Judith Simon
University of Hamburg, Informatics, Faculty Member
- IT University of Copenhagen, Technologies in Practice, Faculty MemberUniversity of Vienna, Department of Philosophy, Department Memberadd
- Values in Design, Psychology, Philosophy, Applied Philosophy, Epistemology, Philosophy of Science, and 18 moreScience, Technology and Society, Philosophy of Technology, Philosophy of Information Technology, Testimony, Social Epistemology, Philosophy of Computer Science, Technology Assessment, Trust, Feminist Theory, Web 2.0, Publishing, STS (Anthropology), The Social Web, Computer Ethics, Open Access Publishing, Information Ethics, Feminist Epistemology, and Information Technologyedit
- Since February 2017 I work as a Professor for Ethics in Information Technologies at the University of Hamburg. Previo... moreSince February 2017 I work as a Professor for Ethics in Information Technologies at the University of Hamburg. Previously I was employed at the IT University of Copenhagen (as Associate Professor for Philosophy of Science and Technology), the University of Vienna (Department of Philosophy), the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (ITAS), the Institute Jean Nicod (CNRS/ENS) in Paris and the Research Centre Jülich, and have held visiting positions in the US (Stanford), Italy (Trento), Spain (IIIA-CSIC Barcelona) and Slovenia (Ljubljana). I hold a PhD in philosophy from the University of Vienna and an MA in psychology from the Free University of Berlin.
I serve as on the editorial boards of the journals "Philosophy & Technology" (Springer) and "Big Data & Society" (Sage), the "Open Library of Humanities", and the book series "Philosophy, Technology and Society" (Rowman & Littlefield International).
I have been elected into the executive boards of the International Society for Ethics and Information Technology (inseit.net) and the International Association for Computing and Philosophy (iacap.org).
I am interested in various epistemological and ethical issues around technologies of information, communication and computation. My approach is inspired by social epistemology, STS, Values in Design, computer ethics as well as feminist theory. At the moment I focus in particular on the topics of (epistemic) trust, reputation, epistemic responsibilities of different agents (e.g. user and designers of ICT) as well as the epistemology of big data practices.
In 2013 I won the Herbert A. Simon Award of the International Association for Computing and Philosophy (IACAP) for outstanding research at the intersection of philosophy and computing and gave a TEDx-Talk in Zurich, which you can find here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MmJ8lkS0-qkedit
Seit einiger Zeit gibt es wieder verstärktes Interesse an sogenannter evidenzbasierter Politikgestaltung. Angelockt durch die großen Versprechen von Big Data scheinen politische Entscheidungsträger zunehmend mit stärker auf digitalen... more
Seit einiger Zeit gibt es wieder verstärktes Interesse an sogenannter evidenzbasierter Politikgestaltung. Angelockt durch die großen Versprechen von Big Data scheinen politische Entscheidungsträger zunehmend mit stärker auf digitalen Daten basierenden Regierungsformen experimentieren zu wollen. Doch obwohl das Aufkommen von Big Data und die damit verbundenen Gefahren von wissenschaftlicher Seite durchaus kritisch hinterfragt werden, gab es bislang nur wenige Versuche, ein besseres Verständnis für die historischen Kontexte und Grundlagen dieser Vorgänge zu entwickeln. Der hier vorliegende Kommentar befasst sich mit dieser Lücke, indem er das der-zeitige Streben nach numerischen Beweisen in einen breiteren gesellschaftspolitischen Kontext einordnet und dadurch zeigt, wie die Erkenntnisversprechen von Big Data sich mit bestimmten Formen von Vertrauen, Wahrheit und Objektivität kreuzen. Wir argumentieren, dass das übersteigerte Vertrauen in zahlenbasierte Evidenz einer speziellen politischen Kultur zugeordnet werden kann, nämlich einer repräsentativen Demokratie, die von öffentlichem Misstrauen und großer Zukunftsunsicherheit gekennzeichnet ist.
Research Interests:
With its promise to transform how we live, work, and think, Big Data has captured the imaginations of governments, businesses, and academia. However, the grand claims of Big Data advocates have been accompanied with concerns about... more
With its promise to transform how we live, work, and think, Big Data has captured the imaginations of governments, businesses, and academia. However, the grand claims of Big Data advocates have been accompanied with concerns about potential detrimental implications for civil rights and liberties, leading to a climate of clash and mutual distrust between different stakeholders. Throughout the years, the interdisciplinary field of technology assessment (TA) has gained considerable experience in studying socio-technical controversies and as such is exceptionally well equipped to assess the premises and implications of Big Data practices. However, the relationship between Big Data as a socio-technical phenomenon and TA as a discipline assessing such phenomena is a peculiar one: Big Data may be the first topic TA deals with that is not only an object of inquiry, but also a major competitor, rivaling TA in several of its core functions, including the assessment of public views and visions, means and methods for exploring the future, and the provision of actionable knowledge and advice for political decision making. Our paper explores this dual relationship between Big Data and TA before concluding with some considerations on how TA might contribute to more responsible data-based research and innovation.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Introduction: Value-sensitive design (VSD) refers to a field of research addressing the inscription of values in technologies in general and information and communication technologies (ICT) in particular. In this contribution,... more
Introduction:
Value-sensitive design (VSD) refers to a field of research addressing the inscription of values in technologies in general and information and communication technologies (ICT) in particular. In this contribution, value-sensitive design, a term originally proposed by (Friedman et al. 2006) is used as an umbrella term encompassing also similar approaches developed by other proponents, such as values in design (Knobel & Bowker 2011), values at play (Nissenbaum 2005; Flanagan et al. 2008), and disclosive computer ethics (Brey 2000, 2010).
Value-sensitive design departs from the observation that in the process of designing technologies, societal values are often unintentionally inscribed into these technologies and that resulting technologies in return may promote or demote certain values, e.g. justice, fairness or privacy. The crucial idea behind value-sensitive design as a research approach and a methodology is then to turn this insight into a research question: if values are often unconsciously imparted in the process of designing and developing technologies, can we steer this inscription more reflexively, i.e. can we intentionally embed desired values into technologies? In line with this goal of embedding desired values into technologies, proponents of value-sensitive design have developed concrete methodologies to guide the design and development of technological artefacts that promote the values desired by the various stakeholders who are or can be affected by these technologies.
Value-sensitive design, therefore, a) aims at steering technology design and development to attune to shared societal values and b) promotes the early inclusion of various direct and indirect stakeholders into the process of technology design and development. As such VSD appears to be particularly suited to support and feed into initiatives promoting more “Responsible Research and Innovation”.
Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) as a term refers to both strategic efforts of national and international funding bodies, most notably the European Commission to better align the process and the outcomes of research and innovation with the values, needs and expectations of society as well as to the academic discourse which has formed around these strategic initiatives (e.g. Grunwald 2011, Koops et al. 2015, Oftedal 2014, Owen et al. 2013a, von Schomberg 2013, Simon 2015, Stilgoe et al. 2013, Timmermans and Stahl 2013, or van den Hoven et al. 2014).
Linking RRI and value-sensitive design therefore appears only consequential: value- sensitive design can support RRI by providing a concrete methodology to both assess societal values, needs and expectations and to implement desired values into technologies. Moreover, RRI can benefit from the lessons learned in value-sensitive design as a research field, in particular with regards to the pitfalls of stakeholder inclusion and the performativity of value inscription. Accordingly, RRI as a strategy should learn from value-sensitive design as a research field and methodology (van den Hoven 2013; Simon 2016). In return, RRI can provide ample opportunity for value-sensitive design to be further applied, developed and refined in highly diverse research settings stretching beyond ICT design.
Value-sensitive design (VSD) refers to a field of research addressing the inscription of values in technologies in general and information and communication technologies (ICT) in particular. In this contribution, value-sensitive design, a term originally proposed by (Friedman et al. 2006) is used as an umbrella term encompassing also similar approaches developed by other proponents, such as values in design (Knobel & Bowker 2011), values at play (Nissenbaum 2005; Flanagan et al. 2008), and disclosive computer ethics (Brey 2000, 2010).
Value-sensitive design departs from the observation that in the process of designing technologies, societal values are often unintentionally inscribed into these technologies and that resulting technologies in return may promote or demote certain values, e.g. justice, fairness or privacy. The crucial idea behind value-sensitive design as a research approach and a methodology is then to turn this insight into a research question: if values are often unconsciously imparted in the process of designing and developing technologies, can we steer this inscription more reflexively, i.e. can we intentionally embed desired values into technologies? In line with this goal of embedding desired values into technologies, proponents of value-sensitive design have developed concrete methodologies to guide the design and development of technological artefacts that promote the values desired by the various stakeholders who are or can be affected by these technologies.
Value-sensitive design, therefore, a) aims at steering technology design and development to attune to shared societal values and b) promotes the early inclusion of various direct and indirect stakeholders into the process of technology design and development. As such VSD appears to be particularly suited to support and feed into initiatives promoting more “Responsible Research and Innovation”.
Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) as a term refers to both strategic efforts of national and international funding bodies, most notably the European Commission to better align the process and the outcomes of research and innovation with the values, needs and expectations of society as well as to the academic discourse which has formed around these strategic initiatives (e.g. Grunwald 2011, Koops et al. 2015, Oftedal 2014, Owen et al. 2013a, von Schomberg 2013, Simon 2015, Stilgoe et al. 2013, Timmermans and Stahl 2013, or van den Hoven et al. 2014).
Linking RRI and value-sensitive design therefore appears only consequential: value- sensitive design can support RRI by providing a concrete methodology to both assess societal values, needs and expectations and to implement desired values into technologies. Moreover, RRI can benefit from the lessons learned in value-sensitive design as a research field, in particular with regards to the pitfalls of stakeholder inclusion and the performativity of value inscription. Accordingly, RRI as a strategy should learn from value-sensitive design as a research field and methodology (van den Hoven 2013; Simon 2016). In return, RRI can provide ample opportunity for value-sensitive design to be further applied, developed and refined in highly diverse research settings stretching beyond ICT design.
Research Interests:
Simon, J. (2016): Values in Design. In: Heesen, J., Handbuch Medien- und Informationsethik, Stuttgart: Metzler.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
The challenge to locate responsibility in ever more entangled and dynamic socio-technical environments is a key concern of the ONLIFE Manifesto. This contribution focuses specifically on responsibilities in processes of knowing, a topic... more
The challenge to locate responsibility in ever more entangled and dynamic socio-technical environments is a key concern of the ONLIFE Manifesto. This contribution focuses specifically on responsibilities in processes of knowing, a topic which is discussed under the heading of epistemic responsibility in philosophy. I argue that two perspectives regarding epistemic responsibility should be distinguished: 1) the individualistic perspective, focusing on individuals as knowers within increasingly complex and dynamic socio-technical epistemic systems and 2) the governance perspective, focusing on the question how systems and environments should be designed so that individuals can act responsibly. Different fields of research have offered valuable insights for the development of a notion of epistemic responsibility in a hyperconnected era, most notably the fields of (social) epistemology, philosophy of computing as well as feminist theory of science and technology. From those insights, two major challenges can be deduced: 1) To acknowledge the socio-technical entanglement of knowers while at the same time striving to support responsibility assumption and attribution and 2) to be attentive to power asymmetries within entangled socio-technical environments.
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"Imagine a world without trust. Without trust even the simplest actions in our lifeworld would hardly ever happen: We would never enter a taxi, never pay with coin or believe in what our doctor says. We would neither know when and where... more
"Imagine a world without trust. Without trust even the simplest actions in our lifeworld would hardly ever happen: We would never enter a taxi, never pay with coin or believe in what our doctor says.
We would neither know when and where we are born and might even still believe that the sun rotates around the earth. Trust is an essential trait of our social life and our relation to our environment. Given the pervasiveness of trust in our lives, it comes as a surprise that trust has only very recently started to receive attention in philosophy. Apart from some early consideration on trust amongst friends, on trust in god as well as some contributions regarding the role of trust
in society by Hobbes, Locke and Hume, trust emerged as a topic of philosophical interest only in the last decades of the 20th century. As pervasive trust appears as a phenomenon, as elusive it seems as a concept. What is trust? Is it a belief, an expectation, an attitude or an emotion? Can trust be willed or can I merely decide to act as if I trusted? Moreover, while the intrinsic as well as the instrumental value of trust for cooperation and social life is almost commonsensical, trust always carries the risk of being unwarranted. Trusting those who are not worthy of our trust can lead to exploitation and betrayal. Yet, not trusting those who would be trustworthy can also be a mistake and cause harm. It has been particularly feminist scholars, who have emphasizes the janus-faced nature of trust. How trust is defined and characterized depends strongly on the examples chosen. It makes a difference whether we analyze trust relations between children and their parents, between humans of equal power, between friends, lovers or strangers. Trust in other persons differs from trust in groups, trust in a specific representative of the state differs from trust in more abstract entities such as governments, democracy or society. Technology is yet another important if neglected patient of trust as well as a mediator of many human-to-human trust relations in our contemporary world. Instead of distinguishing proper and improper uses of the term trust, we should carefully attend to these different meanings of the word “trust” to provide a rich and multi-facetted perspective on this complex and important phenomenon."
We would neither know when and where we are born and might even still believe that the sun rotates around the earth. Trust is an essential trait of our social life and our relation to our environment. Given the pervasiveness of trust in our lives, it comes as a surprise that trust has only very recently started to receive attention in philosophy. Apart from some early consideration on trust amongst friends, on trust in god as well as some contributions regarding the role of trust
in society by Hobbes, Locke and Hume, trust emerged as a topic of philosophical interest only in the last decades of the 20th century. As pervasive trust appears as a phenomenon, as elusive it seems as a concept. What is trust? Is it a belief, an expectation, an attitude or an emotion? Can trust be willed or can I merely decide to act as if I trusted? Moreover, while the intrinsic as well as the instrumental value of trust for cooperation and social life is almost commonsensical, trust always carries the risk of being unwarranted. Trusting those who are not worthy of our trust can lead to exploitation and betrayal. Yet, not trusting those who would be trustworthy can also be a mistake and cause harm. It has been particularly feminist scholars, who have emphasizes the janus-faced nature of trust. How trust is defined and characterized depends strongly on the examples chosen. It makes a difference whether we analyze trust relations between children and their parents, between humans of equal power, between friends, lovers or strangers. Trust in other persons differs from trust in groups, trust in a specific representative of the state differs from trust in more abstract entities such as governments, democracy or society. Technology is yet another important if neglected patient of trust as well as a mediator of many human-to-human trust relations in our contemporary world. Instead of distinguishing proper and improper uses of the term trust, we should carefully attend to these different meanings of the word “trust” to provide a rich and multi-facetted perspective on this complex and important phenomenon."
Research Interests: Philosophy, Ethics, Epistemology, Philosophy of Science, Testimony, and 9 morePhilosophy of Technology, Feminist Theory, Trust, Bibliography, Feminist Epistemology, Trust Theory (Evolution of cooperation), Social Trust, Trust and Reputation Systems, and Trust, Online Privacy, Risk, Consumer Satisfaction, Knowledge of Internet Banking in Relation to Its Adoption/non-Adoption , Within the Technology Acceptance Model Framework
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(First Paragraph) In contrast to Christopher Kelty’s case for the “careful cultural analysis of the domesticated forms that open source is taking” – which we agree to be a very useful endeavor – we would like to stick with the original... more
(First Paragraph)
In contrast to Christopher Kelty’s case for the “careful cultural analysis of the domesticated forms that open source is taking” – which we agree to be a very useful endeavor – we would like to stick with the original call for papers for this special issue, that explicitly addresses the critical power of free software and a necessary shift to epistemologies. In our contribution we are responding to the aims of this special issue and to some of the contributions from the perspective of feminist epistemology. There are several reasons for this decision. First of all, feminist scholars have been amongst the first and most explicit to stress the linkages between knowledge and power. Apart from this generic focus, specific feminist approaches, namely the approaches proposed by Helen Longino, Karen Barad and Lucy Suchman, offer invaluable insights for understanding the critical power of free software as a practice, which enables the materialization of principles into objects, as Kelty rightly emphasizes. Furthermore, feminist approaches suggest looking at epistemological politics and the situatedness of knowledge practices including effects of perspectivism and marginalization (cf. Haraway 1988). We adopt a performative understanding of epistemic practices, an understanding that take the interrelations between epistemology, ontology and ethics seriously.
In contrast to Christopher Kelty’s case for the “careful cultural analysis of the domesticated forms that open source is taking” – which we agree to be a very useful endeavor – we would like to stick with the original call for papers for this special issue, that explicitly addresses the critical power of free software and a necessary shift to epistemologies. In our contribution we are responding to the aims of this special issue and to some of the contributions from the perspective of feminist epistemology. There are several reasons for this decision. First of all, feminist scholars have been amongst the first and most explicit to stress the linkages between knowledge and power. Apart from this generic focus, specific feminist approaches, namely the approaches proposed by Helen Longino, Karen Barad and Lucy Suchman, offer invaluable insights for understanding the critical power of free software as a practice, which enables the materialization of principles into objects, as Kelty rightly emphasizes. Furthermore, feminist approaches suggest looking at epistemological politics and the situatedness of knowledge practices including effects of perspectivism and marginalization (cf. Haraway 1988). We adopt a performative understanding of epistemic practices, an understanding that take the interrelations between epistemology, ontology and ethics seriously.
Research Interests: Information Science, Philosophy, Philosophy of Technology, Web 2.0, Feminist Theory, and 15 moreDigital Humanities, Feminist Epistemology, Computer Networks, Software Studies, Values in Design, Digital Preservation, Social Media, E-Government, Databases, Open Source and Free Software Studies, Web 3.0, Software, Digital Era, Library and Archival Science, and Science and Technology Studies
In this paper I demonstrate the utility of a Values in Design (VID) perspective for the assessment, the design and development of e-democracy tools. In the first part, I give some background information on Values in Design and... more
In this paper I demonstrate the utility of a Values in Design (VID) perspective for the assessment, the design and development of e-democracy tools. In the first part, I give some background information on Values in Design and Value-Sensitive Design and their relevance in the context of e-democracy. In part 2, I analyze three different e-democracy tools from a VID-perspective. The paper ends with some conclusions concerning the merits of VID for e-democracy as well as some considerations concerning the dual tasks of philosophers in assessing and promoting value-sensitive technology design.
Research Interests:
In this paper, we examine the concept of trustworthiness and the role that it plays in trust relationships, both within and outside digital environments. First, we consider and reject the traditional notion of trustworthiness (TW), where... more
In this paper, we examine the concept of trustworthiness and the role that it plays in trust relationships, both within and outside digital environments. First, we consider and reject the traditional notion of trustworthiness (TW), where TW is a characteristic or property applicable only to the trustee in a trust relationship. We then defend a novel concept of TW, which we argue applies both to the trustor and trustee. Next, we describe a scheme for evaluating the TW of trustors and trustees, both from an epistemic and a moral perspective, via criteria based on rationality and evidence. Finally, we look at the question of TW in the context of AAs. We argue that while humans are capable of entering into various degrees of trust relationships with AAs (depending on factors such as the level of autonomy of the AAs involved), current AAs (no matter how autonomous or sophisticated they may be) are not capable of qualifying as TW in a moral sense but only in an epistemic sense.
Cite as: Buechner, J., Simon, J., and Tavani, H.T. (2014). “ Re-Thinking Trust and Trustworthiness in Digital Environments.” In Autonomous Technologies: Philosophical Issues, Practical Solutions, Human Nature: Proceedings of the Tenth International Conference on Computer Ethics Philosophical Enquiry: CEPE 2013. (Edited by E. Buchanan, et al.). Menomonie, WI: INSEIT, pp. 65-79.
Cite as: Buechner, J., Simon, J., and Tavani, H.T. (2014). “ Re-Thinking Trust and Trustworthiness in Digital Environments.” In Autonomous Technologies: Philosophical Issues, Practical Solutions, Human Nature: Proceedings of the Tenth International Conference on Computer Ethics Philosophical Enquiry: CEPE 2013. (Edited by E. Buchanan, et al.). Menomonie, WI: INSEIT, pp. 65-79.
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In this paper I use philosophical accounts on the relationship between trust and knowledge in science to apprehend this relationship on the Web. I argue that trust and knowledge are fundamentally entangled in our epistemic practices. Yet... more
In this paper I use philosophical accounts on the relationship between trust and knowledge in science to apprehend this relationship on the Web. I argue that trust and knowledge are fundamentally entangled in our epistemic practices. Yet despite this fundamental entanglement, we do not trust blindly. Instead we make use of knowledge to rationally place or withdraw trust. We use knowledge about the sources of epistemic content as well as general background knowledge to assess epistemic claims. Hence, although we may have a default to trust, we remain and should remain epistemically vigilant; we look out and need to look out for signs of insincerity and dishonesty in our attempts to know. A fundamental requirement for such vigilance is transparency: in order to critically assess epistemic agents, content and processes, we need to be able to access and address them. On the Web, this request for transparency becomes particularly pressing if (a) trust is placed in unknown human epistemic agents and (b) if it is placed in non-human agents, such as algorithms. I give examples of the entanglement between knowledge and trust on the Web and draw conclusions about the forms of transparency needed in such systems to support epistemically vigilant behaviour, which empowers users to become responsible and accountable knowers.
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We apply approaches from social epistemology and social psychology to the study of knowledge in online communities. We fi rst provide a descriptive analysis of knowledge behaviours informed by social psychology and in particular Arie... more
We apply approaches from social epistemology and social psychology to the study of knowledge in online communities. We fi rst provide a descriptive analysis of knowledge behaviours informed by social psychology and in particular Arie Kruglanski's lay epistemics. This is followed by normative considerations concerning epistemic, i.e. knowledge-related, practices based upon insights from the philosophical fi eld of social epistemology. In particular, we refer to the works of Alvin Goldman, Helen Longino and Miranda Fricker. Outcomes of this dual analysis are norms and evaluation criteria as well as strategies to design online knowledge exchange through avoidance of bias, stimulation of diversity and warranted recognition of epistemic authority.
Cite as: Matthew, P. & Simon, J., (2012), Evaluating and Enriching Online Knowledge Exchange,. In: Lazakidou, A. (Ed.), Virtual Communities, Social Networks and Collaboration, Annals of Information Systems (15), Heidelberg: Springer, 39-53.
Cite as: Matthew, P. & Simon, J., (2012), Evaluating and Enriching Online Knowledge Exchange,. In: Lazakidou, A. (Ed.), Virtual Communities, Social Networks and Collaboration, Annals of Information Systems (15), Heidelberg: Springer, 39-53.
Research Interests:
"In recent years new applications emerged on the Web which received the labels Web2.0 or social software. In many of these applications people are engaged in epistemic activities, such as the dissemination, organization or creation of... more
"In recent years new applications emerged on the Web which received the labels Web2.0 or social software. In many of these applications people are engaged in epistemic activities, such as the dissemination, organization or creation of knowledge. The goal of this thesis is to analyze the epistemological relevance of such epistemic social software. Because communication and interaction between multiple agents seems to be the key to understand the epistemic processes within such systems, social epistemology, the philosophical discipline exploring the ways and the extent to which knowledge is social, was chosen as a theoretical framework. However, none of the existing comprehensive social epistemologies delivers a sufficient framework to analyze epistemic social software. Therefore, I have developed a new socio-epistemological framework to analyze epistemic social software which is rooted in socio-epistemological discourse, but amends it with insights from the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS).
My framework is founded on a tripartite classification of socio-technical epistemic system based on the mechanisms they employ to close socio-epistemic processes. These three mechanisms are integration, aggregation and selection. With this classification I do not aim at reducing the differences between systems to their mechanisms of closure. However, I argue that the classification based on this indicator is heuristically fruitful. Systems employing different mechanisms of closure depend on different social, technical and epistemic prerequisites, have different strengths and weaknesses and are optimal for different epistemic tasks. My model puts a fact into the focus that has been neglected so far in social epistemology: the technical and its relationship to the social and the epistemic. Since most epistemic practices are nowadays pervaded by technologies, such a consideration of the role of technologies in these practices seems to be indispensable for any social epistemology that aims at being not only normatively appropriate, but also empirically adequate."
My framework is founded on a tripartite classification of socio-technical epistemic system based on the mechanisms they employ to close socio-epistemic processes. These three mechanisms are integration, aggregation and selection. With this classification I do not aim at reducing the differences between systems to their mechanisms of closure. However, I argue that the classification based on this indicator is heuristically fruitful. Systems employing different mechanisms of closure depend on different social, technical and epistemic prerequisites, have different strengths and weaknesses and are optimal for different epistemic tasks. My model puts a fact into the focus that has been neglected so far in social epistemology: the technical and its relationship to the social and the epistemic. Since most epistemic practices are nowadays pervaded by technologies, such a consideration of the role of technologies in these practices seems to be indispensable for any social epistemology that aims at being not only normatively appropriate, but also empirically adequate."
Research Interests:
In this paper I propose a new theoretical framework to analyse socio-technical epistemic practices and systems on the Web and beyond, and apply it to the topic of web-based scientific publishing. This framework is informed by social... more
In this paper I propose a new theoretical framework to analyse socio-technical epistemic practices and systems on the Web and beyond, and apply it to the topic of web-based scientific publishing. This framework is informed by social epistemology, science and technology studies (STS) and feminist epistemology. Its core consists of a tripartite classification of socio-technical epistemic systems based on the mechanisms of closure they employ to terminate socio-epistemic processes in which multiple agents are involved. In particular I distinguish three mechanisms of closure, integration, aggregation and selection, and argue that they correspond to three different types of epistemic sociality. Different systems can employ different mechanism of closure or combinations thereof. Yet each mechanism has its own epistemic merits, depends on specific social, technical and epistemic prerequisites, has different strengths and weaknesses, and is optimal for different epistemic tasks. The aim of my analysis is twofold. Distinguishing different modes of epistemic sociality is a way for me not only to put forward a more nuanced framework for analysing socio-epistemic practices, such as web-based scientific publishing and scholarly communication. It can also serve as the theoretical basis for improving them.
Research Interests:
Purpose – New technologies allow for efficient dissemination of scientific knowledge objects (SKOs). Yet they are likely to transform SKOs as well. The aim of this paper is to propose a way to structure SKOs that allows for both a clear... more
Purpose – New technologies allow for efficient dissemination of scientific knowledge objects (SKOs). Yet they are likely to transform SKOs as well. The aim of this paper is to propose a way to structure SKOs that allows for both a clear individuation of the main scientific contributions and a fine-grained structure of credits and evaluation.
Design/methodology/approach – The authors review and analyze existing practices of structuring SKOs in different disciplines.
Findings – Provisionally considering the published paper as an atomic SKO, possible subatomic structures of SKOs are investigated. It is hypothesized that SKOs are meant to satisfy two separated but interdependent sets of constraints, one related to the contribution the SKO makes to the body of knowledge, and another related to the contribution the SKO makes to the reputation of its authors. It is hypothesized that existing SKO structures are not optimal for satisfying both sets of constraints at once.
Research limitations/implications – A broader analysis may be needed that covers the totality of existing practices.
Practical implications – Guidelines are offered. This paper, including the present abstract, is an example of what the scientific paper of tomorrow could be like.
Social implications – The paper proposes better apportioning of scientific credits and evaluation; substantive evolution of the academic publishing and credit attribution models.
Originality/value – The idea that the communication and evaluation function of a SKO are differently reflected in their structure is novel. The proposed fine-grained credit attribution system is novel. The molecular/atomic/sub-atomic distinction is a new way to fix the terminology.
Design/methodology/approach – The authors review and analyze existing practices of structuring SKOs in different disciplines.
Findings – Provisionally considering the published paper as an atomic SKO, possible subatomic structures of SKOs are investigated. It is hypothesized that SKOs are meant to satisfy two separated but interdependent sets of constraints, one related to the contribution the SKO makes to the body of knowledge, and another related to the contribution the SKO makes to the reputation of its authors. It is hypothesized that existing SKO structures are not optimal for satisfying both sets of constraints at once.
Research limitations/implications – A broader analysis may be needed that covers the totality of existing practices.
Practical implications – Guidelines are offered. This paper, including the present abstract, is an example of what the scientific paper of tomorrow could be like.
Social implications – The paper proposes better apportioning of scientific credits and evaluation; substantive evolution of the academic publishing and credit attribution models.
Originality/value – The idea that the communication and evaluation function of a SKO are differently reflected in their structure is novel. The proposed fine-grained credit attribution system is novel. The molecular/atomic/sub-atomic distinction is a new way to fix the terminology.
In this paper we want to explore the epistemological relevance and value of reputation understood as evaluative social information. Using reputation to classify and assess an agent or an item can be epistemologically useful in the absence... more
In this paper we want to explore the epistemological relevance and value of reputation understood as evaluative social information. Using reputation to classify and assess an agent or an item can be epistemologically useful in the absence or -as is especially relevant today -overabundance of information. However, in order to be and remain epistemically useful and ethically just it has to be open to constant scrutiny and revision. We will introduce a model of rational consensus as an example for the rational use of reputation for epistemic purpose before analyzing different reputational tools on the Web. We will conclude our paper with a critical comment on the potential danger of using social information to evaluate information and knowledge claims, resp. to warn from epistemic injustices on the Web and elsewhere.
Call for Papers for Philosophy and Technology’s special issue on Digital Evidence GUEST EDITORS Judith Simon (IT University Copenhagen & University of Vienna) Shannon Vallor (Santa Clara University) INTRODUCTION Digital technologies... more
Call for Papers for Philosophy and Technology’s special issue on Digital Evidence
GUEST EDITORS
Judith Simon (IT University Copenhagen & University of Vienna)
Shannon Vallor (Santa Clara University)
INTRODUCTION
Digital technologies of the 21st century are profoundly transforming the nature of evidence and evidential practices in a wide range of domains, including science, medicine, law, education, journalism, government, public policy and global, national and domestic security. These changes call for rigorous analysis and critical reflection across a range of related topics and disciplines.
The effects and uses are as diverse as the technologies themselves. The much-heralded power of “Big Data” on an unprecedented scale is radically changing how, and from where, social science researchers, marketers and insurers draw their evidence of human behavior, desires and attitudes. Digital neuroimaging technologies are reshaping norms of evidence in the courtroom, in research labs and in doctors’ offices. Varied forms of drone imaging affect how military pilots and intelligence agencies identify and even define legitimate targets, how archeologists, marine biologists, geologists and conservation scientists understand and measure natural phenomena, and how local law enforcement agencies perceive crime and social unrest. Cellphone cameras, body cameras, webcams and hacked ‘data dumps’ have radically changed how, and what, the public sees and knows. Future innovations in digital evidence promise to destabilize traditional evidential norms and practices even further.
The philosophical questions raised by such transformations are many. What if any conceptual shifts in traditional metaphysics and epistemology do these new evidential practices suggest? Are new ontologies of evidence, or new standards of justified belief and knowledge, needed to account for them? What normative considerations (epistemic, political, ethical or legal), should be brought to bear upon these developments? How do new digital technologies condition the relationship between evidence, knowledge, belief and trust? How do these changes affect our understanding of scientific inquiry and explanation, or the role of evidential practices in human cognition, affectivity and action? How are these technologies impacting the distribution of the social and political power of evidence? These are just a few of the critical questions that new and emerging evidential practices invite us to ask.
TOPICS
We solicit the submission of papers that investigate the way in which new and emerging digital technologies are changing evidential norms and practices, within any relevant practical context or contexts (e.g. natural or social science, law, journalism, public policy, medicine, security or intelligence, etc). While the motivating questions should be of a philosophical nature, we welcome submissions from any discipline and/or subdiscipline (for example: philosophy/sociology of science, ethics, metaphysics, epistemology, logic, law, psychology, media studies, criminal justice, political philosophy/science, and so on.)
Topics of special interest include: the impact of digital evidence on scientific research standards and practices; on the role of expertise; on notions of justification, confirmation and reasonable belief; on epistemic assessments of trust, reliability, objectivity and/or truth; on the cultivation of intellectual or moral virtues; on the relationship between modes of perception, affect, reflection and judgment; on individual, group and institutional practices of deliberation, verification and decision; or on the collection, dissemination, integrity and authority of information.
TIMETABLE
February 1, 2016: Deadline for paper submissions
April 1, 2016: Deadline reviews papers
May 1, 2016: Deadline revised papers
2016: Publication of the special issue
SUBMISSION DETAILS
To submit a paper for this special issue, authors should go to the journal’s Editorial Manager http://www.editorialmanager.com/phte/
The author (or a corresponding author for each submission in case of co- authored papers) must register into EM.
The author must then select the special article type: "DIGITAL EVIDENCE” from the selection provided in the submission process. This is needed in order to assign the submissions to the Guest Editors.
Submissions will then be assessed according to the following procedure:
New Submission => Journal Editorial Office => Guest Editor(s) => Reviewers => Reviewers’ Recommendations => Guest Editor(s)’ Recommendation => Editor-in-Chief’s Final Decision => Author Notification of the Decision.
The process will be reiterated in case of requests for revisions.
For any further information please contact:
Judith Simon, jusi@itu.dk
Shannon Vallor, svallor@scu.edu
GUEST EDITORS
Judith Simon (IT University Copenhagen & University of Vienna)
Shannon Vallor (Santa Clara University)
INTRODUCTION
Digital technologies of the 21st century are profoundly transforming the nature of evidence and evidential practices in a wide range of domains, including science, medicine, law, education, journalism, government, public policy and global, national and domestic security. These changes call for rigorous analysis and critical reflection across a range of related topics and disciplines.
The effects and uses are as diverse as the technologies themselves. The much-heralded power of “Big Data” on an unprecedented scale is radically changing how, and from where, social science researchers, marketers and insurers draw their evidence of human behavior, desires and attitudes. Digital neuroimaging technologies are reshaping norms of evidence in the courtroom, in research labs and in doctors’ offices. Varied forms of drone imaging affect how military pilots and intelligence agencies identify and even define legitimate targets, how archeologists, marine biologists, geologists and conservation scientists understand and measure natural phenomena, and how local law enforcement agencies perceive crime and social unrest. Cellphone cameras, body cameras, webcams and hacked ‘data dumps’ have radically changed how, and what, the public sees and knows. Future innovations in digital evidence promise to destabilize traditional evidential norms and practices even further.
The philosophical questions raised by such transformations are many. What if any conceptual shifts in traditional metaphysics and epistemology do these new evidential practices suggest? Are new ontologies of evidence, or new standards of justified belief and knowledge, needed to account for them? What normative considerations (epistemic, political, ethical or legal), should be brought to bear upon these developments? How do new digital technologies condition the relationship between evidence, knowledge, belief and trust? How do these changes affect our understanding of scientific inquiry and explanation, or the role of evidential practices in human cognition, affectivity and action? How are these technologies impacting the distribution of the social and political power of evidence? These are just a few of the critical questions that new and emerging evidential practices invite us to ask.
TOPICS
We solicit the submission of papers that investigate the way in which new and emerging digital technologies are changing evidential norms and practices, within any relevant practical context or contexts (e.g. natural or social science, law, journalism, public policy, medicine, security or intelligence, etc). While the motivating questions should be of a philosophical nature, we welcome submissions from any discipline and/or subdiscipline (for example: philosophy/sociology of science, ethics, metaphysics, epistemology, logic, law, psychology, media studies, criminal justice, political philosophy/science, and so on.)
Topics of special interest include: the impact of digital evidence on scientific research standards and practices; on the role of expertise; on notions of justification, confirmation and reasonable belief; on epistemic assessments of trust, reliability, objectivity and/or truth; on the cultivation of intellectual or moral virtues; on the relationship between modes of perception, affect, reflection and judgment; on individual, group and institutional practices of deliberation, verification and decision; or on the collection, dissemination, integrity and authority of information.
TIMETABLE
February 1, 2016: Deadline for paper submissions
April 1, 2016: Deadline reviews papers
May 1, 2016: Deadline revised papers
2016: Publication of the special issue
SUBMISSION DETAILS
To submit a paper for this special issue, authors should go to the journal’s Editorial Manager http://www.editorialmanager.com/phte/
The author (or a corresponding author for each submission in case of co- authored papers) must register into EM.
The author must then select the special article type: "DIGITAL EVIDENCE” from the selection provided in the submission process. This is needed in order to assign the submissions to the Guest Editors.
Submissions will then be assessed according to the following procedure:
New Submission => Journal Editorial Office => Guest Editor(s) => Reviewers => Reviewers’ Recommendations => Guest Editor(s)’ Recommendation => Editor-in-Chief’s Final Decision => Author Notification of the Decision.
The process will be reiterated in case of requests for revisions.
For any further information please contact:
Judith Simon, jusi@itu.dk
Shannon Vallor, svallor@scu.edu
Research Interests:
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Research Interests:
Simon, J. (2011), Trust, Knowledge and Social Computing, In: Ess, C. and Hagengruber, R. Proceedings IACAP 2011: 1st International Conference of IACAP, Münster: MV-Wissenschaft, p.305
Research Interests:
Recent developments in so-called knowledge technologies, social software, web2.0 or even web3.0 applications as new classes of information and communication technologies have raised not only societal, political or economic hopes and... more
Recent developments in so-called knowledge technologies, social software, web2.0 or even web3.0 applications as new classes of information and communication technologies have raised not only societal, political or economic hopes and expectations, but also epistemic ones. ...
Recent developments in so-called knowledge technologies, social software, web2.0 or even web3.0 applications as new classes of information and communication technologies have raised not only societal, political or economic hopes and... more
Recent developments in so-called knowledge technologies, social software, web2.0 or even web3.0 applications as new classes of information and communication technologies have raised not only societal, political or economic hopes and expectations, but also epistemic ones. ...
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This deliverable reports on copyright and licensing research in LiquidPub. It includes a review of copyright, trademarks and patents and their relationship to scientific discourse, a range of existing licensing models and use-cases, and a... more
This deliverable reports on copyright and licensing research in LiquidPub. It includes a review of copyright, trademarks and patents and their relationship to scientific discourse, a range of existing licensing models and use-cases, and a discussion of various key points of licensing philosophy. It proposes preliminary licensing models for the various Liquid Publication paradigms—liquid books, liquid journals and liquid conferences—and discusses alternative or extended possibilities to the models proposed. In addition it ...
This paper proposes a new paradigm for dealing with scienti c knowledge in general, and publications in particular. The paradigm aims at changing the way in which knowledge is produced, disseminated, evaluated, and consumed. A formal... more
This paper proposes a new paradigm for dealing with scienti c knowledge in general, and publications in particular. The paradigm aims at changing the way in which knowledge is produced, disseminated, evaluated, and consumed.
A formal model is proposed and the issues of credit attribution, copyrights and licensing, which are crucial for the success of any new model, are addressed.
A formal model is proposed and the issues of credit attribution, copyrights and licensing, which are crucial for the success of any new model, are addressed.
Research Interests:
Abstract This deliverable reports on copyright and licensing research in LiquidPub. It includes a review of copyright, trademarks and patents and their relationship to scientific discourse, a range of existing licensing models and... more
Abstract This deliverable reports on copyright and licensing research in LiquidPub. It includes a review of copyright, trademarks and patents and their relationship to scientific discourse, a range of existing licensing models and use-cases, and a discussion of various key points of licensing philosophy. It proposes preliminary licensing models for the various Liquid Publication paradigms—liquid books, liquid journals and liquid conferences—and discusses alternative or extended possibilities to the models proposed. In addition it ...
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Things, artefacts, and infrastructures have always influenced our behaviour as humans. Think of speedbumps as embodied forms of speed regulations or doors which only allow you to exit the arrival area at an airport, but not to enter it.... more
Things, artefacts, and infrastructures have always influenced our behaviour as humans. Think of speedbumps as embodied forms of speed regulations or doors which only allow you to exit the arrival area at an airport, but not to enter it. Currently, however, and largely due to technological developments, the agency of artefacts is on the rise: think of drones, robots, algorithmic trading, search engines or softbots. In all these cases artefacts act, things do things. Acting partly or fully autonomously, artefacts create their own knowledge and decide upon this information what to do. Humans as a result are nowadays only one type of knowledge agents amongst others. Information gets created, processed, filtered, modified and used by numerous human and non-human agents in various ways which are either inaccessible or incomprehensible to us. Distributed agency makes it harder for us as humans to act responsibly as individuals. This poses challenges for governance and design: how should environments be governed, how should systems be designed to support responsible behaviour of us as knowers in highly entangled and dynamic socio-technical environments?
Research Interests:
The challenge to locate responsibility in ever more entangled and dynamic socio-technical environments is a key concern of the ONLIFE Manifesto. This contribution focuses specifically on responsibilities in processes of knowing, a topic... more
The challenge to locate responsibility in ever more entangled and dynamic socio-technical environments is a key concern of the ONLIFE Manifesto. This contribution focuses specifically on responsibilities in processes of knowing, a topic which is discussed under the heading of epistemic responsibility in philosophy. I argue that two perspectives regarding epistemic responsibility should be distinguished: 1) the individualistic perspective, focusing on individuals as knowers within increasingly complex and dynamic socio-technical epistemic systems and 2) the governance perspective, focusing on the question how systems and environments should be designed so that individuals can act responsibly. Different fields of research have offered valuable insights for the development of a notion of epistemic responsibility in a hyperconnected era, most notably the fields of (social) epistemology, philosophy of computing as well as feminist theory of science and technology. From those insights, two major challenges can be deduced: 1) To acknowledge the socio-technical entanglement of knowers while at the same time striving to support responsibility assumption and attribution and 2) to be attentive to power asymmetries within entangled socio-technical environments.
One major trend in software development has been labelled social software. A key feature key feature of it is that social networks or trust relationships between users of a system are used for the selection and evaluation of the quality... more
One major trend in software development has been labelled social software. A key feature key feature of it is that social networks or trust relationships between users of a system are used for the selection and evaluation of the quality of information provided on the web. Based on such observations, I will examine the relationship between knowledge and trust in the web from an epistemological point of view, focusing on recommender systems to elucidate my claims. I will argue that as soon as knowledge is regarded to be the result of socio-epistemic practices, as is the case on the web, epistemology has to meet ethics and politics in analyzing and amending these practices. In the second part of this paper, I will introduce MyChoice and traffic lights of trustworthiness as widgets to be included into social software applications. Their goal is to raise epistemological as well as ethical and political awareness among its users about the impact of - possibly implicit or minor - programming decisions on the information they obtain and on epistemic justice. I will conclude by showing how such widgets can enhance critical awareness and reflection among users while empowering them to make informed, context-dependent epistemic choices.