Hans Born

forthcoming in: Sicherheit + Frieden 35: 2 (2017), 72-78. Abstract: The objective of this article is to explore the role of parliament in police governance in selected countries in Asia and Europe, including Belgium, Germany, India, Indonesia, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Thailand and the United Kingdom. Based on a comparative framework of analysis, the country case studies demonstrate that parliaments apply their generic functions to the police, including the legislative, budget control and oversight function. Furthermore, parliaments in all case studies have a dedicated committee or subcommittee dealing with police affairs, endowed with subpoena and contempt powers to compel government and police officers to appear before committee meetings and to submit required documents. In addition, for police to be fully accountable, parliaments have legislated and set up independent oversight bodies, including independent police complaints bodies, ombudspersons and national human rights institutions as well as anti-corruption/ financial audit bodies and data-protection commissioners.

As the primary agency for law enforcement, the police operates at close
proximity to the public and exerts significant influence over the security
of individuals and communities through its behaviours and performance.
Therefore, ensuring accountability of both the individuals and institutions of the police is a fundamental condition for good governance of the security sector in democratic societies. The parliament, as the highest representative body in a democratic system, plays a significant role in maintaining police accountability.
The objective of the edited volume on “The Role of Parliament in Police
Governance: Lessons Learned from Asia and Europe” is to put forward good practices and recommendations for improving police accountability, with an emphasis on the strengthening of the role of parliament in police governance. The comparative analysis includes insights and lessons learned from eight country case studies including Belgium, Germany, India, Indonesia, the Netherlands, Philippines, Thailand and the United Kingdom. The findings of the cases studies can be taken into account when analysing and considering options for improving the accountability of the police to parliament as well as strengthening independent oversight bodies and parliament-police liaison mechanisms. However, it must be emphasised that these good practices always need to be adapted to the exigencies of the local context.

Intelligence services perform a valuable service to democratic societies in protecting national security, including safeguarding the fundamental freedoms and human rights of their members. The secret nature of intelligence work can, however, put the services at odds with the principles of an open society. This applies in particular to international cooperation, where intelligence services try to keep secret why, how, with whom and when they cooperate with other states. Until relatively recently, international intelligence cooperation was a black box, impenetrable to public scrutiny, about which states gave very little or no information. The secrecy surrounding international cooperation was so high that it was thought to be impossible to address issues of accountability.
Against this backdrop, the aim of the guide is to provide practical and specific guidance on how accountability and oversight of international intelligence cooperation can be strengthened on the basis of practical examples. It is based on international comparative research of legal and institutional frameworks of intelligence oversight, combined with in-depth interviews with former intelligence officials and intelligence overseers. It covers recent developments in intelligence cooperation, domestic and international standards, as well as internal and external oversight of international cooperation. The guide is an invaluable and practical tool for everyone concerned about accountability in this important but challenging field.
Download link:
http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Making-International-Intelligence-Cooperation-Accountable

Hans Born, Loch Johnson and Ian Leigh (eds., 2005) Given recent experiences with terrorism, clearly even the most democratic societies have a legitimate need for secrecy. This secrecy has often been abused, however, and strong oversight systems are necessary to protect individual liberties.


The assembled authors, each well known in the international community of national security scholars, bring together in one volume the rich experience of three decades of experimentation in intelligence accountability. Using a structured approach, they examine the strengths and weaknesses of the intelligence systems of Argentina, Canada, Germany, Norway, Poland, South Africa, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States. While these democracies have experimented with methods to make intelligence more accountable, they all have different political systems, political cultures, legal systems, and democratic traditions, thereby presenting an exceptional opportunity to examine how intelligence accountability evolves under disparate circumstances. The contributors draw together the best practices into a framework for successful approaches to intelligence accountability, including a prescription for a model law.