- Jagiellonians, Medieval Hungary, Wladislaus II, Wladislaus II King of Hungary, Late Medieval Transylvania, Zapolya/Szapolyai/Zapolsky Family, and 19 moreMedieval History, Matthias Corvinus, History of Hungary, Ottoman History, Early Modern History, Medieval Nobility, Medieval Studies, Polish History, Medieval Church History, Political History, Diplomatics (Medieval), Franciscan Studies, Ottoman Balkans, Medieval Croatian History, Medieval Balkans, Medieval Latin, Southeastern Europe in the Middle Ages, Handbook of Medieval Studies, and Zapolya Familyedit
The aim of the paper is to show how the Ferrarese ducal and Hungarian royal courts organised the entourage of the seven-year-old Ippolito (I) d’Este, who had been invited for the archiepiscopal see of Esztergom in 1486, but only came to... more
The aim of the paper is to show how the Ferrarese ducal and Hungarian royal courts organised the entourage of the seven-year-old Ippolito (I) d’Este, who had been invited for the archiepiscopal see of Esztergom in 1486, but only came to Hungary in the summer of 1487. The inquiry was based on seven drafts that have survived in the State Archives of Modena, and are published, together with two other sources, in the appendix. Having presented the diplomatic negotiations between the two courts and the journey of Ippolito to Hungary, the paper explores separately the Italian delegation that came from Ferrara, part of which remained in Hungary, and the Hungarian court that was set up around the infant prelate by the Hungarian royal couple. The archiepiscopal court set up in 1487 – which in fact was supervised by Ippolito’s aunt, queen Beatrice of Aragon – was served by a mixed Ferrarese, Neapolitan and Hungarian personnel, and for reasons of prestige both courts made serious efforts to appoint persons in great numbers and of high social standing in order to make Ippolito’s court look princely enough. The Hungarian barons and nobles selected to the archiepiscopal court left Esztergom within one and a half year, however, and thereafter the only thing that distinguised it from the households of other Hungarian prelates was the high profile of the Italians serving there. The reasons for these changes may have been twofold: on the one hand, the prestige for the Hungarian elite of serving an infant and foreign archbishop must have been lesser than service in the royal court; on the other hand, maintaining a great representative entourage, which took no part in estate administration, must have presented the archbishopric with an untolerable financial burden.
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According to the general academic consensus, the alispán (vicecomes), who headed the county’s judicial seat, was appointed in the Middle Ages by the ispán (comes comitatus) from the ranks of his own retainers (familiares). Based on an... more
According to the general academic consensus, the alispán (vicecomes), who headed the county’s judicial seat, was appointed in the Middle Ages by the ispán (comes comitatus) from the ranks of his own retainers (familiares). Based on an analysis of relevant sources from the late Middle Ages, the author has come to the conclusion that the demand that the alispán be elected by the county nobility was already put forward at the diet of 1486 while, moreover, in some of the counties it was already working practice upon royal license or the ispán’s authorization. During the Jagiellonian period the election of the alispán by the local nobility could be detected in a growing number of counties, but no general legal regulation was possible on account of the diverging local conditions. In many places the link between the ispán and the alispán loosened and was transformed into a relation of official subordination, which had important social historical consequences: the service of the county became an attractive career option for wealthier nobles as well, a fact which influenced the emergence of the nobility as a separate order.
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The study – mostly on a basis of the unique account books (Kammerbücher, Komorské knihy) of Pressburg (Pozsony/Bratislava) – investigates the issue of taxes paid by the town to the Hungarian king, and the value of military services... more
The study – mostly on a basis of the unique account books (Kammerbücher, Komorské knihy) of Pressburg (Pozsony/Bratislava) – investigates the issue of taxes paid by the town to the Hungarian king, and the value of military services imposed on it by a ruler. The haggling between the town and the royal treasurers over royal tax can be demonstrated on almost annual basis (however, the study examines only the events of the financial year 1489–1490 in detail). According to autor´s reckoning, in these years, two kings, Matthias Corvinus (1458–1490) and Wladislas II. (1490–1516) imposed ten thousand florins on the town, from which the latter – after successful bargaining of the town – received 3 450 florins only. This means that the town paid 493 or – including the value of military services – 518 florins a year on average. But if we exclude the time of the wars of succession between the end of 1490 and the spring of 1492, when the town had to shoulder an extremely heavy fiscal burden (cca. 2 250 florins) on account of the mercenary troops hired to defend the town, and the king accordingly imposed no additional tax on it, we get an average of 610 or 632 florins a year. Taking into consideration the population and financial importance of the town, this sum seems to be rather low. In author's view, this was a consequence of credits levied during the 15th century in the wartime from different creditors (mostly foundations) and thus the town had to pay cca. 350 florins a year as an interest to the creditors in the 1490s. The king and his treasurer generally took this regular obligation into consideration.
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Neumann Tibor–C. Tóth Norbert–Pálosfalvi Tamás: Két évszázad a sztereotípiák fogságában. Helyzetkép a Jagelló-kor kutatásáról. In: Több mint egy csata: Mohács. Az 1526. évi ütközet a magyar tudományos és kulturális emlékezetben. Szerk. Fodor Pál-Varga Szabolcs, közrem. Szőts Zoltán Oszkár. Bp. 2019more
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In the life of the Transylvanian Duke János Zápolya, i.e. the subsequent king János I (1526-1540) – in an indirect way, even in his election for king – the peasant war of 1514 occupied a prominent place. Specifically, he was the nobleman... more
In the life of the Transylvanian Duke János Zápolya, i.e. the subsequent king János I (1526-1540) – in an indirect way, even in his election for king – the peasant war of 1514 occupied a prominent place. Specifically, he was the nobleman who smothered the uprising led by Dózsa György, after which he ordered the execution of the peasant leader whereby, after the year 1514, he was able to present himself on the political stage as a saviour of noblemen and nobility in general. The chronology of events that ultimately led to the collapse of the uprising has long been known in scientific literature. This topic is most thoroughly discussed in the monograph by Fekete Nagy Antal and Barta Gábor from 1973, which, even at first reading, represents a quite realistic view of Zápolya`s activities during those days, i.e. of the events from Transylvania and Timisoara, and which, above all, with one or two exceptions, relies entirely on the same sources that are used by present historians. However, as soon as researchers begin examining these sources with a little more scrutiny, they encounter numerous contentual and logical inconsistencies. It is precisely these inconsistencies that the author of this paper wishes to emphasize, without an intention to examine this topic in its entirety.
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The study deals with castle acquisitions of Imre Perényi – later nádor (palatine) – in the 1490s, on the first hand, about his transactions in Sztropkó and Makovica (today: Stropkov and Zborov, Slovakia). Due to the favourable situation... more
The study deals with castle acquisitions of Imre Perényi – later nádor (palatine) – in the 1490s, on the first hand, about his transactions in Sztropkó and Makovica (today: Stropkov and Zborov, Slovakia). Due to the favourable situation with the written sources we are able to learn more details than usually, so we can get some idea how aristocrats of his circle could finance the purchase of their large possessions. Affairs presented in the article throw some light on the process in which Perényi gradually became a key figure of the Hungarian political life in the Jagellonian period. In other words: his acquisitions of possessions, rising of power and prestige that accompanied purchases can be considered as antecedents of his election as palatine in 1504. Conclusions of the study can support the more exact dating of the castle chapel in Füzér.
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The essay argues that the antecedents of the Crusade of 1514 should be researched not in connection with the journey of Cardinal Bakóc to Rome, but rather with the state of war between the Hungarian Kingdom and the Ottoman Empire evolving... more
The essay argues that the antecedents of the Crusade of 1514 should be researched not in connection with the journey of Cardinal Bakóc to Rome, but rather with the state of war between the Hungarian Kingdom and the Ottoman Empire evolving after Selim became the Sultan, and also with the fall of the castles in Bosnia in 1512 and with the growing indebtedness of the Royal Court. Deploying volunteer crusaders seemed a hopeful possibility for the Royal Court, which had more and more financial difficulties of maintaining armies stationing at the borders. The author states that the crusaders should have attached to the border fortress soldiers
and to the armies of the prelates and magnates having stationed at the borders for long, and they should have tried to restore the situation before 1512. The chief commander of the army was János Szapolyai, Voivod of Transylvania, who had been the Chief Captain of the country for long. His break-in to Bulgaria in May of 1514 may have been a diversionary operation planned for a short period, which was to be followed by a greater attack of the army completed with the crusaders. This was hindered by the change of the crusade to a revolt.
The conclusions of the essay based on the research of new sources and the reexamination of the already known sources are significantly different from the results of the previous researches regarding the events of the Peasants’ War in Transylvania, Bihar and Szilágyság. It is probable that coming back from Bulgaria, János Szapolyai sent a part of his army to help the defense of Temesvár and the border fortresses, and
then marched rapidly to Déva so as to forego Dózsa and his army moving along the river Maros (3–9th of May). When he made sure that Dózsa did not want to go to Transylvania but was preparing for the siege of Temesvár, he closed the valley of
Maros with the other part of his army, and inspected personally the gathering of the Transylvanian armies at Nagyenyed (18th of June). The essay argues that in spite of the
statements of the previous relevant literature, South-Transylvania escaped the turbulence of the war.
The whole of the Transylvanian army could not have been withdrawn from the province as troublesome news came not only from Transylvania about the gathering crusaders but also from Bihar county. In Bihar, Lőrinc priest (prebend of the Saint
Sigismund church in Buda), who directed the recruitment of the crusaders, raided Várad after the batt le at Nagylak, then probably following Dózsa’s command turned towards Transylvania with the aim of dividing Szapolyai’s troops with his break-ins. The armies of the nobles of Szilágyság and Bihar probably took their standing near Királyhágó, so prebend Lőrinc att acked the province making a detour, through
Szilágyság. According to one of the sources, they had their camp near Kolozsvár. The Transylvanian crusader gathering, which is hardly anything known about, could not mean a real danger; however, the army of 4500 crusaders led by prebend Lőrinc did: the forced cooperation of Dés, Kolozsvár and Torda with the rebels can be dated these days. The Transylvanian troops remained in the province finally defeated the army led
by prebend Lőrinc in a heavy batt le sometime between 18th and 26th of July at Szamosfalva near Kolozsvár. The commander did not escape to Várad but to the east,
and was captured with the help of the people of Kolozsvár at the border of Moldva, then was executed like Dózsa in the presence of Szapolyai in Kolozsvár (10th of August). After the batt le at Temesvár (15th of July) Szapolyai sent Pál Tomori, castellan of Fogaras, to clean the region from the small remained parts of the army of prebend Lőrinc. Tomori won a battle at Bihar, which was regarded the last batt le of the peasants’ war. Although according to the Hungarian historical tradition, prebend Lőrinc was captured after the batt le of Bihar, in Zilah in Szilágyság, the author assumes that the
commander did not take part in that batt le, only his troops did.
and to the armies of the prelates and magnates having stationed at the borders for long, and they should have tried to restore the situation before 1512. The chief commander of the army was János Szapolyai, Voivod of Transylvania, who had been the Chief Captain of the country for long. His break-in to Bulgaria in May of 1514 may have been a diversionary operation planned for a short period, which was to be followed by a greater attack of the army completed with the crusaders. This was hindered by the change of the crusade to a revolt.
The conclusions of the essay based on the research of new sources and the reexamination of the already known sources are significantly different from the results of the previous researches regarding the events of the Peasants’ War in Transylvania, Bihar and Szilágyság. It is probable that coming back from Bulgaria, János Szapolyai sent a part of his army to help the defense of Temesvár and the border fortresses, and
then marched rapidly to Déva so as to forego Dózsa and his army moving along the river Maros (3–9th of May). When he made sure that Dózsa did not want to go to Transylvania but was preparing for the siege of Temesvár, he closed the valley of
Maros with the other part of his army, and inspected personally the gathering of the Transylvanian armies at Nagyenyed (18th of June). The essay argues that in spite of the
statements of the previous relevant literature, South-Transylvania escaped the turbulence of the war.
The whole of the Transylvanian army could not have been withdrawn from the province as troublesome news came not only from Transylvania about the gathering crusaders but also from Bihar county. In Bihar, Lőrinc priest (prebend of the Saint
Sigismund church in Buda), who directed the recruitment of the crusaders, raided Várad after the batt le at Nagylak, then probably following Dózsa’s command turned towards Transylvania with the aim of dividing Szapolyai’s troops with his break-ins. The armies of the nobles of Szilágyság and Bihar probably took their standing near Királyhágó, so prebend Lőrinc att acked the province making a detour, through
Szilágyság. According to one of the sources, they had their camp near Kolozsvár. The Transylvanian crusader gathering, which is hardly anything known about, could not mean a real danger; however, the army of 4500 crusaders led by prebend Lőrinc did: the forced cooperation of Dés, Kolozsvár and Torda with the rebels can be dated these days. The Transylvanian troops remained in the province finally defeated the army led
by prebend Lőrinc in a heavy batt le sometime between 18th and 26th of July at Szamosfalva near Kolozsvár. The commander did not escape to Várad but to the east,
and was captured with the help of the people of Kolozsvár at the border of Moldva, then was executed like Dózsa in the presence of Szapolyai in Kolozsvár (10th of August). After the batt le at Temesvár (15th of July) Szapolyai sent Pál Tomori, castellan of Fogaras, to clean the region from the small remained parts of the army of prebend Lőrinc. Tomori won a battle at Bihar, which was regarded the last batt le of the peasants’ war. Although according to the Hungarian historical tradition, prebend Lőrinc was captured after the batt le of Bihar, in Zilah in Szilágyság, the author assumes that the
commander did not take part in that batt le, only his troops did.
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This short paper referring to a charter dated 1504 draws attention to the fact, that the son of King Matthias, John Corvinus had also a son called Matthias. This is the only source that mentions his existence. Prince Matthias was born to... more
This short paper referring to a charter dated 1504 draws attention to the fact, that the son of King Matthias, John
Corvinus had also a son called Matthias. This is the only source that mentions his existence. Prince Matthias was born to this world in the last days of his father’s life or maybe even after his death in October, 1504. According to this newly discovered source surely he was born before the middle of December, and some months later, during the turn of the year 1504-1505 he followed his father to the grave. The choosing of the name is symbolic.
Corvinus had also a son called Matthias. This is the only source that mentions his existence. Prince Matthias was born to this world in the last days of his father’s life or maybe even after his death in October, 1504. According to this newly discovered source surely he was born before the middle of December, and some months later, during the turn of the year 1504-1505 he followed his father to the grave. The choosing of the name is symbolic.
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In September 1490 king Wladislaw II (1490–1516) spent almost two weeks at Székesfehárvár in order to have himself crowned in accordance with tradition. The author, describing the preparations of the ceremony with the help of contemporary... more
In September 1490 king Wladislaw II (1490–1516) spent almost two weeks at Székesfehárvár in order to have himself crowned in accordance with tradition. The author, describing the preparations of the ceremony with the help of contemporary sources, establishes the exact date of the coronation, which
was neither 18 September, generally accepted sofar, nor 21 September given by the contemporary Antonio Bonfini, but the 19th day of the same month; on the other hand, he tries to reconstruct the first acts of the new ruler on the basis of the available charter evidence.
The acts reconstructed from sparse evidence throughout the charters as well as a description of Bonfini prove beyond doubt that parallel to the coronation a general assembly was held at Székesfehérvár, at the end of which, before 1 October, the king confirmed the decrees accepted. They can be divided
into four major groups: 1. confirmation of former legal documents securing noble privileges (such as the golden bull of Andrew II); 2. some of the articles of the decree issued by the royal council after the death of king Mathias (1458–1490), with of course modified deadlines (amnesty, obligation of returning estates
unjustly occupied since the death of the king) – a decree whose existence was also proved by the present article; 3. the conditions of election consented to by Wladislaw in the so-called treaty of Farkashida on 31 July 1490 (among its articles the one concerning the preservation of the Holy Crown could be clearly
identified, others partially reconstructed); 4. articles aimed at making the kingdom fit for a war on several fronts (division of the counties according to the prospective enemies, Germans, Poles or Turks, the obligation of equipping one mounted archer after each 20 peasant plots, convocation of another assembly for 22 May1491.).
Although most of these acts were codified again in1492, after the wars had ended, it could be proved that the great lawbook of 1492, which has been handed down to us by the Corpus Juris as the first decree of Wladislaw II, was in fact only the second, and cannot be regarded as a coronation decree.
was neither 18 September, generally accepted sofar, nor 21 September given by the contemporary Antonio Bonfini, but the 19th day of the same month; on the other hand, he tries to reconstruct the first acts of the new ruler on the basis of the available charter evidence.
The acts reconstructed from sparse evidence throughout the charters as well as a description of Bonfini prove beyond doubt that parallel to the coronation a general assembly was held at Székesfehérvár, at the end of which, before 1 October, the king confirmed the decrees accepted. They can be divided
into four major groups: 1. confirmation of former legal documents securing noble privileges (such as the golden bull of Andrew II); 2. some of the articles of the decree issued by the royal council after the death of king Mathias (1458–1490), with of course modified deadlines (amnesty, obligation of returning estates
unjustly occupied since the death of the king) – a decree whose existence was also proved by the present article; 3. the conditions of election consented to by Wladislaw in the so-called treaty of Farkashida on 31 July 1490 (among its articles the one concerning the preservation of the Holy Crown could be clearly
identified, others partially reconstructed); 4. articles aimed at making the kingdom fit for a war on several fronts (division of the counties according to the prospective enemies, Germans, Poles or Turks, the obligation of equipping one mounted archer after each 20 peasant plots, convocation of another assembly for 22 May1491.).
Although most of these acts were codified again in1492, after the wars had ended, it could be proved that the great lawbook of 1492, which has been handed down to us by the Corpus Juris as the first decree of Wladislaw II, was in fact only the second, and cannot be regarded as a coronation decree.
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"Peace Treaty at Pressburg – General Assembly at Buda. A Chapter of the History of Jagiello-Habsburg Relations (1490–1492) (First Part) by Tibor Neumann (Summary). The peace treaty concluded on 7 November 1491 at Pozsony (Bratislava,... more
"Peace Treaty at Pressburg – General Assembly at Buda. A Chapter of the History of Jagiello-Habsburg Relations (1490–1492) (First Part) by Tibor Neumann (Summary).
The peace treaty concluded on 7 November 1491 at Pozsony (Bratislava, Slovakia) between Wladislaw II, king of Hungary and Bohemia on the one hand, and emperor Frederick and Maximilian, king of the Romans on the other, has traditionally been regarded by Hungarian historiography as an ignominious and humiliating agreement, for the Hungarian side was thought to have made considerable concessions while at the very gate of military victory. This judgement, however, was greatly influenced by the negative attitude towards the allegedly impotent king of Hungary, and towards the whole Jagello period (1490-1526), regarded as an age of decadence. Consequently, the author thought it necessary to return directly to the sources instead of refuting one by one the biased statements of previous historiography. The study follows the Hungaro-German negotiations from the accession of Wladislaw II to the Reichstag of Nurenberg (Autumn 1490-Summer 1491), which can be seen as the preliminaries to the peace of Pressburg. Then it retraces from the Hungarian reoccupation of Fehérvár (July 1491) those political and military events which in a sort immediately led to the conclusionof the peace. The author involved a number of hitherto unused sources, such as the accounts of the town of Pressburg and the reports of the Italian ambassadors, which complete, nuance or even refute traditional views. Whereas the two Habsburg rulers laid a claim to the Hungarian throne after the death of king Matthias in 1490 with reference to the 1463 treaty of Wiener Neustadt, Wladislaw II could refer to his election in July 1490 and his coronation in September. In the course of the negotiations at Vienna and later at Sümeg in the autumn of 1490 the king of the Romans aimed at persuading his opponent to resign the Hungarian throne. Perhaps already at the time of the negotiations held at Magyaróvár at the turn of 1490-1491, but during the Reichstag of Nurenberg at the latest, Maximilian, under pressure because of the attack of Charles VIII of France against Bretagne, was willing to drop this demand, which opened the way for a compromise. Wladislaw II launched his campaign against the Germans in the early summer of 1491. At first Székesfehérvár was taken after a six-week-long siege (25 July 1491). He soon run out of money, however, his mercenaries mutinied, while his own brother, prince John Albert and the Ottomans prepared to attack again. Due to the consequent regrouping of troops, the effective of the army at Fehérvár diminished considerably. Consequently, the campaign lost its momentum, and none of the other conquests of Maximilian in Transdanubia, among them the town of Veszprém, could be regained until the peace was finally made. On the very day Fehérvár was taken, part of the royal mercenary troops was sent to Austria, to be completed by other contingents led by Péter Pogány, ispán (comes) of Pressburg. Although this campaign failed to produce spectacular results, it did manage to secure the strongholds in Hungarian hands, and also caused considerable destruction of the enemy lands. In the meantime, peace talks had been arranged for 24 August to Hainburg upon the initiative of emperor Frederick. In Lower Austria Hungarian dominance lasted until the end of August. The surroundings of Pressburg suffered from several attacks by the German mercenaries thereafter. Negotiations between the belligerants began on 10 September at Hainburg, were continued between 12 and 23 September at Pressburg, yet no compromise was attained. Unfavourable military events, such as the attack of John Albert against Kassa (Kosice, Slovakia), and the counterattack of the German troops started late in September, thus finally forced the Hungarians to accept the basic German demands. In October Hungarian envoys left for Austria to negotiate with the delegates of the emperor and the king of the Romans, and early in November the peace treaty was finally concluded at Pressburg. As part of the long treaty, the Austrian House recognised Wladislaw II as the „unquestionable king of Hungary”,and engaged themselves to restore all the castles still occupied by the Germans (with the exception of the territory along the border, which had been mortgaged to Frederick half a century before). In return, Maximilian was guarenteed that in case of the Hungarian king’s dying heirless, he or his heirs would inherit the Hungarian throne; moreover, Wladislaw resigned the territories he was still holding in the hereditary provinces, and promised to pay 100.000 florins of indemnity. Although the practical consequences of the treaty will be analysed in the second part of the study, it can safely be stated that the treaty of Pressburg was far from humiliating from the Hungarians’ point of view. The king of Hungary, pressed by financial misery, could not pursue a war on several fronts, and the prime condition of peace was exactly the abandoning of all claims to Austrian territories. It has to be emphasised that the Hungarians were very far from victory before the treaty; quite to the contrary, it was the German troops of Frederick and Maximilian which were on the attack in October. Consequently, the demand of an indemnity was not unfounded, and, as we will see later, its payment was not even burdensome for the Hungarian government. That the peace was by no means humiliating is further proved by king Maximilian’s displeasure with what was in fact a work of the emperor’s diplomacy. Indeed, one of our sources emphasises that he could have made a much more advantageous peace a year before. From this point of view, Wladislaw’s summer campaign in 1491 did produce a more favourable situation for making the peace."
The peace treaty concluded on 7 November 1491 at Pozsony (Bratislava, Slovakia) between Wladislaw II, king of Hungary and Bohemia on the one hand, and emperor Frederick and Maximilian, king of the Romans on the other, has traditionally been regarded by Hungarian historiography as an ignominious and humiliating agreement, for the Hungarian side was thought to have made considerable concessions while at the very gate of military victory. This judgement, however, was greatly influenced by the negative attitude towards the allegedly impotent king of Hungary, and towards the whole Jagello period (1490-1526), regarded as an age of decadence. Consequently, the author thought it necessary to return directly to the sources instead of refuting one by one the biased statements of previous historiography. The study follows the Hungaro-German negotiations from the accession of Wladislaw II to the Reichstag of Nurenberg (Autumn 1490-Summer 1491), which can be seen as the preliminaries to the peace of Pressburg. Then it retraces from the Hungarian reoccupation of Fehérvár (July 1491) those political and military events which in a sort immediately led to the conclusionof the peace. The author involved a number of hitherto unused sources, such as the accounts of the town of Pressburg and the reports of the Italian ambassadors, which complete, nuance or even refute traditional views. Whereas the two Habsburg rulers laid a claim to the Hungarian throne after the death of king Matthias in 1490 with reference to the 1463 treaty of Wiener Neustadt, Wladislaw II could refer to his election in July 1490 and his coronation in September. In the course of the negotiations at Vienna and later at Sümeg in the autumn of 1490 the king of the Romans aimed at persuading his opponent to resign the Hungarian throne. Perhaps already at the time of the negotiations held at Magyaróvár at the turn of 1490-1491, but during the Reichstag of Nurenberg at the latest, Maximilian, under pressure because of the attack of Charles VIII of France against Bretagne, was willing to drop this demand, which opened the way for a compromise. Wladislaw II launched his campaign against the Germans in the early summer of 1491. At first Székesfehérvár was taken after a six-week-long siege (25 July 1491). He soon run out of money, however, his mercenaries mutinied, while his own brother, prince John Albert and the Ottomans prepared to attack again. Due to the consequent regrouping of troops, the effective of the army at Fehérvár diminished considerably. Consequently, the campaign lost its momentum, and none of the other conquests of Maximilian in Transdanubia, among them the town of Veszprém, could be regained until the peace was finally made. On the very day Fehérvár was taken, part of the royal mercenary troops was sent to Austria, to be completed by other contingents led by Péter Pogány, ispán (comes) of Pressburg. Although this campaign failed to produce spectacular results, it did manage to secure the strongholds in Hungarian hands, and also caused considerable destruction of the enemy lands. In the meantime, peace talks had been arranged for 24 August to Hainburg upon the initiative of emperor Frederick. In Lower Austria Hungarian dominance lasted until the end of August. The surroundings of Pressburg suffered from several attacks by the German mercenaries thereafter. Negotiations between the belligerants began on 10 September at Hainburg, were continued between 12 and 23 September at Pressburg, yet no compromise was attained. Unfavourable military events, such as the attack of John Albert against Kassa (Kosice, Slovakia), and the counterattack of the German troops started late in September, thus finally forced the Hungarians to accept the basic German demands. In October Hungarian envoys left for Austria to negotiate with the delegates of the emperor and the king of the Romans, and early in November the peace treaty was finally concluded at Pressburg. As part of the long treaty, the Austrian House recognised Wladislaw II as the „unquestionable king of Hungary”,and engaged themselves to restore all the castles still occupied by the Germans (with the exception of the territory along the border, which had been mortgaged to Frederick half a century before). In return, Maximilian was guarenteed that in case of the Hungarian king’s dying heirless, he or his heirs would inherit the Hungarian throne; moreover, Wladislaw resigned the territories he was still holding in the hereditary provinces, and promised to pay 100.000 florins of indemnity. Although the practical consequences of the treaty will be analysed in the second part of the study, it can safely be stated that the treaty of Pressburg was far from humiliating from the Hungarians’ point of view. The king of Hungary, pressed by financial misery, could not pursue a war on several fronts, and the prime condition of peace was exactly the abandoning of all claims to Austrian territories. It has to be emphasised that the Hungarians were very far from victory before the treaty; quite to the contrary, it was the German troops of Frederick and Maximilian which were on the attack in October. Consequently, the demand of an indemnity was not unfounded, and, as we will see later, its payment was not even burdensome for the Hungarian government. That the peace was by no means humiliating is further proved by king Maximilian’s displeasure with what was in fact a work of the emperor’s diplomacy. Indeed, one of our sources emphasises that he could have made a much more advantageous peace a year before. From this point of view, Wladislaw’s summer campaign in 1491 did produce a more favourable situation for making the peace."
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"Peace Treaty at Pressburg – General Assembly at Buda. A Chapter of the History of Jagiello-Habsburg Relations (1490–1492) (Second Part) by Tibor Neumann. The present study offers a comprehensive narrative of diplomatic and political... more
"Peace Treaty at Pressburg – General Assembly at Buda. A Chapter of the History of Jagiello-Habsburg Relations (1490–1492) (Second Part) by Tibor Neumann.
The present study offers a comprehensive narrative of diplomatic and political events which followed the peace treaty of Pozsony of 7 November 1491 until June 1492. The treaty itself was signed by the parties on 23 November at Pozsony, when some minor modifications were inserted into the text. Some days later it was ratified by the Hungarian royal council at Buda, and successively confirmed in the next one and a half months by Wladislaw II, king of Hungary, Maximilian, king of the Romans, and finally emperor Frederick III, whereby it became legally valid. The necessary documents, together with other pieces connected to the treaty, were exchanged by the parties on 20 January at Hainburg. Consequently, the general assembly which Wladislaw II convoked for 2 February 1492 to Buda, had only to deal with the oath to be made by the Hungarian estates about the right of inheritance of Maximilian, and the negotiations concerning the execution of the peace articles. Because of the presence of the army lead by the Polish prince John Albert in North-Eastern Hungary, the withdrawal of the mercenary army which was stationed in Lower Austria had already begun before the treaty was signed. Yet after the victorious battle fought on 1 January at Eperjes (Presov, Slovakia), which closed the period of the struggles for the throne, the process of restoring the castles to the emperor lost its initial momentum. Although most of the castles held by the king of Hungary had been given to the Germans before spring, with a delay of some months only, that of Retz, for example, was only handed over in August 1492. Also somewhat be latedly, yet equally before spring did Maximilian restore his castles in Hungary, and so did Jakab Székely with the strongholds which belonged to his captainship in the Austrian provinces. A greater problem was caused by the castles in Lower Austria, which had been pledged by kings Matthias and Wladislaw II to their mercenary captains; understandably enough, the Hungarian court took no pains to relieve them after 1492. Consequently, in Lower Austria it was quite common in the next decades to refer with regard to individual castles to the fact that the king of Hungary had failed to comply with his obligation to redeem them. The author illustrates with some examples the ways in which the holders of „Hungarian” castles in Austria were able to preserve their lands there. The study devotes most attention to the general assembly which was held in February and March 1492 at Buda. Since some of the barons were late, the discussion of the peace treaty as well as Austro-Hungarian negotiations could not begin before the end of February. The charters issued by the estates about Maximilian’s right of inheritance and their consent to the treaty of Pozsony, which are thoroughly analysed by the author, are dated to 7 March. An examination of the persons in the name of whom the charters were drafted, and of the other documents issued during the assembly, has clearly proved that it was the barons, the prelates and the leading nobility (representing the entire nobility), who decided on 7 March upon the oath demanded by Maximilian and the preparation of the charters of credence. Yet, for obvious reasons, they did not ask the opinion of the nobility, which appeared in great numbers, and only communicated their decision to them later. Yet, notwithstanding the indignation of the Hungarian nobility, the leaders of the Hungarian estates proceeded in complete accordance with the peace treaty of Pozsony during the assembly at Buda. The treaty did not require Maximilian’s right of inheritance to be confirmed by a „parliamentary consent”, nor did it prescribe its enactment in the form of law. The author comes to the conclusion that the Slavonian and Croatian envoys issued a separate charter of credence only because the negotiations between the court and the ban of Croatia and Slavonia, and the Slavonian envoys, who likewise arrived late, could not be completed before 24 March.
As a conclusion, the author emphasises the fact that the peace treaty involved concessions on both parts. Although undeniably resulting in some loss of prestige, the agreement offered for Wladislaw II the possibility of confirming his authority in Hungary, and, having restored the peace with his Christian neighbours, to concentrate his financial means for the sole purpose of anti-Ottoman warfare. Maximilian, for his part, had to content himself with the Lower Austrian territories which had been handed over to the emperor, and with the confirmation of his right of inheritance, while he became completely endebted and the unpaid mercenaries of both parties remained in his lands. He only received part of the war indemnities of 100 000 florins, for the payment of which Wladislaw II had engaged himself, between 1492 and 1496, in small installments. It was not without reason that after the birth of Wladislaw’s son, prince Louis, Maximilian regarded the peace as one from which he had profited very little."
The present study offers a comprehensive narrative of diplomatic and political events which followed the peace treaty of Pozsony of 7 November 1491 until June 1492. The treaty itself was signed by the parties on 23 November at Pozsony, when some minor modifications were inserted into the text. Some days later it was ratified by the Hungarian royal council at Buda, and successively confirmed in the next one and a half months by Wladislaw II, king of Hungary, Maximilian, king of the Romans, and finally emperor Frederick III, whereby it became legally valid. The necessary documents, together with other pieces connected to the treaty, were exchanged by the parties on 20 January at Hainburg. Consequently, the general assembly which Wladislaw II convoked for 2 February 1492 to Buda, had only to deal with the oath to be made by the Hungarian estates about the right of inheritance of Maximilian, and the negotiations concerning the execution of the peace articles. Because of the presence of the army lead by the Polish prince John Albert in North-Eastern Hungary, the withdrawal of the mercenary army which was stationed in Lower Austria had already begun before the treaty was signed. Yet after the victorious battle fought on 1 January at Eperjes (Presov, Slovakia), which closed the period of the struggles for the throne, the process of restoring the castles to the emperor lost its initial momentum. Although most of the castles held by the king of Hungary had been given to the Germans before spring, with a delay of some months only, that of Retz, for example, was only handed over in August 1492. Also somewhat be latedly, yet equally before spring did Maximilian restore his castles in Hungary, and so did Jakab Székely with the strongholds which belonged to his captainship in the Austrian provinces. A greater problem was caused by the castles in Lower Austria, which had been pledged by kings Matthias and Wladislaw II to their mercenary captains; understandably enough, the Hungarian court took no pains to relieve them after 1492. Consequently, in Lower Austria it was quite common in the next decades to refer with regard to individual castles to the fact that the king of Hungary had failed to comply with his obligation to redeem them. The author illustrates with some examples the ways in which the holders of „Hungarian” castles in Austria were able to preserve their lands there. The study devotes most attention to the general assembly which was held in February and March 1492 at Buda. Since some of the barons were late, the discussion of the peace treaty as well as Austro-Hungarian negotiations could not begin before the end of February. The charters issued by the estates about Maximilian’s right of inheritance and their consent to the treaty of Pozsony, which are thoroughly analysed by the author, are dated to 7 March. An examination of the persons in the name of whom the charters were drafted, and of the other documents issued during the assembly, has clearly proved that it was the barons, the prelates and the leading nobility (representing the entire nobility), who decided on 7 March upon the oath demanded by Maximilian and the preparation of the charters of credence. Yet, for obvious reasons, they did not ask the opinion of the nobility, which appeared in great numbers, and only communicated their decision to them later. Yet, notwithstanding the indignation of the Hungarian nobility, the leaders of the Hungarian estates proceeded in complete accordance with the peace treaty of Pozsony during the assembly at Buda. The treaty did not require Maximilian’s right of inheritance to be confirmed by a „parliamentary consent”, nor did it prescribe its enactment in the form of law. The author comes to the conclusion that the Slavonian and Croatian envoys issued a separate charter of credence only because the negotiations between the court and the ban of Croatia and Slavonia, and the Slavonian envoys, who likewise arrived late, could not be completed before 24 March.
As a conclusion, the author emphasises the fact that the peace treaty involved concessions on both parts. Although undeniably resulting in some loss of prestige, the agreement offered for Wladislaw II the possibility of confirming his authority in Hungary, and, having restored the peace with his Christian neighbours, to concentrate his financial means for the sole purpose of anti-Ottoman warfare. Maximilian, for his part, had to content himself with the Lower Austrian territories which had been handed over to the emperor, and with the confirmation of his right of inheritance, while he became completely endebted and the unpaid mercenaries of both parties remained in his lands. He only received part of the war indemnities of 100 000 florins, for the payment of which Wladislaw II had engaged himself, between 1492 and 1496, in small installments. It was not without reason that after the birth of Wladislaw’s son, prince Louis, Maximilian regarded the peace as one from which he had profited very little."
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The present study examines the internal political situation of the Kingdom of Hungary between 1493 and 1496 through the example of a conflict opposing the two most powerful magnates of the realm, palatine István Szapolyai, count of... more
The present study examines the internal political situation of the Kingdom of Hungary between 1493 and 1496 through the example of a conflict opposing the two most powerful magnates
of the realm, palatine István Szapolyai, count of Szepes (today Spiš, Slovakia), and János Corvin, illegitimate son of king Matthias and then duke of Liptó. At the root of the conflict between the two
aristocrats lay a promise whereby upon the death of his father (6 April 1490) Corvin, still in the hope of obtaining the royal throne, had engaged himself to reimburse Szapolyai, then captain-in-chief of Austria, for the expenses and damages he had incurred in the defence of Vienna and the Duchy of Austria. Yet reimbursement failed to come along, and thus late in 1493 the count decided to take by way of force the castles of the Duchy of Liptó, which lay in the vicinity of his own estates and had been ascribed to him by the duke as a cover for his debts. The author devotes a separate chapter to the emergence of the Duchy of Liptó. This area in the northwestern corner of the Kingdom of Hungary had originally been held by the Polish Peter Komorowsky from the 1450s, with the comital title after 1468/69, until its confiscation by king Matthias in 1474. By 1479 at the latest Corvin had been accorded the ducal title. The Duchy comprised before all the castles of Likava (today Likavka and Árva (Oravský Podzámok), and the ispánates of Liptó and Árva counties. In the 1480s king Matthias also granted to his son the castles of Szklabinya (Sklabina) and Bajmóc (Bojnice), and the ispánates of Turóc and Nyitra counties that were attached to them. This territory which thus extended to four counties was administered in the name of Corvin by Máté Kiss of Cece as governor of the Duchy until his death in 1490.
Since after 1490 the duke was pressured by the growing burden of his debts into mortgaging three among his castles there to his own retainers, the palatine set about the validation of his claims
by taking Bajmóc in Nyitra county at the turn of 1493/94 in a way described minutiously in the present study. Through an analysis of the consequent events and the baronial groupings which played a role therein the author has come to the conclusion that early in 1493 a strong aristocratic opposition was formed against king Wladislaw II, who aimed to cut short his dependence from the
old barons of Matthias. The new coalition was headed at first by István Báthori, who had been removed from the voevodship of Transylvania at the beginning of 1493, and, after his death in June
1493, by Szapolyai himself, whose strongest allies were duke Lõrinc Újlaki and the renowned captain of king Matthias, Pál Kinizsi, then ispán of Temes. Under intense pressure from his baronial oppponents, the king’s rule ushered in a crisis in 1493–1494, one of the symptoms of which was the series of private wars which were fought then. This lay in the background of the secret treaty that Wladislaw II entered into with his own brother, the king of Poland, in the course of the Jagiellonian summit held at Lõcse (April-May 1494), which was directed in general against their respective disobedient subjects, but probably more concretely targeted at Szapolyai, whose lands lay along the
border between the two kingdoms. In order to buttress his own position at home, the king launched a brief campaign against the Ottomans in the autumn of 1494, and, upon hearing the news of
Kinizsi’s death, turned his army against the southern castles of duke Lõrinc Újlaki, the closest ally of palatine Szapolyai (November 1494–March 1495). The defeat inflicted upon the duke left palatine Szapolyai completely isolated, and with no other choice than to make peace with the king, which in fact happened in May 1495. The domestic political situation was consolidated thereby, and the palatine remained faithful to the ruler until his death in 1499.
Although in May 1495 the king did acknowledge the acquisitions and claims of Szapolyai with regard to the Duchy of Liptó, Corvin, who back in the summer of 1494 had been forced to ascribe the
castles of the Duchy to Szapolyai, profited from the weakening position of the palatine to withhold the castles of Likava and Árva. In the second half of 1495, fearing that the palatine would take the
two castles by assault, Corvin recruited mercenaries in Poland to thus strengthen his castles. Yet in the ensuing conflict the king took sides with Szapolyai, and launched an expedition against the ducal castles in Liptó on account of the induction of the Polish mercenaries. The expedition was led by the palatine himself, whose troops joined battle with the Poles sometime before 2 March 1496. Although the palatine emerged victorious, the castles continued to be garrisoned by Polish soldiers. Since in
the meantime duke Corvin had begun to intrigue against the royal court in Croatia, Wladislaw decided to suspend the operations in the north, and soon entered into a temporary settlement with
Corvin. Consequently, the two castles did not pass onto the hands of Szapolyai. The Polish mercenaries were eventually indemnified and paid by two retainers of Corvin, András and Mihály Horvát of Lomnica, who thereby retained the two castles by right of pledge. Likava and Árva were finally redeemed from the Horvát brothers by the widow and sons of István Szapolyai after the death
of Corvin and with the permission of his widow, Beatrix Frangepán, after 1505.
of the realm, palatine István Szapolyai, count of Szepes (today Spiš, Slovakia), and János Corvin, illegitimate son of king Matthias and then duke of Liptó. At the root of the conflict between the two
aristocrats lay a promise whereby upon the death of his father (6 April 1490) Corvin, still in the hope of obtaining the royal throne, had engaged himself to reimburse Szapolyai, then captain-in-chief of Austria, for the expenses and damages he had incurred in the defence of Vienna and the Duchy of Austria. Yet reimbursement failed to come along, and thus late in 1493 the count decided to take by way of force the castles of the Duchy of Liptó, which lay in the vicinity of his own estates and had been ascribed to him by the duke as a cover for his debts. The author devotes a separate chapter to the emergence of the Duchy of Liptó. This area in the northwestern corner of the Kingdom of Hungary had originally been held by the Polish Peter Komorowsky from the 1450s, with the comital title after 1468/69, until its confiscation by king Matthias in 1474. By 1479 at the latest Corvin had been accorded the ducal title. The Duchy comprised before all the castles of Likava (today Likavka and Árva (Oravský Podzámok), and the ispánates of Liptó and Árva counties. In the 1480s king Matthias also granted to his son the castles of Szklabinya (Sklabina) and Bajmóc (Bojnice), and the ispánates of Turóc and Nyitra counties that were attached to them. This territory which thus extended to four counties was administered in the name of Corvin by Máté Kiss of Cece as governor of the Duchy until his death in 1490.
Since after 1490 the duke was pressured by the growing burden of his debts into mortgaging three among his castles there to his own retainers, the palatine set about the validation of his claims
by taking Bajmóc in Nyitra county at the turn of 1493/94 in a way described minutiously in the present study. Through an analysis of the consequent events and the baronial groupings which played a role therein the author has come to the conclusion that early in 1493 a strong aristocratic opposition was formed against king Wladislaw II, who aimed to cut short his dependence from the
old barons of Matthias. The new coalition was headed at first by István Báthori, who had been removed from the voevodship of Transylvania at the beginning of 1493, and, after his death in June
1493, by Szapolyai himself, whose strongest allies were duke Lõrinc Újlaki and the renowned captain of king Matthias, Pál Kinizsi, then ispán of Temes. Under intense pressure from his baronial oppponents, the king’s rule ushered in a crisis in 1493–1494, one of the symptoms of which was the series of private wars which were fought then. This lay in the background of the secret treaty that Wladislaw II entered into with his own brother, the king of Poland, in the course of the Jagiellonian summit held at Lõcse (April-May 1494), which was directed in general against their respective disobedient subjects, but probably more concretely targeted at Szapolyai, whose lands lay along the
border between the two kingdoms. In order to buttress his own position at home, the king launched a brief campaign against the Ottomans in the autumn of 1494, and, upon hearing the news of
Kinizsi’s death, turned his army against the southern castles of duke Lõrinc Újlaki, the closest ally of palatine Szapolyai (November 1494–March 1495). The defeat inflicted upon the duke left palatine Szapolyai completely isolated, and with no other choice than to make peace with the king, which in fact happened in May 1495. The domestic political situation was consolidated thereby, and the palatine remained faithful to the ruler until his death in 1499.
Although in May 1495 the king did acknowledge the acquisitions and claims of Szapolyai with regard to the Duchy of Liptó, Corvin, who back in the summer of 1494 had been forced to ascribe the
castles of the Duchy to Szapolyai, profited from the weakening position of the palatine to withhold the castles of Likava and Árva. In the second half of 1495, fearing that the palatine would take the
two castles by assault, Corvin recruited mercenaries in Poland to thus strengthen his castles. Yet in the ensuing conflict the king took sides with Szapolyai, and launched an expedition against the ducal castles in Liptó on account of the induction of the Polish mercenaries. The expedition was led by the palatine himself, whose troops joined battle with the Poles sometime before 2 March 1496. Although the palatine emerged victorious, the castles continued to be garrisoned by Polish soldiers. Since in
the meantime duke Corvin had begun to intrigue against the royal court in Croatia, Wladislaw decided to suspend the operations in the north, and soon entered into a temporary settlement with
Corvin. Consequently, the two castles did not pass onto the hands of Szapolyai. The Polish mercenaries were eventually indemnified and paid by two retainers of Corvin, András and Mihály Horvát of Lomnica, who thereby retained the two castles by right of pledge. Likava and Árva were finally redeemed from the Horvát brothers by the widow and sons of István Szapolyai after the death
of Corvin and with the permission of his widow, Beatrix Frangepán, after 1505.
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The aim of this study is to explain the reasons of the governmental reform, which took place in January 1493, when Hungarian and Bohemian King Wladislaw II and his court decided to replace the leading dignitaries of the southern border... more
The aim of this study is to explain the reasons of the governmental reform, which took place in January 1493, when Hungarian and Bohemian King Wladislaw II and his court decided to replace the leading dignitaries of the southern border defence system of the Hungarian Kingdom appointed by King Matthias (or at least reduce their power by appointing a partner for every dignitary). At first he launched an extensive political campaign against Stephen Bátori, Voivode of Transylvania, who was the most powerful baron of the kingdom and the hero of the wars of succession (1490–1492). The official explanation of the royal propaganda – invoking the libel of the Szeklers – was that Bátori often abused his power: the author therefore presents the events of Bátori’s campaign
against the Szeklers (in autumn 1492). Wladislaw appointed two new voivodes, then he dismissed the Ban of Slavonia, too. According to a letter issued in May 1493, he tried to reduce the power of Paul Kinizsi, comes of Temes and general captain of the Lower Parts as well. The author assumes that a league of barons led by Bátori, then Palatine Stephen Szapolyai managed to avoid this attempt. Wladislaw could overcome this league of barons only after the death of Kinizsi in 1494/1495.
against the Szeklers (in autumn 1492). Wladislaw appointed two new voivodes, then he dismissed the Ban of Slavonia, too. According to a letter issued in May 1493, he tried to reduce the power of Paul Kinizsi, comes of Temes and general captain of the Lower Parts as well. The author assumes that a league of barons led by Bátori, then Palatine Stephen Szapolyai managed to avoid this attempt. Wladislaw could overcome this league of barons only after the death of Kinizsi in 1494/1495.
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The study presents the political activity of Bartholomew Drágfi between 1490 and 1501, the year of his death. Following the death of King Matthias, Drágfi joined the widow queen and the group of aristocrats around her, and took part in... more
The study presents the political activity of Bartholomew Drágfi between 1490 and 1501, the year of his death. Following the death of King Matthias, Drágfi joined the widow queen and the group of aristocrats around her, and took part in the defeat of Matthias's illegitimate son, Prince John Corvinus, in the battle of Csontmező. Thanks to this, Wladislas II, elected King of Hungary (1490-1516), following his coronation in September appointed him Master of chamberlains (magister cubiculariorum), then later Ispán of Chamber (comes camararum) of Baia Mare (Nagybánya). The authos presents the events that happened in the beginning of 1493, which led to the appointment of Drágfi and magister tavernicorum regalium Ladislaus Losonczi as Voiovodes of Transylvania. Drágfi and Losonczi were voivodes together for one year and a half, but they only resided in their province in times of war. Soon serious conflicts started between the two voivodes and the groups formed arount them, for which reason Wladislas II - who visited Transylvania for the first and last time - dismissed Losonczi in Sibiu (Nagyszeben) in September 1494. Drágfi, who was now alone Voivode of Transylvania, became the country's most powerful politician and military baron until his dismissal in 1498. At the turn of 1494-1495, he was also in charge of the campaign against Duke Laurence Újlaki in the southern territories, and as voivode, he took part in several military actions, for example he was leader of the campaign initiated to help Moldova in 1497. The study presents the sources which led to Drágfi's dismissal and resignation. The precise reason of this is as yet unknown, but Drágfi had serious disagreements with the estates of Transylvania as early as 1496. The author analyzes the period of double voivodate, Drágfi's activity as a voivode, presents his marriages and his land acquisition strategy involved. Drágfi died on 26 October 1501, and it was because of his activity in the Jagellonian age that Wladislas II appointed Drágfi's sons permanent barons in 1507, and both he and his son, Louis II, granted them several baronial and territorial offices.
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This study takes a look at the history of the castle of Tata in the decades after the death of king Matthias (1458-1490). The history of the castle at that time was closely linked with the history of Komárom: before his death king... more
This study takes a look at the history of the castle of Tata in the decades after the death of king Matthias (1458-1490). The history of the castle at that time was closely linked with the history of Komárom: before his death king Matthias mortgaged the two castles to his illegitimate child Prince John Corvin, which was confirmed by the parliament in 1490 and thus the new king Wladislas II (1490-1516) was obliged to accept it. The author
- contrary to the previous theories - concluded that the prince owned the two castles until March 1493 but then he gave them over for free, as part of a political deal with king Wladislas II, who found it important to take over Tata and Komárom castles personally.
The castle of Tata had its second heyday during the reign of king Wladislas: the monarch stayed in Buda much more than his predecessors and quite often visited Tata and its surroundings especially for recreation and hunting. So far we have information about 10 of his visíts and although the only time that he stayed for months was during the parliamentary session in 1510, presumably he did not only visit the castle in transit but sometimes spent one or two weeks there. The monarch’s affiliation towards Tata is indicated by the renovation of the castle as well. Further studies will probably increase the number of visits later on. As far as we know right now King Wladislas
II’s son Louis II (1516-1526) only stopped by at the castle twice during his travels. The management of the two castles was not the responsibility of the provisor of Buda Castle - as opposed to the earlier practice - but of the king’s confidents, the castellan of both castles who were the comes of Komárom County at the same time. The political gravity of the two castles was augmented by the fact that the number of royal castles had dropped by the Jagiellon era. Their manors, on the other hand, gained significant importance for the court. The study also introduces the reeves of Komárom and Tata in the era. The most influential were the two Korlátkövi’s, Osvát and his son, as
well as seneschal Peter, one of the key figures of the politics in the era. They ruled the castle for almost three decades (1498-1526). The renaissance coat of arms carving in the castle museum of Tata, which is dated between 1498 and 1515 by the author, is a token of their presence.
The three appendices at the end of the study are about Prince John Corvin’s itinerary between 1490 and 1493 and the two Jagiellon kings’ stays in Tata as well as the great reeves of the era.
- contrary to the previous theories - concluded that the prince owned the two castles until March 1493 but then he gave them over for free, as part of a political deal with king Wladislas II, who found it important to take over Tata and Komárom castles personally.
The castle of Tata had its second heyday during the reign of king Wladislas: the monarch stayed in Buda much more than his predecessors and quite often visited Tata and its surroundings especially for recreation and hunting. So far we have information about 10 of his visíts and although the only time that he stayed for months was during the parliamentary session in 1510, presumably he did not only visit the castle in transit but sometimes spent one or two weeks there. The monarch’s affiliation towards Tata is indicated by the renovation of the castle as well. Further studies will probably increase the number of visits later on. As far as we know right now King Wladislas
II’s son Louis II (1516-1526) only stopped by at the castle twice during his travels. The management of the two castles was not the responsibility of the provisor of Buda Castle - as opposed to the earlier practice - but of the king’s confidents, the castellan of both castles who were the comes of Komárom County at the same time. The political gravity of the two castles was augmented by the fact that the number of royal castles had dropped by the Jagiellon era. Their manors, on the other hand, gained significant importance for the court. The study also introduces the reeves of Komárom and Tata in the era. The most influential were the two Korlátkövi’s, Osvát and his son, as
well as seneschal Peter, one of the key figures of the politics in the era. They ruled the castle for almost three decades (1498-1526). The renaissance coat of arms carving in the castle museum of Tata, which is dated between 1498 and 1515 by the author, is a token of their presence.
The three appendices at the end of the study are about Prince John Corvin’s itinerary between 1490 and 1493 and the two Jagiellon kings’ stays in Tata as well as the great reeves of the era.
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"The instruction given by Ferdinand I (1526–1564) to András Bátori, voevode of Transylvania, in 1552, by which the king authorised the voevode to grant away freely the smaller estates (that is, within 20 tenant sessions) which devolved... more
"The instruction given by Ferdinand I (1526–1564) to András Bátori, voevode of Transylvania, in 1552, by which the king authorised the voevode to grant away freely the smaller estates (that is, within 20 tenant sessions) which devolved upon the Crown in Transylvania, has long been known and cited in the historiography. What is still unknown is since when the voevodes had enjoyed such an authority. According to the author, the
first voevode to acquire the royal right to make landed donations was János Szapolyai (1510–1526), later king of Hungary as John I (1526–1540). He seems to have been given the right as a com- pensation after the spring of 1519, when, upon the death of Imre Perényi, István Bátori, ispán of Temes was elected as palatine instead of János Szapolyai himself. The limit of his donational authority was initially 400 tenant sessions, but it seems to have been curtailed shortly thereafter, for already in 1521 and 1523 the voevode only made donations which extended to much smaller estates (the study offers a detailed analysis of the not too many surviving sources). It has to be emphasised, however, that the donational authority of the voevode was not an organic outgrowth of Transylvanian constitutional development, but was tailored instead to the person of the richest Hungarian magnate, voevode János Szapolyai, and thus further contributed to the emerging princely „aura” which surrounded the voevode, anyway of royal blood on his mother’s side. Since so far no donation of land made by any of the voevodes in the period between 1526 and 1552 has come to light, it is open to doubt whether during the wording of the 1552 instruction the right once granted to Szapolyai was used as a precedent. It is thus pos-sible that it is in fact the donational right enjoyed by the royal commissionaries – among them the captain-general András Bátori –, who were sent by king Ferdinand to Transylva-nia in 1551, and the experience gained from their activity there, which should account for the subsequent authority granted to Bátori himself. It is certain that not only he but also his successors, Ferenc Kendi and István Dobó, exerted the right of donation."
first voevode to acquire the royal right to make landed donations was János Szapolyai (1510–1526), later king of Hungary as John I (1526–1540). He seems to have been given the right as a com- pensation after the spring of 1519, when, upon the death of Imre Perényi, István Bátori, ispán of Temes was elected as palatine instead of János Szapolyai himself. The limit of his donational authority was initially 400 tenant sessions, but it seems to have been curtailed shortly thereafter, for already in 1521 and 1523 the voevode only made donations which extended to much smaller estates (the study offers a detailed analysis of the not too many surviving sources). It has to be emphasised, however, that the donational authority of the voevode was not an organic outgrowth of Transylvanian constitutional development, but was tailored instead to the person of the richest Hungarian magnate, voevode János Szapolyai, and thus further contributed to the emerging princely „aura” which surrounded the voevode, anyway of royal blood on his mother’s side. Since so far no donation of land made by any of the voevodes in the period between 1526 and 1552 has come to light, it is open to doubt whether during the wording of the 1552 instruction the right once granted to Szapolyai was used as a precedent. It is thus pos-sible that it is in fact the donational right enjoyed by the royal commissionaries – among them the captain-general András Bátori –, who were sent by king Ferdinand to Transylva-nia in 1551, and the experience gained from their activity there, which should account for the subsequent authority granted to Bátori himself. It is certain that not only he but also his successors, Ferenc Kendi and István Dobó, exerted the right of donation."
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Donations of Land of Captain Generals and Commanders in Chieg in Hungary in the 15th and 16th Centuries. This study calls attention to an interesting, hitherto unknown phenomenon. Notably, that in the 15–16 century Hungary, during... more
Donations of Land of Captain Generals and Commanders in Chieg in Hungary in the 15th and 16th Centuries.
This study calls attention to an interesting, hitherto unknown phenomenon. Notably, that in the 15–16 century Hungary, during periods of civil war, the ruler or the competing rulers often provided their military commanders with the royal rights of donating lands and pardon for disloyalty on behalf of their ruler. These rights significantly enhanced the commanders’ prestige and efficiency. It seems that this practice had become customary as early as the middle ages. The first examples had turned up during the 1403 revolt against King Sigismund of Luxemburg (1387–1437), but it became common during the period of legitimacy struggle following the death of Matthias Corvinus (1458–1490). The custom lingered on even following the 1526 Battle of Mohács, during the power struggle of the two Hungarian kings, John (János) Szapolyai (1526–1540) and Ferdinand of Habsburg (1526–1564). The only difference was that in that period the rights were assigned to Ferdinand’s foreign commanders in chief in Hungary. This indicates that although in many respects 1526 can rightly be considered a turning point in the life of the Kingdom of Hungary, even that of Central Europe, it did not bring about decisive or prompt change in Hungary’s jurisdiction and customary law. The study ends with 21 Latin-written charters concerning the donations of land between 1403 and 1552.
This study calls attention to an interesting, hitherto unknown phenomenon. Notably, that in the 15–16 century Hungary, during periods of civil war, the ruler or the competing rulers often provided their military commanders with the royal rights of donating lands and pardon for disloyalty on behalf of their ruler. These rights significantly enhanced the commanders’ prestige and efficiency. It seems that this practice had become customary as early as the middle ages. The first examples had turned up during the 1403 revolt against King Sigismund of Luxemburg (1387–1437), but it became common during the period of legitimacy struggle following the death of Matthias Corvinus (1458–1490). The custom lingered on even following the 1526 Battle of Mohács, during the power struggle of the two Hungarian kings, John (János) Szapolyai (1526–1540) and Ferdinand of Habsburg (1526–1564). The only difference was that in that period the rights were assigned to Ferdinand’s foreign commanders in chief in Hungary. This indicates that although in many respects 1526 can rightly be considered a turning point in the life of the Kingdom of Hungary, even that of Central Europe, it did not bring about decisive or prompt change in Hungary’s jurisdiction and customary law. The study ends with 21 Latin-written charters concerning the donations of land between 1403 and 1552.
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Troublesome Historical Period in Szabolcs, Szatmár and Bereg Counties (1490-1492). Summary. The essay deals with the struggles for the throne in Szabolcs, Szatmár and Bereg counties after the death of King Mathias (1490–1492). There are... more
Troublesome Historical Period in Szabolcs, Szatmár and Bereg Counties (1490-1492). Summary.
The essay deals with the struggles for the throne in Szabolcs, Szatmár and Bereg counties after the death of King Mathias (1490–1492). There are few sources related to the local events of the war between Wladislas II, Hungarian and Czech king and his
brother, Jan Albert Polish prince. There is only a much later account by Lodovico Tubero about the events, when the troops of the prince marauded some of the domains of Voivod István Bátori as a revenge. There is one thing for certain: the chief captain of Jan Albert, Benedek Borsos, erected a fortress at Eszeny in Szabolcs county (today it is in the Ukraine) in the end of 1490. He addressed the noblemen of the county from the fort and urged them to join his master, the Polish pretender. He was able to convince one of the wealthiest landlords, János Perényi, and some of the noblemen of Bereg county. A branch of the Várdai family, faithful to King Ulaslo, gave up the domains of the other branch of the family to the prince. The castle of Kisvárda and the lands belonging to it thus became the property of the Jan Albert, who granted the domain to his faithful man, Miklós Lapispataki. The peace treaty of Kassa (today: Kosice, Slovakia) signed on the 20th of February 1491 restored all property to the original owners, so no major changes in the structure of the land ownership took place
as a result of the war of succession in the three counties. The donations made by King Wladislas early in 1491 could not take effect either. He wanted to confiscate the domains of the landlords of Szabolcs county who had allegedly joined Jan Albert during the winter campaign (János Lőkös Kállai, Albert Parlagi and the Gúti family) and give the lands to his own supporters. The author uses the examples of Chamberlain Bertalan Drágfi
and Ferenc Jakcs, who occupied the castle of Kovászó to illustrate the general situation during the war of succession. A decision of a royal court returned the castle and the whole domain to its original owner, Miklós Matucsinai in 1492.
The essay deals with the struggles for the throne in Szabolcs, Szatmár and Bereg counties after the death of King Mathias (1490–1492). There are few sources related to the local events of the war between Wladislas II, Hungarian and Czech king and his
brother, Jan Albert Polish prince. There is only a much later account by Lodovico Tubero about the events, when the troops of the prince marauded some of the domains of Voivod István Bátori as a revenge. There is one thing for certain: the chief captain of Jan Albert, Benedek Borsos, erected a fortress at Eszeny in Szabolcs county (today it is in the Ukraine) in the end of 1490. He addressed the noblemen of the county from the fort and urged them to join his master, the Polish pretender. He was able to convince one of the wealthiest landlords, János Perényi, and some of the noblemen of Bereg county. A branch of the Várdai family, faithful to King Ulaslo, gave up the domains of the other branch of the family to the prince. The castle of Kisvárda and the lands belonging to it thus became the property of the Jan Albert, who granted the domain to his faithful man, Miklós Lapispataki. The peace treaty of Kassa (today: Kosice, Slovakia) signed on the 20th of February 1491 restored all property to the original owners, so no major changes in the structure of the land ownership took place
as a result of the war of succession in the three counties. The donations made by King Wladislas early in 1491 could not take effect either. He wanted to confiscate the domains of the landlords of Szabolcs county who had allegedly joined Jan Albert during the winter campaign (János Lőkös Kállai, Albert Parlagi and the Gúti family) and give the lands to his own supporters. The author uses the examples of Chamberlain Bertalan Drágfi
and Ferenc Jakcs, who occupied the castle of Kovászó to illustrate the general situation during the war of succession. A decision of a royal court returned the castle and the whole domain to its original owner, Miklós Matucsinai in 1492.
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The Roll of Lucrum Camerae of the Tramontane District of Nyitra County from 1452. From 1452 a tax roll has come down to us from one of the districts of Nyitra county, called Tramontane in the early modern age. The source cannot be... more
The Roll of Lucrum Camerae of the Tramontane District of Nyitra County from 1452.
From 1452 a tax roll has come down to us from one of the districts of Nyitra county, called Tramontane in the early modern age. The source cannot be regarded as fragmentary, it seems that the official was sent to collect the tax from this district alone.The tax roll is a source of exceptional importance with regard to the history of the area bordering Moravia, which, in consequence of the small number of noble estates here, is rather badly documented. Although the document in question reflects the situation at a given moment of time, the analysis was aimed at describing the historical development of the region, as well as the social and political changes which followed the extinction of the Stibor family which had owned wide stretches of the district prior to 1434. The author also tried to evaluate the advantages and setbacks of the tax roll with regard to an analysis of local noble society. Viewed from the town of Nyitra, the district was in fact the part of the county beyond the river Vág (Vah), complemented by the settlements connected by the road from Nyitra (Nitra) to Galgóc (Hlohovce, Slovakia), and the castellany of Temetvény. The latter was probably incorporated into the district in order to have the two estates of the Újlaki family (Galgóc and Temetvény) in the same district. One of the hypotheses formulated by the author is that the district was formed out of two separate geographical areas, one of which, along the river Vág, had belonged to the county of Nyitra from the outset, whereas the other, beyond the White Carpathes, seems to have originally been part of Pozsony (Pressburg) county until the early 14th century. According to the author the definitive territorial formation of the districts within the county of Nyitra can be put to the end of the 14th century. The paper presents the changes which followed the death of Stibor the younger in1434, the new lords of the castellanies and the noble familiares
who arrived with them from different regions of the country (Abaúj, Csanád, Fejér, Sáros). A separate subchapter demonstrates that in the years of civil strife the land grants and pledges of the barons made in favour of their retainers frequently remained dead letter, despite the fact that according to contemporary legal custom they were followed by royal confirmation and/or regular introduction into the estate. Upon comparison of the information furnished by the tax roll with other contemporary sources it appeared that in 1452 the basis of tax-paying was the inhabited parcel without regard to its appurtenances, whereas unlanded tenants having vineyards and a parcel were counted as a half session. The numbers of the roll seem exact, but in the case of some villages it appears that the destructions caused by the civil war considerably diminished the number of taxable tenancies. Eight settlements are missing from the register, presumably in consequence of various exemptions. It should be emphasised that in the case of villages with several lords only one of them is listed, so many noblemen cannot be found in the list. The author analysed separately those villages which became uninhabited in the coming decades. These were the settlements of the smallest number of population in 1452, and became uninhabited presumably in consequence of the economic interests of their lords. The annex of the paper gives the full text of the tax roll, which is complemented by a list containing the actual Slovak and Hungarian names of the localities concerned.
From 1452 a tax roll has come down to us from one of the districts of Nyitra county, called Tramontane in the early modern age. The source cannot be regarded as fragmentary, it seems that the official was sent to collect the tax from this district alone.The tax roll is a source of exceptional importance with regard to the history of the area bordering Moravia, which, in consequence of the small number of noble estates here, is rather badly documented. Although the document in question reflects the situation at a given moment of time, the analysis was aimed at describing the historical development of the region, as well as the social and political changes which followed the extinction of the Stibor family which had owned wide stretches of the district prior to 1434. The author also tried to evaluate the advantages and setbacks of the tax roll with regard to an analysis of local noble society. Viewed from the town of Nyitra, the district was in fact the part of the county beyond the river Vág (Vah), complemented by the settlements connected by the road from Nyitra (Nitra) to Galgóc (Hlohovce, Slovakia), and the castellany of Temetvény. The latter was probably incorporated into the district in order to have the two estates of the Újlaki family (Galgóc and Temetvény) in the same district. One of the hypotheses formulated by the author is that the district was formed out of two separate geographical areas, one of which, along the river Vág, had belonged to the county of Nyitra from the outset, whereas the other, beyond the White Carpathes, seems to have originally been part of Pozsony (Pressburg) county until the early 14th century. According to the author the definitive territorial formation of the districts within the county of Nyitra can be put to the end of the 14th century. The paper presents the changes which followed the death of Stibor the younger in1434, the new lords of the castellanies and the noble familiares
who arrived with them from different regions of the country (Abaúj, Csanád, Fejér, Sáros). A separate subchapter demonstrates that in the years of civil strife the land grants and pledges of the barons made in favour of their retainers frequently remained dead letter, despite the fact that according to contemporary legal custom they were followed by royal confirmation and/or regular introduction into the estate. Upon comparison of the information furnished by the tax roll with other contemporary sources it appeared that in 1452 the basis of tax-paying was the inhabited parcel without regard to its appurtenances, whereas unlanded tenants having vineyards and a parcel were counted as a half session. The numbers of the roll seem exact, but in the case of some villages it appears that the destructions caused by the civil war considerably diminished the number of taxable tenancies. Eight settlements are missing from the register, presumably in consequence of various exemptions. It should be emphasised that in the case of villages with several lords only one of them is listed, so many noblemen cannot be found in the list. The author analysed separately those villages which became uninhabited in the coming decades. These were the settlements of the smallest number of population in 1452, and became uninhabited presumably in consequence of the economic interests of their lords. The annex of the paper gives the full text of the tax roll, which is complemented by a list containing the actual Slovak and Hungarian names of the localities concerned.
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""""ONE-PLOT NOBLEMAN”. ON THE INTERPRETATION OF A MEDIEVAL CONCEPT The expression of “one-plot noblemen” (nobiles unius sessionis) is liable to frequent misinterpretation in the Hungarian scholarly literature. The group designated with... more
""""ONE-PLOT NOBLEMAN”. ON THE INTERPRETATION OF A MEDIEVAL CONCEPT
The expression of “one-plot noblemen” (nobiles unius sessionis) is liable to frequent misinterpretation in the Hungarian scholarly literature. The group designated with the term is generally thought to have been a separate social layer at the bottom of the noble class, and its member are consequently also frequently referred to as landless, poor or peasant nobles. They are normally percieved as having enjoyed full noble rights, but only managed one single noble plot of land. The author, however, demonstrates with the help of late medieval legal texts that the expression, which turns up in Hungary for the first time in 1463, was in fact a synonym for “nobleman having no tenants” (nobilis iobagiones non habens), which occurs fairly frequently from 1397 on. Thus, such a nobleman could possess several noble plots, and even a deserted peasant plot, but, at the moment when the tax was levied, he had no peasant plot liable to taxation. Moreover, not only persons enjoying “full” or “general” nobility were rated among them, but also other possessors of land who had no peasant tenants, such as the so-called prediales, who were subjected to ecclesiastical authority, or the “castle nobles” who were attached legally to a given castle.
Now, what was the common feature which linked these social groups of various legal status to each other? It is certainly conspicuous that the laws only regulated the modes of their taxation and military service. The reason which underlay this is that the basis for taxation and recruitment was precisely the inhabited tenant plot, and thus, in the case of this group, only the person itself or his noble plot could be burdened with the tax. Consequently, the expression of “one-plot noblemen” is merely a contemporary term of taxation, the exact content of which, emerging in the course of taxation, could perhaps depend on the will of the taxpayer himself, but which by no means designated a separate layer of society. It has to be added that, thanks to their fluctuating fortunes, some poorer noble families were variably listed among the one-plot noblemen and those with a few tenant peasants, which means that in their case it would perhaps be more salutary to speak about petty/inferior nobility (nobiles minores/inferiores), an expression also warranted by the contemporary legal texts.""""
The expression of “one-plot noblemen” (nobiles unius sessionis) is liable to frequent misinterpretation in the Hungarian scholarly literature. The group designated with the term is generally thought to have been a separate social layer at the bottom of the noble class, and its member are consequently also frequently referred to as landless, poor or peasant nobles. They are normally percieved as having enjoyed full noble rights, but only managed one single noble plot of land. The author, however, demonstrates with the help of late medieval legal texts that the expression, which turns up in Hungary for the first time in 1463, was in fact a synonym for “nobleman having no tenants” (nobilis iobagiones non habens), which occurs fairly frequently from 1397 on. Thus, such a nobleman could possess several noble plots, and even a deserted peasant plot, but, at the moment when the tax was levied, he had no peasant plot liable to taxation. Moreover, not only persons enjoying “full” or “general” nobility were rated among them, but also other possessors of land who had no peasant tenants, such as the so-called prediales, who were subjected to ecclesiastical authority, or the “castle nobles” who were attached legally to a given castle.
Now, what was the common feature which linked these social groups of various legal status to each other? It is certainly conspicuous that the laws only regulated the modes of their taxation and military service. The reason which underlay this is that the basis for taxation and recruitment was precisely the inhabited tenant plot, and thus, in the case of this group, only the person itself or his noble plot could be burdened with the tax. Consequently, the expression of “one-plot noblemen” is merely a contemporary term of taxation, the exact content of which, emerging in the course of taxation, could perhaps depend on the will of the taxpayer himself, but which by no means designated a separate layer of society. It has to be added that, thanks to their fluctuating fortunes, some poorer noble families were variably listed among the one-plot noblemen and those with a few tenant peasants, which means that in their case it would perhaps be more salutary to speak about petty/inferior nobility (nobiles minores/inferiores), an expression also warranted by the contemporary legal texts.""""
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""ONE-PLOT NOBLEMAN”. ON THE INTERPRETATION OF A MEDIEVAL CONCEPT The expression of “one-plot noblemen” (nobiles unius sessionis) is liable to frequent misinterpretation in the Hungarian scholarly literature. The group designated with... more
""ONE-PLOT NOBLEMAN”. ON THE INTERPRETATION OF A MEDIEVAL CONCEPT
The expression of “one-plot noblemen” (nobiles unius sessionis) is liable to frequent misinterpretation in the Hungarian scholarly literature. The group designated with the term is generally thought to have been a separate social layer at the bottom of the noble class, and its member are consequently also frequently referred to as landless, poor or peasant nobles. They are normally percieved as having enjoyed full noble rights, but only managed one single noble plot of land. The author, however, demonstrates with the help of late medieval legal texts that the expression, which turns up in Hungary for the first time in 1463, was in fact a synonym for “nobleman having no tenants” (nobilis iobagiones non habens), which occurs fairly frequently from 1397 on. Thus, such a nobleman could possess several noble plots, and even a deserted peasant plot, but, at the moment when the tax was levied, he had no peasant plot liable to taxation. Moreover, not only persons enjoying “full” or “general” nobility were rated among them, but also other possessors of land who had no peasant tenants, such as the so-called prediales, who were subjected to ecclesiastical authority, or the “castle nobles” who were attached legally to a given castle.
Now, what was the common feature which linked these social groups of various legal status to each other? It is certainly conspicuous that the laws only regulated the modes of their taxation and military service. The reason which underlay this is that the basis for taxation and recruitment was precisely the inhabited tenant plot, and thus, in the case of this group, only the person itself or his noble plot could be burdened with the tax. Consequently, the expression of “one-plot noblemen” is merely a contemporary term of taxation, the exact content of which, emerging in the course of taxation, could perhaps depend on the will of the taxpayer himself, but which by no means designated a separate layer of society. It has to be added that, thanks to their fluctuating fortunes, some poorer noble families were variably listed among the one-plot noblemen and those with a few tenant peasants, which means that in their case it would perhaps be more salutary to speak about petty/inferior nobility (nobiles minores/inferiores), an expression also warranted by the contemporary legal texts.""
The expression of “one-plot noblemen” (nobiles unius sessionis) is liable to frequent misinterpretation in the Hungarian scholarly literature. The group designated with the term is generally thought to have been a separate social layer at the bottom of the noble class, and its member are consequently also frequently referred to as landless, poor or peasant nobles. They are normally percieved as having enjoyed full noble rights, but only managed one single noble plot of land. The author, however, demonstrates with the help of late medieval legal texts that the expression, which turns up in Hungary for the first time in 1463, was in fact a synonym for “nobleman having no tenants” (nobilis iobagiones non habens), which occurs fairly frequently from 1397 on. Thus, such a nobleman could possess several noble plots, and even a deserted peasant plot, but, at the moment when the tax was levied, he had no peasant plot liable to taxation. Moreover, not only persons enjoying “full” or “general” nobility were rated among them, but also other possessors of land who had no peasant tenants, such as the so-called prediales, who were subjected to ecclesiastical authority, or the “castle nobles” who were attached legally to a given castle.
Now, what was the common feature which linked these social groups of various legal status to each other? It is certainly conspicuous that the laws only regulated the modes of their taxation and military service. The reason which underlay this is that the basis for taxation and recruitment was precisely the inhabited tenant plot, and thus, in the case of this group, only the person itself or his noble plot could be burdened with the tax. Consequently, the expression of “one-plot noblemen” is merely a contemporary term of taxation, the exact content of which, emerging in the course of taxation, could perhaps depend on the will of the taxpayer himself, but which by no means designated a separate layer of society. It has to be added that, thanks to their fluctuating fortunes, some poorer noble families were variably listed among the one-plot noblemen and those with a few tenant peasants, which means that in their case it would perhaps be more salutary to speak about petty/inferior nobility (nobiles minores/inferiores), an expression also warranted by the contemporary legal texts.""
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A Nobleman or a Bondsman? (Analysis of a Turóc County Legal Custom from the Late Middle Ages). There can be found several charter texts in the records of the first place of authentication of the Turóc convent in which noblemen pawned a... more
A Nobleman or a Bondsman? (Analysis of a Turóc County Legal Custom from the Late Middle Ages).
There can be found several charter texts in the records of the first place of authentication of the Turóc convent in which noblemen pawned a noble site where they lived in a way that in return for staying on the site they payed year census (lease) to the owner of the pawn. According to these texts a nobleman who pawned his noble site became the bondsman of the owner of the pawn legally until the credit against pawn was repayed.
This study analyses these agreements and the forms in them as well. According to it the formation of this custom could be due partly to the vast number of lower noblemen of Turóc Country and partly to the effect of purkrecht contracts which were frequent in municipally life in that time. The credit used by citizenry changed significantly among nobility: a nobleman being without a noble site temporarily became a bondservant according to the strict legal interpretation of the Middle Ages because he lived on someone else's site and payed tax like a bondservant. The study is supplemented with complete texts of twelve charters.
There can be found several charter texts in the records of the first place of authentication of the Turóc convent in which noblemen pawned a noble site where they lived in a way that in return for staying on the site they payed year census (lease) to the owner of the pawn. According to these texts a nobleman who pawned his noble site became the bondsman of the owner of the pawn legally until the credit against pawn was repayed.
This study analyses these agreements and the forms in them as well. According to it the formation of this custom could be due partly to the vast number of lower noblemen of Turóc Country and partly to the effect of purkrecht contracts which were frequent in municipally life in that time. The credit used by citizenry changed significantly among nobility: a nobleman being without a noble site temporarily became a bondservant according to the strict legal interpretation of the Middle Ages because he lived on someone else's site and payed tax like a bondservant. The study is supplemented with complete texts of twelve charters.
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A charter from 1424 mentions that King Andrew II of Hungary (1205-1235) donated two villages in county Nitra to Merkúr of Moravia and married him to his relative, Margaret. It also states that the members of Koloni and Széki families were... more
A charter from 1424 mentions that King Andrew II of Hungary (1205-1235) donated two villages in county Nitra to Merkúr of Moravia and married him to his relative, Margaret. It also states that the members of Koloni and Széki families were the descendants of Merkur. In accordance with other
sources Merkur seems to be identical to Mercurius banus of Slavonia, comes of Somogy (1205-1206), then Pressburg (1206), thence it follows that the unknown charter could be dated to cca. 1205. The author suggests that Margaret
could be the aunt of King Andrew, daughter of KingGéza II (1141-1162). This new piece of information proves one of the statements of SimonKézai's
Chronicle, i.e. that Mérk of Csákány and his brothers - the grand sons of Merkur - were the relatives of King Béla IV (1235-1270) and were offspring of Moravian dukes (actually barons). The author shortly examines the history of the descendants of Merkur and Margaret, the Csákányi, Rovi, Koloni and
Széki families, until the extinction of their male lines in the first decades of the 15th century. These families together were referred to as Janur (Gyánúr) kindred by scholarship so far, from the name of their first known ancestor, Janur, who seems to have been the son of Merkur and Margaret.
sources Merkur seems to be identical to Mercurius banus of Slavonia, comes of Somogy (1205-1206), then Pressburg (1206), thence it follows that the unknown charter could be dated to cca. 1205. The author suggests that Margaret
could be the aunt of King Andrew, daughter of KingGéza II (1141-1162). This new piece of information proves one of the statements of SimonKézai's
Chronicle, i.e. that Mérk of Csákány and his brothers - the grand sons of Merkur - were the relatives of King Béla IV (1235-1270) and were offspring of Moravian dukes (actually barons). The author shortly examines the history of the descendants of Merkur and Margaret, the Csákányi, Rovi, Koloni and
Széki families, until the extinction of their male lines in the first decades of the 15th century. These families together were referred to as Janur (Gyánúr) kindred by scholarship so far, from the name of their first known ancestor, Janur, who seems to have been the son of Merkur and Margaret.
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Te author analyses and publishes the charter of William II, Count of Castell (Germany), dated 1434 in Pozsony (Bratislava). In this document, he permitted using the comital title of Castell for János Kórógyi, as for his distant relative.... more
Te author analyses and publishes the charter of William II, Count of Castell (Germany), dated 1434 in Pozsony (Bratislava). In this document, he permitted using the comital title of Castell for János Kórógyi, as for his distant relative. At the same time, made a mutual inheritance contract with him. According to the source, father of János had made a kind of agreement with parents of William earlier. It could certainly happen in the court of King Sigismund in Konstanz 1417, where both families could perceive that their coats of arms were the same, so that they thought that they were relatives. Tis statement is proved by the fact, that Fülöp Kórógyi had used the comital title of Castell in the end of 1417. In addition, that charter was closed by red wax seal, but in the beginning of the year he used green wax based on Hungarian habits, without the inclination of the comital title.