Bryan Smyth
University of Mississippi, Philosophy and Religion, Faculty Member
- Phenomenology, Critical Theory, Social and Political Philosophy, Phenomenological Marxism, Marxist philosophy, Marxism, and 12 moreFrankfurt School, Reification, Existential Phenomenological Psychotherapy, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Georg Lukács, Phenomenological Reduction, Philosophy of Nature, Enactive cognition, Embodied Cognition, Philosophy of Embodiment, Philosophy of Myth, and Intersubjectivityedit
- I have taught philosophy at the University of Mississippi since 2013, prior to which I taught at the University of Me... moreI have taught philosophy at the University of Mississippi since 2013, prior to which I taught at the University of Memphis and Mount Allison University. My research deals primarily with phenomenology and Critical Theory, in particular how these traditions intersect methodologically with regard to nature and history. My first book, Merleau-Ponty’s Existential Phenomenology and the Realization of Philosophy, was published in 2014 (Bloomsbury Academic). I recently completed the English translation of Merleau-Ponty’s Le monde sensible et le monde de l’expression for Northwestern University Press, and I'm working on its companion volume, Recherches sur l’usage littéraire du langage. With Richard Westerman I recently co-edited a volume of new essays on Marxism and phenomenology, and as time permits I'm working on two further monographs, provisionally entitled Incarnating the Good: Rethinking Heroism as an Embodied Phenomenon, and Hyperdialectical Materialism: Nature and History in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology. I am Immediate Past-President of the Society for Existential and Phenomenological Theory and Culture, I serve on the editorial board of Heroism Studies, and I'm Critical Theory Reviews Co-Editor for Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy.edit
Bringing to light the essential philosophical role of Marxism within Merleau-Ponty's reinterpretation of transcendental phenomenology, this book shows that the realization of this project hinges methodologically upon a renewed conception... more
Bringing to light the essential philosophical role of Marxism within Merleau-Ponty's reinterpretation of transcendental phenomenology, this book shows that the realization of this project hinges methodologically upon a renewed conception of the proletariat qua universal class -- specifically, that it rests upon a humanist myth of incarnation which, substantiated by Merleau-Ponty's notion of 'heroism', locates an objective historical purposiveness in the habituated organism of the modern subject.
Foregrounding the phenomenological priority of history over corporeality in this way, Smyth's analysis recovers the 'militant' character of Merleau-Ponty's existential phenomenology. It thus sheds critical new light on his early thought, and challenges some of the main parameters of existing scholarship by disclosing the intrinsic normativity of his basic methodological commitments. [Back cover]
See below for Preface ...
Foregrounding the phenomenological priority of history over corporeality in this way, Smyth's analysis recovers the 'militant' character of Merleau-Ponty's existential phenomenology. It thus sheds critical new light on his early thought, and challenges some of the main parameters of existing scholarship by disclosing the intrinsic normativity of his basic methodological commitments. [Back cover]
See below for Preface ...
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Lexington Books (2021). Marxism and Phenomenology: The Dialectical Horizons of Critique, edited by Bryan Smyth and Richard Westerman, offers new perspectives on the possibility of a philosophical outlook that combines Marxism and... more
Lexington Books (2021).
Marxism and Phenomenology: The Dialectical Horizons of Critique, edited by Bryan Smyth and Richard Westerman, offers new perspectives on the possibility of a philosophical outlook that combines Marxism and phenomenology in the critique of capitalism. Although Marxism’s focus on impersonal social structures and phenomenology’s concern with lived experience can make these traditions appear conceptually incompatible, the potential critical force of a theoretical reconciliation inspired several attempts in the twentieth century to articulate a phenomenological Marxism. Updating and extending this approach, the contributors to this volume identify and develop new and previously overlooked connections between the traditions, offering new perspectives on Marx, Husserl, and Heidegger; exploring themes such as alienation, reification, and ecology; and examining the intersection of Marxism and phenomenology in figures such as Michel Henry, Walter Benjamin, and Frantz Fanon. These glimpses of a productive reconciliation of the respective strengths of phenomenology and Marxism offer promising possibilities for illuminating and resolving the increasingly intense social crises of capitalism in the twenty-first century.
Marxism and Phenomenology: The Dialectical Horizons of Critique, edited by Bryan Smyth and Richard Westerman, offers new perspectives on the possibility of a philosophical outlook that combines Marxism and phenomenology in the critique of capitalism. Although Marxism’s focus on impersonal social structures and phenomenology’s concern with lived experience can make these traditions appear conceptually incompatible, the potential critical force of a theoretical reconciliation inspired several attempts in the twentieth century to articulate a phenomenological Marxism. Updating and extending this approach, the contributors to this volume identify and develop new and previously overlooked connections between the traditions, offering new perspectives on Marx, Husserl, and Heidegger; exploring themes such as alienation, reification, and ecology; and examining the intersection of Marxism and phenomenology in figures such as Michel Henry, Walter Benjamin, and Frantz Fanon. These glimpses of a productive reconciliation of the respective strengths of phenomenology and Marxism offer promising possibilities for illuminating and resolving the increasingly intense social crises of capitalism in the twenty-first century.
Research Interests: Marxism, Frankfurt School (Philosophy), Herbert Marcuse, Phenomenology, Walter Benjamin, and 15 moreMaurice Merleau-Ponty, Edmund Husserl, Michel Henry, Jean Paul Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Frantz Fanon, Karl Marx, Alienation, Friedrich Engels, Georg Lukács, Reification, Enzo Paci, Ludwig Landgrebe, Ecosocialism, and Karel Kosík
Annotated translation of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Le monde sensible et le monde de l'expression. Cours au Collège de France: Notes, 1953, eds. Emmanuel de Saint Aubert and Stefan Kristensen (Métispresses, 2011) For copyright reasons, a... more
Annotated translation of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Le monde sensible et le monde de l'expression. Cours au Collège de France: Notes, 1953, eds. Emmanuel de Saint Aubert and Stefan Kristensen (Métispresses, 2011)
For copyright reasons, a new translation of the résumé de cours is not included (but see elsewhere on this site).
For copyright reasons, a new translation of the résumé de cours is not included (but see elsewhere on this site).
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The contributors to this book offer productive new readings of Merleau-Ponty’s political philosophy and of other facets of his thought. They each deploy his theories to adopt a critical stance on urgent political issues and contemporary... more
The contributors to this book offer productive new readings of Merleau-Ponty’s political philosophy and of other facets of his thought. They each deploy his theories to adopt a critical stance on urgent political issues and contemporary situations within society. Each essay focuses on a different aspect of political transformation, be it at the personal, social, national, or international level. The book as a whole maps out possibilities for thinking phenomenologically about politics without a sole focus on the state, turning instead toward contemporary human experience and existence.
Introduction: Jérôme Melançon: Situating Merleau-Ponty and Political Philosophy: Relations, Institutions, and Transformations
Chapter 1 Dorothea Olkowski : On the Limits of Perception for Social Interaction in Merleau-Ponty
Chapter 2 Emily S. Lee: The Possibility of Emotional Appropriateness for Groups Identified with a Temperament
Chapter 3 Martín Plot: Societies without Bodies and the Bodies of Society: Equality and Reversibility in Lefort and Butler’s Encounters with
Merleau-Ponty
Chapter 4 Paul Mazzocchi: Homo Utopicus: Merleau-Ponty and the Utopian Body
Chapter 5 Ann V. Murphy: Vulnerability as Revolt: Hunger Strikes, Temporality, and the Contestation of Social Death
Chapter 6 Laura McMahon: The “Great Phantom”: Merleau-Ponty on Habitus, Freedom, and Political Transformation
Chapter 7 Bryan Smyth: Freedom’s Ground: Merleau-Ponty and the Dialectics of Nature
Chapter 8 Ted Toadvine: Ecophenomenology after the End of Nature
Chapter 9 Dan Furukawa Marques: Political Phenomenology as Ethnographic Method
Chapter 10 Jérôme Melançon: Toward a New Balance and Interdependence: Merleau-Ponty on Colonialism and Underdevelopment
Chapter 11 Emmanuel de Saint Aubert: The Perceptual Foundation of Care
Introduction: Jérôme Melançon: Situating Merleau-Ponty and Political Philosophy: Relations, Institutions, and Transformations
Chapter 1 Dorothea Olkowski : On the Limits of Perception for Social Interaction in Merleau-Ponty
Chapter 2 Emily S. Lee: The Possibility of Emotional Appropriateness for Groups Identified with a Temperament
Chapter 3 Martín Plot: Societies without Bodies and the Bodies of Society: Equality and Reversibility in Lefort and Butler’s Encounters with
Merleau-Ponty
Chapter 4 Paul Mazzocchi: Homo Utopicus: Merleau-Ponty and the Utopian Body
Chapter 5 Ann V. Murphy: Vulnerability as Revolt: Hunger Strikes, Temporality, and the Contestation of Social Death
Chapter 6 Laura McMahon: The “Great Phantom”: Merleau-Ponty on Habitus, Freedom, and Political Transformation
Chapter 7 Bryan Smyth: Freedom’s Ground: Merleau-Ponty and the Dialectics of Nature
Chapter 8 Ted Toadvine: Ecophenomenology after the End of Nature
Chapter 9 Dan Furukawa Marques: Political Phenomenology as Ethnographic Method
Chapter 10 Jérôme Melançon: Toward a New Balance and Interdependence: Merleau-Ponty on Colonialism and Underdevelopment
Chapter 11 Emmanuel de Saint Aubert: The Perceptual Foundation of Care
Research Interests: Political Philosophy, Perception, Phenomenology, Politics, Colonialism, and 14 moreEthnographic Fieldwork (Anthropology), Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Philosophy of Emotion, Philosophy of Nature, Phenomenology of the Body (Philosophy), Merleau-Ponty, Ecophenomenology, Utopia, Existentialism, The Ethics of Care, Freedom, Dialectics, Political Phenomenology, and Existentialism In Philosophy
Translation of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Recherches sur l’usage littéraire du langage: Cours au Collège de France. Notes, 1953, eds. Benedetta Zaccarello and Emmanuel de Saint Aubert (Métispresses, 2013)
Coming soon ... 2021
Coming soon ... 2021
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Original uncorrected proofs. Please cite the published version in Marxism and Phenomenology: The Dialectical Horizons of Critique, ed. Bryan Smyth and Richard Westerman (Lexington Books, 2021)
Research Interests: Critical Theory, Marxism, Herbert Marcuse, Phenomenology, Walter Benjamin, and 12 moreMaurice Merleau-Ponty, Edmund Husserl, Michel Henry, Marxism (Political Science), Marxist philosophy, Philosophy of Praxis, Georg Lukács, Reification, Enzo Paci, Ecosocialism, Karel Kosík, and Phenomenological Marxism
Introduction to Merleau-Ponty, The Sensible World and the World of Expression
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Preface to Merleau-Ponty's Existential Phenomenology and the Realization of Philosophy (pre-publication proofs)
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Rosa Luxemburg defended a view of spontaneism as a way of according strategic priority to popular initiatives over the directives of vanguard parties. But she never worked out a theory of spontaneism, and consequently it has typically... more
Rosa Luxemburg defended a view of spontaneism as a way of according strategic priority to popular initiatives over the directives of vanguard parties. But she never worked out a theory of spontaneism, and consequently it has typically been dismissed as lacking solid grounds. In this paper, I take an initial step toward rehabilitating spontaneism by rethinking its assumptions concerning historical agency in embodied habitual terms. After first outlining Luxemburg’s view of spontaneism itself, I consider individual embodied action and focus on the sort of spontaneity that is exhibited in various forms of skilled expertise. This spontaneity reflects an acquired habitual predispositionality that is never a matter of mindless automaticity, and which in certain cases can involve significant degrees of improvisational creativity. Bringing this to light secures a basic plausibility for spontaneism at the level of individual agency by showing how socially transformative action could possibly be engaged in spontaneously.
Research Interests: Critical Theory, Political Philosophy, Marxism, Embodied Cognition, Embodiment, and 11 morePhenomenology, Collective Action, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Habitus, Rosa Luxemburg, Phenomenology of the body, Social movements and revolution, Merleau-Ponty, Marxist philosophy, Spontaneity, and Phenomenological Marxism
The idea of “critical phenomenology” is premised on the belief that there is a radically critical political impetus intrinsic to phenomenology as such. This belief is sound, but its grounds are unclear. This article clarifies the sense of... more
The idea of “critical phenomenology” is premised on the belief that there is a radically critical political impetus intrinsic to phenomenology as such. This belief is sound, but its grounds are unclear. This article clarifies the sense of critical phenomenology by showing how it is based in the methodological need for a generative apprehension of nature as the outermost horizon of experience, that this horizon is pregiven in the mythic Urdoxa of the lifeworld, and that critical phenomenology ultimately goes beyond traditional phenomenology precisely by engaging in a moment of critical mythopoetic praxis, what Hans Blumenberg termed “work on myth,” at this level. This is highly counterintuitive but fundamental to the theoretical coherence of critical phenomenology and crucial to its viability as a transformative political practice in terms of navigating the ideological landscape of the contemporary world.
Uncorrected Proofs -- please cite published version
Uncorrected Proofs -- please cite published version
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In this essay, I consider the significance of Daniel Bensaïd's work on Jeanne d'Arc with regard to dealing with the "difficult times" in which we live. (1) I first consider some of the background in early critical theory in order to show... more
In this essay, I consider the significance of Daniel Bensaïd's work on Jeanne d'Arc with regard to dealing with the "difficult times" in which we live. (1) I first consider some of the background in early critical theory in order to show that Bensaïd's aim to recover Benjamin's notion of a "weak messianic power" requires following through with Horkheimer and Adorno's critique of enlightenment, and that this implies a critical rehabilitation of myth and mythopoesis. (2) Approaching Bensaïd's account of Jeanne in the light of Blumenberg's notion of "work on myth", I show how he portrays her in a way that establishes a concrete connection between the discordant temporalities of contingency and necessity, but that this is best understood in the radically immanent terms of prereflective embodied action as based on the corporeal sedimentation of an intercorporeal ethical habitus. Bensaïd's account of Jeanne thus offers a new lens of historical perception that can help reveal otherwise hidden possibilities for transformative historical agency in embodied coexistence today. (3) By way of conclusion, I briefly consider the deeper meaning and significance of this in terms of offering a non-Promethean mythico-political framework.
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This paper sketches a new approach to the critical-theoretic problem of reification understood as a normatively problematic form of naturalizing or dehistoricizing entification. Entification in general is approached phenomenologically in... more
This paper sketches a new approach to the critical-theoretic problem of reification understood as a normatively problematic form of naturalizing or dehistoricizing entification. Entification in general is approached phenomenologically in terms of the mythic outer horizonality of the lifeworld, and reification is shown to stem from the dichotomy be-tween nature and history which, along with a corresponding dichotomy between myth and reason, is characteristic of Enlightenment rationality. Dereification necessitates overcoming these dichotomies, and this implies a critical embrace of myth and mythopoesis in the sense of instituting more normatively appropriate lifeworld horizons. While classical Marxism and radical social theory have typically adhered to the standard model of Enlightenment thought, with the result that the critique of naturalization backfires by reinforcing the dichotomy between nature and history, Luxemburgian spontaneism, rethought through a phenomenology of embodied enaction, is shown to offer a more viable way of understanding reification and its solution.
Please cite published version (https://metodo-rivista.eu/pub-260885).
Please cite published version (https://metodo-rivista.eu/pub-260885).
Research Interests: Critical Theory, Marxism, Social Cognition, Phenomenology, Rosa Luxemburg, and 15 moreSocial Imaginaries, Philosophy of Nature, Mythopoetics, Enactivism, Marxist philosophy, Spontaneity, Revolutionary Theory, Philosophy of Mythology, Mythopoesis, Georg Lukács, Reification, Anti-Capitalist Spontaneity, Phenomenology of Embodiment, Phenomenological Marxism, and Generative Phenomenology
Agents' self-reports in cases of reactive heroism often deny the optionality, and hence the supererogatory status, of their actions, while conversely supporting a view of them in terms of nonselfsacrificial existential necessity. Taking... more
Agents' self-reports in cases of reactive heroism often deny the optionality, and hence the supererogatory status, of their actions, while conversely supporting a view of them in terms of nonselfsacrificial existential necessity. Taking these claims seriously thus makes it puzzling as to why such cases elicit strong approbation. To resolve this puzzle, I show how this necessity can be understood in the predispositional embodied terms of unreflective ethical expertise , such that the agent may be said literally to incarnate generally accepted norms of a shared ethical habitus. On this basis I argue that the object of the relevant approbation is the agent's embodied predispositionality itself-expressing a deep continuity with her social context, it is in virtue of this alone that her action can be both spontaneous and ethically outstanding. By way of conclusion I briefly discuss how this suggests an important categorial distinction between heroism and saintism.
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Revised version of a talk given at the Second Biennial Heroism Science Conference (Richmond VA, October 2018) This article provides a brief summary of an approach to understanding proactive (or social) heroism in embodied terms, taking... more
Revised version of a talk given at the Second Biennial Heroism Science Conference (Richmond VA, October 2018)
This article provides a brief summary of an approach to understanding proactive (or social) heroism in embodied terms, taking this as essential to supporting the idea of ‘the banality of heroism’. I first present an analysis of heroic action in general that shows it as involving self-realization through nonselfsacrificial existential necessity, and then show how in cases of reactive heroic action this necessity is best understood in predispositional embodied terms, such that the agent may be said to quite literally incarnate certain generally accepted norms of the intersubjective ethical context. I then briefly sketch out how this same kind of embodied necessity can be seen in proactive cases, albeit with the difference that here it has to do with realizing the ‘validity surplus’ of that ethical context, that is, with the expansion of the scope of application of its norms. Unlike the norms enacted in reactive cases, this expansion is initially not generally accepted, and in this way proactive heroism is conceptually tied to the idea of immanent social progress. By way of conclusion, I comment very briefly on how this bears upon questions concerning the wider cultivation of heroism.
This article provides a brief summary of an approach to understanding proactive (or social) heroism in embodied terms, taking this as essential to supporting the idea of ‘the banality of heroism’. I first present an analysis of heroic action in general that shows it as involving self-realization through nonselfsacrificial existential necessity, and then show how in cases of reactive heroic action this necessity is best understood in predispositional embodied terms, such that the agent may be said to quite literally incarnate certain generally accepted norms of the intersubjective ethical context. I then briefly sketch out how this same kind of embodied necessity can be seen in proactive cases, albeit with the difference that here it has to do with realizing the ‘validity surplus’ of that ethical context, that is, with the expansion of the scope of application of its norms. Unlike the norms enacted in reactive cases, this expansion is initially not generally accepted, and in this way proactive heroism is conceptually tied to the idea of immanent social progress. By way of conclusion, I comment very briefly on how this bears upon questions concerning the wider cultivation of heroism.
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Most self-reports of heroic action in both reactive and social (proactive) cases describe the experience as involving a kind of necessity. This seems intuitively sound, but it makes it unclear why heroism is accorded strong approbation.... more
Most self-reports of heroic action in both reactive and social (proactive) cases describe the experience as involving a kind of necessity. This seems intuitively sound, but it makes it unclear why heroism is accorded strong approbation. To resolve this, I show that the necessity involved in heroism is a nonselfsacrificial practical necessity. (1) Approaching the intentional structure of human action from the perspective of embodiment, focusing especially on the predispositionality of pre-reflective skill, I develop a phenomenological interpretation of Bernard Williams’ notion of “practical necessity” as an endogenous existential necessity. (2) I then offer a view of reactive heroism as instantiating this kind of necessity by literally embodying certain socially affirmed values in a way that is not self-sacrificial. This evinces a deep social bond, and it is this bond, rather than the action itself, is the ground of approbation. (3) I then discuss how this construal of reactive heroism can be extended to cases of social heroism by way of a necessity that is internal to the agent’s individual character. Similarly to reactive cases, a social hero literally embodies a certain ethical commitment such that her actions are likewise instances of nonselfsacrificial practical necessity. (4) I then discuss how the commitment perceived in cases of social heroism pertains to the actualization of “surplus validity,” such that whereas the reactive hero is praised for embodying shared value, the social hero is praised for embodying a commitment to actualizing the concrete potential of such value more fully The approbation accorded to social heroism is therefore tied inextricably to a normative judgment concerning such immanent progressive transformation.
[This article was first published online in 2017.]
[This article was first published online in 2017.]
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This paper contributes to the conceptual clarification of ‘heroism’ as the central idea of ‘heroism science’ (HS), by outlining an approach to heroic action, in its distinction from ‘moral saintliness’, based in a phenomenological account... more
This paper contributes to the conceptual clarification of ‘heroism’ as the central idea of ‘heroism science’ (HS), by outlining an approach to heroic action, in its distinction from ‘moral saintliness’, based in a phenomenological account of embodied existence. I first address the paradoxical tension obtaining between the ‘exceptionalization’ of heroism and what has been termed its ‘banality’. Through a discussion of moral supererogation, this points toward a conception of heroic action that excludes self-sacrifice. With reference to examples of ‘Holocaust rescuers’, I develop a view of heroic action as reflecting a pre-personal practical necessity, an anonymous incapacity to do otherwise. I then substantiate this view with considerations drawn from the phenomenology of embodied existence, relying in particular upon the distinction drawn by Merleau-Ponty between the ‘actual’ and ‘habitual’ dimensions of embodiment. On this basis, I sketch out how heroic and saintly action can be understood as contrary ways in which the tension between these dimensions of embodiment is resolved. This approach affords conceptually clear notions of heroism, moral saintliness, and the distinction between them, and on this basis it portends the sort of coherent and viable understanding of heroism’s ‘banality’ that HS requires. By way of conclusion, I briefly address some of the theoretical advantages of this approach, along with some of the larger stakes involved.
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Approaching Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology as an intellectual ‘Gordian knot’, this paper takes up the question as to what has ‘primacy’ within this project as a way to provide insight into the relation between empirical science... more
Approaching Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology as an intellectual ‘Gordian knot’, this paper takes up the question as to what has ‘primacy’ within this project as a way to provide insight into the relation between empirical science and transcendental philosophy in Merleau-Ponty’s account of embodiment. Although the thesis of the primacy of perception expresses an overall result of Merleau-Ponty’s project, it needs to be examined more closely in terms of what has logical priority within it. This priority is necessarily methodological, pertaining to the productivity that actuates and sustains the phenomenological project. This productivity is a matter neither of reflection nor embodiment, but rests on their prior unity. To illuminate this, I show how Kurt Goldstein’s conception of biology provided Merleau-Ponty with a scientific model for approaching human existence holistically in which primacy pertains to the transcendental activity of productive imagination that generates the eidetic organismic Gestalt in terms of which sense is made of empirical facts. This model is followed in Merleau-Ponty’s account of perceptual synthesis and the analogous role played therein by what he called ‘projection’, as well as in his account of phenomenology’s methodological self-reference. Parallel to Goldstein, then, primacy in Merleau-Ponty’s account of embodiment pertains to the transcendental projection of the organismic Gestalt as the eidetic frame for empirical research. In terms of the relation between science and philosophy in this account, the empirical and the eidetic are coupled dialectically on an epistemically equal basis, but they are jointly subordinated to the normative commitments implied by the projective activity. The primacy of the latter is practical such that any tension between empirical science and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology is ultimately a metaphilosophical – not a theoretical – issue.
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In this paper I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s reinterpretation of Husserlian phenomenology is premised upon a certain mythic consciousness of nature in general and of human embodiment in particular. This is not an objection to... more
In this paper I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s reinterpretation of Husserlian phenomenology is premised upon a certain mythic consciousness of nature in general and of human embodiment in particular. This is not an objection to Merleau-Ponty’s work, but rather a clarification of how he resolved the methodological problem (raised by Fink) of the outer horizonality of phenomenological experience on an intuitional basis by invoking (what I term) 'the myth of human incarnation'. The priority granted to mythic consciousness is implicated in the epistemic status of phenomenological claims concerning pre-reflective phenomena such as 'bodily intentionality', and thus has important consequences with regard to questions concerning the 'naturalization' of phenomenology.
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This paper clarifies the relationship between Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception and Fink’s Sixth Cartesian Meditation with regard to ‘the idea of a transcendental theory of method’. Although Fink’s text played a singularly... more
This paper clarifies the relationship between Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception and Fink’s Sixth Cartesian Meditation with regard to ‘the idea of a transcendental theory of method’. Although Fink’s text played a singularly important role in the development of Merleau-Ponty’s postwar thought, contrary to recent claims made by Ronald Bruzina this influence was not positive. Reconstructing the basic methodological claims of each text, in particular with regard to the being of the phenomenologist, the nature of the productivity that makes phenomenology possible, and the problem of methodological self-reference, I show that Phenomenology of Perception is premised on a decisive rejection of the main theses affirmed in the Sixth Cartesian Meditation. In contrast to Fink’s speculative reinterpretation of phenomenology as an absolute science, Merleau-Ponty viewed it as participating in the historical realization of the world, and hence as ultimately based on a practical faith. Albeit with a Marxian inflection, Merleau-Ponty thus related phenomenology much more closely to Kant. This may not be a better philosophical position, but circa 1945 it was Merleau-Ponty’s, whose work must be approached accordingly.
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The aim of phenomenology is to provide a critical account of the origins and genesis of the world. This implies that the standpoint of the phenomenological reduction is properly extramundane. But it remains an outstanding task to... more
The aim of phenomenology is to provide a critical account of the origins and genesis of the world. This implies that the standpoint of the phenomenological reduction is properly extramundane. But it remains an outstanding task to formulate a credible account of the reduction that would be adequate to this seemingly impossible methodological condition. This paper contributes to rethinking the reduction accordingly. Building on efforts to thematize its intersubjective and corporeal aspects, the reduction is approached as a kind of transcendental practice in the context of generativity. Foregrounding the psychotherapeutic encounter with persons suffering schizophrenic delusion as paradigmatic of the emergence of shared meaning, it is argued that this is where we may best come to terms with the methodological exigencies of phenomenology’s transcendental aim. It follows that phenomenologists across all disciplines may have something important to learn from how phenomenology has been put into practice in the psychotherapeutic domain.
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This paper deals with the role played in the development of Foucault’s thought by Binswanger’s Daseinsanalyse. Specifically, it considers how, in his lengthy Introduction (1954) to Binswanger’s “Traum und Existenz” (1930), Foucault’s... more
This paper deals with the role played in the development of Foucault’s thought by Binswanger’s Daseinsanalyse. Specifically, it considers how, in his lengthy Introduction (1954) to Binswanger’s “Traum und Existenz” (1930), Foucault’s re-interpretation and immanent critique of Daseinsanalyse – seen, as Binswanger saw it, as a “productive misunderstanding” of Heidegger’s Daseinsanalytik – can help clarify the pivotal methodological differences between Maladie mentale et personnalité (1954) and Maladie mentale et psychologie (1963), differences that reflect the approach undertaken in Folie et déraison (1961). As a result, contrary to standard views, which dismiss Foucault’s interest in Binswanger as a juvenile error, I argue that this encounter – including its normative concern with subjectivity – had enduring philosophical value for Foucault’s work as a form of radicalized transcendental critique, and that his rejection of Daseinsanalyse should rather be seen as specifically targeting the methodological limitations of genetic phenomenology. This clarifies the overall unity of Foucault’s work, while also indicating how his archeological and genealogical analyses could be seen as methodologically complementary to phenomenology.
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Whereas Phenomenology of Perception concludes with a puzzling turn to “heroism,” this article examines the short essay “Man, the Hero” as a source of insight into Merleau-Ponty’s thought in the early postwar period. In this essay,... more
Whereas Phenomenology of Perception concludes with a puzzling turn to “heroism,” this article examines the short essay “Man, the Hero” as a source of insight into Merleau-Ponty’s thought in the early postwar period. In this essay, Merleau-Ponty presented a conception of heroism through which he expressed the attitude toward post-Hegelian philosophy of history that underwrote his efforts to reform Marxism along existential lines. Analyzing this conception of heroism by unpacking the implicit contrasts with Kojève, Aron, Caillois, and Bataille, I show that its philosophical rationale was to supply experiential evidence attesting to the latent presence of human universality. It is a mythic device intended to animate the faith necessary for Marxist politics by showing that universal sociality is possible, and that the historically transformative praxis needed to realize it does not imply sacrifice. This sheds considerable light on Merleau-Ponty’s early postwar political thought. But inasmuch as the latter cannot be severed from his broader philosophical concerns, the prospect is raised that his entire phenomenological project in the early postwar period rested on a myth. Not necessarily a bad myth, but a myth nonetheless.
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Recent interest in first-person experience has generated proposals about incorporating phenomenology, in particular the work of Merleau-Ponty, into the naturalistic framework of cognitive science. This paper argues that such attempts are... more
Recent interest in first-person experience has generated proposals about incorporating phenomenology, in particular the work of Merleau-Ponty, into the naturalistic framework of cognitive science. This paper argues that such attempts are misguided. For Merleau-Ponty’s work represents a development – albeit a radical one – within, rather than a departure from, the tradition of transcendental philosophy stemming from Kant, and that it consequently remains opposed to standard philosophical naturalism in principle.
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Merleau-Ponty recognized that phenomenology’s methodological coherence required that it reject anthropocentricity and extend its scope beyond the human realm. But he also recognized that this does not change the central role played by... more
Merleau-Ponty recognized that phenomenology’s methodological coherence required that it reject anthropocentricity and extend its scope beyond the human realm. But he also recognized that this does not change the central role played by human consciousness in phenomenology, which he thus construed as a practical, humanistic project based on ‘ontological faith’. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological contributions concerning animals, then, and in particular his notion of ‘interanimality’, need to be understood as ‘generative’ contributions toward the realization of a singular common world. While this does not address issues of interspecific justice directly, it does reveal the underlying ontology of interspecificity to be a normative projection of a de-centred humanism, an insight that has the potential to productively rethink the nature of our ethical relations with animals.
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Forthcoming in Mythical Totalities: Studies in the Philosophy of Mythology, ed. G. Moss (Mohr Siebeck, 2024) This contribution considers the relation between myth and phenomenology, and contends that there is a positive mythopoetic... more
Forthcoming in Mythical Totalities: Studies in the Philosophy of Mythology, ed. G. Moss (Mohr Siebeck, 2024)
This contribution considers the relation between myth and phenomenology, and contends that there is a positive mythopoetic moment concerning "nature" (qua totality of reality) at the heart of phenomenology. (1) Smyth first outline how the question concerning nature and myth emerges from within phenomenology in general methodological terms concerning the analysis of the horizonal intentionality of the lifeworld, and how this points toward a normatively-oriented generative understanding of phenomenology. (2) Drawing especially on the work of Hans Blumenberg, Smyth then clarifies, in terms of "significance," the epistemic character of myth as an ineliminable sui generis feature of experience in general, and shows that the relevant generativity concerning the lifeworld coincides with the mythopoetic "work on myth" that Blumenberg identified as an essential aspect of mythic experience. (3) Smyth then considers an argument by Steven Crowell, which is directed against phenomenology adopting a mythic view of nature as opposed to the Enlightenment ideal of disenchanted meaninglessness. Replying to this argument will serve to confirm the appropriateness of a generative approach, and that the decisive factor to consider is the normativity of the projected sense of nature. (4) Smyth then concludes with some brief remarks concerning the stakes involved in the rapprochement with myth to which phenomenology as a critical philosophical project is methodologically committed.
This contribution considers the relation between myth and phenomenology, and contends that there is a positive mythopoetic moment concerning "nature" (qua totality of reality) at the heart of phenomenology. (1) Smyth first outline how the question concerning nature and myth emerges from within phenomenology in general methodological terms concerning the analysis of the horizonal intentionality of the lifeworld, and how this points toward a normatively-oriented generative understanding of phenomenology. (2) Drawing especially on the work of Hans Blumenberg, Smyth then clarifies, in terms of "significance," the epistemic character of myth as an ineliminable sui generis feature of experience in general, and shows that the relevant generativity concerning the lifeworld coincides with the mythopoetic "work on myth" that Blumenberg identified as an essential aspect of mythic experience. (3) Smyth then considers an argument by Steven Crowell, which is directed against phenomenology adopting a mythic view of nature as opposed to the Enlightenment ideal of disenchanted meaninglessness. Replying to this argument will serve to confirm the appropriateness of a generative approach, and that the decisive factor to consider is the normativity of the projected sense of nature. (4) Smyth then concludes with some brief remarks concerning the stakes involved in the rapprochement with myth to which phenomenology as a critical philosophical project is methodologically committed.
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This chapter is concerned with the question of myth in Marxism (understood in the philosophically broad sense of historical materialism) and phenomenology (understood broadly in the Husserlian transcendental sense), and how, positively... more
This chapter is concerned with the question of myth in Marxism (understood in the philosophically broad sense of historical materialism) and phenomenology (understood broadly in the Husserlian transcendental sense), and how, positively construed, myth represents a significant point of productive complementarity between these philosophically radical traditions.
Forthcoming in Marxism and Phenomenology: The Dialectical Horizons of Critique, ed. Bryan Smyth and Richard Westerman (Lexington Books)
** Unedited draft version ** Not for citation **
Forthcoming in Marxism and Phenomenology: The Dialectical Horizons of Critique, ed. Bryan Smyth and Richard Westerman (Lexington Books)
** Unedited draft version ** Not for citation **
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In this chapter I discuss how Merleau-Ponty's courses on nature in the 1950s implicitly represent a critical reprise of Friedrich Engels' interest in natural dialecticity. To be included in Transforming Politics with Merleau-Ponty:... more
In this chapter I discuss how Merleau-Ponty's courses on nature in the 1950s implicitly represent a critical reprise of Friedrich Engels' interest in natural dialecticity.
To be included in Transforming Politics with Merleau-Ponty: Thinking beyond the State, edited by Jérôme Melançon (Rowman & Littlefield, 2021)
** UNCORRECTED PROOFS ** PLEASE CITE PUBLISHED VERSION **
To be included in Transforming Politics with Merleau-Ponty: Thinking beyond the State, edited by Jérôme Melançon (Rowman & Littlefield, 2021)
** UNCORRECTED PROOFS ** PLEASE CITE PUBLISHED VERSION **
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Final draft of entry for Springer Encyclopedia of Heroism (published online)
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Translation of a few pages of notes by Merleau-Ponty (c. 1947) to appear in Chiasmi 22, pp. 23-26, 39-47, edited and introduced by Michel Dallisier
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Translation of Merleau-Ponty's résumé de cours for "The Sensible World and the World of Expression" (Collège de France, 1953)
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Cahiers de Royaumont (Philosophie IV). La philosophie analytique (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1962), pp. 93–96
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Comments on Ernesto Blanes-Martinez, "Tran Duc Thao: The Foundations of Anticolonial Phenomenology" (SPEP October 2023)
Research Interests: Marxism, Postcolonial Studies, Phenomenology, Contemporary French Philosophy, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and 11 moreFrench Political Philosophy, French philosophy, Merleau-Ponty, Marxist philosophy, Vietnamese Philosophy, Vietnamese studies, Political Phenomenology, Anticolonialism, Critical Phenomenology, Phenomenological Marxism, and Philosophy of Myth
Talk from "Myth and Critique" panel at 2023 meeting of the Society for Existential and Phenomenological Theory and Culture (May 2023).
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Short presentation on a panel at the 2023 meeting of the Society for Existential and Phenomenological Theory and Culture: "Crisis and Ecology: On Ian Angus’s Phenomenological Marxism." The panel was organized and introduced by Gregory... more
Short presentation on a panel at the 2023 meeting of the Society for Existential and Phenomenological Theory and Culture: "Crisis and Ecology: On Ian Angus’s Phenomenological Marxism."
The panel was organized and introduced by Gregory Cameron (WLU). Paper presentations were made by Mahdi Ghanbari (York) and Tyler Gasteiger (York), and Ian Angus (SFU) responded.
The panel was organized and introduced by Gregory Cameron (WLU). Paper presentations were made by Mahdi Ghanbari (York) and Tyler Gasteiger (York), and Ian Angus (SFU) responded.
Research Interests: Critical Theory, Herbert Marcuse, Marxism and Ecology, Indigenous Politics, Phenomenology, and 11 moreMaurice Merleau-Ponty, Edmund Husserl, Socrates, Philosophy Of Crisis, Ecophenomenology, Marxist philosophy, Enzo Paci, Political Phenomenology, Ecological Marxism, Karel Kosík, and Phenomenological Marxism
Brief comments on Helen Fielding, Cultivating Perception Through Artworks: Phenomenological Enactments of Ethics, Politics, and Culture (Indiana UP, 2021) -- Society for Existential and Phenomenological Theory and Culture (9. June 2022)
Research Interests: Aesthetics, Embodiment, Phenomenology, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Aesthetics and Politics, and 12 moreMerleau-Ponty, Marlene Nourbese Philip, Aesthetic Experience, Louise Bourgeois, Phenomenology of Perception, Janet Cardiff, Phenomenology of Embodiment, Phenomenological Ethics, Helen Fielding, Phenomenology of Art, Joan Mitchell, and Anne Truitt
Talk given at The Philosophy of Mythology in the Continental Tradition (Chinese University of Hong Kong): May 2022
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Talk given at People on Streets: Critical Phenomenologies of Embodied Resistance (Paderborn, 12 May 2022). In these remarks, I just want to offer some fairly general reflections on the theme of embodied political resistance, and how this... more
Talk given at People on Streets: Critical Phenomenologies of Embodied Resistance (Paderborn, 12 May 2022).
In these remarks, I just want to offer some fairly general reflections on the theme of embodied political resistance, and how this relates to the idea of spontaneity, and more specifically the idea of spontaneism associated especially with Rosa Luxemburg and her conception of ‘mass strike’ [Massenstreik].
In these remarks, I just want to offer some fairly general reflections on the theme of embodied political resistance, and how this relates to the idea of spontaneity, and more specifically the idea of spontaneism associated especially with Rosa Luxemburg and her conception of ‘mass strike’ [Massenstreik].
Research Interests: Critical Theory, Marxism, Embodied Cognition, Phenomenology, Heroism, and 11 moreResistance (Social), Rosa Luxemburg, Phenomenology of the body, Spontaneity, Social protests, Protest and resistance, Dialectics, Critical Phenomenology, Anti-Capitalist Spontaneity, Phenomenology of Embodiment, and Anti oppression
Brief symposium comments on Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Possibility of Philosophy: Course Notes from the Collège de France, 1959–1961, trans. Keith Whitmoyer (Northwestern University Press, 2022), presented at "The Possibility of... more
Brief symposium comments on Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Possibility of Philosophy: Course Notes from the Collège de France, 1959–1961, trans. Keith Whitmoyer (Northwestern University Press, 2022), presented at "The Possibility of Philosophy: Merleau-Ponty's Final Lectures" (Pace University, 25.III.2022)
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Short paper presented (11 Nov 2021) at Enactivism and Phenomenology: State of the Dialog (conference organized by Jan Halák, Jan Puc, and Caterina Di Fazio), Department of Philosophy, Palacký University (Olomouc, Czech Republic)
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Institute for the Humanities, Simon Fraser University (28 May 2021)
Research Interests: Marxism, Phenomenology, Heroism, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of the body, and 11 moreBig History, Philosophy of Nature, Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Nature, Philosophy of Mythology, Political Myths, Lysenkoism, Deep History, Dialectics of Nature, Phenomenological Marxism, and Dialectical Biology
Workshop presentation given at the 2019 meeting of the Society for Existential and Phenomenological Theory and Culture / Théorie et culture existentialistes et phénoménologiques
Plus a longer chapter-length version of the paper.
Plus a longer chapter-length version of the paper.
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Symposium presentation given at "Relations and Institutions: The Political Implications of Merleau-Ponty’s Work," organized by Jérôme Melançon and Emmanuel de Saint Aubert, at La Cité universitaire francophone at the University of Regina... more
Symposium presentation given at "Relations and Institutions: The Political Implications of Merleau-Ponty’s Work," organized by Jérôme Melançon and Emmanuel de Saint Aubert, at La Cité universitaire francophone at the University of Regina (May 2019).
An expanded version will be included in Transforming Politics with Merleau-Ponty: Thinking beyond the State, edited by Jérôme Melançon (Rowman & Littlefield, 2021)
An expanded version will be included in Transforming Politics with Merleau-Ponty: Thinking beyond the State, edited by Jérôme Melançon (Rowman & Littlefield, 2021)
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In this paper I sketch out a way of rethinking reification on the basis of phenomenological considerations concerning the pre-reflective horizonal-intentional Gestalt structure of experience, combined with resources drawn from... more
In this paper I sketch out a way of rethinking reification on the basis of phenomenological considerations concerning the pre-reflective horizonal-intentional Gestalt structure of experience, combined with resources drawn from contemporary work on situated and embodied cognition, in particular the dialectical framework of enactivism. The idea is to salvage the critical-theoretic import of the concept of reification by coming to more robust material terms with it as a form of embodied cognition – or, if you like, miscognition – understood neither as the representation of an ontologically reified world, nor as the ideological misrepresentation of an unreified world, but rather as the mutually generative enactment of a world-horizon and a mode of experience based upon the dynamic interaction between sensorimotor capacities and sociohistorical context. Approaching reification in this way can shed strategic light on the possibilities and prospects of overcoming it (i.e., dereification).
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There is renewed interest in the contribution that Critical Theory can make to contemporary environmental thought. Current proposals, however, tend to discard the concept of ‘nature’. This is problematic from a phenomenological... more
There is renewed interest in the contribution that Critical Theory can make to contemporary environmental thought. Current proposals, however, tend to discard the concept of ‘nature’. This is problematic from a phenomenological perspective, which shows the hermeneutic need to retain a positive conception of nature as the outer horizon of experience. I will argue that for a critical-theoretic environmentalism this conception will, in epistemic terms, necessarily be mythic in the sense of a narrative process that generates pre-cognitive horizonal significance, and that this is the case precisely because of and not despite its more highly ‘enlightened’ character.
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Construed as the outermost horizon of experience, nature is a fundamental methodological is-sue for transcendental phenomenology. In this paper I argue (counterintuitively) for a generative account of this horizonality in terms of mythic... more
Construed as the outermost horizon of experience, nature is a fundamental methodological is-sue for transcendental phenomenology. In this paper I argue (counterintuitively) for a generative account of this horizonality in terms of mythic significance as the soundest way to secure the methodological viability and coherence of the project. Taking Steven Crowell’s argument in support of ‘naturalistic’ disenchantment as a foil, I thus contend that the question concerning nature places the inescapably normative task of determining the sense and content of this mythic significance at the very beginning of phenomenological investigation.
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The Review of Metaphysics 74:4 (2021): 830-832
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A short review of Morris' excellent book.
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Review of Duane Davis and William Hamrick (eds), Merleau-Ponty and the Art of Perception (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2016)
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Philosophy in Review 31:1 (2011): 70-73
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Philosophy in Review 30:2 (2010): 132-134
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Philosophy in Review 29:3 (2009): 9-11
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Philosophy in Review 28:6 (2008): 411-413
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Philosophy in Review 28:5 (2008): 346-348
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Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy / Revue canadienne de philosophie continentale 11:2 (2007): 468-471
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Philosophy in Review 27:1 (2007): 22-24
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Panel planned for the 2021 meeting of the Society for Existential and Phenomenological Theory and Culture / Théorie et culture existentialistes et phénoménologiques (EPTC/TCEP) [originally planned for 2020 but canceled due to COVID-19]... more
Panel planned for the 2021 meeting of the Society for Existential and Phenomenological Theory and Culture / Théorie et culture existentialistes et phénoménologiques (EPTC/TCEP) [originally planned for 2020 but canceled due to COVID-19]
Please note that Congress 2021 has been switched to a virtual format and that the EPTC/TCEP will not be taking part in this event.
We would still like to hold this panel in a separate online format, so submissions are still welcome.
Please note that Congress 2021 has been switched to a virtual format and that the EPTC/TCEP will not be taking part in this event.
We would still like to hold this panel in a separate online format, so submissions are still welcome.
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This call is no longer current -- the volume in question should appear in the fall of 2021. But if you work in this area, I'd still be interested in hearing about your research. In recent years there has been an increasing level of... more
This call is no longer current -- the volume in question should appear in the fall of 2021. But if you work in this area, I'd still be interested in hearing about your research.
In recent years there has been an increasing level of interest in connections between phenomenology and political philosophy, including the very idea of 'the political' itself. In this context, a wide-ranging body of new work has appeared, much of it engaging productively with emerging tendencies in political theory. What is largely absent from these developments, however, is a serious encounter between phenomenology and Marxism as a philosophical tradition. This absence is all the more notable inasmuch as there is currently a general resurgence of interest in Marxist ideas as providing a framework for the critical analysis of the contemporary world. There is, to be sure, an older tradition of phenomenological Marxism that includes many important contributions. But much of that work is now rather dated in terms of the salient political issues, as well as with regard to current levels of scholarship within the phenomenological tradition. What motivated those contributions, however, remains as pertinent as ever, if not more so—to wit, the recognition of important methodological and philosophical complementarities between a phenomenological analysis of lived experience and a Marxist approach to understanding the historical dynamics of capitalist society.
This volume is intended to gather together new work aiming to revitalize the tradition of phenomenological Marxism (or Marxist phenomenology) by combining cutting-edge scholarship that is fresh and rigorous, with a lucid sensitivity for the practical no less than the theoretical complementarity of the respective traditions. The emphasis will be on philosophical issues as opposed to political-economy as such, but in ways that are not oblivious to the political-economic realities of our time. Although historically-oriented and figure-focused contributions are welcome, preference will be given to proposals having substantive consequences that advance important contemporary debates.
In recent years there has been an increasing level of interest in connections between phenomenology and political philosophy, including the very idea of 'the political' itself. In this context, a wide-ranging body of new work has appeared, much of it engaging productively with emerging tendencies in political theory. What is largely absent from these developments, however, is a serious encounter between phenomenology and Marxism as a philosophical tradition. This absence is all the more notable inasmuch as there is currently a general resurgence of interest in Marxist ideas as providing a framework for the critical analysis of the contemporary world. There is, to be sure, an older tradition of phenomenological Marxism that includes many important contributions. But much of that work is now rather dated in terms of the salient political issues, as well as with regard to current levels of scholarship within the phenomenological tradition. What motivated those contributions, however, remains as pertinent as ever, if not more so—to wit, the recognition of important methodological and philosophical complementarities between a phenomenological analysis of lived experience and a Marxist approach to understanding the historical dynamics of capitalist society.
This volume is intended to gather together new work aiming to revitalize the tradition of phenomenological Marxism (or Marxist phenomenology) by combining cutting-edge scholarship that is fresh and rigorous, with a lucid sensitivity for the practical no less than the theoretical complementarity of the respective traditions. The emphasis will be on philosophical issues as opposed to political-economy as such, but in ways that are not oblivious to the political-economic realities of our time. Although historically-oriented and figure-focused contributions are welcome, preference will be given to proposals having substantive consequences that advance important contemporary debates.