Papers by Fabio Mancini
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Il mio contributo intende richiamare l’attenzione sul nesso tra dovere e
responsabilità nell’Eti... more Il mio contributo intende richiamare l’attenzione sul nesso tra dovere e
responsabilità nell’Etica (1949) di Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Il confronto serrato con
l’etica kantiana, e con la nozione di dovere, induce il teologo tedesco ad un’ampia
riflessione sull’etica e sulle sue forme. Bonhoeffer, lettore attento di Nietzsche,
presenta una critica radicale all’etica tout court: scopo della sua riflessione è quello di
trovare una teoria capace di rendere ragione della complessità della vita concreta.
Vedremo come la ricerca di una tale teoria normativa lo porterà a preferire allo
spazio, astratto, del dovere il luogo, concreto, della responsabilità.
My paper focuses the attention on the connection between duty and responsibility
in Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Ethics (1949). The close comparison with Kantian Ethics,
and with the Kantian concept of duty, leads the German theologian to a wide
reflection on ethics and its forms. Bonhoeffer, careful reader of Nietzsche’s work,
presents a radical critique of ethics: the purpose of his reflection is to find a theory
that can account for the complexity of real life. We will see how the search for such
a normative theory led him to prefer to the abstract space of duty the concrete place of
responsibility.
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Book Reviews by Fabio Mancini
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Talks by Fabio Mancini
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My paper draws the attention to some questions concerning the hierarchy of values. Mainly, I will... more My paper draws the attention to some questions concerning the hierarchy of values. Mainly, I will ask myself if and how it is possible to build up a hierarchy of values. In particular, I will focus on the role of intuition in ethical knowledge and in the construction of a well-ordered realm of value.
Trying to develop this topic, I will quickly consider and discuss two different accounts of hierarchy of values, where intuitive ethical knowledge plays a fundamental, although different, role.
First of all, I will consider the account proposed by W. D. Ross in The Right and the Good (1889). In chapter VI (Degree of Goodness) Ross deals with the commensurability of goods. At the beginning, he distinguishes between commensurability of goods of the same order and that of goods of different order. Furthermore, as we will see, Ross asks himself if pleasure, virtue and knowledge could be compared with one another in value. If we want to determine a range of value among these three kind of goods, ethical intuition should be introduced as an indispensable instrument. As a matter of fact, Ross affirms that pleasure could be compared with virtue - that is higher than pleasure - but that it is not commensurable with it: «no amount of pleasure is equal to any amount of virtue». At the same time, knowledge is higher than pleasure, although virtue (moral goodness) is superior than all the other goods. There are two order of good things - e.g. virtue and pleasure - which are comparable but not commensurable. If we want to establish a scale among them we have to (1) consider value(s) in the concrete situation and (2) appeal to our moral intuition(s).
The second account that I will discuss concerns Scheler's hierarchy of value, as we can read in his Formalism in Ethics and Non-Material Ethics of Value. Scheler recalls the attention on a specific act, the act of vorziehen (to give priority). According to him, there is an objective and stable hierarchy of value: the empirical state of affairs that people in different times and place may prefer a value to another, doesn't imply that the scale of values is contingent. Through the act of vorziehen, a peculiar emotional act, we can indeed access the realm of the axiological apriori and understand the true hierarchy of values.
These two accounts have in common the importance given to intuition(s): they affirm that we need intuitive knowledge to understand the range of values. Considering the problems the notion of intuition has, I will finally wonder if it might be a safe guide to understand values and their hierarchy. And I will pose the question - also considering contemporary criticisms against ethical intuitionism (in particular Hare 2000)- if intuition is a suitable solution only when moral philosophers and, generally, people run out of arguments or if it may assume the central role stated by Scheler and Ross and many others.
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Organized Events by Fabio Mancini
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Books by Fabio Mancini
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Il volume raccoglie gli atti del 1. convegno di Filosofiadaltaquota, Breno (Bs) 12-13 settembre 2... more Il volume raccoglie gli atti del 1. convegno di Filosofiadaltaquota, Breno (Bs) 12-13 settembre 2013.
A cura di I. Faiferri, S. Fumagalli, E. Ravasio, I. Resto
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Papers by Fabio Mancini
responsabilità nell’Etica (1949) di Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Il confronto serrato con
l’etica kantiana, e con la nozione di dovere, induce il teologo tedesco ad un’ampia
riflessione sull’etica e sulle sue forme. Bonhoeffer, lettore attento di Nietzsche,
presenta una critica radicale all’etica tout court: scopo della sua riflessione è quello di
trovare una teoria capace di rendere ragione della complessità della vita concreta.
Vedremo come la ricerca di una tale teoria normativa lo porterà a preferire allo
spazio, astratto, del dovere il luogo, concreto, della responsabilità.
My paper focuses the attention on the connection between duty and responsibility
in Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Ethics (1949). The close comparison with Kantian Ethics,
and with the Kantian concept of duty, leads the German theologian to a wide
reflection on ethics and its forms. Bonhoeffer, careful reader of Nietzsche’s work,
presents a radical critique of ethics: the purpose of his reflection is to find a theory
that can account for the complexity of real life. We will see how the search for such
a normative theory led him to prefer to the abstract space of duty the concrete place of
responsibility.
Book Reviews by Fabio Mancini
Talks by Fabio Mancini
Trying to develop this topic, I will quickly consider and discuss two different accounts of hierarchy of values, where intuitive ethical knowledge plays a fundamental, although different, role.
First of all, I will consider the account proposed by W. D. Ross in The Right and the Good (1889). In chapter VI (Degree of Goodness) Ross deals with the commensurability of goods. At the beginning, he distinguishes between commensurability of goods of the same order and that of goods of different order. Furthermore, as we will see, Ross asks himself if pleasure, virtue and knowledge could be compared with one another in value. If we want to determine a range of value among these three kind of goods, ethical intuition should be introduced as an indispensable instrument. As a matter of fact, Ross affirms that pleasure could be compared with virtue - that is higher than pleasure - but that it is not commensurable with it: «no amount of pleasure is equal to any amount of virtue». At the same time, knowledge is higher than pleasure, although virtue (moral goodness) is superior than all the other goods. There are two order of good things - e.g. virtue and pleasure - which are comparable but not commensurable. If we want to establish a scale among them we have to (1) consider value(s) in the concrete situation and (2) appeal to our moral intuition(s).
The second account that I will discuss concerns Scheler's hierarchy of value, as we can read in his Formalism in Ethics and Non-Material Ethics of Value. Scheler recalls the attention on a specific act, the act of vorziehen (to give priority). According to him, there is an objective and stable hierarchy of value: the empirical state of affairs that people in different times and place may prefer a value to another, doesn't imply that the scale of values is contingent. Through the act of vorziehen, a peculiar emotional act, we can indeed access the realm of the axiological apriori and understand the true hierarchy of values.
These two accounts have in common the importance given to intuition(s): they affirm that we need intuitive knowledge to understand the range of values. Considering the problems the notion of intuition has, I will finally wonder if it might be a safe guide to understand values and their hierarchy. And I will pose the question - also considering contemporary criticisms against ethical intuitionism (in particular Hare 2000)- if intuition is a suitable solution only when moral philosophers and, generally, people run out of arguments or if it may assume the central role stated by Scheler and Ross and many others.
Organized Events by Fabio Mancini
Books by Fabio Mancini
A cura di I. Faiferri, S. Fumagalli, E. Ravasio, I. Resto
responsabilità nell’Etica (1949) di Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Il confronto serrato con
l’etica kantiana, e con la nozione di dovere, induce il teologo tedesco ad un’ampia
riflessione sull’etica e sulle sue forme. Bonhoeffer, lettore attento di Nietzsche,
presenta una critica radicale all’etica tout court: scopo della sua riflessione è quello di
trovare una teoria capace di rendere ragione della complessità della vita concreta.
Vedremo come la ricerca di una tale teoria normativa lo porterà a preferire allo
spazio, astratto, del dovere il luogo, concreto, della responsabilità.
My paper focuses the attention on the connection between duty and responsibility
in Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Ethics (1949). The close comparison with Kantian Ethics,
and with the Kantian concept of duty, leads the German theologian to a wide
reflection on ethics and its forms. Bonhoeffer, careful reader of Nietzsche’s work,
presents a radical critique of ethics: the purpose of his reflection is to find a theory
that can account for the complexity of real life. We will see how the search for such
a normative theory led him to prefer to the abstract space of duty the concrete place of
responsibility.
Trying to develop this topic, I will quickly consider and discuss two different accounts of hierarchy of values, where intuitive ethical knowledge plays a fundamental, although different, role.
First of all, I will consider the account proposed by W. D. Ross in The Right and the Good (1889). In chapter VI (Degree of Goodness) Ross deals with the commensurability of goods. At the beginning, he distinguishes between commensurability of goods of the same order and that of goods of different order. Furthermore, as we will see, Ross asks himself if pleasure, virtue and knowledge could be compared with one another in value. If we want to determine a range of value among these three kind of goods, ethical intuition should be introduced as an indispensable instrument. As a matter of fact, Ross affirms that pleasure could be compared with virtue - that is higher than pleasure - but that it is not commensurable with it: «no amount of pleasure is equal to any amount of virtue». At the same time, knowledge is higher than pleasure, although virtue (moral goodness) is superior than all the other goods. There are two order of good things - e.g. virtue and pleasure - which are comparable but not commensurable. If we want to establish a scale among them we have to (1) consider value(s) in the concrete situation and (2) appeal to our moral intuition(s).
The second account that I will discuss concerns Scheler's hierarchy of value, as we can read in his Formalism in Ethics and Non-Material Ethics of Value. Scheler recalls the attention on a specific act, the act of vorziehen (to give priority). According to him, there is an objective and stable hierarchy of value: the empirical state of affairs that people in different times and place may prefer a value to another, doesn't imply that the scale of values is contingent. Through the act of vorziehen, a peculiar emotional act, we can indeed access the realm of the axiological apriori and understand the true hierarchy of values.
These two accounts have in common the importance given to intuition(s): they affirm that we need intuitive knowledge to understand the range of values. Considering the problems the notion of intuition has, I will finally wonder if it might be a safe guide to understand values and their hierarchy. And I will pose the question - also considering contemporary criticisms against ethical intuitionism (in particular Hare 2000)- if intuition is a suitable solution only when moral philosophers and, generally, people run out of arguments or if it may assume the central role stated by Scheler and Ross and many others.
A cura di I. Faiferri, S. Fumagalli, E. Ravasio, I. Resto