Ludovic Soutif

This paper considers one of the most significant and controversial attempts to account for the meaning of pejoratives as lexical items, namely Hom and May’s. After outlining the theory, we pinpoint sets of pejorative sentences that come out true on their account and for which the question as to whether they are compatible with the view advocated by them (so-called Moral and Semantic Innocence) remains open. Helping ourselves to the standard model-theoretical framework Hom and May (presumably) work in, we prove they are compatible with the view. Given that the issues of both the moral import of pejoratives and the practical effects of their utterance are not settled by the proof, we then highlight unwelcome moral and pragmatic implications for some of the pejorative sentences under scrutiny, thereby showing that the view, broadly understood, is not as morally and semantically innocuous as it is meant to be.

Although Frege’s aim was not to provide a semantic theory for a natural language, he made, to say the least, valuable and enduring contributions to semantic theory, understood as the assignment of semantic values, and possibly, further meaning properties to natural language expressions. His arguing, notably in Frege (1892), for the assignment to any well-formed linguistic expression of a sense (Sinn), in addition to its reference (Bedeutung) — if any—, is one — and, arguably, the most celebrated and disputed among his contributions. 

One of the conundrums of Wittgenstein’s so-called ‘1914–1916 Notebooks’ concerns the role played by the visual instances of logical analysis. As a matter of fact , in discussing in that work the requirement that the logical analysis of meaningful sentences be complete, Wittgenstein often takes as examples statements about the colored parts of the subject's visual image (Gesichtsbild). In view of this, it might be thought that the requirement is not laid down in the Notebooks on logical grounds, but somehow on psychological or psychophysical ones. In this paper I argue this is not so and that the requirement is exemplified rather than justified by the analysis of statements about the products of the subject’s visual imagination. I also argue that, on Wittgenstein’s syntactic notion of a complete logical analysis, our unanalyzed statements embody as they are the requirement that their sense be fully determinate; which is just what is meant by the idea that the analysis must be complete.

No presente verbete faço a revisão crítica de algumas entre as mais expressivas tentativas de resolver o chamado ‘problema da dinâmica cognitiva’. De acordo com Kaplan (1989) – que é responsável pelo próprio apelido, a questão que se coloca é: o que significa dizer de uma pessoa que expressou uma crença particular num determinado contexto de proferimento que ela reteve ou mudou de crença fora desse contexto? E caso ajustes (linguísticos, psicológicos) sejam necessários para manter a relação com o conteúdo semântico original, quais são nossas intuições a respeito de casos em que um sujeito cognitivamente saudável perdeu temporariamente a noção do tempo e/ou a capacidade de rastrear objetos no espaço? Exploro diversas respostas a essas perguntas com o intuito de dizer se elas conseguem acomodar os fatos (semânticos, epistêmicos, cognitivos) aí envolvidos. Abstract: In this paper I review some of the most significant attempts to solve the so-called ‘problem of cognitive dynamics’. Acco...

One of the conundrums of Wittgenstein’s so-called ‘1914–1916 Notebooks’ concerns the role played by the visual instances of logical analysis. As a matter of fact , in discussing in that work the requirement that the logical analysis of meaningful sentences be complete, Wittgenstein often takes as examples statements about the colored parts of the subject's visual image (Gesichtsbild). In view of this, it might be thought that the requirement is not laid down in the Notebooks on logical grounds, but somehow on psychological or psychophysical ones. In this paper I argue this is not so and that the requirement is exemplified rather than justified by the analysis of statements about the products of the subject’s visual imagination. I also argue that, on Wittgenstein’s syntactic notion of a complete logical analysis, our unanalyzed statements embody as they are the requirement that their sense be fully determinate; which is just what is meant by the idea that the analysis must be com...

Doit-on supposer l'existence d'un espace phenomenal distinct de l'espace physique pour rendre compte des differences d'application de nos concepts geometriques et spatiaux? L'objectif de ce travail est de montrer la pertinence d'une approche grammaticale du probleme de l'espace visuel telle qu'illustree par celle de Wittgenstein. On distinguera trois grandes etapes: 1) L'espace visuel est d'abord traite comme un exemple d'espace logique (de variete mathematique) dont les proprietes de structure doivent pouvoir etre reproduites par celles de notre langage. 2) Wittgenstein passe dans les annees 30 d'un projet fondationnaliste de description de la multiplicite de cet espace a une investigation des regles gouvernant l'application de nos concepts a cette modalite sensorielle. 3) Le probleme de l'applicabilite des structures mathematiques de notre langage a l'experience visuelle est diagnostique comme un faux probleme qui resulte...

L'interpretation de Wittgenstein developpee par J. Hintikka (en partie en collaboration avec M. Hintikka) a partir de la fin des annees 1970 se presente comme une interpretation resolument heterodoxe de sa philosophie.1 Dans Investigating Wittgenstein, les Hintikka insistent a plusieurs reprises sur ce qui oppose leur interpretation a ce qu'ils estiment etre la «vision recue» standard de la plupart des autres interpretes de l'evolution philosophique et de certains concepts et arguments celebres de l'auteur, quitte a simplifier ou exagerer quelque peu les termes de l'opposition.2 Et dans le premier volume de ses Selected Papers — dont le titre est emprunte a K. Kraus, J. Hintikka n'hesite pas a assumer le caractere quelque peu excessif— le caractere de «verite et demie», pour parler comme Kraus — des interpretations avancees pour compenser les «demi-verites» couramment admises par la plupart des interpretes a propos de la philosophie de Wittgenstein.3

O presente artigo discute uma concepcao dos pensamentos de re que pode ser endossada com certa naturalidade na esteira da teoria de Russell. Nesta concepcao, um pensamento e acerca da coisa (res), em vez de uma mera caracterizacao, se e somente se ele for constitutivamente ligado, se nao a existencia, ao menos a identidade do objeto e o (a) pensador(a) souber qual/quem e o objeto. Diante do desafio de dar espaco aos casos nao raros de identidade equivocada e de confusao substancial da parte do sujeito, eu argumento que a visao considerada pode ser mantida na sua integridade. E ainda, as limitacoes impostas a sua verdade pelos defensores da imagem do pensamento de re como composto de dois ingredientes e pelos anti-essencialistas podem ser levantadas. Abstract: n this paper, I discuss a view of de re thoughts that can be naturally endorsed in the wake of Russell's account. This is the view that a thought is about the very thing ( res ) rather than a mere characterization of it if ...

In this paper I take issue with Glezakos’s (2009) account of why Frege’s puzzle is un-puzzling. On her view, Frege’s statement of the puzzle –how can sentences of the form a=a and a=b, if true, differ in cognitive value if they express the same semantic content/are made true by the same object’s self-identity?– should not be considered any puzzling either because it is on the whole circular, or because, neutrally stated, it cannot even be set up. I argue against this that if, as she takes it, Frege’s statement is “problematic” it is not for the reasons she gives, but because it rests upon a couple of questionable assumptions; the assumptions that i) there is no ambiguity as to which aspect of the sign (in its relation to the referent) is relevant to a neutral statement of the puzzle ii) it is of the (sentence) forms themselves one may sensibly say they differ in cognitive value.

No presente artigo, argumenta-se, com base em evidencias textuais, que ha duas concepcoes de objeto presentes no Tractatus. A primeira, norteada pelas nocoes de analizabilidade completa e de simplicidade absoluta, foi explicitamente assumida por Wittgenstein como doutrina oficial do livro por razoes puramente logicas. A segunda, norteada pelas nocoes de analise formal multidimensional e de singularidade, so foi contemplada por ele com base em uma analogia entre a relacao do objeto (em sentido logico) ao espaco de possiveis estados de coisas que o ‘cerca’ e a de um item fenomenal qualquer a modalidade sensorial na qual esta localizado. A luz dessa distincao, tenta-se clarificar o debate acerca da exemplaridade (ou nao exemplaridade) de certas categorias de coisas (particulares, universais) em relacao a nocao tractariana de objeto. E da ainda uma interpretacao do tratamento por Wittgenstein do problema da incompatibilidade de certas atribuicoes de cores no Tractatuse do episodio do ab...

This paper takes issue with a certain picture of visual spatial perception sometimes ascribed to Wittgenstein (1975) by recent research – notably, Schwenkler (2009, 2012) – on spatial awareness. On this picture, the perception of the spatial (monadic or relational) properties of the visual objects does not exhaust visual spatial perception for the latter requires in addition the perception of (visual) space itself. I argue that both the metaphysical and the epistemological

... Didier DEBAISE, dir., Vie et expérimentation. Peirce ... Cet ouvrage introduit par DidierDebaise poursuit l'effort entrepris notamment par Wahl et Deleuze de faire connaître au public francophone le pragmatisme nord-américain. Cet ...