Existential phenomenology

The present thesis is an exploration of the relation between atheistic and religious existential philosophy with a focus on the concept of subjectivity. What are the implications of the two positions in relation to understanding subjectivity? This exploration will lead to a discussion about how existential philosophy can play a role in the field of social work, which includes homelessness, addiction and psychiatry. More specifically, I discuss the concepts of subjectivity connected to the atheistic and religious existential philosophy respectively in relation to social work.

The thesis consists of four main chapters. I start by introducing the historical background of the emergence of existential philosophy. I show the relation between the transition from modernity to late modernity – which is characterized by the dissolution of the great universal narratives -, and the emergence of the movement of existential philosophy. Furthermore, I show how this relates to the transition from transcendental to existential phenomenology. Included is an interpretation of the paradox of Meno, which provides the basis for the exploration of the subject’s access to knowledge. Following this, I put forth Pierre Hadot’s existential interpretation of the figure of Socrates in order to illustrate certain insights that are widely drawn upon in existential philosophy. This is further elaborated on through a reading of Hannah Arendt and Pico.

The second chapter Religious and atheistic existential philosophy consists of an analysis of relevant parts of primarily two works of Søren Kierkegaard, a more general presentation of Heidegger’s Being and Time along with an account of Sartre’s explicit atheistic position. Finally, I draw upon Ricoeur to provide a critique of the aetheistic position aimed at illustrating the ontological axioms and concepts of subjectivity of the religious and aetheistic positions respectively.

In the third chapter Two concepts of subjectivity – Self-realization and self-transcendence, I draw on the accounts of the aetheistic and religious position outlined in the previous chapter. I elaborate on the two concepts of subjectivity connected to these two positions: the concept of the subject as self-realization and the concept of the subject as self-transcendent. I return to Pierre Hadot and relate the perspectives of both Hadot and Michel Foucault to the religious and aetheistic position. The aim is to expand the understanding of the two positions in relation to the two concepts of subjectivity and spirituality. And finally, I draw upon Karl Jaspers to further elaborate on the relation between the two concepts of subjectivity and the religious position more specifically.

In the last chapter of the thesis Discussion relating to praxis, I turn to the field of social work. I provide a brief historical sketch of some of the latest changes within the field of social work and relate this to a discussion of relation between individualizing and structural approaches. I illustrate how social work plays out in a paradoxical field of tension between autonomy and control, between subjectification and objectification, which relates to the contradicting individualizing and structural understandings. This is connected to the two central concepts of subjectivity, the concept of the subject as self-realizing and the subject as self-transcendent, outlined earlier in the thesis, in order to show how the existing framework of social work can be said to encourage reductive objectification of the lives of the homeless and the problems connected to homelessness. Furthermore, these frameworks are discussed in relation to the existential perspectives presented in the thesis and to the two concepts of subjectivity. I close the chapter with an account of Ronald D. Laing’s critique of biomedical psychiatry, and illustrate how the same critique can be applied to social work in general.

The explorations of the four main chapters all lead to a problematization of existing professional approaches within the field of social work rather than a final conclusion. By relating the existential philosophical perspectives addressed throughout the thesis to the field of social work, I show how the theoretic understandings employed in praxis can lead to a reduction of the homeless and their life problems. This is not due to the theories themselves, but to the fact that these are ascribed more power of explanation than what they actually possess, which results in both professionals and homeless being misled to equate their own self-understanding with the theoretical constructions they are reduced to in the meeting with one another. Like Hadot criticizes Foucault and Ricoeur criticizes Sarte, I argue that the concept of the subject as self-realization places too much weight on the self. Hereby, the spiritual dimension of being is reduced into an object of a technology that in principle enables the subject to an arbitrary negation of being. This not only supports an individualizing discourse, but actually results in an absolute individualizing discourse.

However, I show that no matter where you stand on a spectrum of a pure structural or pure individualized theoretical understanding, this dualism will entail a reduction of real life human problems. On this background, I conclude that to the extent that the existential conditions are not considered in social work, this will lead to a reduction of human beings to dysfunctional objects that may be healed by means of themselves or by others, medicated, or must be declared totally or partly useless/incompetent. Likewise, I argue, social workers are reduced from fellow human beings to mere functions, who are supposed to possess specific professional knowledge and skills to enable such a healing or to declare efforts to do so totally of partly fruitless.

Following this, I argue that in the field of social work, we must include a dimension of non-knowledge if we are to avoid reducing both professionals to functions and homeless to dysfunctional objects. When reflecting on how you should position yourself as a professional, this inadequacy of theoretic professionalism must be considered.

We are left with the question about whether we may in any way overcome the inadequacy of professionalism by adding to it a sort of professionalism of inadequacy. If we hereby mean that it is possible to overcome the distance between professionalism and its object, we have already stepped into a professional self-adequacy, which reduces a person to an object. Thus, the emphasis must be placed on the inadequacy, not on professionalism, if we wish to contain, meet and understand another person in an existential sense.

Es posible evidenciar similitudes y diferencias en las ideas de Simone de Beauvoir y Ayn Rand. Haciendo suyo lo que podría llamarse una "Ética de la Resolución", Rand elogia a las personas que realizan acciones dirigidas a objetivos sostenidos, como carreras profesionales. Beauvoir, sin embargo, apoya una "Ética de la Ambigüedad" que la hace más escéptica ante las perspectivas de la realización de proyectos a largo plazo sin engañarse a sí mismo.

Discussions of sexual ethics often focus on the wrong of treating another as a mere object instead of as a person worthy of respect. On this view, the task of sexual ethics becomes putting the other’s subjectivity above their status as erotic object so as to avoid the harms of objectification. Ward and Anderson argue that such a view disregards the crucial, moral role that erotic objecthood plays in sexual encounters. Important moral features of intimacy are disclosed through the experience of being an erotic object for another, as well as in perceiving another as an erotic object. Drawing on phenomenology, especially the insights of Simone de Beauvoir, Ward and Anderson argue that erotic encounters are shaped by the human condition of ambiguity, where being an object for others is intertwined with bodily agency. Because sexual agency is complex in this way, theories of sexual ethics and responsibility must widen their focus beyond transparent communication and authoritative expressions of will.

Besides “items of interest,” and “citations received,” this issue includes the following items:
 An “in memoriam” for phenomenological sociologist George Psathas, who died last November;
 A “book note” on philosopher Dan Zahavi’s just-published Phenomenology: The Basics, an introduction to phenomenological principles and methods (Routledge, 2019);
 A “book note” on naturalist Paul Krafel’s recent Roaming Upward, a text that continues his novel efforts to reverse environmental and human entropy;
 The third part of the late philosopher Henri Bortoft’s 1999 conference presentation on Goethean science;
 Sociologist Julia Bennett’s overview of her doctoral research relating to belonging among families who have lived in one English town for multiple generations;
 Environmental educator John Cameron’s continuing discussion of “lived interiority” via consideration of landscape character as understood by several well-known thinkers and writers;
 Australian artist and photograph Sue Michael’s introductory text and several works that were part of her recent painting and photography exhibit, “Settled Areas”;
 To mark EAP’s 30th year of publication, editor David Seamon’s discussion of current conceptual and methodological concerns relating to phenomenology as a philosophy and conceptual approach. He considers: (1) placing phenomenology; (2) displacing phenomenology; and (3) evaluating phenomenology.

This issue also includes a list of 23 definitions of phenomenology.