Turkey-EU Cooperation in the Arab World
Nathalie Tocci2012, in Yossi Alpher et al., Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean. Fostering Cooperation and Strengthening Relations, Gütersloh, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012, p. 41-48 (Europe in Dialogue 2012/03), ISSN 1868-5048
This paper sketches out the broad contours of potential EU-Turkey foreign policy cooperation in the Arab world, addressing the fields of diplomacy, aid, trade and security. In areas such as diplomacy, assistance and trade, there could be a useful division of labor between the two parties. In the field of security, as currently demonstrated by the unfolding drama in Syria, joint action would be warranted instead.
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The International Spectator, 2008
Yossi Alpher, Nilgün Arısan Eralp, Seçil Paçacı Elitok, Rana Deep Islam,
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Dorothée Schmid, Thomas Straubhaar, Nathalie Tocci
Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
Fostering Cooperation and Strengthening Relations
Europe in Dialogue 2012 | 03
Europe in Dialogue
Europeans can be proud as they look back on fifty years of peaceful integration. Nowadays many people worldwide see the European Union as a model of how states and their
citizens can work together in peace and freedom. However, this achievement does not
automatically mean that the EU has the ability to deal with the problems of the future
in a rapidly changing world. The European Union must continue developing its unity in
diversity dynamically, be it with regard to energy issues, the euro, climate change or new
types of conflict. Indeed, self-assertion and solidarity are key to the debates shaping our
future.
Bertelsmann Stiftung (ed.)
Advocating reforms targeting the goal of a constitutional democracy and socially responsible
market economy, the Transformation Index BTI
provides the framework for an exchange of best
practices among agents of reform. Within this
framework, the BTI publishes two rankings, the
Status Index and the Management Index, both of
which are based on in-depth assessments of 128
countries.
“Europe in Dialogue“ wishes to make a contribution to these open debates. The analyses in this series subject political concepts, processes and institutions to critical scrutiny
and suggest ways of reforming internal and external European policymaking so that it
is fit for the future. However, “Europe in Dialogue“ is not merely trying to encourage
an intra-European debate and makes a point of including authors from non-EU states.
Looking at an issue from different angle or from afar creates a shift in perspective which,
in turn, renders Europe‘s development more meaningful as it engages in critical dialogue
with other societies.
How successful are OECD countries in achieving
sustainable policy outcomes? How effectively do
governments in these countries steer change, and
to what extent do they engage civil society in the
process? In answering these questions, the 2011
edition of the Sustainable Governance Indicators
(SGI) aims to foster good governance and sustainable policy outcomes in the OECD by encouraging institutional learning through an exchange
of best practices. The authors argue that national
governments still have a considerably broad cope
of action in facing upcoming challenges.
ISSN 1868-5048
Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung, P.O. Box 103, 33311 Gütersloh, GERMANY
Fax +49 5241 81-681175, E-Mail: sabine.reimann@bertelsmann-stiftung.de
Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
Fostering Cooperation and Strengthening Relations
Yossi Alpher, Nilgün Arısan Eralp, Seçil Paçacı Elitok,
Rana Deep Islam, Ayhan Kaya, E. Fuat Keyman,
Ghassan Khatib, Ziad Majed, Almut Möller,
Dorothée Schmid, Thomas Straubhaar, Nathalie Tocci
Europe, Turkey and
the Mediterranean
Fostering Cooperation and Strengthening Relations
Europe in Dialogue 2012 | 03
© 2012 Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh
Editors:
Armando Garcia Schmidt, Joachim Fritz-Vannahme
Managing editors:
Christian-Peter Hanelt, Julia Seiler
Language editing/Translation:
Barbara Serfozo, Berlin
Layout:
Dieter Dollacker, Berlin
Cover photo:
iStockphoto
Print:
media and more GmbH, Gütersloh
ISSN:
1868-5048
www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de
New Proposals for Cooperation
in the Mediterranean …...…………………………………….……… 7
Christian-Peter Hanelt and Julia Seiler
Transformation Partners
The Possibility of a “Transformational Partnership“
Between Turkey and the EU: Will “Opportunity“
Become a Reality? ……………………………………..……….….… 15
Nilgün Arısan Eralp
Crossing Borders or Introvert Union?
The Euro Crisis and the European Union's
Relations with its Southern Neighbors …………….…......…… 25
Almut Möller
Turkey, Europe and the Arabs Next Door ……………………... 33
Ziad Majed
Turkey-EU Cooperation in the Arab World …………….……... 41
Nathalie Tocci
Conflict Resolution
Turkey and the Arab Spring in Light of
Regional Conflicts ………………………………….………………... 49
E. Fuat Keyman
Tensions in the Middle East and North Africa:
Can Turkey and the EU Come Along? …………………………... 59
Dorothée Schmid
Coaxing the EU and Turkey to Engage
with the Middle East …………………………………………..……... 69
Ghassan Khatib
Turkey, the EU and Regional Conflict Resolution:
An Israeli View ……………………………………………….…..…….. 77
Yossi Alpher
Migration Across the Mediterranean
Turkey as an Emerging Destination Country for Immigration:
Challenges and Prospects for the Future ………………..……... 85
Ayhan Kaya
Migration from Turkey to Europe:
Betwixt and Between? ………………………………..……………... 97
Seçil Paçacı Elitok and Thomas Straubhaar
From a Policy of Fear to a Policy of Potential:
Migration in a Cross-Mediterranean Context …………...…... 107
Rana Deep Islam
Authors …...……………………………………………..……..…….… 117
New Proposals for Cooperation in the Mediterranean
7
New Proposals for Cooperation
in the Mediterranean
Christian-Peter Hanelt and Julia Seiler
The remarkable developments underway across North Africa since
December 2010 continue to captivate observers worldwide. Tunisians,
Egyptians and Libyans have successfully ousted dictators and are pursuing
their desire to live in freedom, dignity and justice. Citizens and leaders in these
countries have been eager to organize elections and draft constitutional
processes. But they still need to deliver internal security and provide solutions
to socioeconomic inequalities.
From Morocco to Turkey
In spring 2011, as these changes were underway, the Bertelsmann Stiftung
held in Rabat, Morocco, its 13th Kronberg Talks. The conference focused on
recalibrating Europe‟s relations with its southern neighbors in light of the
ongoing upheavals in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. In the Europe in Dialogue
volume, The Future of the Mediterranean – Which Way for Europe and North Africa?,
published on the eve of the conference, the Bertelsmann Stiftung asked
renowned scholars and activists from North Africa to offer their opinion and
suggest actions Europe could – and should – take in order to support
transformation processes in the region.
Europe‟s quite late reaction to the Arab Uprising as well as the financial
crisis, however, have limited the EU‟s capability to act as transformation
partner. Cooperation with an effective partner would support Europe‟s efforts
and help restore its credibility in its immediate southern neighborhood.
8
Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
Turkey as a regional soft power
Turkey has for decades been a valuable partner for Europe. It also enjoys a
solid reputation and considerable influence among Arab and predominantly
Muslim countries. Since 2001, Turkey‟s new foreign and domestic policy
approach has facilitated its rise as a regional power and key actor in the Middle
East. Turkey intensified its relations with the EU and its individual member
states despite the stop-and-go EU accession process. At the same time, it
began looking eastward, strengthening ties with its direct neighbors and other
ascendent regional powers such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Having
experienced a severe economic crisis itself in 2002 and 2003, Turkey emerged
from the global financial crisis relatively unscathed, deepening its business and
trade relations with Europe and countries across the region from Russia to
(Central) Asia.
In 2001, Turkey‟s AKP (Justice and Development Party) successfully
integrated Islamist forces into an official party and the parliamentary system.
Following its electoral success in 2002, the governing AKP implemented
sound economic policies leading Turkey out of severe financial crisis. Indeed,
continued economic growth throughout the following years helped the party
win another electoral mandate in 2007.
In response to EU accession conditions, the AKP-led government
implemented several reforms in the early 2000s aimed at increasing
transparency and strengthening minority rights, the latter to a limited extent
only. The government even placed further constraints on the traditionally
strong influence of the Turkish armed forces – a noteworthy development in a
region where civilian control over military institutions is common. Parallel to
the military‟s retreat from political affairs, civil society organizations
flourished. Motivated by the prospect of EU membership, various institutions
and organizations have fought for individual and political rights, such as
freedom of expression, women‟s rights and political participation.
Despite continued shortcomings in areas related to freedom of expression
and minorities‟ rights, the positive developments witnessed in Turkey have
made the country a pioneer in a region dominated by non-democratic regimes.
In order to respond capably to the regional developments unleashed in 2011,
New Proposals for Cooperation in the Mediterranean
9
Europe must look eastward for a strategic partnership. The Bertelsmann
Stiftung was thus very pleased when the Istanbul Policy Center of the
renowned Sabancı University invited us to hold the 14th Kronberg Talks in
Istanbul in May of 2012 to discuss politics and development in the
Mediterranean with a focus on European-Turkish cooperation.
14th Kronberg Talks and Europe in Dialogue
Since the 2011 Kronberg Talks in Morocco and its related edition of Europe
in Dialogue, we have broadened our approach and examined the tasks that lay
ahead: transformation processes in the Arab World, regional conflicts in the
Middle East, and the opportunities and challenges inherent to migration across
the Mediterranean. These issues call for sustainable and well-coordinated
cooperation among several actors from different regions, each with different
backgrounds, experiences and abilities. It is therefore important we maintain a
continued dialogue in which each party involved can express itself open and
freely. This edition of Europe in Dialogue aims to provide authors from
Europe, Turkey, the Arab world and Israel the opportunity to voice a variety
of opinions and perspectives on European-Turkish cooperation in the context
of the Arab Uprising.
Transformation partners
The future of revolutionary Egypt, Tunisia and Libya continues to capture
global attention. In Libya, where the situation remains unstable, long-running
struggles and societal cleavages that predate Muammar al-Qadhafi‟s rule
continue to shape developments. Whereas things look quite promising in
Tunisia, establishing a constituent assembly in Egypt has proved to be a
sensitive issue between the military council, Islamist and secular parties.
Secular forces have driven revolutions, and elections are bringing Islamists to
power: these developments present a new challenge for Europe. How will
Islamist parties shape their foreign policies, in particular their policies toward
Europe? The EU, for its part, having called for expanded political
participation and democratic elections in these countries, must acknowledge
the Islamists‟ electoral victories if it is to remain credible. The example of
10
Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
Turkey illustrates how Islamist parties might successfully manage a state
economy while maintaining strong ties with the West.
Contributors Almut Möller (DGAP; Berlin), Ziad Majed (American
University of Paris), Nilgün Arısan Eralp (TEPAV, Ankara) and Nathalie
Tocci (IAI, Rome) explore these issues, elaborating on the opportunities and
obstacles inherent to cooperation between Turkey and the EU in supporting
developments in the Arab world. The authors agree that Turkey‟s diplomatic
skills, regional influence and its know-how in managing a staggering economy
are valuable contributions to a partnership that targets transformation. Indeed,
Turkey is well-positioned to shape things positively given its history,
predominantly Muslim population, and ongoing experience with political
transformation. Ziad Majed discusses within this context Turkey‟s flexible
foreign policy as facilitative of a collective European-Turkish initiative.
Europe, by contrast, has established specific policy instruments and
institutions in order to support development in its southern neighborhood.
One such instrument, the EU‟s customs union, is often highlighted as a
potentially effective means of supporting transformation in the region.
Advocating stronger foreign policy dialogue between Turkey and the EU,
Nathalie Tocci calls for the establishment of institutional mechanisms through
which a specific European-Turkish dialogue might take place. In addition to
these points, the authors also address potential stumbling blocks to TurkishEuropean cooperation, in particular the stalled EU accession process and the
EU‟s internal divisions. Noting the divisive impact of the euro crisis on the
EU, Almut Möller suggests here that a “two-speed” Europe could provide
individual European member states the opportunity to strengthen relations
with neighboring countries. Pointing to Turkey‟s popularity among its Arab
neighbors, Nilgün Arısan Eralp warns against the dangers of Turkey being
perceived as a dominant or hegemonic power among its Arab neighbors.
Given this and other factors such as stalled reforms in Turkey, she
underscores the need for institutionalized dialogue if joint efforts are to
succeed.
New Proposals for Cooperation in the Mediterranean
11
Conflict resolution
Reflections on the Arab Uprising must consider other regional
developments, such as the international struggle for change in Syria, the
dispute over the Iranian nuclear program and the ongoing conflict between
Israelis and Palestinians. Contributors Fuat Keyman (IPC, Istanbul), Dorothée
Schmid (IFRI, Paris), Ghassan Khatib (bitterlemons.org, Ramallah) and Yossi
Alpher (bitterlemons.org, Tel Aviv) take on these issues in discussing Turkey
and the EU as regional players in conflict resolution. Taking stock of
individual countries‟ priorities, they identify possible areas for fruitful EUTurkish cooperation. In her contribution, Dorothée Schmid points out how
the EU and Turkey, despite their shared interests of stability and security, do
not necessarily share the same objectives. They differ, for example, in their
(foreign) policy approaches to the plight of Cyprus or the Kurds, and in their
handling of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Focusing on this latter point, Yossi
Alpher also suggests that a stronger EU-US effort to get Turkey and Israel
closer together could be helpful. Ghassan Khatib, who criticizes Europe for
prioritizing short-term strategic goals at the expense of establishing genuine
stability in the Mediterranean, illustrates how Turkey‟s reputation for
trustworthiness tops that of Europe. He sees in regional partnerships with
institutions such as the Arab League an opportunity to undergird with greater
credibility both Turkey and Europe‟s efforts. Underscoring Turkey‟s unique
position, Fuat Keyman reminds us that citizens in Arab countries are reluctant
to accept a democratization process initiated by outside actors or controlled by
military forces.
Opportunities and challenges posed by migration
The third issue addressed in this Europe in Dialogue edition deals with
migration and the opportunities and challenges it poses for Europe, Turkey
and the Mediterranean. Countries in both Europe and the Mediterranean are
increasingly interlinked through the effects of countless migration processes.
Some 20 million people in the EU (4% of Europe‟s total population) do not
have European citizenship. According to the most recent eurostat figures
(Statistics in focus 34/2011), Turkish and Moroccan nationals represent the
largest number of foreigners living in the EU. The number of asylum-seekers
12
Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
in Europe has increased by 19 percent in 2011. According to the UNHCR, the
number of Tunisian nationals seeking asylum in Europe increased ninefold for
the same period, while claims by Libyans rose fivefold and claims by Syrian
nationals increased by an alarming 68 percent. By March 2012, 17,000 refugees
from Syria were registered in Turkish refugee camps.
Contributors Rana Islam (Berlin), Thomas Straubhaar and Seçil Paçacı
Elitok (HWWI, Hamburg) and Ayhan Kaya (Bilgi University, Istanbul)
address the situation of migrants in Turkey and the EU and the perception
within Arab countries of Turkish and European migration policies.
Highlighting problems of integration and issues of public debate, they explore
the attendant economic, political and cultural advantages to migration, calling
for a more open and positive attitude towards migrant populations. They
emphasize the benefits of circular temporary and regulated work migration in
decreasing illegal migration and reducing the demographic gap in Europe.
Rana Islam criticizes the effects of security interests in shaping migration
policies in many European coutries, which does little to mitigate the right-wing
extremism faced by an increasing number of immigrants in Europe. Ayhan
Kaya suggests that Turkey, as an important net migration country, could play a
key role in regulating circular migration. He therefore calls for an improved
Turkish immigration policy and the need for a public debate on migration.
Thomas Straubhaar and Seçil Paçacı Elitok, noting Turkey‟s prospective shift
from being a labor exporter to a labor importer country, support the idea of a
comprehensive, far-sighted migration policy for Turkey and Europe.
We would like to express our thanks to all those who have supported us in
compiling this edition. We thank the authors for contributing their ideas and
time to this edition and the conference. We owe a particular debt of gratitude
to Ahmet Evin and his team at the Istanbul Policy Center for their energetic
and invaluable support. Ahmet Evin proved integral to the process with his
valuable input and recommendations of Turkish scholars. We thank as well
Barbara Serfozo and Mehmet Beşikçi for their editorial efforts with the
English and Turkish versions of this edition, and Dieter Dollacker for his
support with layout and graphics. Last but certainly not least, we want to
thank Ruth Martens, who supported us during the editing process with
valuable comments and contributed to this introduction.
New Proposals for Cooperation in the Mediterranean
13
Before passing the baton to our authors, please allow us to briefly highlight
some of the recommendations offered here on how the EU and Turkey might
support sustainable development in the Mediterranean.
Key points at a glance
Transformation partners
• In order to support transformation in Arab countries and the resolution of
regional conflicts, Europe and Turkey should act in accordance with their
respective strengths. Whereas Europe has the necessary expertise and
established institutional frameworks for multilateral cooperation (i.e.,
European Neighborhood Policy, European-Mediterranean Partnership,
Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), enlargement policy and transformation
partnerships), Turkey is a flexible and credible actor in the region. It is a
valuable source of inspiration for its neighbors, thanks to its own experience
with democratization and development.
• Existing institutions of cooperation (UfM) should be strengthened to
support the dialogue between various actors and carry out measures
targeting capacity-building.
• Carefully planned and implemented investments, free-trade agreements and
the expansion of the customs union to the southern Mediterranean
countries could support economic and migration policies.
• Second-track diplomacy should foster civil society cooperation parallel to
official or intergovernmental agreements.
Paying better attention to the needs specific to a country will help prevent
regional NGOs from being overburdened.
14
Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
Conflict resolution
• Europe and Turkey should avoid double standards: security and economic
interests should not be prioritized over human rights and democracy.
• Europe and Turkey should be more adamant in seeking peaceful solutions
to the Middle East conflict and the controversy over the Iranian nuclear
program.
• Cooperation with regional actors like the Arab League is essential in order to
avoid perceptions of hegemonic powers afoot in the region.
Migration across the Mediterranean
• Differentiating accurately between Islam and Islamism is crucial to fostering
sound foreign policies and sensible integration debates. Reflecting upon
commonly used terminology will help battle stereotypes and right-wing
extremism from taking hold.
• Europe should establish a common, far-sighted and strategic migration
policy instead of a fortress policy.
• Circular migration policies and a target-oriented migration policy could help
mitigate illegal migration. Turkey, as an important transit country, could play
a crucial role in these efforts.
• Migrants‟ countries of destination could benefit from providing immigrants
a good educational framework.
The Possibility of a “Transformational Partnership”
15
The Possibility of a “Transformational Partnership”
between Turkey and the EU: Will “Opportunity”
Become Reality?
Nilgün Arısan Eralp
Although both Turkey and the European Union have accepted the need to
respond to the turbulent transformation process in the Arab world – albeit
with a certain amount of delay – they have not yet approached the region
jointly, an alternative offering the opportunity to craft a more effective, valuebased and forward-looking strategy (Soler i Lecha 2011: 27). Indeed, the EU
and Turkey as yet lack any institutionalized process of dialogue regarding the
transformation in the Arab world, much less a combined strategy. However,
the two have both a historical responsibility and a present-day opportunity to
act together by combining their energies and potential in the design of a new
policy toward the region. The transformation in the Arab world will not only
check the attractiveness and transformative power of the post-enlargement
EU and change the dynamics of Turkey‟s relationship with the Union, but will
also test the new role Turkey has sought for itself in the Middle East (Krastev
2011: 1).
Turkey’s present instruments and strategies for supporting
Arab countries undergoing transformation
In examining Turkey‟s present efforts to support Arab countries undergoing
transformation, instruments are more clearly discernible than strategies per se.
The main factors driving government behavior in this area include the
country‟s newly active foreign policy within its region and its increasing
attempts to “lead by example.” The regime‟s guiding idea seems to be to serve
as a “source of inspiration” or to provide a “demonstrative effect” (Ülgen
2011b: 1).
16
Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
As Daniel Dombey pointed out in a Financial Times article titled “Turkish
Diplomacy: An Attentive Neighbor” on 26 February 2012, “not since the fall
of the Ottoman Empire nine decades ago has Turkey played a more active role
in the Middle East and beyond.” This active policy, which has also been
described as a “sea change” (Tocci and Walker 2010: 1), started with Turkey
playing a more significant role as a regional mediator, followed by a diplomatic
activism enhanced by economic and trade links and a liberal visa policy toward
nearby countries (Soler i Lecha 2011: 27). The declared objective was to
promote a stable and prosperous neighborhood through encouraging greater
economic integration between Turkey and the Arab world (Kirişci 2011a: 43),
putting a special emphasis on the free movement of people.
This essentially autonomous foreign policy has been shaped by a number of
broad international currents, including the end of the Cold War and the
world‟s emerging multipolarity, the events following 9/11, the U.S. invasion of
and withdrawal from Iraq, the fragile nature of global economic system, the
exclusion of Turkey from Europe‟s architecture by some EU member states
and the subsequent stalling of EU accession negotiations, and finally the
vacuum in the region created by the reduction of U.S. influence. All these
factors have redefined Turkey‟s geopolitical situation and increased the
regional emphasis in its foreign policy (Kardaş 2011: 34).
However, in the environment created by the recent transformations in the
Arab world, conditions have become less conducive to autonomous action
(Özel 2012: 4), especially as the number of cases necessitating multilateral
action and assistance (such as Libya and Syria) has increased. This has again
brought Turkey closer to its Western partners. The rising number of other
actors competing for influence in the region, with Iran and Russia serving as
prominent examples, has played a significant role in this rapprochement.
In this context, although Turkey has adopted a pro-democracy position visà-vis the transformation in the Arab world, it lacks an explicit strategy toward
this end. Yet even in the absence of such a strategy, Turkey has exerted a
definite appeal for countries going through uncertain transformations.
Affinities in the areas of religion and culture have played a crucial role in this
regard, although other important factors are also in play.
The Possibility of a “Transformational Partnership”
17
A recent survey covering 16 Middle Eastern countries by the Turkish
Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), an Istanbul-based think
tank, showed Turkey to be the most highly regarded country in the eyes of the
people of the region (Akgün and Gündoğar 2012: 21). Interestingly enough, in
survey respondents‟ citation of the country as a model for the region, as its
future economic leader and as the country that contributes most to peace,
Turkey‟s Muslim identity was only the third most important factor, behind the
fact of its democratic rule and its working economy.
Turkey‟s “demonstrative effect” operates through its economic performance
and liberal trade policies, accompanied by its liberal visa policy (Kirişci 2011:
46). On the other hand, being “a country with a predominantly Muslim
population which can fully implement the core values driving the Arab Spring:
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the protection of minorities”
clearly plays a crucial role (Verheugen 2012: 3). To a considerable extent,
Turkey owes the establishment of these values within its domestic sphere to its
EU accession process, which has served as an important catalyst in the
country‟s recent political, economic and social transformation.
It is hence clear that Turkey‟s appeal in the region is an important
instrument, and that the country‟s EU accession process has played a
significant role in the construction of this appeal, alongside the country‟s own
economic performance and political model. In order to convert this appeal to
political leverage within the region, Turkey should share its experience in areas
such as political reform, economic reform and institution building, thus
contributing to economic growth and sustainable democratization in the
region.
Where could the EU and Turkey cooperate?
The European Union has long struggled to promote democratic reform and
economic modernization in North Africa and the Middle East, typically by
engaging in regional cooperation and trade liberalization in the form of
bilateral association agreements. Although it largely failed to achieve its
regional objectives, the EU has been motivated by the belief that establishing
18
Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
EU norms and practices in the Mediterranean would reduce the significant
economic and political gap between the EU and countries in the region (Soler
i Lecha 2011: 27).
Since 1995, when the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) was created,
the EU has implemented specific policies geared toward the Mediterranean
region; however, these have not included policies similar to the EU project
itself.
From the EMP‟s initiation in 1995 to the 2004 incorporation of
Mediterranean countries into the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and
the 2008 launch of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) as a replacement
for the EMP, and even in the case of the “Partnership for Democracy and
Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean” of 2011, the European
Union has struggled to find a successful framework and strategy for relations
with its Mediterranean partners. The various efforts have in many respects
sought to complement one another: The ENP focuses on EU‟s bilateral
relations with each partner, for example, while the EMP and its successor
UfM have provided forums where all the countries can meet together.
Unfortunately, these policies have not successfully closed the region‟s
income and democratic-governance gap with the European Union. Indeed,
they even served to strengthen authoritarian regimes (Grant 2011: 1), resulting
in a loss of credibility for the EU in the region. The main weakness of the
UfM and its predecessor EMP was a focus on states or governments, with
comparatively less emphasis on private sector and NGO development. On the
other hand, ENP has focused extensively on improving the economic
environment rather than putting any significant emphasis on the promotion of
democracy, human rights or the rule of law.
Consequently, the European Union has decided that in creating a regional
policy better adapted to the current circumstances, it should offer more in
terms of “money, markets and mobility,” while implementing stricter terms of
conditionality (Grant 2011: 2).
Taking all these past weaknesses into consideration, the EU has responded
to the transformation in the Arab world with 2011‟s “Partnership for
Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean.” The
The Possibility of a “Transformational Partnership”
19
emphasis of this program is on democratic transformation and institution
building through person-to-person contact, as well as urban and rural
development through the improvement of educational and health systems.
Further areas of engagement include the protection of fundamental freedoms,
constitutional and judiciary reform, and the fight against corruption
(Schumacher 2011: 109).The approach taken to implementation is one of
“more for more and less for less,” in the sense that delivery of aid is to be
conditional on performance in the areas of democracy and human rights. In
other words, unlike in the past, the EU aims this time to associate a strict
conditionality with its aid.
Despite its weaknesses, the EU‟s greatest asset at the moment is the rich
expertise regarding the North Africa and Middle East region acquired through
the pursuit of its previous policies. There is wide consensus that these policies
have enabled the EU to acquire financial and institutional resources that
Turkey lacks. Conversely, Turkey enjoys a level of popularity within the Arab
public that the EU has lost over the last decades. It would thus be wise for the
EU and Turkey to combine their strengths, as both parties have an interest in
fostering economic development as well as a sustainable pattern of broader
development within their joint neighborhood. This gives the two parties a
foundation on which to build working cooperation in the region.
Although the European Union has not itself been regarded as a political
model within the Arab world, European or universal values have played a
significant role in establishing Turkey as a source of inspiration. Arab
protesters do not regard European societies as a model for imitation, but
during the uprisings they have demanded that important European values and
norms such as democracy, freedom and an end to corruption be respected –
all of which have to a certain extent been established in Turkey through the
country‟s EU accession process. These are also the norms that the European
Union has long aspired to institutionalize in these countries. The primary areas
of engagement within the EU‟s new strategic approach to the area –
specifically, protection for fundamental freedoms, constitutional and judicial
reform, and the fight against corruption – have long been important
constituents of Turkey‟s own transformation process, again due to the EU
20
Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
accession process. For this reason, Turkey‟s appeal in the region gives it the
potential to fill Europe‟s “credibility gap” (Soler i Lecha 2011: 27).
In the above-noted TESEV survey, respondents were asked whether a
Turkish accession to the EU would benefit the Union in the region overall.
“Sixty percent of respondents said Turkish accession would have a positive
effect on the EU‟s regional role” (Akgün and Gündoğar 2012: 22).
Hence, cooperation between EU and Turkey would seem to have the
potential to create a positive political and economic transformation in the
Arab world, particularly if the parties can strengthen reformist forces in the
Arab countries by developing projects that aim at grassroots-level capacity
building. Turkey‟s business community and civil society can play an
instrumental role toward this end. The declared willingness of the EU and
Turkey to cooperate more closely in their foreign policy toward the region
shows promise in this sense, although there has as yet been no sign of a joint
strategy or even the establishment of a process of working dialogue on the
issue.
While Turkey‟s recent economic and political transformation process offers
a very good showcase for the establishment of EU norms in the region, the
country‟s customs union with the EU could also be very useful (Ülgen
October 2011: 2). If this experience could be extended to the region as a
whole, replacing the EU‟s free trade agreements with individual Arab
countries, it might initiate a process of economic integration able to trigger
much-needed economic growth in addition to political transformation.
Possible obstacles to successful partnership
Although the prospect of an EU-Turkey strategic partnership vis-à-vis the
Arab world holds strong potential for the stimulation of sustainable
democratization and economic growth, significant obstacles to any such
cooperation may yet stem from the EU, from Turkey and/or from the
relations between them.
The Possibility of a “Transformational Partnership”
21
Internal EU problems such as the euro crisis, persistent threats to the
Union‟s economic and financial foundations, and the potential collapse of the
Schengen system (Soler i Lecha 2011: 29) could disrupt an otherwise
successful partnership between Turkey and the EU. The EU financial crisis
might easily limit the amount of money allocated to new policy toward the
Arab world. On the other hand, the (already extant) risk of an immense inflow
of illegal migrants and the specter of Islamic fundamentalism could easily
result in widespread objections within the European public to the provision of
additional EU support to the Arab world.
Another potential impediment to efficient partnership between EU and
Turkey stems from shortcomings in the construction of EU‟s foreign policy.
EU countries in many cases lack consensus, making it difficult to arrive at a
joint strategy. Unless there is efficient coordination of member state policies,
bilateral problems between Turkey and any individual member state could
undermine joint activity between the broader Union and Turkey toward the
Arab world.
Turkey‟s vulnerability as a source of inspiration is another factor that could
become a serious disruption in any partnership between the EU and Turkey.
This vulnerability stems both from the slowdown in Turkey‟s domestic
political reform process and the instability of its economic performance.
Turkish democratization is still a work in progress, and has suffered serious
recent setbacks, particularly in the areas of fundamental freedoms and the rule
of law. If such a situation were to persist, it would seriously undermine the
country‟s transformative power in the region. In addition, the Turkish
economy‟s sensitivity to rising oil prices and dependence on the performance
of EU economies both comprise risk factors in the country‟s ability to assist
Arab countries during the difficult period of transformation.
Turkey‟s fragile democratization process is closely linked with its EU
accession process, which has been stalled for several years. In principle, the
initiation of accession negotiations constitutes the beginning of an irreversible
process in which the candidate country‟s membership prospects become
gradually clearer over time. However, this has not been the case for Turkey
(Arısan Eralp 2011: 1), as half of its negotiation chapters have been blocked
for political reasons. Although Turkey has been engaged in accession
22
Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
negotiations for more than six years, joining the EU has domestically become
almost a non-issue, with the accession debate today having very little effect on
internal transformation processes. This situation presents the most serious risk
to foreign policy cooperation with the European Union “unless there is a
boost to accession negotiations, or at the very least, EU movement toward
visa liberalization with Turkey” (Soler i Lecha 2011: 29).
More broadly, Turkey itself should seek to avoid repeating the mistakes of
the European Union‟s previous Middle East and North Africa policies, which
were torn between upholding Europe‟s values and its interests, and ultimately
failed to deliver the promised “money, markets and mobility.” As noted by
Charles Grant, “many EU leaders perceived an inevitable contradiction
between Europe‟s values and its interests, and chose to prioritize the latter”
(Grant 2011:1). Turkey should avoid falling into this trap, and avoid behaving
as a regional superpower seeking to dominate others. Any such behavior has
the potential to remind neighbors of the negative legacy of Turkey‟s imperial
past (Verheugen 2012: 3). Rather, it can play an important role by serving as a
source of inspiration that offers assistance, shares best practices and gives
guidance.
Looking ahead
As the Arab world‟s transformation evolves in the direction of creating
economically prosperous and democratic countries, it is increasingly obvious
that this process can best be helped through transnational cooperation
(Bishara 2012: 19). Given the complicated and uncertain nature of the
transformation in the Middle East and North Africa, as well as the scope of
the opportunities at stake, both Turkey and the European Union feel a
responsibility to help restore respect for human rights, support a sustainable
democratization process and contribute to economic growth in the region. A
successful regional policy partnership between the EU and Turkey would
strengthen both parties‟ positions. However, the significant potential
underlying any such partnership can be realized only if dialogue between the
parties is institutionalized. If this fails to take place, each party will be “torn
between being a relevant actor in the region and a simple spectator that
The Possibility of a “Transformational Partnership”
23
continues to be overwhelmed by local and regional political developments”
(Schumacher 2011: 108).
References
Akgün, Mensur and Sabiha Senyücel Gündoğar. “The Perception of Turkey in the Middle
East 2011.” Istanbul: TESEV Foreign Policy Program. February 2012.
http://www.tesev.org.tr/Upload/Publication/8df416b2-6026-4af7-bbc9ba90954e7b3b/Perception%20of%20Turkey%202011_IIBASIM.pdf
Arısan Eralp, Nilgün. “Turkey-EU Relations: Has It Become a Hopeless Case?” Istanbul:
TEPAV, 2011.
http://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/13194377600.Turkey_____EU_Relations_Has_It_Become_a_Hopeless_Case.pdf
Bishara, Marwan. The Invisible Arab. New York: Nation Books, 2012.
Grant, Charles. “A New Neighbourhood Policy for the EU.” London: Centre for European
Reform, 2011. http://www.cer.org.uk/publications/archive/policy-brief/2011/newneighbourhood-policy-eu
Kardaş, Şaban. “Turkish-American relations in the 2000s: Revisiting the Basic Parameters
of Partnership?” Perceptions 16 (3): 25–52, 2011.
Kirişci, Kemal. “Comparing the Neighborhood Policies of Turkey and the EU in the
Mediterranean.” In Turkey: Reluctant Mediterranean Partner, edited by Natalie Tocci,
Meliha Altunisik and Kemal Kirişci. Washington, D.C.: German Marshall Fund,
Mediterranean Paper Series, February 2011a: 23–46.
-------. “Turkey‟s Demonstrative Effect and the Transformation of the Middle East.”
Insight Turkey 13 (2): 33–55, 2011b.
Krastev, Ivan. “Arab revolutions, Turkey‟s dilemmas: zero chance for zero problems.”
Open Democracy. 2011. http://www.opendemocracy.net/ivan-krastev/arabrevolutions-turkey%E2%80%99s-dilemmas-zero-chance-for-zero-problems
Özel, Soli. “Waves, Ways and Historical Turns: Turkey‟s Strategic Quest.” Washington,
D.C.: German Marshall Fund, 2012. http://www.gmfus.org/archives/waves-ways-andhistorical-turns-turkeys-strategic-quest
Schumacher, Tobias. “The EU and the Arab Spring: Between Spectatorship and
Actorness.” Insight Turkey 13 (3): 107–119, 2011.
24
Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
Soler i Lecha, Eduard. “The EU, Turkey, and the Arab Spring: From Parallel Approaches
to a Joint Strategy?” In Turkey and the Arab Spring: Implications for Turkish Foreign Policy
From a Transatlantic Perspective, edited by Nathalie Tocci, Ömer Taşpınar et al.
Washington, D.C.: German Marshall Fund Mediterranean Paper Series, 2011: 25–34.
Tocci, Nathalie and Joshua Walker. “The Sea Change in Turkey‟s Middle Eastern Policy.”
Open Democracy. 2010. http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/nathalie-toccijoshua-walker/sea-change-in-turkeys-middle-eastern-policy
Ülgen, Sinan. “A Faster, Better Route to Economic Integration Across The
Mediterranean.” Brussels: Carnegie International Economic Bulletin, October 13,
2011a.
-------. “From Inspiration to Aspiration. Turkey in the New Middle East.” Brussels:
Carnegie Europe, The Carnegie Papers, December 2011b.
Verheugen, Günter. “Meeting the Geopolitical Challenges of the Arab Spring : A Call for a
joint EU-Turkish Agenda.” TEPAV: International Policy and Leadership Institute,
Turkey Policy Brief Series, 2012. http://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/13280024649.Meeting_the_Geopolitical_Challenges_of_the_Arab_Spring_A_Call_for_a_joint_EU
_Turkish_Agenda.pdf
The Euro Crisis and the EU’s Relations with its Southern Neighbors
25
Crossing Borders or Introvert Union?
The Euro Crisis and the EU’s Relations
with its Southern Neighbors
Almut Möller
A year and a half into the Arab awakening, the European Union is facing a
dual challenge. The first challenge has to do with the Union itself: The
financial, economic and sovereign debt crises and the loss of competitiveness
of a number of EU member countries have called into question the Union‟s
prosperity, its economic and social cohesion, and even its attractiveness for
both its citizens and potential new members.
The second challenge to the European Union is an external one, resulting
from the Arab awakening and the changing political landscapes in the
southern Mediterranean. Since early 2011, EU countries have been facing a
new order emerging in their southern neighborhood – an order that at least
for the time being hardly looks “ordered.”
In this essay I will examine the links between these challenges, and explore
what impact the internal state of the European Union has on its external
relations with its southern neighbors. While both the internal and the external
challenges entail a great deal of uncertainty and even risk, I will argue that they
also offer opportunities for a true renewal of the Union‟s relations with its
neighbors – a renewal that may help the EU continue to deliver on its promise
of peace and prosperity for its citizens.
The impact of the Euro crisis on the EU’s internal
cohesion: Toward a new “two-speed” Europe
As of the time of writing, in the spring of 2012, there is cautious optimism
within the EU‟s capitals that the most acute symptoms of the sovereign debt
26
Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
crisis in Greece and other euro zone countries have been successfully
addressed. Apart from addressing immediate crisis issues, EU countries agreed
to reinforce existing rules and establish new ones aimed at limiting future
accumulation of sovereign debt, which was widely (though not unanimously)
considered one of the main roots of the crisis.
However, even after two years of great distress, the EU and its members
cannot simply slip from crisis mode into a state of “normality.” While austerity
has been the word of the day for the last two years, the challenge now is to
reestablish growth, jobs and competitiveness. In this task, several questions
remain outstanding: How can EU members strengthen the Union so that it
again manages to compete successfully in a globalized world increasingly
shaped by emerging powers? Is what has been branded the “European model”
– knowledge-based economies committed to social cohesion and
environmental sustainability – still affordable? Now that the most acute crisis
phase seems to be over, these fundamental issues remain to be addressed.
Although the answer to the crisis has become “more Europe, not less,” EU
nation-states remain hesitant to give up or share additional competences in
economic and social affairs at the supranational level. And throughout the
crisis, centrifugal forces have intensified across the European Union. The
United Kingdom and the Czech Republic, which decided not to sign the new
“Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and
Monetary Union” adopted in March 2012 – the former country even forcing
other EU members into a legal solution outside of the Lisbon Treaty – are the
most vivid examples, but clearly not the only ones. Across the Union,
euroskepticism is on the rise, and anti-EU campaigns are gaining ground.
It is fair to ask whether the Union of 27 members has reached the limits of
its governability. It will clearly be even more difficult to steer the Union in the
future. It was against this background that 17 members of the euro zone
ultimately decided to act on their own, and in the course of the fall of 2011
agreed to move toward a “real” fiscal union. For now, the steps being taken in
this direction look rather timid, but they will set a course for further activity in
the years to come. Under the pressure of the crisis, the euro zone has finally
started to complete its dysfunctional economic and monetary union.
The Euro Crisis and the EU’s Relations with its Southern Neighbors
27
Eight non-euro members declared that they want to stay as close as they can
to the euro zone “core,” but this cannot mask the fact that being “in” or “out”
of the euro zone matters. And it will matter even more in the future, when
new modes of governance within the euro zone show their impact.
Consequently, there is a risk that the gap between the “core” and the
periphery, between the “ins” and the “outs” of the euro zone, will increasingly
widen.
How much asynchronicity can the European Union of 27 members handle?
Clearly, the internal coherence of the EU-27 will be challenged by this
development. But the prospect of a two-speed Europe might not be such a
bad thing for the relationship between the European Union and its neighbors.
A looser periphery within the EU might create new opportunities for the
external periphery of the Union.
A two-speed EU might actually be able to deal much better with the
countries in its neighborhood than the EU-27 does at present, because the
neighbors could more easily become part of a wider European Union
essentially defined by the common market.
However, much depends on whether the EU continues a policy of
introversion as a response to the crisis in the years ahead, or instead embraces
its changing southern neighborhood with fresh ideas for closer cooperation.
External relations in times of austerity:
Toward an ever more introverted Union?
How will the crisis impact the European Union‟s foreign policy? First and
foremost, the Union has lost a great deal of credibility and attractiveness over
the last two years, not only among its own citizens but also in its
neighborhood and around the world. The European Union was once viewed
with great interest from both inside and outside its borders, and the prospect
of neighborly relations – or in Turkey‟s case, accession to the Union – was a
policy offer that appealed to many leaders and citizens in the southern
neighborhood.
28
Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
Today, many depict the European Union as obsolete, torn apart by widening
internal gaps and deficient institutions. Within the Arab neighborhood, many
forces formerly in the opposition blame the EU for having prioritized stability
interests over its avowed values, cooperating with and thereby perpetuating
the power of the old regimes.
European foreign policy must currently operate within the context of this
perception. And indeed, its effects have already begun to limit the clout of the
EU‟s external action (see the findings of the European Foreign Policy
Scorecard 2012, published by the European Council on Foreign Relations).
Furthermore, efforts to strengthen EU foreign policy, an objective declared
by EU members only recently to be a high priority, have lost momentum. EU
governments are largely focused on economic and financial issues, and foreign
policy has all but fallen off the radar. Of course, this is not to suggest that EU
members altogether lack a foreign policy at the moment. But the impetus to
strengthen joint EU approaches has lost steam in many of the EU‟s capitals,
despite the promises of the Lisbon Treaty.
EU members‟ intervention in Libya, complicated by Germany‟s March 2011
U.N. Security Council opposition to military action, is a good example. So too
has been the hesitance to further develop the foreign and security instruments
laid down in the Lisbon Treaty (for instance, by engaging in permanent
structured cooperation), or the apparent lack of vision in making use of the
new External Action Service. EU governments currently appear rather
unimaginative when it comes to EU foreign policy – precisely at a point in
time when creative thinking is needed with regard to the Union‟s southern
neighborhood, which has begun a transition toward a new, largely uncertain
future.
Is it only a question of time before the dust settles over the euro crisis and
EU governments again devote more time and resources to a Union foreign
policy? Unfortunately, this is far from assured. It is not only the euro zone
countries most affected by the crisis that have started to make serious budget
cuts. In states across the European Union, austerity measures have been
adopted that will mean less money available for expenditure on foreign and
defense issues in the future. While this development will indeed require that
The Euro Crisis and the EU’s Relations with its Southern Neighbors
29
more rather than less cooperation take place at the EU level, politically
speaking the pressure on EU governments to cooperate has not yet been high
enough to compensate for the national cuts.
Clearly, this is not a promising development with respect to the EU‟s
foreign and security policy vis-à-vis its southern neighborhood. For example,
if another Libya-like scenario in the southern neighborhood were to emerge,
EU countries are not currently able to plan and carry out military interventions
on their own. Even more importantly, they probably will not be able to do so in
the future. Moreover, the United States has become much more selective in its
engagement in the Middle East and North Africa region. The EU‟s security
relationship with Turkey retains considerable potential, but has not yet
launched properly.
In engaging with its southern neighbors, the European Union has had
recourse to a number of specific foreign policy instruments carried out largely
by EU institutions – notably the European Commission and the European
External Action Service (EEAS) – rather than by national governments. These
include enlargement policy (in the case of Turkey), the country-specific
European Neighborhood Policy (covering Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan,
Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria and
Tunisia), and the interregional approach of the Barcelona Process/Union for
the Mediterranean (UfM).
However, none of these policy approaches has proved particularly
successful so far. For a number of reasons within both the EU and Turkey,
the prospects for Turkish EU membership have changed rather dramatically
since the launch of accession negotiations in October 2005. As a response to
the Arab awakening, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) was revised
in 2011 (see the joint communications of the High Representative and the
Commission “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the
Southern Mediterranean” of 8 March 2011, and “A New Response to a
Changing Neighborhood” of 25 May 2011).
According to these documents, the Union wants to focus its southern ENP
on three “Ms”: money, mobility and markets (for a comprehensive overview
30
Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
of the measures taken by the EU following the Arab uprisings see “The EU‟s
Response to the Arab „Spring,‟ MEMO 11/918, 16 December 2011).
But even though the European Union has increased its overall level of
spending, loans and investment in its southern neighborhood since 2011,
numbers suggest that this will not be enough to raise the southern ENP to a
qualitatively new level. Promises of mobility (in the form of legal migration)
and market access are even more questionable for the time being. Visa
liberalization is a sensitive issue within the EU, and only time will tell if the
proposed deep and comprehensive free trade agreements (DCFTAs) will ever
be realized, or will significantly improve southern Mediterranean countries‟
access to the EU‟s common market.
Finally, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) was largely invisible when
the Arab awakening started to unfold, and has remained so ever since, despite
the growing need for a regional forum for exchange between EU countries
and the southern Mediterranean. It is fair to argue that the UfM was never
meant to be a political forum, but was rather aimed at facilitating expert
cooperation on practical issues such as cleaning up the Mediterranean.
However, if there had been a flourishing Euro-Mediterranean expert
community at the end of 2010, it might have been able to play a bigger role
over the last year and a half in facilitating dialogue and setting up new projects.
Thus, while one has to acknowledge that after the initial stumbles of some
of its members – most prominently, France – the EU did develop a response
to the Arab awakening rather quickly, it is questionable whether the two
documents of March and May 2011 live up to their promise of being a strategic
response.
Crossing borders: Fresh ideas for the
Mediterranean neighborhood
A strategic response to the Arab awakening and to the changing context of
EU-Turkish relations would require a depth similar to that of the European
Union‟s response to the fall of the Berlin Wall. At that time, the Union
The Euro Crisis and the EU’s Relations with its Southern Neighbors
31
adopted enlargement as the strategic tool used to transform the central and
eastern European countries, most of which are today EU members.
This is not to suggest that the European Union should offer the ENP
countries the kind of membership it once offered to Hungary, Poland or
Lithuania – and indeed, to Turkey.
But the Union‟s response to the changes in its southern neighborhood
should take a longer strategic view than what has been adopted by the EU‟s
institutions to date. This is where the member state governments have to
come in. This is a time for politics, not for the regulatory approaches on which
both enlargement policy and the ENP are based.
The question I want to put is in fact rather simple, and bridges the
European Union‟s internal and external challenges: To what extent can the
EU find solutions to its internal malaise through new modes of cooperation
with its southern neighbors? Trade, technology, energy, security,
demographics and natural resources are only some of the issues that
necessarily underlie any such debate. The question is whether, two years into
the European crisis, the EU and its members are willing and capable of
engaging in fresh, bold, out-of-the-box thinking.
For the last decade, the narrative regarding the southern Mediterranean has
been predominantly negative, focusing largely on security concerns. Despite
the neighborhood‟s uncertain future (and giving particular credit to those
countries that have embarked on a process that may yield more open political
systems and societies), can the European Union‟s members develop a positive
narrative for their neighborly relations with the south Mediterranean? Crossing
the conceptual borders that limited the old neighborhood models and
developing a new vision for cooperation might give the stumbling Union a
much-needed boost.
For the southern neighbors in turn, it might be useful to start thinking of
the European Union in a new way: As a result of the crisis, the EU is no
longer a monolithic bloc (which in fact it never really was). During the course
of 2011, the Union cemented and even accelerated its move toward a “two
speed” Europe, with the euro zone forging ahead toward fiscal union. Let us
assume for the moment it will succeed. This allows the other 10 EU members
32
Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
to form a periphery with different levels of ambition. In this context, the
European Union‟s neighbors should take the opportunity to think (or rethink)
where they want their place to be in terms of relations with the new European
Union.
Turkey, Europe and the Arabs Next Door
33
Turkey, Europe and the Arabs Next Door
Ziad Majed
The “Turkish model” of governance for export to the Arab world has
become the subject of a growing number of conversations. This is due to
Turkey‟s experience with, on the one hand, a strong military that once played a
decisive political role and, on the other, a party with an Islamic identity elected
to govern the country according to an agreed separation between religion and
the state.
Following the outbreak of the Arab Spring, Tunisia and Egypt organized
their first-ever free, multiparty elections. Elections in Morocco, organized at
the same time, resulted in an electoral breakthrough for the Muslim
Brotherhood. Comparisons between these countries and Turkey thus
increased in parallel with growing talk about the Turkish democratic
experience, the moderation exercised by the Turkish AKP, the ruling party,
and the need to draw lessons from Turkey‟s experience.
The following pages are an attempt to explain how Turkey‟s role as a nonArab actor in the region has evolved to represent an alternative to the region‟s
other non-Arab actor, Iran. It is also an exploration of what may inspire ArabTurkish relations, especially in terms of improving Turkish-European
cooperation within the Mediterranean basin.
The Middle East, 2003 – 2010
For a number of years, the influence of Arab states in the formulation of
policies and alliances within the Middle East has eroded while the roles played
by Iran and Turkey in this regard have expanded. This shift took place as
America began to play a more direct role with the Iraq war in 2003. However,
in the last three years, America‟s engagement in the region has diminished as
the U.S. military has begun to withdraw its troops from Iraq, and the Obama
34
Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
administration has proved unable to revitalize the stalled peace process
between Palestinians and Israelis.
By contrast, during the period from 2003 to 2009, Iran appeared to be
advancing its political interests and expanding its influence throughout the
region. The Islamic Republic benefited from the rising price of oil over several
years, using these dividends to develop its armaments and launch a “civil
nuclear program” with supplies purchased from Russia. It also benefited
strategically in geopolitical terms from the Americans‟ overthrow of the
Taliban regime in Afghanistan on its eastern border and the Iraqi Ba‟ath
regime on its western border. Tehran was thus liberated from the burdens of
dealing with two hostile neighboring regimes which, at the same time, enabled
it to adopt in its strategy the presence of Iranian allies with specific social and
sectarian bases in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Particularly in Iraq, this
guaranteed Iran not only direct access to the court of the Americans but also
the ability to deepen their political and security problems. All of this was done
with the goal of fortifying Iran‟s bargaining position with Washington more
generally and, with an eye to the post-withdrawal scenario, of becoming an
active partner in any transitional administration. In addition, through its
alliance with Syria, its support for Hamas and Islamic Jihad and its organic
relationship with Hezbollah, Iran became a key player in the Arab-Israeli
conflict with a foothold on the shores of the Mediterranean. The July 2006
war between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon attests to this fact. Iran‟s
presence, reinforced both politically and militarily, was consolidated.
Consequently, Tehran began to pursue a doctrine of containment for the
adversaries and enemies of its nuclear program. It did so by threatening
retaliation through some of its allies if attacked and by creating points of
tension or conflict in several areas. Iran also proceeded to expand its influence
within Lebanon via Hezbollah, which imposed its political interests on the
national government.
The paradox of Iran‟s ascendancy is that this became in itself a drain on
Iran‟s expansionist capacity by posing a threat to a number of regimes in the
region. It definitively ended the attempts of a number of states to maintain fair
relations, albeit frigidly, with it. Iran‟s growing influence in the Middle East
also exacerbated sectarian tensions, raising the specter of “Persian Shi‟ite
Turkey, Europe and the Arabs Next Door
35
attempts to dominate Arab Sunni land,” a commonly repeated argument in
many of the region‟s capitals hostile to Iranian policies.
If we look at the escalating international sanctions and threats against
Tehran due to the failure of negotiations over its nuclear program, and if we
take into account the severe economic crisis and the renewed rift inside the
regime between the Supreme Leader Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad,
we can conclude that Iran‟s expansion in the region is difficult to sustain. It
has reached its climax, and it is no longer capable of expanding its political
investment to additional areas.
It thus appears that the United States and Iran have each lost some of their
competing influences in recent years and that a new regional power could play
a more important role. This is where Turkey emerges as a serious contender.
Turkey: the key actor?
Turkey, as a secular Muslim state at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, and
as a member of NATO, is of considerable economic, geostrategic and political
importance. Many Turkish officials believe that Ankara, in building on this
importance, must gradually assume a greater role in those areas left vacant by
Washington and Teheran. Their faith in the use of “soft” power may explain
the increased and extensive Turkish activity observed in the Middle East in
recent years.
In what has been called the “zero problem approach,” Turkey has for years
cultivated good relations with most neighbors and regional actors as it pursued
a balancing act domestically (between the ruling party and the secular military
institution) and internationally (between states such as the United States and
Iran and Syria). In the game of equilibriums, it has repeatedly sought out room
to maneuver, even if within narrow margins. For example, as its relations with
Israel have deteriorated, especially since the Israeli military attack against the
“Gaza Freedom Flotilla” in 2010, Turkey maintained its alliance with the
United States and tried to afford it greater attention. Efforts to work with Iran
in finding a solution to the nuclear dilemma are balanced with attempts to
coordinate with Saudi Arabia on other regional matters. Whereas Turkey‟s
36
Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
security policy toward the Iraqi Kurds is restrictive, there is openness toward
Baghdad. And finally, Turkey, as a Sunni nation (governed by a leadership
with a Muslim Brotherhood background), is aware of the fact that it can
exercise greater influence in Arab countries and in Palestine than can Iran.
Turkey has generally remained cautious in its regional engagements and is
keeping its options (and “lines of retreat”) open, apparently waiting to see
what the tensions between Iran and the United States yield. While waiting for
an outcome on that front, Turkey continues to work on its relationship with
Europe, despite the recently closed door to Ankara‟s EU accession.
Nevertheless, it is the developments in the Arab world in 2011, beginning
with the revolutions in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, but particularly in Syria, which
have presented the Turkish leadership with new challenges. The political map
of the region is being redrawn, particularly in the Mediterranean states, and
this development has reached Turkey‟s southern border. All of this has
compelled Turkey to reassess its various positions and begin developing a new
Middle Eastern policy that necessarily considers several issues.
First, the Muslim Brotherhood has been able to claim electoral success in
more than one country in the region. This has prompted discussions about the
need to draw from the experience of the Justice and Development party in
Turkey. Egypt and Tunisia are currently two states where these discussions
could apply.
Second, NATO‟s intervention in the war in Libya with a U.N. mandate to
protect Libyan citizens raised several issues and opportunities for Turkey. By
taking on an active role in defining the mission, and as the intervention
evolved into ending the al-Qadhafi regime, Turkey entered into a new phase in
its relations with Libya.
Third, events in Syria demand a carefully considered recalibration of Turkish
diplomacy. The Syrian regime has responded to a popular revolution with
brutal repression, taking the lives of thousands within a few months. The
violence of the regime has brought the country to a breaking point. Syria
shares not only a long border with Turkey but close economic ties as well. The
conflict therefore threatens Turkish interests directly, not only in terms of
security and finance, but also with respect to the Kurdish issue. A regime
Turkey, Europe and the Arabs Next Door
37
change in Damascus would demand close attention and adroit follow-up on
the part of Turkish leaders in order to ensure good relations with any new
Syrian leadership, given the effects such a change might have on the
conflicting interests of other parties (i.e., Russia, Iran, the EU, United States,
Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the latter being a very active mediator). Although
Turkey has severely condemned the Asad regime, opened its cities to
opposition conferences, and established refugee camps for Syrian civilians
(and one for military personnel escaping service in the Syrian army), it still
appears hesitant in practice. Turkish leaders have proved unable in some ways
to accurately assess behind-the-scene activities in Damascus.
Fourth, Qatar‟s political and economic ascent, at times in competition with
Saudi Arabia, is affecting regional power dynamics. Leaders in both Doha and
Riyadh, however, agree on the need for a radical approach to the situation in
Syria and have interests in the Asad regime being toppled. Given the strategic
relevance of Persian Gulf dynamics to Turkey, Turkish leaders cannot afford
to take a very different position from that of the Gulf Cooperation Council‟s
two most active states if it wants to coordinate politically with them.
Fifth, Turkey is linked with Russia by a number of mutual interests related
to natural gas and central Asia. There are occasional tensions between the two
countries as a result of competition or a lack of mutual understanding on
some issues, of which Syria currently figures prominently.
Sixth, Turkey has not abandoned its orientation toward Europe, though it
has eased its rush westward in the face of repeated rejections of EU
membership. Turkey is linked to the European continent by important
economic and political relationships, large Turkish communities in European
countries, and Mediterranean interests. Despite tensions with France, these
fundamental interests remain one priority for the Turks.
Seven, and finally, Turkey is linked with the United States of America via
NATO. The conditions of its membership in the alliance have not been
modified but clearly strained by recent Turkish-Israeli tensions. Turkey
depends on its relationship with the United States if it wants to play a more
effective role in the Palestinian issue.
38
Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
Cooperation within the Mediterranean
Cooperation within the framework of the Mediterranean basin is, therefore,
of critical importance to Ankara and all other capitals. Given Turkey‟s unique
capacity to act flexibly in its relations with countries around the
Mediterranean, cooperation would enable it to play an essential role that is
commensurate with its economic and demographic weight. Every effort to
consolidate a Turkish-European partnership would help make the
Mediterranean a calmer place. However, doing so requires special care with
respect to a number of prominent issues.
• The issue of religion and the state. This issue, which affects most Arab
countries and Israel, should be addressed in a manner demonstrating respect
for pluralism, tolerance as well as religious, ethnic and cultural diversity
• The issue of human rights. Demonstrating respect for human rights, as
formulated by ratified international agreements, should be a condition for
economic cooperation and development and investment projects. Human
rights encompass public and private freedoms in recognition of the political
and cultural rights of all components of a society. As such they apply to
Kurds in Syria, Iraq and Turkey, and to all ethnic and religious groups in
North Africa and in several other Mediterranean states.
• The issue of women‟s rights. Women are subjected to discrimination in all
Arab countries. This should be countered with support from international
treaties, and by encouraging governments to adopt policies and legislation
that can strengthen the participation of women in political and economic
decision-making processes. In addition, governments should be encouraged
to eschew legalized discrimination of women by changing, for example, laws
regulating personal status and citizenship.
• The issues of immigration, racism and integration. The combination of
increasing migration and growing economic crises has exacerbated problems
associated with integration and racism. Northbound immigration flows will
be limited only if investment in the southern states is improved and
employment opportunities in these countries are expanded. In addition,
improving the conditions of migrants and providing assistance in integration
will help counter mounting social tensions.
Turkey, Europe and the Arabs Next Door
39
• The role of the military in politics. It is important to support throughout the
region a political culture in which the military is subject to the authority of
elected political officials. In many Arab countries (and previously in Turkey),
military forces have played crucial roles in political decision-making
processes. The emergence of new political elites and the organization of free
and fair elections should replace all traces of the coups and eras of martial
law that once controlled lives throughout the region.
• Independence of the judiciary and anti-corruption. The reconstruction of
constitutional institutions should be accompanied by judicial reform in order
to guarantee the judiciary‟s independence from political authorities. Doing
so will allow the judiciary to confront the corruption that has damaged
economies and public morale in many countries.
• Syria. It is difficult to imagine a stable Mediterranean if there is no
transitional phase in Damascus guaranteeing the end of despotism and the
introduction of democratization. Europe and Turkey have an interest in
cooperating to find a solution in Syria. Their positions so far have been clear
in condemning the Asad regime‟s abuses of human rights, but this should
lead to more measures that protect the Syrian population.
• Palestine/Israel. A joint Turkish-European effort to renew serious peace
talks that are based on U.N. resolutions and lead to the creation of a viable
Palestinian state is important for the stability and prosperity of the entire
Mediterranean basin. For more than 65 years, the conflict in Palestine and
the occupation of Palestinian territories have been the source of tensions,
frustrations and injustice. It is time to reassess the different approaches to
the conflict and its resolution.
Indeed, the Mediterranean countries today – those along its shores and their
neighbors – stand before a great historical moment. Full cooperation in favor
of justice, peace and economic development will bear fruits today and for
many years to come. Europe and Turkey alike can play leading roles in these
efforts.
40
Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
Turkey-EU Cooperation in the Arab World
41
Turkey-EU Cooperation in the Arab World
Nathalie Tocci
Talk about foreign policy cooperation between Turkey and the European
Union is not new. For years, broad convergence between the two parties‟
views and visions of the neighborhood has made a joint strategy a worthwhile
endeavor to explore. Yet never has there been an alignment of the stars like
today. The historic transformation underway in the Middle East and North
Africa (MENA) region has rendered EU-Turkey foreign policy cooperation
imperative. Above all, the Arab Spring has strongly underscored the fact that
neither the EU nor Turkey can act effectively alone in confronting today‟s
extraordinary challenges.
With this in mind, this paper sketches out the broad contours of potential
EU-Turkey foreign policy cooperation in the Arab world, addressing the fields
of diplomacy, aid, trade and security. In areas such as diplomacy, assistance
and trade, there could be a useful division of labor between the two parties. In
the field of security, as currently demonstrated by the unfolding drama in
Syria, joint action would be warranted instead.
Turkey‟s EU accession process is badly stuck. Negotiations were launched in
2005, but since then a mere 13 out of 32 chapters have been opened. Most
remaining chapters have been blocked either by Cyprus, France or the
European Council as a whole. In turn, all momentum has been lost, with no
chapter having been opened since June 2010. Matters are getting worse, as
Turkey has threatened to interrupt political dialogue with the Union as Cyprus‟
EU presidency approaches in the second half of 2012, and as intercommunal
talks on the eastern Mediterranean island near a point of breakdown.
Despite this dire situation, time has never been riper for EU-Turkey
cooperation in their shared neighborhood. In particular, the historic
transformation in the Arab world has made joint EU-Turkey action in the
southern neighborhood imperative. On the one hand, Turkey‟s regional role
42
Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
and the synergies between Turkey and the EU are as critical as ever. Whereas
the EU has developed aid, trade and diplomatic instruments for supporting
transformative change in the neighborhood, it lacks the credibility that a
resurgent Turkey has acquired in recent years. Moreover, Turkish foreign
policy seems to have entered into its “third wave” (Lesser 2011). Whereas
Ankara still vies for strategic foreign policy autonomy (Kardaş 2011), the Arab
Spring has demonstrated that it cannot freelance effectively in its unstable
backyard.
Hence, despite ongoing tensions, the prospect of EU-Turkey foreign policy
cooperation has become more compelling in light of the Arab Spring, as the
two parties find themselves sharing strategic interests relative to the manifold
challenges facing their shared neighborhood. But assuming such cooperation
is both desirable and possible, what could it consist of?
The elements of a joint EU-Turkish strategy
for the Arab world
The institutional framework
The first hurdle to overcome would be that of establishing the appropriate
institutional mechanism to engage in foreign policy dialogue. EU-Turkey
dialogue has suffered as a result of Turkey‟s ailing accession process. Until the
passage of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, Turkish officials met regularly with the EU
troika. When Turkey‟s accession negotiations were still moving (slowly)
forward, Turkey also used to meet with individual EU member states at the
intergovernmental conferences that opened and closed negotiations over
accession chapters. In those years, Turkey also enthusiastically aligned its
foreign policy positions with the Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP). But as the EU-Turkish relationship soured, opportunities for Turkey
and the EU to discuss foreign policy became few and far between (Ülgen
2011a).
Turkey-EU Cooperation in the Arab World
43
To remedy the situation, High Representative Catherine Ashton and Foreign
Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu have recently established regular talks, coupled
with an annual four-way meeting between High Representative Ashton,
Foreign Minister Davutoğlu, Commissioner Stefan Füle and Minister for
European Affairs Egemen Bağış. There has also been talk of Davutoğlu‟s
participation in the EU‟s Gymnich foreign affairs meetings.
These talks should be intensified and conducted under the CFSP chapter of
Turkey‟s accession talks. However, they should also be brought up to the level
of heads of state – for example, through annual summits – as well as down to
sectoral levels, between Turkish ministries and agencies and EU directoratesgeneral, the External Action Service and the Political and Security Committee
of the Council. Turkish and European civil society organizations engaged in
the neighborhood should also be brought into the dialogue.
Diplomacy
When it comes to diplomacy, there could be a useful geographic and
thematic division of labor between Turkey and the EU. Geographically, the
EU would concentrate its diplomatic efforts on the Maghreb, while Turkey is
bound to focus more on its immediate neighbors in the Mashreq.
Thematically, the European Union may be better placed to advocate
universal norms grounded in international law, particularly in areas related to
human rights, fundamental freedoms, transparency, accountability and the rule
of law. When backed by the solid force of international law, the EU, whose
reputation in the neighborhood is far from spotless, would be less subject to
potential criticism. For its part, Turkey could focus its diplomatic interventions
on more specific political topics, particularly those for which its own
experience gives it greater legitimacy. A notable example is Prime Minister
Erdoğan‟s praise for secularism during his visit to Cairo in the fall of 2011.
True, Erdoğan‟s words were scorned by the Muslim Brotherhood and
criticized by the Salafist al-Nour party. But the Egyptian reaction would likely
have been far more vehement had an EU official offered the same words. The
fact that the figure calling for secularism was a leader broadly viewed as
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Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
Islamist at home conferred on Erdoğan a degree of legitimacy that EU
officials would be hard pressed to obtain.
Following the same line of reasoning, one could imagine retired Turkish
military officials advocating the democratic oversight of the armed forces in
the neighborhood, or Turkish business persons calling for export promotion
policies in the region. A variety of Turkish actors could thus send diplomatic
messages to neighboring countries which, while coordinated with the EU,
would differ somewhat from those of EU actors and might be better received
precisely because of the “incompleteness” of Turkey‟s ongoing
democratization process (Kirişci 2011).
Assistance
With respect to aid in support of the Arab Spring movements, we could
imagine bilateral EU-Turkey action in the area of governance assistance. The
EU Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX) and Twinning
programs might prove useful models, whereby the EU would engage in
exchanges and training to support capacity building in various regional
governance structures. Turkey could be brought into these programs, acting as
an additional reservoir of expertise on which to draw.
Turkey could bring to bear its own experience in a number of areas where it
has undertaken reform. Ülgen cites a number of promising examples (Ülgen
2011b). One is the banking sector, in which Turkey (unlike the European
Union, but like other states in the neighborhood) was bedeviled by problems
of clientelism before 2001, but has since engaged in a radical overhaul of the
sector that has included effective regulatory mechanisms. It is no coincidence
that Turkey has already been involved in assisting Syria with its own banking
reform. A second example is that of urban planning and housing, critical areas
both in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia which have experienced revolts,
and in countries such as Algeria which have not. Again, having experienced an
urbanization process and youth bulge similar to those in other neighborhood
states, and having overcome related housing problems through the work of its
Mass Housing Authority, Turkey could bring its expertise to bear in these
areas more usefully than could the European Union. A third example is that of
Turkey-EU Cooperation in the Arab World
45
small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) promotion, necessary in the MENA
region where undoing state capture of the economy and promoting an
independent private sector both represent significant future challenges. Here,
the experience of the Turkish chamber of commerce, TOBB, could be usefully
integrated with EU programs. TOBB, in fact, was instrumental in establishing
the Levant Business Forum, which represents business organizations from
Turkey, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan.
Moreover, by bringing in non-EU member Turkey, the EU Twinning and
TAIEX programs could downplay their focus on the export of the acquis
communautaire. Aquis promotion is one of the EU‟s main professional biases.
While reasonable in the eastern neighborhood, where states typically aspire to
EU membership, compatibility with the acquis cannot be taken for granted in
the southern Mediterranean. By including Turkey in its programs, the EU may
be nudged to move away from merely exporting the acquis and toward
responding more effectively to the governance needs of its neighbors.
Trade
Differences between the east and south also apply on the issue of trade.
Whereas negotiating deep and comprehensive free trade agreements
(DCFTAs) seems an appropriate way to upgrade relations with neighbors in
eastern Europe, the same does not necessarily apply to the south. Proceeding
along the DCFTA path may prove excessively complex and costly for the
southern neighbors, and in the medium term would do little to induce
intraregional trade.
An alternative proposed by Ülgen would be that of extending the EUTurkey customs union to the southern Mediterranean. However, this would
mean exporting Turkey‟s difficulties within the EU customs union to
countries with an even lower level of development. Hence, like Turkey, the
southern Mediterranean countries would lose their ability to determine their
external trade relations autonomously. This might prove costly for the poorly
competitive southern economies, as they would see a substantial lowering of
their most-favored nation (MFN) tariffs vis-à-vis the rest of the world. But
participating in the EU-Turkey customs union would mean that by simply
46
Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
signing one agreement, each MENA country could be a part of a customs
space that included not only the EU and Turkey, but all of the country‟s
neighbors as well, inducing intraregional trade as well as EU-sourced and
other external FDI. However, any such endeavor should be prepared carefully
through a transition period of a decade or more, during which the southern
Mediterranean countries, supported by the EU, would gradually lower their
tariffs vis-à-vis the rest of the world and concomitantly work on enhancing
their competitiveness.
Security
Security cooperation between Turkey and the European Union would focus
on specific crises in the neighborhood. At the time of writing, Syria stands out
as a prime case in which EU-Turkey security cooperation is taking place,
alongside the United States and the Arab League. As the crisis unfolds and the
international community converges on an appropriate form of action, the
precise modalities of the EU‟s own participation will have to be settled, a
question that will in turn hinge on whether and to what extent it is possible to
forge intra-EU consensus. Hence, it remains to be seen whether the EU will
act through High Representative Ashton or through a core group of member
states (as in the case of Iran or Libya).
Yet irrespective of the form of EU participation, the establishment of a
contact group on Syria – the Friends of Syria – featuring some 70-odd
countries including the EU, Turkey, the United States and key members of the
Arab League, highlights how a joint security strategy in the neighborhood is
already being forged. Spearheaded by Turkey and its transatlantic partners, the
Friends of Syria group is exploring possible modalities of humanitarian
intervention, potential support for the Syrian opposition and prospects for
international consensus on the way ahead. The work of the Friends of Syria
group could act as an important precedent for EU-Turkey security
cooperation if and when other crises erupt in the neighborhood.
Turkey-EU Cooperation in the Arab World
47
Looking ahead
Though earlier efforts at EU-Turkish cooperation have proven to yield
mixed results, the historic transformation today underway in the Middle East
and North Africa has made EU-Turkey foreign policy cooperation imperative.
Above all, the Arab Spring has made it clear that the EU and Turkey can
achieve their joint strategic interests more effectively by working together to
confront today‟s extraordinary challenges.
With this in mind, this paper has sketched out the broad contours of
potential EU-Turkey foreign policy cooperation in the Arab world. Broadly
speaking, such a strategy could include public and private diplomatic
interventions, assistance, trade and security cooperation. In some areas, such
as diplomacy, assistance and trade, there could be a useful division of labor
between the two. In the field of security, as currently being demonstrated in
Syria, joint action would be warranted instead.
This is not to underplay the many obstacles that hinder foreign policy
cooperation between Turkey and the European Union, foremost among
which is the dire state of EU-Turkey relations today. But responding
effectively to the shift of tectonic plates underway in the neighborhood is a
challenge that neither can afford to neglect.
References
Kardaş, Şaban. “Quest for Strategic Autonomy Continues, or How to Make Sense of
Turkey‟s „New Wave‟.” In On Turkey. Washington, D.C.: German Marshall Fund,
November 28, 2011. http://www.gmfus.org/archives/quest-for-strategic-autonomycontinues-or-how-to-make-sense-of-turkeys-new-wave
Kirişci, Kemal. “Democracy Diffusion: The Turkish Experience.” In Turkey and its
Neighbors: Foreign Relations in Transition, edited by Linden, Ronald et al. pp. 179–215.
Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2011.
Lesser, Ian. “Turkey‟s Third Wave – And the Coming Quest for Strategic Reassurance.” In
On Turkey. Washington: German Marshall Fund (GMF), October, 2011.
http://www.gmfus.org/wpcontent/files_mf/1321550150_magicfields_attachment__1_1.pdf
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Ülgen, Sinan. “How to operationalize foreign policy dialogue between the EU and Turkey.”
In On Turkey. Washington, D.C.: GMF, April, 2011a.
http://www.gmfus.org/archives/how-to-operationalize-the-foreign-policy-dialoguebetween-ankara-and-brussels
-------------. “From Inspiration to Aspiration: Turkey in the New Middle East.” The
Carnegie Papers. Washington, D.C.-Brussels: Carnegie Endowment for Peace,
December, 2011b.
Turkey and the Arab Spring in Light of Regional Conflicts
49
Turkey and the Arab Spring in Light of
Regional Conflicts1
E. Fuat Keyman
More than a year after its first stirrings, the Arab Spring rages on across the
Middle East with undiminished momentum. Following the fall of the
authoritarian governments in Tunisia and Egypt last year, the revolution
claimed the tyrannical regime of Muammar al-Qadhafi in Libya last fall. Yet
even as the storm closes in on Syria‟s Asad regime, which has committed some
of the 21st century‟s worst atrocities and human rights violations, the future
for the Arab Spring countries remains deeply uncertain. Will they be successful
in their transition to democracy, or are they destined to fall into the chaos of
political and economic instability? Is there an alternative model of political and
institutional development, and if so, where might be this be found? This latter
question has drawn attention both inside and outside the region toward
Turkey, but has also demanded further examination: In what specific ways, for
example, might Turkey contribute to advancing and enhancing the creation of
responsible and democratic governance in these countries? Is it possible for
Turkey and the European Union (EU) to work together in a coordinated and
collaborative fashion to positively affect the Arab Spring movement? In this
paper, I suggest that Turkey‟s dynamic economy, deepening entrepreneurial
culture and secular democracy can indeed serve as a model or “locus of
aspiration” for the Arab Spring. Moreover, if Turkey and the EU can work
and act together, Turkey‟s ability and capacity to play its expected roles would
be immensely increased.
1
I would like to thank Cana Tulus and Onur Sazak for their valuable contributions to the process of
writing and editing this paper. Without their hard work and excellent editing, this paper would not have
been possible.
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Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
Historical context: The multiple crises of globalization
In a world disoriented by a multiplicity of global crises, answers to the
above-noted questions are not to be found easily. Globalization is undergoing
what is not only a severe, but also a multifaceted crisis. The world is
witnessing the simultaneous decline of the West and the rise of the rest. More
importantly, as Charles Kupchan correctly suggests, the world is becoming
“no one‟s world.” The ongoing shift of power at the global scale is creating
tendencies both toward multipolarity and multiple modernities; multipolarity
in that “rather than embracing the rules of the current international system,
rising powers seek to adjust the prevailing order in ways that advantage their
own values and interests,” and multiple modernities in the sense that there is
both an increasing disjuncture between modernization and Westernization and
the existence of “a politically diverse landscape in which the Western model
will offer only one of many competing conceptions of domestic and
international order” (Kupchan 2012: 4).
The Arab Spring thus broke out at a time when the multiple crises of
globalization have begun to align themselves with the emergence of “no one‟s
world.” The powerful revolutionary movement has already eliminated some of
the world‟s most enduring authoritarian regimes. Yet it has also created a
power vacuum in the region. Moreover, the lack of experience with
democratic governance in the Middle East poses a significant challenge in
terms of laying the groundwork for democratization. In the absence of
indigenous models for self-rule, reformers will eventually turn to time-tested
models and global best practices
Models of transition to democracy
In order to smooth this process, it is of critical importance to analyze how
and in what ways a transition to democracy can occur and be implemented.
The transition from authoritarian regimes to democracy has occurred in a
variety of regions since the 1970s, and has always been a painful process. Each
of the various episodes offers lessons that may shed light on recent
developments. The transitions in Southern Europe (Greece, Portugal, Spain)
Turkey and the Arab Spring in Light of Regional Conflicts
51
in the early 1970s, the successive transformations in Latin America (Brazil,
Argentina, Chile and Mexico) in the 1980s, and the similar experiences in
Eastern and Central European countries in the 1990s all created different
modes or models of transitioning to democracy from either military or
authoritarian regimes. Within these models, the Southern European and the
Eastern/Central European experiences were able to draw on the European
Union as an anchor. Countries within these regions have today gone through
the integration process with the EU, ultimately becoming full members.
Moreover, the South European, Latin American and Eastern/Central
European cases all involved an exposure to globalization and the global
economy, which played a positive role in these experiences.
By contrast, the Arab Spring is occurring both without an anchor such as
the European Union, and against a backdrop of pressing security, economic,
social and ecological challenges that have introduced considerable uncertainty
into global affairs, and which have collectively given rise to crises of
globalization that have taken multiple forms. From an economic perspective,
the global economic crisis has led to a serious financial meltdown, a global
recession and widespread unemployment. On the security front, the specific
issues related to the Arab Spring, including the regime change or regime
restoration problems in Syria and Libya, are naturally of great significance
within today‟s international relations. Yet these issues are themselves affected
by questions that collectively constitute a global security crisis, including the
future of Iraq after the withdrawal of the U.S. armed forces and the increasing
risk of its disintegration, the broader uncertainties associated with
longstanding Middle East conflicts, the increasingly thorny problems posed by
Iran, the Afghanistan and Pakistan security risk zones, and violence and
terrorism in general.
Global challenges stemming from climate change, energy and resource
scarcity, and food insecurity constitute a crisis of civilization, the third pillar of
the looming global crisis. The crisis of hegemony and shifts in the global
distribution of power – trends combining the current lack of global leadership
and the crisis of modernity – constitute the last and crucial element of the
global crisis (for further details, see Keyman 2013, forthcoming). In this
environment characterized by risk and instability, the Western powers have
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Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
been unable to respond effectively and constructively to the recent
developments in the Mediterranean and broader Middle East region.
Although it was an essential facilitator of democratization and the transition
to free-market economic systems in Eastern and Southern Europe, the
European Union is unable to play this role alone in the context of the Arab
Spring. In the years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the prospect of EU
membership proved to be a valuable carrot for formerly socialist countries in
Central and Eastern Europe to undertake a swift democratization and market
liberalization. Moreover, civil society in these countries had already been
developed to a certain degree. At that time, the EU was faring much better
financially, and could readily commit resources in the form of structural
reform packages to the encouragement of democratization in countries such
as the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary.
The favorable climate of the 1990s has vanished, however. Brussels today
has been shaken by the severe global economic crisis and the metastasizing
sovereign debt problem. Major EU actors‟ recent attempts to respond to the
Greek financial meltdown have demonstrated the constraints on Europe‟s
capacity to mobilize its resources and rally public support behind efforts to
resolve even the most pressing issues. Although the Greek situation now
appears contained, the possibility of spillover – and political aftershocks – still
haunts Italy, Spain and Portugal, and reinforces concerns as to the future of
the EU. Furthermore, the prospect of EU membership cannot be employed as
an incentive encouraging revolting Arab nations to engage in reform.
Significantly, the Arab Spring also demonstrated the declining capacity of
the United States, which showed a quite limited response to the territorially
broad and diverse uprisings. Many observers argued that the United States
failed to address the diversity of the events appropriately, at least in terms of
developing effective strategies to contribute to the advancement of democracy
and good/responsible governance in these countries, and more importantly, to
reduce human tragedy, as in the case of Syria. For Woodrow Wilson Center
scholar Aaron David Miller, it has not been a spring but rather an “Arab
Winter” for the United States, precisely because of this decline in the nation‟s
capacity to respond to the uprisings. Miller identifies in particular the U.S.
failure to engage Egypt and Tunisia in a compelling way, which in turn has
Turkey and the Arab Spring in Light of Regional Conflicts
53
directly affected the United States‟ ability to engage with other Arab countries
over the longer term. While the United States did back the overthrow of
authoritarian regimes in Egypt and Tunisia, it lacked a concrete means of
showing its engagement and support. After the escalation of the uprisings, in
the middle of the Arab Spring year, for example, President Barack Obama
briefly mentioned in a speech that direct U.S. involvement in the region would
remain selective. The new political and economic situation in the region
demands a new American approach, in which it would act in concert both
with Western European partners and regional powers. Each of these actors
have a duty to the newly liberated communities of the Arab Spring to use their
resources to promote democratic governments, the rule of law, fundamental
rights, and the creation of a stable political and economic environment.
The decline in U.S. and European capacities has created a power vacuum
that has enabled regional actors such as Turkey to have increasing impact
within the Arab Spring countries. According to recent research by groups
including the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), as
well the assessments of scholars such as Joshua W. Walker, Turkey has been
the “ambiguous winner” and the “rising star” (for Steven A. Cook and Şaban
Kardaş) of the Arab Spring. In this atmosphere, Turkey is expected to play a
strategic role in the region while simultaneously addressing global challenges,
by means of a “proactive foreign policy.” Turkish foreign policy has
approached the Arab Spring by locating it in a broader global context, arguing
that the transition to democracy in this region would enhance not only
regional but also global peace and stability. In doing so, Turkey has positioned
itself not with the existing authoritarian regimes but with people demanding
political and economic change.
Why and how Turkey should respond to the Arab Spring
In 2012, the United States will hold presidential elections, an event that
already has begun to focus political debate and interest. In Europe, the
sovereign debt crisis has been and will remain in 2012 the primary or even sole
political concern. With superpowers and other great powers thus turning
inward to focus on domestic issues and problems, all eyes have turned to
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Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
Turkey as a potential model, or at least a locus of aspiration, for the Arab
Spring countries. The country‟s image as a secular democracy with a Muslim
population has encouraged observers and analysts to champion Turkey as a
model for aspiring Arab democracies. The strong diplomatic and economic
relations that Turkey has established with the region under the Justice and
Development Party (AKP) government have reinforced this perception.
Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu‟s “zero problems with neighbors” policy
has been instrumental in improving Ankara‟s political, economic and
diplomatic relations with Turkey‟s neighbors and other key states in the
region. However, the Arab Spring has brought change and transformation in
its wake. Conflict and resistance, human tragedy and increasing risks of civil
war have resulted as well as peaceful regime change. In other words, the
events in the Arab world, as well as the recent negative developments in
Turkish-Iranian and Turkish-Armenian relations, have made the “zero
problems with neighbors” policy difficult to sustain. Nevertheless, Turkey
wants to maintain this policy as at least one of the principal elements of its
proactive, constructive and soft-power-based foreign policy strategy. Indeed,
despite growing skepticism as to the viability of the “zero problems” policy,
many Arab states have come to regard Turkey‟s impressive growth rate and
the improvements in its citizens‟ economic wellbeing under the AKP‟s
neoliberal economic policy as a source of awe and inspiration. Driven by
strong domestic growth, Turkish investments in the broader Middle East and
North Africa – and recently in sub-Saharan Africa – have strengthened the
country‟s economic and diplomatic relations with these states, winning the
hearts and minds of people in these regions while presenting them with an
alternative development model. For example, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan received a rock star‟s welcome when he visited Egypt in 2011, thanks
to Turkey‟s reputation as a key Arab ally. While there, he promoted economic
opportunities as well as improved Turkish-Egyptian relations.
Turkey has also thrown its full political and diplomatic weight behind the
peaceful solution of some of the most complex conflicts in the region.
Between 2004 and 2008, it involved itself – albeit without success – in the
efforts to secure peace between Israel and Palestine, as well as between Israel
and Syria, by arranging a number of high-level meetings in Istanbul. Although
Turkey and the Arab Spring in Light of Regional Conflicts
55
Turkish efforts seem to be frozen in the aftermath of Israel‟s Gaza raid in
2008, and particularly following the murder of nine Turkish civilians by Israeli
special forces on the Mavi Marmara in 2010, Ankara remains actively engaged
on this issue. Furthermore, in January 2011, Turkey hosted a high-profile
summit to discuss the issue of Iran‟s nuclear ambitions. Dubbed “the Istanbul
talks,” the conference brought together the five permanent members of the
U.N Security Council plus Germany – known as the P5+1 – with a delegation
from Iran. Istanbul has also served as an attractive venue for international
conferences discussing the future of newly liberated Arab countries such as
Tunisia and Libya. Since the beginnings of the Arab Spring last year, influential
politicians, human rights activists and opinion leaders have repeatedly met
with their Western counterparts at these high-profile Istanbul summits. As a
consequence, in a recent symposium on conflict resolution and peace building,
Ahmet Davutoğlu alluded to an ambition to name Istanbul as the United
Nations‟ conflict-resolution hub.
Without doubt, the abovementioned values (despite problems concerning
political rights and freedoms), Turkey‟s secular democratic governance system
and its dynamic free market economy have served as inspiration for
enthusiasts proselytizing on behalf of adoption of the Turkish model by Arab
revolutionaries. However, one must be extremely careful not to confuse
Turkey‟s positive contributions to the region with an ambition to impose its
own model. Indeed, nothing could be farther from the truth, for a number of
reasons.
First, Turkey itself is reluctant to impose its own model on the aspiring Arab
countries. Since the beginning of the Arab Spring, the Turkish government
has clearly communicated that it has neither the desire nor design to take on a
nation-building role in these countries. On numerous occasions, it has rejected
claims that it has sought to preach on behalf of a Turkish model of
democratization. It has committed to providing structural help as it deepens
its economic and commercial relations with these countries; however, it has
rejected any assertions that it is pursuing a hidden agenda of recreating its
former Ottoman sphere of influence. Nevertheless, it will not shy away from
using its soft power to inspire these nations to achieve the level of economic
development it has itself reached and sustained. Moreover, Ankara
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Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
understands that respect for each country‟s national interests and sovereignty
is essential.
Second, the Turkish model is a product of unique circumstances; its
adoption by incipient Arab movements would not guarantee institutions
identical to those in Turkey. The country‟s experience with secularism and
laicism is endogenous to its own reform process, which has been ongoing
since the early 1920s. Turkish democratization has been significantly
influenced by efforts to reconcile military power with democracy, and a secular
system with a religious orientation. However, this constructive tension has also
served as a model for economic success, and has helped establish a functional
culture bridging East and West.
Third, the Arab Spring countries are themselves reluctant to accept the
Turkish model – or any other model – per se. The Turkish model in particular
is still viewed as originating from an outsider, and as incompatible with the
realities and peculiarities of the region. The majority of Arab revolutionaries
see the debate over alternative models through the prism of the Ottoman
legacy in the Middle East. Certain countries such as Egypt may feel indifferent
or even appreciative toward this legacy, yet the majority of people on the Arab
Street oppose any design imposed from outside, whether Turkish or
otherwise. Finally, most Arab Spring actors recognize that the Turkish military
has had a destabilizing impact on the democratization process. Given the
victories in Tunisia and Libya against military-backed regimes, and the ongoing
contest for power between the Egyptian people and the military custodians of
the government, the last thing these movements want is a democratization
process “assisted” by the military. However, this perception may change if
Turkey approaches the Arab Spring in coordination and collaboration with the
European Union, presenting itself not only as a dynamic and transforming
country, but also as a country moving toward full EU membership. In this
case, its contribution to the region‟s democratic transition may become more
effective, and the perception of any such contribution by the region‟s peoples
and governments might improve.
In fact, Turkey can still provide substantive assistance to the
democratization process within its neighborhood. Moreover, Turkey‟s most
significant contribution will likely come as it shares its experience in the areas
Turkey and the Arab Spring in Light of Regional Conflicts
57
of economic recovery and sustainable development. In both areas, TurkishEU cooperation is crucial. Over the last decade, Turkey has transformed its
private sector, made its markets more transparent and competitive, and
implemented the financial and market regulations necessary to increase foreign
investors‟ confidence. By the same token, the state has undertaken effective
reforms to strengthen its social services. Today, the quality of health care and
the population‟s access to education services are vastly improved as compared
to the 1990s and 1980s.
Based on this experience, Turkey can offer effective solutions to some of
the current economic ills of the Arab Spring countries. As Kemal Derviş
suggests, the Arab Spring countries need policies that eradicate the old
practices of rent-seeking capitalism and reliance on discredited state
bureaucracy (Derviş 2011). More importantly, “a truly competitive private
sector has to be unleashed,” and “neither the old statist left, nor the rentseeking, crony capitalist right had policies to respond” to this need (ibid). In
this respect, Turkey can use both its expertise with free markets, which has
developed significantly since the 1980s, and the last decade‟s experience with
responsible growth to help guide the Arab Spring countries. Indeed, it is
within these areas of economic development and democracy that Turkey holds
the greatest potential for making a lasting contribution to the Arab Spring.
References
Derviş Kemal. “The Economic Imperatives of the Arab Spring.” Year End Series, Project
Syndicate, 2011. www.project-syndicate.org
Keyman, E. Fuat. Turkey’s Transformation and Democratic Consolidation. London:
Palgrave/Macmillan, 2013, forthcoming.
Kupchan, Charles A. No One’s World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
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Tensions in the Middle East and North Africa
59
Tensions in the Middle East and North Africa: Can
Turkey and the EU Come Along?
Dorothée Schmid
Turkey and the European Union (EU) are each important stakeholders in
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. In the aftermath of the
Arab Spring, both face the challenge of adapting to a post-revolutionary
situation, and of engaging in a satisfactory way with new actors on the ground
in such a way as to ensure their own security and advance their own interests
in the medium term.
Europeans and Turks were in fact caught similarly off guard by the
suddenness and brutality of the Arab revolts. Although in some senses they
faced the same difficulties in dealing with their wavering Mediterranean
partners, their reactions were not similar or coordinated. This was partly due
to the deteriorating quality of their mutual political relationship, as a
consequence of Turkey‟s stalled EU accession process. Yet other important
factors must also be taken into account. Turkey and the EU are not natural
partners in the Middle East, a region that has long been a focus of European
external policies, while Turkey has only recently performed a remarkable
comeback in the hearts and minds of Arab people, after decades of a voluntary
lack of contact. Divergences in views and interests between Turkey and the
EU should thus not be underestimated.
At present, regional stability appears to be a chief concern for both players.
Persistent unrest and violence in a number of countries could degenerate into
civil wars, or reignite interstate conflicts. With transition processes still under
way, it remains very difficult to set out new cooperation practices or to devise
sustainable security arrangements on anything other than a case-by-case and
temporary basis. Neither Turkey nor the EU can afford to remain inert vis-àvis such hazardous prospects. Yet it remains to be seen whether the Middle
60
Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
East, which has long served as a showground for the competition of influence,
could become an area where efficient cooperation can be established in the
field of conflict prevention.
The Middle East’s role in the EU – Turkey relationship
The Middle East has historically played an important role and been
consistently exploited by both sides in the context of the EU/Turkey
relationship. Turkey has earned its place as a Western ally in the Middle East
as a member of NATO since 1952. It took on a role as the Eastern pillar of
the alliance during the Cold War, and to this day is considered by the
American government to be a primary strategic partner in the region. For its
part, the European Union treated Turkey ambiguously for a considerable
period of time. While the Turks expressed their interest in joining the
European Community at an early date, negotiations for full membership were
opened only in 2005. Until that point, Turkey was included in the perimeter of
the EU‟s Mediterranean policies, where it never felt at ease.
When the accession process started, Turkey rapidly identified the Middle
East as a bargaining chip with which to foster diplomatic rapprochement. It
then insisted on its geographical proximity to and cultural affinities with the
region, underscoring its theoretical capacity to mediate and handle security
issues. Such a discourse resonated with the change in style and ambition of
Turkish foreign policy observable in the period starting with the fall of the
Berlin Wall and heightened when the Justice and Development Party (Adalet
ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) took the reins of government in Ankara in 2002.
Under Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu‟s guidance, Turkey rapidly gained a
reputation in the region as a soft power of the benign type, focused on the
promotion of peace and prosperity in the neighborhood. Turkey‟s diplomatic
overtures to Arab countries and to Iran looked particularly remarkable given
its decades-long hostile or defensive behavior toward these states.
In recent years, Turkey has presented itself as a bridge between the Muslim
East and the West, later sophisticating this argument into the “Turkey as a
model for the Middle East” leitmotiv. Once the EU accession process slowed
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61
down – approximately from 2006 on – Turkey began taking a more aggressive
approach to its role in the Middle East, in an attempt to challenge the EU‟s
inefficiency in coping with strategic developments in the region. Some of
Turkey‟s initiatives then gradually yet explicitly diverged from the EU‟s
positions, notably in the case of Iran‟s nuclear program, with Turkey opposing
sanctions and trying to broker a parallel political arrangement. In the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, Turkey entered into open diplomatic confrontation with
Israel following the attack on the ferry Mavi Marmara off the Gaza coast
(2010). From this point on, rather than being an ideal place to advance
diplomatic cooperation between the EU and Turkey, the Middle East seemed
to become one of the areas where the political rift between the two was most
evident.
Rising tensions: A comparative assessment of
EU and Turkish stances vis-à-vis the Arab Spring
Shared concerns, parallel interests?
In order to reflect on the potential for convergence and increased
cooperation in the future, it is necessary to assess the forces driving regional
commitment on both sides, introducing the differences between concerns and
interests.
EU and Turkey obviously share some apprehensions as to the stability and
security of the MENA region. Such traditional concerns were notably
strengthened by the succession of revolts in 2011 and their consequences in
political, economic and more broadly strategic terms. The unexpected and
rapid process of regime change that started almost simultaneously in a series
of Arab countries has not yet reached an end. These changes have produced
both internal unrest and regional, systemic instability, which could affect the
course of international affairs far beyond the Middle East itself – for example,
pro-democracy protesters in places as distant as China, Russia and even
Europe have since claimed to be following the Arab example. On a regional
scale, the security threat is fuelled by the reignition of old disputes and the
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Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
possible emergence of new ones. The risk of an intensification of violence is
multifaceted, including:
At the intrastate level, with different possible degrees of gravity: plain civil
war, as in the case of the battle against Colonel Muammar al-Qadhafi‟s regime
conducted by the Libyan insurgency in 2011 with the help of NATO forces;
looming civil confrontation, as in the case of Syria, where the opposition‟s
struggle against Bashar al-Asad‟s authority is now taking the form of military
operations, leading to reckless repression; or a significant degradation of
internal political consensus, as in the case of Iraq, where the current escalation
of sectarian hostility may lead to political disaggregation.
At the interstate level, with the reactivation of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute,
aggravated by uncertainty regarding peace agreements signed between Israel
and neighboring Arab states; the prospect of a confrontation with Iran
following potential Western intervention to prevent an attack against Israel
brings further concern.
Europeans and Turks do not necessarily assess the potential consequences
of the crises listed above in a similar way. Their appraisals of the situation and
definitions of their individual interests are marked by their own geographical
contiguities, the quality of existing relations with neighboring countries and
the availability of effective means to act.
In purely security-focused terms, the risk associated with wars in the region
is not as immediate for the EU as it is for Turkey, a country located very close
to several hotbeds of crisis. Turkey is on the front line, and is expected to play
an indispensable role in any solution to the Syrian crisis; in reality, as it shares
an exceptionally long (822 km) border with Syria, it is very vulnerable to any
degradation of the situation there, due to a combination of ethnic (presence of
Kurds), economic (roads to Iraq passing through Syria) and strategic
(relationship with Iran and with Russia) factors. Difficulties associated with
local unrest in all forms seem more distant for the EU. Such events might
bring to the fore political forces committed to a radical ideological struggle
against Western values, possibly increasing the level of the terrorist threat.
European economic performance could also be affected if political crises spill
over into oil- and gas-exporting countries such as the Gulf States or Algeria.
Tensions in the Middle East and North Africa
63
The most concrete worry in fact expressed is that regional disorders would
raise the number of unwanted migrants to Europe.
Speaking in terms of interests, the EU and Turkey‟s ambitions may not
automatically converge. Both claim to pursue a “neighborhood” approach in
the region, but the label means different things to each party. The success of
Davutoğlu‟s “zero problems with neighbors” policy depended on the
establishment of a fragile chain of political equilibriums, with the objective of
consolidating Turkey‟s influence in the region. The economic side of this soft
power rested on the signing of a series of free trade and free circulation
agreements with Arab countries, with the aim of securing the country‟s energy
needs and opening new export markets to compensate for the EU‟s economic
slowdown. Turkey has openly expressed its ambition of building a Middle
Eastern bloc of countries inspired by the EU model, and its visa diplomacy
has challenged the EU‟s comparatively restrictive regime regarding migration.
Finally, a few important obsessions on the Turkish national agenda, such as
the Kurdish question, cannot be easily shared with European allies, while
Cyprus remains a lasting bone of contention with the EU.
Responding to the Arab Spring: Instruments and reactions compared
The European and the Turkish responses to the Arab uprisings were
determined by these partly contrasting concerns and interests. In practical
terms, Turkey‟s major goal was to live up to the expectations of its followers
in the region, while the EU essentially felt constrained to reorganize its old
system of cooperation with Mediterranean countries on an emergency basis.
Turkey‟s rising profile as a regional power made it a natural protagonist in
any serious scenario of change. Its growing economic and political clout and
its cultural aura created a responsibility to act. The Arab Spring was for the
country a moment of truth; Turkish diplomacy had to adjust its objectives,
quickly assess the consistency of the protests and make drastic choices in
order to avoid landing on the wrong side of history. The country‟s reaction
came in two parallel channels. The first was passive: Turkey„s popularity within
the Arab public was confirmed by the debate on the relevance of the “Turkish
model” for Arab political transitions, even if Turkish authorities tactically
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Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
downplayed this, saying that Turkey was not a “model,” but rather a “success
story” and a “source of inspiration.” The second channel was active
diplomacy, including political declarations (Prime Minister Erdoğan was the
first political leader to advise Hosni Mubarak to leave office), proposals of
mediation (at the beginning of the Libyan crisis, later in Syria), intervention
(ultimately joining the NATO coalition in Libya) and aid (providing budgetary
support to the new Libyan authorities after the war). Turkey‟s advantage in
such a chaotic context was clearly its flexibility and the very complete range of
its external instruments, that could be mobilized in support of changing
strategies.
On the EU side, the Arab Spring appeared as a long-awaited moment for an
aggiornamento of the EU‟s much-criticized Mediterranean policies. Europeans
had the advantage of precedent, as their analysis of the region‟s political
deficiencies since the launch of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP),
later the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), had strongly emphasized
economic and social issues, which in turn appeared to have been key triggers
for the revolt in Tunisia. Similarly, one should not forget that the rule of law,
democracy, accountability and the role of civil society were all principles
enshrined in the Barcelona Declaration of November 1995. The EU‟s
credibility has suffered as a result of its incapacity to implement such
principles through regular cooperation programs; however, the “wait and see
syndrome” Europe has been suffering from may in fact turn into an asset. The
legal bases for EU/MENA cooperation remain, and a new set of guidelines
were issued in spring 2011 to efficiently address the dire financial problems of
the post-revolutionary environments.
Working together or testing one another:
Achieving at least minimal efficiency in times of crisis
Common objectives for complementary profiles
What type of objectives could the EU and Turkey share in the MENA
region? Both sides have declared their support for the rights of the people and
Tensions in the Middle East and North Africa
65
for democratic values. Yet the EU remains embarrassed by its past record of
complicity with authoritarian regimes, while the Turkish model may today be
failing in Turkey itself, where the state of some basic freedoms has become a
cause for concern. In the economic realm, Turkey appears primarily as a
business player, not yet as a donor. It is the issue of regional security that thus
presents the most promise in terms of potential common action, particularly in
the realms of conflict prevention, by contributing to smooth political
transitions and working to prevent violence from degenerating into civil wars.
Each party‟s natural modes of activity can to a certain extent complement
the other‟s. The EU has built up a solid institutional frame, while Turkey is
more capable of flexible intervention, notably drawing on its exceptional
networking capacity. Socializing and mediating remain Turkey‟s major
strengths, including with actors such as Iran whose relationships with the EU
have progressively deteriorated. In addition, Turkish popularity ratings are still
high in the region, while the reputation of some EU member states – notably
France – has eroded. Managing reform and institution-building programs over
the long run is a strength of the EU, yet Turkey has recently demonstrated a
remarkable ability to target aid in a reactive way, as for instance with its
support for the organization of elections and training of new (Islamist) Arab
elites. When political pressure or military intervention appear as last-resort
necessities, the advantage of efficiency seems by contrast to lie more with
European states, who may build temporary coalitions with the Turks, as in the
Libyan case.
Constraints and principles for joint action
Turkey‟s frustrated EU candidacy casts a long shadow across any attempt at
strategic rapprochement. Turkey‟s warning that it might completely freeze its
relationship with the EU during the Cypriot EU presidency in the second half
of 2012 is not encouraging in that regard. While Turkey views any European
demand for joint action in the MENA region as an opportunity to weigh in on
the accession process, some European states, notably France, insist on
delinking diplomatic cooperation from accession in order to avoid such
constant bargaining.
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Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
In the future, Turkey‟s effective contribution to the framing of European
policies will depend substantially on its capacity to agree on appropriate
political directions with leading EU member states. At present, the
institutional formalization of EU-Turkey cooperation does not seem realistic.
As an example, the currently strained Franco-Turkish relationship has blocked
mutual consultation on the Syrian crisis. Confidence-building measures will be
necessary if repeated logjams are to be avoided in the future.
While the face-to-face EU-Turkey relationship does not seem very
productive today, triangulation with the United States might be a more
promising way to foster security cooperation in a larger frame. Since the
beginning of the Arab Spring, Washington has indeed pushed Turkey to the
front line, and has attentively sought to keep its allies working together. The
Libyan crisis showed in the summer of 2011 that the EU and Turkey can in
fact overcome their divergences and agree on a pattern of joint intervention.
Despite tension due to bilateral disagreements between the Turks and several
other NATO member states (France, Cyprus), the alliance remains an arena
where the Americans can mediate and discipline everyone into dialogue and
common action.
Areas and avenues of cooperation
Global exchanges of views concerning the future of the Middle East are
certainly needed in order to advance the cause of consistent cooperation, and
could act as a confidence-building measure. Yet they remain difficult to
organize at the official level. Parallel or second-track diplomacy engineered by
civil society organizations and think tanks is very useful in keeping contact
active between Turkey and its EU counterparts.
Nonetheless, information sharing and consulting processes at the state level
must be maintained at all costs, with or without the mediation of the United
States. Ad hoc meetings and conferences, such as those convened to discuss
Syria, seem to be the most adequate system for the time being.
Finally, in considering synergies at the level of financial cooperation
agencies, pursuing joint activity between the Turkish International
Development and Cooperation Agency (TIKA) and Europe‟s DevCo might
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67
be a practical way to foster political agreement in the longer run. Moreover,
humanitarian assistance will definitely be a field where joint action could be
plausible in the future, given Turkey‟s geographical location and its specific
skills in that field.
References
Pierini, Marc. “Turkey, the EU and the Arab Transition Processes.” Talk at the conference
“Turkey and The Arab World: Natural Partners” organized by Ifri, in Brussels,
February 14, 2012.
Schmid, Dorothée (ed.). “La Turquie au Moyen-Orient: le retour d‟une puissance
régionale?.” Paris: CNRS Editions, 2011.
Soler i Lecha, Eduard. “The EU, Turkey, and the Arab Spring: From Parallel Approaches
to a Joint Strategy?” In Turkey and the Arab Spring: Implications for Turkish Foreign Policy
From a Transatlantic Perspective, edited by Nathalie Tocci, Ömer Taşpınar and Henri J.
Barkey. Washington, D.C.: GMFUS and IAI, October 2011: 25-35.
Tocci, Nathalie. “Turkey and the Arab Spring: Implications for Turkish Foreign Policy in
Transatlantic Perspective.” Commentary, Carnegie Endowment, September 12, 2011.
Ülgen, Sinan. “How to operationalize foreign policy dialogue between the EU and Turkey.”
In On Turkey. Washington: GMF, April 2011.
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Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
Coaxing the EU and Turkey to Engage with the Middle East
69
Coaxing the EU and Turkey to Engage with the
Middle East
Ghassan Khatib
A number of signs in the last several years have indicated that Europe‟s
attention to and involvement in the Middle East is on the rise. In parallel, and
for different reasons, Turkey too has become more engaged in the region.
This concurrence raises a question: Might the two parties be interested in
coordinating their involvement so as to improve both sides‟ understanding of
the relevant issues, and to make action by each in the region more effective?
The Middle East is going through a phase of revolutionary change that will
have far-reaching consequences. These changes and the consequent instability
are of great concern to the international community, especially to neighboring
nations such as Turkey and the European states. The dramatic developments
underway also come at a time when the failure to end Israel‟s illegal
occupation and the parallel obstruction of the Palestinian struggle for freedom
and independence have already exacerbated Middle East insecurity.
The European Union and European states, especially if they are able to
agree on a unified policy on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, are positioned to
play a political role beyond that of simply funding the Palestinian Authority.
Historical, religious and geographic factors are driving Turkey to expand its
role in the region as well.
The experience of the Arab Spring has thus far demonstrated that the Arab
League cannot alone play a successful mediating role within intra-Arab and
broader Middle East conflicts. The League itself has asked for international
contributions to these efforts, and Europe and Turkey are natural candidates
in this regard. However, neither Europe nor Turkey has to date fulfilled their
individual potentials in the Mediterranean neighborhood. Nor have they
sought to work together in addressing these conflicts.
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Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
In comparison to the United States (which has a decidedly negative regional
reputation following its war in Iraq and other interventions), Europe‟s regional
credibility is high, giving it the potential to contribute effectively. By the same
token, many of the rising forces in Arab countries admire Turkey and view it
as a model for their own societies. Turkey‟s support for Palestinians after
Israel‟s 2008 – 2009 offensive in Gaza markedly increased the country‟s stature
among Arabs.
Given their unique but shared positions, then, can Turkey and Europe join
forces to serve as mediators across the current spectrum of Middle East
conflicts, ranging from the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories to
the new conflicts and obstacles related to the Arab Spring? Also, does either
have much room to maneuver, given the powerful influence of their transAtlantic ally, the United States?
What does the Arab world need from its northern
neighbors?
The Arab world is going through the second most important phase in its
modern history. The first critical phase occurred roughly half a century ago,
when the Arab people revolted to throw off the mantle of European
colonialism. The current phase appears to be completing that revolution, with
citizens driven by poverty, unemployment and oppression to seek social and
economic justice and democratization.
At this stage of the ongoing upheavals collectively dubbed the “Arab
Spring,” it remains too early (and risky) to assess their outcomes or even to
carry out a comprehensive analysis. The various processes are still ongoing,
and may yet be in only the early stages. Moreover, these processes differ
greatly from one country to the next.
The citizen-led revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt were very different from
the armed regime change that dispatched the Qadhafi regime in Libya.
Likewise, Yemen‟s uprising has its own unique characteristics, and the ongoing
confrontations in Syria belong in a category of their own. As a result, it is
Coaxing the EU and Turkey to Engage with the Middle East
71
difficult to extrapolate broadly; the needs of Egyptians are different from
those of Syrians, Yemenis or Bahrainis.
However, now that Egyptians and Tunisians have succeeded in
overthrowing their respective leaders and have begun a democratic process
based on free and fair elections, it is clear that economic and social
development will be needed to sustain this process. Economic growth,
reductions in unemployment and poverty, and ultimately improvements in the
standard of living will all be critical drivers in this regard.
A statement by European Bank of Reconstruction and Development chief
Thomas Mirow, published by AFP on March 16, 2012, offered concise
reflection on what Europe can do to aid this process: “Across the whole of
the southern and eastern Mediterranean region, we have the capacity to invest
eventually as much as €2.5 billion ($3.27 billion) a year,” the bank president
said, announcing plans to support Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia.
Syria, on the other hand, has very different needs, at least at the moment.
The country has been caught up in – and has become a victim of – regional
and international competition for hegemony. While the Syrian people are
struggling for freedom, dignity and improved standards of living, regional and
international players are backing the parties to this struggle for very different,
self-interested reasons.
Arabs are sensitive to foreign interference. One of the most difficult
challenges for those seeking to provide assistance at this delicate juncture is
that of navigating between the genuine desire to help and the ambition to
control, attain hegemony and exploit.
As Arabs evaluate international intentions in their region, a key criterion is
any potential partner‟s attitude toward the Palestinian people and their cause.
It is difficult, for example, for the average Arab to understand criticism of
Russia and China for vetoing international censure of the Syrian regime when
that criticism comes from the same country (the United States) that vetoed a
resolution criticizing the expansion of illegal Israeli settlements on Palestinian
land. Such double standards weaken the credibility of any intervention.
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Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
Iraq is another factor driving instability in the region. Lying between Iran
and Syria, it holds a very significant strategic location. Its current government
has a vested interest in the perpetuation of Syria‟s regime. Thus, it is
imperative to keep a close eye on the rising sectarian tension in Iraq. More
broadly, the Kurdish issue serves as a common denominator linking Syria, Iraq
and Turkey; any special status Syrian Kurds might achieve will have a spillover
effect in Iraq, where the question of Kurdish status is already a delicate one.
Any efforts by Europe and Turkey to exert a positive, useful influence in the
region must also take the Iranian factor into consideration. As it competes for
Middle East hegemony, Iran‟s strategy involves influence both on states and
non-state actors. Neutralizing Iran‟s influence would require ending the Israeli
occupation of the Palestinian Territory and finding a solution to the
Palestinian problem, among other requisites.
How Europe and Turkey can help
In this international context, both Europe and Turkey are well positioned to
offer aid on issues related to the Arab Spring and Israel‟s ongoing occupation.
Despite its colonial history, Europe possesses enough credibility to play a
constructive role. Arab countries‟ strongest commercial and business ties are
with Europe, and Arab public opinion perceives Europe to be a more
balanced broker than the United States.
Turkey enjoys an even better reputation, while sharing elements of its
religious and historical heritage with the Arab world. Moreover, its recent
principled positions in support of Palestinians after Israel‟s Operation Cast
Lead in Gaza solidified its reputation as a friendly country. Many Arabs today
see the Turkish model as a source of possible inspiration in their own
democratic development. Turkey‟s success in combining an Islamic identity
with democracy and sustained economic development has raised its stature in
Arab eyes.
How might Turkey and Europe coordinate their efforts to assist the Arab
world during this difficult transition? Turkish-European relations are
themselves fraught with their own East-West tensions. Nevertheless, the two
Coaxing the EU and Turkey to Engage with the Middle East
73
parties have common interests in the region that can be expanded if the
following principles are observed.
First, constructive dialogue must be maintained with all significant parties to
these conflicts and confrontations. This includes governments and opposition
groups, not excepting Islamists and revolutionary movements, especially those
generated by the youth.
Second, double standards should be avoided and a coherent policy
developed. Europe and Turkey must deepen what are today relatively balanced
positions if they are to enhance their roles in helping to achieve legitimate
Arab Spring objectives such as democratization and social and economic
development.
Third, Turkey and Europe each must remain faithful to their own ideals,
avoiding the American mistake of promoting democracy at home while
abandoning democratic movements in the Arab world. There is no good
reason to pursue contradictory policies; even the selfish goal of maintaining
good economic relations with regimes that obstruct democratization and social
and economic development is self-defeating in the long run, as this corrodes
key relationships and promotes a lack of public trust.
In this process, the European Union and Turkey should also closely and
collectively coordinate their activities with the Arab League. In spite of the
difficulties facing the League, encouraging Arab states to act collectively is very
important for the region‟s long term outlook – not only because it will
facilitate future Arab coordination, but also because this serves to neutralize
public sensitivities over “foreign intervention” somewhat.
Europe and Turkey should also increase the frequency of economic and
cultural exchanges with Arab countries currently in transition. This helps
foster democratization and contributes to the economic development critical
to the consolidation of change and the maintenance of stability.
Official policies should differentiate between Islam as a faith and the
extreme radical political forces that manipulate Islam to forward their
particular agendas. Europe in particular must increase its efforts to uproot the
Islamophobia that has become prevalent there.
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Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
Finally, Europe and Turkey – and for that matter, the rest of the
international community – should in a serious and direct manner take up their
responsibility to end the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip,
including East Jerusalem, thus correcting the injustice done to the Palestinian
people more than 65 years ago.
Europe and Turkey can and should help in this regard by helping to realize a
two-state solution that enables Palestinians and Israelis to coexist in peace and
security, within recognized borders. Among other actions, this would require
helping the Palestinians in their efforts to build their country and its
institutions. In addition, it would require convincing Israel to halt the practices
that currently interfere with the two-state solution, particularly the policy of
expanding illegal settlements in occupied East Jerusalem and elsewhere.
A historical opportunity
The world, including Europe, bears some responsibility for the challenges
faced by parts of the Arab world over the last century. Through most of the
first half of the 20th century, Arabs were under the direct control of outsiders,
first of Turkey and then of colonial European states. Throughout the century‟s
second half, the Arab world was entangled in Cold War calculations, as powers
from the East and West competed for hegemony over the region.
During this period, the West was mostly selfish, opportunistic and shortsighted in its approach to the region. In order to maintain control and reap
strategic and economic benefits, it discouraged democratization, respect for
human rights, and social and economic development. This policy backfired to
a colossal extent.
In his landmark speech in Cairo in May 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama
alluded to this mistake, saying that “tension has been fed by colonialism that
denied rights and opportunities to many Muslims, and a Cold War in which
Muslim-majority countries were too often treated as proxies without regard to
their own aspirations.” Yet only three years later, many Arabs believe these
comments to have been mere lip service, lacking any foundation in subsequent
policy changes. As a result, the U.S. government has squandered its chance for
Coaxing the EU and Turkey to Engage with the Middle East
75
change, and today suspicion remains high. Many Arabs thus question the
intentions behind Washington‟s approach to the Arab Spring.
This deep divide opens the way for others to take the lead. Can Europe and
Turkey successfully engage the Arab peoples during this historical
opportunity, grounding their involvement in support of newly articulated
popular aspirations? Or will they continue to disregard genuine and long-term
Arab interests in the pursuit of their own short-term goals?
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Turkey, the EU and Regional Conflict Resolution: An Israeli View
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Turkey, the EU and Regional Conflict Resolution:
An Israeli View
Yossi Alpher
This article looks at interactions between Israel, the European Union and
Turkey with regard to regional conflict in the Middle East. It describes the
issue areas, analyzes the relevant policy approach of the government of Israel
and offers ideas for new Israeli departures.
The primary conflict areas identified by the Israeli security and political
establishments in the region are, first and foremost, the threat posed by Iran‟s
nuclear and regional/ideological ambitions, followed by “overflow” issues
from neighboring Arab revolutions – particularly Egypt and Syria – that could
affect Israel-Arab peace and regional stability. Interwoven with these is Israel‟s
interaction with hostile non-state actors: the Palestinian question, and jihadi
terrorism by Shi‟ite Iran/Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas, al-Qaeda and other
Sunni groups. Israel's discovery of large natural gas deposits in its territorial
waters, a small portion of which are disputed by Lebanon, hints at another
potential conflict zone that could also involve Cyprus and Turkey. Indeed,
there is a Turkish “angle” to nearly every one of these issue areas.
One notable feature of this “ranking” of conflict areas is the relatively low
priority currently assigned in Israel to the Palestinian issue. Ostensibly, this
reflects the looming dominance of the perceived Iranian threat, along with a
preoccupation with Arab Spring-related issues. Clearly, this is the way the
government of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu would like Israel‟s threat
assessment to be perceived, with the Palestinian issue downgraded to a
manageable problem, however persistent, even as additional settlement “facts”
are created daily. This situation is also a byproduct of three years of
mismanagement by the Obama administration, as well as the apparent
assessment by Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas that direct negotiations
have lost their usefulness and that an alternative approach has to be found. In
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European and Turkish eyes, the low level of attention being paid to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict almost certainly appears strategically skewed, insofar as the
Palestinian issue informs and interacts with the Iranian, regional revolutionary,
peace and terrorism issues, and accordingly should be awarded a higher
priority.
In the Israeli view, the Iranian threat is by no means limited to Tehran's
nuclear aspirations. Iran has surrounded Israel with missiles and rockets in
Syria, Lebanon (Hezbollah) and the Gaza Strip (Hamas). This reflects Iran's
ambitions in the “Shi‟ite” Levant (Shi‟ite regions of Lebanon and the Alawite
regime in Syria), backed by its heavy influence in Shi‟ite-dominated Iraq, as
well as an aspiration to deter Israel from attacking it. As a consequence, the
dangers of accidental escalation between Israel and Iran's proxies and allies are
at least as great as that of an Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear infrastructure,
which appears to be on hold as long as U.S.-led sanctions, spurred on by
Israeli threats to resort to force, seem to be effective and direct talks are being
held between Iran and the five plus one powers.
Further, the chaos and unrest in Syria have unleashed a series of threats by
President Bashar al-Asad, his influential cousin Rami Makhlouf and Hezbollah
leader Hassan Nasrallah to attack Israel preemptively in order to divert
regional and international attention from the Syrian revolution. However low
its probability, this threat too has to be taken seriously by Israel. Any and all of
these scenarios could escalate into regional war.
A more manageable scenario of conflict management potentially involving
Israel, Turkey and possibly Europe could be engendered by some sort of
minimalistic Israeli intervention in Syria. Israel currently understands it is not a
candidate even for humanitarian intervention on the ground in Syria, simply
because its motives would in every conceivable instance be interpreted by all
its neighbors as malevolent: as an attempt to conquer Arab territory. Hence
the intervention would be counterproductive for all concerned. Israel appears
to appreciate that, barring extreme provocation, its forces must not set foot on
Syrian soil, precisely in order to avoid giving Asad a pretext for attacking Israel
as a diversion. Israel has already announced preparations for the possibility of
absorbing Syrian refugees fleeing from the fighting to the Golan, and has
offered to provide indirect humanitarian aid.
Turkey, the EU and Regional Conflict Resolution: An Israeli View
79
Yet beyond the contingency of countering an attack from Syria or southern
Lebanon, it is not difficult to conceive “worst case” scenarios in which Israel
feels impelled to intervene more proactively. If, for example, the Asad regime
is losing its grip on vital military ordnance that could be captured and used
irresponsibly by al-Qaeda forces, other radical Islamist rebels or a breakaway
military faction – chemical warheads and missile delivery systems, for example,
of which Syria has a huge stockpile – one could conceive of an Israeli decision
to bomb these installations. Turkey, too, would presumably be sensitive to this
contingency and weigh preventive action. Without close Israeli-Turkish
cooperation, matters could easily get out of hand.
Obviously, contingencies pitting Israel against Iran and/or Syria are of vital
relevance to Turkey, which borders on both and has played a major role in
supporting the Syrian opposition. Turkey's relations with Iran have also
become increasingly tense in recent months, over the Syria issue, Iraq-related
issues and Iran's nuclear program. Ostensibly, Israel and Turkey are on the
same side of what is increasingly becoming a Sunni-Shi‟ite divide, and should
be interested in coordinating their policies.
In reality, this is not the case. The necessary Israeli-Turkish strategic and
diplomatic coordination demanded by any of the instances noted above does
not currently appear to be an easy prospect. In Israel's perception, there are
two reasons for this development, which is deeply regretted by virtually all
circles in Israel. One is Turkey's insistence on seeking regional influence at
Israel‟s expense by capitalizing on the Palestinian issue and supporting Hamas
Islamists who preach Israel‟s destruction. A second, related and broader
explanation is that Turkey‟s drive to expand its presence throughout the
Middle East is based primarily on affinity with like-minded Sunni Islamists
that are emerging as the dominant political force in the revolutionary Arab
world – leaving little or no room for a productive strategic relationship with
Israel.
During the course of 2011, the government of Prime Minister Binyamin
Netanyahu seemingly missed an opportunity to apologize to Turkey for the
death of nine Turkish citizens in the May 2010 Mavi Marmara incident, an act
some hoped might have restored the relationship to its status quo ante. That
Netanyahu actually rejected the counsel of some of his own strategic advisers
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Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
and did not offer such an apology reflects his assessment that the pro-Arab
and pro-Islamist underpinnings of Turkey‟s approach to the region are
dominant. An Israeli expression of regret would do little to alter Ankara‟s
basic approach, and would be construed by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan as a triumphant humiliation of Israel. But this decision ignored the
acute need for Israel to find some sort of accommodation with a regional
player as dominant as Turkey.
Key Israeli policymakers are apparently laboring under a mistaken vision of
Turkey as a country whose real destiny is to be a natural regional ally of Israel
simply because it is not Arab and has a past history of disaffection with the
Arab world. This approach looks back to the two countries‟ strategic/military
alliance that commenced in the 1950s, within the framework of Israel‟s
“periphery doctrine.” It is totally at odds with the current reality of Turkey's
regional approach.
Any prospect of Turkish-Israeli strategic coordination in the near future is
overshadowed by a number of existing and potential conflict situations
wherein Israeli and Turkish interests are seen to conflict: Israel‟s threat to
attack Iran's nuclear infrastructure; the Palestinian issue; possible Israeli
responses to acts by an Egyptian government dominated by political Islam;
and Israel‟s growing alliance with Cyprus (reportedly including Israel Air Force
landing rights at Paphos) and Greece – both EU members – regarding the
exploitation of Mediterranean offshore energy resources that are disputed by
Lebanon (Israel‟s maritime exploitation zone) and Turkey (Cyprus‟ zone).
This last issue of energy discoveries poses several intriguing challenges.
Within two or three years, Israel will become an exporter of natural gas and
can look forward to far greater wealth and economic power than ever in its
history. Will its Mediterranean drilling sites and installations, exploited in
collaboration with Cyprus, become yet another arena of conflict, or will its
economic clout enable it to mitigate conflict? Notably, too, within a decade or
so, thanks to a massive desalination effort, Israel will be capable of exporting
water to its thirsty neighbors, thereby creating yet another economic factor in
potential future conflicts or conflict resolution.
Turkey, the EU and Regional Conflict Resolution: An Israeli View
81
Perhaps the greatest lacuna in Israel‟s regional strategic behavior is its failure
to adopt a proactive attitude toward the Arab revolutions. Instead, it has
preferred a passive “keep your powder dry” approach that the Netanyahu
government has departed from only under duress, as in its cooperation with
the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces in Egypt regarding violence in and
from Sinai, and its participation in pre-negotiation peace talks in Jordan at
least in part to bolster the faltering status of King Abdullah II.
In contrast, despite the virtual collapse of its “zero conflicts” policy, Turkey
appears to have cultivated its strategic interests regarding Arab revolutionary
developments far better than Israel, by leading the opposition to the Asad
regime in Syria and advocating its own successful model of integrating political
Islam with democracy. (By way of instructive comparison, Saudi Arabia has
also responded far more successfully than Israel to threats to its interests
perceived to be associated with the Arab Spring, by using a combination of
force, dominant influence and financial largesse to maintain a relative quiet in
neighboring states Bahrain, Yemen and Jordan.)
Israel‟s fears of being surrounded by revolutionary Arab political Islam are
legitimate, but its response has proven uninspired, leaving it vulnerable to
additional revolutionary change in the region. Examples of areas where Israel
could and should become more proactive in order to project a positive profile
toward regimes old and new include peace talks or some alternative strategic
departure with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), engaging Egypt
and Hamas over Palestinian reconciliation, and discussing Syria with Turkey.
The deadlocked Palestinian issue, in particular, threatens to explode or
deteriorate in some unexpected way. Palestinian political paralysis, coupled
with the Netanyahu government‟s not-so-hidden agenda of expanding
settlements to a point where a viable two-state solution is impossible,
seemingly ensures that the parties, if left alone, have little chance of achieving
significant progress. Here the Israeli peace camp, the Quartet and Turkey
should be paying closer and more positive attention to PLO Chairman
Mahmoud Abbas‟ United Nations initiative. After two abortive attempts at the
highest level to resolve all final status issues in accordance with the Oslo
framework (Camp David in 2000 and the Olmert-Abbas talks in 2008), Abbas
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appears to have understood that the Oslo formula has run its course and
needs to be replaced with an alternative paradigm.
International recognition of a Palestinian state by the United Nations, the
Quartet or some other international entity offers an intriguing possible way
forward, insofar as it would reformulate the conflict into one between two
states and award priority to solution of the most relevant issues – the post1967 questions of borders, security and twin capitals in Jerusalem. Even if the
pre-1967 narrative issues of refugees and holy places remain unresolved, a
huge step forward toward stabilizing and managing the conflict would be
achieved, enabling Hamas to be integrated more easily into the process. Such
an approach – indeed almost any alternative to the current stalemate – would
require a far higher level of international involvement than is currently the
case.
Israel‟s perception of Europe‟s involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
focuses on policy disunity within the European Union and the EU‟s
consequent seeming inability to express a dynamic and forceful position. To
the extent that the EU and specific European countries seek to pressure the
Netanyahu government, Jerusalem capitalizes on this disunity. Current Quartet
peacemaking efforts, spearheaded by the EU, appear to both Israelis and
Palestinians to be increasingly useless, and risk undermining confidence in the
Quartet in general and Europe in particular. They should be reevaluated in
light of the need for an alternative paradigm for Israeli-Palestinian
peacemaking. The year 2012, in which the Obama administration is not
undertaking any risky peacemaking efforts due to electoral considerations, is
the perfect opportunity for the Quartet to undertake such a re-evaluation.
In parallel, the government of Israel seeks opportunities for strategic
cooperation with specific European countries that are less critical than the EU
as a whole or that share Israeli threat assessments, such as the United
Kingdom and France regarding Iran, Greece and Cyprus regarding Turkey and
energy, and the Central European countries in terms of their support for the
Israeli position in the conflict. One particularly sensitive potential point of
disturbance in the European-Israeli relationship is Germany‟s growing
dissatisfaction with the Netanyahu government, seen through the prisms of its
increasingly central role as the economic anchor of the European Union on
Turkey, the EU and Regional Conflict Resolution: An Israeli View
83
the one hand, and its self-imposed constraints regarding Israel in view of its
Holocaust history on the other.
At the end of the day, most European countries take their cue regarding the
Middle East conflict from the United States, where Israel‟s influence is
relatively strong. Washington has also tried to use its regional clout to improve
Turkish-Israeli relations, but with little success. Here we must underline the
potential significance of the approaching U.S. elections for the future of
American influence over the Israel-EU-Turkey triangle: A re-elected President
Barack Obama, for example, might adopt a more forceful role than previously.
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Turkey as an Emerging Destination Country for Immigration
85
Turkey as an Emerging Destination Country
for Immigration: Challenges and Prospects
for the Future
Ayhan Kaya
Turkey is a multiethnic, multicultural and multidenominational country,
home to approximately 50 different Muslim and/or non-Muslim ethnic
groups, including Sunni Turks, Alevi Turks, Sunni Kurds, Alevi Kurds,
Circassians, Lazis, Armenians, Georgians, Jews, Greeks, Arabs and Assyrians.
However, despite the last decade of democratizing reforms, the Turkish state
has not given full official recognition to the ethnically and culturally diverse
nature of Turkish society since the republic‟s foundation in 1923. The
country‟s ethno-cultural and denominational heterogeneity results from
diverse waves of migration that have swept across Anatolia throughout its
history. New migratory flows have again turned modern Turkey into a
destination country for immigration. This paper discusses the state of
contemporary immigration flows to Turkey as well as the challenges and
opportunities they present.
Throughout the first half of the 20th century, Turkey was heavily agrarian.
However, the subsequent mechanization of the agricultural sector and the rise
of industrial production radically changed the country‟s population dynamics,
resulting in considerable internal and international migration. Indeed, data
from the Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜIK) shows a threefold increase in
urban population numbers from 1927 to 2010.
Turkey has recently become a positive net migration country, in part due to
a rise in transit and return migration. The country is also an increasingly
attractive destination for international direct investment.
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Net migration trends in Turkey
The number of incoming migrants in Turkey is almost equal to the number
of emigrants leaving the country. Emigration no longer poses a significant
challenge for Turkey from a demographic perspective, with the exception of
persistent concerns about brain drain. According to the World Bank, Turkey‟s
2010 migrant population numbered 1.4 million individuals, or around 1.93
percent of the total population. The net immigration rate for the year 2010
was nearly 0.06 percent (World Bank 2010).
Irregular migrants from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan
have been using Turkey as a transit route since the 1990s (Kirişci 2003;
İçduygu 2009). According to Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs statistics,
about 561,000 irregular migrants were apprehended between 2000 and 2008.
Turkey is also a destination point for human trafficking in the Black Sea
region, with victims typically coming from Moldova, Ukraine, the Russian
Federation, Kyrgyzstan or Uzbekistan. Turkey has long been a destination
country for immigrants mainly from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union, who seek new work and a new life in Turkey itself, or regard the
country as a stepping stone to employment in the West (İçduygu 2009; Danis,
Taraghi and Perouse 2009). Istanbul has become home to many recently
arrived international migrants, though these communities still have a
comparatively low profile. Kaiser and İçduygu (2005) identify eight different
categories of migrants in Turkey from the European Union alone.
Turkey serves as an important stepping stone for transit migrants from more
distant countries. Between 1995 and 2009, authorities apprehended 794,937
irregular immigrants (IOM 2010). Political developments in the region
including the Iranian revolution, turmoil in the Middle East, the end of the
Cold War and the Gulf War turned Turkey into a de facto country of first
asylum. Migrants from the region are expected to make up the largest
component of this flow well into the future (Frenzen 2011).
It should be noted that Turkey grants refugee status only to European
asylum seekers. Until recently, it has ranked among the top three countries
globally in the facilitation of non-European refugees‟ resettlement, with the
main countries of destination being the United States, Canada and Australia
Turkey as an Emerging Destination Country for Immigration
87
(IOM 2008: 31). Migration policies have been shaped by the country‟s efforts
to become a member of the European Union, which in turn has created
pressures for revision of its immigration and asylum policies (Kirişci 2009). As
of the time of writing, the Turkish government‟s negotiations over a
readmission agreement with the European Commission were currently in their
final stages (Council of the European Union 2011).
Turkey’s growing soft power in the region
Migrants originating from Middle Eastern countries, African countries,
Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh and
elsewhere choose Turkey because of the availability of informal jobs,
comparatively high wages (relative to their countries of origin), geographical
proximity, existing social networks and the country‟s flexible visa system. For
instance, unlike European countries, no visa is needed for North African
migrants to enter Turkish territory. Some North African migrants see arrival in
Turkey as an initial step toward entering the European Union clandestinely,
ultimately by crossing the Turkish-Greek border. Attracted by the
opportunities offered by the big cities in Turkey, some of these migrants even
choose to stay in Turkey.
Today, the Turkish economy is booming, having weathered the recent
global financial crisis better than most European countries. With a large and
dynamic population, the country‟s economy grew an average of 6.0 percent
per year from 2002 through 2007 – one of the highest such sustained rates of
growth in the world. GDP declined during the 2008 – 2009 crisis but
recovered quickly in 2010 (with a growth rate of 6.8%). The per capita income
(on a purchasing power parity basis) is €10,350 (2009 figures).1
The volume of Turkey‟s trade with its neighbors increased from $4 billion to
$82 billion between 1991 and 2008. Turkish entrepreneurs are today driving a
Unless otherwise stated, all data are from Turkey‟s official statistical institute, TUIK
(www.tuik.gov.tr).
1
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Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
flow of investment into neighboring countries and regions including Iraq,
Bulgaria, Georgia, Russia, Central Asia, Syria, Lebanon and now Greece
through various business associations such as the Turkish Industry and
Business Association (TUSIAD), the Independent Industrialists and
Businessmen‟s Association (MUSIAD), the Foreign Economic Relations
Board of Turkey (DEIK), the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges
of Turkey (TOBB), the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and
Industrialists (TUSKON) and the Turkish Exporters‟ Assembly (TIM).
Furthermore, Turkey‟s free trade agreements with Syria, Jordan and Lebanon,
which conform with Europe‟s Mediterranean policies and the European
Neighborhood Policy, have also contributed to the increase in trading volumes
with the country‟s neighbors.
Turkey is becoming a soft power in the region, with growing ability to affect
the ways in which other nations act, think, imagine and perceive the world.
This influence takes places through a variety of channels, including the
ideological instruments of the state (popular culture, media, church, education
institutions). The decision to lift visa restrictions with neighboring countries
such as Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and Iran also bolstered Turkey‟s political and
cultural impact in the region. The Muslim world‟s high regard for Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, U.S. President Barack Obama‟s visit to
Turkey and the spread of popular Turkish culture (such as soap operas) offer
further examples of the country‟s growing influence. In a manner similar to
counterparts such as the Goethe Institute, the British Council and the
Cervantes Institute, branches of the Yunus Emre Institute disseminate
Turkey‟s culture and language around the region.
Higher education is one of Turkey‟s fastest-growing sectors; as of 2011, the
country had 103 public universities and 62 universities operated by private
foundations (Figure 1). As the supply of classroom seats today exceeds
domestic student volume, Turkish universities are now expanding their focus
to neighboring countries. Turkish universities also attract students from the
Middle East, Central Asia and Africa. On the instructional side, the quickly
expanding community of foundation-run universities is attracting foreign
scholars and researchers as well as those of Turkish origin. Because English is
the language of instruction in most of these universities, as well as in some of
Turkey as an Emerging Destination Country for Immigration
89
the country‟s public universities, international researchers and scholars have
increasingly been willing to pursue at least a portion of their career in Turkey.
Fig. 1:
Source:
Number of public universities and universities operated by private foundations
in Turkey (different years)
Higher Education Council, http://www.yok.gov.tr
Return migration
Prior to the official termination of temporary circular migration policies in
European countries in 1974, an estimated 2 million migrants of Turkish origin
were involved in a cyclical form of temporary migration. After 1974, inward
bound migration increased in the form of family reunification. Return
migration continues even today (Table 1).
90
Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
Table 1: Return Migration to Turkey from Germany, Austria and the Netherlands
(2003 - 2008)
Germany
Austria
The Netherlands
2003
35,612
2,470
1,125
2004
37,058
2,684
1,992
2005
34,595
2,976
1,987
2006
33,229
3,338
2,189
2007
32,172
3,329
2,335
2008
38,899
3,269
2,291
Source:
Note:
Eurostat 2011, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu
These figures include all German, Austrian and Dutch citizens migrating to
Turkey regardless of whether they are ethnically Turkish or of non-Turkish
origin. However, returnees who lack German, Austrian or Dutch citizenship
are not included.
The return migration of the 1990s and 2000s has been quite different from
that of the 1970s and 1980s. Typical early returnees were either engaged in
cyclical labor migration or were participants in one of a number of assisted
remigration programs, as in 1984. Today, return migration for transmigrants
has become a process of constant mobility between their previous country of
residence and the country of origin. The profile of returnees or transmigrants
migrating to Turkey is quite diverse, encompassing not only Turks, but also
Assyrians, Kurds, and even Rums repatriating to the homeland of their
parents.
Public discussion of Turkish migration policies
Turkey currently lacks a full-fledged immigration policy or legal framework,
although the government introduced such legislation in 2011. The European
Union is affecting the course and content of these policies (Özçürümez and
Şenses 2011). Indeed, the EU‟s impact has been very visible in the readmission
agreements signed by Turkey with Syria (2001), Greece (2001), Kyrgyzstan
Turkey as an Emerging Destination Country for Immigration
91
(2003), Romania (2004) and Ukraine (2005). Readmission agreement
negotiations remain underway with Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Sri
Lanka, China, and Bulgaria, while Turkey has drafted and submitted proposed
agreements to Egypt, the Russian Federation, Belarus, Georgia, Israel, Sudan,
Nigeria, Ethiopia, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon,
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Mongolia. In addition, in 2008 the Ministry of
Interior established an Office
for Migration
and Asylum
(http://gib.icisleri.gov.tr), tasked with generating and implementing migration
policies in collaboration with academics, NGOs, international organizations,
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the European
Union.
Migration policy is rarely a subject of significant public debate in Turkey.
Yet the public did take notice of a new law that came into force on 1 February
2012 making it more difficult for foreigners to live and work in Turkey
without a residence and work permit. Foreigners used to exit Turkey officially
after their 90-day visa expired, and then immediately reenter with a new 90-day
visa. However, the new law allows foreign citizens entering the country with a
tourist visa to stay in Turkey for only three months, and no longer allows
immediate reentry (Ziflioğlu 2012). Those affected are primarily nationals
from the Middle East, Armenia, Georgia, Central Asian Turkic Republics and
southern Mediterranean countries who filled informal labor market demand
(mainly as caretakers, housecleaners, “suitcase trader” merchants, etc.)
following a 2007 law that made it harder for Bulgarian and Romanian labor
migrants to live and work in Turkey.
Impact of immigration on Turkish society and culture
Created from the remnants of an empire, Turkey is historically a
multicultural and multidenominational country. However, the state‟s
difference-blind republican policies have to this day explicitly and implicitly
defined Turkish citizenship on the basis of the Sunni-Muslim-Turk trinity, in
such a way as to include Muslims who are ethnically Turks and/or religiously
Sunni (such as Kurds, Alevis, Circassians, Arabs, etc.), while effectively
excluding non-Muslims from the implied nation. However, the last three
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Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
decades have seen tremendous social and political change associated with
various global and local challenges such as the rise of a politics of identity
(particularly on the part of Kurds and Alevis), political Islam, Europeanization
and of course globalization. Turkey is also shifting its political and economic
perspective toward its neighboring countries.
Because Turkey is gradually becoming a destination country for
immigration, Turkish citizens will more routinely encounter a greater diversity
of people in the near future. Central and local administrations seeking to
manage ethno-cultural and religious diversity will have to concern themselves
with the growing number of allochthonous immigrant populations as well as
with the country‟s autochthonous minorities. Hence, there is a pressing need
for the state and ruling political parties to display strong political will toward
the management of diversity on the basis of respect, recognition and human
rights.
Problems with the EU’s externalization of
migration controls
From a strictly demographic perspective, European countries appear to need
to find ways to increase their population rather than preventing immigrants
from coming in. Accordingly, a “zero tolerance” migration policy toward the
Euro-Mediterranean region is neither feasible nor sustainable in the medium
and long term. A fortress policy of zero immigration can only lead to
structural conflicts between European and southern Mediterranean countries,
and helps to create non-institutional mediatory labor market actors that
operate outside the legal framework (for further analysis of the EuroMediterranean migration issues, see Piperno and Stocchiero 2006). The
growth of irregular transit movements across the Sahara desert to and from
the Maghreb countries (Libya, Morocco, Tunisia) and along dangerous
maritime smuggling routes to Italy, Malta and Spain are partly a consequence
of this restrictive immigration policy. The same applies to the transit migratory
route through Turkey, Greece and Italy. The majority of transit migrants who
arrive in the European Union countries originate from Senegal, the Gambia,
Mali, Congo, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Cameroon, Côte d‟Ivoire,
Turkey as an Emerging Destination Country for Immigration
93
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, China or Iraq, and pass through
Morocco, Algeria, the Canary Islands, Tunisia or Turkey in transit.
The decision by European countries to “externalize” border controls, giving
transit countries a primary role in the containment of migratory flows, is not a
sustainable solution. Thus, a different approach is needed to manage the
migratory processes originating from the southern and eastern Mediterranean
basin. One component of a new migration management strategy could be the
creation of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade zone; this would conform to the
strategic goals of the EU‟s Barcelona Process and improve opportunities for
the circulation of goods and capital between the EU and its neighboring
countries. Additionally, European Union countries should engage in the active
management of migratory flows by means of policies enhancing the role of
migrants as catalysts for local development in their countries of origin.
Challenges and prospects for the future
Turkey‟s growing regional economic, political and cultural impact has made
it an attractive destination for migration not only for people originating from
the Middle East, the southern Mediterranean and the Caucasus, but even for
those coming from European countries. The Europeanization of Turkey‟s
foreign policy, domestic politics and economy has smoothed the way for the
development of friendly relations between Turkey and its neighbors. The fact
that Turkey is becoming even more multicultural will require additional
reforms in the fields of migration, integration and citizenship. Policymakers
and the broader society will have to focus on these issues more closely in the
near future; but indeed, positive signs already indicate that the country is
willing to do so.
94
Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
References
Council of the European Union. “Council Conclusions on EU-Turkey Readmission
Agreement and Related Issues.” 3071st Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting.
Brussels, February 24-25, 2011.
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/119501.p
df
Danis, Didem, Cherie Taraghi and Jean-Francoise Perouse. “Integration in Limbo: Araqi,
Afghan, Maghrebi and Iranian Migrants in Istanbul.” In Land of Diverse Migrations,
Challenges of Emigration and Immigration in Turkey, edited by Ahmet İçduygu and Kemal
Kirişci. Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University Press 2009: 443–636.
Frenzen, Niels. “Frontex Issues 2011 Annual Risk Analysis.” The Migrants at Sea Blog,
May 12, 2011. http://migrantsatsea.wordpress.com/2011/05/12/frontex-issues-2011annual-risk-analysis/
İçduygu, Ahmet. “International Migration and Human Development in Turkey.” Human
Development Research Paper 52. New York: UNDP, 2009. http://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/19235/
International Organization for Migration (IOM). “Migration in Turkey: A Country Profile.”
Geneva: IOM, 2008.
http://www.turkey.iom.int/documents/migration_profile_turkey.pdf? entryId=10260
IOM. Study on Migration, Employment and Labour Market Integration Policies in the
European Union, Geneva: IOM, 2010.
Kaiser, Bianca and Ahmet İçduygu. “Türkiye‟deki Avrupa Birliği Yurttaşları” (EU Citizens
in Turkey). In Türkiye’deki Çoğunluk ve Azınlık Tartışmaları, edited by Ayhan Kaya and
Turgut Tarhanlı. Istanbul: TESEV Publications, 2005: 224–240.
Kirişci, Kemal. “Turkey: A Transformation from Emigration to Immigration.” Migration
Information Source, 2003.
http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/print.cfm?ID=176
Kirişci, Kemal. “Harmonization of Migration Policy and Turkey‟s Security Challenges.”
Istanbul: Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM) and German
Marshall Fund, 2009.
OECD. International Migration Outlook. Paris: SOPEMI 2010.
Özçürümez, Saime and Nazli Şenses. 2011. “Europeanization and Turkey: studying
irregular migration policy.” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 13(2): 233–248.
DOI: 10.1080/19448953.2011.578867
Turkey as an Emerging Destination Country for Immigration
95
Piperno, Flavia. and Andrea. Stocchiero. “Migrants and Local Authorities for the
EuroMediterranean Transnational Integration.” CeSPI Working Papers 23/2006.
Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSIAD). Turkey‟s Window of Opportunity.
TUSIAD Publication No-T/99-3-254, İstanbul: 1999.
World Bank. World Bank Data, Turkey. 2010. http://data.worldbank.org/country/turkey
Ziflioğlu, Vercihan. “Foreigners leave Turkey amid new residence law.” Hürriyet Daily News,
January 27, 2012. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/foreigners-leave-turkey-amidnew-residence-law.aspx?pageID=238&nID=12391&NewsCatID=339
96
Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
Migration from Turkey to Europe
97
Migration from Turkey to Europe:
Betwixt and Between?
Seçil Paçacı Elitok and Thomas Straubhaar
Turkey-EU migration in historical context
Due to its geographical location linking Europe, Asia, and the Middle East
and North Africa region (MENA), Turkey has throughout its history been
host to significant migratory movements, serving both as source and
destination for emigration and immigration, and as a transit corridor for
migrants with destinations elsewhere (Kirişci 2003; Tolay 2012). Massive
internal migration movements within Turkey have been and remain periodic
occurrences, mostly from rural to urban areas, from smaller to larger cities,
and from the east to the west of the country. Following the foundation of the
Republic of Turkey in 1923, migration policy was regarded as a nationbuilding tool, and was designed specifically to foster a homogenous (Turkishspeaking and Muslim) identity (İçduygu and Sert 2009).
Diverse patterns of immigration
One of the most significant migration movements in the initial years of the
Turkish Republic was the population exchange between Greece and Turkey
(1922), in the course of which approximately 1.5 million ethnic Greeks left
Anatolia, and 500,000 Muslims and Turks immigrated to Turkey. The stream
of people of “Turkish descent and culture” from other Balkan regions
continued through the following years, encouraged by authorities. The second
mass immigration flow to Turkey took place during World War II, when
roughly 100,000 Jews escaped from Europe and found temporary asylum in
Turkey. In later years, after the regime change in Iran in the late 1970s, almost
1 million Iranians moved to Turkey, as did about 510,000 Iraqi Kurds between
1988 and 1993. Finally, nearly 1 million migrants came to Turkey following the
collapse of the Soviet Union (Kirişci 2003). Today, Turkey receives migrants
98
Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
primarily from neighboring regions (Europe, the Soviet Union and MENA);
these individuals have various skill levels, stay for different durations and hold
a wide range of immigration statuses. However, immigration to Turkey is
increasing overall. Migrants from MENA in particular have been drawn to
Turkey by its improving living standards and employment opportunities
(especially in informal sectors). The Arab Spring of 2011 – 2012 also triggered
migration to Turkey from the MENA region.
Emigration
Turkish emigration to Western Europe was initiated by a recruitment
agreement, the so-called guest worker program signed by Turkey and
Germany in 1961 (similar agreements were later negotiated with other Western
European countries). The flow of Turkish migrants to Germany proved a
boon to both countries. It solved the labor shortages created by Germany‟s
booming economy after World War II, and it eased an excess labor supply
associated with an economic recession in Turkey in the early 1960s. The guest
worker program came to an end in the mid-1970s due to the oil crisis, yet the
emigration of Turks to Europe continued in the form of family reunification.
Other destination countries (i.e., Russia and the Middle East) have also
become important in the intervening years.
Transit and illegal migration
Turkey‟s flexible visa regime (especially toward Middle Eastern countries)
has made it a hub for undocumented migrants and irregular flows. Migrants
intending to go on to final destinations in Europe often use Turkey as a transit
corridor. Asylum seekers and refugees too may lose an initially official status
and fall into illegality. As a result of the geographical limitation clause in
Turkey‟s asylum policy, which allows non-European refugees to stay in Turkey
only temporarily, most asylum seekers whose applications are rejected become
illegal migrants. This is of particular importance for the European Union, as
the common Turkish-EU border ensures that any transit through Turkey has a
direct effect on immigration patterns within the EU.
Migration from Turkey to Europe
99
Future perspectives on Turkey-EU migration patterns
In the context of Turkey‟s accession to the EU, “potential migration” from
Turkey and its impact on European labor markets has become an issue of
significant concern within the Union. Three factors play a crucial role in this
regard: Turkey‟s growing population and comparatively young labor force; the
gap in living standards between Turkey and the EU; and the Muslim identity
of Turkish immigrants.
Population development
Germany currently has the largest population of any EU member state.
However, this will likely change in the future, particularly if Turkey joins the
Union. Figure 1 illustrates this point: In 2012, at the time of writing,
Germany‟s population numbered 82 million, compared to Turkey‟s smaller
population of 74 million. According to the mid-range projections contained in
the United Nations‟ World Population Prospects report, the two populations
will reach near equivalence in 2020. The Turkish population is ultimately
projected to grow to about 92 million, while the German population will
shrink to about 75 million (Figure 1). Consequently, Turkey might have
surplus labor supply and Germany might have excess labor demand in the
future. However, Turkey‟s fertility rate and population growth rates are
currently in decline, while employment opportunities in the country are on the
rise. Both factors might lower the incentives for emigration over time.
100
Fig. 1:
Source:
Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
Total population in Turkey and Germany (millions, 1980 – 2010; UN mediumfertility variant used for 2011 – 2050)
Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the
United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision,
http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm
From a political point of view, if Turkey joins the European Union, it will be
quite costly for other members in terms of voting rights. From the migration
point of view, Turkey represents a potential remedy for demographic decline
in Europe.
Living standards
A significant gap in average living standards currently exists between Turkey
and the European Union (Figure 2). In comparing per capita gross national
incomes (GNI) measured on a purchasing power parity basis, this gap can be
seen to have declined in percentage terms between 1980 and 2010. However,
Migration from Turkey to Europe
101
GNI in Turkey remains at about half the EU level today. This difference has
several implications.
Even given projected convergence with EU living standards in the future,
especially if Turkey becomes an EU member state, the gap in living standards
will likely remain large enough to stimulate emigration from Turkey to the EU
for the next few decades. However, individual decisions to emigrate follow a
logarithmic relationship to differences in living standards, not a linear one.
This means that there may be a strong individual propensity to migrate under
conditions of large income differential, but that migration propensity becomes
much weaker as the income gaps narrow. In coming decades, it is thus likely
that rapidly rising living standards in Turkey will lead to lower levels of
emigration.
Fig. 2:
Source:
Note:
Per capita GNI in Turkey and the European Union (PPP $, 1980 – 2010)
World Bank, World Development Indicators;
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD.
In this figure, GNI is converted to international dollars using purchasing power
parity (PPP) rates. U.S. dollar PPP has been used to reflect the gap in actual
living standards between Turkey and the euro area.
102
Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
Europe’s Christian values and the Muslim identity of Turkish immigrants
The Muslim identity of many Turkish immigrants has become a growing
source of concern in Europe in recent years. The issues of religion and culture
have often taken center stage in EU membership negotiations with Turkey.
As this trend has developed, Turkish migrants in Europe have increasingly
been perceived as being “Muslims.” The events of September 11 indisputably
increased fears of Muslim extremism and gave rise to Islamophobia on the
part of some non-Muslims. In addition, a growing conservatism within the
Turkish diaspora has been reflected in the increasing number of Turkish
migrant ethnic and religious associations. Turkey‟s internal politics have also
evolved in consonance with the religious tendencies of Turkish communities
in Europe. This has led to questions as to whether Europe‟s secular identity
and Turkey‟s Muslim tradition can comfortably coexist.
Unfounded fears?
As previously noted, migration flows from Turkey to the EU are expected
to continue in the coming decades. This is one of the primary reasons why EU
countries (especially Germany) continue to restrict the movement of Turkish
workers. Yet are these fears justified by either theoretical projections or
empirical evidence?
The main methodological difficulty in estimating the “migration intention”
of Turks migrating to the EU lies in the uncertainty surrounding Turkey‟s
prospective EU accession, which would pave the way for free movement of
labor. Current estimations of “migration intention” suggest a migration
potential of between 0.5 to 4.4 million Turkish migrants.
However, these estimates may not adequately account for people's social
and cultural ties to their local environment. Though these represent significant
practical obstacles to migration, they have commonly been underestimated
from the perspective of theoretical economics, and have not been sufficiently
integrated into structural migration (forecasting) models.
Erzan et al. (2006) suggest that EU membership could increase economic
growth in Turkey, which would decrease the number of people attracted by
Migration from Turkey to Europe
103
the prospect of emigration. After the European Union‟s Eastern enlargement,
migration flows increased temporarily, but subsequently fell back. Something
like a migration hump is thus also the most realistic scenario for EU-Turkish
migration following Turkey‟s EU accession. An increase in migration flows
would likely follow the grant of free movement rights, but these flows would
in turn decrease over time.
Future migration flows from the European Union to Turkey will also be
determined by a variety of factors (income differentials, unemployment,
migrant networks, migration policies, religion, culture, etc.). As Istanbul is
likely to become an increasingly attractive site for international business,
expatriate workers and professionals will be correspondingly motivated to
migrate to Turkey for work. In addition to foreign professionals, the potential
for migration on the part of highly skilled migrants educated in Germany but
with a Turkish ethnic background is and will be significant.
Turkey‟s role in managing migration flows from the Middle East and the exSoviet Union countries is of considerable importance today. In this context,
migration from the Middle East is expected to retain its importance in the near
future, perhaps even increasing as a result of changes to Turkey‟s visa policies.
Current forms of migration such as contract-dependent labor migration and
marriage migration will persist in the near future, whereas asylum seeking may
decline (particularly if a solution to the Kurdish dispute is found). If the
Kurdish minority is successful in gaining autonomy rights, Kurds may be
motivated to migrate internally from western cities back to the villages in the
country‟s eastern regions. The potential for migration from Turkey to the
Middle East is relatively weak, due to the tendency of employers in the region
to favor their own citizens.
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Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
Challenges and opportunities1
Illegal migration constitutes one of the most significant challenges Turkey
faces in its relations with the European Union. Kirişci (2008) emphasizes the
increasing importance of managing illegal migration for Turkey, seeing this as
both challenge and opportunity. He contends that the European Union‟s
treatment of migration as a security issue has adversely affected EU-Turkish
relations, and has generated mistrust on both sides. According to Kirişci, the
EU feels that Turkey is not doing enough to combat or prevent illegal transit
migration. Yet for its part, Turkey has no interest becoming a buffer zone for
irregular migrants to the EU.
In line with EU regulations, Turkey recently began a reform of its asylum
law, visa regulations, illegal migration policies and efforts to combat human
trafficking. The 1994 Asylum Regulation and 2006 Circular specifying asylum
procedures and the rights and obligations of refugees and asylum seekers are
being revised. Turkey is party to the U.N. Refugees Convention of 1951, but
has not yet lifted geographical limitations that prevent non-Europeans from
being granted refugee status. If Turkey is successful in improving its
immigration and asylum policies, then the challenge of migration can be
transformed into an opportunity. For example, the reforms could improve its
chances for successful EU accession. From a security perspective, cooperation
and dialogue between Turkey and the EU with respect to illegal migration
would be beneficial to both sides (Kirişci 2008: 126).
Turkey should also pursue economic reforms in order to reduce the effects
of migration push factors such as low wages, economic instability,
unemployment and inadequate working conditions. Turkey‟s approach in the
1960s – that of considering migration as a remedy for unemployment and
remittances as a significant source of foreign currency – should be replaced by
a more realistic and contemporary future strategy.
1
See also various contributions in Elitok/Straubhaar 2012.
Migration from Turkey to Europe
105
Current migration policies in Europe give clear evidence of an increasing
interest in circular and temporary migration. This trend can be considered an
attempt to find an alternative to the traditional guest worker programs that are
today deemed “unsuccessful,” with three main perceived advantages:
• Low or zero risk of permanent migration: It is assumed that when migration
is temporary and/or circular, the “risk” of permanent migration is either low
or zero, meaning that European countries will save on “integration” costs.
However, even short-term migrants have integration needs, in both the
work environment and their social life.
• Flexible labor markets: Europe also intends to create more flexible labor
markets, in which short-term shortages are met by seasonal workers.
However, Europe‟s structural and long-term demographic problems (chiefly
associated with an aging, shrinking population) cannot be alleviated solely by
short-term migration. Various studies argue that Europe‟s long-term needs
will ultimately have to be met by migrants. In this regard, migration is
mandatory for Europe‟s future at all skill levels. Furthermore, flexibility may
easily be misused by employers, as it may reduce the bargaining power of
migrants who come to be preferred because of their low wages.
• Irregular migration reduction: Policymakers hope that circular and
temporary migration programs will serve to reduce illegal migration.
However, this may require the institution of excessive bureaucracy and
monitoring programs, since the return of migrants is not guaranteed, and
even circular or short-term migrants have the potential to become illegal by
overstaying their visas.
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Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
References
Elitok, Seçil Paçacı and Thomas Straubhaar (eds.) Turkey, Migration and the EU: Potentials,
Challenges and Opportunities. Hamburg: Hamburg University Press, 2012.
Erzan, Refik, Umut Kuzubas and Nilufer Yildiz. “Immigration Scenarios: Turkey-EU.”
Turkish Studies 7 (1): 33–44, 2006.
İçduygu, Ahmet and Deniz Sert. “Turkey. Focus Migration Country Profile,” Nr. 5., April
2009. http://focus-migration.hwwi.de/uploads/tx_wilpubdb/CP_05_Turkey_2009.pdf
Kirişci, Kemal. “Turkey: A Transformation from Emigration to Immigration.” Washington,
D.C.: Migration Policy Institute Migration Information Source, 2003.
http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?id=176
------- “Managing Irregular Migration in Turkey: A Political-Bureaucratic Perspective.”
CARIM Analytical and Synthetic Notes, 61. Fiesole/Florence: Robert Schuman Centre
for Advanced Studies (EUI), 2008.
Polenz, Ruprecht. “Besser für beide: Die Türkei gehört in die EU.” Hamburg: Edition
Körber-Stiftung, 2010.
Tolay, Juliette. “Coming and Going: Migration and Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy.” In
Turkey and its Neighbors: Foreign Relations in Transition, by R.H. Linden et al. Boulder:
Rienner, 2012.
From a Policy of Fear to a Policy of Potential
107
From a Policy of Fear to a Policy of Potential:
Migration in a Cross-Mediterranean Context
Rana Deep Islam
The U.K.-based Asian Dub Foundation, a rap group originally born out of a
community project, released one of its most politically charged songs in 2003,
entitled “Fortress Europe.” The lyrics are as follows:
“We got a right, know the situation // We‟re the children of globalization
// No borders, only true connection // Light the fuse of the insurrection
// This generation has no nation // Grassroots pressure the only solution
// (…) // Tear down the walls of Fortress Europe”
The words shed light on the band‟s negative perception of Europe and its
treatment of foreigners and migrants. Indeed, the entire song illustrates the
Zeitgeist that served as the background to debate during the first decade of the
21st century. Leftist circles in particular have seen Europe as erecting a
bulwark aimed at keeping out the dangers that lurked outside its borders. And
indeed, ideas characterizing mainstream discourse during this time – especially
that of an alleged “clash of civilizations” that seemingly challenged the survival
of the Western hemisphere – were taken up even by experts, decision-makers
and public figures. Islam as a religion and the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) as a region were identified as the main sources of insecurity
threatening the West in general and Europe in particular. Significantly, the five
key challenges formulated by the European Security Strategy can be found in
this region: international terrorism, regional conflicts, failing states, weapons
of mass destruction and organized crime.
Against this backdrop, approaches to the MENA region were given a
security-focused rationale. An examination of the action plans created as part
of the European Neighborhood Policy speaks volumes: Following a trend of
securitization, Europe‟s decision-makers considered economic deprivation and
social segregation to be the sources of radicalism and religious extremism. The
EU‟s offers of economic cooperation, administrative assistance, political
108
Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
reform and trade preferences between the Union and its Mediterranean
“partner states” were all seen as instruments aimed at increasing Europe‟s
security. Under this conception, the more prosperous Europe‟s neighborhood
became, the lower would be the risk of an inflow of instability and insecurity.
With this security-centered perspective, migration too turned from a social
phenomenon into a political factor with significant relevance to security.
However, migration from the Middle East and North Africa clearly displays
a double-faceted character. There is an external dimension which comes to the
fore through the steady migratory pressure from this area. However, a separate
internal dimension is reflected by all those EU citizens and habitants with a
family background of migration, who have lived in Europe for two, three or
even four generations.
How Europe lost its guiding compass
More than 60 years ago, the European integration project was created as a
political response to the continent‟s post-war devastation. Integration seemed
to be a way of safeguarding against intolerance, xenophobia, extreme
nationalism and chauvinism. The logic behind the idea was plain and simple:
Enmity among European societies would be abandoned once and for all,
exchanged for the bonds of cooperation and common institutions. However,
the EU‟s success has ostensibly turned into its greatest danger. Europe‟s
younger generations know of war, hunger, unrest and devastation only
through textbooks. Memories of the two world wars have seemed to fade
across the continent. During the Cold War, Europe‟s war-torn history was
depicted as its own “other,” and was used as a projection ground for the
formation of a collective European identity. Today, we return to geopolitical
thinking in sketching patterns of in-groups and out-groups (Diez 2004).
Foreign peoples, civilizations and countries are increasingly characterized as
Europe‟s “other,” from which the continent needs protection.
Unsurprisingly, we have witnessed the rise of right-wing parties all over
Europe. In 2000, Jörg Haider and his Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) became
part of that country‟s government coalition, sparking outrage among
From a Policy of Fear to a Policy of Potential
109
European politicians. The European Union even imposed sanctions on
Austria as a reaction against FPÖ‟s participation in government. However,
times have apparently changed, as the same right-wing populism that triggered
public opposition 10 years ago seems far more normal nowadays, whether it
be in the form of the National Front (Front National) in France, the Flemish
Interest (Vlaams Belang) in Belgium, the Swiss People‟s Party (Schweizerische
Volkspartei), the Pro Germany Citizens‟ Movement (Pro Deutschland) in
Germany, the Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid) in the Netherlands
or the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna). Right-wing radicalism
seems to have regained widespread public support.
All the above-mentioned parties share an ideology that includes a critical and
offensive stance toward Islam. The 9/11 terrorist attacks, the bombings of
London and Madrid, and the cartoon crisis all reinforced anti-Islamic
sentiments among European people that have been reflected in these parties‟
electorate success. However, this mistrust and skepticism toward Muslim
people is deeply linked with structural and societal factors, namely insufficient,
malfunctioning or even a complete absence of integration willingness among
migrants and EU citizens with a migration background.
Muslims in Europe are predominantly from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and
Turkey by origin. This is why the role of Islam and Islamophobia in Europe is
strongly intertwined with the issue of migration from the MENA region (see
also European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia 2006). The two
issues form two sides of the same coin. The fear of an alleged “Islamization”
of Europe has been aggravated by highly publicized and opinion-shaping
debates over the construction of mosques (see for instance the Swiss
referendum banning the building of minarets), honor killings, the juvenile
delinquency of children of foreign descent and urban/suburban riots as seen
in France‟ banlieues or the United Kingdom. Public rejection of Islam and
Muslim migrants therefore does not arise from nowhere, but rather from
seemingly comprehensible day-to-day experiences, reflecting the subtle fear of
what is presumed to be a foreign infiltration. For many Germans the
prospects for Turkey‟s EU membership bid are decided not in Brussels but on
the streets of the so-called problem neighborhoods (Problemkieze, a term
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Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
describing broken societies in urban neighborhoods) in Berlin-Neukölln and
Berlin-Kreuzberg.
EU-wide resentment against people with a southern Mediterranean
background is not expressed solely by right-wing parties. Indeed, it has
become clear that the political mainstream is increasingly campaigning for
support from this part of the electorate. In 2011, the heads of state and
government of France, the United Kingdom and Germany publicly and
almost simultaneously declared an end to the era of multiculturalism (Laurence
and Vaïsse 2011). However, none of the three politicians explained their
concrete understanding of multiculturalism, or what kind of integrated society
they wanted to see accomplished instead. By failing to dig deeper into the
details of how we might be better able to live together in harmony, the whole
debate appeared to be just a cheap public-relations move by the governing
elites aimed at reaching out to a far-right constituency.
The German government‟s contribution to the integration discourse
culminated in 2011 when Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich declared that
Islam did not belong to Germany. Such statements are hardly helpful in
encouraging migrants to integrate, as they might have a different view on how
appropriately to welcome people with a foreign background. Seeing that most
are in fact living well-integrated lives, creating jobs, paying taxes and
contributing to Germany‟s prosperity, it is legitimate to consider
confrontational rhetoric of this kind as nothing less than a slap in the face.
What Friedrich did was an act of “othering” – letting a specific group of
people know that they will not be a part of German society, no matter how
hard they try.
Decision-makers need to realize at last that integration begins with an
integrative choice of words. Indeed, it is true that elements within migrant
communities all over Europe have seemed to have had difficulties in adopting
the societal principles of the majority population, as reflected by their
comparatively higher unemployment rates and the statistics on migrants‟
representation in higher education (for the German case, see Bundesamt für
Migration und Flüchtlinge 2011, Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge
2009). These problems need to be discussed in a transparent manner, and
must not be simply brushed under the carpet. However, at the end of the day,
From a Policy of Fear to a Policy of Potential
111
the ultimate goal must be to make genuine improvements in the living
conditions of people irrespective of their ethnic descent, not simply to gain
votes from the far right side of the political spectrum.
The demographic bomb is ticking
With regard to the external perspective, migration from the MENA region
has been the exception rather than the rule since the 1970‟s and the oil-price
shock. Though asylum seekers and migrants, especially from sub-Saharan
countries, are using Northern African routes to reach European soil, only
about 10 percent of all EU-bound migrants are of MENA origin (Gubert and
Nordman, 8, 62). Nonetheless, the pressure exerted by migration from the
Middle East and North Africa remains comparatively high, a tendency that has
been reinforced by the Arab Spring uprisings that have swept across the
region. Though Western observers were surprised by the protests‟ rapidness
and virulence, the demographic realities underlying the unrest have been
known for years. According to the Arab Human Development Report, 54
percent of the Arab population is below 25 years of age (United Nations
Development Programme 2010). This youth bulge has given the region the
world‟s second-fastest-growing population (Commission of the European
Communities 2008, 6). At the same time, the unemployment rate among this
younger generation is 24 percent. With these forces acting in conjunction, it
was only a matter of time before civil unrest erupted (Roudi 2011). Behind
these figures is the face of the young Tunisian vendor named Mohammed
Bouazizi, who set himself on fire to protest a lack of economic opportunity
and persistent harassment by corrupt authorities. His self-immolation was the
trigger for a regional uprising that has been calling for change since 2011
(Fahim 2011).
Hopes that the Arab Spring would begin a reform process bringing
democracy and the rule of law to the region have not yet been realized.
Toppling autocratic systems was only the beginning; the process of
transformation will take many more years. The establishment of sustainable
governing systems that represent all elements of society will be a lengthy and
painful struggle. The MENA region will therefore remain an area of instability
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Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
and geopolitical volatility. Among other indicators, this fact is reflected by the
growing number of people seeking to emigrate to Europe. At the beginning of
2012, Eurostat declared that asylum applications to the EU had increased by
nearly 25 percent. The highest growth was registered among applicants from
Tunisia and Libya, which respectively saw sixfold and fivefold increases
(Eurostat 2012). This trend will in all probability gain in strength before it
wanes. This is true too of the massive labor demand, which will only increase.
Simply in order to maintain the current unemployment rate, southern
Mediterranean countries will need to generate 25 million new jobs in the next
10 years (World Economic Forum/OECD 2011, 9). As this today appears an
insurmountable challenge, Europe must face the issue of work-related
migration originating from the Middle East and North Africa as one of the
main issues for any future Mediterranean agenda.
What needs to be done
If the European Union is to live up to its self-proclaimed image of being a
global power, it must actively help shape events in its southern neighborhood.
Though an Arab Marshall Plan has been proposed, such ideas have not yet
been matched by practical policy action. Overall, it is imperative that the EU
stop treating MENA countries solely on the basis of security-related
considerations. Indeed, many challenges do emanate from this region. But it
also offers huge potential and opportunities which are of mutual interest.
Because of this, European states would be better advised to deal with
migration in its double dimension. The inflow of MENA migrants is inevitably
connected with the way European societies are able to integrate preexisting
migrant communities.
The added value of targeted labor migration
As seen above, the youth bulge is leading to a generational lack of
employment in MENA countries. At the same time, it is obvious that many
European states suffer from a shrinking labor force due to a low fertility rate
and increased life expectancy. This situation is leading to a distinct job vacancy
From a Policy of Fear to a Policy of Potential
113
rate, which amounted in 2010 to 1.5 percent. In Germany, this figure reached
as high as 2.6 percent (Eurostat 2011, 68). The labor shortage is being felt
primarily within the service sector, especially in wholesale and retail trade,
hotels and restaurants, and transport and communication (World
Bank/European Commission 2009, 37). Thus, the labor markets on the two
shores of the Mediterranean at this point seem to have natural
complementarities. A regulated labor migration from MENA to the European
Union could help lower the demographic surplus in southern Mediterranean
societies, while simultaneously mitigating the negative macroeconomic
consequences of Europe's own demographic gap. Working as an element of
EU's neighborhood policy, a Mediterranean job agency could take care of
filling European job vacancies with adequate candidates from MENA
countries. As opposed to Frontex, any such agency must not aim at protecting
the EU's external borders, but rather at opening them up in order to actively
promote and channel the inflow of migrants.
Diversity as an asset
A change in attitude among EU decision-makers will be an important
prerequisite for any integrative cross-Mediterranean migration. Political and
public discourses about migration, both in its external and internal
dimensions, are still predominantly characterized by negative images and
stigma. Instead, leading public figures within the European Union must begin
to deal with migration issues in a deliberately positive fashion. Advantages and
opportunities need to be given more weight than disadvantages and risks. The
goal must be to manifest a Europe-wide philosophy and identity of
Willkommenskultur (welcoming culture), which ought in turn to be
internalized by every EU resident.
Standing up against right-wing populism
In order to change the overall climate, which determines the ability to
achieve a positive stance toward MENA migrants, EU politicians must deal
with the growing levels of far-right sentiment. What stands out most today is
the evident complacency among European decision-makers. Though it is hard
114
Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
to name EU member states in which right-wing populism is not represented in
either parliament or government, the political elite has remained almost
entirely silent on the issue. This passive attitude has created the impression
that the European political mainstream is resigned to the participation of
right-wing parties in the political system. This form of inaction must come to
an end. As Stéphane Hessel writes in his “Time for Outrage!” it is a citizen's
duty not to react with indifference to societal trends that conflict with the
normative foundations of European society, in this case the tolerance and
respect for human dignity that should prevent discrimination on the basis of
people's ethnic and religious backgrounds. One step forward might be the
establishment of an annual EU council involving heads of state and
government, gathered specifically for the purpose of marginalizing the impact
of right-wing parties and their xenophobic ideologies.
Strengthening dialogue through an Islamic conference
As noted above, many migrants and EU citizens with a family background
of migration are of MENA origin. Though they must not be reduced simply to
their Muslim beliefs, it is important to foster a debate on how Europeans want
to interact with Islam and its growing role in society. However, it is crucial that
instead of simply talking about the issue, a dialogue is conducted with the
religion and its representatives. One means of fostering such an exchange
would be the inauguration of an Islamic Conference, following the German
model of the Islamkonferenz. Through this means, European politics would
finally recognize Islam as a part of European society. The delicate relationship
between the state and Islam, questions of secularism, and the goal of
promoting a better integration of the religion into society all need to be
discussed in a forum of this nature.
From a Policy of Fear to a Policy of Potential
115
References
Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge. “Migranten am Arbeitsmarkt in Deutschland.”
Integrationsreport Working Paper 36, 2011.
Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge. “Berufliche und akademische Ausbildung von
Migranten in Deutschland.” Integrationsreport Working Paper 22, 2009.
Commission of the European Communities (CEC). “Regions 2020 – Demographic
Challenges for European Regions.” Background Document to Commission Staff
Working Document SEC(2008) 2868, “Regions 2020 – An Assessment of Future
Challenges for EU Regions.” Brussels: CEC, 2008.
Diez, Thomas. “Europe‟s Others and the Return of Geopolitics.” Cambridge Review of
International Affairs 17: 319–335, 2004.
European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC). “Muslims in the
European Union. Discrimination and Islamophobia.” Vienna: EUMC, 2006.
Eurostat. “Asylum Applicants and First Instance Decisions on Asylum Applications:
Second Quarter 2011.” 2012.
Eurostat. “Labour Market Statistics – 2011 Edition.” Brussels: Eurostat, 2011.
Fahim, Kareem. “Slap to a Man‟s Pride Set Off Tumult in Tunisia.” New York Times,
January 22, 2011.
Gubert, Flore and Christophe J. Nordman. “Migration from MENA to OECD Countries:
Trends, Determinants, and Prospects.” Background Paper for World Bank‟s “Shaping
the Future” Report. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2009.
Laurence, Jonathan and Justin Vaïsse. “The Dis-Integration of Europe.” Foreign Policy,
March 28, 2011.
Roudi, Farzaneh. “Youth Population and Employment in the Middle East and North
Africa: Opportunity or Challenge?” UN Expert Group Meeting on Adolescents, Youth
and Development, 2011.
United Nations Development Programme. “Arab Human Development Report –
Population Levels, Trends and Policies in the Arab Region: Challenges and
Opportunities.” New York: UNDP, 2010.
World Bank and European Commission. “Shaping the Future – A Long Term Perspective
of People and Job Mobility for the Middle East and North Africa.” Washington,
D.C./Brussels: World Bank/EC, 2009.
World Economic Forum and OECD. “Arab World Competitiveness Report, 2011–2012.”
Paris: OECD, 2011.
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Authors
117
Authors
Yossi (Joseph) Alpher is a consultant and writer on Israel-related strategic issues,
and is coeditor of the bitterlemons.net family of internet publications. From 1981
to 1995 he was associated with the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel
Aviv University, ultimately serving as director of center. In July 2000 (during
the Camp David talks) he served as Special Adviser to the Prime Minister of
Israel, concentrating on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
Nilgün Arısan Eralp holds a Bachelor‟s degree in Economics from Middle East
Technical University, a Master‟s degree in Economic Development from
Leicester University and an MSc in European Studies from London School
of Economics. Ms. Arısan Eralp worked as an advisor from 1987 to 1996
to several senior public authorities, including the Ministry of State in
charge of EU Affairs and Deputy Prime Ministry, and the Prime Ministry
of Turkey. From 1990 to 1992, she worked as an expert for the State
Planning Organization, Directorate General for EU Affairs. In 1996, Ms.
Arısan Eralp coordinated the “Information Network Project for Small and
Medium Sized Enterprises on Customs Union,” which was jointly financed
by the Economic Development Foundation (İKV) and the European
Commission. Between 1997 and 2000, Ms. Arısan Eralp served as the
Head of Department of Policies and Harmonization in the Directorate
General for the EU Affairs at State Planning Organization. After leaving
this position, she served as the Director of National Programme in the
Secretariat General for the European Union Affairs (EUSG) until 2009.
Throughout this period, Ms. Arısan Eralp has been a Member of the
Academic Board at the European Research Centre, Ankara University on
behalf of the EUSG. She has lectured at several universities on the EU and
on Turkish-EU relations, subjects on which he has published extensively.
Ms. Arısan Eralp has been the Director of TEPAV EU Institute since
2009.
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Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
Seçil Paçacı Elitok holds a PhD in economics from the University of Utah,
where she specialized in economic growth, development economics and
international trade. Throughout her graduate studies, she worked as an
instructor in the Economics Department of the University of Utah before
joining the Maltepe University (Istanbul), where she had the opportunity to
participate in research projects on migration, coordinate the Erasmus
program, while enriching her teaching portfolio. She received the Higher
Education Teaching Specialist (HETS) designation from the University of
Utah in December 2006. She joined the Hamburg Institute of International
Economics (HWWI) in June 2009 as a Marie Curie research fellow in the
context of the EU Marie Curie Research Training Network TOM
(Transnationality of Migrants) and worked as a senior researcher for the
Migration Research Group (MRG). Her main research interests include
international migration with a specific focus on migration from and to
Turkey as well as high-skilled migration and remittances. She is currently a
research fellow at the HWWI.
Christian-Peter Hanelt is a Senior Expert at the Bertelsmann Stiftung on
Europe and the Middle East for the “Europe„s Future” program. Mr.
Hanelt has been managing the Stiftung‟s “Kronberg Middle East Talks”
for more than a decade. Having studied political science, history and
Arabic sciences in Kiel and Damascus, Mr. Hanelt holds an MA in Political
Science from the Christian-Albrechts University in Kiel, Germany. He has
worked as an editor and reported for German television‟s SAT.1 on
developments following the Kuwait war and the beginning of the Middle
East peace process. He has been engaged in activities promoting literacy in
Egypt and in the education of journalists in Israel and the Palestinian
Territories. His areas of expertise include the Israeli-Arab Conflict, EUGulf Relations (GCC), Iraq and Iran, and sociopolitical and economic
development in the Arab world.
Authors
119
Rana Deep Islam is currently a PhD candidate in international relations at the
University of Erlangen-Nürnberg. His research interests include EU and
Turkish approaches toward the Middle East and questions of integration
and migration in German society. Rana Deep Islam is also a lecturer at the
Universities of Potsdam and Chemnitz. In 2011, he served as a fellow at
the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies at Johns
Hopkins University in Washington, D.C. In addition to having worked for
the European Parliament in Brussels, he has held positions at the School of
Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C. and with the
Executive Committee of Germany‟s Social Democratic Party in Berlin. He
holds an MA from the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium.
Ayhan Kaya is Professor of Politics and Jean Monnet Chair at the Department
of International Relations at the Istanbul Bilgi University. As Director of
the European Institute, his focuses include: European modernities and
identities, in particular Euro-Muslims in Germany, France, Belgium and
the Netherlands; the Circassian diaspora in Turkey; the construction and
articulation of modern diasporic identities; and tolerance and
multiculturalism. He received his PhD and MA degrees at the University of
Warwick. His most recently published book is Islam, Migration and
Integration: The Age of Securitization (London: Palgrave, 2009); other relevant
publications are as follows: Circassian Diaspora in Turkey (Istanbul: Istanbul
Bilgi University Press, 2011), Belgian-Turks (Brussels: King Baudouin
Foundation, 2008, co-written with Ferhat Kentel), Euro-Turks: A Bridge or a
Breach between Turkey and the EU (Brussels: CEPS Publications, 2005, cowritten with Ferhat Kentel). His forthcoming book is Europeanization and
Tolerance in Turkey (London: Palgrave, 2013). He is currently involved in the
FP7 Projects entitled “Identities and Modernities in Europe” and
“Tolerance, Pluralism, and Social Cohesion: Responding to the Challenges
of the 21st Century in Europe” in addition to another EU project, “Social
Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern
Europe.”
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Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
E. Fuat Keyman is Professor of International Relations at Sabancı University in
Istanbul. He is also the director of Istanbul Policy Center (IPC) at Sabancı
University. He regularly contributes to the newspaper Radikal, and has a
TV program in which he offers political commentary on and analysis of
Turkish and global politics. He works on democratization, globalization,
international relations, civil society and Turkey-EU relations. He has
published extensively on these topics in both Turkish and English. A
selection of his books include: Symbiotic Antagonisms: Contending Discourses of
Nationalism in Turkey (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2011, with
Ayşe Kadıoğlu); Remaking Turkey (Oxford: Lexington, 2008); Turkish Politics
in a Changing World: Global Dynamics, Domestic Transformations (Istanbul: Bilgi
University Publications, 2007, with Ziya Öniş); Citizenship in a Global World:
European Questions and Turkish Experiences (London: Routledge, 2005, with
Ahmet İçduygu); Globalization, State, Identity/Difference: Towards a Critical
Social Theory of International Relations (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1997);
Cities: The Transformation of Anatolia (Istanbul: Dogan Publications, 2010, in
Turkish); Globalization, Europeanization and Citizenship in Turkey, (Istanbul:
Bilgi University Publications, 2009, in Turkish); The Good Governace of Turkey
(Istanbul: Bilgi University Publications, 2008, in Turkish); Changing World,
Tranforming Turkey (Istanbul: Bilgi University Publications, 2005, in
Turkish); and Turkey and Radical Democracy (Istanbul: Alfa, 2001, in
Turkish).
Ghassan Khatib is the current Director of the Palestinian Government Media
Center. He has served as Palestinian Minister of Labor in 2002 and
Minister of Planning in 2005–2006. Mr. Khatib was Vice President for
community outreach at Birzeit University in 2006–2009, and was founder
and Director of the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center, which
specializes in research, opinion polling and media activities. He was a
member of the Palestinian delegation for the Madrid Middle East Peace
Conference in 1991 and the subsequent bilateral negotiations in
Washington from 1991 to 1993. Mr. Khatib co-founded and co-directed
bitterlemons.org, a Palestinian-Israeli internet-based political magazine. He
holds a PhD in Middle East politics from the University of Durham, and is
Authors
121
the author of Palestinian Politics and the Middle East Peace Process: Consensus and
Competition in the Palestinian Negotiation Team.
Ziad Majed has been a visiting scholar at the Kettering Foundation in the
United States (2008) and the editor-in-chief of the Al-Ofok monthly
review (2007–2010). He has also worked as a consultant for the
International Institute for Sustained Dialogue (2003–2006). Mr. Majed was
program officer at the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral
Assistance in Stockholm (1999–2000) and projects coordinator at the
Lebanese Center for Policy Studies in Beirut (1994–1998). Since 2007, he
has been a researcher and coordinator at the Arab Network for the Study
of Democracy, and Assistant Professor of Middle East Studies at the
American University of Paris since 2010.
Almut Möller is a political analyst on European integration and European
foreign and security policy. She heads the Alfred von Oppenheim Centre
for European Policy Studies at the German Council on Foreign Relations
(DGAP) in Berlin. Ms. Möller has published widely on the European
Union‟s overall political and institutional developments, Germany‟s
European policy, as well as foreign and security issues related to the EU‟s
neighbourhood, in particular the Middle East region. She is a frequent
commentator on European and foreign affairs in the German and
international media. Apart from her native German she is fluent in English
and French, and is working on her Arabic. Prior to joining DGAP in 2010,
Almut lived as an independent analyst in London. From 2002 to 2008 she
was a researcher at the Center for Applied Policy Research (CAP) at
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität in Munich, working on questions of the
EU‟s institutional reform, enlargement and Euro-Mediterranean
cooperation. Ms. Möller is a Non-Resident Fellow at the American
Institute for Contemporary German Studies (AICGS) at Johns Hopkins
University in Washington D.C., and an Associate Fellow at the Austria
Institute for European and Security Policy (AIES) in Maria Enzersdorf
near Vienna. She was a guest researcher at Renmin University of China in
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Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
Beijing (2006), the Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in
Cairo (2007) and at the AICGS in Washington D.C. (2008). Ms. Möller
holds an MA in Political Science from the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität
in Munich (2002). She also studied at Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität in
Münster and at the Institut d‟Études Politiques (Sciences-Po) in Aix-enProvence. For a list of publications visit DGAP‟s website:
https://dgap.org/de/user/258
Dorothée Schmid is the Director of the Turkey program at the Institut français
des relations internationales (IFRI), a leading think tank dealing with
international politics in Paris. As an expert on EU policies in
Mediterranean countries and the Middle East, she has worked closely with
European institutions on several Euro-Mediterranean research projects
related to political reform and democratization in the region. Her current
work focuses on French-Turkish relations, internal political developments
in Turkey and Turkey‟s new diplomatic ambitions, especially in the
aftermath of the Arab Spring. Her recent publications include the
report Les Élites françaises et la Turquie : une relation dans l'attente (The French
Elite and Turkey: A Pending Relationship), published with the Turkish think
tank EDAM (2010). She recently edited a book on Turkey‟s foreign policy
in the Middle East : La Turquie au Moyen-Orient : le retour d'une puissance
régionale ? (Turkey and the Middle East: Return of a Regional Power?), CNRS
éditions (2011). Dorothée Schmid graduated from Sciences-po Paris with a
specialization in Economics. She holds a master in Economics from
Sciences-po Paris and a PhD in Political science from Paris-II University
(Panthéon-Sorbonne).
Julia Seiler currently works for the Bertelsmann Stiftung‟s “Europe‟s Future”
program. She holds a Master‟s degree in Near and Middle Eastern Studies
from the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of
London. In addition to an internship with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation
in Amman, Ms. Seiler has spent time improving her Arabic in Syria, Yemen
and Egypt.
Authors
123
Thomas Straubhaar is Director of the Hamburg Institute of International
Economics (HWWI) (2005–present) and Professor of Economics,
specializing in international economic relations, at the University of
Hamburg since 1999. Upon completing his PhD in Economics from the
University of Bern (1993), Mr. Straubhaar conducted postdoctoral research
at the University of California in Berkeley (1985–1986). He received his
Habilitation from the University of Bern in 1987 with the publication of
“On the Economics of International Labor Migration.” In addition to
having taught at the Universities of Bern, Konstanz, Basel and Freiburg, he
was appointed in 1992 to the position of Professor of Economics at the
Helmut Schmidt University in Hamburg. He has served since 1998 as
Director of the Institute for Integration Research at the Europa Kolleg in
Hamburg, and from 1999 to 2006 as President of the Hamburg Institute of
International Economics. In 2010, he was the Helmut Schmidt Fellow at
the Transatlantic Academy in Washington, D.C. Mr. Straubhaar‟s research
interests include economic relations, economic policy, regulatory policy,
migration, population economics and the economics of education.
Nathalie Tocci is Deputy Director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali and
Associate Editor of The International Spectator. She has held research posts at
the Transatlantic Academy (Washington, D.C.) the European University
Institute (Florence) and the Centre for European Policy Studies (Brussels).
Her book publications include: Turkey's European Future: Behind the Scenes of
America's Influence on EU-Turkey Relations (New York: NYU Press, 2011);
The EU Civil Society and Conflict (London: Routledge 2011, ed.); Civil Society,
Conflict and the Politicisation of Human Rights (Tokyo: UN University Press,
2011, ed. with R. Marchetti ); Cyprus: A Conflict at the Crossroads
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009, ed. with T. Diez); The EU
and Conflict Resolution (London: Routledge, 2007); EU Accession Dynamics and
Conflict Resolution (London: Ashgate, 2004).
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Europe, Turkey and the Mediterranean
Previous Issues of Europe in Dialogue
Europe in Dialogue 2012 | 02
The Arab Spring: One Year After. Transformation Dynamics,
Prospects for Democratization, and the Future of the ArabEuropean Cooperation.
Amine Ghali, Ibrahim Hegazy, Salam Kawakibi, Eberhard Kienle, Elham Manea,
Samir Saadawi, Tobias Schumacher, Jan Völkel
Europe in Dialogue 2012 | 01
Solidarity: For Sale? The Social Dimension of the New European
Economic Governance.
Gordon Bajnai, Thomas Fischer, Stephanie Hare, Sarah Hoffmann, Kalypso
Nicolaïdis, Vanessa Rossi, Juri Viehoff, Andrew Watt
Europe in Dialogue 2011 | 02
European Economic Governance. Impulses for Crisis Prevention
and New Institutions.
Iain Begg, Ansgar Belke, Sebastian Dullien, Daniela Schwarzer, Ramūnas
Vilpišauskas
Europe in Dialogue 2011 | 01
The Future of the Mediterranean. Which Way for Europe and
North Africa?
Khalil Al-Anani, Zeidan Ali Zeidan, Moncef Cheikh-Rouhou, Arslan Chikhaoui,
Ahmed Driss, Moaaz Elzoughby, Bassma Kodmani, Mehdi Lahlou, Ziad Majed
Europe in Dialogue 2010 | 01
Rebalancing the Global Economy. Four Perspectives on the
Future of the International Monetary System.
Stefan Collignon, Richard N. Cooper, Masahiro Kawai, Yongjun Zhang
Transformation Index BTI 2012
Europeans can be proud as they look back on fifty years of peaceful integration. Nowadays many people worldwide see the European Union as a model of how states and their
citizens can work together in peace and freedom. However, this achievement does not
automatically mean that the EU has the ability to deal with the problems of the future
in a rapidly changing world. The European Union must continue developing its unity in
diversity dynamically, be it with regard to energy issues, the euro, climate change or new
types of conflict. Indeed, self-assertion and solidarity are key to the debates shaping our
future.
2003 | 2006 | 2008 | 2010 | 2012
Bertelsmann Stiftung (ed.)
“Europe in Dialogue“ wishes to make a contribution to these open debates. The analyses in this series subject political concepts, processes and institutions to critical scrutiny
and suggest ways of reforming internal and external European policymaking so that it
is fit for the future. However, “Europe in Dialogue“ is not merely trying to encourage
an intra-European debate and makes a point of including authors from non-EU states.
Looking at an issue from different angle or from afar creates a shift in perspective which,
in turn, renders Europe‘s development more meaningful as it engages in critical dialogue
with other societies.
Advocating reforms targeting the goal of a constitutional democracy and socially responsible
market economy, the Transformation Index BTI
provides the framework for an exchange of best
practices among agents of reform. Within this
framework, the BTI publishes two rankings, the
Status Index and the Management Index, both of
which are based on in-depth assessments of 128
countries.
Transformation Index BTI 2012
Political Management in International Comparison
2012, 140 pp. paperback
EUR 20.00 / ISBN 978-3-86793-344-5
Sustainable Governance Indicators 2011
Bertelsmann Stiftung (ed.)
Sustainable Governance Indicators 2011
Policy Performance and Governance Capacities in the OECD
How successful are OECD countries in achieving
sustainable policy outcomes? How effectively do
governments in these countries steer change, and
to what extent do they engage civil society in the
process? In answering these questions, the 2011
edition of the Sustainable Governance Indicators
(SGI) aims to foster good governance and sustainable policy outcomes in the OECD by encouraging institutional learning through an exchange
of best practices. The authors argue that national
governments still have a considerably broad cope
of action in facing upcoming challenges.
2011, 288 pp., paperback
EUR 32.00 / ISBN 978-3-86793-081-9
Contact:
Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung, P.O. Box 103, 33311 Gütersloh, GERMANY
Fax +49 5241 81-681175, E-Mail: sabine.reimann@bertelsmann-stiftung.de
Yossi Alpher, Nilgün Arısan Eralp, Seçil Paçacı Elitok, Rana Deep Islam,
Dorothée Schmid, Thomas Straubhaar, Nathalie Tocci
Address | Contact:
Bertelsmann Stiftung
Carl-Bertelsmann-Straße 256
P.O. Box 103
33311 Gütersloh
GERMANY
Phone +49 5241 81-0
Fax
+49 5241 81-81999
Armando Garcia Schmidt
Phone +49 5241 81-81543
E-Mail armando.garciaschmidt@bertelsmann-stiftung.de
Joachim Fritz-Vannahme
Phone +49 5241 81-81421
E-Mail joachim.vannahme@bertelsmann-stiftung.de
www.bertelsmann-stiftung.org
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