154
Al-Sadr, Moqtedar, 156
Al-Sheikh, Sheikh Abdulaziz bin
Abdallah, 153
Al-Zarqawi, Abu Musab, 59, 156
Al-Zawahiri, Ayman, 53, 59, 155
Albania, 95
Algeria, 121
Islamic Salvation Front, 146
Islamist insurgents in, 95
Algerian Armed Islamic Group, 121
Alienation, 2, 8, 24, 141, 146
Aliens, protection of in democratic
nations, 55
American Exceptionalism, 67
Amnesty, 27, 98
Amnesty International, 66
Anarchists, 52
Angola, 118
Angry Brigade, 74
Anti-Americanism, 142
Anti-Western ideology, 25
Antiglobalization measures, 111, 142
Antiglobalization movement, 118, 161
Antimodernism, 142
Antireligious denigration, 124
Antiterrorism, programs for, 25
Arafat, Yasser, 20, 150, 155
Argentina, 5, 47
Armed Islamic Group, 53, 121, 124,
150
Armed Nuclei for Popular Autonomy,
75
Ashcroft, John, 135
Assassins, 151
Assimilation, 167
Asylum seekers, 118
Atocha train bombings, 1, 24, 45, 52,
133, 177
1
The Roots of Terrorism
Atta, Mohammad, 55, 85, 161
Aum Shinrikyo, 138, 140
Authoritarian regimes, 80
Authorities, behavior of as an
instigating condition for
terrorism, 49
Azerbaijan, 66, 121
Azzam, Abdullah, 162
B
Baader-Meinhoff terrorists, 18, 73.
See also Red Army Faction
Backlash, 62, 64
Balkans, 95, 108
Bangladesh, suicide operations in, 33
Barbar Khalsa International, 121
Basque Fatherland, 18, 63, 72, 73,
117
Basra, Riaz, 37
BBC, 66
Beirut, suicide bombing attacks in,
152
Belgium, 74
Communist Combatant Cells, 74
Bell, J. Bowyer, 61
Beslan, 49
Bin Laden, Osama, 7, 19, 21, 39, 53,
66, 145, 148, 151, 162
“Letter to America,” 54
spread of global terrorism due to,
154
Biological weapons, 24
Black Hawk down incident, 55
Black September terrorists, 17
Black terrorism, 72
Bloody Sunday Massacre, 90
Bologna train station bombing, 77
Bombers, suicide, 3, 29
Born-again Muslims, 8, 160, 162,
167
Bosnia, 150
oppression and liberation of
Muslims in, 147
Brigates Internationales, 75
Buddhism, 138
Bulgaria, 107
Burnout, 62
Burundi, 118
Bush, George W., 135
C
Cairo, American support for nonIslamic regime in, 53
Capitalism, 105
Catholic militants, 140
Caucuses, 108
Caze, Christian, 160
Cells, components of, 36
Central Africa, 87
Central Asia, 66
Charismatic leaders, 22, 31, 91
Charities, checks and balances for, 98
Chechnya, 2, 49, 65, 90, 150
oppression and liberation of
Muslims in, 147
Chemical weapons, 24
Chicago Project of Suicide Terrorism,
137
China. See People’s Republic of
China
Christian abortion clinic bombers,
133
Christian militia, 136, 140
Christianity, 135
Civil liberties, relationship to
terrorism incidents to, 48
Civil rights, relationship to terrorism
incidents to, 48
Civil society, 186
Clergy-mosque networks, 147
CNN, 66
Cold War, 54
Collective identity, 3, 18, 22
Collective protest, 80
Columbia, 90, 108
M-19 organization in, 50 (See also
M-19 organization)
Revolutionary Armed Forces of,
87, 94
terrorism in, 47
terrorist groups in, 87 (See also
speciic groups)
Comisiones Obreras killings, 78
Communist Combatant Cells, 74
Comparative politics, 80
Congo, 87, 118
Index
Contingent factors, 76
Continuity of democracy, relationship
to terrorism incidents and,
47
Converts, 160
Corsica, 2
Cosmic war, 141
Cosmotheoism, 136
Counterterrorist policies, 9, 12, 57
backlash, 64
identifying purposes of, 58
international and domestic
response strategies, 96
international nature of, 59
psychological dynamics and, 27
Coup attempts, 77
Crime, 94. See also economic crime
organized, 124
Criminal terrorism, 107
Cross-border terrorism, 99. See also
transnational terrorism
Cuba, 121
Cultural identities, 140
Cultural resistance, 106
Cultural transnational dispersals, 119
D
Daghestan, 150
Dar es Salaam, terrorist attack on
American embassy in, 53,
56
Darul Islam, 161
Deculturation, 8, 162
Defense, Quranic interpretation of,
151
Deglobalization, 105
Democracy, 184
accountability of citizens in, 54
counterterrorism policies and, 60
international terrorism and, 51
noisy, 50
relationship with terrorism of, 5,
45
Democratization, 146
Deprivation, 7
Deterrence, 62
Developmental projects, 112
Diaspora, 6, 24, 26, 90, 117
1
ethnonational terrorism by, 123,
125
Palestinian, 30
stateless, 123, 126 (See also
speciic groups)
transstate ethnonational, 119
Dictatorships, 79
Discriminate terrorism, 24
Discrimination, 124. See also
inequalities
reduction of, 97
terrorism due to, 91
Dispersed persons, 119
Displaced persons, 118
Dispositional conditions, 61
Dissension, 27
Dodd, Christopher, 135
Domestic terrorism, 5
Drug traficking, 94
Dumont, Lionel, 160
E
Early intervention, 23, 26
East Turkistan Islamic Movement, 66
Economic conditions, 93
Economic crime, 96
Economic deprivation, 106
Economic development, 79
Economic factors, 6, 85, 126
Economic incentives, 98
Economic injustice, 19
Economic responses to terrorism, 10
Education, 10, 96, 112
religious, 8
women and, 89
Egypt, 121
Al-Gama’s al-Islamiyya, 124
Islamic Jihad in, 124
jihad groups in, 147
Muslim Brotherhood, 146
El Salvador, 65
Engene, Jan Oskar, 47, 72
Equal rights, 97
Erbakan, Ecmettin, 146
Eritrea, 118
ETA, 63, 86, 117, 123
1
The Roots of Terrorism
Ethnic groups, acceptance of
transitional democracies
by, 46
Ethnonational identity, 125
Ethnonationalist terrorism, 4, 7, 63,
87, 122
causes and motivations for, 123
diaspora and, 121
inancing, 95
Europe. See Western Europe
European Islam, 161, 166
European Union, 107
immigration in, 119
Euzakadi ta Askabasuna. See ETA
Exclusionary ideologies, 91
Extremist organizations, 7, 145, 157
F
Facilitating causes of terrorism, 46
Falwell, Jerry, 135
Family loyalty, 19
Fanaticism, 184
Fascist terrorism, 72, 78, 79. See also
speciic groups
Fatah, 54
Fatah-Tanzim, 121
Fatwas, suicide bombings and, 31
Fatwas, 156
Fear, 183
Financing, 37, 98, 108, 112, 186
First of October Antifascist
Resistance Group. See
GRAPO
Followers, role of in terrorist groups,
21
Foreign aid, 110
Foreign policy reform, 156
FP 25 Abril, 4
France, 46
Action Directe, 4 (See also Action
Directe)
revolutionary terrorism in, 75
support of Algerian regime by, 53
terrorist groups in, 75 (See also
speciic groups)
Franco, Francisco, 46, 78
Freedom ighters, view of diaspora
as, 117
French Council of Muslim Faith, 168
Fundamentalism, 139, 163
G
Gamaa Islamiyya, 156
Gaza Strip, 54, 88, 133, 152
Israeli occupation of, 48
Generational dynamics of terrorist
groups, 18
intervention required for change
of, 23
Georgia, 66
Germany, 48, 78
fascist regime in, 80
Red Army Faction, 4 (See also Red
Army Faction)
revolutionary terrorism in, 76
Ghannoushi, Tashid, 146
Ghetto syndrome, 168
Ghost groups, 32
Global Strategy for Fighting
Terrorism, 182
Global terrorism
legitimate vs. illegitimate violence,
156
Osama bin Laden and, 154
Globalization, 5, 10, 103, 140
international terrorism and, 51
power of the nation state and, 109
Government legitimacy, relationship
to terrorism incidents and,
48
GRAPO, 4, 76
Grayqaan, 164
Great Britain. See United Kingdom
Great Depression, 89
Greece, 74, 78, 121
authoritarian past of, 80
Revolutionary Organization
17 November, 4 (See
also Revolutionary
Organization 17
November)
revolutionary terrorism in, 76
Greed, 93
Group dynamics, 26
Group exit, 23, 27
Group of Partisan Action, 78
Index
Grupo d’Azione Partigiana, 78
Guantánamo, 67
Guerrillas, 72
H
Halal, 165
Hamas, 21, 23, 40, 54, 65, 81, 86,
92, 117, 121, 141, 150,
151, 155
suicide bombers, 30
Hanaism, 164
Harakat ul Mujahadin, 53
Hate-mongering leaders, 21
Hatred, 183
Hezbollah, 86, 117, 121, 124, 150,
153
suicide bombings by, 152
Hindu political violence, 140
Hinduism, 135
militant, 91
Hizballah. See Hezbollah
Hizbollah. See Hezbollah
House of Islam, terrorism due to
presence of non-Muslims
in, 53
Human bombs, 29, 33. See also
bombers; suicide jihadis
Human capital, 109
Human rights, 97
counterterrorism and, 61
terrorism and the lack of, 86
Human Rights Watch, 66
Humiliation, 40, 141
Hussein, Saddam, 45, 53, 127
Hyrgyzstan, 66
I
Iceland, 50
Ideology of terrorism, 2
countering, 97
religion and, 140
Immigration, terrorism and, 52
Income distribution, 47
Income stratiication, 109
India, 2, 11, 41, 121
Barbar Khalsa International, 121
suicide operations in, 33
terrorism in, 47, 53
1
Indiscriminate terrorism, 24
Individualization, 162
Indonesia, 121
jihad groups in, 147
Inequalities, 7, 87
increase in due to globalization,
105
women and, 89
Informal Value Transfer Systems, 108
Instigating causes of terrorism, 4
Insurgent terrorism, 126
combating, 60
International Brigades, 75
International Criminal Court, 67
International Summit on Democracy,
Terrorism, and Security.
See Madrid Summit
International terrorism, 5, 54
democracies and, 51
globalization and, 103
measures of, 52
new minorities and, 108
political selection and, 81
soft targets for, 111
Internet
psychological effects of, 25
terrorism and, 46
Intervention
generational, 23
measures, 26
Intifada, 30, 48, 54, 93
Intimidation, 183
Iran, 121
Islamic government in, 145
National Liberation Army, 124
use of mosque-mullah network in,
147
use of petrodollars by, 147
Iraq, 45, 121
Al-Qaeda organization in, 59 (See
also Al-Qaeda)
suicide operations in, 31, 133
Sunni Muslims in, 46 (See also
Sunni Muslims)
terrorist groups in, 33
U.S.-led invasion of, 90
use of clergy-mosque networks in,
147
1
The Roots of Terrorism
Iraqi Kurdistan, 121
Ireland. See Northern Ireland
Irish Republican Army, 50, 63, 73,
87, 121
funding of, 94
Islam, 7, 134
acceptance of, 8
European, 161
inancing of terrorism by, 37
ideological principles derived
from, 91
militants, 33
relationship of to terror, 145
suicide operations of, 30
Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews
and Crusaders, 154
Islamic Jihad, 23, 121, 124, 137, 149.
See also Palestinian Islamic
Jihad
Egyptian, 24
suicide bombers, 30
Islamic militants, 159. See also
extremist organizations
Islamic mysticism, 146
Islamic radicalism, 148
Islamic terrorism, 135
Israel, 45, 92, 121
displacement of West Bank
Palestinians by, 20
occupation of West Bank and
Gaza Strip, 48
suicide operations in, 133
Israeli Olympic village seizure, 17
Israeli-Palestinian conlict, 11, 48,
53, 127, 137, 151
use of suicide bombing in, 156
(See also suicide bombing)
Italy, 46, 48
amnesty programs for group exit
in, 27
bombings in, 77
Christian Democrats, 50
fascist regime in, 80
Prima Linea, 4 (See also Prima
Linea)
Red Brigades, 4 (See also Red
Brigades)
revolutionary terrorism in, 74
terrorist groups in, 78 (See also
speciic groups)
ITERATE III, 52
J
Jaish e Mohammad, 34
Jammu, 53. See also Kashmir
Japan, 52
Aum Shinrikyo movement in, 138,
140
fascist regime in, 80
nerve gas attacks in, 138
revolutionary terrorism in, 76
Jewish terrorist groups, 124, 133
Messianic movements, 140
Jews, 124, 126
Jihad, 7, 135, 145, 155
interpretation of, 149
link with militancy and
madrassas, 34
material gain and, 93
peripheral, 162
suicide bombers, 3, 33
Jihadist doctrines, 91
Jordan, 65, 119
Judaism, 135
K
Kach, 124
Kahane Chai, 124
Kahane, Rabbi Meir, 124, 134
Kashmir, 11, 41, 53, 94, 121, 150
Muslim separatist movement in,
140
oppression and liberation of
Muslims in, 147
suicide operations in, 31, 33
Kazakhstan, 66
Kenya, truck bombings in, 154
Kharajites, 150
Khomeini, Ayatollah, 149
Kosovo, 90, 95, 121, 150
Kurdish-Turkish conlict, 127
Kurdistan, 121
Workers’ Party, 22 (See also PKK)
Index
L
Lashkar e Jhangvi. See LeJ
Lashkar e-Tayba, 53
Latin America, 48
revolutionary terrorism in, 73
suppression by the state in, 10
Latino diaspora, 120
Law enforcement, role of in
counterterrorism, 60
Leaders, 36
role of in terrorist groups, 21
Lebanon, 32, 45, 119, 121, 153
Shi’a, 87 (See also Shias)
Left-wing ideology, terrorist political
violence due to, 73
Legal persecution, 124
Legitimacy of government, 80
relationship to terrorism incidents
and, 48
LeJ, 33, 36, 41
Liberalism, 163
Liberia, 119
Liberty ETA, 18, 63, 73, 81, 117. See
also ETA
Libya, 121
use of petrodollars by, 147
Lindsay, Germaine, 160
Living martyrs, 22
London transit system bombings, 24,
45, 52, 133
LTTE, 22, 63, 86, 117, 121, 124,
137, 156
Luxembourg, 50
M
M-19 organization, 50
Macedonia, 95
Madani, Abbasi, 146
Madrassa, 3, 34, 150
Madrid Agenda, 178, 180
Madrid Summit, 60, 177
policy recommendations, 182
Principles, 181
Mainstream Muslims, 7, 145, 151,
153, 157
policies targeting, 9
support for, 98
1
Majority principle, 47
Marginalization, 8, 87, 141
Marighella, Carlos, 73
Martyr commandos, 34
Martyrdom, 22, 34, 150, 156
training, 35
Masque of the Patriarch killings, 152
Mass casualty terrorism, 24, 120
Mawlud, 164
McVeigh, Timothy, 49, 136
Media, 66
provision of an audience for
terrorists by, 58
psychological effects of, 25
terrorism and, 46
Messianic Jewish movements, 140
Middle East, 2
Arab nationalism and socialism
of, 146
Migrants, 119
Migration, 107
Militancy, 34
Militant ideologies, 91
Muslim, 148
Minorities, 107
Mobilization, 76, 126, 145. See also
political mobilization
Modernization, 91
Moldova, 108
Moral justiication, 142
Mosque schools, 3, 34
Mosque-mullah network, 147
Moussem, 164
Mujahiddin, 150
Mujahidin holy war, 150
Multiculturalism, 167
Multipolarity of international system,
51
Muslim Brothers, 65, 146
Muslim countries. See also speciic
countries
deglobalization of, 105
Muslim diaspora, 120
Muslim fundamentalists, 122
Muslim nationalism, 146
Muslim politics, 147
Muslim separatists, 140
Muslims
1
The Roots of Terrorism
born-again, 8, 160, 162, 167
extremist (See extremist
organizations)
mainstream, 9, 98, 145, 151, 153,
157
N
Nairobi, terrorist attack on American
embassy in, 53, 55
Narcoterrorism, 94
Nation state, 80
globalization and the power of
the, 109
National Liberation Army, 124
Nationalism, 2, 73
extremes of, 91
relationship of suicide operations
to, 40
use of suicide bombers in
terrorism, 30
Nationalist terrorism, 2
Nationalist-separatist terrorist
groups, psychology of, 18
Nawruz festival, 164
Neofundamentalism, 163
Neoliberal capitalism, 105
Netherlands, 74
Red Resistance Front, 74
Red Youth, 74
New minorities, globalization and,
107
New Zealand, 50
Nizari Ismailis, 151
Noisy democracies, 50
Non-Muslims in the House of Islam,
53
Nonstate sector, 110
North Africa, Arab nationalism and
socialism of, 146
North Korea, 54, 121
Northern Alliance, 150
Northern Ireland, 2, 4, 49, 72, 78,
121, 140
amnesty programs for group exit
in, 27
Good Friday agreement, 50
terrorist groups in, 81 (See also
speciic groups)
Norway, 50
Noyaux Armés pour l’Autonomie
Populaire, 75
Nuclear weapons, 24
O
Ocalan, Abdallah, 49
Oklahoma City Bombing, 49
Omar, Sheykh Saïd, 162
Oppressive regime, 60
Organizational structure of terrorist
groups, 23
Organized crime, 124
Oslo Accords, 152
Others, 118. See also diaspora
P
Padilla, José, 160, 166
Pakistan, 11, 41, 121
Islamic government in, 145
suicide operations in, 30, 32
characteristics, 38
Palestine, 19, 41, 121
Abu Nidal Organization, 19
(See also Abu Nidal
Organization)
Intifada, 30, 48
Islamic Jihad, 150
PLO, 20 (See also Palestinian
Liberation Organization)
suicide operations in, 40
terrorist groups of, 63, 81, 123
(See also speciic groups)
Palestinian Authority, 92
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, 40, 54
Palestinian Liberation Organization,
20, 48, 54, 152
Palestinian National Authority, 150
Pearl, Daniel, 162
Pentagon attack, 151, 156. See also
9/11
People’s Republic of China, 52, 54
Percolation system, 35
Permissive causes of terrorism, 4, 46,
48
Persecution, 124
Petrodollars, 147
PFLP, 40, 54
Index
Philippines, 121, 150
Piazza Fontana bombing, 77
Pierce, William, 136
Pinnelli, Pino, 78
PIRA, 73, 78. See also Irish
Republican Army
PKK, 22, 88, 121
Plastic explosives, 33
Pluralism, 168
Police conduct, relationship to
terrorism of, 49
Policy recommendations, 9, 25, 50,
168, 182
counterterrorism, 60
democratic rights and incentives,
91
diasporic terrorism and, 127
Political accommodations, 91
Political activism, 147
Political causes of terrorism, 46, 48,
90
Political compromises, 127
Political confrontation, 143
Political discourse, 145
Political dissent, 66
Political entrepreneurs, 21, 95
Political fragmentation, 48
Political injustice, 147
Political instability, 4, 81
Political Islam, 7, 146
Political mobilization, 72, 76, 79
Political objectives of terrorism, 2
Political persecution, 124
Political resistance, 106
Political selection model, 4, 72, 75,
81
Political terrorism, 107
Muslim, 156
Political violence, 71, 166
poverty and, 86
Popular Democratic Front for the
Liberation of Palestine, 54
Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine. See PFLP
Portugal
authoritarian past of, 80
FP 25 Abril, 4 (See also FP 25
Abril)
1
Poverty, 7, 106, 184
terrorism and, 85
Preemption, 62
doctrine of, 67
Prima Linea, 4, 76
Protestant militants, 140
Psychological warfare, 26
Psychology of terrorism, 17
suicide terrorism, 22
Public diplomacy, 10, 26
Punjab, 34, 37, 49, 121, 140
Q
Qassim Brigade, 152
Quraiqa’an, 164
Qutb, Sayyid, 148, 151
R
Racism, 124, 136
Radicalization, 5, 90, 160, 161, 162
Rage, 40
Rand-St. Andrews Chronologies, 52
Rantisi, Abdul Aziz, 142
Rebellion, 93
Red Army Faction, 4, 10, 18, 63, 73,
76, 86, 160
Red Brigades, 4, 18, 50, 63, 75, 87,
160
Red Resistance Front, 74
Red Youth, 74
Refugees, 118
Reid, Richard, 160
Religion
role of in shaping identity and
behavioral patterns, 122
role of in terrorism, 133, 155, 167
sacred warfare and, 142
Religionists, 122
Religions
legitimization of violence by, 12
relationship to terrorism of, 8
suicide bombers and religious
rhetoric, 30
Religious activism, 140
Religious denigration, 124
Religious edicts, 31
Religious transnational dispersals,
119
00
The Roots of Terrorism
Religious war, 184
Repression, 4, 45, 49, 64, 78, 91, 152
Resonance, 30
Response strategies, 111
Retaliation, 143
Revivalism, 165
Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Columbia, 87, 124
inancial activities of, 94
Revolutionary Communist League,
161
Revolutionary movements, 4
social, 2
Revolutionary Organization 17
November, 4, 10, 76, 80,
124
Revolutionary terrorism, 72, 106
contingent factors, 76
lethality of, 75
structural factors of, 79
Rezaq, Omar, 19
Risky shift, 22
Riyadh, American support for nonIslamic regime in, 53
Robertson, Pat, 135
Romania, 107
Rove, Karl, 1
Ruby Ridge, 136
Rudolph, Eric Robert, 136
Russia, 121
Rwanda, 119
S
Sabri, Akram, 153
Sacred warfare, 141
Sadat, Anwar, 148
Salai jihad network, 24
Salaism
fundamentalism of, 163
isolation of religion by, 165
Sanctuary
denial, 26
treatment of seekers of by
democratic nations, 55
Saudi Arabia, 53, 121, 156
use of petrodollars by, 147
Scandinavia, low incidence of
terrorism in, 47, 72
Scarf affair, 168
Secular nationalism, 138
Secularization, 168
September 11, 2001. See 9/11
Shafeism, 164
Shahid, 150, 155
Sharon, Ariel, visit of to Temple
Mount/al-Aqsa Mosque,
90
Shias, 33, 87
Shiite Muslims, 120, 124, 147, 151
Sierra Leone, 118
Sikh terrorism, 49, 137, 140
Sistani, Ayatollah, 156
Situational conditions, 61
Six Day War, 20
Social activism, 147
Social conlict and religion, 143
Social dynamics of terrorist groups,
18
Social fragmentation, 48
Social frustration, 8, 141
Social injustice, 147
Social malaise, 140
Social mobilization, 142
Social polarization, increase in due to
globalization, 105
Social revolutionary movements, 2,
106
Societal resilience, promotion of, 25
Sociocultural context, 3
Socioeconomic change, 7, 10, 86, 89,
96
Socioeconomic marginalization, 87.
See also marginalization
Solidarity, 186
Somalia, 53, 55, 118
South Asia, 48
South Korea, 52
Southeast Asia, 65
Soviet Union, 54, 126
Soviet-Afghan War, 147, 150
Spain, 2, 45, 46, 72, 74
amnesty programs for group exit
in, 27
Atocha train bombings in, 1
authoritarian past of, 80
Comisiones Obreras killings, 78
Index
GRAPO, 4 (See also GRAPO)
revolutionary terrorism in, 76
terrorist groups in, 18 (See also
speciic groups)
Spiritual training, 35
Sri Lanka, 2, 121, 140
Tamil Tigers, 22 (See also LTTE)
State power, use of for
counterterrorism, 62
State repression, 79. See also
repression
Stateless diaspora, 123, 126
Strategic communications program,
10, 26
Structural elements, 46, 61, 76, 79
Sudan, 65, 118, 121
Islamic government in, 145
Suism, 146
Suicide bombing, 29, 151. See also
suicide jihadis
debate among Muslims
concerning, 153
religion and, 136
Suicide jihadis, 3, 29
objectives of, 32
reasons behind, 40
selection of, 37
sponsoring groups, 31
training of, 35
Suicide teams, 37
Suicide terrorism, 22
Sunni jihadi movements, 140, 151,
155
Sunni Muslims, 46, 120, 147
LeJ, 33
Symbionese Liberation Army, 74
Sympathizers, 31, 34
Syria, 121
Baathist regime of, 45
T
Taiwan, 52
Tajikistan, 66
Taliban, 33, 39, 92, 145, 150, 163
Tamil Tigers. See LTTE
Tantawi, Sheikh Muhammad Sayyid,
153
Tanzania, truck bombings in, 154
01
Taqiya, 161
Technology, facilitation of terrorism
by, 110
Temporal conditions, 46
Terrorism
addressing the causes of, 156
audience for, 58
confronting, 185
deinition of, 2
delegitimization of, 64
diasporic, 118, 120
economic responses to, 10
inancing, 7, 93
globalization and, 103
homeland vs. hostland, 122
ideologies of, 91
inequalities as a source of, 87
instigating conditions for, 49
international, 5, 51
cooperation of nations to
counter, 113
international and domestic
response strategies to, 96
link between crime and, 94
link between economic factors
and, 85
link of repression with emergency
of, 79 (See also repression)
mass casualty, 24
nature of the state and, 80
origins of, 71
Osama bin Laden and the global
spread of, 154
Pakistan, 32 (See also Pakistan)
policy approaches to, 146 (See also
policy recommendations)
political causes of domestic, 46
political choices of, 90
proximate causes of, 98
psychology of, 17
relationship of behavior of
authorities to, 49
relationship to democracy, 5, 45
research, 11, 25
response strategies for, 111
risk factors for, 8, 183
role of religion in, 133
social revolutionary, 106
0
The Roots of Terrorism
socioeconomic change and
increase in risks for, 89
state sponsors of, 121
suicide, 31, 151 (See also suicide
jihadis)
sympathizers of, 31, 34
underlying causes of, 3
understanding causes of, 1
women and, 89
Terrorist groups. See also speciic
groups
backgrounds of Islamic militants,
159
cells, 36
cooperation between, 34
exploitation of democratic rights
by, 55
formation of, 71
generational and social dynamics
of, 18
organizational structure of, 23
changes in due to globalization,
111
Terrorist mutation, 72, 76
Terrorist personality, 17
Terrorists, life-cycle of, 22
The Engineer, 49
Time bombs, 33
Torture of detainees, 66
Tourists, 118
Training camps, 34
Transitional democracies, 46, 80
Transnational counterterrorism
networks, 65
Transnational dispersals, 119
Transnational terrorism, 5
Transparency, 168
Transstate ethnonational diasporas,
119
True globalizers, 104
Tunisia, Renaissance Party, 146
Tupamaros, 73
Turkey, 2, 5, 45, 47, 49
Welfare Party, 146
Turkish Kurdistan, 121
Turkmenistan, 66
Twin Towers bombing, 31
U
Ul-Haq, General Zia, 145
Ummah, 8, 30, 40
virtual, 162
Underground banking networks, 108
United Freedom Front, 74
United Kingdom, 74. See also
Northern Ireland
amnesty programs for group exit
in, 27
Angry Brigade, 74 (See also Angry
Brigade)
London transit system bombings,
24
terrorism in, 47
United States, 74
abortion clinic bombers in, 133
American Exceptionalism, 67
Christian theocracy in, 136
immigration in, 119
international terrorism against,
51, 53 (See also speciic
terrorist attacks)
Middle East policies, 54
Osama bin Laden’s war against,
155
Symbionese Liberation Army, 74
terrorist groups in, 74 (See also
speciic groups)
United Freedom Front, 74
views of allies on War on Terror,
68
Weather Underground, 74
Universal Declaration, 64
Uruguay, 5, 47
Tupamaros, 73 (See also
Tupamaros)
USS Cole, terrorist attack on, 53, 155
Uzbekistan, 66
Islamic Movement of, 124
V
Vichy government, 80
Victims of terrorism, 24, 33
Vietnam War, 46, 76
Violence
activities of diaspora, 117
Index
early intervention measures to
prevent, 26
legitimate vs. illegitimate, 156
lethality of due to political
instability, 4
moral justiication for, 142
political, 71
religious commitment and, 134,
139
role of leadership in, 3
Vulnerability, programs to reduce, 25
W
Wahhabis, 163
War on Terror, 66, 143
allied views of, 68
Weak globalizers, 104
reintegration of, 111
Weapons of mass destruction, 24,
186
Weather Underground, 74
West Bank, 54, 88, 133, 152
Israeli occupation of, 48
Western Europe
Islamic violence in, 8
0
study of terrorism in, 47, 72
terrorism in, 47
terrorism in due to globalization,
51
Westernization, 106
White Christian supremacy, 136
Wilkinson, Paul, 61
Wilkinson-Bell debate, 61
Women
education of, 10, 112
empowerment of as a terrorism
reduction incentive, 89, 96
World Trade Center, 53, 133, 140,
151, 156. See also 9/11
Y
Yasin, Sheikh Ahmad, 153
Yusuf, Ramzi, 31
Z
Zaydism, 164
Zero tolerance policies, 9, 146, 157
Zikr, 164
Zyarat, 164