TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING
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IN OIC COUNTRIES
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Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
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TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING
RADICALISM & VIOLENT EXTREMISM
IN OIC COUNTRIES
ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION STATISTICAL ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL RESEARCH AND TRAINING CENTRE FOR ISLAMIC COUNTRIES
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Table of Contents
FOREWORD ........................................................................................................................ iii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY........................................................................................................... v
1.
Main Concepts Trends & Narratives ........................................................ 1
1.1 Main Concepts ....................................................................................................... 1
1.2 Historical and Contemporary Trends .................................................................... 4
1.3 Narratives .............................................................................................................. 5
Chapter One Bibliography ........................................................................................... 8
2.
Root Causes of Radicalism & ..................................................................... 9
Violent Extremism ..................................................................................................... 9
2.1 Youth Bulge .......................................................................................................... 10
2.2 Socio Economic Root Causes ................................................................................ 12
2.3 Government Ineffectiveness and Corruption....................................................... 16
Chapter Two Bibliography .......................................................................................... 18
3.
Economic Impacts of Radicalism & Violent Extremism .................... 19
3.1 Economic Growth ................................................................................................. 21
3.2 Trade, Finance & Investment ............................................................................... 27
3.3 Tourism & Transportation .................................................................................... 31
3.4 Consumption & Savings ........................................................................................ 32
Chapter Three Bibliography........................................................................................ 35
4.
Social Impacts of Radicalism & Violent Extremism ........................... 37
4.1 Socio-Psychological Impacts of Terrorism ............................................................ 37
4.2 Political Impacts of Terrorism............................................................................... 41
i
4.3 Cultural Impacts of Terrorism............................................................................... 45
Chapter Four Bibliography ......................................................................................... 49
5.
De-radicalisatio n Models & ....................................................................... 53
Approaches ................................................................................................................. 53
5.1. De-radicalisation and Disengagement: Differences ............................................ 53
5.2. Approaches and Models of De-radicalisation ..................................................... 55
5.3. Examples of De-radicalisation Programs in some OIC Member Countries ......... 58
Chapter Five Bibliography .......................................................................................... 68
6.
ii
Challenges & the Way Forward ................................................................ 71
FOREWORD
The rise of radical and violent extremist groups and the atrocities they have committed
in many parts of the globe in general and OIC countries in particular coupled with the
negative and sometimes devastating human, social and economic consequences of
their acts has pushed the subject of radicalism and violent extremism to the very top of
the agenda of the OIC countries and the international society alike.
The OIC has been among the first to recognize the phenomena and formulate a policy
against it. The Organization has issued in 1999 a convention and a code of conduct on
combating international terrorism and has not relented in its effort since then. More
recently, in the 13th session of the Islamic Summit conference held in Istanbul in April
of 2016, the Kings and Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the
OIC voiced their alarm by the threat terrorism poses to peace and stability in many OIC
Member States, and reaffirmed their strong condemnation of the atrocious and
deliberate terrorist attacks that have occurred against the member countries and in
various parts of the world. Moreover, the recently adopted OIC-2025 Programme of
A tio ide tifies Cou te -terrorism, Extremism, Violent Extremism, Radicalization,
“e ta ia is , & Isla opho ia as one of the priority areas.
As the main socio-economic research arm of the OIC, SESRIC has also been quick to
espo d. Follo i g the eeti g of the OIC i stitutio s o Co ati g Te o is ,
Viole t E t e is a d ‘adi alizatio , hi h as held at the OIC General Secretariat in
August 2015, SESRIC has sprung to action and formed a cross functional team at the
Centre to work on the project of combating terrorism and violent extremism. One of
the outputs of this tea has ee this epo t To a ds U de sta ding Radicalism &
Viole t E t e is i OIC Cou t ies hi h o sits i ou ha ds.
SESRIC prepared this report based on the premises that; it has become crystal clear
that hard security measure alone will not suffice to confront radicalism and violent
ext e is . The t uth is that e a ot ou te a d defeat hat e do t u de sta d.
This fact highlights the need for a thorough understanding of the issues revolving
around radicalism and violent extremism. Such understanding is crucial if the efforts to
defeat radicalism and violent extremism are to succeed.
We pray Allah the Almighty that this humble contribution by SESRIC will add value to
developing a better understanding of the critical issues related to Radicalism and
Violent Extremism in OIC countries.
Amb. Musa Kulaklikaya
Director General
SESRIC
iii
Acknowledgement
This report has been prepared by a research team at SESRIC led by Fadi
Farasin with the participation of Adam Atauallah Bensaid, Cihat
Battaloglu, Kenan Bagci and Neslihan Cevik. The work was conducted
under the general supervision of Nabil Dabour, Director of Research
Department at SESRIC, who provided directions, comments and
feedback.
iv
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Main Concepts, Trends & Narratives
Radicalism and violent Extremism are extremely complex sets of phenomena, covering
a great diversity of issues with different causes and consequences. Radicalism indicates
a way of thinking or behaving that is based on the belief that important political or
social changes are necessary. Radicalism has a long history, but its systematic analysis
has a short past. Historically, many radical movements evolved into violent extremism
but this is not a general rule as many radicals never cross the line towards violent
extremism. The concept radicalism, therefore, interchanges often with violent
extremism, terrorism, and political violence and the borderline between these
concepts is often blurred in discussions.
At the beginning of the 20th century, anarchist movements turned to terrorist tactics by
revolutionaries, and defined their actions as a means for the polarization of the
populous. Self- determination (or nationalism) had also been another prominent
doctrine, when anti-colonial mass movements and violent radical groups were
challenging colonial power. In the second half of the 20th century, radical movements
had started to be seen in a more organized form where the majority of them
transformed into international terrorist organizations.
In recent times, the emergence of Al-Qaeda as a global terrorist organisation carrying
out devastating strikes across the world shed a spotlight on radicalism and terrorism.
The current wave of terrorist groups creates different definitions and narratives related
with radicalism, terrorism and violent extremism. Socio-economic, political and
personal grievances are effectively used by the current radical groups to influence
public opinion, disseminate messages, gain new recruits, and elicit sympathy. More
critically, the abusive interpretation of specific religious terms is at the heart of radical
narratives. Terrorist groups and radical movements utilise Islamic terms to legitimate
their actions. Current global terrorism misinterprets the Islamic terms of Jihad and Daral Harb to justify the killing of other people. The concept of Takfir is articulated as the
main discourse to legitimize the violence against Muslims and governments in Islamic
countries in particular. Therefore it is very crucial that a clear distinction be made
between Islam and terrorism when talking about or defining the current radical wave
and the new wave of global terrorism. It should also be emphasized that in the case of
current global terrorism: it is not Islam that has radicalised Muslims, but rather radicals
that have radicalised Islam.
v
Root Causes of Radicalism & Violent Extremism
Understanding the root causes of radicalism is essential if the efforts to confront
radicalism and violent extremism are to succeed. Radicalism is not a simple reality, it is
multidimensional and its causes are varied and intertwined; however, this not prevent
the pinpointing of some of its root causes in OIC countries, namely; socio-economic
root causes, demographic stress and the youth bulge, government ineffectiveness and
corruption.
The overwhelming majority of people engaged in radicalism and violent extremism
happen to be young adults. This is of high relevance to the OIC countries since their
demographic structure is younger than the rest of the world. The share of OIC
countries in total world youth population is in steady increase in contrast to non-OIC
de elopi g ou t ies a d the de eloped o ld. I
, . % of the o ld s outh
lived in OIC countries, but this percentage increased to 26.7% in 2015 and is projected
to reach 30.9% by 2030. Theoretically speaking, the youth bulge should carry a lot of
potential to OIC countries in term of economic development; yet, it also carries a lot of
threat. The youth bulge when associated with widespread unemployment carries the
risk of serving as a radicalising element for youth which is exactly the case in many OIC
countries. Unemployment of youth in OIC countries is more than 16% and also well
above the averages of non-OIC developing and developed countries. Youth who cannot
find decent jobs -and as a result cannot get married- end up excluded from the
economy and society alike. This causes tremendous frustration to youth and without
the availability of conduits to channel this frustration, a portion of those youth end up
being driven down the path of radicalism and violent extremism believing that it is the
only solution to implement change. Also, terrorist organizations use the fact of youth
unemployment as part of their narratives in order to attract followers and in some
cases utilise the promise of a job as part of their recruitment campaigns.
Poor socioeconomic conditions, such as poverty, lack of education and economic
inequality can be radicalising elements. However, the analysis shows that in the OIC
Arab group - a group of high significance for the study of radicalism and violent
extremism – the socioeconomic conditions are positive when compared with other
country groups. This does not mean that there is a disconnect between socioeconomic conditions and radicalism in the OIC Arab group since people in the region
frequently express their dissatisfaction with the socioeconomic situation. More
critically, radical extremist groups often make reference to the issues of poverty and
inequality in their narratives. The conclusion is that the issue at hand here is not
absolute deprivation but rather relative deprivation, referring to the gap between
perceptions of what people believe they deserve and what they actually receive.
People in the region have high expectations while the socio-economic realties fail to
vi
satisfy these expectations. In a nutshell, the driver of radicalism in the OIC Arab group
is not absolute deprivation, but relative deprivation.
Some of the root causes of radicalism and violent extremism in OIC countries can be
traced to the states themselves. One of the root causes related to states is government
ineffectiveness in providing services - such as health and education- to their
populations. The analysis reveals that many OIC countries perform rather weakly when
it comes to government effectiveness. This is especially true for OIC countries in the
Arab group and OIC countries in the African group. This leaves a gap that is then filled
by radical and violent extremist groups. By filling the gap left by states and by providing
services to the population, radical and violent extremist groups gain a footing in society
and gain some degree of legitimacy in the eyes of some of the population they serve.
This is turn provides radical and violent extremist groups with an audience to
propagate their radical views and ideology and a pool of potential recruits. Corruption
is another root cause related to states. People perception of state corruption is high in
many OIC countries. This leads to the erosion of state legitimacy in the eye of the
populatio a d i eases o di a
itize s oppo tu it a d illi g ess to e gage i
radical activities and violence. Also perceptions of state corruption provide radical and
violent extremist groups with a line of attack frequently used in their propaganda. This
shows that the perception of corruption in OIC counties is a serious issue that can no
longer be ignored.
Economic Impacts of Radicalism & Violent Extremism
Economic impacts of constantly increasing terrorist attacks are definitely detrimental as
they create an environment of deep uncertainty and imperfect information. This limits
investor and consumer confidence and results in reduced private sector investment
and household spending. Investors consider the increasing violence as worrisome sign
of overall deterioration in the business environment and weaker national
governments, and may respond with major change in their investment decisions.
Economic impacts amplify in countries that rely more on sectors that are particularly
vulnerable to terrorism, such as finance, transportation and tourism sectors.
Strong policy response to major terror attacks may mitigate the short-term impacts on
critical sectors, but longer-term impacts may prevail. The rise in security-related public
and private spending is likely to have a permanent negative effect on production and
productivity levels. Repeated terrorist attacks exacerbate these trends. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, the ability of a country to withstand terrorist attacks without
experiencing significant economic effects depends on the development levels of an
economy and its institutions. Given the enormous shortcomings in some OIC member
vii
countries in terms of economic and institutional capacities, terrorism may turn to a
constant source of instability and fragility.
The review of the economic impacts of terrorism in OIC countries shows that there are
increasingly more damages to infrastructure and public facilities in OIC countries due to
terror attacks. In some OIC countries, economic impact of violence and conflict exceeds
50% of national GDP. OIC countries that have higher values of terrorism index tend to
have lower rates of trade openness, measured as the ratio of total trade to GDP.
Tourism sectors in some OIC countries contracted due to terrorist attacks in tourist
destinations. It is also highlighted that the costs of borrowing increases with higher
number of terrorist attacks and reduces trade and investment in affected countries.
Social Impacts of Radicalism & Violent Extremism
Since the turn of the Millennium, terrorism has brought severe costs to societies and
individuals virtually in every corner of the globe. However, discussions on effects of
terrorism on societies have so far been confined mai l to easu i g te o s ost i
economic and structural terms, neglecting social losses caused by terrorism across
spheres of society, from health to cultural and political outcomes. Accordingly, there is
a need to shed some light on the social effects of terrorism in OIC countries, especially
in the socio-psychological, political and cultural domains. These categories by no
means exhaust the spectrum of social effects of terrorism; yet, they provide
policymakers a starting point and a benchmark to make further projections.
In regards to socio-psychological impacts of terrorism; direct and media-based contact
with terrorism as well as the broader context created by terrorism affects mental
health of youth and children, in addition to trauma at the collective level. This
demonstrates that terrorism is a determinant of public mental health. In the political
arena, terrorism leads to a vicious circle of violence -terrorism leads to harsher
responses and harsher responses in turn aggravate terrorist activity-. Also terrorism
triggers xenophobia, discrimination, and social polarization; in addition, terrorism has
adverse effects on the sensitive balance between civil rights and security. Such impacts
in OIC countries disturb the political environment; in transitioning democracies, it
hinders and delays consolidation of democracy, while in established democracies,
terrorism undermines democratic achievements and processes. Equally important is
the understudied subject of cultural looting and destruction of educational institutions
by acts of terror, and their impacts on society, particularly regarding school attendance
and educational attainment— hi h affe t a ou t s hu a de elop e t a d its
future economic and social progress.
viii
De-radicalisation Models & Approaches
Amidst the search for a sustainable strategy against radicalism and violent extremism,
de-radicalisation gains recognition for its potential and adaptability. The need for deradicalization models is a necessity, given their significant role within broader security
strategies. In this context, there is a need to identify catalysts, drivers and factors for
radicalisation in OIC member countries, and design programs to reverse these effects
in the radicalised and protect the masses from strains of extremist thought. This may
be carried out in a number of ways, with varying levels of public funding, ranging from
engaging civil society networks to provide resources and intervention capacity, to
integrating de-radicalisation programs in prison complexes. Highlighted are the specific
cases of Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, chosen to present workable de-radicalisation
models taking into consideration the diversity of OIC member states. In this respect,
different approaches are taken with regards to specific program outcomes. Regardless
of the adopted approach however, de-radicalisation should have a scientific, precise
approach to program subjects, launching interventions from a solid psychological,
ideological and theological basis. In this respect, de-radicalisation models present a
modular potential for expansion into other critical fields of countering violent
extremism, growing capacity for online de-radicalisation, counter-narrative
campaigning, and educational curriculum reform. Taken as an offsetting balance to
hard security strategies, the approach presents a vital and much needed means of
further understanding and contending with the challenges of radicalism and violent
extremism in OIC member countries.
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TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING RADICALISM & VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN OIC COUNTRIES | 2017
1. Main Concepts Trends & Narratives
Understanding radicalism and violent extremism requires as a first step a clear
comprehension of the concepts related to this phenomenon. It also requires an
understanding of how radicalism and violet extremism have evolved over time and
how the current trends of radicalism and violent extremism are different from previous
ones. Equally important is the identification of narratives used by radical and violent
extremist groups and how those narratives are being used.
This chapter is an attempt to examine all the above and by doing so serves as the
introduction for the report and paves the way for the subsequent chapters. This
chapter starts by defining the main concepts that are used through the report such as;
radicalism, extremism and terrorism. It then moves on to discuss the main trends of
radicalism and violent extremism at both the global and OIC levels. In discussing the
main trends, this chapter presents the trends of violent extremisms in comparative
a al sis. Pa ti ula l , old a d e fo s of adi alis a e dis ussed. This se tio
concludes by exploring the narratives utilised by radical and violent extremist
organizations underpinned by an abusive interpretation of Islam.
1.1 Main Concepts
Radicalism and Violent Extremism are very complex sets of phenomena, covering a
great diversity of issues with different causes and consequences. A number of key
concepts are used through the report such as; radicalism, radicalisation, extremism and
terrorism. These concepts need to be examined in order to conceptualize radicalism
and violent extremism, and to define the differences between these concepts.
Literally, radicalism refers to a way of thinking or behaving that is based on the belief
that i po ta t politi al o so ial ha ges a e e essa . The histo of adi alis
offe s so e guida e o ho the o ept of adi alis has ha ged u h of its
ea i g o e ti e. The te
adi al , hile al eady in use in the 18th century and
often linked to the Enlightenment and the French and American revolutions of that
period, became widespread in 19th century. During those years, it was a relative
concept, but often referred to a political agenda advocating thorough social and
political reform. Political parties calling themselves radical, mainly advocated
republicanism anchored in liberal, anti-clerical, pro-democratic, progressive political
© SE SR I C 2 0 1 7
1
Main Concepts Trends & Narratives
positions. Many of the radicals in the late 19th and early 20th century were mostly nonviolent activists (Schmid, 2013).
The ea i g of adi alis , ho e e , has ha ged du i g the late th century. The
contemporary use of radicalism moved from republican and liberal agenda (in 19th
century) to the opposite direction, embracing fundamentalist and regressive views.
This new form of radicalism has certain characteristics, which might be common with
iole t e t e is , su h as alie atio f o the state, a ge o e a ou t s fo eig
policy, and feelings of discrimination (Bartlett & Miller, 2012). Radicalism became a
concept often equated with radicalization and extremism; however, this is wrong!
Certain differences between these concepts exist as the following paragraphs make
clear.
Radicalization is defined as a multi-staged and multifaceted phenomenon, which varies
with place and time. When analysing the literature, the earlier notions of radicalization
e e used i the
s i studies o politi al iole e a d depi ted the i te a ti e
(social movements/state) and processual (gradual escalation) dynamics in the
fo atio of iole t, ofte la desti e g oups Della Po ta a d LaF ee,
, p. .
Until the 2000s there had been virtually no mentioning of radicalization in texts on
terrorism and political violence (Neumann, 2013).
Since, 2004/05, the concept of radicalization has become a part of the long-neglected
search for the root causes of terrorism (Schmid, 2013). At the same time, the urgency
to better understand what gave rise to the so- alled p o essual e te o is led to
the emergence of the concept of radicalization as a less value-laden, more liberal
alte ati e to the si ple a ou ts of te o is
Ku d a i,
, p. .
In mainstream political debates, the concept of radicalization is still understood as a
process of developing extremist ideologies and beliefs, which might eventually turn
into violent extremism; although, it should be emphasized that not all radicalisation
processes end up turning into violent extremism. For this reason it is beneficial to reconceptualize the term radicalization in two forms: violent radicalisation and
nonviolent radicalisation.
Violent radicalisatio is defi ed as the a ti e pu suit o a epta e of the use of
violen e to attai the stated goal , while non-violent radicalisation – efe s to the
process by which individuals come to hold radical views in relation to the status quo
ut do ot u de take, o di e tl aid o a et te o ist a ti it . Ba tlett, Bi d ell a d
King, 2010, p.10)
Radicals might be violent or not, whereas extremists are violent. Extremists have some
distinguishing features such as the rejection of pluralism and diversity, use of force
2
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TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING RADICALISM & VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN OIC COUNTRIES | 2017
over persuasion, and close-mindedness compared to more rational radicals. The
o ept
iole t e t e is
is ofte i te ha ged ith te o is a d politi al
iole e. The lite atu e o e i g iole t e t e is e plo s the o ept i a a that
suggests it is self-evident and self-explanatory (Nasser-Eddine, etc., 2011).
As can be inferred from the above discussion, the borderline between these concepts
is often blurred. Particularly, when discussing terrorism, the complexity increases,
because analysis of terrorism encompasses history, politics, economics, social
anthropology and psychology as well as sociology, ideology and religion (Schmid,
2013).
The term terrorism describes the use, or threat of use, of violence against civilian
targets for political or ideological goals. There are many attempted detailed typologies
of terrorism, which may be international, transnational, or national. In the literature,
there are number of studies identifying different types of terrorism as a foundation for
comparative analysis. In this regard, one of the most useful and elaborate typologies
was developed by Schultz (1980) who identifies three general categories of terrorism
as follows:
1. Revolutionary Terrorism: the threat and/or development of extranormal forms
of political violence, in varying degrees, with the objective of successfully
effecting a complete revolutionary change (i.e., a change of fundamental
political-social processes) within the political system. Such means may be
employed by revolutionary elements indigenous to a particular political system
or by similar groups acting outside the geographic boundaries of the system.
2. Sub-Revolutionary Terrorism: the threat and/or employment of extranormal
forms of political violence, in varying degrees, with the objective of effecting
various changes in the particular political system. The goal is to bring about
certain changes in the body politic, not to abolish it in favour of a complete
system change. Perhaps the broadest of the three categories, groups included
here span the political spectrum from left to right.
3. Establishment Terrorism: the threat and/or employment of extranormal forms
of political violence in varying degrees, by an established political system,
against both external and internal opposition. Specifically such means may be
employed by an established political system against other nation-states and
groups external to the particular political system, as well as internally to
repress various forms of domestic opposition/unrest and/or to move the
populace to comply with programs/goals of the state.
In addition to the different typologies of terrorism, terrorism defines itself to each
group differently. Socio-political realities, religious affiliation, and cultural identification
© SE SR I C 2 0 1 7
3
Main Concepts Trends & Narratives
create different forms of non-state violent groups. In this regard, Change Institute
(2008) categorizes terrorism as follows:
1. Pathologi al/ i i al te o is : te o ists g oups ope ati g ithout sig ifi a t
identifiable public support
2. Liberation movements: non-state groups conducting violent action in the face
of a perceived injustice and a desire to promote political aims on behalf of an
identified populous
3. Guerrilla/ civil Warfare: non-state groups conducting violent action against
military targets but will also include civilian targets often with more or less
defi ed f o t li es
4. State sponsored terrorism: non-state individuals or groups given variable
degrees of support by states or individual components of a state in order to
advance a particular view of strategic state interests (Change Institute, 2008)
1.2 Historical and Contemporary Trends
Radicalism has a long history, but its systematic analysis has a short past. At the
beginning of the 20th century, anarchist movements turned to violent terrorist tactics.
They saw their actions as a means for polarizing the populous. The activists of the time
defined themselves as terrorists as a direct challenge to the authority of the state and
its systems of management and criminalization of violence. In the ideological realm,
Marxism was the primary ideological challenger to the primacy of western style
capitalism and liberal democracy. It was adopted by a range of terrorist groups (i.e. The
New People's Army (NPA) in the Philippines) to varying degrees by using the powerful
narrative: eradicate the hegemonic economic system and cultural superstructures
(Rapoport, 2006).
Self- determination (or nationalism) was another prominent doctrine throughout the
20th century, when anti-colonial mass movements and violent radical groups were
challenging colonial power. Particularly, after World War I and World War II, the use of
violent action in support of self-determination become more widespread through the
targeting of military and colonial institutions. The principle of self-determination was
based on the belief in identifiable collective identities -usually ethnic and/or cultural- as
the basis for political organization. Violence was characterized in this case as politi s
othe ea s a d a e essit fo ed upo a g oup the a tio s of a e e .
In the second half of the 20th century, radical movements started to be seen in more
organized form; the majority of them transformed into international terrorist
organisations. The nationalistic claims in radical (or terrorist) movements were
4
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TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING RADICALISM & VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN OIC COUNTRIES | 2017
combined with the belief that the existing national and global systems are not just. The
links and joint action between previously national groups, who increasingly shared
comparable ideologies, became more common (i.e. ETA-Spain). Particularly after
1970s, violence at national level crossed the border and terrorism started to become a
global phenomenon.
With the end of the cold war, a unipolar world order emerged and the Marxist or
nationalistic motivations in radical and terrorist movements shifted clearly to a wave
which was based on the religious and ideological motivations. The new discourse was
based on misinterpreted religious and ideological terms and instrumentalised to
support specific contexts and aims of global terrorism. In this new wave of terrorism,
religious and ideological narratives become highly important, particularly as attractors
for radical ideas and recruits. Al-Qaeda simplified this new wave of terrorism. The
emergence of Al-Qaeda as a global terrorist organization carrying out devastating
strikes across the world shed a spotlight on radicalism and violent extremism. The
attention has intensified later with the rise of DAESH, its atrocities and the regional
surge in terrorist groups pledging allegiance to it. This in turn has pushed the issue of
radicalism and violent extremism to the top of the international agenda.
When comparing the new wave of radicalism and violent extremism with the previous
waves, there are certain points that are new. First of all, the new wave of radicalism
and violent extremism has increasingly used the sharing and connectivity features of
online platforms to organize their activities. Transnational networks and activates have
become the distinctive characteristic of the new wave. In the new wave, radical and
iole t e t e ist o e e t s a tivities have also changed significantly. The Guerrilla/
civil Warfare (mostly used by Marxist movements) have partially turned to individual
actions and suicide bombings.
As explained earlier, the previous radical and violent extremist movements tended to
use the ideological and nationalistic motivations, but in the current wave religious
narratives became the most important element. This fact affects OIC countries the
most and as a result OIC countries became the main theatre of this wave. When talking
about or defining current radical and violent extremist waves it is highly important to
make a clear distinction between Islam and the misinterpreted versions of Islam that
are utilised by radical and violent extremist group.
1.3 Narratives
The role of radical narratives – how radical and violent extremists see the situation –
has emerged as an important dimension in explaining radicalisation and violent
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Main Concepts Trends & Narratives
extremism. Thus, to understand the current radical and violent extremist movements
there is a need to map the key narratives which are particularly articulated or misused
by Al-Qaida and DAESH. The rest of this chapter is devoted to this aim.
The analysis of narratives used by the current radical and violent extremist groups
shows that socio-economic, political and personal grievances are effectively used to
sway public opinion, disseminate messages, gain new recruits, and elicit sympathy.
These narratives are mostly combined with distinctive terms rooted in issues of
political instability, socio-economic stagnation, civic strife, and, in some cases, war.
Values of solidarity and loyalty are also common in the narratives of current radical and
violent extremist groups. Similarly, a narrative of duty and responsibility is clearly
visible and is being used to reinforce and maintain a deep seated sense of
espo si ilit to a d the ause. DAE“H use of i ages f o Call of Duty ideo ga e is
just one example.
In the current wave, martyrdom has been presented as the ultimate act of redemptive
self-sacrifice. Particularly, in the tactics of Al Qaida and DAESH the concept of
martyrdom often carries particularly powerful emotional narratives of self-sacrifice and
regeneration, purity and determination, afterlife and redemption. DAESH slogan which
appears in its publication “You only die once, why not make it martyrdom e e plifies
this tactic
In addition, the abusive interpretations of specific religious terms can be underlined as
a othe sou e of u e t adi als a d iole t e t e ist s discourses. Radicals and
violent extremist groups misuse Islamic terms to legitimate their action. They do so by
weaving together historical symbols, deeply-held beliefs, core grievances, and strategic
objectives—to advance their agenda in the wider Islamic world.
Again, a clear distinction between Islam and terrorism must be drawn when talking
about and/or defining current radical and violent extremism waves. This is especially
true since the analysis of narratives utilised by current radicals and violet extremist
organisations demonstrate that Islamic terms have intrumentalised as the fundamental
tenets of the discourses. In this regard, current global violent extremist organisations
misinterpret Islamic terms such as; Takfir, Jihad and Dar-al Harb. By using the concept
of Takfir, they justify killing Muslims and the war against Muslim governments. As seen
in the example of DAESH, the group utilizes the concept of Takfir to determine who is a
real Muslim and who is not. The concept of Jihad and Dar-al Harb are also misused.
Fighti g the Fa E e
a d Fighti g the E e
at Ho e a e a ti ulated
DAE“H
as the main discourses to legitimize the violence against both Muslims and NonMuslims.
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In order to attract more attention of the Muslim constituency, radical movements also
use eye-catching narratives, promoting golden age thinking, re-establishment or
restoration of pre-eminence, glory and honour of Muslims. In the case of DAESH,
Glo if i g the Caliphate — depicts current territory held by Islamic State fighters. The
so- alled Isla i Caliphate is see as a e a ple of thei utopia
the e e s of
this organization. This narrative differentiates DAESH from other groups, such as alQaeda, which never aimed to establish a caliphate immediately (Lavoy et al., 2014).
Overall, understanding the main concepts, historical trend and the key narratives is
critical to effectively combat radicalism. Thus, this report started with the
conceptualization of the terms and framed the history of radicalism, extremism and
terrorism both in the world and the OIC in particular. As a final point, it should be
emphasized that in the case of the current wave of radicalism and violent extremism: it
is not Islam that has radicalized Muslims, but rather radicals that have radicalized
Islam.
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Main Concepts Trends & Narratives
Chapter One Bibliography
Commins, David; The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia, (I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2006)
‘i ha d “ hultz, Co eptualizi g Politi al Te o is : A T polog , i I te atio al Te o is :
Current Research and Directions, ed. Alan D. Buckley and Daniel D. Olson (Wayne, N.J.: Avery
Publishing Group, 1980), 9–15.
Rapoport, David C.; the Four Waves of the Modern Terrorist; In Terrorism, Critical Concepts in
political science, David C. Rapoport (ed) (Routledge, Oxford, 2006)
Farisin, F., Battaloglu, C., & Bensaid, A. (2017). What is Causing Radicalism in the MENA?
Retrieved February 07, 2017, from http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/867dd9e6-7ad3421c-9f73-ca1dfd9662ad
Peter Lavoy, Alexa Monti, and Elizabeth Wente. (2014.). Why is ISIL Winning the Narrative War?
Retrieved February 09, 2017, from http://www.monitor-360.com/resources/isil-narratives
Bartlett, J., & Miller, C. (2012). The edge of violence: Towards telling the difference between
violent and non-violent radicalization. Terrorism and Political Violence, 24(1), 1-21.
Della Porta, D., & LaFree, G. (2012). Guest editorial: Processes of radicalization and deradicalization. International Journal of Conflict and Violence (IJCV), 6(1), 4-10.
Neumann, P. R. (2013). The trouble with radicalization. International Affairs, 89(4), 873-893.
(Kundnani, 2012: 5).
Borum, R. (2011). Radicalization into violent extremism I: A review of social science
theories. Journal of Strategic Security, 4(4), 7. (Bartlett, Birdwell and King, 2010: 10)
Nasser-Eddine, M., Garnham, B., Agostino, K., & Caluya, G. (2011). Countering violent
extremism (CVE) literature review (No. DSTO-TR-2522). DEFENCE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
ORGANISATION EDINBURGH (AUSTRALIA).
Anderson, P. (2009). Transnational Radical Islamism. Journal of Conflict Studies, 29.
Rapoport, D. C. (2006). Modern Terror: History and Special Features. Politics of Terrorism: A
Survey.
Fe az, M.
Co eptualizi g te o is t e ds patte s i
pe spe ti e , Pe spe ti es o Te o is , Vol. , No. .
Pakista
– an empirical
The Change Institute. (2008). Studies into violent radicalisation; Lot 2 The beliefs ideologies and
narratives.
Retrieved
February
10,
2017,
from
ttps://ec.europa.eu/homeaffairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/doc_centre/terrorism/docs/ec_radicalisation_study_on_ideology
_and_narrative_en.pdf
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2. Root Causes of Radicalism &
Violent Extremism
Do social and economic realities contribute to radicalism or is radicalism an
independent phenomenon that needs to be analysed in isolation from the social and
economic realities? The correlation between socioeconomic deprivation and terrorism
is strongly rejected by some analysts. Their logic is simple: most terrorists are neither
poor nor uneducated. In fact, the majority seem to come from middle class, ordinary
a kg ou ds. Te o is is the efo e pe ei ed al ost e lusi el as a se u it th eat
with no discernible socioeconomic roots or links with deprivation. Not surprisingly, this
group defines the fight against terrorism with a single-minded focus on state actors,
jihadist ideology, counter-intelligence, and coercive action (Taspinar, 2009).
On the other side, there are analysts who believe that socio-economic conditions such
as poverty, lack of education and economic inequality are to blame for pushing people
down the path of radicalism and terrorism. The underlying logic to their theses is an
extension to what is found in mainstream literature on the economics of crime, that
point to poverty and the lack of education as driving forces behind illegal and violent
activity. In this vein, terrorism is akin to violent crime, on the basis of which the same
causal factors contributing to crime are extended to terrorism. What follows, is the
obvious conclusion; that social and economic development are the best cure for
radicalism and terrorism (Farasin, Battaloglu & Bensaid, 2017). This camp of analysts
also claims that the argument presented by those who reject the link between social
and economic realities and radicalism is erroneous for a number of reasons. First, the
a gu e t is ased o a e
a o a d e lusi e fo us o elite te o ist leade s. As
terrorism expert, Jud Ba salou poi ts out: Effe ti e te o ist g oups el o a di isio
of labour et ee ou g a d u edu ated foot soldie s a d logi all t ai ed a d ellfunded elite operatives. The second point with regard to the link between
socioeconomic deprivation and radicalism is the fact that terrorist organisations usually
seek failing or failed states—which are often poor—in which to set up shop (Taspinar,
2009).
Understanding the root causes of radicalism is essential if the efforts to confront
radicalism and violent extremism are to succeed. However, radicalism is not a simple
reality, it is multidimensional and its causes are varied and intertwined, thus a
reductionist approach fails to account for the complexity of the issue (Farasin et al.,
2017). Thus, this chapter will examine the root causes of radicalism in OIC countries
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Root Causes of Radicalism & Violent Extremism
with a focus on socio-economic root causes; demographic stress and the youth bulge;
government ineffectiveness and corruption. The hope is that by better understanding
the root causes of radicalism in the OIC, better models and policies for countering and
preventing it can be devised.
2.1 Youth Bulge
The relation between population growth rates - and specifically the age composition of
the population - to political instability is both important and complex (Ehrlich & Liu,
2002). The overwhelming majority of people engaged in radicalism and violent
extremism happen to be young adults. So, focusing on this age group can help shed
light on some of the driving forces behind radicalisation.
This is of high relevance to the OIC countries since their demographic structure is
younger than the rest of the world and future projection shows that this fact will
solidify over time. In 2015, the share of youth population (15-24 years old) to the total
population was 18.5% in OIC countries; the highest in the world, and it will continue to
be the highest in 2030 (Figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1: Share of Youth Population (15-24 years old)
22%
20%
18%
16%
19.8%
19.5%
18.5%
17.9%
16.4%
15.3%
14.8%
14%
12%
11.9%
11.0%
10%
1990
1995
OIC Countries
2000
2005
2010
2015
Other Developing Countries
2020
2025
2030
Developed Countries
Source: SESRIC Staff Calculations based on the UN World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision
Meanwhile, the share of OIC countries in total world youth population is in steady
increase in contrast to non-OIC developing countries and the developed world. In 1990,
. % of the o ld s outh lived in OIC countries, but this percentage increased to
26.7% in 2015 and is projected to reach 30.9% by 2030 (see Figure 2.2), which means
that
a little less tha o e thi d of the o ld s outh populatio ill e esidi g
in OIC countries.
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Figure 2.2: Geog aphi al Dist i utio of Wo ld s Youth aged
100%
90% 13.3%
80%
70%
60%
50% 66.7%
40%
30%
20%
10% 19.9%
0%
1990
1995
OIC Countries
-24)
10.2%
9.2%
63.1%
60.0%
30.9%
26.7%
2000
2005
2010
2015
Other Developing Countries
2020
2025
2030
Developed Countries
Source: SESRIC Staff Calculations based on the UN World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision.
The increase in the youth proportion in the total population is termed by social
scientists as the youth bulge. Although, theoretically speaking, the youth bulge should
carry a lot of potential to OIC countries in term of economic development it also carries
a lot of threats. The youth bulge when associated with widespread unemployment
carries the risk of serving as a radicalising element for youth.
According to the latest estimates of the ILO, some 73.4 million young people were
unemployed in 2015 in the world, with global youth unemployment rate reaching
13.1%, but reaching even alarming rates in one of the major regions of the OIC which is
the Middle East (28.2%). The analysis on youth labour force participation shows that a
larger proportion of youth remains inactive in OIC countries compared to other country
groups (SESRIC, 2016). Figure 2.3 shows that unemployment of youth in OIC countries
is above 16%; a rate which is well above the averages of non-OIC developing and
developed countries.
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Root Causes of Radicalism & Violent Extremism
Figure 2.3: Youth unemployment rates
OIC
Non-OIC Developing
Developed
20%
18%
16%
14%
12%
10%
8%
Source: SESRIC Staff Calculations based on ILO, Key Indicators of Labour Market (KILM), 9th Edition.
A survey of recent scholarly work suggests that a relationship exists between youth
unemployment on the one hand and violence and terrorism on the other (Flowers,
2014). Youth who cannot find decent jobs may not be able to get married and may end
up excluded from the economy and society alike. This causes tremendous frustration to
youth and without the availability of conduits to channel this frustration a portion of
those youth end up being driven down the path of radicalism and violent extremism
believing that it is the only solution to induce change. Also terrorist organisations use
the fact of youth unemployment as part of their narratives in order to attract followers
and in some cases utilise the promise of a job as part of their recruitment campaigns.
2.2 Socio Economic Root Causes
Poor socioeconomic conditions such as poverty, lack of education and economic
inequality can be radicalising elements. A survey of the literature (Johnson, 2001; Lai,
2007) shows that terrorism:
is a consequence of poverty and underdevelopment;
is more prevalent in countries that suffer from inequality than in countries that
are egalitarian;
usually finds a harbour in countries that are economically underdeveloped.
This begs the question of whether OIC countries suffer from socioeconomic deprivation
that can be tied to the rise of radicalism and violent extremism. To analyse the
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socioeconomic conditions of the OIC countries properly this report uses the following
indicators: poverty, inequality, and the level of human development.
Poverty is often defined by one-dimensional measures, such as income. This is
contentious as one-dimensional measures fail to capture the dynamic range of factors
that constitute poverty. For this reason, this report utilises the multidimensional
poverty index developed by the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Imitative
(OPHI) which complements traditional income-based poverty measures by capturing
the deprivations that each person faces at the same time with respect to education,
health and living standards.
Figure 2.4 shows that the level of multidimensional poverty in OIC countries stands at
36.0% which is higher than the 26.6% observed in non-OIC developing countries.
However, what is pushing up the level of multidimensional poverty in OIC countries is
the OIC –African group where 62% of the total population is multidimensional poor.
The level of multidimensional poverty in OIC countries in the OIC –Arab group, a group
that suffers tremendously from radicalism and violent extremism, is relatively low
where only 17.4% of the total population are relatively poor.
Figure 2.4: Multidimensional poverty
Source: SESRIC Staff Calculations based on OPHI, 2016
The GINI index is the most commonly used measure of economic equality (distribution
of income) where a value of zero reflects perfect equality and a value of 100 expresses
maximal inequality. Figure 2.5 shows that the level of inequality in the OIC countries
(36.9) is lower than that observed in non-OIC developing countries (41.8) and the world
average (38.6). In fact, the level of inequality in the OIC-Arab group is even lower
standing at 35.9 which indicates that income in the OIC in general and the OIC Arab
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Root Causes of Radicalism & Violent Extremism
group in particular, is more equally distributed in comparison to other developing
countries.
The third and final indictor used in this report to analyse the socioeconomic realties in
the OIC countries is the Human Development Index (HDI) of the UNDP. The HDI is a
summary measure of average achievements in key dimensions of human development;
a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and having a decent standard of living.
According to the Human Development Index, OIC countries perform poorly with 41% of
OIC countries recording low human development levels, 23% recording medium human
development levels and only 36% recording very high or high human development
levels. The performance of the OIC countries in human development compares poorly
to other country groups (Figure 2.6).
Figure 2.5: Equality (income distribution)
Source: SESRIC Staff Calculations based on World bank WDI database, latest available data since 2005
Here again, the OIC African group is pushing down the OIC performance with 94% of
the countries in the OIC African group suffering from low human development levels.
When focusing on the OIC Arab group, again a group suffering greatly from radicalism
and violent extremism, it can be observed that that the majority of countries in this
group (55%) actually enjoy very high or high levels of human development.
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Figure 2.6: Human development
Source: SESRIC Staff Calculations based on the Human Development Index, 2015
The above analysis shows that in the OIC Arab group - a group of high significance for
the study of radicalism and violent extremism – the socioeconomic conditions are
positive when compared with other country groups. Could there be a disconnect
between socio-economic conditions and radicalism in the OIC Arab group thus
rendering discussions about socio-economic roots moot? To accept such an argument
would fly against what we know about the region. In this region, people frequently
express their dissatisfaction with the socioeconomic situation. More critically, radical
extremist groups often make reference to the issues of poverty and inequality in their
narratives.
This presents an obvious contradiction, but how can this contradiction be solved.
Farasin et al, (2017) in their study of the roots causes of Radicalism in the Middle East
and North Africa (MENA) offer a solution to this apparent contradiction. They state:
While they may seem to be an initial contradiction between socio-economic realities
on the ground and what people feel and believe throughout the MENA region, analysis
shows that socio-economic realities in the MENA region are comparatively better off
than other developing countries, in spite of feelings throughout the region of socioeconomic deprivation. To resolve this apparent contradiction, it is possible to conclude
that the issue at hand here is not absolute deprivation but rather relative deprivation,
referring to the gap between perceptions of what people believe they deserve and what
they actually receive. In the MENA region, there are high expectations while the socioeconomic realties fail to satisfy these expectations . I a utshell, the d i e of
radicalism in the OIC Arab group is not absolute deprivation, but rather relative
deprivation.
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Root Causes of Radicalism & Violent Extremism
2.3 Government Ineffectiveness and Corruption
Some of the root causes of radicalism and violent extremism in OIC countries can be
traced to the states themselves. One of the root causes related to states is government
ineffectiveness in providing public services – such as health and education - to their
populations. This leaves a gap that is then filled by radical and violent extremist groups.
By filling the gap left by states and by providing services to the population, radical and
violent extremist groups gain a footing in society and gain some degree of legitimacy in
the eyes of some of the population they serve. This, in turn, provides radical and
violent extremist groups with an audience to propagate their radical views and
ideology and a pool of potential recruits.
Figure 2.7 shows government effectiveness which is part of the World Wide
Governance Indicator. Government effectiveness scores reflects perceptions of the
quality of public services; the quality of the civil service and the degree of its
independence from political pressures; the quality of policy formulation and
implementation; and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.
Estimates of government effectiveness range from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong
governance performance). As the Figure reveals, governments of OIC countries
perform rather weakly according to the Government Effectives Indicator. This is
especially true for OIC countries in the Arab group and OIC countries in the African
group.
Figure 2.7: Government effectiveness
Source: SESRIC staff calculations based on the World Wide Governance Indictor, 2016 Update
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A second root cause of radicalism and violent extremism that is related to states is
corruption. Perception of state corruption leads to the erosion of state legitimacy in
the e e of the populatio a d i eases o di a
itize s oppo tu it a d illi g ess
to engage in radical activities and violence. Also perceptions of state corruption
provide radical and violent extremist groups with a line of attack frequently used in
their propaganda.
Figure 2.8 shows control of corruption which is part of the World Wide Governance
Indicator. Control of corruption scores capture perceptions of the extent to which
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of
corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. Estimates of
control of corruption range from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong governance performance).
As the figure illustrates, perception of corruption is very high in OIC countries greatly
exceeding those in other country group. This shows that the perception of corruption
in OIC counties is a serious issue that can no longer be ignored.
Figure 2.8: Control of corruption
Source: SESRIC staff calculations based on the World Wide Governance Indictor, 2016 Update
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Root Causes of Radicalism & Violent Extremism
Chapter Two Bibliography
Ehrlich, P. R., & Liu, J. (2002). Some roots of terrorism. Population and environment, 24(2), 183192.
Farasin, F., Battaloglu, C., & Bensaid, A. (2017). What is Causing Radicalism in the MENA? Arab
Center for Research and Policy Studies. Retrieved February 07, 2017, from
http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/867dd9e6-7ad3-421c-9f73-ca1dfd9662ad
Flowers, S. C. (2014). The Relationship Between Youth Unemployment and Terrorism.
Johnson, A. (2001). Disparities in wealth seen as fuel for terrorism. International Herald Tribune,
December, 20.
Lai, B.
. D ai i g the s a p : a e pi i al e a i atio of the p odu tio of
international terrorism, 1968–1998. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 24(4), 297-310.
SESRIC (2016). Key challenges facing youth. SESRIC: Background report
Taşpı a , Ö.
. Fighti g ‘adi alis , Not" Te o is ": ‘oot Causes of a I te atio al A to
Redefined. SAIS Review of International Affairs, 29(2), 75-86.
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3. Economic Impacts of Radicalism &
Violent Extremism
Economic impacts of terrorist attacks are definitely detrimental, as they create an
environment of deep uncertainty and imperfect information. This limits investor and
consumer confidence and results in reduced private sector investment and household
spending. Investors consider the increasing violence as a worrisome sign of overall
deterioration in the business environment and weaker national governments, and may
respond with major change in their investment decisions. Some sectors are particularly
vulnerable to terrorism, such as finance (particularly insurance), transportation and
tourism sectors. Effective functioning of financial operations requires high levels of
trust and confidence. However, risks related to terrorism are difficult to price for
insurance companies, which leads them to raise premiums and reduce coverage. This
in turn reduces the risk-taking behaviour of private investors. Terrorism either directly
disrupts the transport systems or limits the ease of movement due to tightening of
security controls. This harms the efficient and timely transportation of goods and
people and cause disruptions in production processes. Intensified security measures
may also increase the costs of trading nationally and internationally. Safety concerns
also discourage people from travelling, with significant consequences on the tourism
and transportation sector. On the other hand, few other sectors benefit from such
threats, including defence, security and information sectors.
Strong policy response to major terror attacks may mitigate the short-term impacts on
critical sectors, but longer-term impacts may prevail. The rise in security-related public
and private spending is likely to have a permanent negative effect on production and
productivity levels. Repeated terrorist attacks exacerbate these trends. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, the ability of a country to withstand terrorist attacks without
experiencing significant economic effects depends on the development levels of an
economy and its institutions. Given the enormous shortcomings in some OIC member
countries in terms of economic and institutional capacities, terrorism may turn to a
constant source of instability and fragility. In this context, this subsection will review
the economic impacts of terrorism in OIC countries. More specifically, the analysis will
be under four categories: (i) economic growth, (ii) trade, finance and investment, (iii)
tourism and transportation; and (iv) consumption and savings.
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Economic Impacts of Radicalism & Violent Extremism
Economic impacts differ across countries depending on the intensity of terror attacks
they experienced. In order to analyse the economic impacts, OIC countries are
classified under four groups with respect to the intensity of terror attacks. The first
group is comprised of countries that experienced less than 10 incidents during 20112015, the second group is comprised of countries that experienced more than 10 but
less than 100 incidents, the third group is comprised of countries that experienced
more than 100 but less than 1000 incidents and the fourth group is comprised of
countries that experienced more than 1000 incidents. These countries are provided in
Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Classification of OIC Countries with Respect to the Number of Terror Incidents during
2011-2015
Low Intensity
(Less than 10)
Medium Intensity
(More than 10, less
than 100)
High Intensity
(More than 100,
less than 1000)
Benin
Suriname
Tunisia
Cameroon
Qatar
Oman
Saudi Arabia
Bahrain
Gambia
Gabon
Malaysia
Bangladesh
Tajikistan
Burkina Faso
Mozambique
Palestine
Azerbaijan
Mauritania
Niger
Mali
Comoros
Guinea-Bissau
Cote d'Ivoire
Turkey
Sierra Leone
Guinea
Kazakhstan
Lebanon
Djibouti
Jordan
Uganda
Sudan
Togo
Guyana
Chad
Indonesia
Brunei
Uzbekistan
Algeria
UAE
Kuwait
Iran
Kyrgyz Rep.
Albania
Senegal
Morocco
Turkmenistan
Maldives
Extreme Intensity
(More than 1000)
Syria
Afghanistan
Egypt
Somalia
Iraq
Libya
Pakistan
Yemen
Nigeria
Source: Global Terrorism Database
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3.1 Economic Growth
Depending on the level of exposure and vulnerability of the affected countries,
terrorism may put significant pressure on the economies and reduce the prospects for
higher growth rates. The magnitude at which countries are affected mainly relies on
the frequency, impact and target of terror incidences as well as the capacity of national
authorities to respond to these incidences. Researchers found that rich, large, and
diversified economies are better able to withstand the effects of terrorist attacks than
small, poor, and more specialized economies (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2015). If terrorism
disrupts productive activities in one sector in a diversified economy, resources can
easily flow to another unaffected sector. Moreover, more developed countries could
address the security concerns more effectively to reduce potential macroeconomic
consequences of such attacks. Stronger institutions in developed countries also take
timely measures to offset adverse economic impacts. In contrast, small developing
economies, which are specialized in a few sectors, are less likely to be resilient to
terrorist threats and resources will potentially flow from an affected sector to less
productive activities (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2015). Consequently, terrorist attacks on
less resilient economies, if they persist, are likely to impose larger and more lasting
macroeconomic costs.
Te o is
a i pai e o o i a ti it di e tl
dest o i g a e o o
s hu a
and physical capital stock through destruction and indirectly as a reaction of markets
and economic agents. Terrorism typically creates uncertainty, leading to the
postponement of long-term investments or an increase in government spending on
security at the expense of (more productive) spending on education and infrastructure,
which ultimately reduces growth (Bird, Blomberg & Hess, 2008). Globally, it is
estimated that the total economic impact of violence reached US$14.3 trillion based on
PPP in 2014, corresponding to 13.4% of world GDP and around 84% of the total GDP of
OIC countries. This implies that if global violence were to decrease by 10% uniformly,
an additional US$1.43 trillion would effectively be added to the world economy each
year (IEP, 2015).
Empirical studies on the economic impacts of terrorism are generally very modest and
of a short-term nature for most economies.1 Bloomberg et al. (2004) finds the impact
of terrorism on economic growth as negative on 177 countries over the period 19682000. Empirical studies also show that terrorism results in shifting of resources from
i est e t spe di g to go e
e t spe di g. Mood s
fou d that te o ist
Blomberg et al. (2004) found that the incidence of terrorism, on average, may have an economically
significant negative effect on growth, but at a considerably smaller and less persistent level compared with
wars or conflict.
1
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Economic Impacts of Radicalism & Violent Extremism
attacks have long-lasting and significantly negative effects on economic growth. In
2013, the 10 countries most affected by terrorism took an immediate and significant
hit to growth, dampening GDP between 0.5 and 0.8 percentage points. According to
the report, what is worse is that the negative impact continues for years after the
attack, taking up to five years for the effects to die out. Terrorist events in the top ten
most terrorism-inflicted countries further deteriorate growth between 0.4 percentage
points and 0.6 percentage points after one year.
At regional level, Gaibulloev and Sandler (2008, 2009, 2011) investigated the impact of
terrorism on economic growth in Western Europe, Asia and Africa, respectively. They
found significant growth limiting impact of terrorism in three continents, but the
impact is stronger in the developing countries as compared to developed one due to
more developed markets and institutions.2 In the case of Europe, the authors found
that each additional transnational terrorist incident per million persons reduces
economic growth by about 0.4 percentage points. In Asia, their estimates suggest that
terrorism did not significantly hamper growth in the developed economies, but they
show that each additional transnational terrorist incident reduced an affected
de elopi g e o o
s g o th ate
a out . %. Co pa ed to p oa ti e
counterterrorism measures, defensive measures lock economies into a flow of
counterterrorism spending and crowds out more productive investments.
In general, the literature identifies four main channels through which terrorism
potentially reduces economic growth. These are diversion of foreign direct investment
(FDI), destruction of infrastructure, reallocation of public investment funds to security,
or lower trade (Sandler and Enders, 2008). Tendency of foreign investors to invest in
less-violent and more stable countries may lead a reduction in foreign capital inflows
that developing countries need for financing critical investment projects. Defensive
counterterrorism measures, including the need for increasing the capacity of security
forces against terrorist threats, requires the reallocation of public resources to less
productive and growth enhancing sectors.3 Growth is also affected from the increase in
the costs of doing business due to, among others, increased uncertainty, rising risk
premiums, limited resources for productive investments, destructed physical assets,
restricted mobility of people and goods, and disrupted financial markets.
The issues related to trade, investment and finance will be discussed in more detailed
later in the chapter. When it comes to the destruction of infrastructure and public
2
For example, the bombings of USS Cole and the French tanker Limburg in 2002 significantly increased the
risk p e iu s fo sea t a spo tatio , hi h da aged the Ye e s shippi g i dust a d di e ted po t
activities to safer facilities in the neighbouring countries (Sandler and Enders, 2008).
3
Blomberg et al (2004) found that the incidence of terrorism is associated with a diversion of spending
from investment towards government expenditures.
22
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facilities, the extent of property damage in OIC countries is substantial. Although data
on exact costs of terrorist attacks are not available, at least 1% of all terrorist attacks
cause an economic cost between USD 1 million and USD 1 billion, while 75% of the
attacks cost less than USD 1 million (Figure 3.1).
Since 2001, the number of terror incidents towards transportation and other
infrastructure facilities has continuously increased and exceeded 550 attacks and the
share of OIC countries in total terrorist attacks towards infrastructure facilities reached
70% in 2014 (Figure 3.2). This implies that there are increasingly more damages to
infrastructure and public facilities in OIC countries due to terror attacks.
Figure 3.1: Terrorists Attacks by Economic
Impacts (1996-2015)
Btw 1 bln & 1 mln
Less than 1 mln
Figure 3.2: Terrorists Attacks towards Transport
and Other Infrastructure (1996-2015)
Unknown
OIC
Share in World
600
228,
1.0%
80%
70%
500
60%
5,542,
24.1%
400
50%
300
17,237,
74.9%
40%
30%
200
20%
100
10%
0%
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
0
Source: SESRIC staff calculation based on Global Terrorism Database.
Terrorist attacks also cause a reallocation of public funds from productive sectors to
less growth-enhancing sectors. As reported in SESRIC (2015), compared to non-OIC
developing and developed countries, OIC countries as a group allocate the largest
share of public resources to defence, where public spending in defence accounts for
17.3% of total public spending in OIC countries. If some of these resources could be
allocated to more productive sectors in the absence of terrorist threats, they would
better promote long-term development in OIC countries.
However, terrorist threats are now widespread across the region and sustained
terrorist campaigns are likely to aggravate the economic consequences. In 2015,
economic impact of violence and conflict, including terrorist attacks, reached 54.1% of
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Economic Impacts of Radicalism & Violent Extremism
total GDP in Syria, 53.5% in Iraq and 45.3% in Afghanistan (Figure 3.3, top). In Libya,
Mauritania, Somalia, Saudi Arabia and Oman, the costs exceeded 20% of their GDP. In
absolute terms, Saudi Arabia (USD 274 billion), Iraq (USD 206 billion) and Turkey (USD
129 billion) experienced the largest economic impact of violence (Figure 3.3, middle),
while in per capita terms, Saudi Arabia (USD 8,886), Qatar (USD 8,397) and Bahrain
(USD 7,061) experienced the largest costs (Figure 3.3, bottom).
When the average growth rates of OIC countries under four categories are
investigated, it is observed that the countries with extreme intensity of terror attacks
experienced an average annual growth rate of 3.3%, which is lower than the growth
rates observed in countries with low and high intensity of terror, but higher than those
with medium intensity (see Figure 3.4). Despite all the potential and economic
instabilities caused by frequent violence, extremely affected countries appear to
achieve good economic performance over the period 2011-2015. Perhaps more
strikingly, countries with medium level of terror intensity could grow at a slower rate
than those with extreme level of intensity. Differences in growth rates cannot be solely
attributed to the intensity of terrorism, but one would characteristically expect a falling
average growth rates with the increase in violence and associated increase in
uncertainty and instability. One explanation could be the level of vulnerabilities of
countries. When a relatively more stable country is hit by a terrorist attack, confidence
of investors and consumers in that country may fall more sharply compared to those
with more frequent violence. However, long term impact would probably be much
higher in countries with more frequent attacks.
While terrorism negatively affects economic growth, relative economic deprivation
may be one of the root causes of radicalism and violent extremism. If this argument is
true, then radicalism and violent extremism may be reduced by stimulating the
economy and providing enhanced opportunities for economic participation for
(potential) radicals and violent extremists and their supporters. In this regard
improving growth rates, per capita income, and reducing levels of economic
discrimination should be among economic priorities.
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Figure 3.3: Economic Impact of Violence and Conflict in OIC Countries (2015)
Economic Impact of Violence and Conflict as % of GDP
19.0%
20.1%
20.2%
10%
20.9%
24.9%
20%
20.3%
30%
45.3%
40%
53.5%
50%
54.1%
60%
0%
Economic Impact of Violence and Conflict (Billion US$ 2015 PPP)
Saudi Arabia
Iraq
Turkey
274
206
129
125
Pakistan
Iran
Nigeria
118
104
Egypt
Algeria
Indonesia
83
54
52
Sudan
33
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Economic Impact of Violence and Conflict per Person (US$ 2015 PPP)
Saudi Arabia
Qatar
Bahrain
Iraq
Oman
Kuwait
UAE
Libya
Turkey
Lebanon
8,886
8,397
7,061
5,930
5,717
4,921
3,280
2,839
1,700
1,644
0
2,500
5,000
7,500
10,000
Source: IEP (2016).
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Economic Impacts of Radicalism & Violent Extremism
By using a large country sample, Meierrieks and Gries (2012) found that African and
Islamic countries with low levels of institutional development, major economic and
political instability, and persistent terrorist activity, are more vulnerable to terrorism
than those in other parts of the world.
One explanation is that institutional Figure 3.4: GDP Growth in OIC Countries (20112015)
quality in African and Islamic countries
is particularly poor. In this fashion, it is
GDP Growth
argued that democratic countries
5%
4.4%
suffer less damage from terrorism,
4.3%
5%
potentially because of strongly
4%
3.3%
decentralized economic and political
4%
2.9%
3%
power, which reduces the probability
3%
of terrorism to produce distorting
2%
effects (Tavares, 2004). Therefore, it
2%
a
e a gued that a ou t s
1%
robustness to terrorism depends on a
1%
variety of country-specific factors such
0%
as its level of politico-institutional
Low
Medium
High
Extreme
development and political stability,
Source: SESRIC staff calculation based on World
and its culture.
Bank WDI database.
At the individual country level, there are some empirical studies investigating the
impacts of terrorism on economic performance of individual countries. Bilgel and
Karahasan (2013) investigate the economic costs of PKK terrorism, particularly in the
Eastern and South-eastern provinces of Turkey. They find that after the emergence of
terrorism, the per capita real GDP in Eastern and South-eastern Anatolia declined by
about 6.6% relative to the case without terrorism. Hyder et al. (2015) find that 1%
increase in terrorist incidents results in reducing the per capita GDP growth by 0.39% in
Pakistan, which excludes indirect effects on trade and investment due to fear of
te o is . Mood s
i estigates the impact of terrorism on the economic
activity and borrowing costs in two most affected country, Iraq and Pakistan. According
to the report, in the absence of any terrorist attacks in Iraq from 2008 to 2013, GDP
could have been 8.2% higher, and the cost of borrowing could be 150 basis points
lower by the end of that period. Similarly, in the case of Pakistan, GDP growth could
have been 5.1% higher, and the cost of borrowing, 100 basis points lower.
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3.2 Trade, Finance & Investment
As previously highlighted, terrorism may negatively affect trade, financial and
investment flows, mainly by increasing uncertainty and weakening investor confidence.
Trading with a nation affected by recurring terrorism incidents involves several risks.
One is the rise in trade costs due to higher risk premiums driven by security concerns
while transporting goods. If specific sectors are particularly hit by terror attacks, firms
operating in those sectors may find it difficult to conduct profitable businesses and
timely fulfil their financial obligations. Moreover, financial institutions may also exhibit
some shakiness in their operations due to potential economic and political instabilities,
particularly in less developed country settings. At a time when supply chain
mechanisms in the world trade require timely delivery and minimum uncertainty, such
eak esses pote tiall ause dela i t ade ope atio s a d egati el affe t a atio s
trade capacity. Additional costs for transactions and increasing uncertainty will imply a
negative association between terrorist activity and the volume of trade.
Rise in the costs of doing business, change in consumer and production patterns and
lack of predictability of business operations due to terrorism-induced insecurity may all
reduce the attractiveness of a country for international producers and traders. In
additio to these i di e t ha els, te o ists a di e tl ta get a ou t s t ade
disrupting supply chains or destructing particular modes of transportation that are
critical for conducting trade. Moreover, terrorism not only affects transaction costs for
a t adi g atio , ut also a deplete a atio s suppl of s a e p odu ti e fa to s.
Empirical studies investigating the impact of terrorism on trade find evidence that
te o is i deed te ds to dep ess a atio s t ade. Nits h a d “ hu a he
fi d
that countries that are plagued by a larger number of terrorist attacks trade
significantly less with each other than otherwise similar countries that do not suffer
from terrorism. Quantitatively, a doubling in the number of terrorist incidents is
associated with a decrease in bilateral trade by about 4%. Blomberg and Hess (2006)
also fi d e ide e that te o is i deed te ds to dep ess a atio s t ade. Mo e
recently, Egger and Gassebner (2015) find that there is little or no immediate or shortrun effect of transnational terrorism on international trade when monthly data are
used. However, it impacts bilateral and unilateral trade, if at all, in the medium term,
about one and a half years after incidents. More provokingly, Bandyopadhyay and
Sandler (2014) argue that some forms of terrorism may augment trade under certain
o ditio s. The fi d that a atio s adjust e t of its ou te te o is le el i
response to a greater terrorist threat may moderate the impact of terrorism on trade.
In the case of OIC countries, it is observed that there is a negative association between
trade openness and terrorism (Figure 3.5). Countries that have higher values of
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Economic Impacts of Radicalism & Violent Extremism
terrorism index, as provided by the Institute for Economics and Peace, tend to have
lower rates of trade openness, measured as the ratio of total trade to GDP.
Figure 3.5: Trade Openness and Terrorism in OIC Countries (2011-2015)
Source: World Bank WDI database and Terrorism Index of Economics & Peace.
The annual export growth rates in four groups of OIC countries and cumulative change
in the share of exports in GDP during the period 2011-2015 are provided in Figure 3.6.
There was a worldwide fall in trade flows (around 2.3% average annual fall) during the
period under consideration. However, compared to other groups, OIC countries with
extreme exposure to terrorist attacks experienced the largest fall in their exports. As in
Figure 3.6: Export Growth in OIC Countries (2011-2015)
Exports
Change in Share of Exports in GDP (PPS)
0%
0
-2%
-2
-2.5%
-4%
-1.3
-4
-6
-6%
-5.0%
-8
-8%
-6.5
-10
-10%
-9.9%
-10.1%
-12%
-12
-11.5
-13.0
-14
Low
Medium
High
Extreme
Low
Medium
High
Extreme
Source: SESRIC staff calculation based on World Bank WDI database and IMF DOT database.
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the case of the GDP growth rates, countries with medium level of intensity of terror
experienced a fall in export flows at levels similar to those with extreme level of
intensity. Accordingly, share of exports in countries with extreme intensity of terror has
fallen by 13 percentage points (PPS), while the decrease was as low as 1.3 PPS in
countries with high intensity during the period 2011-2015 (Figure 7, right).
With respect to capital and investment flows, the immediate impacts of terrorism are
largely predictable in that they lead to greater risk aversion of investors. In the longer
term, it is possible to see declining confidence of investors to national markets, lower
investment, a fall in capital flows and a rise in the costs of capital. Investors will shift
from high risk, high return long term investment to low risk, low return and short term
projects. Violence also causes reductions in investment in capital intensive sectors,
lowering productivity and reducing returns (IEP, 2016). This reduces the stock of
productive capital and the flow of productivity-enhancing technology to the affected
nation (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2015). All these will consequently lead to an economic
slowdown in the economy.
Empirical literature provides supporting evidence to the above arguments. Terrorism
may lead to the diversion of capital flows due to great uncertainties and lower
expected returns to investments (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2008). The resulting
withdrawal of international capital may hurt economic development, in particular
when foreign finance and investment are important engines of growth (Meierrieks and
Gries, 2012). There are several other studies that show that greater incidence of
terrorism tends to reduce foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing and developed
nations and induces large movements of capital across countries. Specifically, Abadie
and Gardeazabal (2008) found that a one standard deviation increase in the intensity of
terrorism produces a 5% fall in the net FDI position of the country, while Enders and
Sandler (1996) estimated a negative 13.5% effect of terrorism on FDI for Spain and a
negative 11.9% effect for Greece during the period 1968-1991. Analyzing 78 developing
economies over the period 1984–2008, Bandyopadhyay et al. (2015) find that a
elati el s all i ease i a ou t s do esti te o ist i ide ts sha ply reduced net
foreign direct investment. In general, while the impacts of a large-scale singular event
in a comparatively well diversified capital and stock market may be relatively short
lived and small, the impact of protracted terror events (and changes in terror risk due
to changes in the political landscape), even if smaller in scale, in relatively less
diversified markets may create lasting negative impacts (Schneider et al. 2011).
Mnasri & Nechi (2016) investigate the impact of terrorist attacks on stock market
volatility in eleven emerging countries from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
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Economic Impacts of Radicalism & Violent Extremism
region, which are all OIC member countries.4 Results show that the impact of terrorist
attacks on the volatility of financial markets lasts about 20 trading days, which is
considered to be long compared to the term effect of similar events in developed
markets. One explanation is that the frequency of terrorist attacks is already quite high
in the MENA region, which may heighten the fear of investors and affects long-run
investment decisions at greater levels. As argued by the authors, the risk of terrorism is
a threat not only to the stability of local economies but also cross-border economies in
the region. This may require taking collective actions towards increasing security and
minimizing terrorist threats in order to lessen the further social and economic tensions
in a region that is already subject to widespread unrest in many aspects.
A o di g to Mood s
, te o ist e e ts edu e i est e t g o th on the year of
the terrorism event, by between 1.3 percentage points and 2.1 percentage points, for
the top ten most affected countries. It also estimates that in the absence of any
terrorist attacks from 2008 to 2013, the level of investment in Pakistan could have
been 9.3% higher, and in Iraq, 15.1% higher. According to the report, terrorism has a
long-lasting negative impact on government borrowing costs. In the most terroristinflicted countries, the cost of borrowing jumps between 41 and 65 basis points within
one year and by 51-81 basis points after one year of the event.
When change in FDI inflows to four
groups of OIC countries during the
period 2011-2015 is considered, quite
interesting outcomes are observed.
While FDI inflows to extremely affected
countries increased at an average
annual rate of 8.6%, it decreased in
other country groups at rates reaching
up to 12% (Figure 3.7). Again, countries
that are affected with medium intensity
experienced the largest negative
impact. It should be noted that the total
FDI inflows to extremely affected
countries were already low in 2011,
which increased sharply during 20122013, but then started to decline during
2013-2015. However, the average
Figure 3.7: Change in FDI Inflows in OIC Countries
(2011-2015)
Change in FDI Inflows
8.6%
10%
5%
-3.9%
-12.1%
-0.9%
Low
Medium
High
0%
-5%
-10%
-15%
Extreme
Source: SESRIC staff calculation based on World
Bank WDI database.
4
These are Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey and
United Arab Emirates.
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annual growth rate turns out to be positive due to rapid increase earlier in the period
under consideration.
3.3 Tourism & Transportation
Certain sectors are particularly vulnerable to terrorist attacks and sometimes they are
deliberately targeted by terrorists to cause more specific damages. Tourism and
transportation sectors are generally the most heavily affected sectors in an economy
by terrorist attacks. Attacks against tourist venues or tourist mode of transportation
drive tourist to consider the risks involved with their vacation plans and can cause
tourists to alter their plans by either postponing the vacation or opting for a safer
destination. For example, 9/11 attacks in New York and Madrid Train Bombings in 2004
have caused major concerns over the air and rail transport security. Disruption of
transportation networks can significantly impact the mobility of people and goods in
the country and retard the production processes.
The tourism sector can be affected from terror acts through several channels. The loss
of tourism revenue is the first one. This is due to reduced number of tourist arrivals as
well as reduction in prices to attract more tourists and additional expenses related to
advertising aimed at restoring the image of the travel destination. The sectors can also
be affected from the destruction of infrastructure, which will require additional
resources to recover. Also, reduced capital and investment flows from outside and
increased borrowing costs may deter the reconstruction works in the affected areas.
Given the considerable impacts of
terrorism in the tourism sector, Figure 3.8: Tourism Arrivals in OIC Countries
governments will need to allocate a (2011-2015)
larger share of resources for new
Change in Tourist Arrival
security measures.
25%
Quite a number of OIC countries with
large tourism industries have suffered
from frequent terrorist attacks. In the
case of Turkey, which experienced
increased number of terror attacks
during the recent years due to mainly
the conflict in neighbouring countries
and some terrorist groups within the
country, Afonso-Rodríguez (2016)
obtains significant and consistent
evidence on the negative impact of
terrorist activity on economic growth
© SE SR I C 2 0 1 7
20.7%
20%
17.3%
17.6%
15%
10%
5%
-3.5%
0%
-5%
Low
Medium
High
Extreme
Source: SESRIC staff calculation based on World
Bank WDI database.
31
Economic Impacts of Radicalism & Violent Extremism
for Turkey through the deterioration of the long-run relationship between tourism and
economic growth. He estimates a negative impact on the contribution of tourism
demand on economic growth of around 10% of real GDP for periods where the number
of terrorist attacks exceeds a certain level. The negative impact seems to be
concentrated between three and six months after the event and thereafter it vanished,
reflecting the resilience of the tourism sector in Turkey. However, increasing violence
in Turkey requires effective policy measures to increase safety and eliminate the
negative perceptions about the country to attract more tourists.
Basu and Marg (2011) investigated the impact of political instability and terrorism in
the tourism industry of three middle-east countries, namely Egypt, Jordan and
Lebanon, and found that individual terror events led to a loss of 8% of foreign tourism
receipts in Egypt, 7% in Jordan and 7.2% in Lebanon. Overall, countries with extreme
intensity of terror attacks experienced a cumulative amount of 3.5% fall in tourist
arrivals, while other country groups on average experienced an increase in the number
of tourist arrivals (Figure 3.8).
3.4 Consumption & Savings
Households are one of the three major economic agents, along with private sector and
public sector, whose collective reaction to violent strikes determines the economic
consequences of these attacks. While private and public sectors have a general
capacity to postpone decisions towards any major shift in their economic activities,
economic behaviour of households is likely to be an immediate but short-term
response due to psychological fear of terrorism. Households typically revise their
consumption and saving behaviours due to increased uncertainties and change in their
risk perceptions, which may then influence the economy. This may include reduction of
spending in leisure, rise in food expenditure and increase in savings. Their spending on
education and health will be influenced by government policies. Household behaviours
can also be affected from terrorist attacks if their capabilities to productively
participate in economic life deteriorate through physical injuries or mental sickness. In
such cases, they may need to allocate some of their resources to recover and be
productive again.
It is difficult to estimate the economic costs experienced by households, particularly
when they are not directly affected. Reduced investments by private sector may
reduce new job creation and lead to higher unemployment rates. Reallocation of public
resources from more productive and welfare-improving sectors, such as education and
health, to security sectors also may deteriorate the human capital and reduce the
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quality of life. This may require households to increase their spending on these sectors
to mitigate the damage in their standards of livings.
Impacts of terrorism on households are mainly observed in the form of job losses,
destruction of properties and increased expenditures needed to cope with the
o se ue es of te o is . Lite atu e i estigati g the households e o o i
behaviour is not quite rich. Christelis and Georgarakos (2009) find that anxiety of
terrorism discourages households from investing in stocks. Insecurity due to terrorism
also makes them less likely to own a business. They also find evidence of expenditure
shifting away from recreational activities that can potentially leave one exposed to a
terrorist attack and towards goods that might help one cope with the consequences of
terrorism materially or psychologically. Due to considerable heterogeneity of
perceptions about terrorism in the population, different studies find conflicting results.
While one study finds marked decrease in consumption of non-durables (Eckstein and
Tsiddon, 2004), another study finds an increase in consumer confidence particularly
reflected in the consumer demand for durables (Enders and Sandler, 2005). However,
studies commonly find a negative impact of terrorism on consumption (Schneider et
al., 2011).
The change in the consumption and saving behaviours of households in OIC
countries during the period 2011-2015 is provided in Figure 3.9 in terms of
current prices.
Figure 3.9: Change in Household Consumption and Savings in OIC Countries (2011-2015)
Change in Household Consumption
35%
31.6%
Change in Savings
5%
0.2%
0%
30%
-5%
25%
-10%
20%
-15%
15%
12.1%
12.4%
-20%
10%
-25%
-21.8%
-24.9%
5%
-30%
1.3%
-29.8%
-35%
0%
Low
Medium
High
Extreme
Low
Medium
High
Extreme
Source: SESRIC staff calculation based on World Bank WDI database.
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Economic Impacts of Radicalism & Violent Extremism
Once again, it is not possible to directly attribute the change in consumption and saving
to terrorism, but it is possible to roughly observe the differences in economic
behaviours of households in different country groups that are affected from terrorism
at various intensities. In general, there is a trend in OIC countries towards higher
consumption and lower savings, but it is difficult to identify the changes due to
terrorism by looking only at raw data. However, compared to other groups, those that
are affected extremely appear, on average, to increase their consumption (32%) and
reduce their savings (25%) more significantly. This implies that households are likely to
react by increasing their consumption and reduce their savings as the level of terror
intensity increases. On the other hand, those that are affected at high intensity appear
to be neutral, but it cannot be argued that the household in these countries do not
react to terrorism. It is possible that they would save at even greater amounts if there
would be no terrorism in the group of these countries.
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Chapter Three Bibliography
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Ba d opadh a , “. a d “a dle , T.
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36
itigate the ad e se effe ts of te o is
o g o th?
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4. Social Impacts of Radicalism &
Violent Extremism
Since the turn of the Millennium, terrorism has brought severe costs to societies and
individuals virtually in every corner of the globe. A growing number of scholars,
accordingly, have addressed the need to consider the fight against terror as a
necessary component of sustainable growth and development (see for example,
Oladeji and Folorunso, 2007; Bamidele 2012; Omadjohwoefe 2013). However,
discussions on effects of terrorism on societies have so far been confined mainly to
easu i g te o s ost i e o o i a d st u tu al te s, egle ti g so ial losses
caused by terrorism and conflict across spheres of society, from health to cultural and
political outcomes (Boscarino et al., 2003).
Against this back drop, this chapter hopes to shed some light on the social impacts of
terrorism in OIC countries. The section categorizes these effects into three main areas,
in which terrorism induces the most pronounced effects: socio-psychological impacts,
political impacts, and cultural impacts. These categories by no means exhaust the
spectrum of social effects of terrorism; yet, they provide policymakers a starting point
and a benchmark to make further projections.
4.1 Socio-Psychological Impacts of Terrorism
Exposure to any devastating event or disaster will have profound effects on
communities and individuals as well as organisations. However, acts of terrorism and
their effects on society are distinguished from other disasters by a combination of
factors. As Table 1 maps, acts of terrorism differ both from natural disasters such as
floods o ea th uakes a d f o
hu a - ade disaste s “il e a & La G e a,
.
Unlike natural disasters, terror is not inevitable, and differs from human-made
disasters caused by error or malfunction (e.g., airplane crashes or toxic waste
accidents). Terrorism is marked by malicious intent to deliberately harm and destroy.
Differing from other conflict-driven human-made disasters, such as wars, acts of terror
are not preceded by a warning period and are unpredictable. Moreover, at least
theoretically and ideally, rules of war are codified by international protocols and
conventions and civilians are not the main target of violence. In addition, given the
unpredictability, terrorism can uniquely disrupt societal functioning and national
security.
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Social Impacts of Radicalism & Violent Extremism
Given these unique characteristics, terrorism carries with it a potentially greater impact
tha othe disaste s o i di iduals e tal health (Becker and Rubinstein, 2004). In
fact, a growing body of research on children and youth have highlighted that distress
responses, behavioural change, and psychiatric illness caused by terrorism are greater
than that of other disasters (Somasundaram, 2007). Similarly, terrorism has a potential
to create a more chronic environment than other disasters at the supra-individual
social and produce systemic changes in social dynamics, processes, structures and
functioning (Somasundaram, 2007). In the following, the chapter will examine both
individual, especially among children and the youth and collective psychological
traumas induced by terrorism.
Table 1 Characteristics of disasters
Natural disasters
Not present
Human made disasters
Error and Neglect
Terrorism
Not present
Present
Inevitability
Warning period
and predictability
Violence
Not present
Maybe present
Present
Maybe present
Present
Not present
War
Present, but subject
to codifications
under conventions
and protocols, at
least ideally
Present
Present
Not present
Not present
Availability of
coping tools
Religious belief or
Science
Forgiveness and
technological
advancement
Present and is used as
the main tool and
directed to civilians
Face the fact that fellow
humans indiscriminately
intend to harm civilians
P ese t ut İdeall
not directed at
civilians
Patriotism and
protection of
civilians
Malicious Intent
Psychological Impacts on Children & Youth
Research has found a strong relationship between exposure to terrorism and poor
mental health outcomes (Schuster et al., 2001; Schlenger et al., 2002; Grieger 2003),
documenting that contact with terrorism is associated particularly with increased rates
of psychological distress, traumatic stress-related symptoms, and posttraumatic stress
disorder (Comer and Kendall 2007).
A study in Swat Valley, a region of Pakistan especially stricken by terrorist violence,
found, for example, severe post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms in a
majority of its participants (Khalily, 2011). Another study in Pakistan found a significant
association between terrorism and psychiatric morbidity (Nasim et al., 2014). In fact,
ranked as third on the Global Terrorism Index of the Institute for Economics and Peace
(2015), Pakistan, from 2001 to 2011, witnessed an almost 100% increase in mental
illnesses incidence (Chaudhry 2016).
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In the wake of rapidly increasing acts of violence and terrorism, tremendous concern
has developed among scholars regarding the impact of terrorism on children and
youth. The most visible effect of terrorism is that it leaves behind a large number of
bereaved youth and children as well as children and youth with severe injuries. Yet,
effects of terrorism on children and youth go well beyond what meets the eye and
those late t i pa ts of te o th eate hild e s a d the outh s ell-being in rather
complex ways. In fact, studies conducted in various national contexts stricken by
terrorism have in common demonstrated that children indeed are the segment of the
population at greatest risk for psychological trauma, behavioural changes, and
impairment as a result of exposure to violence (Goldfrank et al., 2003).
All in all, these findings demonstrate that terrorism results in severe health outcomes
for adolescents and children, and as such, impacts public and population health in a
substantial way. Terrorism becoming an important determinant of public mental health
puts forward a pressing need to precisely identify the channels through which
terrorism affects adolescents and children and to develop preventive and rehabilitative
strategies accordingly.
A study on child development and terror (Comer and Kendall, 2007) reveal that
children and adolescents come in contact with terrorism through three main paths:
1. Proximal contact, where children directly come in contact with terror by ,for
example, being in a city under attack or losing a loved one
2. Media-based contact, where children indirectly experience the attack by
viewing a terrorist attack or its results on media and social media
3. Exposition to an extended climate of threat, expectation, and alert.
The considerable body of research on youth and children who come into proximal
contact with a terrorist attack indicates increased rates of psychopathology —
regardless of whether attack is an isolated case in country not at war or in a region
exposed to continual conflict. The most frequent psychopathological findings on
proximal contact include increased rates of re-experiencing, emotional numbing, and
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and importantly these symptoms can be
identified as long as one year after the attack (Solberg et al., 2015). Another stream of
research that focuses on functional impairment has shown that adolescent victims
exposed to proximal contact with terror lack sense of security and majority of them
report difficulty functioning at home, with peers, and/or at school, even one-year postattack (Pfefferbaum, Nixon, Krug, et al., 1999).
Interestingly, studies have shown that when it comes to media-based contact (e.g.,
viewing a terrorist attack on television, reading about an attack in the newspaper)
adverse implications are no less serious than that of proximal contact. In fact, empirical
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Social Impacts of Radicalism & Violent Extremism
studies have documented equally significant functional impairment and PTSD between
direct and indirect expositions (Pfefferbaum, Nixon, Krug, et al., 1999)
Exposure of youth to terrorism through media and proximal constitutes only one part
of a broader picture. The youth and children adaptation to terrorism is also determined
by the broader social and political context generated by terrorism. Research has found
that i the afte ath of te o ist atta ks se se of se u it , st ess ea tio s, ha a te
strengths, attitudes toward immigration and ethnic group and leadership rhetoric
(Comer and Kendall, 2007: 42) changes, while media starts to capitalise greater levels
of aggressive content and references to hardship (Bligh et al., 2004). These post-attack
changes in the broader political and social context lead to heightened vigilance and a
sense of omnipresent threat and insecurity, keeping children and youth in a state of
pervasive anxiety.
Collective trauma and Social deterioration
While individual trauma in itself is substantial, given the rapid and wide dissemination
of trauma through media-based contact and changes in the broader political and social
environment, terrorism also traumatizes society as a whole and is experienced
collectively. Scholars have conceptualized the supra-individual level trauma, either
experienced by a certain group or by the entire society, as collective or cultural trauma.
Mo e spe ifi all , olle ti e t au a efe s to s ste i ha ges i so ial d a i s,
p o esses, st u tu es a d fu tio i g “o asu da a ,
as ell as ha ges i
mass action and cultural patterns that occur in reaction to devastating effects of
disasters, including terrorism. According to, Erikson, a prominent American sociologist,
collective trauma is a "blow to the basic tissues of social life that damages the bonds
attaching people together and impairs the prevailing sense of community" (Erikson,
1995: 233)
Empirical research on various communities exposed to prolonged acts of conflict and
terror have reported in common that terrorism leads to collective trauma most
prominently by
Creating a chronic climate of insecurity and uncertainty.
Abolishing vital resources of society. Acts of terror not only destructs such
tangible assets of a society as roads or neighbourhoods, but it also degrades
and debilitates social capital of society, which indeed is harder to recover and
rebuild. Terror destroys the nexus of vibrant relationships, essential networks,
leadership, and talented human resources from the community
“o asu da a ,
. This g a e loss ollapses o
u it s working
relationships and leadership and organizations, opening up a vacuum for the
rise of aberrant ideologies, authoritarian control, and propaganda. On the
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other hand, terrorism and the chronic environment of insecurity created by it
lead to impairment of members of community, both in terms of social and
professional functions and roles (Michael, 2007
Weake i g a so iet s apa it to e uild itself a d eake i g so ial t ust. One
of the g a est so ietal o se ue es of te o is its dest u tio of a so iet s
capacity to rebuild and recover itself, especially in contexts exposed to
prolonged terror. Under prolonged stress, and to sustain survival, individuals
and communities tend to develop submission, withdrawal, distancing, and
avoidance of any behaviour that carry a risk. Equally importantly, terrorism
cause a serious loss in interpersonal trust (family, kin, community) as well as
trust in social institutions, police and justice, law, values and cultural beliefs.
The loss of t ust fu the
akes it diffi ult fo o
u itıes to e o e f o
te o a d o flı t.
All of these adverse changes induced by terrorism subtly become part of a socialisation
process and get passed down to children and newcomers, as such destabilising future
generation and future advancement of society. Acts of terror and the collective trauma
created by it poses a direct assault on the continuity and integrity of the cultural
system (de Young, 1998), just like individual trauma poses a threat to individual
integrity and wellbeing.
4.2 Political Impacts of Terrorism
Acts of terror also have substantial political implications. In the following the focus will
be on political consequences of terrorism: the rise of a vicious circle of violence and
insecurity, increasing social polarisation and xenophobia, and disturbance of the
balance between security and civil liberties. All in all, in OIC member states, acts of
terror disturb the political environment; in transitioning democracies, it hinders and
delays consolidation of democracy, while in established democracies, terrorism
undermines democratic achievements and processes.
A Vicious Circle of Violence
A growing body of research on terrorism and political outcomes has been studying
su h uestio s as ho e posu e to te o is affe ts people s e aluatio of thei
politi al leade s pe fo a es, the effe ts of i il terror fatalities on voting turn out,
and effects of acts of terror on the electoral choice and voter preference (Davis and
“il e
; Kı ıs,
. This esea h a d lite atu e ha e esta lished the a a e ess
that the electorate is highly sensitive to acts of terror and that terror attacks and
fatalities influence political behaviour and values in a substantial way.
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Social Impacts of Radicalism & Violent Extremism
Qualitative case studies in Turkey (Kibris, 2011), Madrid (Bali, 2007), and USA
(Hetherington and Nelson 2003), and a panel study of 115 countries (Gassabner, JongA-Pin, and Mierau, 2008), which traced the relationship between voting behaviour and
terrorism (1968-2002), have reported remarkably parallel findings. According to these
studies:
Terror attacks and fatalities increase voting turn out
Terror attacks and fatalities decrease the legitimacy of the incumbent party;
the electorate blames the government for the loss and casualties
Terror attacks and fatalities lead people to vote for parties that are more
authoritarian and intransigent
Mo e spe ifi all , the ase stud i Tu ke , e a i i g PKK s te o a ti ities a d oti g
behaviour, has found that:
In the 1995 general elections, the number of security force terror casualties
per hundred thousand voters negatively affected the percentage of votes the
governing party/coalition received (Kibris, 2011),
The governing party lost around 0.5 percentage points for each additional
casualty per hundred thousand voters in the two years before the election,
In the 1995 general election, the vote share of the right-wing parties was
increased by around 2.5 percentage points on the average at the district level
due to the PKK attacks that took place within the two years before the election
(Kibris, 2011).
This public political reaction to terrorism ca e i pa t e plai ed th ough all -roundthe-flag effe t, he e oth the pu li a d the oppositio al leade s a ute iti is
of the government in exchange of elimination of the terror threat. In USA, for example,
in the aftermath of 9/11, the approval rate of the president Bush increased from 51%
on September-10 to 86% on September-15. On September- , P eside t s app o al
achieved a remarkable 90%, representing the highest rating ever recorded for a
president (Hetherington and Nelson 2003).
The rally-round-the-flag effe t ei fo es the a gu e t that te o is leads the
population to tolerate any uncompromising and hawkish political action. While in the
short term intransigent policies and action may provide a sense of security and unity, in
the long term such counter-terror measures may create greater security issues.
Political theorists argue that hawkish response may alienate the broader group
(religious, ethnic, or racial) terrorists come from and as such as may turn moderates
into radicals (De Mesquita 2008). English (2003: 17), for instance, observed in the case
No the I ela d that the B itish espo se to epu li a su e sio f e ue tl
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involved punishing the wider population for IRA activities: this had the unintended,
counterproductive effe t of st e gthe i g the I‘A that it as i te ded to u de i e.
On the other hand, hawkish counter-response is likely to lead to greater violent
retaliation by the terrorist group; in fact this may precisely be the tactic used by
terrorists to create more chaos while gaining sympathy from the group it claims to
represent (Siqueira and Sandler 2007)
These findings and discussions overall suggest that terrorism, or even the mere threat
of terrorism; can trigger social and political responses with wide ramifications (Comer
et al. 2007). Most prominently, this threat can be exploited both by government and
terrorists themselves. Terrorists can exploit this threat by using violence to aggravate
governments into indiscriminate responses to radicalise and mobilize a population the
terrorists claim to belong. While, on the other hand, governments may wish to seize
de o ati p o esses, f ighte the pu li to a ept the p ote tio of a di tato ship
and pursue draconian and authoritarian agenda (De Mesquita 2008). All in all,
terrorism comes with severe political costs, both in non-authoritarian political contexts
and in contexts of democratic transition by impairing democratic processes and
triggering a spiral of violence.
Discrimination and Xenophobia
Research in social psychology has pointed to the powerful effect of major events in
t a sfo i g people s alues, eliefs, pe eptio s, a d attitudes Co e et al.
.
This effect is indicated to be larger when a major event is a negative and threating one
(Canetti-Nisim 2009). Being a major event with highly abrupt, negative, and
threatening content, terror is expected to lead to substantial belief and attitude
change. In a context of inter-group conflict, one such substantial change occurs in how
people ie the out-g oup , the g oup to hi h te o ist pe pet ato s lai to elo g
or represent.
Empirical and panel studies have found that following exposure to an attack, targeted
community and individuals display more altruistic behaviour towards and show greater
support to the in-group. On the contrary, support for the out-group decreases (Voors
et al. 2012) along with an increase in negative beliefs about and negative stereotyping
of the out-group (Sherif et al., 1961). This change in attitude and perception can largely
be accounted by the rise of a sense of victimhood among the targeted group, being the
subject of random and malicious harm entirely unjustified by virtue of it addressing
innocent civilians.
Importantly, by victimizing the target group, te o is i tu leads to ta get g oup s
generalizing its negative beliefs beyond the perpetrator and towards the broader
group, who shares the same ethnic, religious, racial, national, or ideological
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Social Impacts of Radicalism & Violent Extremism
background with the terrorist group. The target group fully de-legitimizes the broader
out-group and become fully uncompromising towards its grievances. More broadly, by
increasing negative stereotyping of the out-group, terrorism leads to ethnocentrism
and xenophobia. Since the 9/11 for example, there have been numerous instances of
the ise of Isla opho ia i the U ited “tates as ell as a ti-Arab and anti-immigrant
sentiments across Europe following attacks in France, Brussels, and Madrid, leading to
the rise of violent and xenophobic groups such as Pegida.
Ethnocentrism and xenophobia generates serious malaises in a society to an extent
where violence and discrimination exerted on the out-group may be seen as legitimate
or are unquestioned. Terrorist acts are often perceived to be perpetrated by a specific
ethnic, racial, or religious group. As such institutional discrimination or profiling of the
identified racial, ethnic, or religious group, as potential terrorists or threats is a
common practice that threatens community cohesion, social trust, and social tolerance
(Goldfrank 2003). For instance, in the last few years, media has reported numerous
ases of hija ea i g o e o Musli looki g e o A a i speaki g outh ei g
forcefully taken out of airplanes due to profiling done by flight attendants or complaint
by civilians, demonstrating the extent to which the in-group civilians may approve
random discrimination and violation of civil liberties.
Even worse, by rising ethnocentrism and xenophobia, terrorism may lead civilians to
accept the worst views as unproblematic, especially when these relate to retaliation
through violence. In fact, in addition to academic studies, inquiries by Human Rights
Watch (Acebes and Collins 2002) as well as by FBI (2002) reported, for instance, a sharp
rise in the number of hate crimes, from physical assaults to vandalism of places of
worship to murder, against Arabs, Muslims, and those perceived to be Arab or Muslim
in the aftermath of 9\11 attacks. In fact, the number of anti-Muslim hate crimes rose
from 28 in 2000 to 481 in 2001 (FBI, 2002). These numbers show that terrorism fuels
significant social division, social segregation and polarisation, which not only affects the
out-group but the society as a whole by damaging the social fabric and unity adversely.
The dilemma: Security versus Civil Liberties
Ea h e l dis o e ed ode of a te o ist atta k eates a e
ode of o t ol
(Kreissl 2015: 2) Scanning of shoes at the airport, limiting the amount of liquid that can
be taken into the planes, and scanning of laptops and electronic devices emerged as
reaction to actual attempts of terrorist attacks (Kreissl 2015). Today, passenger
screening has become quite rigorous, and it involves intrusions such as searches of
people and their personal belongings, includi g i t udi g people s so ial edia a d
email accounts.
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These developments generated a serious and necessary debate on the effects of
terrorism on the balance between civil rights and security. Civil liberties are given
symbolic commitment toward the highest level. Many would argue that civil liberties
are guaranteed rights, rights that cannot be compromised (Viscusi and Zeckhauser,
2003). Yet, in much the same way security, or the absence of terrorism, is also a
fundamental public good (Frey et al. 2009) and advocates of security typically argue
that rights can be restricted to ensure true safety. Fundamental public good in modern
governance and citizenship, in a context of constant threat or possibility of terrorism,
causes security and civil rights to compete with one another to a troubling extent (Frey
et al. 2009), where less security means more rights, and less rights mean more security.
The fear of terrorism, in sum, has implications such as diminishing public confidence,
an increase in social polarisation, and more broadly a public acceptance of moving
away from morally binding measures of social relations and categories regarding
equality and basic civil rights. In sum terrorism has the costly effect of curbing
democratic measures as well as moral rules and codes that keep various segments of
society together.
4.3 Cultural Impacts of Terrorism
Another grave social consequence of terrorism is the loss of cultural property, heritage,
and history (Bren 2016) as well as destruction of institutions of society that are pivotal
to a atio s futu e de elop e t a d su i al, ost ota l edu atio al i stitutio s.
Cultu al p ope t a
e defi ed as a
o a le o i
o a le p ope t of g eat
i po ta e to the ultu al he itage of e e people… UNE“CO,
0:9). Destruction,
targeting, and plunder of cultural property reveal the particular vulnerability and great
symbolic value of such property (Milligan, 2008). Protection of cultural property is
e essa
e ause a o
u it s so ial se se of ide tit a d ollective memory are
embedded in its cultural properties. Destruction of cultural property is equal to
dest u tio i di iduals a d o
u ities ultu al past Be
. Fu the o e,
respecting cultural property speaks to multiculturalism and therefore has the practical
implication of fostering a cooperative international environment and peace (Bern
. It should also e oted that a gi e o
u it s ultu al p ope t is pa t of
hu a i ilisatio s olle ti e histo .
Despite the importance of cultural property both for local communities and human
civilisation and despite the recognition of this importance by international
organizations, studies and policymaking regarding acts of terror and cultural property
have so far remained limited. This neglect comes with great costs, in fact, since the
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Social Impacts of Radicalism & Violent Extremism
2000s; terrorist attacks on cultural property have increased substantially and have
become more complex and systematic (Milligan, 2008). Destruction and looting of
cultural property is being used by terrorists as tools to, on the one hand, to further
their ideological cause and on the other to continue financing their various operations.
More specifically:
Terrorists aim to instil fear into the heart of society and to cause chaos and
collective trauma. Destruction of cultural property is one way to demoralise
o
u ities; it is a ea s of e adi ati g the othe He s he & ‘iedl a e ,
2000) and dominate over them by eliminating any psychical and symbolic
record of their history and cultural identity (Bern 2016)
Looting of cultural property also provides terrorist groups with a substantial
financial resource for gain and profit. DAESH, for instance, benefits both from
the tax it levies from the civilian looting and from the sale of antiquities in the
black market (al-Taie 2014).
In the same vein, attacks on key institutions of society, most notably educational
institutions, have also become part and parcel of terrorist activity. Since the 2000s, a
growing number of educational institutions, schools and universities, from Nigeria to
Pakistan and Afghanistan, have been targeted in terrorist attacks. According to The
University of Maryland's Global Terrorism Database (GTD); since 2004 there has been a
sharp rise in terror attacks on schools as illustrated in Figure 4.1.
The Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (GCPEA) Report (GCPEA, 2014)
identified the countries that were most heavily affected by terror attacks on schools or
universities— where 1,000 or more attacks on schools, universities, staff and students
took place during 2009-2012. The top 5 countries among the most affected category
include Afghanistan, Colombia, Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan and Syria. As can be clearly
seen this list is dominated by OIC member state.
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Figure 4.1: The Rise in Terrorist Attacks on Schools, Global
Adopted from: GTD, reported in Gilsinan (2014).
As the above mentioned data reveals, OIC member states are particularly vulnerable to
school attacks by terrorists. Both in OIC countries and elsewhere, terrorists target
schools for various reasons. Schools constitute practical, symbolic, and ideological
targets. Schools, where large number of people congregates, are practical for attacks
because they constitute soft-targets in the sense that they are relatively unguarded.
Schools are also symbolic-targets because schools and children are powerful symbols
and an attack on them evoke particularly strong and explosive emotional response
(Bradford and Wilson, 2013), enabling the perpetrator to cause considerable harm at
the collective level. Moreover, schools are ideological targets given that educational
institutions are the main channels of a nation to transfer their common norms and
social identity to the new generation and cultivate citizens committed to social and
political norms.
Systematic destruction of schools by acts of terror bears severe implications upon
society. Empirical studies on Nigeria have pointed to a connection between acts of
terror perpetrated by Boko Haram, an extremist movement that reject modern science
and modern education, and school attendance in Northern Nigeria (Patrick and Felix,
2013). These studies have shown that compared to South Nigeria, Northern Nigeria has
suffered lower enrolment rates especially at the primary education sector and a lower
rate of educational attainment. This difference is accounted in large part by constant
attacks of Boko Haram on educational institutions and the perpetual fear such attacks
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have created. In fact, the areas with the lowest number of children in school are in the
Northern region of Nigeria as they are worst hit by the attack (Patrick and Felix, 2013).
To conclude, it seems that policy makers in OIC member state should pay equal
attention to economic and social costs of terrorism; while social costs may not be as
easily measurable and recognizable in the short term, they have longer and more
complex implications and replacement of social costs are in most cases impossible. It
should also be noted that the direct and media-based contact with terrorism as well as
the broader context created by terrorism have serious impacts on mental health of
youth and children, demonstrating that terrorism has become a determinant to public
mental health. In the political arena, terrorism leads to a vicious circle of violence,
triggering xenophobia, discrimination, and social polarization. Terrorism has also
adverse effects on the sensitive balance between civil rights and security. Finally, acts
of terror could have other negative social impacts such as cultural looting and
destruction of educational institutions.
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Chapter Four Bibliography
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Folorunso, B. A. (2007). The Imperative of National Security and Stability for Development
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5. De-radicalisation Models &
Approaches
De-radicalization as a holistic program encompasses reversing violent extremist
perspectives and countering the causes that engendered them in the first place. Deradicalization programs usually include motivating active violent extremist individuals
to give up arms or defect, or targeting the group by means of effective counternarrative campaigns that eliminate the impetus for organized violent action through
reconciliation, dialogue and disillusionment campaigns. In the light of this
understanding, this chapter underscores the vital role played by de-radicalisation
programs in countering the spectre of violent extremism in OIC member countries. A
distinction is made between superficial disengagement and changes in outward
behaviour, and thorough de-radicalisation with its resulting shift in ideology and
worldview. The chapter also highlights the necessary role of de-radicalisation as a
component within a larger strategy geared towards countering violent extremism, and
one that is ideally inclusive of hard and soft security approaches and the effective use
of political signalling and counter-narratives.
5.1. De-radicalisation and Disengagement: Differences
In the field of countering violent extremism, the approaches of de-radicalisation and
disengagement are often confused with one another. De-radicalisation differs from
disengagement in that it seeks to alter patterns of thinking and held ideologies while
disengagement affects its external behavioural manifestation. Defined broadly, deradicalisation refers to the socio-ps hologi al shapi g o ha ge of the ta get s
sympathy and commitment to violent extremism, to a point where the possibility of
violence is extremely mitigated or made unlikely. Disengagement on the other hand,
may choose to focus on the action of violent extremism as a target that reflects visible
change, without necessarily touching on the root ideologies or sympathies that
generate it.
Given that both approaches are often implemented together, it should be noted that a
basic form of disengagement is necessary for a more comprehensive de-radicalisation
process to occur. In the absence of healthy religious beliefs for instance, or functional
nationalism; it may still be possible to appeal to the emotional side of an individual
through dise gage e t usi g a ase ased o the ha
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carrying out violent acts for instance. Hard security practitioners are often inclined to
disengagement due to its lower overhead costs and easier measurability; however, this
may not reflect a sustainable solution (Bjorgo & Horgan, 2008). This is particularly
critical given that disengagement relies on perceived costs and gains, where emotional
appeals or provided employment may suffice for a time, but as counter-terrorism
campaigns progress the subject may choose to alter their mental equation suddenly in
favour of resorting to violent extremism again. In this sense, it is crucial for any
counter-radicalization strategy to include both approaches (Rabasa et al., 2008).
With regards to de-radicalisation, it has become evidently clear that the battle is
primarily one of ideas. In this respect, while violent extremism is often alleged to grow
in power vacuums or brought about through unmet socio-economic demands for
instance, the reality often remains that bridging the gap between disillusionment and
disenfranchisement requires a bridging idea to generate sympathy and increase
recruitment to violent extremist groups. Such an idea is often contextual and rooted
deeply in existing worldviews and grievances, adapting intelligently to its circumstances
(Storer, 2012). More critically perhaps, such ideas, whether rooted in ideology or
economic reasons, often provide the enduring power of violent extremists to survive
hard security responses.
The pathway to violent extremism is characterized by a number of reflective phases,
during which the individual may assess root causes in light of their faith, emotions or
personal pragmatism, following which a decision to engage further or step away from
the process is made. Radicalisation recruitment succeed in part through strategically
progressive incremental commitments designed with low entry-costs, beginning with
emotional sympathy and continuing on to ideological support, and eventually violent
action.
In such a context, de-radicalisation seeks to generate a counter-narrative to undermine
and educate against radicalizing agents, while simultaneously providing alternative
streams of thought and engagement. This is done by either reclaiming subverted
narratives, generating new ones, or providing legal means of engagement, sociopolitical change and participatory citizenship. This does not constitute the suppression
of radical opinions per se, but rather provides more acceptable means of channelling it
while attempting to instil alternative worldviews in subjects. That said, while
radicalisation recruitment often relies on overwhelming group-thinking, ideological
isolationism and mirroring of similar ideas as proof of the intrinsic validity of the idea,
this may at times necessitate separation from instigating and radicalizing environments
in cases of rehabilitation, and specifically in the case of minors (Qureshi, 2015).
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A distinction should be made, however, between the prioritization of disengagement
versus de-radicalisation programs. In the West for instance, disengagement is often
given more weight over its counterpart due to a disinterest or lack of capability to
engage in effective ideological or theological reversals. In OIC countries, however,
given the relative prevalence of counter-ideological capacity, the focus is on deradicalisation. There remains, however, the lack of scientifically-supported models
unique to OIC countries, and the absence of sharing of good practices in this domain.
5.2. Approaches and Models of De-radicalisation
Violent extremism has its roots in radicalism; however, it is worth to note that the large
majority of radicals do not opt to engage in violent extremism. Taking this into
consideration, radicalization is therefore a process ranging from the non-violent to the
violent. By the same token, de-radicalisation is a process that reverses the
radicalisation process. The appeal of this reversal is to specifically roll-back violent
extremism in individuals that have already acted violently, which is a more difficult
achievement when compared to the de-radicalisation of individuals that have only
reached a level of sympathy or emotional support for violent extremist groups. All
approaches to de-radicalisation share the target of bringing a cognitive and
behavioural change in target subjects, and in doing so, a reversal of the root causes
that originally led to violent extremism in the first place. More critically, deradicalisation programs target the specific use of violence as a means to social change,
either through undermining the assumptions towards the effectiveness of violence;
reinforcing a moral, religious, theological or ideological perspective inimical to
violence; or altering subjective perceptions towards root causes of radicalism in and of
themselves.
De-radicalisation nonetheless remains a relatively nascent approach, with consensus
only being found in the necessity for the inclusion of soft approaches in counterterrorism. Bringing about behavioural change through disengagement, even if
temporary, is usually easier and more quantifiable for the purpose of public policy. As a
result, it is often favoured over fully-fledged de-radicalization, which is challenged by
the inability to measure ideological changes in the individual. Equally critical to the
development of de-radicalisation programs is the complexity of the radicalisation
process itself, requiring policy and programs to be specific, adaptive and dynamic in a
way that prevents standardization. This presents challenges to large-scale deradicalisation or disengagement programs, given the focal emphasis usually made on
the p a titio e s e pe tise, i o ati e ess and emotional intelligence.
In this context, de-radicalisation may often benefit from complementing streams of
parallel public policy. For instance, de-radicalisation programs may opt to offer
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economic aid and assistance to the families of program subjects; as practiced in Saudi
Arabia for individuals convicted of violent extremism. To say that such efforts
complement de-radicalisation progress would be a severe understatement, as such
public policy initiatives often form the base of interventions.
For radicalisation catalysts originating from perceptions of economic hardship, deradicalization programs can provide financial support or subsidies to families of the
subject. In cases of ideologically-based or theologically-motivated extremism, deradicalisation programs often make use of selective re-education, ideological countera ati es, delegiti izi g su je t s figu es of autho it a d the use of iole e as a
means to change. In the specific case of radicalised juvenile youths, programs target
peer and family networks, and supplement mentorship programs with resiliency
counselling, engaged public service programs and narratives reinforcing self-worth and
civic engagement. With regards to the often-encountered perception held by deradicalisation subjects of the lack of effectiveness of non-violent pathways to sociopolitical change, counter-narratives and re-education are used in emphasizing the
ineffectiveness of violence and terrorism to bring about changes, combined with
serious political signalling and public policy encouraging inclusive development and
participatory politics.
Significant to the approach of generating effective de-radicalisation programs is the
strength of constructive narratives, arguments, therapy and catalysts over
deconstructive alternatives. Counter-intuitively, violent extremism often seeks out
creation of a specific ideal for the perceived good of others. Undermining this narrative
by pointing out ideological flaws will at best promote indifference. On the other hand,
generating new constructive narratives that address root causes of the radicalized
which positively attracts them to civic life and public participation will ultimately prove
an effective strategy. In this sense, violence and repression will be the less effective of
the two approaches.
Constructive approaches would utilize de-radicalization programs that fulfil the innate
wish to live a normal life, get married, pursue education, find employment, and find
meaning and purpose in public service, or through the provision of ideologies or beliefs
more attractive than those offered by violent extremism. On the other hand,
deconstructive approaches include legal prosecution and severe legal charges,
disillusionment with violence, individual loss of stature within the group, exhaustion
from fear, or having to make a choice between violent extremism while engaged in
increased political participation.
The progressive pathway an individual takes towards violent extremism starts with
disillusionment and culminates in carrying out acts of violence as illustrated in Figure
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5.1. For the purpose of maximum effectiveness in de-radicalisation approaches, models
should identify stages of radicalisation where de-radicalisation programs have the most
potential to succeed. More critically, programs should differentiate between different
roles and distinct identities within radical extremist groups, given the vast intellectual
and psychological difference between leadership cadres, and other segments of the
organization (Victoroff , 2005).
Figure 5.1: Radicalization Pathway to Violent Extremism
Disillusionment, desensitization to violence, emotional manipulation
using individual sense of justice, duty, and psychological need for selfactualization
Emotional, ideological or intellectual sympathy with extremism as a nonviolent step with little consequence. Increased acceptance of seemingly
less extreme ideology
Paradigm shift with acceptance of moral subjectivism or necessity
of violence, followed by complete self-identification with violent
extremism group
Efforts to support extremist group in non-violent means.
Crystallized identification with violent and non-violent parts of
organization. Anger at attacks on group
Abandoning ineffective non-violence. Adopting hardened violent
approach. Seeking revenge for fallen group members. Increasing
extremism
Amidst the variation between approaches to de-radicalisation, an established guiding
principle is the significance of social relations in reinforcing or defining held values. In
this context, re-education or theological reinterpretation find more success when
directed towards families, as opposed to individuals (Hegghammer, 2006). This is
perhaps even more relevant to OIC member countries where the socializing and
guiding role of the family unit is more significant than in the West. As such, any
approach to de-radicalisation that does not account for the potential inherent in co-
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opting family structures would be limited severely in effectiveness and sustainability
(Bjorgo & Horgan, 2008).
Moreover, a core element of all de-radicalisation programs is public knowledge
surrounding available initiatives. This has the benefit of engaging former violent
extremists in such programs, and providing significant value and insight into program
design and development. This often takes the form of volunteer de-radicalisation
organizations that provide a sense of community and purpose. In specific cases as
found in Germany, the majority of engaged former extremists working in deradicalisation programs made individual decisions to contact such organizations and
offer their services (Grunenberg & Donselaar, 2006).
Finally, de-radicalisation program efforts are time-sensitive and relative to surrounding
events. For most criminal or politically motivated violent extremists, the turning point
of de-radicalisation comes in a moment of disillusion or disenfranchisement usually as
a result of excessive violence or actions not in line with their alleged ideals. This has
critical implications for the necessary adaptive nature of de-radicalisation programs for
targeted subjects and in outreach interventions.
5.3. Examples of De-radicalisation Programs in some OIC Member
Countries
Throughout the course of intense struggles against violent extremism, a significant
number of extremists had been arrested. This led to the necessity for a diverse range of
reform programs with the specific intent of rehabilitation to avoid or prevent
recidivism and return to extremism. Such efforts are also positioned in a growing
understanding within the security community that soft approaches to countering
violent extremism are necessary, given the theological, ideological and psychological
dimensions of the struggle (Cordesman, 2006).
While de-radicalisation programs may not necessarily provide a one-stop solution to
the problem of violent extremism, they hold the potential to allow for reintegration of
extremists into society. The base premise to all such programs is that extremists have
been misinformed or mislead by their handlers and hold to misperceptions and flawed
understandings of Islam. Prisons therefore represent ideal settings for such programs
given the high level of control they offer.
Taken broadly, de-radicalisation programs take a range of approaches, beginning with
targeting the understanding of the meaning of Jihad and Takfir. Others may focus on
distancing the subject emotionally, physically and ideologically from extremist groups.
Yet others choose to focus on healthy, monitored integration into society. A large
majority of the programs not only seek to undermine held extreme ideologies, but also
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p o ide so e easu e of so ial a d e o o i suppo t to su je ts fa ilies. It e ai s
to be said that the impact of such programs cannot be conclusively stated given limits
to data collection and the relative novelty of such approaches.
While hard security approaches may have led to high rates of capture of violent
extremist offenders, in most cases, not enough evidence exists to detain these
individuals for life, or the judgements they receive are based on crimes that do not
require life-sentences. In one study on violent extremist prison sentences, only 15% of
offenders receive death or life sentences, where the rest receive 20 to 10 years or less.
A large majority of offenders often acquire release through pardons or good behaviour.
More critically, unlawful detainment of suspects will often do more harm than good to
the moral high ground of narratives pertaining to government legitimacy and authority.
In this case, the release of inmates is a foregone truth that requires necessary action,
especially given high rates of reoffending and recidivism by extremists after release. If
necessary action is not taken, a significant number of former militants or extremists
will reintegrate with old extremist networks, and in the case of a number of countries
including Morocco, Yemen, Egypt and Algeria; a significant number of former inmates
returned to the same lifestyles of direct involvement or support of violent extremism
as before.
It is also essential to bear in mind that prisons often prove fertile grounds for
radicalisation. Numerous cases exist of inmates who had not held extremist ideas prior
to entering prison, yet through the prison environment eventually came to be
proponents of extreme ideologies. Harsh treatment is often a stimulus for increased
radicalisation; as with cases of torture, deprivation and hostility. This naturally
necessitates a conscious prison environment and rehabilitation program design
inclusive of a broad range of aspects affecting prisoner psychology. In this respect,
state funding and program design are two pillars critical to the success of such
programs.
Historically speaking, de-radicalisation models and programs are not new; having been
used in Egypt and Algeria; but with emphasis on a larger group rather than a specific
individual. These efforts were made less effective by crackdowns and overwhelming
hard security approaches as opposed to any conscious studied effort to reform ideas
and perceptions. Moreover, while de-radicalisation programs targeting religious
extremism may exist from country to country, they usually differ significantly on the
asis of ea h ou t s apa it , a d thei u i ue app oa hes to the p o le . The
remaining of this chapter is devoted to examining two such programs in OIC countries
(Saudi Arabia and Indonesia) which differ significantly from each other in their
approach.
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Saudi Arabian Model
Violent extremism in Saudi Arabia has traditionally been linked to extreme antiWesternism (Hegghammer, 2006). This is usually invariably due to perceived close ties
between Saudi Arabia and the United States, and discontent with alleged policy
contentions. Religious extremism is also served to a significant extent by the return of
Saudi nationals from Jihad in Afghanistan in 2002 (Hafez, 2009). Issues with this specific
strain of radicalism include their interpretation of Islam, and the specific
rationalizations for violence against the state to fulfil ideological goals. In this regard,
Saudi Arabia has developed a multi-faceted approach, specifically targeting
understandings of Jihad, and the conception of Takfir. Moreover, other programs
operate in parallel to counter internet radicalization, alongside a social reintegration
program.
The Saudi Arabian de-radicalisation model remains the most comprehensive and
funded program of all current approaches (Boucek, 2008b). It consists of targeted
Islamic re-education, psychological therapy and integration following pardon or
release. Moreover, it is built on the base premise that iole t e t e ists ie s a d
ideologies have their root in misinformed or misperceived conceptions of Islam (Fink &
Hearne, 2008). In this context, the inmate is seen as a victim of deviation and
manipulation by extremist ideologues and influencers (Boucek, 2007a). Consequently,
the subject-victim is seen as deserving of education and guidance as would a misguided
individual. To increase the impact of programs, the Saudi model places a significant
emphasis on culture and tradition through the utilization of family networks and social
elatio s to adopt espo si ilit fo the pa ti ipa ts p og ess a d ell-being, with
more stakeholders often reflecting greater sustainability of rehabilitation (Fink &
Hearne, 2008). This is not to say however, that all violent extremists are entered into
de-radicalisation programs. Rather, nearly 10% of violent extremists are identified as
dangerous extremists, of whom a significant amount refuse any form of engagement
altogether with de-radicalisation programs (Ansary, 2008). Extremists who have taken
part in violence against the Saudi Arabian government are disqualified from entry by
default. Others who have carried out terrorism may take part, yet are not provided
with release (Ansary, 2008). The core of the de-radicalisation program is found in its
ideological approach to Takfir thought, by means of intensive dialogue and
psychological therapy (Boucek, 2007b). The de-radicalisation program is administered
by a committee within the Ministry of Interior, consisting of four sub-committees; the
religious; security; media; psychological and social committees, respectively (Boucek,
2007a).
The religious committee arranges direct religious debate and dialogue with prisoners,
from a pool of approximately 150 scholars and imams. This approach is no doubt
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supported by the high numbers of religious scholars within Saudi Arabia, which permits
for filtering based on methods of communication (Boucek, 2008b). In this regard,
selection of scholars is based on their ability to generate engaging dialogue (Boucek,
2007a). The psychological and social committee consists of a nearly 50 psychologists
and social scientists with the mandate of assessment and diagnosis of progress, mental
dysfunction and disorder and study of behaviour (Boucek, 2008b). The group is also
charged with ascertaining whether the participant is genuine and sincere in their wish
for reform, alongside assessment of the families of the inmates to determine the level
or nature of support they require. The security committee assesses security risks, and
is charged with recommending discharge, in addition to serving as parole officers
following discharge and being responsible for monitoring them after their exit. The
final committee pertaining to media designs and produces educational content for use
in counselling, therapy and religious re-education sessions, as well as producing
content for use in public mosques and schools. In parallel to its internal deradicalisation, the committee also provides outreach to youth cross-sections that may
have been exposed to radical views (Boucek, 2007a).
Counselling is conducted through individual meetings between the program subject
and the appointed scholar, where initially the scholar or cleric will begin by establishing
their independence from the state security apparatus. In the remainder of the first
session, attempts are made to engage the subject in discussion regarding actions that
caused them to be imprisoned and to identify the religious rationale for their actions.
This is followed by further dialogue of why these justifications were flawed, followed
by the beginning of re-education (Boucek, 2007a). It is critical to note here that
knowledge is not enough to generate effective de-radicalisation rather the cleric or
scholar must earn the respect of the subject in some manner or form. Therefore,
simple declarations of religious law are often not enough, but rather there is a need for
persuasive, engaging theological and juristic interpretations of specific religious issues
(Hassan, 2006). Following the individual session phase, programs shift into formal and
informal dialogue sessions (Boucek, 2007a). With the end of short sessions, longer sixweek courses are provided in subjects such as Takfir, terrorism and Jihad, with
examinations that determine whether the subject must retake the course.
With the end of counselling and dialogue, release evaluation occurs where subjects are
placed in a rehabilitation centre in a domestic suburb for a period of 8 to 12 weeks for
further counselling and integration. During this period, they cannot leave the facility
unless their family provides custody. With official discharge, parole is instituted where
the subjects are observed and required to check in regularly with program officials. The
challenge of radicalisation necessitated the separation of extremists from other
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radicalisation programs, with an individual capacity of 1200 subjects. Traditionally
prisoners were kept in a large shared cell; unlike the de-radicalisation-specific facilities
which ensure individual segregation. De-radicalisation prisons contain televisions for
dedicated lecture broadcast. Additionally, the facility design minimizes contact
between security personnel and inmates, and prevents contact between prisoners
altogether. Furthermore, all cells are digitally monitored to prevent abuse or
mistreatment. The prison design accommodates for family visit, given the vital role of
family in reform, with specific accommodating areas. Conjugal visits for married
prisoners are also permitted (Boucek, 2008a).
Internet De-radicalisation
The Saudi Arabian de-radicalisation model is not limited to inmate rehabilitation, but is
rather more expansive, with passive online dissemination, particularly on websites that
support extremist thought. This is done from the base premise that the internet
presents one of the most important fronts for extremist groups to spread their
ideology to youth (Ansary, 2008). More critically, aside from its potential for
radicalization, internet havens allow for the easy transfer of methods and coordination
of planning with other extremists (Hafez, 2008). In this light, the Saudi government
launched the al-Sakinah Campaign, to provide counter-narratives to online extremist
dialogue through volunteer scholars and imams by engaging with radical members of
extremist domains. The al-Sakinah campaign makes use of over 60 academics, scholars,
psychologists and social science experts who engage with extremists through the
internet by means of infiltration, targeting individuals who are sympathetic to or
support extremist beliefs, yet have not committed terrorist acts. In one presented case,
over nearly 54,000 hours of interaction, a total of 972 online subjects were alleged to
have reverted from their extremist ideologies (Ansary, 2008).
Disengagement
The multifaceted model of de-radicalisation found in Saudi Arabia reflects a number of
variables that play a significant role in the process of disengagement and ultimately,
the possible de-radicalisation of subjects. On a physical level, this includes anxiety,
isolation and segregation from other radicalised ideologues. In the specific context of
transitioning from a predisposing to violent extremism to peaceful behaviour, the role
of a mentor or positive influence that reinforces the former is crucial. According to
state statistics, rates of recidivism range from 1% to 2% (Horgan, 2009b).
The role of family in reaffirming and sustaining the process of reform and behavioural
engagement was integral in providing external support. Additionally, the Saudi model
was designed to take advantage of its emphasis on family bonds, with extensive
support for families of de-radicalisation program subjects to generate goodwill to state
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authority. This was conducted from the base premise that by increasing loyalty and
bonds with the family, bonds to extremist thought were weakened. Therefore, Saudi
de-radicalisation programs often include programs to facilitate marriage, education
and monetary support in certain cases. Moreover, the family of the de-radicalisation is
also held accountable for recurring extremist behaviour on the part of the subject.
Financial support is provided in the way of payments to assist the family while the main
earner is jailed (Horgan, 2009b). This support also extends to education and health
coverage, taking into context that the wife and family are one of the largest variables in
sustained change of behaviour (Fink & Hearne, 2008). This invariably results in critiques
levelled against the model, where any changes are ascribed to basic disengagement
due to monetary support, and not an actual change in ideology.
Conclusion
While a measure of success is reported in the use of the Saudi Arabian model, certain
fall-backs can be identified. The model targets improper understandings of Islam;
however, educational streams reflect a thorough immersion in religious knowledge,
which may point to a different root to the problem than misconceptions per se; calling
for a review of religious education in its own right. Moreover, while high success rates
are reported, returns to extremism still occur. For instance, with citizens who
underwent the program after return from Guantanamo, nearly 11 returned to violent
extremism (Worth, 2009). This calls for better post-program monitoring and tracking
methods.
That said, the relative success of the model is positive in that if it continues to exhibit
success, the model or its methods may be effectively transplanted into other OIC
member countries. Note should be made however, that the Saudi model is based on
the prevalence of significant resources set aside for the program, which other member
states may find difficult to dedicate. Additionally, scholars and imams in the program
may benefit from referent authority and legitimacy given the religious establishment to
Makkah and Madinah, which would be difficult to reproduce elsewhere.
Indonesian Model
Indonesia is the largest OIC and Muslim country in the world in terms of population,
with a total of approximately 260 million people. Nearly 87% of its population is
Muslim, with minor variations in terms of practice and the country has contended with
violent extremist groups since the mid s.
Following significant violence, and with a relatively slow response to the problem of
violent extremism the state sought to directly engage with the issue. This was
something of a contention as a strong opinion within the country exists that the war on
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terrorism is a war on Islam itself, and where religious extremism is not perceived as a
threat per se. Moreover, the government also presented hesitance in isolating the
support of mainstream citizens who may view such radical groups as part of the
Indonesian community (Smith, 2005).
This changed with the Bali bombings in 2002. With significant arrests in the aftermath
of the Bali bombings, the Indonesian government altered their approach in the manner
of engaging with militants. This included aggressive crackdowns seeking to capture
violent extremists, while simultaneously changing their ideologies through a deradicalization model, and also to a significant extent by replacing Imams and public
speakers with moderates.
I do esia s atte pt at de-radicalisation consisted of a model geared towards changing
the ideologies of extremists, through a collection of individuals and groups that were
required to make do with limited resources. In spite of relative low levels of staff and
funding, Indonesia presents a model that has exhibited a good measure of success.
Efforts to counter violent extremism began through scholars in 2005, following an
executive decision to bring together groups of scholars to counter the narrative of
violent extremist teachings. However, this effort was soon abandoned due to scholars
not feeling the necessity of the project, while others were yet not familiar with
extremist teachings (International Crisis Group, 2007).
In the years to come, the judiciary and police would come to implement their own
program within the scope of counterterrorism. An ad hoc de-radicalisation program
targeting inmates was launched with the aim of picking out and targeting prisoners
who had intelligence value to police against other violent extremists (International
Crisis Group, 2007). Police also sought to recruit violent extremists principally against
the use of violence towards civilians to counter the influence of other violent jihadists.
In Indonesia, extremists hold significant distrust of police due to heavy crackdowns in
the past “ hulze,
. I do esia s u e t app oa h is to p o ide hu a e t eat e t
and respect religious practices. In this context, it is worthy to note that most police are
Muslim. Maintaining Islamic values within the police force has aided the reputation of
police who manage rehabilitation programs. Moreover, former violent extremists who
assist with rehabilitation program are often allocated one week with new inmate police
i te ogato s. Mo e ele a tl , the ajo it of I do esia s poli e ou te te o is selfidentify as practicing Muslims who will end interrogation sessions to pray. These
demonstrations of piety aid in building trust (Abuza, 2009).
The Indonesian model approaches each inmate on an individual level. In addition to
counselling, it offers educational opportunities to the subjects and provides financial
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assistance to families of imprisoned subjects (Sheridan, 2008). Police provide financial
assistance to families for the purpose of food, clothing and education, as well as
additional opportunities to visit with the subject.
The program is built on two assumptions, namely that extremists only listen to other
extremists and that perception of the police can be changed through kind treatment
(Schulze, 2008). Indonesia does not make use of religious scholars to provide
counselling or religious re-education, as they believe the inmates do not find the
scholars credible. The program instead relies on reformed violent extremists to talk to
prisoners, believing that extremists are able to relate to these former extremists
(Waterman, 2008). Commonly, reformed violent extremists used in the program were
once senior leaders in extremist groups, which is helpful given the hierarchical culture
of the region which tends to exhibit deference to authority figures (Abuza, 2009).
Disengagement
A number of variables provide the basis for both violent extremists to disengage and
de-radicalise. This includes the removal of the inmate from the influence of extremist
networks, and applying immediate engagement upon being detained, as well as
positive treatment from police.
The ost ota le fa to s see
ithi I do esia s de-radicalisation model are the
physical factors of shock arrest and imprisonment by security forces. Upon arrest, the
extremist is cut off from the former group. Extremist group leaders are often kept at
police headquarters to prevent contact with other prisoners (Schulze, 2008).
Moreover, inmates receive humane treatment from police, which invalidates the
argument that security forces are hostile towards Muslims.
A psychological factor often seen in disengagement is disillusionment or ideological
dissonance. Disillusionment can have a critical role in an individual s ha ge i a
organization during the period of their shift from an active participant to a far less
active role (Horgan, 2009b). Loss of belief in the ideology of a group or the pervasive
feeling that violence has gone too far can be a force causing an individual to disengage.
Prior to interrogations, police allow reformed extremists to spend several days with
inmates debating ideologies, which they find allows for easier interrogations once
ideological contentions have been resolved. One strength of the Indonesian model is
the ability of the police to identify and secure assistance of former extremist
leadership. As seen in the case of Algeria and Egypt, leadership can play a significant
role in encouraging others to disengage and de-radicalize. Indonesian police make use
of this in the hopes that if a leader changes their ideology, others will follow.
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Model Weaknesses
A number of weaknesses exist in the Indonesian model. While former leadership may
be presented as credible to extremist inmates, they are easily undermined due to their
documented and often publicized cooperation with security forces. Public
identification of former leaders with public police officials and their lifestyles have
been pointed out by Indonesian media, which contributes to a critical loss of credibility
in the eyes of many extremists (Abuza, 2009).
Yet another criticism is that the prison system undermines rehabilitation efforts by
nature. In Indonesia, prisons struggle with corruption and overcrowding, with their
own internal hierarchy and extortion. Prisoners must therefore engage with this
internal system to access basic necessities, while also contending with gangs. Usually,
this will cause extremists to group together for protection. While efforts are made to
separate extremists from the rest of the prison; no attempts are made to separate
hardened violent extremists or terrorists from extremists that are more likely to
achieve success in the de-radicalisation program (International Crisis Group, 2007).
I do esia s de-radicalisation model is often undermined as soon as the jihadist enters
prison. It is worthy of note that Indonesian police are aware of this, and therefore, try
to keep many prisoners at police headquarters rather than place them in the prison
system (Schulze, 2008).
The program is, moreover, only directed towards some violent extremists in custody,
with no clear structured rehabilitation program once they are released from holding
“ hulze,
. Also, afte elease, a u e of eha ilitated iole t e t emists are
allowed to return to their former environments and networks, making the risk of
e idi is
o e likel . Fu the o e, hile poli e atte pt to add ess su je ts eeds,
aid is not evenly distributed among the prisoners; with some benefiting more than
others. One senior program official stressed that he felt the socio-economic approach
was far more effective in rehabilitating violent extremists than the religious-ideological
approach. Yet, only a small number of inmates receive financial assistance while others
are ignored altogether (International Crisis Group, 2007).
As a whole, Indonesian police perceive the model as a successful one and root this in
the assessment of a decrease in bombings since 2005, which may not constitute an
effective metric to assessing the spread of radicalism throughout the country, but may
point to the success of other operations in the hard security sector designed to limit
violent extremist capacity. The program has nonetheless led to better intelligence
information, and enabled the arrest of high ranking extremist group leadership
(International Crisis Group, 2007). The program however, remains critically
underfunded. Additionally, due to short prison sentences in Indonesia, little motivation
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exists to participate in the program (Abuza, 2009). Without increased funding and
support, the program is likely to only exhibit limited success.
Conclusion
The Indonesian de-radicalisation model points to some measure of success through its
unique approach to the challenges of radicalism. In this respect, to ensure continued
viability of the Indonesian approach, a number of items require attention; including the
need for effective prison reform, greater public funding for de-radicalisation programs,
social welfare to program subjects fa ilies, a d the eed fo effe ti e follo -up parole
mechanisms.
As the number of program subjects increase, resources available to deal with them in
the prison environment are further strained, leading to overall less focus and results
(Hannah et al., 2008). Moreover, separating extremists from the general population is
essential to preventing radicalization. Caution should be taken with regards to prison
corruption, which can severely undermine de-radicalisation efforts. Therefore,
I do esia
odel s success is closely linked to the need for broader prison reform.
It is also worthy to note that local research has shown the critical role to be played by
wives and families in initial disengagement from violent extremism (Fink & Hearne,
2008). Unfortunately, increasing focus on the role of family has yet to materialize. Of
400 violent extremists and family members offered counselling, only 20 participated.
This is partly because while support is slowly phased in for families, extremist groups
still extend financial and social support to these families (Abuza, 2009).
Finally, program subjects need a means of effective re-integration into normal society,
with effective monitoring and follow-up mechanisms to prevent recidivism. Indonesia
has no parole system and is strained for resources to allow for effective monitoring of
former program subjects. Therefore, it is difficult to ensure actual reform or whether
they simply apply the tool of Taqiyya where disinformation and deception are
permitted if their safety or faith is threatened (Pluchinsky, 2008). Also, prisoners are
able to secure early releases through the program, which encourages some measure of
duplicity. Nonetheless, Indonesia has been able to initiate a relatively successful model
despite shortages of funding and crowded prison establishments. This is perhaps best
reflected in public rejection of violence extremist ideology by a number of former
leade s. I additio , the g o i g aid gi e to the p og a
I do esia s e e uti e
branch is helpful in st e gthe i g the p og a . I do esia s de-radicalisation program
may not be viable in the long run however, due to the above identified faults in the
program. Unless Indonesia is prepared to tackle prison reform, it is likely that the deradicalisation model will only be able to be effectively implemented towards a small
minority of extremists.
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Chapter Five Bibliography
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Ansary, A. F. (2008). Combating extremism: a brief overview of Saudi Arabia's approach. Middle
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Bjørgo, T., & Horgan, J. (Eds.). (2008). Leaving terrorism behind: Individual and collective
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Bjørgo, T. (2009). Processes of disengagement from violent groups of the extreme right. Leaving
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Boucek, C. (2007a). Extremist re-education and rehabilitation in Saudi Arabia. Terrorism
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Boucek, C. (2007b). The Saudi process of repatriating and reintegrating Guantanamo
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Hafez, M. M. (2008). Radicalization in the Persian Gulf: assessing the potential of Islamist
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Hassan, M. H. B. (2006). Key considerations in counterideological work against terrorist
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Hegghammer, T. (2006). Terrorist recruitment and radicalization in Saudi Arabia. Middle East
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Hegghammer, T. (2008). Islamist violence and regime stability in Saudi Arabia. International
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Horgan, J. (2009a). Deradicalization or disengagement? A process in need of clarity and a
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6. Challenges & the Way Forward
The rise of Al-Qaeda and DAESH and the atrocities committed by them has had a
devastating effect on many OIC countries thus pushing the issues of radicalism and
violent extremism to the top of the Agenda of the OIC. Nonetheless, OIC countries
cannot confront radicalism and violent extremism without understanding these
phenomena. This is not an easy task since radicalism and violent extremism are very
complex sets of phenomena, covering a great diversity of issue with different causes
and consequences.
The current wave of radicalism and violent extremism differs fundamentally from
previous waves. Radical and violent extremist groups have utilised gross
misinterpretation of Islamic concepts to develop religious narratives. These religious
narratives are at the heart of this current wave of radicalism and violent extremism.
This fact affects OIC countries the most and, as a result, OIC countries have become the
main theatre of this wave.
Hard security measure will not suffice. Radicalism and violent extremism have roots
such as: relative deprivation, government ineffectiveness in providing services to the
population and perceptions of state corruption. Understanding the root causes of
radicalism and violent extremism and reducing - or even better - eliminating these root
causes is essential if the efforts to counter radicalism and terrorism are to succeed. In
addition, the economic and social impacts have to be fully understood by OIC countries
in order to develop capacities and resilience in the face of violent extremism.
An effective mean to countering violent extremism is the availability of channels for
citizen engagement, if only to develop public engagement and civic responsibility. In
the absence of this, violence and extremism become more attractive as a medium for
change.
Similarly, comprehensive counter-radicalization must begin with critical social
institutions including the family and educational curricula. In this context, no stone
must be left unturned. Possible targets in need of focus include fostering increasingly
participatory politics. Educational curriculum require thorough vetting and review to
ensure healthy educational and to identify ideological narratives that may serve as
base points for radicalization in the future. A healthy emphasis is also needed on
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instilling curricula with the spirit of critical thinking and independent inquiry, so as to
counteract the demagogic, simplified appeals to emotion and group-thinking often
used by radicalising agents. This may be instilled through the study of critical and
creative thinking, rhetoric and logic and the healthy and balanced inclusion of
competitive sports in educational streams among other mediums for self-expression.
With regards to examining educational curricula and practices, the pertinent question
of the role of religious re-education in de-radicalisation programs arises, where it may
perhaps be more strategic to not only target those affected by radical teachings but to
also identify sources of such teachings within mainstream society. More often than
not, radical teachings hijack existing socio-religious narratives that have not been
protected through additional steps that ensure, distinguish or safeguard them on a
doctrinal and ideological level from extremist perversions and manipulation. This may
require a renewed perspective on concepts of Jihad, Takfir, social injustice, just war,
political and religious legitimacy, and violence.
Moreover, when taking the challenge into a broader context, there is a definite need
for dynamic disengagement and de-radicalisation models that adapt not only to
targeted ideologies, but to individuals themselves. This in turn necessitates
comprehensive studied counterterrorism approaches that balance psychometric,
security and socio-cultural considerations. Ultimately however, multi-level approaches
are limited by the existing level of political will and available resources OIC member
states may direct towards the problem of violent extremism. Given the myriad
consequences posed by violent extremism not only to public safety and national
security but to development efforts, education, public health and infrastructure
deterioration, there is a need to give greater weight to the threat of violent extremism
in policy. Moreover, given the role of violent extremism in undermining state
legitimacy and in drawing essential resources away from other fields of necessary
investment, a half-hearted effort at eliminating violent extremism and radicalism only
risks a prolonged, more cost-intensive effort given longer counter-terrorism campaign
times.
In this manner, there is a need for clear political signalling to crystallise public opinion
on the necessity of countering violent extremism, and the specific harm this
phenomenon poses to society. Aside from the crystallisation of public opinion, there is
a parallel need to study and engage with factors and attributes unique to specific
public audiences and cultures, specifically for the purpose of informing the
disengagement targets of comprehensive de-radicalisation programs. This should take
into context the unique role of family vis-à-vis a specific culture, concepts of shame and
social pressure, honour and so on. Additionally, de-radicalisation models need to
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internalize the potential effectiveness of providing social welfare or assistance to
inmates while they undergo de-radicalisation programs. This may serve as an effective
measure by developing some measure of rapport, cognitive dissonance or sympathy
towards the state; and effectively serve as an initial disengagement factor that may
lead to de-radicalisation. One other critical aspect includes the effective legitimacy and
perceived authority of religious scholars involved in de-radicalisation programs, given
the role of Takfiri rhetoric that ensures ideological immunity against interventions by
mainstream scholars.
De-radicalisation programs should also look to make use of former radical extremists,
a d seek to e gage ith i il so iet et o ks sha i g the p og a s ideals if o l to
multiply efforts on a larger scale. Elements critical to the success of de-radicalisation
programs however, include prison reform. This in turn necessitates ensuring the
separation of radicalized inmates from normal criminals, and treating de-radicalisation
subjects humanely; given the historical role prison abuse has had in producing strains
of hardened, increasingly extremist ideology. Aside from the previously noted role of
family welfare and support for the purpose of disengagement, the effectiveness of deradicalisation models must utilise the family as a stakeholder in robust follow-up
mechanisms for those program subjects that are given parole or pardon.
Taking a step back, and examining the role of radicalisation in fostering violent
extremism per se, it is worthy to note that all effective radicalisation processes invest
in developing initially easy commitment to a violent extremist group. This is followed
by progressively stronger commitments. In this context, de-radicalization as an
approach should target stages of radicalisatio he e the odel s i te e tio a still
provide an effective or feasible alternative to the material, emotional, psychological
and social benefits of belonging to a terrorist group. In this context, a dynamic strategy
is necessary where distinction is made between radicals that have reached the end of
the line for ideological and emotional rewards in return for commitment to the group.
There is moreover a need to ensure de- adi alisatio
odels d a i adapta ilit
towards distinctions such as education levels, varying levels of exposure, and the
critical difference between regular operatives and senior leadership, given the
variations between their respective roles and functions. In this regard, differences in
commitment, interest, ideology, justification and perhaps goals may be observed.
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Challenges & the Way Forward
The spectre of violent extremism requires effort on a variety of fronts to eliminate it. In
this domain the role of adaptive de-radicalisation programs cannot be understated. If
designed with effective adaptive review mechanisms coupled with the sharing of good
practices and individual member state experiences, de-radicalisation could gain much
in the way of established effective practice, and collective experience. Along this
parallel, there are a number of areas of interest to de-radicalisation programs that
could potentially be solved through bilateral or multilateral OIC member country
cooperation. This includes identifying the effects of cease-fires or ends to hostility on
group moral and cohesion, identifying and mapping triggers for regret or
disengagement across different radical leadership levels, as well as combining
theological and scholarly approaches with applied psychometrics and unified
psychological models or theories. Other points of interest include the differences and
similarities in de-radicalisation pathways between imprisoned de-radicalisation
subjects and the independent disengagement by former violent extremists.
Finally, through a methodical, critical approach engaged in a broader multilateral effort
to address the challenges of violent extremism, an OIC framework towards countering
violent extremism may be of use in establishing linkages for concerted efforts towards
uncovering a workable praxis for interoperable and replicable methods to not only
reverse radicalisation, but project and produce internal fragmentation within extremist
groups and dismantle their bases of support.
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