Enough is Enough: Austin
on Knowing
Guy Longworth1
November 9th 2016
1. Introduction.
J. L. Austin’s main discussion of knowledge is in “Other Minds”. (Austin
1946; 1979.) The essay gives rise to numerous questions, both local and
global. Ostensibly, the topic of the essay is knowledge of other minds.
However, explicit discussion of that topic is postponed until its twenty
seventh page. Apparently by way of preamble, the main body of the
essay comprises an analysis of aspects of our ordinary treatment of
expressions of knowledge, stippled with tantalizing pronouncements
about knowing in general. One aim of my discussion is to address a
global question about the function of Austin’s more general discussion
of knowledge. How, if at all, does it further pursuit of our knowledge of
other minds? More local questions arise about Austin’s
pronouncements.
I’ll also address a more local question. Austin invites us to consider
a natural way of treating a claim to the effect that a goldfinch is present:
If you have asked ‘How do you know it’s a goldfinch?’ then I may
reply ‘From its behaviour’, ‘By its markings’, or, in more detail, ‘By
its red head’, ‘From its eating thistles’.... You may object:... But
that’s not enough: plenty of other birds have red heads. (Austin
1946: 154–5; 1979: 83)
Reflecting on the extent to which one who knows is required to be in a
position to address such challenges, he writes the following:
(b) Enough is enough: it doesn’t mean everything. Enough means
enough to show that (within reason, and for presents intents and
purposes) it ‘can’t’ be anything else, there is no room for an
alternative, competing, description of it. It does not mean, e.g.,
enough to show it isn’t a stuffed goldfinch. (Austin 1946: 156; 1979:
84)
Austin’s pronouncement is both enticing and elusive: enticing, in that it
seems to expose a significant limit on our obligations as knowers;
elusive, in that Austin fails to resolve or vindicate the alleged limit.
What does he mean to claim about knowing? Should we believe him?
1
I’m grateful for discussion and comments to audiences at Oxford, Porto, and
Warwick, and to Bill Child, Thomas Crowther, Naomi Eilan, Elizabeth
Fricker, Anil Gomes, Mark Kalderon, Hemdat Lerman, Ian Phillips, Johannes
Roessler, Matthew Soteriou, and Charles Travis.
1
Philosophical positions rarely form in a vacuum, and so one way to
enhance one’s understanding of a position is by attending to its roots.
On the topic of knowledge, Austin’s avant-couriers were his teacher, H.
A. Prichard, and Prichard’s teacher, John Cook Wilson, and so it is on
their work that I shall focus. (Important influences who won’t be
considered here include G. E. Moore, especially his 1905–6.) I’ll begin by
sketching the shared core of Cook Wilson’s and Prichard’s views about
knowledge—the epistemological component of Oxford Realism—before
pointing to ways in which Austin’s position emerges naturally from
theirs. I’ll suggest that Austin would have viewed his discussion of
knowledge, not only as a preamble to a treatment of knowledge of other
minds, but as a case study. And I’ll suggest that Austin’s pronouncement
is best understood as a partial characterization of a necessary, but
insufficient, condition on knowing. We’ll see that when Austin’s
pronouncement is so understood, there is no reason to take him to be
proposing that someone might know that a goldfinch is present without
being in a position to know that it isn’t stuffed.
Section 2. comprises a sketch of six core commitments of Oxford
Realism. Section 3. explains how Austin’s general discussion of
knowledge constitutes a case study of our knowledge of other minds.
Sections 4. and 5. develop an interpretation of Austin’s project on which
his pronouncement leaves intact that being in a position to know is
closed under known entailment.
2. Oxford Realism.
2.1. Knowledge as primitive.
The first and most basic commitment of Oxford Realism is that
knowledge is primitive. Thus, Cook Wilson writes:
Perhaps most fallacies in the theory of knowledge are reduced to
the primary one of trying to explain the nature of knowing or
apprehending. We cannot construct knowing—the act of
apprehending—out of any elements. I remember quite early in my
philosophic reflection having an instinctive aversion to the very
expression ‘theory of knowledge’. (Cook Wilson 1926: 803)
Prichard echoes:
Knowledge is sui generis and therefore a ‘theory’ of it is impossible.
Knowledge is simply knowledge, and any attempt to state it in
terms of something else must end in describing something which is
not knowledge. (Prichard 1909: 245)
According to Cook Wilson and Prichard, knowledge is a distinct kind,
and cannot be constructed out of elements distinct from knowledge. If
the goal of a theory of knowledge is to say how knowledge is
constructed, then the goal is unachievable; there can be no such theory.
2.2. Knowledge as akin to proof.
The first commitment of Oxford Realism is bound up with a second:
knowing amounts to, or is equivalent to, possession of proof:
2
In knowing, we can have nothing to do with the so-called ‘greater
strength’ of the evidence on which the opinion is grounded; simply
because we know that this ‘greater strength’ of evidence of A’s
being B is compatible with A’s not being B at all. (Cook Wilson
1926: 100)
The view is not that one who knows must possess a cogent derivation of
what they know from premises that are distinct—and, perhaps, known.
That is, the view is not that knowing is equivalent to possession of a
proof. Rather, the view is that knowing is itself proof of what is known
Where one knows, one has a conclusive guarantee of that which one
knows. One’s standing with respect to that which one knows is
incompatible with falsity. Thus, meeting a threshold condition on
strength of evidence could not suffice for knowing if meeting that
condition were consistent with falsity.
As Prichard notes, Cook Wilson appears to have derived his model
of knowing from reflection on mathematics:
The point of departure of Cook Wilson's views lay in his
unwavering conviction of the truth of mathematics. In
mathematics we have, without real possibility of question, an
instance of knowledge; we are certain, we know. (Prichard 1919:
302)
The model of mathematics is useful in presenting a case in which it is
plausible that we can possess absolute guarantees of truth. Furthermore,
it presents a case in which we can possess such guarantees both with
respect to basic and derived truths, and so a case in which the
distinction between possession of proof and possession of a proof is
operative. However, the model also points to a delicate issue about the
notion of incompatibility that figures in Cook Wilson’s exposition. For
suppose that incompatibility of a standing with falsity amounted to the
impossibility of having that standing with respect to a proposition whilst
the proposition is false. On the natural assumption that true
mathematical propositions are necessarily true, it would be impossible
to have any standing with respect to such propositions whilst those
propositions were false. And in that case, incompatibility with falsity
would fail to characterize a distinctive property of the standing of one
who knows. Thus, the operative notion of incompatibility must be more
demanding than the simple modal notion.
2.3. Knowledge as a state of mind.
The third commitment of Oxford Realism is a partial corollary of the
first two: knowing is a state (or frame, or condition) of mind. We can
reconstruct a path to the commitment as follows. If one’s standing when
one knows is to furnish one with a guarantee against falsity, then it must
make a difference to one’s subjectivity. Thus, one’s standing must partly
comprise a mental state. Suppose, then, that that mental state did not
suffice for knowing. In that case, knowing would comprise that mental
state together with whatever extra-mental elements provide a guarantee
against falsity. But in that case, knowing would be constructible out of
elements. Hence, since knowing is at least partly mental, and is not
constructible out of elements, it must be wholly mental. That is,
3
knowing is a mental state, occupancy of which state is incompatible
with falsity. (See also McDowell 1982; Williamson 2000.)
2.4. Knowing as distinct from believing.
Connected with the third commitment is a fourth: knowing is not a
form of believing. In particular, knowing is not believing whilst meeting
further conditions. In fact, Cook Wilson makes the stronger claim that
knowing excludes believing:
Belief is not knowledge and the man who knows does not believe
at all what he knows; he knows it. (Cook Wilson 1926: 100)
Prichard brings together the previous four commitments in a way which
again echoes Cook Wilson:
Knowing is not something which differs from being convinced by
a difference of degree of something such as a feeling of confidence,
as being more convinced differs from being less convinced, or as a
fast movement differs from a slow movement. Knowing and
believing differ in kind as do desiring and feeling, or as do a red
colour and a blue colour. (Prichard 1950: 87)
Both Cook Wilson and Prichard are drawn to the stronger claim that
knowing excludes believing due to their positive views about the
distinctive nature of believing—in particular, that believing is a matter
of holding something true on broadly evidential grounds whilst
recognizing that one’s grounds fail to decide the issue. By contrast, some
contemporary thinkers will be willing to adopt a more minimal
conception of believing, or to accept the existence of a more general
kind of state of mind that encompasses believing. For example, they will
be willing to allow a conception on which believing, or some more
general sort of state of mind, is a matter of holding something true in a
way that is potentially responsive to evidence. However, the crucial
claim here is that knowing isn’t itself a form of believing. And one could
consistently endorse that claim whilst allowing that knowing doesn’t
exclude believing, or even that knowing entails believing. I can see no
grounds for thinking that Cook Wilson or Prichard would have denied
that knowing was, or at least entailed occupancy of, a frame of mind of
the more general sort. (See Williamson 2000: 41–48.)
2.5. The Accretion.
The fifth commitment of Oxford Realism concerns our capacities to
know which frames of mind we occupy. The seemingly implausible
strength of this commitment, together with its seeming independence
from other commitments, has led Charles Travis to label it the Accretion.
(Travis 2005.) Cook Wilson presents the commitment in the following
passage:
[knowledge cannot be one of] two states of mind…the correct and
the erroneous one…quite indistinguishable to the man himself.
[For] as the man does not know in the erroneous state of mind,
neither can he know in the other state (Cook Wilson 1926: 107)
4
The first thought contained here is that subjects must be in a position
to distinguish any state of knowledge from other “erroneous” states of
mind, at least in principle. The second is that if a state were not in the
required sense distinguishable by its subject from “erroneous” states,
then—since those other states are, by assumption, not states of
knowledge—that state could not be a state of knowledge.
Cook Wilson’s view may have been sponsored by an argument like
the following. In order for a state to be a case of knowledge it must be
different in kind from any “erroneous” state. Furthermore—and,
perhaps, because the kinds in question are mental kinds—the required
difference must have a subjective reflection: it must make a difference
to how things are, or seem, from the subject’s perspective. If the
difference between the target state and its “erroneous” ringers were
blankly external to the way things are for the subject, then how things
were subjectively for the subject of either kind of state would be
compatible with their not knowing. And in that case, even if they
occupied the target state, they wouldn’t know. A final step in the
argument is required in order to connect the requirement that the
difference between knowing and its “erroneous” ringers be reflected
subjectively with the further requirement that the subject be in a
position to distinguish the two states—that is, to tell the two states
apart.
What, more precisely, does Cook Wilson mean by claiming that
subjects must be in a position to distinguish states of knowing from
ringers? Prichard offers the following elaboration:
We must recognize that when we know something we either do,
or by reflecting can, know that our condition is one of knowing
that thing, while when we believe something, we either do or can
know that our condition is one of believing and not of knowing: so
that we cannot mistake belief for knowledge or vice versa.
(Prichard 1950: 88)
Prichard’s elaboration of the Accretion invokes two conditions on
knowing:
(i)
If one knows p, then one is in a position, at least in principle,
to know by reflection that one knows p.
(ii) If one believes p without knowing p, then one is in a position,
at least in principle, to know by reflection that one believes p
without knowing p.
Condition (i) does not obviously entail condition (ii). It is consistent to
hold that one might fail to know p whilst being unable to know by
reflection that one failed to know p even if one also held that if one
knew p, then one would be in a position to know that one knew p. To
take one sort of example, one might reasonably hold that a severely
drunk person can fail to know that they are drunk (and can even believe
that they are sober) whilst at the same time being precluded by their
drunkenness from knowing that they don’t know that they are drunk.
And holding that would seem perfectly consistent with also holding that
someone who is sober, and who knows that they are, would be in a
5
position to know that they know that. (See Williams 1978: 309–313;
Soteriou 2016: 117–156.)
Furthermore, when conditions (i) and (ii) are distinguished, it
becomes apparent that meeting the former condition would be enough
to render states of knowing distinguishable from their ringers. On at
least one reasonable understanding, one can distinguish Fs from Gs just
in case one can activate knowledge that presented Fs are not Gs.
Similarly, one can distinguish Gs from Fs just in case one can activate
knowledge that presented Gs are not Fs. Thus, distinguishability is
asymmetrical. Very often the required capacities run in step: one can
activate knowledge that a presented sheep isn’t a wolf when, and only
when, one can activate knowledge that a presented wolf isn’t a sheep. In
those cases, the asymmetry doesn’t matter. But in the sorts of cases
we’ve just considered, the capacities can come apart: one can activate
knowledge that a case of one’s sobriety isn’t a case of one’s severe
drunkenness, even though one cannot activate knowledge that a case of
one’s severe drunkenness isn’t a case of one’s sobriety. One can
distinguish one’s knowing from one’s occupying ringer states if one can
activate knowledge that one’s state is not a ringer state. And that can be
so even if one cannot distinguish one’s occupying a ringer state from
one’s knowing. Cook Wilson’s requirement that knowing be
distinguishable by its subjects from ignorance can be implemented by
condition (i); condition (ii) is needless.
Even if we treat the Accretion as incorporating only condition (i),
it seems implausibly demanding. For according to condition (i), that one
knows is, in Timothy Williamson’s sense, a luminous condition: for every
case a, if in a one knows, then in a one is in a position to know that one
knows. And Williamson has offered powerful arguments that no
condition which obtains only sometimes—and in particular no such
condition that one knows—is luminous. (Williamson 2000: 93–123)
2.6. Being under the impression.
The Accretion presents Oxford Realism with a difficulty. Given the
luminosity of one’s epistemic position, how is it possible for one to
make mistakes? More carefully, how is it possible for one to make
mistakes that one cannot, by reflection, correct? Cook Wilson offers
the following example:
…we see at a little distance a person whom ‘we mistake for an
acquaintance’ and without hesitation perform some act which it
would be a liberty to take with anyone but an acquaintance, do
something in fact which we rightly say we should not have done if
we had ever suspected he was not an acquaintance. We did not act
on an opinion that it was our friend; for, in forming an opinion, we
are aware that the evidence is insufficient and, if we had thought
that, we should never have done the act. It seems more like belief;
but if we had consciously made it a matter of belief, we should
have distinguished it from knowledge, and then again, ex hypothesi,
we should not have done the act. Probably one answer offered
would be that, though we didn’t know, we thought we knew. But
this will not suffice. Apart from the criticism we have already
passed on this phrase itself, if we really thought we knew, we must
have reflected and must have thought the evidence conclusive,
6
whereas, ex hypothesi, any reflection shows it could not be
conclusive. (Cook Wilson 1926: 109–10)
Cook Wilson fails to detail what no Edwardian would have risked from
a position of ignorance. His response to the challenge of explaining its
performance is the invocation of a further species of attitude: being
under the impression. This is the sixth commitment of Oxford Realism.
Being under the impression is—like opinion or belief—a mode of
holding something to be true. However, unlike belief or opinion, being
under the impression need not be installed or sustained by reflection.
Indeed, being under the impression is incompatible with, and so apt to
be destroyed by, reflection. (Cook Wilson 1926: 108–113)
Being under the impression falls outside the scope of the
Accretion. One cannot know by reflection that one is under an
impression, since reflection would release one from its hold. Thus, being
under the impression can help to explain how subjects can hold things
to be true in a way precluded by the activation of knowledge. It can
explain how unreflective mistakes are possible. However, it’s natural to
think that some mistakes can withstand reflection. If one were
ensconced in a standard skeptical scenario, then one might be subject to
mistakes both about how things were—e.g. that one had hands—and
about one’s attitudes to how things were—e.g. that one knew that one
had hands. And it’s natural to think that no amount of reflection would
remedy one’s situation.
There are two broad routes via which an attempt might be made
to exploit the state of being under the impression in order to explain
reflective error. The first would be to deny that genuinely reflective
errors are possible. Genuine reflection would reveal that one doesn’t
know that one has hands and, so, that one isn’t entitled to hold true that
one has hands. The claim would be that we are commonly less reflective
than we take ourselves to be—that is, than we are under the impression
of being. The second route would be to extend the first by seeking to
explain barriers to reflection. The claim would be that in certain
circumstances genuine reflection cannot be undertaken. Severe
drunkenness might block reflection. More delicately, being the subject
of a skeptical scenario might prevent the activation of knowledge that
would otherwise enable reflection.
That completes my sketch of the six core commitments of Oxford
Realism: (1) knowledge is primitive; (2) knowledge is akin to proof; (3)
knowledge is a state of mind; (4) knowledge is distinct from belief; (5)
the Accretion; (6) mistakes depend upon the unreflective state of being
under the impression. (See also Marion 2000a, 2000b; Travis 2005;
Travis and Kalderon 2013.)
3. Other Minds.
There are numerous echoes of Oxford Realism in Austin’s work. Cook
Wilson and Prichard both present commitment (1), knowledge as
primitive, as precluding one form of theory of knowledge. Austin agrees:
…there could be no general answer to the questions what is evidence
for what, what is certain, what is doubtful, what needs or does not
need evidence, can or can’t be verified. If the Theory of
7
Knowledge consists in finding grounds for such an answer, there is
no such thing. (Austin 1962: 124)
Commitment (2), knowledge as akin to proof, reverberates more widely.
Thus, for example, Austin contrasts (inconclusive) evidence with what
settles a question:
The situation in which I would properly be said to have evidence
for the statement that some animal is a pig is that, for example, in
which the beast itself is not actually on view, but I can see plenty
of pig-like marks on the ground outside its retreat. If I find a few
buckets of pig-food, that’s a bit more evidence, and the noises and
the smell may provide better evidence still. But if the animal then
emerges and stands there plainly in view, there is no longer any
question of collecting evidence; its coming into view doesn’t
provide me with more evidence that it’s a pig, I can now just see that
it is, the question is settled. (Austin 1962: 115; cp. 1946: 176–182;
1979: 105–111)
Austin makes a closely related point here:
…saying ‘I know’ is taking a new plunge. But it is not saying ‘I have
performed a specially striking feat of cognition, superior, in the
same scale as believing and being sure, even to being merely quite
sure’: for there is nothing in that scale superior to being quite sure.
(Austin 1946: 171; 1979: 99)
It is natural to read Austin as appealing here to a distinction between
the accumulation of grounds for sureness of belief and the achievement
of a position that differs not merely in degree, but in kind.
The distinction between evidence and proof feeds into the idea of
knowledge as a state of mind distinct from belief (commitments (3) and
(4)). At first blush, Austin might be read as rejecting the first idea in the
following passage:
If we like to say that ‘I believe’, and likewise ‘I am sure’ and ‘I am
certain’, are descriptions of subjective mental or cognitive states or
attitudes, or what not, then ‘I know’ is not that, or at least not
merely that: it functions differently in talking. (Austin 1946: 150;
1979: 78–9)
However, the key phrase is “or at least not merely that” and the main
point is to distinguish knowing from believing. The claim is that ‘I
know’ is not merely a description of a subjective mental state. That is
either because knowing differs from believing in not being merely a
subjective mental state, or because ‘I know’ has functions over and
above describing the subjective mental state of knowing. (The latter idea
figures in Austin’s infamous comparison of ‘I know’ with ‘I promise’. See
Austin 1946: 169–175; 1979: 97–103.)
There is evidence, then, if not proof, that Austin accepted at least
the first four commitments of Oxford Realism. That supports a
straightforward answer to our first question. A general discussion of
knowledge might be useful preparation for a discussion of knowledge of
8
other minds. However, insofar as Austin views knowledge itself as a
state of mind, such a discussion assumes a more central role. For the
question how we can know about what other people know is viewed as a
special case of the more general question of how we can know about
other’s minds.
Furthermore, there are forces internal to Oxford Realism that
make it pressing to address questions about our knowledge of what
other people know. One source of pressure is the idea that knowledge is
primitive. It is apt to seem to follow from that idea that there are no
independently specifiable criteria by which to discern whether or not
someone knows. And in that case, we can’t account for our knowledge
of whether or not someone knows by appeal to our knowledge of
whether or not they satisfy such criteria. A second source of pressure
arises from the Oxford Realist treatment of the idea that knowing is a
state of mind and, in particular, the Accretion. For by making the
reflective subject decisively authoritative about whether or not they
know, the Accretion problematizes the idea that other people might
have access to ways of determining whether or not the subject knows
other than via recourse to the subject’s avowals of their own reflective
view about whether or not they know. The first two sources of pressure
sponsor a third: the threat of dogmatism. Suppose, first, that reflective
subjects can be decisively authoritative about whether or not they know
and, second, that there are no independently discernible conditions to
which appeal can be made in attempting to show that subjects are wrong
to take themselves to know. In that case, it would be hard to see how a
challenge could be mounted to someone’s sincere and reflective claim to
know. The situation would be akin to one in which a subject reflectively
avows that they believe something. Typically, the most that one would
achieve by challenging such an avowal would be to encourage the subject
to reflect again. So questions about how we can know whether other
people know arise naturally from engagement with Oxford Realism. (R.
G. Collingwood’s central complaint about Oxford Realism was that it
enabled dogmatism. (Collingwood 1939.) The threat was live: Cook
Wilson thought he knew that non-Euclidean geometry is impossible.
Cook Wilson 1926: 456, 561. See also Prichard 1950: 99–100.)
As Austin in effect observes, the Oxford Realist denial that
knowing can be reconstructed out of other materials—that is, their
claim that there are no independently specifiable sufficient conditions for
knowing—leaves open that there are independently specifiable necessary
conditions on knowing. One such condition to which the Oxford
Realists make explicit appeal is that if one knows, then one can’t be
wrong. (See e.g. Cook Wilson 1926: 69; Prichard 1950: 88.) Opining
falsely is incompatible with knowing. It is to that condition that Austin
points in his comment to the effect that talk about knowing functions
differently from talk about believing. Whilst falsity is no immediate
threat to the claim that someone believes, it excludes the claim that
they know. So, if it is belief’s compatibility with falsity which is
supposed to ground the idea that belief is merely subjective, and which
in turn grounds the idea that thinkers are decisively authoritative about
what they believe, then that ground is unavailable with respect to
knowing.
Austin’s central project involves seeking to discern further
necessary conditions on knowing, as revealed in our ordinary handling of
9
challenges to a thinker’s claims to know. A typical challenge might begin
with the question how the thinker knows, raised with the aim of having
the thinker reveal sources of their standing, with those revelations
potentially giving rise to further challenges. Thus, for example,
If you have asked ‘How do you know it’s a goldfinch?’ then I may
reply ‘From its behaviour’, ‘By its markings’, or, in more detail, ‘By
its red head’, ‘From its eating thistles’. (Austin 1946: 154; 1979: 83)
Austin focuses on challenges to the presumption that the thinker
possesses a standing equivalent to proof:
You may object:... But that’s not enough: plenty of other birds
have red heads. (Austin 1946: 155; 1979: 93)
If the thinker’s standing were exhausted by their awareness of the bird’s
red head, then—according to the challenger—their standing would be
compatible with falsehood, and so could not amount to proof.
Superficial appearances notwithstanding, we can see Austin as
pursuing questions about our knowledge of other minds throughout
“Other Minds”. In doing so, he seeks to discern necessary conditions on
knowing. In the following section, we’ll consider some of the conditions
that he discerns.
4. Reasons for Doubt.
The question at issue is whether some particular thinker knows some
particular fact. The answer is pursued by a challenger who seeks to
determine whether the claimant meets necessary conditions on
possessing proof:
It is in the case of [this] objection that you would be more inclined
to say right out ‘Then you don’t know’. Because it doesn’t prove it,
it’s not enough to prove it. (Austin 1946: 155; 1979: 84)
One natural reading is the following. It is a necessary condition on
knowing that a goldfinch is present that one’s standing is equivalent to
proof. It is a natural consequence of that condition that one who knew
would be in a position to articulate that standing, so as to show that
they had the required standing. And showing that one had the required
standing would amount to providing proof. If the best that a thinker
could do by way of articulating their standing didn’t amount to proof,
then their incapacity would provide reason to think that they lacked
proof and, so, failed to know.
On the natural reading, it would be reasonable to expect that if a
candidate knower were able successfully to navigate all appropriate
challenges to their claim to know, then their doing so would constitute a
conclusive defence of their claim. That is a perspective from which it is
natural to read Austin’s further comments on the obligations attending
the candidate:
(a) If you say ‘That’s not enough’, then you must have in mind
some more or less definite lack. ‘To be a goldfinch, besides having
10
a red head it must also have the characteristic eye-markings’: or
‘How do you know it isn’t a woodpecker? Woodpeckers have red
heads too’. If there is no definite lack, which you are at least
prepared to specify on being pressed, then it’s silly (outrageous)
just to go on saying ‘That’s not enough’.
(b) Enough is enough: it doesn’t mean everything. Enough means
enough to show that (within reason, and for presents intents and
purposes) it ‘can’t’ be anything else, there is no room for an
alternative, competing, description of it. It does not mean, e.g.,
enough to show it isn’t a stuffed goldfinch. (Austin 1946: 156; 1979:
84)
My focus in this section will be (a). (We’ll return to (b) in the next
section.) The central thought in (a) seems to be that there can be reason
to doubt that a candidate knows something only if there is a reason for
doubting that the candidate’s standing amounts to proof that is available
to the challenger—that is, a reason that is specifiable, and so known. On
the face of it, this represents a significant restriction on the candidate’s
obligations. They are required to be in a position to respond to a
challenge only if that challenge isn’t silly (outrageous); and a challenge
meets that condition only if it is backed by reasons that are specific and
available. Austin expands on the apparent restriction:
The doubt or question ‘But is it a real one?’ has always (must have) a
special basis, there must be some ‘reason for suggesting’ that it
isn’t real, in the sense of some specific way, or limited number of
ways, in which it is suggested that this experience or item may be
phoney. (Austin 1946: 159)
According to the natural reading, where no challenge that is
appropriately grounded in available reasons is forthcoming, the
candidate knows.
By way of comparison, consider a similar idea expressed by J. M.
Hinton:
…the apparent rigorism which runs ‘I need more than there is
here, before I stop saying that an item is not known’ is at the same
time the apparent laxism, ‘I need no more than there is here, to
make me admit an item “not p” as epistemically possible—not
known not to be the case’. (Hinton 1989: 232)
Believing that something is known and believing that something is not
known should be treated symmetrically. Insofar as one should believe
something only if one has reasons for believing it, one should believe
that something is known only if one has reasons for believing that it is
known. But for the same reason, one should believe that something is
not known only if one has reasons for believing that it is not known.
Thus, one should believe that a candidate does not know that a
goldfinch is present—that from their perspective it is epistemically
possible that it’s not the case that a goldfinch is present—only if one has
reasons for believing it. Doubt and belief are equally reason hungry.
Hinton’s proposal that belief and doubt be treated symmetrically
doesn’t impose any substantive restriction on the obligations attending
11
candidate knowers. In particular, it doesn’t insulate their claims to know
from defeat by countermanding reasons on grounds of the unavailability
of those reasons. To what extent does Austin’s proposal impose such a
restriction? We can pursue that question by considering a development
of Austin’s proposal due to Adam Leite:
If one recognizes that there is no reason in favour of some
possibility that would undermine one’s authority, competence, or
reliability regarding a certain domain, then (other things being
equal) one may reasonably believe things in that domain even if
one lacks adequate independent grounds for believing that the
possibility does not obtain, and one may reasonably dismiss as
groundless the suggestion that it does obtain. (Leite 2011: 94)
If one recognizes (and so knows) that there are no reasons for believing
that not-p is epistemically possible, then there are no reasons for
believing that not-p is epistemically possible; and in that case, one may
reasonably believe p. Although Leite doesn’t present his proposal as
covering the case of knowledge, a natural extension would be the
following. If one recognizes that there is no reason in favour of any
possibility the obtaining of which would undermine a claim to know,
then one is in a position to dismiss as groundless any objections to that
claim, and so to endorse the claim. Indeed, that would be a way of
possessing proof.
Leite’s proposal seems close to Hinton’s plea for symmetry and, to
that extent, not to impose substantive restrictions on candidate
knowers’ obligations. However, Leite’s applications of the proposal
reveal that, as he understands it, it differs from Hinton’s.
Leite seeks to apply his proposal in order to undercut forms of
skepticism that are based on an alleged inability to know that one isn’t
dreaming. Leite considers two types of case that might be thought to
sponsor a threat to knowledge based on one’s current experience. The
first type of case is that of a dream that is phenomenologically
indistinguishable from wakeful experience. Here, the threat to
knowledge is supposed to arise because one lacks positive reasons for
believing that one isn’t currently suffering such a dream. If it were an
epistemic possibility that one is currently suffering such a dream, then it
is plausible that its being so would preclude one from exploiting one’s
current experience in order to know things about one’s environment.
Hence, the fact that one has—and as a matter of principle can have—no
positive reasons for excluding that epistemic possibility seems to
undercut one’s claim to know. However, the nature of such a dream not
only rules out one’s acquiring positive reasons for thinking that one is
not suffering one. It also rules out one’s acquiring reasons for thinking
that one is suffering one. Thus, on reflection, one can recognize that one
can never be apprised of reasons for believing that one is now suffering
such a dream. And now, according to Leite, his proposal operates to
deliver the result that the putative epistemic possibility can reasonably
be dismissed as groundless. (Leite 2011) Thus, in serving to exclude what
might otherwise have seemed a threatening possibility, Leite’s proposal
is shown to impose a substantive restriction on the obligations of
knowers.
12
Given the substantive restriction on the obligations of knowers,
admissible challenges to claims to know must be grounded on facts or
reasons that are themselves available, and so knowable. Thus, the only
type of dream the possibility of which could pose a threat to one’s claim
to know would be a dream which was phenomenologically
distinguishable from one’s actual experience, and that is the second sort
of case that Leite considers. In this case, he allows that we have some
reasons for believing that we might now be suffering such a dream since
we have, after all, suffered such dreams in the past. However, we can in
principle establish that we are not suffering such a dream, by exploiting
their phenomenological distinguishability from wakeful experience. We
therefore have the resources to exclude the possibility.
Unlike Leite’s initial proposal, his applications rely on restricting
admissible challenges to those grounded on available reasons. That
suggests that the transition from proposal to applications involved
slippage. On closer inspection, that is what we find.
This can be seen by comparing the following principles:
1.
2.
3.
If one recognizes that there are no reasons that support a
possibility, then the possibility may be dismissed.
If one doesn’t recognize that there are reasons that support a
possibility, then the possibility may be dismissed.
If one recognizes that one can’t recognize that there are
reasons that support a possibility, then the possibility may be
dismissed.
Leite’s initial proposal is a version of principle 1. However, his
applications rely not on one’s recognizing that there are no reasons that
support a possibility, but rather on one’s recognizing that one cannot
recognize that there are such reasons. Thus, Leite’s applications rely on
a version of principle 3., rather than 1. We can most clearly see the
difference between those principles by reflecting on the difference
between principles 1. and 2. 1., as we observed above, relies on one’s
recognizing, and so knowing, that there are no reasons that support a
possibility. Since knowing is factive, that principle delivers that there are
no such reasons. By contrast, principle 2. relies only on one’s failure to
recognize any reasons that support a possibility. That would entail that
there are no such reasons only on the assumption that we are
incorrigible with respect to the geography of reasons. Having noted the
weakness of principle 2., by contrast with 1., it becomes obvious that
principle 3. represents no significant advance. For again, one’s
recognizing that one is debarred from recognizing reasons in support of
a possibility leaves open that that is due to limitations on our ability to
track whatever reasons there are, rather than to the absence of such
reasons. Thus, principle 1. is quite plausible, but is of no assistance in
dealing with, for example, phenomenologically indistinguishable dreams.
In order to exploit that principle, one would have to recognize, and so
know, that there are no reasons for believing that one is suffering such a
dream. By contrast, principle 3. might sustain the dismissal of the
possibility that one is suffering such a dream, but only at a cost to
plausibility. For meeting its condition is consistent with getting things
wrong, for reasons of which one is unaware even in principle. (That is
13
the central message of Barry Stroud’s use of Thompson Clarke’s example
of the plane spotters. Stroud 1984: 67–74; Clarke 1972.)
The upshot is that principles 2. and 3. impose no plausible
restriction on the obligations of knowers, since one can adhere to the
restriction and yet fail to know. And principle 1., whilst plausible,
imposes no substantive restriction. With that information in hand, let’s
return to consideration of Austin’s proposal. Is it a version of the
insubstantial principle 1., or is it rather a version of the substantial but
implausible principle 3.?
It is neither. It can’t be the second because the gap between a
thinker’s being unaware, even in principle, of reasons that would
undermine their claim to know and, on the other hand, there being no
such reasons, is too large and too obvious to have escaped Austin’s
attention. And it can’t be the first because Austin builds into his
proposal that operative reasons must be available. But if Austin’s
proposal isn’t to be understood in either of those ways, how is it to be
understood?
At the outset, I suggested that Austin’s proposal seems to impose
a substantive restriction on the range of challenges that a knower should
be in a position to address. And I suggested that his proposal seems to
allow that someone able to answer all such challenges would thereby
count as knowing. If we adhere to both of those suggestions, we are
forced to read Austin as proposing a restriction on what knowers should
be in a position to do that is either insubstantial or implausible. Since
Austin explicitly endorses the first suggestion, we should reject the
second: it is no part of Austin’s proposal that being able to deal with all
available reasons for doubt is a sufficient condition on knowing.
John McDowell provides a useful model for the proposed reading
of Austin. McDowell presents a view of the standing, and obligations, of
knowers comprising three main claims. First, knowing p is a matter of
possessing reasons that suffice for truth. (Compare Oxford Realism (2)
and (3).) However, second, one can meet that condition without
knowing specifiable, non-question-begging reasons that suffice for that
truth. (Compare Oxford Realism (1).) For example, one’s possession of
reasons for holding p might be constituted by one’s seeing p or one’s
remembering p, where those standings could not be specifiable
independently of appeal to one’s knowing p. Appeal to those standings
would therefore beg the question against a challenge to one’s claim to
know. One might possess reasons that don’t beg the question in that
way—for example, facts about the way things look to one. But there is
no general expectation that it will be possible to reconstruct sufficient
conditions for truth on the basis of those reasons. What is the role of
those reasons, if not to constitute one’s standing as a knower?
McDowell’s third claim addresses that question. Knowing requires that
one is doxastically responsible. That is, it requires that one is appropriately
sensitive to non-question-begging reasons for or against the truth of
what one knows. (McDowell 1994.) As I’ll explain, that necessary
condition on knowing is central to the proposed reading of Austin.
McDowell presents his model in the following passage:
There is a completely cogent argument from the fact that
someone, say, sees that things are thus and so to the conclusion
that things are thus and so. But that argumentative transition
14
cannot serve to explain how it is that the person’s standing with
respect to the fact that things are thus and so is epistemically
satisfactory…. Genuinely mediated epistemic standings, on the
conception I have in mind [—that is, the governing conception
that McDowell rejects—], would have to consist in the cogency of
an argument whose premises do not beg the relevant question of
epistemic standing “If one’s takings of things to be thus and so are
to be cases of knowledge, they must be sensitive to the
requirements of doxastic responsibility. We could not conceive
remembering that things are thus and so, say, as a standing in the
space of reasons if a subject could count as being in that position
even if he were not responsive to the rational force of
independently available considerations—the material to which the
governing conception appeals. But we can separate that point from
the idea that one can reconstruct the epistemic satisfactoriness of
the standing in terms of the rational force of those considerations.
(McDowell 1994: 416)
Austin endorses the proposed distribution of epistemological labor. In
accord with Oxford Realism, he views knowing as possession of
conclusive reasons. However, in order to have access to such reasons,
one must be appropriately sensitive to independently specifiable, nonquestion-begging reasons. Crucially, that obligation is limited. Although
one must be able to address appropriate challenges to one’s claim to
know, such challenges must be based upon reasons that are both specific
and available. As we saw, the limitations that Austin proposes are
implausible if taken to exhaust the obligations on knowers. However,
when construed as limitations on the demands of doxastic responsibility,
where the latter is a necessary but not sufficient condition on knowing,
they appear defensible.
In the next section, the proposed reading of Austin is extended in
order to encompass part (b) of the target passage. As we’ll see, this
allows for a reading of that passage which is less dramatic, but more
plausible, than an alternative reading due to Mark Kaplan (2011).
5. Enough is Enough.
In the previous section, I suggested that we read Austin as aiming to
characterize only a necessary condition on knowing, according to which
knowing requires appropriate sensitivity to non-question-begging
reasons for or against what one claims to know. The conditions on
doxastic responsibility are weaker than the conditions on knowing, since
knowing requires possession of conclusive reasons and, so, reasons that,
in effect, beg the question against challenges. In this section, the
proposed reading is applied to Austin’s claim, in (b), that enough is
enough: that meeting the obligations that attend knowing that there is a
goldfinch requires being in a position to do enough to show that “there
is no room for an alternative, competing, description of it. It does not
mean, e.g., enough to show it isn’t a stuffed goldfinch.” (Austin 1946: 156;
1979: 84)
One might read the passage as suggesting that the description of
something as stuffed needn’t compete with its description as a
goldfinch, because it’s possible for something to be both. (Austin was
15
skeptical about the idea that claims about ordinary things carry a
determinate range of entailments: 1946: 159–161; 1979: 88–89; 1962: 118–
124.) Another way of reading (b) would be as allowing that one might be
in a position to show that something is a goldfinch without (yet) being
in a position to show that it isn’t stuffed because one hadn’t realized
that being a goldfinch entails not being stuffed. Kaplan proposes a more
tantalizing reading of the passage. On Kaplan’s reading, Austin’s
proposal is that one might be in a position to meet sufficient conditions
on knowing that something is a goldfinch, and also that its being a
goldfinch entails that it isn’t stuffed, and yet not be in a position to
know that it isn’t stuffed. (Kaplan 2011)
Kaplan’s reading can be developed via the sixth component of
Oxford Realism, the appeal to a state of being under the impression. On
this reading, knowing that there is a goldfinch, and that its being a
goldfinch entails that it isn’t stuffed, would impose an obligation to hold
true that it isn’t stuffed. However, one can meet that condition without
knowing that it isn’t stuffed. For one might hold it true unreflectively in
being under the impression that it isn’t stuffed. (Kaplan 2011: 60–72)
On the assumption that Austin follows the Oxford Realists in
identifying knowledge with possession of proof, Kaplan’s reading would
have Austin allowing that one can have proof that there’s a goldfinch,
and that that entails that it isn’t stuffed, without being able to convert
those proofs into proof that it isn’t stuffed. But if one’s purported
proofs leave it open whether it’s stuffed, then one might reasonably
doubt that what one has are proofs. It’s imaginable that one might have
done enough to show that something is a goldfinch, and that its being so
entails that it isn’t stuffed, without having done anything further to
show that it isn’t stuffed. But one might wonder why Austin would have
accepted the demand that showing that something isn’t a stuffed
goldfinch must proceed independently of showing that it is a goldfinch.
Furthermore, and as noted by Leite, Kaplan’s reading is in tension
with Austin’s explicit animadversions about assumptions:
To say…that we are making assumptions and taking things for
granted whenever we make an ordinary assertion, is of course to
make ordinary assertions look somehow chancy.... (Austin 1962:
138; Leite 2011: 91, fn.24)
Austin’s general target is the idea that one isn’t always in a position to
know all the things that are entailed by things that one takes oneself to
know. In that case, Austin suggests, ordinary claims to know would look
somehow chancy, since those claims would be dependent on things
about which one was strictly ignorant. One’s standing with respect to
the things that one claims to know would appear no better than one’s
standing with respect to the mere assumptions on which those claims to
know depend. Austin’s response casts doubt on the conjunctive claim (i)
that there are things entailed by things that one takes oneself to know
and (ii) that one is confined to assuming those things. Since Kaplan’s
reading relies upon Austin’s endorsing that conjunction, the reading is
undermined.
We’ve seen, in the previous section, that an alternative
interpretation of Austin’s project is available. According to the
alternative, Austin’s discussion of what a knower must be in a position
16
to show is concerned not with the totality of a knower’s reasons, but
only with those that sponsor their doxastic responsibility. Knowing
requires being appropriately sensitive to non-question-begging reasons
for or against what one claims to know. In this case, it requires being
appropriately sensitive to non-question-begging reasons for or against
the claim that there is a goldfinch. However, one’s non-question-begging
reasons needn’t furnish proof that there’s a goldfinch. So, although a
proof that there is a goldfinch would be convertible, inter alia, into a
proof that it isn’t stuffed, the reasons that figure in that proof are liable
to beg the questions whether it’s a goldfinch and, thus, whether it’s
stuffed. Alternatively, one’s non-question-begging reasons for holding
that there is a goldfinch can leave open whether it’s a goldfinch—for
example, by leaving open whether it’s stuffed. Thus, we can find passage
(b) intelligible without reading Austin as allowing that someone could
know that there is a goldfinch, and that that entails that it isn’t stuffed,
whilst being incapable of knowing that it isn’t stuffed.
6. Conclusion.
I’ve suggested that that we can better understand some otherwise
puzzling aspects of “Other Minds” if we read that work against the
background of Oxford Realism. First, we can discern evidence that
Austin agreed with the Oxford Realists in viewing knowing as a mental
state. In that way, we can see the whole of Austin’s essay as addressing
its titular topic. Second, we can discern evidence that Austin agreed
with the Oxford Realists in viewing knowing as primitive. In that way,
we can see him as seeking to uncover necessary conditions on
knowing—including, especially, the requirement of doxastic
responsibility—without treating those conditions as elements in a
conjunctive reconstruction of knowing. And that, in turn, makes space
for a plausible reading of some of Austin’s tantalizing pronouncements.
References.
Austin, J. L. 1946. “Other Minds.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
Suppl. Vol. 20: 148–187. Reprinted in his 1979.
Austin, J. L. 1962. Sense and Sensibilia. Reconstructed from the
manuscript notes by G. J. Warnock. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Austin, J. L. 1979. Philosophical Papers. 3rd edn., J. O. Urmson and G. J.
Warnock eds. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Clarke, T. 1972. “The Legacy of Skepticism.” The Journal of Philosophy 69,
20: 754–769.
Collingwood, R. G. 1939. An Autobiography. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Cook Wilson, J. 1926. Statement and Inference. A. S. L. Farquharson ed.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Gustafsson, M. and Sørli, R. 2011. The Philosophy of J. L. Austin. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Hinton, J. M. 1989. “Scepticism: Philosophical and Everyday.” Philosophy
64, 248: 219–243.
Kaplan, M. 2011. “Tales of the Unknown: Austin and the Argument
from Ignorance.” In M. Gustafsson and R. Sørli eds. 2011: 51–77.
17
Leite, A. 2011. “Austin, Dreams, and Scepticism.” In M. Gustafsson and
R. Sørli eds. 2011: 78–113.
Marion, M. 2000a. “Oxford Realism: Knowledge and Perception I.”
British Journal for the History of Philosophy 8, 2: 299–338.
Marion, M. 2000b. “Oxford Realism: Knowledge and Perception II.”
British Journal for the History of Philosophy 8, 3: 485–519.
McDowell, J. 1982. “Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge.” Proceedings
of the British Academy 68: 455–479. Reprinted in his 1998: 369–394.
McDowell, J. 1994. “Knowledge by Hearsay.” In B. K. Malital and A.
Chakrabarti eds. Knowing from Words: Western and Indian
Philosophical Analyses of Understanding and Testimony. Dordrecht:
Kluwer: 195–224. Reprinted in his 1998: 414–443.
McDowell, J. 1998. Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Moore, G. E. 1905–6. “The Nature and Reality of Objects of
Perception.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 6: 68–127.
Prichard, H. A. 1919. “John Cook Wilson”. Mind 28, 111: 297–318.
Prichard, H. A. 1968. Moral Obligation and Duty and Interest: Essays and
Lectures. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Prichard, H. A. 1950. Knowledge and Perception: Essays and Lectures.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Soteriou, M. 2016. Disjunctivism. London: Routledge.
Stroud, B. 1984. The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Travis, C. 2005. “A Sense of Occasion.” The Philosophical Quarterly 55,
219: 286–314.
Travis, C. and Kalderon, M. E. 2013. “Oxford Realism.” In M. Beaney
ed. The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy.
Oxford: Oxford University Press: 489–517.
Williams, B. 1978. Descartes: The Project of Pure Inquiry. London: Penguin.
Williamson, T. 2000. Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
18