Stephane Dias

Este trabalho tem como tema agencia comunicativa humana. A competencia para instanciar um conjunto de procedimentos comunicativos e tomada como um componente da racionalidade humana que cumpre a funcao central de regulacao de nosso ambiente cognitivo (um conjunto de estados mentais, destacadamente suposicoes e emocoes) tendo em vista maximizar metas praticas e sociabilidade. A abordagem linguistico-inferencial desse escopo de racionalidade que oferecemos abarca dois niveis: cognitivo e pratico, tratados hierarquicamente em funcao das regulacoes supostas. Primeiramente, consideramos que o aparato cognitivo (base inferencial, representacional e matarrepresentacional), junto com o aparato linguistico (computacao mais expressoes interpretaveis), nos permite operar do nivel mais basico de processamento linguistico a niveis mais altos (em que se consideram suposicoes sobre outras mentes). No dominio pratico, por sua vez, consideramos que o comportamento linguistico-comunicativo e usado po...

This article aims to discuss a set of concepts underlying the area known as Language Acquisition, by a metatheoretical perspective. The discussion is guided by the Metatheory of Interfaces (CAMPOS, 2007), which represents an organizational apparatus to deal with complex theoretical objects, such as those constructed by interdisciplinary research. Topics in semantic acquisition and pragmatic acquisition are presented in order to illustrate the perspective.

Este artigo explora uma agenda de pesquisa teórico-aplicada no âmbito das ciências da linguagem. Como parte da pesquisa, apresentaremos nossa análise de um diálogo, disponibilizado pelo projeto The Palestine Papers, entre negociadores do Estado de Israel e da Organização para a Libertação da Palestina. Abordaremos, assim, um objeto teórico (agência dialógica) e um objeto empírico (diálogos de paz israelo-palestinos). E, a partir do arsenal teórico proposto, dos problemas levantados na análise e de uma proposta de pacificação tomada como base, defenderemos um cenário alternativo de mediação, cujo núcleo é o uso de novos agentes e novas linguagens.

Hate speech as a political tool of extremism has been on the rise in the Global North and Global South. Its appeal gains audience, support, and strength every day in numerous countries. The geographical spaces may be different, but the geopolitical social locations of groups, members, and individuals reveal similar inequalities and aggressions. Considering this context, we intend to contribute with an assessment of hate speech via a case study-a politician's statements in the Netherlands with a brief parallel with a Brazilian scenario. Centrally, our paper approaches two different domains of hate speech. One domain of hate speech is its discursive framing, taken as a major source of representations, and the other is its interpretation in the context of legal systems. Agency is what connects the two domains. That is, we will address institutional agents and legal interpretation of politicians' speeches. To have an understanding of the subject matter, we need to understand the collective representations involved. In simple terms, we connect (legal) interpretation and (collective) representation to deal with hate speech cases performed by agents. These agents are addressed in hate speech laws both within the Netherlands and within the UN-also considering speech aggression in the Brazilian political scenario. Finally, addressing the agents and the framed speech acts involved seem to be relevant steps to broaden our understanding of the criminalization of hate speech and its propagation inside human societies, observing that we can resignify our frames and the agents around us as part of a bigger community.

Uma nova versão de minha dissertação sobre o comportamento dialógico humano dentro e fora das redes sociais.
Neste trabalho, o foco recaiu sobre o jogo dialógico, tendo em vista que o diálogo, quer seja presencial ou mediado por máquinas, quer seja de um-para-um, um-para-vários, vários-para-um ou de vários-para-vários, é uma expressão básica do comportamento comunicativo humano. Nesse sentido, a escolha do tema levou em consideração que a cultura digital, ao possibilitar novas formas de contato comunicativo, trouxe, e continua trazendo, desafios aos estudos linguísticos, pois novos elementos entram em cena na análise dos fenômenos. Como consequência, noções centrais aos estudos semântico-pragmáticos, como contexto, intenção, significado-do-falante e benefício comunicativo, são redimensionadas.

Our competence to instantiate a set of communicative procedures is taken as a component of human rationality that meets a key role of regulating our cognitive environment (a set of mental states, centrally assumptions and emotions), in order to maximize practical goals and sociability. The linguistic-inferential approach offered here for this scope of rationality covers two main levels: the cognitive and the practical level.

We consider that the cognitive apparatus (the inferential, representational and metarepresentational basis), together with the linguistic apparatus (computation plus interpretable expressions), allows us to operate from the most basic levels of linguistic processing to higher levels (where agents consider assumptions about other minds).

In the practical domain, we consider that the linguistic and communicative behavior is used by agents to affect mental states and courses of action, thus being in the basis of our  social cognition. In this scenario, we not only interact with agents since we also create a social agency via language. We, therefore, consider a communicative agency framework in which acts are performed within a dialogical structure.

The general thesis is that communication requires the use of skills that incorporate practical rationality parameters. This regulation would rely on a cognitive and practical structure of agency in which human cognition represents three types of agents: individuals, group members and groups (collectives or representatives). Each of these levels presents characteristic features of communicative agency. In all of them, however, there is the possibility of disagreement among agents, cognitive or practical, in dialogue situations.

We illustrate this aspect with a scenario of conflict between agents that are supposed to reach a peace agreement. The illustrative analysis focuses on real negotiation dialogues between group members and representatives of the State of Israel and of Palestine. We observe how practical goals of agents of these types regulate their cognitive and dialogical goals.

As a result, we present an alternative proposal to the standard scenario of negotiation, or conflict mediation. As a theoretical benefit, ad hoc pragmatic issues (relevance to the individual qua agent, conflicts between agents) are given prominence and effective treatment. As a practical benefit, the model can be applied to the area of conflict mediation, given the downsizing of a biosocial disposition: our cognitive states are particularly affected by stimuli from a class of agents, with potential effect on individual and collective agencies.

A Group decision-making necessarily involves communication. Deciding is an individual cognitive act and a group speech act. Thus, analyzing a proposition proffered/assumed/attributed to an entity (individual or collective) is in the scope of communicative rationality. It is quite reasonable to consider that rational agency patterns applied to individuals (centrally, making a doxastic decision towards p, as knowing, believing, assuming it as true or false; entertaining propositions, having justification) are valid to group agency. We can approach a group as an entity governed by the same patterns of rationality applied to humans individually, since such groups are formed and represented by individuals. However, we assume here that with respect to cognitive-communicative human behavior some of these considerations of individual agency could not be used to provide an adequate framework of collective agency, since the latter is governed by specific principles, presented as follows: 1) We can describe internal group status (recognition) and external group status (attributions). Concerning the first one, we assume the existence of a set of conscious general relations that link individuals under the realm of an agency and allow them to qualify themselves as a specific entity in the world. Concerning the second one, we assume that we can identify individuals or institutions as a collective agent and we can attach acts and content to them. Besides, we assume that communication is required for internal and external manifestability.

We claim that we can better approach collective agency by a communicative perspective based on the concept of speech act. Like Searle (2010), we are committed to a linguistic account of collective intentionality that has joint acceptance in its base. We assume that human society operates via three types of agents: individuals, members of groups and groups. Differently of Gilbert (1987), we consider a joint acceptance account of the semantics-pragmatics of everyday collective position statements.

Nossa proposta, em desenvolvimento, agrega a modelos teóricos defendidos no campo da filosofia (Searle, 2001, 2010; List & Pettit, 2011), da linguística (Sperber & Wilson, 1995; Wodak, 2000; Weigand, 2010), da psicologia do raciocínio (Mercier & Sperber, 2011, 2017) e da computação (Traum & Allen, 1994; Jennings & Lesperance, 2000),  destacando-se aqui uma noção de agência comunicativa humana que pode envolver agentes coletivos e institucionais.

In this talk, I will focus on the question whether the notion of agency is relevant to the analysis of dialogue. The answer I will provide is positive, given that notion's descriptive and explanatory advantages. I will illustrate the point in two domains of dialogue activity, i.e. deliberation and negotiation. More specifically, I will consider three main levels of human dialogical agency: (1) the reasoning process of individuals when speaking in the name of institutional groups ('we' or 'me as a representative of the group'), (2) their reasoning as members of a group, and (3) their reasoning as individuals, who communicate their goals, reasons and feelings. I will thereby offer good reasons for that positive claim. Moreover, these theoretical tools have the advantage of clarifying dialogue types and moves, speakers' intentions, reasons and goals and, consequently, conflicts. Finally, I will address central results and applications of this ongoing project.

Grice's pragmatic turn is still an open debate

The importance of Studies in the Way of Words is such that the main trends in Pragmatics acknowledge themselves as being post or neo-Gricean. In fact, this proposal addresses the central issue posed by Grice in chapter 2 of his book: there is an inadequate attention to the nature and importance of the conditions governing conversation. Even though Grice fully explains the cooperative principle and its maxims with quite convincing arguments, the core aspect of his proposal is still under dispute. Centrally, some scholars, like Chomsky, assume that the "study of the way a hearer arrives at an interpretation is hopeless" (Allott, 2005: 219). Our main task is, then, to understand the relevance of this disagreement and to evaluate alternative views on the scope of pragmatics. Our method evaluates central arguments in the literature and confront them with empirical data in related areas. We often claim of natural language as having two main functions, where the first one is in the base of the second: information processing and communication. As we can infer, for the second one to operate, we need the first. Regarding the second, we can generally say that we use language instrumentally, that is, to do something else, our main goal. And one of the main differences between the first and the second functions can be pointed out as a difference between a natural versus a social function, or an innate versus a learned one. These claims seem not to be right. For sure, people learn social norms (such as how to ask polite questions and how to greet in a language-x) and enrich conceptual knowledge by experience, if this is what we want to capture by felicitous interaction. Yet, the central debate stated on the Studies in the Way of Words is far from being solved. While there are undoubtedly many answers to the issue, the debate is still polarized. For some, people learn the basis of how to interact with other agents, or rather are equipped with rational tools that allow them to follow rules or maxisms, or yet with cognitive dispositions for interpretation and production of ostensive behavior. As a common point, we all realize that kids are too good communicators for them to learn it entirely from experience.