- Université de Genève
Département de philosophie
2, rue de Candolle
1211 Genève 4
Switzerland
Swiss Center for Affective Sciences
Campus Biotech
9, Chemin des Mines
1202 Genève
Switzerland
Fabrice Teroni
Université de Genève, Département de philosophie, Faculty Member
- Université de Genève, Philosophy, Department Memberadd
- I work in the philosophy of mind and epistemology. My background is in the philosophy of memory, of perception and of... moreI work in the philosophy of mind and epistemology. My background is in the philosophy of memory, of perception and of affective states. I have published several articles and monographs on the general theory of emotions (The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction, Routledge 2012), on the nature of shame (In Defense of Shame: The Faces of an Emotion, Oxford 2011) and on memory. I am currently developing my views regarding emotions elicited by fiction, feelings of familiarity as well as the involvement of the self in emotions.edit
The paper is structured as follows. §1 lays out the worry that the FA analysis fosters a revisionary understanding of emotional values. §2 introduces the distinction between enablers and favourers and how it is pressed into service by... more
The paper is structured as follows. §1 lays out the worry that the FA analysis fosters a revisionary understanding of emotional values. §2 introduces the distinction between enablers and favourers and how it is pressed into service by Toni to reply to this worry. While I agree that the reply is attractive, since casting emotions in the role of enablers chimes well with how we pre-theoretically understand the relations between emotions and values, I observe that doing so requires that we tackle two connected issues. First, how do emotions function as value enablers? Second, is the resulting picture compatible with the FA analysis? The rest of the discussion is structured around these issues. §3 looks at the role of emotions within the FA analysis so as to specify the kind of enabling role they can play. On this backdrop, I explore in §4 a contrast between how belief relates to truth and how emotions relate to values, a contrast which helps uncover what we are after. A first reaction to this contrast, according to which emotions are value enablers by allowing us to access values, which differ from truth, is examined in §5. I argue that this idea cannot do justice to the key insight of the FA analysis. §6 defends an alternative idea, according to which emotions are enablers in virtue of their attitudinal shapes.
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Les émotions peuvent être pénibles, voire néfastes. Pensons par exemple à la peur, la colère, la haine, la jalousie ou au mépris. De telles émotions sont souvent qualifiées de négatives. Mais que sont les émotions négatives et comment se... more
Les émotions peuvent être pénibles, voire néfastes. Pensons par exemple à la peur, la colère, la haine, la jalousie ou au mépris. De telles émotions sont souvent qualifiées de négatives. Mais que sont les émotions négatives et comment se distinguent-elles des émotions positives ? Plus généralement, qu’impliquent-elles pour notre compréhension des émotions ? Et quelles sont concrètement leurs effets sur nos pensées et nos vies ? De plus, comment analyser l’ambivalence affective, comme lorsque l’on ressent à la fois de l’amour et de la haine ? Réunissant dix contributions rédigées pour l’occasion, Les ombres de l’âme propose des éléments de réponses originaux à ces questions. Ce faisant, cet ouvrage jette les bases d’une philosophie des émotions négatives.
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This chapter explores substantive accounts of emotional phenomenology, in order to see whether it sheds light on key features of emotions. To this end, it focuses on four features that can be introduced by way of an example. Say Sam is... more
This chapter explores substantive accounts of emotional phenomenology, in order to see whether it sheds light on key features of emotions. To this end, it focuses on four features that can be introduced by way of an example. Say Sam is angry at Maria’s nasty remark. The first feature relates to the fact that anger is a negative emotion, by contrast with positive emotions such as joy and admiration (valence). The second feature is how anger differs from other emotions such as sadness, fear, and joy (individuation). The third concerns the objects of anger and the sense in which anger discloses the significance of Maria’s remark to Sam (intentionality). Finally, there is anger’s relation to behaviour (motivation). Does focusing on emotional phenomenology encourage specific accounts of these features? This chapter argues that there are reasons to think it does
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Contrary to the emotions we feel in everyday contexts, the emotions we feel for fictional characters do not seem to require a belief in the existence of their object. This observation has given birth to a famous philosophical paradox (the... more
Contrary to the emotions we feel in everyday contexts, the emotions we feel for fictional characters do not seem to require a belief in the existence of their object. This observation has given birth to a famous philosophical paradox (the 'paradox of fiction'), and has led some philosophers to claim that the emotions we feel for fictional characters are not genuine emotions but rather "quasi-emotions". Since then, the existence of quasi-emotions has been a hotly debated issue. Recently, philosophers and psychologists have proposed to solve this debate by using empirical methods and experimentally studying differences between 'real' and 'fictional' emotions. In this paper, our goal is to assess the success of these attempts. We begin by surveying the existing empirical literature and stressing the methodological problems that plague most studies that might seem relevant to the debate, before focusing on recent studies that avoid this pitfall. We then...
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Selon l’analyse FA des concepts évaluatifs, notre conception d’un objet comme ayant une valeur donnée est la conception d’une certaine attitude évaluative appropriée à son endroit. Cet article examine deux défis que doit relever cette... more
Selon l’analyse FA des concepts évaluatifs, notre conception d’un objet comme ayant une valeur donnée est la conception d’une certaine attitude évaluative appropriée à son endroit. Cet article examine deux défis que doit relever cette analyse. Le défi psychologique exige de l’analyse qu’elle fasse appel à des attitudes qui soient à même d’éclairer nos concepts évaluatifs, tout en ne présupposant pas la maîtrise de ces mêmes concepts. Le défi normatif réclame quant à lui que la compréhension du caractère approprié des attitudes pertinentes s’articule autour d’une forme de normativité intimement liée à la nature de ces attitudes, sans pour autant dépendre de la maîtrise des concepts évaluatifs analysés. Afin d’établir si l’analyse FA peut relever ces défis, nous commençons par clarifier la nature des attitudes auxquelles il convient de faire appel. Dans la première section, nous considérons des attitudes génériques comme les désirs et présentons des raisons de privilégier des attitude...
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Gervais & Fessler argue that because contempt is a sentiment, it cannot be an emotion. However, like many affective labels, it could be that "contempt" refers both to a sentiment and to a distinct emotion. This possibility is... more
Gervais & Fessler argue that because contempt is a sentiment, it cannot be an emotion. However, like many affective labels, it could be that "contempt" refers both to a sentiment and to a distinct emotion. This possibility is made salient by the fact that contempt can be defined by contrast with respect, but that there are different kinds of respect.
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We argue that the main objections against two central tenets of a Jamesian account of the emotions, that is, that (a) different types of emotions are associated with specific types of bodily feelings ( specificity), and that (b) emotions... more
We argue that the main objections against two central tenets of a Jamesian account of the emotions, that is, that (a) different types of emotions are associated with specific types of bodily feelings ( specificity), and that (b) emotions are constituted by patterns of bodily feeling ( constitution), do not succeed. In the first part, we argue that several reasons adduced against specificity, including one inspired by Schachter and Singer’s work, are unconvincing. In the second part, we argue that constitution, too, can withstand most of the objections raised against it, including the objection that bodily feelings cannot account for the outward-looking and evaluative nature of emotions. In both sections, we argue that the kinds of felt bodily changes posited by a Jamesian account of emotions are best understood in terms of felt states of action readiness.
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In this paper, we develop a fresh understanding of the sense in which emotions are evaluations. We argue that we should not follow mainstream accounts in locating the emotion–value connection at the level of content and that we should... more
In this paper, we develop a fresh understanding of the sense in which emotions are evaluations. We argue that we should not follow mainstream accounts in locating the emotion–value connection at the level of content and that we should instead locate it at the level of attitudes or modes. We begin by explaining the contrast between content and attitude, a contrast in the light of which we review the leading contemporary accounts of the emotions. We next offer reasons to think that these accounts face substantial problems since they locate the link emotions bear to values at the level of content. This provides the incentive to pursue an alternative approach according to which emotions qualify as evaluations because they are specific types of attitudes, an approach we substantiate by appealing to felt bodily stances. We conclude by considering two reasons why this approach may be resisted; they respectively pertain to the alleged impossibility of drawing the attitude–content contrast in the case of the emotions and to the suspicion that so doing raises qualia-related worries.
Research Interests: Psychology, Emotion, Philosophy, Phenomenology, Qualia, and 4 moreAttitude, Value, Intentionalism, and Dialectica
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Preface Introduction A. Why shame? B. Emotions and their Dimensions C. Shame and the sense of shame D. Emotions and morality E. The structure of the book Part One: Two Dogmas About Shame Chapter I. The Social Emotion Chapter II. The Ugly... more
Preface Introduction A. Why shame? B. Emotions and their Dimensions C. Shame and the sense of shame D. Emotions and morality E. The structure of the book Part One: Two Dogmas About Shame Chapter I. The Social Emotion Chapter II. The Ugly Emotion Part Two: The Nature Of Shame Chapter III. Shame, values and the self Chapter IV. Shame revealed Part Three: Revisiting the Dogmas Chapter V. Socialism with Modesty Chapter VI. Shame's Fragile Beauty Part Four: Shame in the Public Domain Chapter VII. Shame, Crime, and Punishment Chapter VIII. Shame, Legislation, and Subordination
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Le emozioni possono essere penose, addirittura nefaste. Pensiamo per esempio alla paura, alla collera, all'odio, alla gelosia o al disprezzo. Simili emozioni sono spesso considerate negative. Ma cosa sono le emozioni negative e come... more
Le emozioni possono essere penose, addirittura nefaste. Pensiamo per esempio alla paura, alla collera, all'odio, alla gelosia o al disprezzo. Simili emozioni sono spesso considerate negative. Ma cosa sono le emozioni negative e come si distinguono da quelle positive? Più in generale, che cosa implicano per la nostra comprensione delle emozioni? Quali sono concretamente i loro effetti sui nostri pensieri e sulla nostra vita? E come analizzare l'ambivalenza affettiva, quando si provano allo stesso tempo amore e odio, felicità e pena? Riunendo i contributi su questo tema di importanti studiosi, "Le ombre dell'anima" propone originali risposte a tali interrogativi e getta le basi per una filosofia delle emozioni negative e della complessità dei sentimenti.
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Abstract We are prone to think that the emotions someone undergoes are somehow revelatory of the sort of person she is, and philosophers working in the field have frequently insisted upon the existence of an intimate relation between a... more
Abstract We are prone to think that the emotions someone undergoes are somehow revelatory of the sort of person she is, and philosophers working in the field have frequently insisted upon the existence of an intimate relation between a subject and her emotions. But how intimate is the relation between emotions and the self? I first explain why interesting claims about this relation must locate it at the level of emotional intentionality. Given that emotions have a complex intentional structure – they are about an object and evaluate it – this means that the relation between emotions and the self may take different shapes. My discussion focuses on three different claims about this relation. According to the first claim, all emotions are about the subject who undergoes them. The second claim appeals to a more moderate form of reflexivity and affirms that emotions always feature a representation of other psychological states of the subject. The third understands the relation between emotions and the self in evaluative terms: emotions are said to evaluate relationally, one of the terms of this relation being the subject who undergoes it. I argue that all three claims apply, at best, only to a limited subset of emotions and that they must sometimes give way to claims that do not presuppose any intentional connection between emotions and the self.
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Research Interests: Philosophy and Routledge
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Une fois exposee la maniere dont les emotions se distinguent d'autres phenomenes affectifs tels que les humeurs, les sentiments et les dispositions affectives, l'etude propose une elucidation originale du probleme majeur auquel... more
Une fois exposee la maniere dont les emotions se distinguent d'autres phenomenes affectifs tels que les humeurs, les sentiments et les dispositions affectives, l'etude propose une elucidation originale du probleme majeur auquel fait face aujourd'hui la philosophie des emotions : comment comprendre la specificite de l'intentionnalite affective? A travers une discussion a la fois fouillee et didactique des theories contemporaines les plus abouties concernant les relations entre emotion et desir d'une part, et entre emotion et valeur d'autre part, les auteurs defendent l'idee selon laquelle le corps ressenti peut fonctionner comme presentation intentionnelle en premiere personne d'un monde de valeurs.
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In this paper, we contrast the different ways in which the representationalist and the attitudinalist in the theory of emotions account for the fact that emotions have evaluative correctness conditions. We argue that the attitudinalist... more
In this paper, we contrast the different ways in which the representationalist and the attitudinalist in the theory of emotions account for the fact that emotions have evaluative correctness conditions. We argue that the attitudinalist has the resources to defend her view against recent attacks from the representationalist. To this end, we elaborate on the idea that emotional attitudes have a rich profile and explain how it supports the claim that these attitudes generate the wished-for evaluative correctness conditions. Our argument rests on the idea that emotional attitudes manifest a sensitivity to evaluative evidence and that this sensitivity secures the kind of normativity we expect of the emotions. We bring our discussion to a close by assessing whether the psychological underpinnings of this sensitivity to evaluative evidence are such as to threaten the foundation of attitudinalism: the idea that emotions do not represent values. Given the available models of how we might acc...
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In this paper, we contrast the different ways in which the representationalist and the attitudinalist in the theory of emotions account for the fact that emotions have evaluative correctness conditions. We argue that the attitudinalist... more
In this paper, we contrast the different ways in which the representationalist and the attitudinalist in the theory of emotions account for the fact that emotions have evaluative correctness conditions. We argue that the attitudinalist has the resources to defend her view against recent attacks from the representationalist. To this end, we elaborate on the idea that emotional attitudes have a rich profile and explain how it supports the claim that these attitudes generate the wished-for evaluative correctness conditions. Our argument rests on the idea that emotional attitudes manifest a sensitivity to evaluative evidence and that this sensitivity secures the kind of normativity we expect of the emotions. We bring our discussion to a close by assessing whether the psychological underpinnings of this sensitivity to evaluative evidence are such as to threaten the foundation of attitudinalism: the idea that emotions do not represent values. Given the available models of how we might access values prior to emotional experience, we conclude that the attitudinalist is still in the game.
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This chapter focuses on fundamental trends in the philosophy of emotion since the publication of William James’ seminal and contentious view. James is famous for his claim that undergoing an emotion comes down to feeling (psychological... more
This chapter focuses on fundamental trends in the philosophy of emotion since the publication of William James’ seminal and contentious view. James is famous for his claim that undergoing an emotion comes down to feeling (psychological mode) specific changes within the body (content). Philosophers writing after him have also attempted to analyse emotional modes in terms of other psychological modes (believing, desiring, and perceiving) and to adjust their contents accordingly. The discussion is organized around a series of contrasts that have played fundamental roles in shaping these approaches to the emotions. These contrasts are those between emotions and feelings, between specific and unspecific phenomenology, and between dependent and independent modes. Focus on these contrasts enables a review of some dramatic turning points in the recent history of theorizing about the emotions; it also serves to bring to light fundamental constraints bearing on emotion theory.
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In contemporary psychology and philosophy, influential theories approach the emotions via their relations to values and evaluations. My aim is to contribute to our understanding of how these evaluative theories in psychology and... more
In contemporary psychology and philosophy, influential theories approach the emotions via their relations to values and evaluations. My aim is to contribute to our understanding of how these evaluative theories in psychology and philosophy relate to one another. I first explain why this presupposes that we make up our minds about the relations between “molecular” and “molar” properties. The rest of my discussion explores some ways of understanding the relation between the molar and the molecular: as a relation of epistemological support, of identity or of the determinable-determinates type.
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According to the fitting attitude (FA) analysis of value concepts, to conceive of an object as having a given value is to conceive of it as being such that a certain evaluative attitude taken towards it would be fitting. Among the... more
According to the fitting attitude (FA) analysis of value concepts, to conceive of an object as having a given value is to conceive of it as being such that a certain evaluative attitude taken towards it would be fitting. Among the challenges that this analysis has to face, two are especially pressing. The first is a psychological challenge: the FA analysis must call upon attitudes that shed light on our value concepts while not presupposing the mastery of these concepts. The second challenge is normative: the FA analysis must account for the fittingness of the relevant attitudes in terms of a kind of normativity intimately related to these attitudes, but again without presupposing the mastery of the relevant value concepts. In this paper, we show that real progress is possible if we pay close attention to the nature of the attitudes recruited by the analysis. More specifically, we claim that an FA analysis that appeals to emotions conceived as evaluative attitudesas opposed to, for instance, evaluative judgements or evaluative perceptionshas the best prospects of meeting the two challenges and of putting the FA analysis on a strong footing.
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Pre-theoretically, it seems obvious that there are deep and multifarious relations between memory and emotions. On the one hand, a large chunk of our affective lives concerns the good and bad events that happened to us and that we... more
Pre-theoretically, it seems obvious that there are deep and multifarious relations between memory and emotions. On the one hand, a large chunk of our affective lives concerns the good and bad events that happened to us and that we preserve in memory. This is one amongst the many ways in which memory is relevant to the nature and causation of emotions. What does recent research teach us about these relations? § 1 surveys some key issues in this regard. On the other hand, which events we happen to preserve in memory very much depends on how we affectively reacted to them when they took place. Emotions are relevant to the nature and causation of memory in this and many other ways. Key issues regarding these relations are surveyed in § 2.
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This paper explores substantive accounts of emotional phenomenology so as to see whether it sheds light on key features of emotions. To this end, we focus on four features that can be introduced by way of an example. Say Sam is angry at... more
This paper explores substantive accounts of emotional phenomenology so as to see whether it sheds light on key features of emotions. To this end, we focus on four features that can be introduced by way of an example. Say Sam is angry at Maria’s nasty remark. The first feature relates to the fact that anger is a negative emotion, by contrast with positive emotions such as joy and admiration (valence). The second feature is how anger differs from other emotions such as sadness, fear and joy (individuation). The third concerns the objects of anger and the sense in which anger discloses the significance of Maria’s remark to Sam (intentionality). Finally, there is anger’s relation to behaviour (motivation). Does focussing on emotional phenomenology encourage specific accounts of these features? We shall see that there are reasons to think it does. Still, are these reasons of sufficient import to dispel the scepticism of those who think that nothing of consequence plays out at the personal level of emotional experience? Given the role of emotional experience in our evaluative practices, we shall conclude that they are. Our discussion is structured as follows: section 1 focuses on feeling approaches to phenomenology, section 2 on componential approaches, section 3 on perceptual approaches and section 4 on attitudinal approaches. Section 5 concludes with some observations regarding the significance of emotional phenomenology.
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The aim of this article is to explore in a systematic way the rationality of emotions elicited when we engage with works of fiction. I first lay out the approach to the emotions on which my discussion is premised. Next, I concentrate on... more
The aim of this article is to explore in a systematic way the rationality of emotions elicited when we engage with works of fiction. I first lay out the approach to the emotions on which my discussion is premised. Next, I concentrate on two facets of emotional rationality – the first pertains to the relation between emotions and the mental states on which they are based, the second to the relation between emotions and the judgements and behaviour they elicit. These observations about emotional rationality are then applied to emotions elicited by works of fiction. After having distinguished several families of emotions, I concentrate on what I call blob-emotions (e.g., one is terrified by the monster on the screen) and emotions-for (e.g., one is afraid for a character in the movie). I argue that, given their nature as direct responses to a restricted range of stimuli, blob-emotions are not irrational. As regards emotions-for fictional entities, I emphasize that a subject’s rationality shows in the way her emotions-for respond to evidence. On this basis, I discard an influential reason to think that emotions-for fictional entities are irrational. Finally, I offer an argument to conclude that they are typically correct and rational.
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Bodily (dis)pleasures and emotions share the striking property of being valenced, i.e. they are positive or negative. What is valence? How do bodily (dis)pleasures and emotions relate to one another? This chapter assesses the prospects of... more
Bodily (dis)pleasures and emotions share the striking property of being valenced, i.e. they are positive or negative. What is valence? How do bodily (dis)pleasures and emotions relate to one another? This chapter assesses the prospects of two popular theses regarding the relation between bodily (dis)pleasures and emotions in light of what we can reasonably think about valence. According to the first thesis, the valence of bodily (dis)pleasures is explanatory prior vis-à-vis the valence of emotions. According to the second, emotions contain bodily (dis)pleasures. I argue that bodily (dis)pleasures are intentional states whose valence is to be understood in terms of evaluative experience, and bring to light the similarities and dissimilarities between their intentional structure and that of emotions. On this backdrop, I offer reasons to conclude that we should adopt neither of the two theses.
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Philosophers and psychologists often distinguish episodic or personal memory from propositional or semantic memory. A vexed issue concerns the role, if any, of memory “impressions” or “seemings” within the latter. According to an... more
Philosophers and psychologists often distinguish episodic or personal memory from propositional or semantic memory. A vexed issue concerns the role, if any, of memory “impressions” or “seemings” within the latter. According to an important family of approaches, seemings play a fundamental epistemological role vis-à-vis propositional memory judgments: it is one’s memory seeming that Caesar was murdered, say, that justifi es one’s judgment that he was murdered. Yet, it has been convincingly argued that these approaches lead to insurmountable problems and that memory seemings are not well suited to play this justifying role. As a result, many contemporary accounts of propositional memory dispense with these seemings altogether. Is the idea that memory seemings play a key role in propositional memory really the result of bad theorizing? My aim is to shed light on this issue, which I will approach as follows.
In Section 1, I contrast episodic memory with propositional memory so as to clarify the nature of the latter. According to the account I put forward, episodic memory consists in the preservation of acquaintance with objects and events, whereas propositional memory consists in the preservation of thought contents. In Section 2, I turn my attention to the contrast between propositional memory contents and propositional memory as an attitude. I argue that they play different roles. Memory contents satisfy a past awareness constraint and a causal constraint; the attitude of remembering explains why we are inclined to endorse these contents. This distinction leads me to explore the attitude of remembering, and I argue, in Section 3, that the most appealing account of this attitude is in terms of feelings of familiarity. In Section 4, I turn my attention to the epistemology of propositional memory and revisit the claim that propositional memory judgments are justified by memory seemings. In so doing, I contend that the attitude of remembering plays an exclusively explanatory role and does not contribute to the epistemology of propositional memory judgments. I conclude by drawing a more general lesson regarding the respective roles of attitudes and contents.
In Section 1, I contrast episodic memory with propositional memory so as to clarify the nature of the latter. According to the account I put forward, episodic memory consists in the preservation of acquaintance with objects and events, whereas propositional memory consists in the preservation of thought contents. In Section 2, I turn my attention to the contrast between propositional memory contents and propositional memory as an attitude. I argue that they play different roles. Memory contents satisfy a past awareness constraint and a causal constraint; the attitude of remembering explains why we are inclined to endorse these contents. This distinction leads me to explore the attitude of remembering, and I argue, in Section 3, that the most appealing account of this attitude is in terms of feelings of familiarity. In Section 4, I turn my attention to the epistemology of propositional memory and revisit the claim that propositional memory judgments are justified by memory seemings. In so doing, I contend that the attitude of remembering plays an exclusively explanatory role and does not contribute to the epistemology of propositional memory judgments. I conclude by drawing a more general lesson regarding the respective roles of attitudes and contents.
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This paper explores substantive accounts of emotional phenomenology so as to see whether it sheds light on key features of emotions. To this end, we focus on four features that can be introduced by way of an example. Say Sam is angry at... more
This paper explores substantive accounts of emotional phenomenology so as to see whether it sheds light on key features of emotions. To this end, we focus on four features that can be introduced by way of an example. Say Sam is angry at Maria’s nasty remark. The first feature relates to the fact that anger is a negative emotion, by contrast with positive emotions such as joy and admiration (valence). The second feature is how anger differs from other emotions such as sadness, fear and joy (individuation). The third concerns the objects of anger and the sense in which anger discloses the significance of Maria’s remark to Sam (intentionality). Finally, there is anger’s relation to behaviour (motivation). Does focussing on emotional phenomenology encourage specific accounts of these features? We shall see that there are reasons to think it does. Still, are these reasons of sufficient import to dispel the scepticism of those who think that nothing of consequence plays out at the personal level of emotional experience? Given the role of emotional experience in our evaluative practices, we shall conclude that they are. Our discussion is structured as follows: section 1 focuses on feeling approaches to phenomenology, section 2 on componential approaches, section 3 on perceptual approaches and section 4 on attitudinal approaches. Section 5 concludes with some observations regarding the significance of emotional phenomenology.
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The most salient aspect of memory is its role in preserving previously acquired information so as to make it available for further activities. Anna realizes that something is amiss in a book on Roman history because she learned and... more
The most salient aspect of memory is its role in preserving previously acquired information so as to make it available for further activities. Anna realizes that something is amiss in a book on Roman history because she learned and remembers that Caesar was murdered. Max turned up at the party and distinctively remembers where he was seated, so he easily gets his hands on his lost cell phone. The fact that information is not gained anew distinguishes memory from perception. The fact that information is preserved distinguishes memory from imagination. But how do acquisition and retrieval of information contribute to the phenomenology of memory?The exclusive aim of this chapter is to sketch a map of the phenomenology of memory. It is structured as follows. In section 1, I introduce the contrast between content (what is remembered) and psychological attitude (remembering). This distinction will be helpful in disentangling issues in the phenomenology of memory. Section 2 is devoted to the contribution of memory content to phenomenology, section 3 to the contribution of the attitude of remembering.
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Abstract We are prone to think that the emotions someone undergoes are somehow revelatory of the sort of person she is, and philosophers working in the field have frequently insisted upon the existence of an intimate relation between a... more
Abstract We are prone to think that the emotions someone undergoes are somehow revelatory of the sort of person she is, and philosophers working in the field have frequently insisted upon the existence of an intimate relation between a subject and her emotions. But how intimate is the relation between emotions and the self? I first explain why interesting claims about this relation must locate it at the level of emotional intentionality. Given that emotions have a complex intentional structure—they are about an object and evaluate it—this means that the relation between emotions and the self may take different shapes. My discussion focuses on three different claims about this relation. According to the first claim, all emotions are about the subject who undergoes them. The second claim appeals to a more moderate form of reflexivity and affirms that emotions always feature a representation of other psychological states of the subject. The third understands the relation between emotions and the self in evaluative terms: emotions are said to evaluate relationally, one of the terms of this relation being the subject who undergoes it. I argue that all three claims apply, at best, only to a limited subset of emotions and that they must sometimes give way to claims that do not presuppose any intentional connection between emotions and the self.
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Research Interests: Psychology, Cognitive Science, Social Perception, Adolescent, Shame, and 7 moreHumans, Female, Male, Young Adult, Self Concept, Adult, and Morals
We argue that the main objections against two central tenets of a Jamesian account of the emotions, i.e. that (1) different types of emotions are associated with specific types of bodily feelings (Specificity), and that (2) emotions are... more
We argue that the main objections against two central tenets of a Jamesian account of the emotions, i.e. that (1) different types of emotions are associated with specific types of bodily feelings (Specificity), and that (2) emotions are constituted by patterns of bodily feeling (Constitution), do not succeed. In the first part, we argue that several reasons adduced against Specifity, including one inspired by Schachter and Singer’s work, are unconvincing. In the second part, we argue that Constitution, too, can withstand most of the objections raised against it, including the objection that bodily feelings cannot account for the outward-looking and evaluative nature of emotions. In both sections, we argue that the kinds of felt bodily changes posited by a Jamesian account of emotions are best understood in terms of felt states of action-readiness.
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Chapter 1 The Importance of Memory and the Status of Taxonomies Chapter 2 The Scope of Memory Chapter 3 The Language of Memory Chapter 4 Perception, Reduction and Concepts Chapter 5 The Object of Perception Chapter 6 Memory and... more
Chapter 1 The Importance of Memory and the Status of Taxonomies
Chapter 2 The Scope of Memory
Chapter 3 The Language of Memory
Chapter 4 Perception, Reduction and Concepts
Chapter 5 The Object of Perception
Chapter 6 Memory and Reductionism
Chapter 7 Links between Perception, Memory and Beliefs acquired in the Past
Chapter 8 Memory Experiences, Judgements and Concepts
Chapter 9 The Object of Memory
Chapter 10 Memory Demonstratives
Chapter 11 The Epistemology of Memory
Chapter 2 The Scope of Memory
Chapter 3 The Language of Memory
Chapter 4 Perception, Reduction and Concepts
Chapter 5 The Object of Perception
Chapter 6 Memory and Reductionism
Chapter 7 Links between Perception, Memory and Beliefs acquired in the Past
Chapter 8 Memory Experiences, Judgements and Concepts
Chapter 9 The Object of Memory
Chapter 10 Memory Demonstratives
Chapter 11 The Epistemology of Memory
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Le but de cette présentation est d’explorer la phénoménologie du souvenir. Après avoir introduit la distinction entre contenu et attitude psychologique, je distinguerai deux groupes de questions. Premièrement, on peut s’intéresser à... more
Le but de cette présentation est d’explorer la phénoménologie du souvenir. Après avoir introduit la distinction entre contenu et attitude psychologique, je distinguerai deux groupes de questions. Premièrement, on peut s’intéresser à l’impact phénoménologique de différents types de contenus mnésiques. Comment ce dont nous nous souvenons contribue-t-il à la phénoménologie de la mémoire? Y a-t-il une phénoménologie du contenu exclusive au souvenir? Et peut-on expliquer les différences phénoménologiques entre perception, souvenir et imagination en termes de contenus? Deuxièmement, on peut s’intéresser à l’impact phénoménologique de l’attitude de se souvenir. Comment se souvenir, par contraste avec ce dont nous nous souvenons, contribue-t-il à la phénoménologie de la mémoire? Y a-t-il un ressenti propre à cette attitude? En essayant de répondre à ces questions, j’aborderai la phénoménologie cognitive, les limites de la représentation « par images » et un groupe d’impressions (feelings) métacognitives.
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The aim of this talk is to explore what it is like to remember. After having introduced the distinction between content and psychological attitude, I shall distinguish two groups of issues in the phenomenology of memory. First, one may... more
The aim of this talk is to explore what it is like to remember. After having introduced the distinction between content and psychological attitude, I shall distinguish two groups of issues in the phenomenology of memory. First, one may enquire into the phenomenological impact of various memory contents. How does what one remembers contribute to phenomenology? Is there a phenomenology of content exclusive to memory? And can we explain the phenomenological differences between perceiving, imagining and remembering in terms of content? Second, one may enquire into the attitude of remembering and how it impacts on phenomenology. How does remembering itself, as opposed to what is remembered, contribute to phenomenology? Is there a feeling distinctive of remembering? Exploring the impact of memory contents and the attitude of remembering on consciousness will lead me to discuss cognitive phenomenology, the limits of imagistic representation and a variety of metacognitive feelings.
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On rencontre régulièrement dans la littérature des remarques soulignant l’étroitesse des rapports entre un sujet et ses émotions, remarques sans doute sous-tendues par certaines intuitions à ce propos. C. Calhoun (2004) observe ainsi que... more
On rencontre régulièrement dans la littérature des remarques soulignant l’étroitesse des rapports entre un sujet et ses émotions, remarques sans doute sous-tendues par certaines intuitions à ce propos. C. Calhoun (2004) observe ainsi que toute émotion possède une certaine « subjectivité biographique » et R. de Sousa (2007) insiste sur la présence de deux aspects au sein des émotions : elles seraient à la fois à propos du monde et à propos du sujet qui les ressent. Par ailleurs, on dit couramment de quelqu’un qui répond émotionnellement à un événement qu’il le « prend personnellement ». Ces remarques suggestives laissent entendre qu’une bonne compréhension des émotions doit tenir compte de leur rapport au moi.
Afin d’être digne d’intérêt, ce rapport doit dépasser le constat selon lequel l’occurrence d’une émotion exige la présence d’un sujet, constat qui s’applique à tout état mental. Les remarques précédentes n’ont pas pour fonction de rappeler ce truisme, mais celle de signaler l’existence d’un rapport plus étroit entre un sujet et ses émotions. Quel pourrait-il être? Puisqu’un trait fondamental des états psychologiques est leur intentionnalité, c’est-à-dire le fait qu’ils sont dirigés vers quelque chose, il convient de se tourner vers ce trait des émotions. Or, l’intentionnalité des émotions est complexe – quelque chose (objet particulier) s’y trouve évalué (objet formel) – et il existe pour cette raison différentes façons de comprendre le rapport entre émotions et moi. Une thèse ambitieuse situe ce rapport au niveau de l’intentionnalité des émotions, où il peut caractériser soit l’objet particulier, soit l’objet formel. Le caractère ambitieux de cette thèse provient du fait qu’elle considère que le rapport entre émotions et moi est réfléchi dans la nature même des émotions en tant que phénomènes psychologiques, nature au moins partiellement constituée par leur intentionnalité.
Mon exposé est structuré autour de l’examen de trois thèses de cette nature. J’examinerai d’abord la thèse selon laquelle toute émotion renferme une forme de réflexivité en ce qu’elle est intentionnellement dirigée vers le sujet qui la ressent. Le moi est ici considéré être l’objet particulier de toute émotion. Je me consacrerai ensuite à l’examen d’une deuxième thèse, plus subtile, qui considère que les émotions sont réflexives en ce qu’elles portent sur d’autres états psychologiques du sujet. Je me tournerai enfin vers une thèse qui situe le rapport entre émotions et moi au niveau de l’objet formel. Elle soutient que toute émotion a pour objet formel une propriété évaluative relationnelle dont l’un des termes est le sujet qui la ressent. Je chercherai à montrer que ces trois thèses valent au mieux pour un sous-ensemble restreint d’émotions et qu’elles doivent parfois être remplacée par des thèses modestes quant au rapport entre émotions et moi, à savoir des thèses qui ne présupposent aucun rapport intentionnel entre les deux.
Afin d’être digne d’intérêt, ce rapport doit dépasser le constat selon lequel l’occurrence d’une émotion exige la présence d’un sujet, constat qui s’applique à tout état mental. Les remarques précédentes n’ont pas pour fonction de rappeler ce truisme, mais celle de signaler l’existence d’un rapport plus étroit entre un sujet et ses émotions. Quel pourrait-il être? Puisqu’un trait fondamental des états psychologiques est leur intentionnalité, c’est-à-dire le fait qu’ils sont dirigés vers quelque chose, il convient de se tourner vers ce trait des émotions. Or, l’intentionnalité des émotions est complexe – quelque chose (objet particulier) s’y trouve évalué (objet formel) – et il existe pour cette raison différentes façons de comprendre le rapport entre émotions et moi. Une thèse ambitieuse situe ce rapport au niveau de l’intentionnalité des émotions, où il peut caractériser soit l’objet particulier, soit l’objet formel. Le caractère ambitieux de cette thèse provient du fait qu’elle considère que le rapport entre émotions et moi est réfléchi dans la nature même des émotions en tant que phénomènes psychologiques, nature au moins partiellement constituée par leur intentionnalité.
Mon exposé est structuré autour de l’examen de trois thèses de cette nature. J’examinerai d’abord la thèse selon laquelle toute émotion renferme une forme de réflexivité en ce qu’elle est intentionnellement dirigée vers le sujet qui la ressent. Le moi est ici considéré être l’objet particulier de toute émotion. Je me consacrerai ensuite à l’examen d’une deuxième thèse, plus subtile, qui considère que les émotions sont réflexives en ce qu’elles portent sur d’autres états psychologiques du sujet. Je me tournerai enfin vers une thèse qui situe le rapport entre émotions et moi au niveau de l’objet formel. Elle soutient que toute émotion a pour objet formel une propriété évaluative relationnelle dont l’un des termes est le sujet qui la ressent. Je chercherai à montrer que ces trois thèses valent au mieux pour un sous-ensemble restreint d’émotions et qu’elles doivent parfois être remplacée par des thèses modestes quant au rapport entre émotions et moi, à savoir des thèses qui ne présupposent aucun rapport intentionnel entre les deux.
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Abstract Conscience is typically approached through its function, which consists in regulating the agent’s behaviour in circumstances which put (or merely seem to put) her moral standing at stake. This obviously calls for a specification... more
Abstract Conscience is typically approached through its function, which consists in regulating the agent’s behaviour in circumstances which put (or merely seem to put) her moral standing at stake. This obviously calls for a specification of the psychological mechanisms underlying conscience and of their own moral credentials. Now, the emotions of shame and guilt have a claim to being essential parts of these mechanisms, and a distinctive trend within the contemporary literature consists in arguing that shame is a ‘less moral’ emotion than guilt. What sorts of criteria underlie such a claim? A first criterion has to do with differences in the kinds of actions typically promoted by these emotions. The action tendencies associated with shame are claimed to be less moral than those associated with guilt. Secondly, one may emphasize a distinction in the concepts that the subject deploys in the judgements underlying these emotions – only guilt, it is alleged, speaks to moral concepts such as that of responsibility for wrongdoing. Thirdly, it may be claimed that only guilt requires that the subject autonomously endorse the relevant judgement – for that reason, it stands in sharp contrast with shame, which is heteronomous. According to the fourth and last criterion, shame is essentially concerned with the subject’s social appearance or reputation, and only guilt constitutes a response to moral features of the relevant situation. On the basis of these criteria, a broad tendency in the literature attributes both a higher moral status and a greater moral relevance to guilt. Is this conclusion warranted? I shall argue that a close investigation of the areas covered by these criteria falls short of supporting it and shall develop further considerations suggesting a fundamental role for shame in conscience.
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In this talk, I shall explore different reasons why positive and negative emotions can be of non-instrumental prudential or personal value, i.e. contribute non-instrumentally to the well-being of the individual undergoing these emotions.... more
In this talk, I shall explore different reasons why positive and negative emotions can be of non-instrumental prudential or personal value, i.e. contribute non-instrumentally to the well-being of the individual undergoing these emotions. To this end, my discussion will be premised on a value-based approach to the emotions and on an objectivist conception of well-being. I shall start by situating these two approaches in relation to the available alternatives, as well as by explaining how value-based approaches to the emotions apprehend the contrast between suffering and being pleased. Against this backdrop, I shall then explore some of the implications of this combination of approaches on how an individual’s emotions contribute to his or her well-being. I shall argue that it allows for a rich understanding of this contribution by concentrating on three distinct reasons why emotions can be of final, personal (dis-)value. These reasons respectively trace back to the emotions’ hedonic aspect, to their impact on motivation and to their relation to evaluative knowledge. In the process, I shall investigate how these reasons relate to the contrast between positive and negative emotions.