Guy Longworth

To what extent was ordinary language philosophy a precursor to
experimental philosophy? Since the conditions on pursuit of either
project are at best unclear, and at worst protean, the general
question is hard to address. I focus instead on particular cases,
seeking to uncover some central aspects of J. L. Austin’s and John
Cook Wilson’s ordinary language based approach to philosophical
method. I make a start at addressing three questions. First, what
distinguishes their approach from other more traditional
approaches? Second, is their approach a form of experimental
philosophy? Third, given their aims, should it have been? I offer
the following preliminary answers. First, their approach
distinctively emphasizes attention to what we should say when.
Second, their approach is closer to contemporary experimental
mathematics than it is to some prominent forms of contemporary
experimental philosophy. Third, some purported grounds for
pursuing their aims by way of surveying what individual speakers
would say when are not compelling.

On the most prominent account, understanding what was said is always propositional knowledge of what was said. I develop a more minimal alternative, according to which understanding is sometimes a distinctive attitude towards what was said—to a first approximation, entertaining what was said. The propositional knowledge account has been supported on the basis of its capacity to explain testimonial knowledge transmission. I argue that it is not so supported.

I explore some of Kant's discussions of faith. The aim is to consider the prospects of the idea that trust more generally might sometimes be made reasonable on the basis of practical rather than evidential grounds. (Slightly revised version.)

Abstract Some philosophers find linguistic meaning mysterious. Two approaches suggest themselves for removing the felt mystery, or demystifying meaning. One involves providing a substantive account of meaning in meaning-free terms. Although this approach has come ...

This fascinating book is about propositional attitudes. In it, Robert Matthews pursues, with great rigour and tenacity, the question of how we should understand our practice of attributing propositional attitudes and, in particular, the specific question of how subjects ...

Is linguistic understanding a form of knowledge? I clarify the question and then consider two natural forms a positive answer might take. I argue that, although some recent arguments fail to decide the issue, neither positive answer should be accepted. The aim is not yet to foreclose on the view that linguistic understanding is a form of knowledge, but to develop desiderata on a satisfactory successor to the two natural views rejected here.

This paper is about first-person thoughts—thoughts about oneself that are expressible through uses of first-person pronouns (for example, ‘I’). It is widely held that first-person thoughts cannot be shared. My aim is to postpone rejection of the more natural view that such thoughts about one- self can be shared. I sketch an account on which such thoughts can be shared and indicate some ways in which deciding the fate of the account will depend upon further work.

Why do people want to be known by others? One answer is that others who know us can help us to know ourselves. I delineate some of the boundaries of the space within which it might be possible for those who know us to help us to know ourselves. To that end, I consider two proposals according to which our capacity to know ourselves can be heavily dependent on the support of others who know us, one due to Sigmund Freud and the other derived from Aristotle. I argue that neither of the extreme proposals should be accepted: the first, because the gaps in self-knowledge that Freud’s view posits would tend to make us opaque to others; the second, because, even on the assumption that others could have knowledge about us that we lacked, the forms of self-ignorance posited by the Aristotelian view posits would render us unable to share their knowledge. Being known by others may help us to know ourselves, but not in quite the ways suggested by the proposals considered here.

Language plays a central role in human life. Much that we do depends on it: shopping for food, chatting to family and friends, reading this book. Indeed, language is so central, and so familiar, that it only rarely engages our attention. Rather, our attention is directed to what ...

If we wish to provide an account of the workings of a badger, 5* we must find a badger to study. Similarly, if we wish to give*" an account of the workings of a human mind, we must find 9 a human mind to study. But where should we look? With£~ respect to badgers, the ...

I explore J. L. Austin's discussion of knowledge in "Other Minds", in light of the work of Austin's teachers, John Cook Wilson and H. A. Prichard. Section 2. comprises a sketch of six core commitments of Oxford Realism. Section 3. explains how Austin’s general discussion of knowledge constitutes a case study of our knowledge of other minds. Sections 4. and 5. develop an interpretation of Austin’s project on which his pronouncement leaves intact that being in a position to know is closed under known entailment.