- Strategic Studies and International Relations (SSIR) Program,
School of History, Politics and Strategy (PPSPS), FSSK
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM)
43600 Bangi, Malaysia
- Cheng-Chwee KUIK is an associate professor at the Strategic Studies and International Relations Program at the Nation... moreCheng-Chwee KUIK is an associate professor at the Strategic Studies and International Relations Program at the National University of Malaysia (UKM), and concurrently an associate fellow at the Institute of China Studies at the University of Malaya (UM). He is the co-founder and co-convener of the East Asian International Relations (EAIR) Caucus, a research platform for exchange, engagement, and empowerment among foreign affairs professionals in Malaysia. Dr. Kuik is an adjunct lecturer at the Malaysian Armed Forces Defense College (under Ministry of Defense) and the Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations (under Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Previously he was a postdoctoral research associate at the Princeton-Harvard “China and the World” Program (CWP) and a visiting research fellow at Oxford's Department of Politics and International Relations. Dr. Kuik’s research concentrates on weaker states’ foreign policy behavior, state alignment choices, regional multilateralism, East Asian security, China-ASEAN relations, and Malaysia’s external policy. His publications have appeared in peer-reviewed journals as well as edited books. Cheng-Chwee’s essay “The Essence of Hedging” was awarded the biennial 2009 Michael Leifer Memorial Prize by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies for the best article published in any of the three ISEAS journals. He is a co-editor (with Alice Ba and Sueo Sudo) of Institutionalizing East Asia (Routledge 2016). His current projects include: hedging in international relations, ASEAN states’ responses to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (with Lee Jones), and the politics of China-related railroad projects in Southeast Asia (with David Lampton and Selina Ho). Cheng-Chwee serves on the editorial boards/ committee of Contemporary Southeast Asia, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Asian Perspective, and Routledge’s “IR Theory and Practice in Asia” Book Series. He holds an M.Litt. from the University of St. Andrews, and a PhD from the Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He can be contacted at cckuik@gmail.comedit
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Although much has been written on hedging in traditional security, few studies have focused on hedging in the non-traditional security (NTS) domains. This essay examines NTS hedging through the case of Vietnam’s disaster response... more
Although much has been written on hedging in traditional security, few studies have focused on hedging in the non-traditional security (NTS) domains. This essay examines NTS hedging through the case of Vietnam’s disaster response cooperation with the USA and with China. “Hedging” is insurance-seeking behaviour, characterised by avoidance of irrevocable commitment, adoption of impartial and inclusive diversification, and the pursuit of prudent contradictions—all aimed at offsetting risks and cultivating a fallback position. We argue that it is Vietnam’s elite-defined strategic considerations and functional needs amid uncertainty that both drive and constrain its hedging approach to disaster management cooperation with the competing powers—China and the USA. While not fully aligning with either power, Vietnam has sought closer cooperation with both, with different objectives in mind: engaging China to maintain a good relationship, while engaging the USA to enhance its capabilities. Th...
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China’s South China Sea policy in recent years has been marked by a mix of maritime assertiveness and economic-diplomatic inducement. This article argues that this contradiction is a result of both structural drivers and domestic... more
China’s South China Sea policy in recent years has been marked by a mix of maritime assertiveness and economic-diplomatic inducement. This article argues that this contradiction is a result of both structural drivers and domestic imperatives. Structurally, the perceived opportunity after the global financial crisis and later, the perceived risk of a US-led encirclement after Obama’s “rebalancing to Asia” strategy have both pushed China to take a more hard-line approach to maritime disputes. However, the necessity to avert regional backlash has, on the other hand, compelled Beijing to counteract its maritime moves with active economic and diplomatic statecraft to reassure its smaller neighbours, albeit with mixed effects. Domestically, the contradiction is rooted in the ruling Communist Party of China elites’ needs to strike a balance between their different pathways of legitimation: while nationalist legitimation necessitates China to assert its sovereign rights, performance legitimation requires it to pursue a cooperative regional strategy via the “Belt and Road Initiative” so as to preserve a stable and productive environment needed for sustained domestic growth.
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When do smaller states defer to and when do they defy stronger powers? How and why? This article traces and explains the changing patterns of deference and defiance in Malaysia's China policy. There are three findings. First,... more
When do smaller states defer to and when do they defy stronger powers? How and why? This article traces and explains the changing patterns of deference and defiance in Malaysia's China policy. There are three findings. First, deference and defiance are essential elements in all inter-state relations, especially asymmetric ones. The greater the power asymmetry, the greater the inclination to defer and defy. Second, states often pursue defiance and deference concurrently and selectively, with approaches adapted in accordance with changing external and internal conditions. The concurrent adoption of the two behaviors often manifest in hedging, an insurance-seeking policy aimed at offsetting multiple risks by counteracting the effects of the other behavior: deference without defiance risks subservience and dependency; defiance without deference invites hostility and confrontation. Third, the specific patterns and proportions of the deference–defiance mix are attributable more to dom...
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This paper adopts a two-level model to explain Malaysia’s forward diplomacy toward the Northeast Asian states, the larger economies beyond its immediate neighborhood of Southeast Asia. We contend that while such structural conditions as... more
This paper adopts a two-level model to explain Malaysia’s forward diplomacy toward the Northeast Asian states, the larger economies beyond its immediate neighborhood of Southeast Asia. We contend that while such structural conditions as power dynamics drive and constrain the smaller state’s agency toward the Northeast Asian nations, their effects are filtered by domestic politics, specifically the ruling elite’s pathways of legitimation. The findings highlight that while diplomacy is almost always motivated by the imperatives of immediate reality and identity, there is a different genre of driver, that of nurtured necessity. This paper illustrates how Malaysia’s outlook toward the Northeast Asian states—and its resulting active and anticipatory diplomacy—has been more “discovered” than determined and why such diplomacy has been driven more by the elite’s domestic political needs than the idiosyncrasies of its leaders.
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Attempts to define middlepowership mostly focus on three attributes: the relative size, capability, and impact of a sovereign state. We contend that a more important attribute in distinguishing a middle power from typical small states is... more
Attempts to define middlepowership mostly focus on three attributes: the relative size, capability, and impact of a sovereign state. We contend that a more important attribute in distinguishing a middle power from typical small states is activism, i.e. a persistent and concerted effort to put forward, promote, and institutionalize an actionable initiative – or a series of initiatives – into an international outcome involving other state(s) as partner(s). The greater the impact and sustainability of the outcome (e.g. an institutionalized cooperation with a growing number of partnering states, and widening scope of collaboration), the greater the middlepowership. This essay unpacks Malaysia’s middlepowership – as an instance of Lilliputian survival strategy – by tracing the state’s activism in promoting an array of diplomatic, development, and defence initiatives around – and beyond – Southeast Asia over the past decades. We offer a Neoclassical Realist explanation, arguing that the m...
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Pengurusan pertikaian di Laut China Selatan mesti mengambil kira perilaku “hedging” negara serantau. Hedging adalah pendirian tidak menyebelahi mana-mana pihak yang terlibat dalam perlumbaan kuasa, yang digandingi pelbagai tindakan yang... more
Pengurusan pertikaian di Laut China Selatan mesti mengambil kira perilaku “hedging” negara serantau. Hedging adalah pendirian tidak menyebelahi mana-mana pihak yang terlibat dalam perlumbaan kuasa, yang digandingi pelbagai tindakan yang bertentangan untuk offset risiko yang mungkin muncul, dan diiringi usaha berterusan bagi menyediakan ruang contingency atau jalan keluar jika wujud sesuatu kebuntuan. Kecenderungan hedging seperti ini bukan hanya dipamerkan oleh negara penuntut, bahkan oleh negara bukan penuntut. Sebenarnya, tindakan assertif China yang kian meningkat, dan strategi Indo-Pasifik oleh A.S. yang kelihatan terumbang-ambing, menyebabkan negara-negara Asia Tenggara mengelakkan “balancing” (menjalin pakatan dengan A.S. bagi mengimbangi China); dan tiada satu pun negara kecil di rantau ini yang memilih “bandwagoning” (menerima hubungan secara berhierarki dengan China demi keuntungan, walaupun ini menjejaskan autonomi serta lain-lain kepentingan nasionalnya). Sebaliknya, mere...
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Malaysia and China have seen one of the most cordial and productive relationships in the Asia-Pacific throughout the post–Cold War era, one with implications beyond their bilateral ties. However, relations were tested through a series of... more
Malaysia and China have seen one of the most cordial and productive relationships in the Asia-Pacific throughout the post–Cold War era, one with implications beyond their bilateral ties. However, relations were tested through a series of unprecedented events in 2013–14. This article analyzes how the Beting Serupai incidents have impacted Malaysia’s evolving South China Sea policy, and then assesses the impact of the MH370 and Sabah kidnapping incidents on bilateral relations. Finally, it makes an overall assessment of the implications of these events, focusing on the developments after Najib Razak’s visit to Beijing in May–June 2014.
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Abstract The extant literature on alignment behavior has focused primarily on the macro dimensions, i.e. the typology, manifestations and implications of states’ alignment choices vis-à-vis the great power(s). Relatively few studies have... more
Abstract The extant literature on alignment behavior has focused primarily on the macro dimensions, i.e. the typology, manifestations and implications of states’ alignment choices vis-à-vis the great power(s). Relatively few studies have examined the micro aspects of alignment choices. This article attempts to fill in the gap by unpacking the constituent component of weaker states’ alignment decisions, with a focus on ASEAN states’ hedging behavior in the face of a rising China in the post-Cold War era. It contends that the enduring uncertainty at the systemic level has compelled the states to hedge by pursuing contradictory, mutually counteracting transactions of ‘returns-maximizing’ and ‘risk-contingency’ options, which seek to offset the potential drawbacks of one another, as a way to project a non-taking-sides stance while keeping their own fallback position at a time when the prospect of power structure is far from clear.
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China’s recent ini a ves such as the US$50 billion Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the wider “one belt, one road” strategy (i.e. the overland “Silk Road Economic Belt” and the “21st Century Mari me Silk Road”) may well... more
China’s recent ini a ves such as the US$50 billion Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the wider “one belt, one road” strategy (i.e. the overland “Silk Road Economic Belt” and the “21st Century Mari me Silk Road”) may well mark the emergence of a third pillar in the 21st century Asian architecture, alongside long‐standing U.S.‐led bilateral alliances and ASEAN‐led regional mul lateralism. Britain and other key European countries’ announcements on joining the Beijing‐ini ated ins tu on are accelera ng this process at an unexpected pace, with poten ally profound implica ons for re‐shaping the long‐term geo‐ economic and geopoli cal landscape in Asia and the world. The an cipated moves by key U.S. allies such as Australia and South Korea (and perhaps even Japan) to follow suit are likely to add further momentum to the emergence of this third pillar.
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[ ]our model hypothesizes, if and when forging closer cooperation with an external power—in our case, connectivity cooperation with China—boosts the ruling elites’ major pathways of legitimation (and enhances their cooptation and/or... more
[ ]our model hypothesizes, if and when forging closer cooperation with an external power—in our case, connectivity cooperation with China—boosts the ruling elites’ major pathways of legitimation (and enhances their cooptation and/or coercive capacity), then the state is likely to downplay apprehensions and embrace such big power-backed ventures as the BRI [ ]if a close partnership would undermine the elites’ principal pathway(s) of inner justification, then the state is likely to foreground perceived risks, discount potential benefits, and respond indifferently to the BRI [ ]the AA framework bridges structural and domestic variables (Kuik 2013, 2017) 3 It shows that a structural variable like power asymmetry has no inherent logic Asymmetry Effects: Ambivalent, Uneven, and Dynamic Smaller states view China’s BRI through the prism of power asymmetry Because of the vast disparities between Southeast Asian states and China, the smaller states have always viewed China with ambivalence, seeing China as a source of both apprehensions and attractions (Ba and Kuik 2018)
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ABSTRACT This essay traces the structural sources of Malaysia's South China Sea policy. It argues that Malaysia's ‘light-hedging’ approach is primarily a smaller-state's response to growing systemic pressure arising from power... more
ABSTRACT This essay traces the structural sources of Malaysia's South China Sea policy. It argues that Malaysia's ‘light-hedging’ approach is primarily a smaller-state's response to growing systemic pressure arising from power asymmetry, rivalry, and uncertainties. The features of this approach are: an insistence on not taking sides, concurrent adoption of open deference and indirect defiance, and an active effort to cultivate a fallback position, all aimed at reducing multiple risks associated with the uncertainties of US commitment , China's long-term intentions, and their future relations. We have arrived at three main findings. First, structural impact matters: as geopolitical uncertainty increases, weaker states hedge more deeply. Second, smaller states do have agency, even if only in a low-profile manner. Because smaller states have been disadvantaged under an asymmetric power structure, they often use a combination of diplomatic, legal, developmental, and defence means to shape favourable external conditions. Third, while hedging is chiefly a result of structural factors, the forms and degree of a state's hedging activism are necessarily a function of its threat perceptions, elite interests and other unit-level variables. These factors explain Malaysia's light form of hedging: quiet action and limited defiance alongside open accommodation in managing the South China Sea disputes.
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If “militarisation” is defined as an act of deploying military assets to pursue wider strategic ends, then all players of the South China Sea disputes have engaged in some forms of militarisation. China’s militarisation reflect three... more
If “militarisation” is defined as an act of deploying military assets to pursue wider strategic ends, then all players of the South China Sea disputes have engaged in some forms of militarisation. China’s militarisation reflect three layers of target audiences: the United States (the main target), regional countries (the secondary target) and its domestic audience. Beijing’s growing anxieties over US rebalancing and the arbitration ruling have paradoxically pushed it to accelerate its “militarisation” activities.
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China's South China Sea policy in recent years has been marked by a mix of maritime assertiveness and economic-diplomatic inducement. This article argues that this contradiction is a result of both structural drivers and domestic... more
China's South China Sea policy in recent years has been marked by a mix of maritime assertiveness and economic-diplomatic inducement. This article argues that this contradiction is a result of both structural drivers and domestic imperatives. Structurally, the perceived opportunity after the global fi nancial crisis and later, the perceived risk of a US-led encirclement after Obama's " rebalancing to Asia " strategy have both pushed China to take a more hard-line approach to maritime disputes. However, the necessity to avert regional backlash has, on the other hand, compelled Beijing to counteract its maritime moves with active economic and diplomatic statecraft to reassure its smaller neighbours, albeit with mixed effects. Domestically, the contradiction is rooted in the ruling Communist Party of China elites' needs to strike a balance between their different pathways of legitimation: while nationalist legitimation necessitates China to assert its sovereign rights, performance legitimation requires it to pursue a cooperative regional strategy via the " Belt and Road Initiative " so as to preserve a stable and productive environment needed for sustained domestic growth.
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If " militarisation " is defined as an act of deploying military assets to pursue wider strategic ends, then all players of the South China Sea disputes have engaged in some forms of militarisation. China’s militarisation moves, however,... more
If " militarisation " is defined as an act of deploying military assets to pursue wider strategic ends, then all players of the South China Sea disputes have engaged in some forms of militarisation. China’s militarisation moves, however, have received the most attention and criticism from most quarters. This should not be surprising. Although China’s military actions are relatively recent and less entrenched as compared to US longstanding robust military presence in Asian waters, the rising power’s militarisation activities in the contested areas over the past years have been pursued at the largest scope (compared to other regional countries), at the fastest rate, and with potentially most consequential implications for the extant regional order. China's militarisation reflect three layers of target audiences: the United States (the main target), regional countries (the secondary target) and its domestic audience. Beijing's growing anxieties over US rebalancing and the arbitration ruling have paradoxically pushed it to accelerate its " militarisation " activities.
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The extant literature on alignment behavior have focused primarily on the macro dimensions, i.e. the typology, manifestations, and implications of states’ alignment choices vis-à-vis the great power(s). Relatively few studies have... more
The extant literature on alignment behavior have focused primarily on the macro dimensions, i.e. the typology, manifestations, and implications of states’ alignment choices vis-à-vis the great power(s). Relatively few studies have examined the micro aspects of alignment choices. This article attempts to fill in the gap by unpacking the constituent component of weaker states’ alignment decisions, with a focus on ASEAN states’ hedging behavior in the face of a rising China in the post-Cold War era. It contends that the enduring uncertainty at the systemic level has compelled the states to hedge by pursuing contradictory, mutually counteracting transactions of “returns-maximizing” and “risk-contingency” options, which seek to offset the potential drawbacks of one another, as a way to project a non-taking-sides stance while keeping their own fallback position at a time when the prospect of power structure is far from clear.
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This article analyzes Malaysia’s alignment behavior vis-a-vis America and China, with a focus on explaining how the weaker state’s insistence on hedging has both motivated and limited its defense links with the competing powers. Contrary... more
This article analyzes Malaysia’s alignment behavior vis-a-vis America and China, with a focus on explaining how the weaker state’s insistence on hedging has both
motivated and limited its defense links with the competing powers. Contrary to the
conventional wisdom that regional states choose to align militarily with the rebalancing America to hedge against China, the article argues that this characterization is only partially true; a more accurate account is that weaker states do not hedge against any single actor per se; rather, they seek to hedge against a range of risks associated with uncertain power relations. In the case of Malaysia, while Putrajaya aims to mitigate the challenges of an assertive Beijing, its alignment
behavior is more a function of a desire to offset several systemic and domestic risks, namely, the shadow of entrapment, abandonment, and alienation, alongside the fear of authority erosion at home.
motivated and limited its defense links with the competing powers. Contrary to the
conventional wisdom that regional states choose to align militarily with the rebalancing America to hedge against China, the article argues that this characterization is only partially true; a more accurate account is that weaker states do not hedge against any single actor per se; rather, they seek to hedge against a range of risks associated with uncertain power relations. In the case of Malaysia, while Putrajaya aims to mitigate the challenges of an assertive Beijing, its alignment
behavior is more a function of a desire to offset several systemic and domestic risks, namely, the shadow of entrapment, abandonment, and alienation, alongside the fear of authority erosion at home.