- Department of Philosophy, History, Culture and Art Studies, Pl 24 00014 University of Helsinki
My stuff is available for download in https://zenodo.org/communities/mro/?page=1&size=20
Markku Roinila
University of Helsinki, Helsinki University Library, Department Member
- University of Helsinki, Department of Philosophy, History and Arts, Department Memberadd
- 17th Century & Early Modern Philosophy, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, John Locke, Philosophy of the Emotions, Early Modern Political Thought, Early Modern Philosophy, and 33 morePractical Rationality, Descartes, René, Baruch Spinoza, Nicolas Malebranche, Early Modern theories of the passions, Moral Psychology, Early Modern Intellectual History, Early Modern Science and Philosophy, Practical Reasons and Rationality, Metaphysics, History of Science, Dreams, Dreams (Psychology), Automata, Soul (Humanities), Early Modern Intellectual History and the History of Ideas, Intellectual History, History of the Philosophy of Mind, Antoine Arnauld, Spinoza, Leibniz (Philosophy), Pierre Bayle, History Of Emotions, Leibniz, Hobbes, History of Philosophy, Imagination, Descartes, Leibniz) Phenomenology (Heidegger, Open Access, Open Access Publishing, Open science, and Perfectionismedit
- My central interest has been Leibniz since early 1990s. I first studied in the Department of History where I made a l... moreMy central interest has been Leibniz since early 1990s. I first studied in the Department of History where I made a licenciate thesis on Leibniz's practical projects. After that thesis I changed to the Department of Philosophy and wrote a Ph.D. thesis on Leibniz's theory of Rational Decision (2007). My other interests include Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Passions, Dreams and Open Access.
My last research project was on emotions and the perfectibility of man in Leibniz (2011-2013; Postdoctoral Research Fellow of The Academy of Finland) where I concentrated on his view of emotions and their effect on our moral action. I am applying funding for a continuating project which extends the topic to metaphysics and dynamics of the mind.
Currently I am working as an information specialist in Helsinki University Library and I hold a title of a docent in theoretical philosophy of Faculty of Arts in the University of Helsinki since December 2015.edit
In this study I discuss G. W. Leibniz's (1646-1716) views on rational decision-making from the standpoint of both God and man. The Divine decision takes place within creation, as God freely chooses the best from an infinite number of... more
In this study I discuss G. W. Leibniz's (1646-1716) views on rational decision-making from the standpoint of both God and man. The Divine decision takes place within creation, as God freely chooses the best from an infinite number of possible worlds. While God's choice is based on absolutely certain knowledge, human decisions on practical matters are mostly based on uncertain knowledge. However, in many respects they could be regarded as analogous in more complicated situations. In addition to giving an overview of the divine decision-making and discussing critically the criteria God favours in his choice, I provide an account of Leibniz's views on human deliberation, which includes some new ideas. One of these concerns is the importance of estimating probabilities – in making decisions one estimates both the goodness of the act itself and its consequences as far as the desired good is concerned. Another idea is related to the plurality of goods in complicated decisions and the competition this may provoke. Thirdly, heuristic models are used to sketch situations under deliberation in order to help in making the decision. Combining the views of Marcelo Dascal, Jaakko Hintikka and Simo Knuuttila, I argue that Leibniz applied two kinds of models of rational decision-making to practical controversies, often without explicating the details. The more simple, traditional pair of scales model is best suited to cases in which one has to decide for or against some option, or to distribute goods among parties and strive for a compromise. What may be of more help in more complicated deliberations is the novel vectorial model, which is an instance of the general mathematical doctrine of the calculus of variations. To illustrate this distinction, I discuss some cases in which he apparently applied these models in different kinds of situation. These examples support the view that the models had a systematic value in his theory of practical rationality. Get it from https://zenodo.org/record/2560915#.XF6bDDP7SM9
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This is a large selection of Leibniz's most well-known writings, along with some less known, but intresting texts translated to Finnish with extensive notes and introductions. Professor Simo Knuuttila has authored the general... more
This is a large selection of Leibniz's most well-known writings, along with some less known, but intresting texts translated to Finnish with extensive notes and introductions. Professor Simo Knuuttila has authored the general introduction.
Review in Finnish in Helsingin sanomat: http://www.hs.fi/kirjat/artikkeli/Kaikkea+tutkinut+Leibniz+edustaa++yksin+kokonaista+akatemiaa/HS20110703SI1KU02p8v
Review in Finnish in Helsingin sanomat: http://www.hs.fi/kirjat/artikkeli/Kaikkea+tutkinut+Leibniz+edustaa++yksin+kokonaista+akatemiaa/HS20110703SI1KU02p8v
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This book (in Finnish) contains stories of how various philosophers died.
http://www.hs.fi/kirjat/artikkeli/Viimeinen++diskurssi/HS20040327SI1KU02l90
http://www.hs.fi/kirjat/artikkeli/Viimeinen++diskurssi/HS20040327SI1KU02l90
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This book includes 89 micro-autobiographies of different Finnish philsophers. They focus on the doctoral stage, on the pleasure of pain of writing a doctoral theses and defending it. Included are such philosophers as Jaakko Hintikka,... more
This book includes 89 micro-autobiographies of different Finnish philsophers. They focus on the doctoral stage, on the pleasure of pain of writing a doctoral theses and defending it. Included are such philosophers as Jaakko Hintikka, Ilkka Niiniluoto, Simo Knuuttila and Martin Kusch.
Teon on saatavissa avoimena Helda Open Books-kokoelmassa https://doi.org/10.31885/9789515150080
Teon on saatavissa avoimena Helda Open Books-kokoelmassa https://doi.org/10.31885/9789515150080
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G. W. Leibniz developed a new model for rational decision-making which is suited to complicated decisions, where goods do not rule each other out, but compete with each other. In such cases the deliberator has to consider all of the goods... more
G. W. Leibniz developed a new model for rational decision-making which is suited to complicated decisions, where goods do not rule each other out, but compete with each other. In such cases the deliberator has to consider all of the goods and pick the ones that contribute most to the desired goal which in Leibniz’s system is ultimately the advancement of universal perfection. The inclinations to particular goods can be seen as vectors leading to different directions much like forces in Leibniz’s dynamics. The vectorial model of rational decision-making is related to Leibniz’s work with metaphysical physics and the calculus of variations and is a heuristic tool which helps in finding reasonable combinations – in ideal cases optimums - between competing goods. By applying the model, the decision-maker can map and compare outcomes of combinations of goods in question and practice a kind of pseudo-mechanical arithmetic of reasons. A central feature of the model is the possibility to employ geometrical figures to help the conceptualization. In this paper I present the vectorial model, examine its applications in practical cases from political theory, jurisprudence and ethics Leibniz presented, and compare the model to recent theories of acting under uncertainty, such as bounded rationality and optimizing under constraints.
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Research Interests: Avoin Tiede and Kirjastot
Viime vuosien avoimen julkaisemisen kulttuuri on tuonut tutkijan ulottuville ilmiömäisen määrän tutkimusmateriaalia, erityisesti avoimia tutkimusartikkeleita. Siinä missä luonnontieteissä tätä uutta tutkimusmateriaalia on hyödynnetty... more
Viime vuosien avoimen julkaisemisen kulttuuri on tuonut tutkijan ulottuville ilmiömäisen määrän tutkimusmateriaalia, erityisesti avoimia tutkimusartikkeleita. Siinä missä luonnontieteissä tätä uutta tutkimusmateriaalia on hyödynnetty systemaattisesti jo vuosia, ihmis- ja yhteiskuntatieteissä avointa materiaalia käytetään tutkimusjulkaisujen perusteella selkeästi vähemmän. Tässä kirjoituksessa pohdin syitä tähän eroon ja mietin ihmis- ja yhteiskuntatieteiden julkaisukulttuurin tulevaisuutta. Luettavissa: https://netn.fi/node/8396
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Leibniz ja universaalikirjasto Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnizia (1646-1716) on usein kutsuttu universaalineroksi. Luonnehdinta on varsin osuva ottaen huomioon Leibnizin intressien laajuuden, hänen luovan panoksensa monille eri aloille ja... more
Leibniz ja universaalikirjasto Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnizia (1646-1716) on usein kutsuttu universaalineroksi. Luonnehdinta on varsin osuva ottaen huomioon Leibnizin intressien laajuuden, hänen luovan panoksensa monille eri aloille ja metafyysis-kulttuurisen vision, joka kajasti kaikkien hänen hankkeidensa, niin teoreettisten kuin käytännöllistenkin, taustalla. Leibniz tunnetaan nykyään ennen kaikkea filosofina ja matemaatikkona, mutta ei juurikaan siitä, että hän toimi suuren osan elämästään kahden eri kirjaston hoitajana: Hannoverin herttuallisen kirjaston ja edelleen maineikkaan, Wolfenbüttelissä sijaitsevan Herzog August Bibliothekin. Tämä katsausartikkeli esittelee Leibnizin kirjastouraa ja hänen kirjastonhoitoa koskevia näkemyksiään, jotka eivät omana aikanaan olleet aivan tavanomaisia. Leibnizin universaalikäsityksen mukaan kirjasto ei nimittäin ole kirjoilla täytetty tila vaan heijastus koko inhimillisen tiedon tilasta. Artikkelissa luodaan katsaus aiheesta kirjoitettuun kansainväliseen tutkimuskirjallisuuteen ja Leibnizin kirjastonhoitoa käsitteleviin muistoihin.
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Avointa julkaisemista edistetään tarjoamalla siihen tutkijan kannalta merkityksellisiä kannustimia. Lisäksi tulee tarjota riittäviä ja monipuolisia palveluita julkaisemisen tueksi.
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We will discuss teaching publishing practices and different forms of student participation in three open access journals hosted by Helsinki University Library's Editori-service, two of which are from a field of neurosciences. As a... more
We will discuss teaching publishing practices and different forms of student participation in three open access journals hosted by Helsinki University Library's Editori-service, two of which are from a field of neurosciences. As a theoretical framework, we will distinguish between classroom journals (with students providing the content and teacher acting as an editor), student-led journals (students acting in both roles) and mock journals (which are like classroom journals, but the journal remains unpublished). Our discussion is founded on interviews of journal editors and analysis of student roles in the journals. In addition, we will mention one previous experiment of a mock journal in Editori-service, related to a Doctoral School working seminar in Humanities and Social Sciences.
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In his defense of innateness in New Essays on Human Understanding (1704), Leibniz attributes innateness to concepts and principles which do not originate from the senses rather than to the ideas that we are born with. He argues that the... more
In his defense of innateness in New Essays on Human Understanding (1704), Leibniz attributes innateness to concepts and principles which do not originate from the senses rather than to the ideas that we are born with. He argues that the innate concepts and principles can be known in two ways: through reason or natural light (necessary truths), and through instincts (other innate truths and principles). In this paper I will show how theoretical and moral reasoning differ from each other in Leibniz, and compare moral reasoning and instincts as sources of knowledge in his practical philosophy. As the practical instincts are closely related to pleasure and passions, which are by nature cognitive, my emphasis will be on the affective character of instinctive moral action and especially deliberation which leads to moral action. I will argue that inclinations arising from moral instinct, which lead us to pleasure while avoiding sorrow, can direct our moral action and sometimes anticipate reasoning when conclusions are not readily available. Acting by will, which is related to moral reasoning, and acting by instincts can lead us to the same moral knowledge independently, but they can also complement each other. To illustrate the two alternative ways to reach moral knowledge, I will discuss the case of happiness, which is the goal of all human moral action for Leibniz.
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Academic libraries play a pivotal role in promoting open science, providing essential services for opening research and education. The library has also a key role in increasing awareness of open educational resources and practices.... more
Academic libraries play a pivotal role in promoting open science, providing essential services for opening research and education. The library has also a key role in increasing awareness of open educational resources and practices. Editori is an open journal service at the University of Helsinki designed with an educational focus, providing simultaneously a contribution to the rising trend of university-based and library-based publishing. We show how this service can be applied as a pedagogical tool for teaching scholarly publishing skills to university students. In 2019 Helsinki University Library initiated a pilot project together with the Working Seminar of Doctoral Programme in Philosophy, Arts and Society of the Arts Faculty of the University of Helsinki. We outline expected pedagogical outcomes from the project, relating to scholarly communication skills, report feedback from teachers and students and discuss implications for future service development. In sum, students and teachers found the Editori platform intuitive and easy to use, although the learning curve for course leaders was considered steep in the initial phase.
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In §18 of Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason, Leibniz says: ”Thus our happiness will never consist, and must never consist, in complete joy, in which nothing is left to desire, and which would dull our mind, but must consist... more
In §18 of Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason, Leibniz says: ”Thus our happiness will never consist, and must never consist, in complete joy, in which nothing is left to desire, and which would dull our mind, but must consist in a perpetual progress to new pleasures and new perfections.”
This passage is typical in Leibniz’s Nachlass. Universal perfection creates in us joy or pleasure of the mind and its source is our creator, God. When this joy is constant, we reach happiness and wisdom which is a kind of standing state of virtue, readiness to practice charity in the best of all possible worlds. However, it also indicates that our knowledge is never perfect. Perfecting our knowledge is a never-ending process which gives us joy in itself and motivates us to act in imitation of God. In this way some passions advance our knowledge and we can create ourselves a passionate habit of knowing more about the world and its perfection.
In this paper I try to see this process of self-perfection from a cognitive rather than ethical point of view. While it is clear that in the final stage of wisdom we act mostly on our volitions which are founded on clear and distinct perceptions, it is less clear what cognitive status is to be attributed to our initial perceptions of perfection, our emotions and finally, the intellectual emotions which lead us to perfection and God. I will also reflect the role of the minute perceptions in our struggle for happiness. My argument is that a central cognitive role in Leibniz’s views on self-perfection is held by clear, but confused perfections which are subjective, undemonstrable impressions, shades, feelings. Therefore our ethical action is largely founded on passing, minute feelings rather than on deliberated conscious volitions, although the goal in Leibniz’s moral theory is to change this fact.
My discussion is founded on several texts from Leibniz’s later philosophy, such as the discussion following from New System of the Nature and the Communication of Substances of 1695, Leibniz’s letter to Queen Sophie Charlotte of 1702 (also known as On What is Independent in Sense and Matter), New Essays on Human Understanding (1704), Theodicy (1710) and naturally Leibniz’s most important epistemological text, Meditations of Truth, Knowledge and Ideas (1684).
This passage is typical in Leibniz’s Nachlass. Universal perfection creates in us joy or pleasure of the mind and its source is our creator, God. When this joy is constant, we reach happiness and wisdom which is a kind of standing state of virtue, readiness to practice charity in the best of all possible worlds. However, it also indicates that our knowledge is never perfect. Perfecting our knowledge is a never-ending process which gives us joy in itself and motivates us to act in imitation of God. In this way some passions advance our knowledge and we can create ourselves a passionate habit of knowing more about the world and its perfection.
In this paper I try to see this process of self-perfection from a cognitive rather than ethical point of view. While it is clear that in the final stage of wisdom we act mostly on our volitions which are founded on clear and distinct perceptions, it is less clear what cognitive status is to be attributed to our initial perceptions of perfection, our emotions and finally, the intellectual emotions which lead us to perfection and God. I will also reflect the role of the minute perceptions in our struggle for happiness. My argument is that a central cognitive role in Leibniz’s views on self-perfection is held by clear, but confused perfections which are subjective, undemonstrable impressions, shades, feelings. Therefore our ethical action is largely founded on passing, minute feelings rather than on deliberated conscious volitions, although the goal in Leibniz’s moral theory is to change this fact.
My discussion is founded on several texts from Leibniz’s later philosophy, such as the discussion following from New System of the Nature and the Communication of Substances of 1695, Leibniz’s letter to Queen Sophie Charlotte of 1702 (also known as On What is Independent in Sense and Matter), New Essays on Human Understanding (1704), Theodicy (1710) and naturally Leibniz’s most important epistemological text, Meditations of Truth, Knowledge and Ideas (1684).
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In this article we will examine the question of how open access publishers should be evaluated from the point of view of library acquisition services or of a researcher who considers publishing in an OA journal. We will present a method... more
In this article we will examine the question of how open access publishers should be evaluated from the point of view of library acquisition services or of a researcher who considers publishing in an OA journal. We will present a method for evaluation of the practices of OA publishers and the impact of their e-journals. Our method combines quantitative and qualitative analysis and can also be applied to evaluating singular OA journals. Open access. Available (in Finnish) at https://journal.fi/inf/article/view/70192
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2000-luvun suomalaista tiedepolitiikkaa on leimannut kvantatiivisten mittareiden yleistyminen sekä tieteen vaikuttavuuden mittaamisessa että yliopistojen rahanjaossa. Karkeasti yleistäen tutkijan työpanosta mitataan useimmilla aloilla sen... more
2000-luvun suomalaista tiedepolitiikkaa on leimannut kvantatiivisten mittareiden yleistyminen sekä tieteen vaikuttavuuden mittaamisessa että yliopistojen rahanjaossa. Karkeasti yleistäen tutkijan työpanosta mitataan useimmilla aloilla sen mukaan miten paljon hän julkaisee vertaisarvioiduissa kansainvälissä aikakausilehdissa ja monissa tapauksessa myös hänen uransa eteneminen riippuu pikemminkin vertaisarvioitujen artikkelien määrästä kuin niiden laadusta. Onkin usein tuotu esiin, että sellainen mainekas tutkija kuin Albert Einstein ei olisi ikinä pärjännyt nykyisessä tiedemaailmassa. Tilanne on johtanut siihen, että tieteellisten artikkelien määrä on kasvanut räjähdysmäisesti. Tämä taas on puolestaan johtanut kahteen melko vastakkaiseen ilmiöön. Ensinnäkin tutkimusartikkeleita ilmestyy niin nopeaan tahtiin, että tutkijan on vaikea olla selvillä suhteellisen suppeankin erikoisalan uusimmista tutkimustuloksista. Kaikkea ei vain ehdi lukea, pääasiassa siksi, että on itse jatkuvasti tuotettava uusia tutkimusartikkeleita pysyäkseen kilpailussa mukana. Niinpä saattaa hyvin käydä niin, että tärkeätkin uudet tutkimustulokset jäävät huomaamatta ja asia saattaa jäädä havaitsematta myös vertaisarvioijalta, jonka kalenteri täyttyy oman tutkimusuran edistämisen eli artikkeleiden kirjoittamisen lisäksi lukuisista referee-pyynnöistä. Viime aikoina on kirjoitettu toisinaan siitä, että hyvissäkin lehdissä ilmestyneihin artikkeleihin viitataan vain harvoin, sillä artikkeleiden paljous vähentää niiden lukumääriä. Toinen ilmiö on puolestaan se, että tutkijat tekevät turhankin rohkeita hypoteeseja erottuakseen massasta. Tuskin kukaan normaalitiedettä kaipaa, mutta lieveilmiönä voidaan pitää melko kevein perustein tehtyjä oletuksia, jotka äkkiä rustataan artikkelikäsikirjoituksiksi ja koetetaan saada vertaisarvioinnista läpi. Lisäksi tulevat vielä avoimeen tieteeseen kuuluvat kyseenalaiset lehdet, jotka hyväksyvät lähest mitä tahansa kirjoittajamaksua vastaan. Nämä huolet eivät ole toki uusia. Jo 1600-luvulla oltiin huolestuneita tiedon määrän tai ainakin julkaisujen määrän nopeasta kasvusta. Esimerkiksi universaalioppinut G. W. Leibniz laati suunnitelmia erilaisten sensorijärjestelmien perutamiseksi, jotka perkaisivat hyvän ja tärkeän kirjallisuuden huonosta. Voiko asialle tehdä jotakin? Onko tärkeämpää julkaista vähän ja punnittua tavaraa kuin häthätää puoliajateltua ideanpoikasta? Vastaus molempiin kysymyksiin on kyllä. Meritoituminen ei saa perustua määrään vaan laatuun. Ikävä kyllä laadun arvioiminen on vaikeaa ja vaatii asiantuntijoita. Toisaalta voidaan ajatella, että julkaisurumban hiljennyttyä kaikilla osapuolilla olisi aikaa keskittyä siihen, mikä tieteessä on tärkeää. Nimittäin tieteen eikä julkaisumäärän edistämiseen.
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The topic of disinterested love became fashionable in 1697 due to the famous amour pur dispute between Fénelon (1651-1715) and Bossuet (1627-1704). It soon attracted the attention of Electress Sophie of Hanover (1630-1714) and she asked... more
The topic of disinterested love became fashionable in 1697 due to the famous amour pur dispute between Fénelon (1651-1715) and Bossuet (1627-1704). It soon attracted the attention of Electress Sophie of Hanover (1630-1714) and she asked for an opinion about the dispute from her trusted friend and correspondent, the Hanoverian councilor Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716). This gave Leibniz an opportunity to present his views on the matter, which he had developed earlier in his career (for example, in Elementa juris naturalis of 1671 and Codex iuris gentium of 1693). In his 1697 letter to Sophie he did not explicitly take sides in the dispute, but formulated his own views on the topic in a theological manner, aiming to provide an account of disinterested love which would surpass the doctrines of both French theologians. In addition to presenting Leibniz’ early views on disinterested love and examining this alternative formulation of Leibniz’s his views on love, I will show that after the letter Leibniz gave this alternative perspective up and returned to refer to his earlier, more philosophical views on the topic, which suggests that he regarded them to be superior to the theological version, where the virtue of charity was related to the virtue of hope.
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The famous philosopher Leibniz (1646-1716) was also active in the (cultural) politics of his time. His interest in forming scientific societies never waned and his efforts led to the founding of the Berlin Academy of Sciences. He also... more
The famous philosopher Leibniz (1646-1716) was also active in the (cultural) politics of his time. His interest in forming scientific societies never waned and his efforts led to the founding of the Berlin Academy of Sciences. He also played a part in the founding of the Dresden Academy of Science and the St. Petersburg Academy of Science. Though Leibniz's models for the scientific society were the Royal Society and the Royal Science Academy of France, his pansophistic vision of scientific cooperation sometimes took on utopian dimensions. In this paper, I will present Leibniz's ideas of scientific cooperation as a kind of religious activity and discuss his various schemes for the founding of such scientific societies.
http://inderscience.metapress.com/app/home/contribution.asp?referrer=parent&backto=issue,13,14;journal,10,118;linkingpublicationresults,1:110891,1
Aikaisempi suomenkielinen versio tästä artikkelista ("Tieteen historian tähtihetkiä : G. W. Leibniz ja Berliinin tiedeakatemian varhaisvaiheet", Tieteessä tapahtuu 2004:1) on saatavilla: https://oa.doria.fi/handle/10024/21907
http://inderscience.metapress.com/app/home/contribution.asp?referrer=parent&backto=issue,13,14;journal,10,118;linkingpublicationresults,1:110891,1
Aikaisempi suomenkielinen versio tästä artikkelista ("Tieteen historian tähtihetkiä : G. W. Leibniz ja Berliinin tiedeakatemian varhaisvaiheet", Tieteessä tapahtuu 2004:1) on saatavilla: https://oa.doria.fi/handle/10024/21907
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Artikkeli esittelee G. W. Leibnizin näkemyksiä itsetietoisuudesta.
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Artikkelissa esitellään G. W. Leibnizin päätöksentekomalleja, joita hän sovelsi erilaisiin ongelmatilanteisiin.
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Artikkelissa vertaillaan Locken ja Leibnizin käsityksiä akrasiasta.
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An article in Finnish on imagination and moral deliberation in Leibniz. Published in Niin & Näin 2/2007.
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Tieteessä avoin julkaiseminen on 2010-luvun keskeisiä kiistakysymyksiä. Useimmat tunnustavat sen hyödyllisyyden, mutta ansaintalogiikan ratkaiseminen on vaikeaa. Millaisia trendejä on nähtävillä? Miten avoin julkaiseminen etenee Suomessa?... more
Tieteessä avoin julkaiseminen on 2010-luvun keskeisiä kiistakysymyksiä. Useimmat tunnustavat sen hyödyllisyyden, mutta ansaintalogiikan ratkaiseminen on vaikeaa. Millaisia trendejä on nähtävillä? Miten avoin julkaiseminen etenee Suomessa? Millaisia kehitysmuotoja se saa tulevina vuosina?
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An article in Finnish on Descartes, Leibniz and the universal language. Published in Niin & Näin 4/1996.
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An article on harmony and disharmony in pop music in Finnish. Published in a Finnish philosophical journal Niin & Näin 1/2009.
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Hahmottelen tässä artikkelissa tekoälyn historiaa varhaismo- dernin filosofian aikakaudella 1600–1700-luvuilla. Esittelemäni aiheet ovat hieman erillisiä toisistaan, mutta yhteistä niille on ajatus komputaatiosta tai automaatiosta,... more
Hahmottelen tässä artikkelissa tekoälyn historiaa varhaismo-
dernin filosofian aikakaudella 1600–1700-luvuilla. Esittelemäni aiheet ovat hieman erillisiä toisistaan, mutta yhteistä niille on ajatus komputaatiosta tai automaatiosta, eräänlaisesta mekaanisesta laskemisesta tai toiminnasta, jota voi pitää tekoälyn varhaisena lähtökohtana.
On kuitenkin huomattava, että pelkkä komputaatio eli
informaation käsittely sinänsä ei riitä tekoälylle – kaikkia näitä
pyrkimyksiä leimaa tietynlainen epistemologinen optimismi:
automatisoidun ajattelun avulla uskotaan saatavan enemmän laa-
dukasta tietoa ja kenties myös uudenlaisia ajatuksia, kun ajattelu-
prosessi tulee sujuvammaksi. Tekoälyn varhaishistoria liittyy siis
nimenomaan inhimillisen ajattelun mekanisoimiseen ja uskoon
siitä, että sen avulla voidaan lieventää ihmismielen rajoituksia ja
ajatella paremmin. Yhteistä sekä tekoälyn että tietokoneen histo-
rialle on kuitenkin laskennan kehitys.
dernin filosofian aikakaudella 1600–1700-luvuilla. Esittelemäni aiheet ovat hieman erillisiä toisistaan, mutta yhteistä niille on ajatus komputaatiosta tai automaatiosta, eräänlaisesta mekaanisesta laskemisesta tai toiminnasta, jota voi pitää tekoälyn varhaisena lähtökohtana.
On kuitenkin huomattava, että pelkkä komputaatio eli
informaation käsittely sinänsä ei riitä tekoälylle – kaikkia näitä
pyrkimyksiä leimaa tietynlainen epistemologinen optimismi:
automatisoidun ajattelun avulla uskotaan saatavan enemmän laa-
dukasta tietoa ja kenties myös uudenlaisia ajatuksia, kun ajattelu-
prosessi tulee sujuvammaksi. Tekoälyn varhaishistoria liittyy siis
nimenomaan inhimillisen ajattelun mekanisoimiseen ja uskoon
siitä, että sen avulla voidaan lieventää ihmismielen rajoituksia ja
ajatella paremmin. Yhteistä sekä tekoälyn että tietokoneen histo-
rialle on kuitenkin laskennan kehitys.
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Tämä on post-print-versio artikkelista, joka on ilmestynyt teoksessa Terhi Kiiskinen & Sami Pihlström (toim.), Kuoleman filosofia, Filosofisia tutkimuksia Helsingin yliopistosta. Filosofian laitos, Helsingin yliopisto 2002, s. 89-96
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I will give an overview of the fascinating communication between G. W. Leibniz and Pierre Bayle on pre-established harmony and sudden change in the soul which started from Bayle’s footnote H to the article “Rorarius” in his Dictionnaire... more
I will give an overview of the fascinating communication between G. W. Leibniz and Pierre Bayle on pre-established harmony and sudden change in the soul which started from Bayle’s footnote H to the article “Rorarius” in his Dictionnaire historique et critique (1697) and ended in 1706 with Bayle’s death. I will compare the views presented in the communication to Leibniz’s reflections on the soul in his partly concurrent Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain (1704) and argue that many topics in the communication with Bayle are discussed with more details in Nouveaux essais. I also argue that the communication helped Leibniz to respond to Locke’s views concerning uneasiness in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, II, xxi. Bayle himself, however, was not able to completely understand Leibniz’s views on spontaneity as he was unaware of the contents of the Nouveaux essais, especially the systematic role of petites perceptions in Leibniz’s philosophy of mind. I will also reflect on whether the controversy could have ended in agreement if it would have continued longer.
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According to Leibniz, there is no death in the sense that the human being or animal is destroyed completely. This is due to his metaphysical pluralism which would suffer if the number of substances decreased. While animals transform into... more
According to Leibniz, there is no death in the sense that the human being or animal is destroyed completely. This is due to his metaphysical pluralism which would suffer if the number of substances decreased. While animals transform into other animals after “death”, human beings are rewarded or punished of their behavior in this life. This paper presents a comprehensive account of how Leibniz thought the “death” to take place and discusses his often unclear views on the life after death. I will also present a new, naturalistic reading of Leibniz’s views on afterlife.
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In this paper I will discuss the doctrine of substance which emerges from Leibniz’s unpublished early memoir De affectibus of 1679. The memoir marks a new stage in Leibniz’s views of the mind. The motivation for this change can be found... more
In this paper I will discuss the doctrine of substance which emerges from Leibniz’s unpublished early memoir De affectibus of 1679. The memoir marks a new stage in Leibniz’s views of the mind. The motivation for this change can be found in Leibniz’s rejection of the Cartesian theory of passion and action in the 1670s. His early Aristotelianism and some features of Cartesianism persisted to which Leibniz added influences from Hobbes and Spinoza. His nascent dynamical concept of substance is seemingly a combination of old and fresh influences, representing a characteristically eclectic approach, but I will argue that the influence of Hobbes is especially important in the memoir. To do that, I will examine Leibniz’s development in the 1670s up to the De affectibus and consider the nature of affects in the memoir, especially the first affect which starts the thought sequence. This first affect of pleasure or pain is the key to Leibniz’s theory of active substances and in this way to the whole of Leibniz’s moral psychology and ethical metaphysics.
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G. W. Leibniz famously proclaimed that this is the best of all possible worlds. One of the properties of the best world is its increasing perfection. He gave a prominent role in his discussion of emotions to hope which is related to... more
G. W. Leibniz famously proclaimed that this is the best of all possible worlds. One of the properties of the best world is its increasing perfection. He gave a prominent role in his discussion of emotions to hope which is related to intellectual activity such as curiosity and courage which again is essential for the practice of science and promoting the common good. Leibniz regarded hope as a process where minute perceptions in the mind, that is, unconscious promises or signs of a future pleasure of the mind or joy may accumulate to an expectation which we became aware of, the passion of hope. Related to a moral instinct of striving for joy and avoiding sorrow, hope motivates us to promote perfection which produces joy in us and eventually leads to happiness.
Preprint is available at http://www.helsinki.fi/~mroinila/Hope.doc
Preprint is available at http://www.helsinki.fi/~mroinila/Hope.doc
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""Leibniz frequently argued that reasons are to be weighed against each other as in a pair of scales, as Professor Marcelo Dascal has shown in his article "The Balance of Reason." In this kind of weighing it is not necessary to reach... more
""Leibniz frequently argued that reasons are to be weighed against each other as in a pair of scales, as Professor Marcelo Dascal has shown in his article "The Balance of Reason." In this kind of weighing it is not necessary to reach demonstrative certainty – one need only judge whether the reasons weigh more on behalf of one or the other option However, a different kind of account about rational decision-making can be found in some of Leibniz's writings. In his article "Was Leibniz's Deity an Akrates?" Professor Jaakko Hintikka has argued that Leibniz developed a new vectorial model for rational decisions which is better suited to complicated decisions, where values are complementary to each other. This model, related closely to his work in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, is a heuristic device which helps in finding rational combinations - and in an ideal case an optimum - between plural inclinations to the good. I shall argue that Leibniz applies more or less implicitly both of these models in his practical rationality. In simple situations he applied the pair of scales model and in more complicated situations he applied the vectorial model.
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""One of the features of John Locke’s moral philosophy is the idea that morality is based on our beliefs concerning the future good. In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding II, xxi, §70 Locke argues that we have to decide between the... more
""One of the features of John Locke’s moral philosophy is the idea that morality is based on our beliefs concerning the future good. In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding II, xxi, §70 Locke argues that we have to decide between the probability of afterlife and our present temptations. In itself, this kind of decision model is not rare in Early Modern philosophy. Blaise Pascal’s Wager is a famous example of a similar idea of balancing between available options which Marcelo Dascal has discussed in his important 2005 article “The Balance of Reason”.
Leibniz, however, was not always satisfied with this kind of simple balancing. In his commentary to Locke’s Essay, Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain, II, xxi, §66 he presented an alternative model which is based on an idea of plural, mutually conflicting inclinations. This kind of model, called as vectorial theory of rational decision by Simo Knuuttila, fits well with Leibniz’s theory of the soul where volitions are formed as a kind of compromise between different inclinations to different goods.
I will present these two models and show how they illustrate the practical rationality of Locke and Leibniz and how their moral philosophies differ, although being similar in certain respects. The topics include Leibniz’s criticism of Lockean hedonism and the discussion of acratic behaviour in II, xxi of Essay and Nouveaux essais.""
Leibniz, however, was not always satisfied with this kind of simple balancing. In his commentary to Locke’s Essay, Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain, II, xxi, §66 he presented an alternative model which is based on an idea of plural, mutually conflicting inclinations. This kind of model, called as vectorial theory of rational decision by Simo Knuuttila, fits well with Leibniz’s theory of the soul where volitions are formed as a kind of compromise between different inclinations to different goods.
I will present these two models and show how they illustrate the practical rationality of Locke and Leibniz and how their moral philosophies differ, although being similar in certain respects. The topics include Leibniz’s criticism of Lockean hedonism and the discussion of acratic behaviour in II, xxi of Essay and Nouveaux essais.""
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Unet ja muisti kietoutuvat toisiinsa kiehtovalla tavalla. Voimme keskustella unistamme mutta niiden elävyyttä on vaikea tavoittaa yksinkertaisesti siitä syystä, että muistamme ne huonosti. Tämän hetken ehkä tunnetuimman unitutkija J.... more
Unet ja muisti kietoutuvat toisiinsa kiehtovalla tavalla. Voimme keskustella unistamme mutta niiden elävyyttä on vaikea tavoittaa yksinkertaisesti siitä syystä, että muistamme ne huonosti. Tämän hetken ehkä tunnetuimman unitutkija J. Allan Hobsonin mukaan saatamme esimerkiksi muistaa oikeasti värilliset unemme mustavalkoisina yksinkertaisesti sen vuoksi, että muistimme on niin huono (Hobson, Dreaming, 39). Filosofiassa unen ja muistin suhdetta on mietitty filosofiassa jo Aristoteleesta lähtien, mutta tässä esitelmässä keskityn varhaismoderniin filosofiaan.
Lähtökohtani on Descartesin Kuudes Mietiskely, jossa filosofi painottaa aistihavaintojen elävyyttä verrattuna mielen kuvitteluihin ja (sensorisiin) muistijälkiin. Unet ovat mainio esimerkki tälläisista mielen aikaansaannoksista, joiden elävyys häviää aistihavaintojen kouriintuntuvuudelle. Varmuus aistihavaintojen luotettavuudesta nimenomaan osoittaa, että pystyn erottamaan unitilan ja valvetilan toisistaan. Eroon liittyy olennaisesti myös muisti, sillä se yhdistää valvetilassa asiat toisiinsa kun taas unissa näin ei käy. Unessa vain kaikki ilmestyy ja häviää selittämättömästi ja nopeasti (CSM II, 61-62). Descartesin näkemystä vastusti Thomas Hobbes, joka vastaväitteissään kysyi eikö uneksijan uni liity pitkään sarjaan menneitä tapahtumia? Jos tämä on mahdollista, uneksijan arvostelmassa menneet tapahtumat ovat tosia, aivan kuin valveilla. Siten myös unessa voidaan tehdä arvostelmia. Descartesin vastauksen mukaan uneksija ei voi yhdistää uniaan menneiden tapahtumien ideoihin, vaikka hän saattaa uneksia voivansa näin tekevänsä (CSM II, 137).
Käyn esitelmässäni läpi Kuudennen mietiskelyn argumentit ja sen herättämän keskustelun. Aihetta ovat käsitelleet Hobbesin lisäksi ainakin Berkeley, joka oli Descartesin kanssa pitkälti samaa mieltä, Spinoza (joka väitti, että unessa arvostelmaa voidaan lykätä), Leibniz (jonka mukaan herääminen on nimenomaan sitä, että yhdistämme nykyisen tilamme menneisiin tapahtumiin ja että unissa arvostelmat perustuvat vain niissä läsnäolevaan aineistoon), Kant (joka oli Hobbesin kannalla) sekä Locke, joka kiinnostavasti väitti, että unien irrationaalisuus johtuu siitä, että uneksiessa sielu on irrallaan ruumiista, joka takaa mielen järjestyksen ja täydellisyyden.
Vertaan myös varhaismodernien filosofien ajatuksia nykyfilosofiaan sekä unien nykytutkimukseen. Uudemmista filosofeista unien ja muistin suhdetta ovat käsitelleet mm. Ludvig Wittgenstein, joka yhtyy Leibnizin näkemykseen, että muisti aktivoituu herätessä (Philosophical Investigations, 1953), Norman Malcolm, joka tarkentaa Wittgensteinin näkemyksiä (Dreaming, 1959) sekä Owen Flanagan (Dreaming Souls, 2000).
Lähimmäksi nykykäsitystä unien ja muistin suhteesta ylsi varhaismoderneista filosofeista John Locke, jonka mukaan nukkuvien ihmisten unet on tehty valveilla olevien ihmisten ideoista, vaikkakin ne on oudosti koostettu (Essay II, i, §17). Tämä väite on yhdenmukainen aivotutkija Robert Stickgoldin tutkimusten kanssa, joista selviää, että unet muodostuvat muistifragmenteista. Toisin sanoen muisti ikään kuin organisoituu uudelleen unissa (Hobson, Dreaming 109).
Lähtökohtani on Descartesin Kuudes Mietiskely, jossa filosofi painottaa aistihavaintojen elävyyttä verrattuna mielen kuvitteluihin ja (sensorisiin) muistijälkiin. Unet ovat mainio esimerkki tälläisista mielen aikaansaannoksista, joiden elävyys häviää aistihavaintojen kouriintuntuvuudelle. Varmuus aistihavaintojen luotettavuudesta nimenomaan osoittaa, että pystyn erottamaan unitilan ja valvetilan toisistaan. Eroon liittyy olennaisesti myös muisti, sillä se yhdistää valvetilassa asiat toisiinsa kun taas unissa näin ei käy. Unessa vain kaikki ilmestyy ja häviää selittämättömästi ja nopeasti (CSM II, 61-62). Descartesin näkemystä vastusti Thomas Hobbes, joka vastaväitteissään kysyi eikö uneksijan uni liity pitkään sarjaan menneitä tapahtumia? Jos tämä on mahdollista, uneksijan arvostelmassa menneet tapahtumat ovat tosia, aivan kuin valveilla. Siten myös unessa voidaan tehdä arvostelmia. Descartesin vastauksen mukaan uneksija ei voi yhdistää uniaan menneiden tapahtumien ideoihin, vaikka hän saattaa uneksia voivansa näin tekevänsä (CSM II, 137).
Käyn esitelmässäni läpi Kuudennen mietiskelyn argumentit ja sen herättämän keskustelun. Aihetta ovat käsitelleet Hobbesin lisäksi ainakin Berkeley, joka oli Descartesin kanssa pitkälti samaa mieltä, Spinoza (joka väitti, että unessa arvostelmaa voidaan lykätä), Leibniz (jonka mukaan herääminen on nimenomaan sitä, että yhdistämme nykyisen tilamme menneisiin tapahtumiin ja että unissa arvostelmat perustuvat vain niissä läsnäolevaan aineistoon), Kant (joka oli Hobbesin kannalla) sekä Locke, joka kiinnostavasti väitti, että unien irrationaalisuus johtuu siitä, että uneksiessa sielu on irrallaan ruumiista, joka takaa mielen järjestyksen ja täydellisyyden.
Vertaan myös varhaismodernien filosofien ajatuksia nykyfilosofiaan sekä unien nykytutkimukseen. Uudemmista filosofeista unien ja muistin suhdetta ovat käsitelleet mm. Ludvig Wittgenstein, joka yhtyy Leibnizin näkemykseen, että muisti aktivoituu herätessä (Philosophical Investigations, 1953), Norman Malcolm, joka tarkentaa Wittgensteinin näkemyksiä (Dreaming, 1959) sekä Owen Flanagan (Dreaming Souls, 2000).
Lähimmäksi nykykäsitystä unien ja muistin suhteesta ylsi varhaismoderneista filosofeista John Locke, jonka mukaan nukkuvien ihmisten unet on tehty valveilla olevien ihmisten ideoista, vaikkakin ne on oudosti koostettu (Essay II, i, §17). Tämä väite on yhdenmukainen aivotutkija Robert Stickgoldin tutkimusten kanssa, joista selviää, että unet muodostuvat muistifragmenteista. Toisin sanoen muisti ikään kuin organisoituu uudelleen unissa (Hobson, Dreaming 109).
Research Interests:
G. W. Leibnizin mukaan moraali on prosessi. Opimme vähitellen tunnistamaan hyvän maailmassa ja tätä kautta ymmärtämään mitkä ovat Jumalan tarkoitukset. Tässä prosessissa keskeisiä tekijöitä ovat tiede, erityisesti luonnontiede, jonka... more
G. W. Leibnizin mukaan moraali on prosessi. Opimme vähitellen tunnistamaan hyvän maailmassa ja tätä kautta ymmärtämään mitkä ovat Jumalan tarkoitukset. Tässä prosessissa keskeisiä tekijöitä ovat tiede, erityisesti luonnontiede, jonka avulla voimme tutkia Jumalan luomistyötä ja täydellisyyttä luonnossa sekä tunteet, joista tärkeimmät hyveen kannalta ovat ilo, toivo ja rakkaus.
Keskustellessaan rakkauden käsitteestä Leibniz argumentoi, että voimme tunnistaa toisessa ihmisessä täydellisyyden, joka herättää meissä mielihyvää. Tämä motivoi meitä toimimaan toisen ihmisen hyväksi. Toisinaan tätä aihetta sivuavissa kirjoituksissa (erit. Elementa juris naturalis (1670-71) ja Codex iuris gentium (1693)) Leibniz viittaa siihen, että moraalisesti tietyn tason saavuttanut ihminen on ikään kuin hyveellisessä tilassa eli hän tunnistaa täydellisyyden herkemmin kuin vähemmän hyveellinen ihminen.
Leibniz ei kovin tarkkaan määrittele mitä tämä hyveellisyyden tila oikeastaan on. Hän puhuu samasta asiasta myös muilla nimillä. Esimerkiksi kirjoituksessa Von der Weisheit (1694-1698?) hän puhuu siitä, että täydellisyyttä maailmassa kokee parhaiten ihminen, jolla on siihen sopiva luonne (Gemüth). Joka tapauksessa on ilmeistä, että hän olettaa tietynlaisten ihmisten olevan valmiimpia Jumalan tarkoituksiin, joiksi hän katsoo täydellisyyden ja onnellisuuden edistämisen maailmassa. Nämä henkilöt voivat edistää universaalia täydellistymistä parhaiten ja tämä tapahtuu paitsi tieteen edistämisen kautta, myös harjoittamalla oikeutta, sillä Leibniz määrittelee oikeuden viisaan ihmisen harjoittamana hyväntekeväisyytenä.
Tarkoitukseni on esitelmässä tarkastella Leibnizin huomautuksia edellämainitusta hyveen tilasta ja verrata sitä Descartesin ja Spinozan käsitykseen hyveestä. Leibnizin näkemyksen voidaan katsoa olevan melko lähellä Spinozan käsitystä, vaikka Leibnizin näkemyksissä on monia piirteitä, jotka erovat Spinozan deterministisestä maailmankuvasta. Joissakin kohdin (esim. vahvan tahdon korostus) hän taas lähestyy Descartesia. Leibnizin omimmat käsitykset hyveestä liittyvät prosessimaisuuteen – hän esimerkiksi katsoi, että onnellisuus vaatii systemaattista ylläpitoa, jonka keskeinen sisältö on nimenomaan hyveellinen toiminta. Toisin sanoen vain systemaattisesti hyveellinen ihminen voi olla onnellinen. Lisäksi tarkastelen mikä on hyveen ja viisauden suhde Leibnizilla – hän käyttää termejä melko vapaasti, mutta näyttää siltä, että ne viittaavat hiukan eri asiaan, hyve moraaliseen hyvään ja viisaus kognition tasoon. Edellinen näyttäisi seuraavan jälkimmäisestä.
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Keskustellessaan rakkauden käsitteestä Leibniz argumentoi, että voimme tunnistaa toisessa ihmisessä täydellisyyden, joka herättää meissä mielihyvää. Tämä motivoi meitä toimimaan toisen ihmisen hyväksi. Toisinaan tätä aihetta sivuavissa kirjoituksissa (erit. Elementa juris naturalis (1670-71) ja Codex iuris gentium (1693)) Leibniz viittaa siihen, että moraalisesti tietyn tason saavuttanut ihminen on ikään kuin hyveellisessä tilassa eli hän tunnistaa täydellisyyden herkemmin kuin vähemmän hyveellinen ihminen.
Leibniz ei kovin tarkkaan määrittele mitä tämä hyveellisyyden tila oikeastaan on. Hän puhuu samasta asiasta myös muilla nimillä. Esimerkiksi kirjoituksessa Von der Weisheit (1694-1698?) hän puhuu siitä, että täydellisyyttä maailmassa kokee parhaiten ihminen, jolla on siihen sopiva luonne (Gemüth). Joka tapauksessa on ilmeistä, että hän olettaa tietynlaisten ihmisten olevan valmiimpia Jumalan tarkoituksiin, joiksi hän katsoo täydellisyyden ja onnellisuuden edistämisen maailmassa. Nämä henkilöt voivat edistää universaalia täydellistymistä parhaiten ja tämä tapahtuu paitsi tieteen edistämisen kautta, myös harjoittamalla oikeutta, sillä Leibniz määrittelee oikeuden viisaan ihmisen harjoittamana hyväntekeväisyytenä.
Tarkoitukseni on esitelmässä tarkastella Leibnizin huomautuksia edellämainitusta hyveen tilasta ja verrata sitä Descartesin ja Spinozan käsitykseen hyveestä. Leibnizin näkemyksen voidaan katsoa olevan melko lähellä Spinozan käsitystä, vaikka Leibnizin näkemyksissä on monia piirteitä, jotka erovat Spinozan deterministisestä maailmankuvasta. Joissakin kohdin (esim. vahvan tahdon korostus) hän taas lähestyy Descartesia. Leibnizin omimmat käsitykset hyveestä liittyvät prosessimaisuuteen – hän esimerkiksi katsoi, että onnellisuus vaatii systemaattista ylläpitoa, jonka keskeinen sisältö on nimenomaan hyveellinen toiminta. Toisin sanoen vain systemaattisesti hyveellinen ihminen voi olla onnellinen. Lisäksi tarkastelen mikä on hyveen ja viisauden suhde Leibnizilla – hän käyttää termejä melko vapaasti, mutta näyttää siltä, että ne viittaavat hiukan eri asiaan, hyve moraaliseen hyvään ja viisaus kognition tasoon. Edellinen näyttäisi seuraavan jälkimmäisestä.
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Research Interests:
Julkaisematta jääneessä muistiossaan Mietteitä oikeuden yleiskäsitteestä (1702-1703?) G. W. Leibniz muotoilee uudelleen Platonin Euthyfron-dialogissa esitetyn kuuluisan kysymyksen. Hän kirjoittaa: ”Myönnetään, että kaikki mitä Jumala... more
Julkaisematta jääneessä muistiossaan Mietteitä oikeuden yleiskäsitteestä (1702-1703?) G. W. Leibniz muotoilee uudelleen Platonin Euthyfron-dialogissa esitetyn kuuluisan kysymyksen. Hän kirjoittaa: ”Myönnetään, että kaikki mitä Jumala tahtoo, on hyvää ja oikein. Sen sijaan kysytään, onko se hyvää ja oikein siksi että Jumala niin tahtoo, vai tahtooko Jumala sitä koska se on hyvää ja oikein. Eli kysytään, onko hyvyys tai oikeus jotakin mielivaltaista, vai koostuvatko ne asioiden luonnetta koskevista välttämättömistä ja ikuisista totuuksista, kuten luvut ja suhteet.” Universaaleja, ikuisia totuuksia puolustava filosofi ei voi hyväksyä ensin mainittua vaihtoehtoa. Hänen mukaansa ”Se toden totta tuhoaisi Jumalan oikeudenmukaisuuden. Sillä miksi ylistäisimme häntä oikeudenmukaisista teoista, jos oikeudenmukaisuuden käsite ei hänen tapauksessaan lisää mitään teon käsitteeseen? Ja sanonta stat pro ratione voluntas, minun tahtoni käyköön perusteesta, on todella tyrannin motto.”
Leibnizin kritiikki on suunnattu erityisesti hänen aikalaisiaan René Descartesia, Thomas Hobbesia ja Samuel Pufendorfia vastaan. Hän ei voi hyväksyä näkemystä, jonka mukaan oikeudenmukaisuuden mitta on vain Jumalan tahto. Perustan on löydyttävä ikuisista totuuksista, jotka ovat myös Jumalan oikeudenmukaisuuden standardi. Erityisen kuuluisaksi tuli Leibnizin kritiikki Pufendorfin näkemyksiä kohtaan, sillä Pufendorfin laajalle levinneen teoksen De officio hominis et civis ranskalaisen laitoksen neljännen painoksen toimittaja Barbeyrac liitti siihen Leibnizin kiistakirjoituksen, joka tunnetaan lyhyellä nimellä Monita (Epistola viri excellentissimi ad amicum qua monita quaedam ad principia Pufendorfiani operis de officio hominis et civis continentur, 1706) ja puolusti Pufendorfia Leibnizia vastaan.
Leibnizin onnistui kuitenkin ilmeisesti osoittaa eräs heikkous Pufendorfin näkemyksissä, jota Barbeyrac ei pystynyt sivuuttamaan: tämän mukaan Jumala on saman aikaan sekä ylin tuomari että lakien laatija. Siten Leibnizin näkökulmasta Jumala on tyranni – hänen tahtonsa on oikeuden ja etiikan mitta ja koska hän on kaikkivaltias, hän voi pakottaa ihmiset noudattamaan sellaista oikeudenmukaisuutta, joka on hänen mieleistään. Koska Jumalan yläpuolella ei ole Pufendorfin mukaan mitään, hän voi toimia aivan mielivaltaisesti. Leibnizin kritiikki kiteytyy Pufendorfin epäselvään erotteluun ulkoisen ja sisäisen velvollisuuden välillä, joka jättää hänen näkemyksensä arvoitukselliseksi.
Tutkiskelen tässä esitelmässä oliko Leibnzin kritiikki johdonmukainen ja oikeutettu. Onko Pufendorfin näkemyksissä heikkous, jota hän ei itse huomannut? Vertailen myös asiaa koskevia eri kommentaareja (mm. Kari Saastamoinen, Petter Korkman, Fiametta Palladini) ja arvioin Leibnizin kritiikin reseptiota Pufendorf-tutkimuksessa.
In English: This paper discusses Leibniz's views on justice and especially the Divine Command-theory. Of special interest if Barbeyrac's defense of Pufendorf against Leibniz's critcism. I attemp to reflect how Leibniz would have reacted to Barbeyrac's interpretation of Pufendorf's views. An international version of this paper is planned.
Leibnizin kritiikki on suunnattu erityisesti hänen aikalaisiaan René Descartesia, Thomas Hobbesia ja Samuel Pufendorfia vastaan. Hän ei voi hyväksyä näkemystä, jonka mukaan oikeudenmukaisuuden mitta on vain Jumalan tahto. Perustan on löydyttävä ikuisista totuuksista, jotka ovat myös Jumalan oikeudenmukaisuuden standardi. Erityisen kuuluisaksi tuli Leibnizin kritiikki Pufendorfin näkemyksiä kohtaan, sillä Pufendorfin laajalle levinneen teoksen De officio hominis et civis ranskalaisen laitoksen neljännen painoksen toimittaja Barbeyrac liitti siihen Leibnizin kiistakirjoituksen, joka tunnetaan lyhyellä nimellä Monita (Epistola viri excellentissimi ad amicum qua monita quaedam ad principia Pufendorfiani operis de officio hominis et civis continentur, 1706) ja puolusti Pufendorfia Leibnizia vastaan.
Leibnizin onnistui kuitenkin ilmeisesti osoittaa eräs heikkous Pufendorfin näkemyksissä, jota Barbeyrac ei pystynyt sivuuttamaan: tämän mukaan Jumala on saman aikaan sekä ylin tuomari että lakien laatija. Siten Leibnizin näkökulmasta Jumala on tyranni – hänen tahtonsa on oikeuden ja etiikan mitta ja koska hän on kaikkivaltias, hän voi pakottaa ihmiset noudattamaan sellaista oikeudenmukaisuutta, joka on hänen mieleistään. Koska Jumalan yläpuolella ei ole Pufendorfin mukaan mitään, hän voi toimia aivan mielivaltaisesti. Leibnizin kritiikki kiteytyy Pufendorfin epäselvään erotteluun ulkoisen ja sisäisen velvollisuuden välillä, joka jättää hänen näkemyksensä arvoitukselliseksi.
Tutkiskelen tässä esitelmässä oliko Leibnzin kritiikki johdonmukainen ja oikeutettu. Onko Pufendorfin näkemyksissä heikkous, jota hän ei itse huomannut? Vertailen myös asiaa koskevia eri kommentaareja (mm. Kari Saastamoinen, Petter Korkman, Fiametta Palladini) ja arvioin Leibnizin kritiikin reseptiota Pufendorf-tutkimuksessa.
In English: This paper discusses Leibniz's views on justice and especially the Divine Command-theory. Of special interest if Barbeyrac's defense of Pufendorf against Leibniz's critcism. I attemp to reflect how Leibniz would have reacted to Barbeyrac's interpretation of Pufendorf's views. An international version of this paper is planned.
Research Interests:
G. W. Leibnizin opissa parhaasta mahdollisesta maailmasta keskeisenä taustaoletuksena on, että Jumala valitsee yhden ja vain yhden parhaaksi katsomansa maailman äärettömästä määrästä mahdollisia maailmoja. Ei siis voi olla kahta yhtä... more
G. W. Leibnizin opissa parhaasta mahdollisesta maailmasta keskeisenä taustaoletuksena on, että Jumala valitsee yhden ja vain yhden parhaaksi katsomansa maailman äärettömästä määrästä mahdollisia maailmoja. Ei siis voi olla kahta yhtä hyvää maailmaa valinnan kohteena. Tämä oletus on tärkeä paitsi siksi, että Leibniz hylkää equilibrium-teorian, jonka mukaan voi olla kaksi yhtä hyvää valinnan kohdetta, myös siksi, että luotujen, äärellisten olioiden on helpompi uskoa, että Jumalan valinta oli selkeä ja perustui johonkin tiettyyn syyhyn, jonka vuoksi aktuaalinen maailma on parempi kuin muut mahdolliset maailmat. Siten doktriini luo pohjan uskolle Jumalan hyvyyteen.
Varhaisessa esseessään Versuch einiger Betrachtungen über den Optimismus (1759) Immanuel Kant esitti joitakin vastaväitteitä tälle opille. Hänen mukaansa on oltava jokin mahdollinen maailma, joka on raja-arvo eli ei voi olla parempaa maailmaa kuin tietty mahdollinen maailma. Tästä ei kuitenkaan seuraa, että on oltava vain yksi, singulaarinen ja täydellinen mahdollinen maailma, sillä jos kaksi tai useampi maailma on yhtä lailla täydellinen, kumpikaan ei olisi paras, sillä niillä olisi yhtä suuri aste hyvyyttä.
Kant pyrki puolustamaan Leibnizin oppia olettamalla, että olion absoluuttinen täydellisyys on samaistettava sen todellisuuden asteen kanssa. Kahta todellisuutta ei voida hänen mukaansa erottaa toisistaan, voidaan vain väittää, että jokin on läsnä toisessa, mutta ei toisessa. Siten ero on kvantatiivinen, ei kvalitatiivinen. Tästä Kant saattoi päätellä, että kahdella mahdollisella maailmalla ei voi milloinkaan olla sama aste todellisuutta ja siksi ei voi olla kaksi yhtälailla hyvää ja täydellistä maailmaa.
Tässä esitelmässä yritän ajatella Kantin ajatuskulun uudelleen ja tutkia sen pätevyyttä. Ei ole itsestäänselvää, että argumentti toimii. Leibniz jätti melkoisen hämäräksi täydellisyyden ja todellisuuden suhteen – nykykommentaattorit ovat olleet eri mieltä siitä, miten täydellisyyden ja todellisuuden keskinäinen suhde on ymmärrettävä. Tästä johtuen nykyteoriat aiheesta ovat jakautuneet eri leireihin, joissa on samankaltaisuutta Kantin ehdotusten kanssa. Kantin kaltaista ehdotusta parhaasta mahdollisena maailmasta todellisuuden maksimina ovat puolustaneet mm. David Blumenfeld ja Donald Rutherford. Puolustan tässä esitelmässä vanhempaa Nicholas Rescherin teoriaa, joka esittää parhaan mahdollisen maailman valinan kriteerin sittenkin kvalitatiiviseksi. Tällekin teorialle löytyy pohjaa Kantin kirjoituksesta – vaihtoehtoisena ratkaisuna hän esitti, että tämä maailma on paras koska Jumala on sen sellaiseksi arvioinut. Koska Jumalan harkinta on erehtymätön, tämä maailma on paras. Kant jättää kuitenkin avoimeksi sen, mikä takaa tässä ratkaisussa vain yhden parhaan vaihtoehdon olemassaolon. Pyrin esitelmän lopussa tarjoamaan Rescherin teorian perusteella ratkaisun tähän ongelmaan.
Varhaisessa esseessään Versuch einiger Betrachtungen über den Optimismus (1759) Immanuel Kant esitti joitakin vastaväitteitä tälle opille. Hänen mukaansa on oltava jokin mahdollinen maailma, joka on raja-arvo eli ei voi olla parempaa maailmaa kuin tietty mahdollinen maailma. Tästä ei kuitenkaan seuraa, että on oltava vain yksi, singulaarinen ja täydellinen mahdollinen maailma, sillä jos kaksi tai useampi maailma on yhtä lailla täydellinen, kumpikaan ei olisi paras, sillä niillä olisi yhtä suuri aste hyvyyttä.
Kant pyrki puolustamaan Leibnizin oppia olettamalla, että olion absoluuttinen täydellisyys on samaistettava sen todellisuuden asteen kanssa. Kahta todellisuutta ei voida hänen mukaansa erottaa toisistaan, voidaan vain väittää, että jokin on läsnä toisessa, mutta ei toisessa. Siten ero on kvantatiivinen, ei kvalitatiivinen. Tästä Kant saattoi päätellä, että kahdella mahdollisella maailmalla ei voi milloinkaan olla sama aste todellisuutta ja siksi ei voi olla kaksi yhtälailla hyvää ja täydellistä maailmaa.
Tässä esitelmässä yritän ajatella Kantin ajatuskulun uudelleen ja tutkia sen pätevyyttä. Ei ole itsestäänselvää, että argumentti toimii. Leibniz jätti melkoisen hämäräksi täydellisyyden ja todellisuuden suhteen – nykykommentaattorit ovat olleet eri mieltä siitä, miten täydellisyyden ja todellisuuden keskinäinen suhde on ymmärrettävä. Tästä johtuen nykyteoriat aiheesta ovat jakautuneet eri leireihin, joissa on samankaltaisuutta Kantin ehdotusten kanssa. Kantin kaltaista ehdotusta parhaasta mahdollisena maailmasta todellisuuden maksimina ovat puolustaneet mm. David Blumenfeld ja Donald Rutherford. Puolustan tässä esitelmässä vanhempaa Nicholas Rescherin teoriaa, joka esittää parhaan mahdollisen maailman valinan kriteerin sittenkin kvalitatiiviseksi. Tällekin teorialle löytyy pohjaa Kantin kirjoituksesta – vaihtoehtoisena ratkaisuna hän esitti, että tämä maailma on paras koska Jumala on sen sellaiseksi arvioinut. Koska Jumalan harkinta on erehtymätön, tämä maailma on paras. Kant jättää kuitenkin avoimeksi sen, mikä takaa tässä ratkaisussa vain yhden parhaan vaihtoehdon olemassaolon. Pyrin esitelmän lopussa tarjoamaan Rescherin teorian perusteella ratkaisun tähän ongelmaan.
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The advance of mechanism in science and philosophy in the 17th century created a great interest to machines or automata. Leibniz was no exception - in an early memoir Drôle de pensée he wrote admiringly about a machine that could walk on... more
The advance of mechanism in science and philosophy in the 17th century created a great interest to machines or automata. Leibniz was no exception - in an early memoir Drôle de pensée he wrote admiringly about a machine that could walk on water, exhibited in Paris. The idea of automatic processing in general had a large role in his thought, as can be seen, for example, in his invention of the binary code and the so-called Calculemus!-model for solving controversies.
In metaphysics, the idea of an automata was expressed most clearly in the 1695 article New System of the Nature of Substances and their Communication, and the ensuing correspondence with, among others, Foucher, Bayle, Lamy, Jaquelot and Masham. In the article Leibniz discusses the soul as a spiritual machine in the context of pre-established harmony, arguing that God can "give to a substance at the outset a nature or internal force which could produce in it an orderly way (as in spiritual or formal automaton; but a free one, in the case of a substance which is endowed with a share of reason) everything that is going to happen to it, that is to say, all the appearances or expressions it is going to have, and all without the help of any created thing."
The basic idea of Leibniz's spiritual machine is that the soul or entelechy is an autonomous and spontaneous unity, consisting of internal active force and producing its own perceptions (both confused and distinct). It is a self-moving machine, driven by its perceptions and appetites, but it follows (without being conscious of it) a lawful series or programme created by God. The entelechy remains the same despite undergoing an infinite number of changes. To Foucher he explained that each state of the individual substance is a consequence of its preceding one, "as if there were only God and the substance in the world". Despite this, the spiritual machine is related not only to God, but through the pre-established harmony to bodies or natural machines. However, as it is not dependent on them, the spiritual machine is superiot to natural machines.
In this paper I concentrate on three moral themes related to the spiritual machine: moral deliberation, moral identity and the goal of moral action. All these themes are more or less implicit in the New System, but are discussed in more detail in the ensuing correspondence after the publication of the article. Finally, the themes are given an extended discussion especially in the second book of New Essays on Human Understanding (1704, published 1765), written partly at the same time as some of the correspondence and unpublished related material.
I will first give an overview of Leibniz's position concerning the spiritual machine or automaton in the New System and then go on to explore the three moral themes one by one, as they feature in the subsequent correspondence and in the New Essays. I will show that the three topics are essential to the function of the spiritual machine – to Sophie Charlotte Leibniz wrote: "...let us say that everything in bodies happens mechanically, or in accordance with laws of motion, and that everything in the soul happens morally, or in accordance with perceived good or evil."
There are many texts that anticipate the views in the New System (notably the unpublished memoir De Affectibus of 1679) and Leibniz continued to discuss its themes later on (in addition to correpondence, for example, in Theodicy of 1710 and Monadology and Principles of Nature and Grace of 1714). Here I focus on the short-term development of Leibniz's views on the topic (around 1695-1705), but I argue that his basic view of the spiritual machine did not change much after finishing the dialogue with Locke in 1704.
In metaphysics, the idea of an automata was expressed most clearly in the 1695 article New System of the Nature of Substances and their Communication, and the ensuing correspondence with, among others, Foucher, Bayle, Lamy, Jaquelot and Masham. In the article Leibniz discusses the soul as a spiritual machine in the context of pre-established harmony, arguing that God can "give to a substance at the outset a nature or internal force which could produce in it an orderly way (as in spiritual or formal automaton; but a free one, in the case of a substance which is endowed with a share of reason) everything that is going to happen to it, that is to say, all the appearances or expressions it is going to have, and all without the help of any created thing."
The basic idea of Leibniz's spiritual machine is that the soul or entelechy is an autonomous and spontaneous unity, consisting of internal active force and producing its own perceptions (both confused and distinct). It is a self-moving machine, driven by its perceptions and appetites, but it follows (without being conscious of it) a lawful series or programme created by God. The entelechy remains the same despite undergoing an infinite number of changes. To Foucher he explained that each state of the individual substance is a consequence of its preceding one, "as if there were only God and the substance in the world". Despite this, the spiritual machine is related not only to God, but through the pre-established harmony to bodies or natural machines. However, as it is not dependent on them, the spiritual machine is superiot to natural machines.
In this paper I concentrate on three moral themes related to the spiritual machine: moral deliberation, moral identity and the goal of moral action. All these themes are more or less implicit in the New System, but are discussed in more detail in the ensuing correspondence after the publication of the article. Finally, the themes are given an extended discussion especially in the second book of New Essays on Human Understanding (1704, published 1765), written partly at the same time as some of the correspondence and unpublished related material.
I will first give an overview of Leibniz's position concerning the spiritual machine or automaton in the New System and then go on to explore the three moral themes one by one, as they feature in the subsequent correspondence and in the New Essays. I will show that the three topics are essential to the function of the spiritual machine – to Sophie Charlotte Leibniz wrote: "...let us say that everything in bodies happens mechanically, or in accordance with laws of motion, and that everything in the soul happens morally, or in accordance with perceived good or evil."
There are many texts that anticipate the views in the New System (notably the unpublished memoir De Affectibus of 1679) and Leibniz continued to discuss its themes later on (in addition to correpondence, for example, in Theodicy of 1710 and Monadology and Principles of Nature and Grace of 1714). Here I focus on the short-term development of Leibniz's views on the topic (around 1695-1705), but I argue that his basic view of the spiritual machine did not change much after finishing the dialogue with Locke in 1704.
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Keskityn siihen miten Leibnizilla yksittäiset mielihyvän tai mielipahan tiedostamattomat havainnot voivat kasautua tai tiivistyä ja muodostaa vähitellen tunteita, joista tulemme tietoisiksi.
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In New Essays on Human Understanding, book II, chapter xxi Leibniz presents an interesting picture of the human mind as not only populated by perceptions, volitions and appetitions, but also by endeavours. The endeavours in question can... more
In New Essays on Human Understanding, book II, chapter xxi Leibniz presents an interesting picture of the human mind as not only populated by perceptions, volitions and appetitions, but also by endeavours. The endeavours in question can be divided to entelechy and effort; Leibniz calls entelechy as primitive active forces and efforts as derivative forces. The entelechy, understood as primitive active force is to be equated with a substantial form, as Leibniz says: “When an entelechy – i.e. a primary or substantial endeavour – is accompanied by perception, it is a soul” (NE II, xxi, §1; RB, 170).
What about efforts, then? One is certainly the will. In NE, II, xxi, §5 Leibniz argues that volition is the effort (conatus) to move towards what one finds good and away from what one finds bad and that this endeavor arises from the perceptions we are aware of. As an endeavour results in action unless it is prevented, from will (which is always directed to the good) and power together follows action.
However, this is not so simple. Leibniz argues that there is also a second class of efforts: “There are other efforts, arising from insensible perceptions, which we are not aware of; I prefer to call these ‘appetitions’ rather than volitions” (NE II, xxi, §5; RB, 173). Although there are appetitions of which one can be aware, usually these appetitions arise from the insensible petite perceptions and are consequently affecting us subconsciously. Now, although all minute perceptions are confused perceptions, they are always related to pleasure and displeasure and also to perfection and imperfection. From this follows that there can be different efforts present in the soul at the same time: the will which is directed to apperceived good and several separate appetitions which lead to different goals, both to those which bring about perfection and pleasure of the mind (joy) and those which bring about displeasure and imperfection (sorrow).
These efforts are not only in conflict with each other but may also be in conflict with entelechy. A typical case is perceiving a sensual pleasure. Our entelechy which is always directed to final causes (perfection) may be in conflict with several different appetitions which are related in different ways to the sensual pleasure in question. If our understanding is developed enough, our will resists the temptation posed by the pleasure (agreeing with entelechy), but if the temptation is too strong, the appetitions outweigh the will and the resulting action bring about imperfection and sorrow as it is related to imperfection.
In this paper I will argue that deliberation in the human soul is a battle of different endeavors described above: the entelechy in the soul strives according to its law-of-the-series towards its telos (perfection) and the will accompanies it by being automatically directed to the good. This thrust towards the apparent good is aided or hindered by the appetitions which can be thought as derivative forces in the Leibnizian dynamics. Depending on whether the predominant appetitions are related to good or bad desires, the deliberation succeeds or fails in achieving the real good which is the goal of human deliberation. The successs can be facilitated beforehand by developing our understanding so that we are less easily swept away by the derivative forces (NE II, xxi, §19). A central role in this task is played by strong willing. As Martha Bolton has noted in her recent paper, an essential feature of the basic, standing endeavors is that they are continuous – although the power balance in the soul changes from moment to moment, something lingers from our previous volitions. That is why Leibniz argues that we pave way for the future deliberations by our previous voluntary actions (NE II, xxi, §23). In contrast, the appetitions are temporary, fliegende Gedanken as Leibniz says in NE II, xxi, §12. Therefore there is a constant, always changing power balance between two kinds of endeavors in the soul: primitive active force versus derivative forces.
I will argue that the behavior of the forces in the soul can be understood with a vectorial model which is related to Leibniz’s early ideas of calculus of variations and which was anticipated by Arnauld and Nicole’s Port-Royal Logic. The central idea in the model is that the options are in tension towards each other and the ratio between them at each moment determines the consequent outcome. The proper relationship between the endeavors is not a simple balance, two options which exhaust each other, but a case where different efforts complement each other: “Since the final result is determined by how things weigh against one another, I should think it could happen that he most pressing disquiet did not prevail; for even If it prevailed over each of the contrary endeavours taken singly, it may be outweighed by all of them together.” Leibniz continues : “Everything which then impinges on us weighs in the balance and contributes to determining a resultant direction, almost as in mechanics” (NE II, xxi, §40; RB, 193). The different endeavors can be understood as vectors leading to different directions and the end result is a certain direction that deliberation takes.
The dynamical tension between the different endeavors presents a situation where everything affects everything and the following direction, the resulting volition follows more or less automatically. In Theodicy, §325 Leibniz describes the deliberation as follows: “One might, instead of the balance, compare the soul with a force that puts forth an effort on various sides simultaneously, but which acts only at the spot where action is easiest or there is least resistance” (Huggard, 322)
This kind of dynamical tension can be understood in terms of the calculus of variations where there are several possible variations available but where the dynamics of the situation results in the decision taking the “easiest” route which is more or less objectively good depending on the level of the deliberator’s understanding. In his comments to Bayle’s note L of “Rorarius” Leibniz says: “The soul, even though it has no parts, has within it, because of the multitude of representations of external things, or rather because of the representation of the universe lodged within it by the creator, a great number, or rather an infinite number, of variations (Woolhouse & Francks (ed.), ‘New System’ and Associated Texts, 101). This kind of deliberation is comparable to God’s choice of the best world with the difference that God’s understanding is infinite which again results in the fact that the choice is the best possible. Whereas in nature the easiest route taken is always optimal as nature is God’s creation, in men the goodness or badness of men’s actions is dependent on their state of wisdom, that is, how developed their understanding is. The more wise men are, the more metaphysical goodness or perfection follows from their actions.
What about efforts, then? One is certainly the will. In NE, II, xxi, §5 Leibniz argues that volition is the effort (conatus) to move towards what one finds good and away from what one finds bad and that this endeavor arises from the perceptions we are aware of. As an endeavour results in action unless it is prevented, from will (which is always directed to the good) and power together follows action.
However, this is not so simple. Leibniz argues that there is also a second class of efforts: “There are other efforts, arising from insensible perceptions, which we are not aware of; I prefer to call these ‘appetitions’ rather than volitions” (NE II, xxi, §5; RB, 173). Although there are appetitions of which one can be aware, usually these appetitions arise from the insensible petite perceptions and are consequently affecting us subconsciously. Now, although all minute perceptions are confused perceptions, they are always related to pleasure and displeasure and also to perfection and imperfection. From this follows that there can be different efforts present in the soul at the same time: the will which is directed to apperceived good and several separate appetitions which lead to different goals, both to those which bring about perfection and pleasure of the mind (joy) and those which bring about displeasure and imperfection (sorrow).
These efforts are not only in conflict with each other but may also be in conflict with entelechy. A typical case is perceiving a sensual pleasure. Our entelechy which is always directed to final causes (perfection) may be in conflict with several different appetitions which are related in different ways to the sensual pleasure in question. If our understanding is developed enough, our will resists the temptation posed by the pleasure (agreeing with entelechy), but if the temptation is too strong, the appetitions outweigh the will and the resulting action bring about imperfection and sorrow as it is related to imperfection.
In this paper I will argue that deliberation in the human soul is a battle of different endeavors described above: the entelechy in the soul strives according to its law-of-the-series towards its telos (perfection) and the will accompanies it by being automatically directed to the good. This thrust towards the apparent good is aided or hindered by the appetitions which can be thought as derivative forces in the Leibnizian dynamics. Depending on whether the predominant appetitions are related to good or bad desires, the deliberation succeeds or fails in achieving the real good which is the goal of human deliberation. The successs can be facilitated beforehand by developing our understanding so that we are less easily swept away by the derivative forces (NE II, xxi, §19). A central role in this task is played by strong willing. As Martha Bolton has noted in her recent paper, an essential feature of the basic, standing endeavors is that they are continuous – although the power balance in the soul changes from moment to moment, something lingers from our previous volitions. That is why Leibniz argues that we pave way for the future deliberations by our previous voluntary actions (NE II, xxi, §23). In contrast, the appetitions are temporary, fliegende Gedanken as Leibniz says in NE II, xxi, §12. Therefore there is a constant, always changing power balance between two kinds of endeavors in the soul: primitive active force versus derivative forces.
I will argue that the behavior of the forces in the soul can be understood with a vectorial model which is related to Leibniz’s early ideas of calculus of variations and which was anticipated by Arnauld and Nicole’s Port-Royal Logic. The central idea in the model is that the options are in tension towards each other and the ratio between them at each moment determines the consequent outcome. The proper relationship between the endeavors is not a simple balance, two options which exhaust each other, but a case where different efforts complement each other: “Since the final result is determined by how things weigh against one another, I should think it could happen that he most pressing disquiet did not prevail; for even If it prevailed over each of the contrary endeavours taken singly, it may be outweighed by all of them together.” Leibniz continues : “Everything which then impinges on us weighs in the balance and contributes to determining a resultant direction, almost as in mechanics” (NE II, xxi, §40; RB, 193). The different endeavors can be understood as vectors leading to different directions and the end result is a certain direction that deliberation takes.
The dynamical tension between the different endeavors presents a situation where everything affects everything and the following direction, the resulting volition follows more or less automatically. In Theodicy, §325 Leibniz describes the deliberation as follows: “One might, instead of the balance, compare the soul with a force that puts forth an effort on various sides simultaneously, but which acts only at the spot where action is easiest or there is least resistance” (Huggard, 322)
This kind of dynamical tension can be understood in terms of the calculus of variations where there are several possible variations available but where the dynamics of the situation results in the decision taking the “easiest” route which is more or less objectively good depending on the level of the deliberator’s understanding. In his comments to Bayle’s note L of “Rorarius” Leibniz says: “The soul, even though it has no parts, has within it, because of the multitude of representations of external things, or rather because of the representation of the universe lodged within it by the creator, a great number, or rather an infinite number, of variations (Woolhouse & Francks (ed.), ‘New System’ and Associated Texts, 101). This kind of deliberation is comparable to God’s choice of the best world with the difference that God’s understanding is infinite which again results in the fact that the choice is the best possible. Whereas in nature the easiest route taken is always optimal as nature is God’s creation, in men the goodness or badness of men’s actions is dependent on their state of wisdom, that is, how developed their understanding is. The more wise men are, the more metaphysical goodness or perfection follows from their actions.
Research Interests:
Chapter 20 of book II of John Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, titled ‘Of Modes of Pleasure and Pain’ is the most extensive discussion of emotions available in Locke’s corpus. Likewise, Nouveaux essais sur l’entedement... more
Chapter 20 of book II of John Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, titled ‘Of Modes of Pleasure and Pain’ is the most extensive discussion of emotions available in Locke’s corpus. Likewise, Nouveaux essais sur l’entedement humain, II, xx, together with the following chapter xxi remains the chief source of Leibniz’s views of emotions. They offer a very interesting and captivating discussion of moral philosophy and good life.
The chapter provides also a great platform to study Leibniz’s argumentative techniques and the differences between the philosophers in general. Locke strives to explain the emotions with a single, unifying notion of uneasiness while Leibniz’s view of the mind is much more complex and he finds more unique ways of explaining different emotions.
My paper focuses on Leibniz’s critique of Lockean uneasiness as an explanans for emotions. He views uneasiness as a unavoidable part of all our mental states and therefore it is not sufficient to explain passions or moral wrong-doing of men. I will discuss such passions as love, joy, sorrow, hope, fear, despair, anger, envy and shame and consider Locke’s possible response to Leibniz’s critique.
The chapter provides also a great platform to study Leibniz’s argumentative techniques and the differences between the philosophers in general. Locke strives to explain the emotions with a single, unifying notion of uneasiness while Leibniz’s view of the mind is much more complex and he finds more unique ways of explaining different emotions.
My paper focuses on Leibniz’s critique of Lockean uneasiness as an explanans for emotions. He views uneasiness as a unavoidable part of all our mental states and therefore it is not sufficient to explain passions or moral wrong-doing of men. I will discuss such passions as love, joy, sorrow, hope, fear, despair, anger, envy and shame and consider Locke’s possible response to Leibniz’s critique.
Research Interests:
Descartes argued that the passions of the soul were immediately felt in the body, as the animal spirits, affected by the movement of the pineal gland, spread through the body. In Leibniz the effect of emotions in the body is a different... more
Descartes argued that the passions of the soul were immediately felt in the body, as the animal spirits, affected by the movement of the pineal gland, spread through the body. In Leibniz the effect of emotions in the body is a different question as he did not allow the direct interaction between the mind and the body, although maintaining a psychophysical parallelism between them.
In general, he avoids discussing emotions in bodily terms, saying that general inclinations, passions, pleasures and pains belong only to the mind or to the soul (NE II, xxi, §72). He is also keen to point out that our passions derive mostly from our bodies. However, like Spinoza (Ethics III, prop. XI, Scholium) he thought that some emotions such as joy can produce pleasures which can be described also in bodily terms. For example, in a short memoir Felicity he says that music can be a pleasure for the ears and symmetry can be a pleasure for the eyes. These more intellectual emotions are actions in the sense that they represent perfection emanating from their source, the absolutely perfect being, that is, God. The feeling of perfection may produce a state of well-being which concerns both the soul and the body.
In my paper I will trace instances of Leibniz’s remarks on how these kind of emotions affect the body. I will also discuss the different ways the body gives rise to passions in the soul. My primary source is Nouveaux essais, book II, chapter xx and xxi, but I will also discuss various other writings by Leibniz.
In general, he avoids discussing emotions in bodily terms, saying that general inclinations, passions, pleasures and pains belong only to the mind or to the soul (NE II, xxi, §72). He is also keen to point out that our passions derive mostly from our bodies. However, like Spinoza (Ethics III, prop. XI, Scholium) he thought that some emotions such as joy can produce pleasures which can be described also in bodily terms. For example, in a short memoir Felicity he says that music can be a pleasure for the ears and symmetry can be a pleasure for the eyes. These more intellectual emotions are actions in the sense that they represent perfection emanating from their source, the absolutely perfect being, that is, God. The feeling of perfection may produce a state of well-being which concerns both the soul and the body.
In my paper I will trace instances of Leibniz’s remarks on how these kind of emotions affect the body. I will also discuss the different ways the body gives rise to passions in the soul. My primary source is Nouveaux essais, book II, chapter xx and xxi, but I will also discuss various other writings by Leibniz.
Research Interests:
"Kant and Leibniz on the Singularity of the Best of All Possible Worlds In his early lecture note Versuch einiger Betrachtungen über den Optimismus (1759) a young supporter of metaphysical optimism called Immanuel Kant tested the... more
"Kant and Leibniz on the Singularity of the Best of All Possible Worlds
In his early lecture note Versuch einiger Betrachtungen über den Optimismus (1759) a young supporter of metaphysical optimism called Immanuel Kant tested the Leibnizian optimism by posing some counter-arguments against it only to falsify them. His counter-arguments were very inventive and they feature often in modern scholarship on Leibniz. In this paper I will present Kant’s main arguments and evaluate them. I will argue that Kant’s understanding on Leibnizian optimism is little misguided and for this reason his own positive counter-argument despite its ingeniousness is problematic. His second solution to the problem is comparable to the doctrine of metaphysical optimism, but fails also for the same reason as the first one.
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In his early lecture note Versuch einiger Betrachtungen über den Optimismus (1759) a young supporter of metaphysical optimism called Immanuel Kant tested the Leibnizian optimism by posing some counter-arguments against it only to falsify them. His counter-arguments were very inventive and they feature often in modern scholarship on Leibniz. In this paper I will present Kant’s main arguments and evaluate them. I will argue that Kant’s understanding on Leibnizian optimism is little misguided and for this reason his own positive counter-argument despite its ingeniousness is problematic. His second solution to the problem is comparable to the doctrine of metaphysical optimism, but fails also for the same reason as the first one.
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Human deliberation is a complicated and a difficult process. When forming moral judgement, various reasons inclinate the agent without necessitating him or her and the final result is more or less a compromise between these different... more
Human deliberation is a complicated and a difficult process. When forming moral judgement, various reasons inclinate the agent without necessitating him or her and the final result is more or less a compromise between these different spurs for action. Choosing right requires clear mind, good habits and strength of will. However, by a kind of self-manipulation moral development is possible. In my presentation, I shall discuss the forming of moral judgement in the intellect, consider the role of the passions in deliberation and discuss how moral self-improvement takes place according to Leibniz in Nouveaux essais and Animadversiones in partem generalem Principiorum Cartesianorum.
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Kirja-arvostelu Teoksesta Rob Boddice: Tunteiden historia (Book review of Rob Boddice: A history of feelings). Vastapaino, 2022.
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This is author's accepted version of the lengthy review of the highly interesting collection of articles of Leibniz's impact and legacy.
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Causality and Mind presents seventeen of Nicholas Jolley's essays on early modern philosophy, which focus on two main themes. One theme is the continuing debate over the nature of causality in the period from Descartes to Hume. Jolley... more
Causality and Mind presents seventeen of Nicholas Jolley's essays on early modern philosophy, which focus on two main themes. One theme is the continuing debate over the nature of causality in the period from Descartes to Hume. Jolley shows that, despite his revolutionary stance, Descartes did no serious re-thinking about causality; it was left to his unorthodox disciple Malebranche to argue that there is no place for natural causality in the new mechanistic picture of the physical world. Several essays explore critical reactions to Malebranche's occasionalism in the writings of Leibniz, Berkeley, and Hume, and show how in their different ways Leibniz and Hume respond to Malebranche by re-instating the traditional view that science is the search for causes. A second theme of the volume is the set of issues posed by Descartes' innovations in the philosophy of mind. It is argued that Malebranche is once again a pivotal figure. In opposition to Descartes Malebranche insists that ideas, the objects of thought, are not psychological but abstract entities; he thus opposes Descartes' 'dustbin theory of the mind'. Malebranche also challenges Descartes' assumption that intentionality is a mark of the mental and his commitment to the superiority of self-knowledge over knowledge of body. Other essays discuss the debate over innate ideas, Locke's polemics against Descartes' theory of mind, and the issue of Leibniz's phenomenalism. A major aim of the volume is to show that philosophers in the period are systematic critics of their contemporaries and predecessors.
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We discuss in this article the 17th Munin Conference on Scholarly Publishing which took place in Tromsø, Norway, end of 2022. The Munin Conference is an annual conference on scholarly publishing and communication, primarily revolving... more
We discuss in this article the 17th Munin Conference on Scholarly Publishing which took place in Tromsø, Norway, end of 2022. The Munin Conference is an annual conference on scholarly publishing and communication, primarily revolving around open access publishing, open research data and open science. In the conference special focus was on copyright issues, including experiences on rights retention strategy, and on discussing open science infrastructures. We also reflect the flipped format-method used in the conference and the pre-workshop on publishing ethics.
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Katkelma unista (G. W. Leibniz 1646-1716) / A Finnish translation of a fragment on dreams by G. W. Leibniz (kääntänyt Markku Roinila)
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Johdanto Leibnizin unia käsittelevään katkelmaan
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Tässä katsauksessa vertaillaan Academia.edu- ja PhilPapers-tallennusalustoja avoimen saatavuuden kannalta.
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Tässä katsauksessa esitellään avoimen julkaisemiseen olennaisesti liittyviä käsitteitä.
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An introduction to Leibniz's Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis - in Finnish. Published in Niin & Näin 2/1999.
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An introduction to the thought and person of Marcelo Dascal, published in Finnish Journal Niin & Näin 3/2011.
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An interview on Leibniz and how to do history of philosophy with Pauline Phemister - in Finnish. Published in Finnish philosophical journal Niin & Näin 3/2012.
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- Descartes-Elisabeth-correspondence (with Tuomo Aho), Descartes,Teokset [Works] IV, Gaudeamus, Helsinki, 2005, pp. 144-278. - Various translations of Leibniz's texts in Aho & Roinila (ed.), Leibniz: Filosofisia tutkielmia [Philosophical... more
- Descartes-Elisabeth-correspondence (with Tuomo Aho), Descartes,Teokset [Works] IV, Gaudeamus, Helsinki, 2005, pp. 144-278.
- Various translations of Leibniz's texts in Aho & Roinila (ed.), Leibniz: Filosofisia tutkielmia [Philosophical essays], Helsinki, University Press 2011.
- Dascal: The Challenge of Human Difference and the Ethics of Communication, Finnish translation forthcoming in 2011.
- Various translations of Leibniz's texts in Aho & Roinila (ed.), Leibniz: Filosofisia tutkielmia [Philosophical essays], Helsinki, University Press 2011.
- Dascal: The Challenge of Human Difference and the Ethics of Communication, Finnish translation forthcoming in 2011.
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These are general articles on Leibniz in a Finnish net-encyclopedia Logos, in connection with philosophy-portal Filosofia.fi: Leibniz : http://filosofia.fi/node/2412 Leibniz tiedosta [Leibniz on knowledge]: http://filosofia.fi/node/2415... more
These are general articles on Leibniz in a Finnish net-encyclopedia Logos, in connection with philosophy-portal Filosofia.fi:
Leibniz : http://filosofia.fi/node/2412
Leibniz tiedosta [Leibniz on knowledge]: http://filosofia.fi/node/2415
Leibniz metafysiikasta [Leibniz's metaphysics]: http://filosofia.fi/node/2413
Leibniz moraalifilosofiasta ja teodikean ongelmasta [Leibniz's moral philosophy and the problem of evil]: http://filosofia.fi/node/2414
Leibniz : http://filosofia.fi/node/2412
Leibniz tiedosta [Leibniz on knowledge]: http://filosofia.fi/node/2415
Leibniz metafysiikasta [Leibniz's metaphysics]: http://filosofia.fi/node/2413
Leibniz moraalifilosofiasta ja teodikean ongelmasta [Leibniz's moral philosophy and the problem of evil]: http://filosofia.fi/node/2414
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This blog post gives you five tips to recognize predatory publications.
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In this blog text I discuss the strengths and weaknesses of various web 2.0 applications for a philosopher and philosophical discussion in internet in general. The piece is published in New Apps blog.... more
In this blog text I discuss the strengths and weaknesses of various web 2.0 applications for a philosopher and philosophical discussion in internet in general. The piece is published in New Apps blog.
http://www.newappsblog.com/2011/08/the-social-media-for-a-philosopher.html
http://www.newappsblog.com/2011/08/the-social-media-for-a-philosopher.html
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Tässä blogissa esittelen hankkeessamme tehtyä monitieteistä termityötä ja pohdin sen teoreettisia taustaoletuksia.
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These are presentation slides of a Fall 2013 lecture course. They are freely available in Zenodo under CC BY-license: https://zenodo.org/record/1407046#.W4kuOqKY8Vs
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Introduction to Open Science<br> A webinar by Helsinki University Library The purpose of the two-part webinar is to give a basic introduction to open science, especially open access publishing. We will discuss basic terminology of... more
Introduction to Open Science<br> A webinar by Helsinki University Library The purpose of the two-part webinar is to give a basic introduction to open science, especially open access publishing. We will discuss basic terminology of open science, why open science is important, what are the central features of open access publishing and how one promote open access in teaching. The open access services of the Helsinki University library are introduced as well. This slideset is distributed to the participants.
Open access has created a new unfortunate phenomenon, the so-called predatory publishers and journals who sell publishing services through email spam. In many cases, these keen service providers are in the business solely for collecting... more
Open access has created a new unfortunate phenomenon, the so-called predatory publishers and journals who sell publishing services through email spam. In many cases, these keen service providers are in the business solely for collecting article processing charges, not publishing the articles or developing research. In this webinar, we will introduce you to the characteristic features of these journals / publishers and explain by which criteria one can tell the good journals from the predatory journals for your publishing purposes.
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These are the slides from the LIBER 2020 Session Libraries as Open Innovators and Leaders. <strong>Session Description:</strong> The way we access information is rapidly changing. While the library catalogue used to be the... more
These are the slides from the LIBER 2020 Session Libraries as Open Innovators and Leaders. <strong>Session Description:</strong> The way we access information is rapidly changing. While the library catalogue used to be the main point of contact for scholarly material, researchers and students now frequently go online to find information. This change is strengthened by movements such as Open Access (OA) and Open Science. Instead of signalling the end of the library, these developments open up a range of possibilities and new roles for research libraries and librarians. In this session, we will look at new roles for libraries and librarians as open innovators and leaders. Dr. Markku Roinila, Kimmo Koskinen and Kati Syvälahti will discuss the role of education in generating the cultural change needed for Open Science. They will focus on a pilot project initiated by Helsinki University Library together with a Doctoral Programme in Philosophy, Arts and Social Sciences, discus...
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This blog post gives you five tips to recognize predatory publications.en
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These are presentation slides of a lecture course held in theoretical philosophy, University of Helsinki 2013.
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In §18 of Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason, Leibniz says: "Thus our happiness will never consist, and must never consist, in complete joy, in which nothing is left to desire, and which would dull our mind, but must... more
In §18 of Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason, Leibniz says: "Thus our happiness will never consist, and must never consist, in complete joy, in which nothing is left to desire, and which would dull our mind, but must consist in a perpetual progress to new pleasures and new perfections." This passage is typical in Leibniz's Nachlass. Universal perfection creates in us joy or pleasure of the mind and its source is our creator, God. When this joy is constant, we reach happiness and wisdom which is a kind of standing state of virtue, readiness to practice charity in the best of all possible worlds. However, it also indicates that our knowledge is never perfect. Perfecting our knowledge is a never-ending process which gives us joy in itself and motivates us to act in imitation of God. In this way some passions advance our knowledge and we can create ourselves a passionate habit of knowing more about the world and its perfection.<br> In this paper I try to...
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Artikkeli esittelee Leibnizin näkemyksiä kuolemasta. Se on hänen mukaansa mahdoton, sillä monadit eivat voi syntyä tai tuhoutua itsestään.
Esitykseni Edistyksen päivillä syksyllä 2017. Esitykseen liittynyt artikkeli ilmestyny Tiedpolitiikka-lehdessä (http://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:ELE-2501333)
Esitykseni Leibnizin luonnonfilosofiasta, erityisesti vis viva-kiistasta Luonnonfilosofian seurassa 2017.
Nämä ovat kalvot esityksestäni Suomen filosofisen yhdistyksen Tekoäly-kollokviosta Tampereella tammikuussa 2019. Niissä esitellään varhaisia tekoälyyn liittyviä projekteja 1600/1700-luvulta, mukaanlukien laskukoneet, universaalikielet,... more
Nämä ovat kalvot esityksestäni Suomen filosofisen yhdistyksen Tekoäly-kollokviosta Tampereella tammikuussa 2019. Niissä esitellään varhaisia tekoälyyn liittyviä projekteja 1600/1700-luvulta, mukaanlukien laskukoneet, universaalikielet, binäärilaskenta ja spirituaaliset automaatit.
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In his defense of innateness in New Essays on Human Understanding (1704), Leibniz attributes innateness to concepts and principles which do not originate from the senses rather than to the ideas that we are born with. He argues that the... more
In his defense of innateness in New Essays on Human Understanding (1704), Leibniz attributes innateness to concepts and principles which do not originate from the senses rather than to the ideas that we are born with. He argues that the innate concepts and principles can be known in two ways: through reason or natural light (necessary truths), and through instincts (other innate truths and principles). In this paper I will show how theoretical and moral reasoning differ from each other in Leibniz, and compare moral reasoning and instincts as sources of knowledge in his practical philosophy. As the practical instincts are closely related to pleasure and passions, which are by nature cognitive, my emphasis will be on the affective character of instinctive moral action and especially deliberation which leads to moral action. I will argue that inclinations arising from moral instinct, which lead us to pleasure while avoiding sorrow, can direct our moral action and sometimes anticipate r...
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In this article we will examine the question of how open access publishers should be evaluated from the point of view of library acquisition services or of a researcher who considers publishing in an OA journal. We will present a method... more
In this article we will examine the question of how open access publishers should be evaluated from the point of view of library acquisition services or of a researcher who considers publishing in an OA journal. We will present a method for evaluation of the practices of OA publishers and the impact of their e-journals. Our method combines quantitative and qualitative analysis and can also be applied to evaluating singular OA journals. Tässä artikkelissa tarkastelemme sitä, miten open access -julkaisijoita tulisi arvioida kirjastojen hankintapalvelujen tai avointa julkaisemista harkitsevan tutkijan näkökulmasta. Esittelemme kvantitatiiviseen ja kvalitatiiviseen arviointiin perustuvan menetelmän, jonka avulla voidaan arvioida OA-julkaisijan uskottavuutta ja sen julkaisemien lehtien vaikuttavuutta. Samaa laadunarviointimenetelmää voidaan soveltuvin osin käyttää myös yksittäisten open access -lehtien laadun arviointiin.
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In this paper I will first introduce GW Leibniz's theory of rational decision-making as presented by Nicholas Rescher and then apply it to the Reunion of the Churches and especially to the practical methodology of resolving the... more
In this paper I will first introduce GW Leibniz's theory of rational decision-making as presented by Nicholas Rescher and then apply it to the Reunion of the Churches and especially to the practical methodology of resolving the differences between the confessions. GW Leibniz's Theory ...
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Samassa paikassa Hobbes määrittelee myös harkinnan, jonka hän sanoo olevan "koko halujen, aversioiden, toivojen ja pelkojen summa, aina siihen asti kun asia joko tehdään tai katsotaan mahdottomaksi." (Hobbes 1999, 71) Toisin... more
Samassa paikassa Hobbes määrittelee myös harkinnan, jonka hän sanoo olevan "koko halujen, aversioiden, toivojen ja pelkojen summa, aina siihen asti kun asia joko tehdään tai katsotaan mahdottomaksi." (Hobbes 1999, 71) Toisin sanoen moraalinen valinta on ...
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Academic libraries play a pivotal role in promoting open science, providing essential services for opening research and education. The library has also a key role in increasing awareness of open educational resources and practices.... more
Academic libraries play a pivotal role in promoting open science, providing essential services for opening research and education. The library has also a key role in increasing awareness of open educational resources and practices. Editori is an open journal service at the University of Helsinki designed with an educational focus, providing simultaneously a contribution to the rising trend of university-based and library-based publishing. We show how this service, based on Open Journal Systems (OJS), can be applied as a pedagogical tool for teaching scholarly publishing skills to university students. In 2019 Helsinki University Library initiated a pilot project together with the Working Seminar of Doctoral Programme in Philosophy, Arts and Society of the Arts Faculty of the University of Helsinki. We outline expected pedagogical outcomes from the project, relating to scholarly communication skills, report feedback from teachers and students and discuss implications for future servic...
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Sysäyksen Berliinin tiedeakatemian perustami-selle antoi filosofi GW Leibniz useissa yhteyk-sissä tiedeakatemiasta onkin puhuttu Leibnizin akatemiana. Filosofi oli monipuolisessa tieteelli-sessä toiminnassaan ollut jo tekemisissä... more
Sysäyksen Berliinin tiedeakatemian perustami-selle antoi filosofi GW Leibniz useissa yhteyk-sissä tiedeakatemiasta onkin puhuttu Leibnizin akatemiana. Filosofi oli monipuolisessa tieteelli-sessä toiminnassaan ollut jo tekemisissä aikansa kuuluisimpien ...
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In this paper I will first introduce GW Leibniz's theory of rational decision-making as presented by Nicholas Rescher and then apply it to the Reunion of the Churches and especially to the practical methodology of resolving the... more
In this paper I will first introduce GW Leibniz's theory of rational decision-making as presented by Nicholas Rescher and then apply it to the Reunion of the Churches and especially to the practical methodology of resolving the differences between the confessions. GW Leibniz's Theory ...
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Ensin on kuitenkin syytä katsoa käsitteen taustaa, jotta näemme missä määrin Leibniz seurasi edeltäjiään ja missä suhteessa hänen käsityksensä oli omaperäinen. Teoksessaan Sielusta, III kirja, 3. luku Aristoteles sanoo seuraavasti:... more
Ensin on kuitenkin syytä katsoa käsitteen taustaa, jotta näemme missä määrin Leibniz seurasi edeltäjiään ja missä suhteessa hänen käsityksensä oli omaperäinen. Teoksessaan Sielusta, III kirja, 3. luku Aristoteles sanoo seuraavasti: "Kuvittelukyky on
eri asia kuin aistiminen ...
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Tiedepolitiikan ja rahoittajien linjauksissa on korostettu yhä enemmän tutkimusaineistojen avointa saatavuutta. EU:n Horisontti 2020 -ohjelma edellyttää aineiston avaamista ja Suomen Akatemia vaatii rahoitushakemuksissa... more
Tiedepolitiikan ja rahoittajien linjauksissa on korostettu yhä enemmän tutkimusaineistojen avointa saatavuutta. EU:n Horisontti 2020 -ohjelma edellyttää aineiston avaamista ja Suomen Akatemia vaatii rahoitushakemuksissa aineistonhallintasuunnitelmaa. Myös monet julkaisijat vaativat yhä useammin tutkimusdatan liittämistä artikkeleihin. Avoimuuden vaatimus tieteessä ei toki ole uusi keksintö, tietotekniikan kehitys vain tarjoaa sille uusia käytännön sovellutuksia. Mutta millaisia edellytyksiä tutkimusdatan avaamiseen ja jakamiseen käytännössä tällä hetkellä on? Tässä artikkelissa esiteltävä Helsingin yliopistossa tehty selvitys osoittaa, että nykyinen tutkimuskulttuuri ei ehkä kaikilta osin ole vielä valmis datan avaamiseen. Erityisenä ongelmana nousee esiin metadatan puutteellisuus.
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In this draft we are trying to characterize different ways to think about interdisciplinary terminological work in humanities (in this case, philosophy and literature studies) and suggest that a possible methodological basis for this kind... more
In this draft we are trying to characterize different ways to think about interdisciplinary terminological work in humanities (in this case, philosophy and literature studies) and suggest that a possible methodological basis for this kind of work would be the concept of family resemblance by Ludwig Wittgenstein.
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This is an introduction in English of the term project I am currently working with.
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Esitys Suomen filosofisen yhdistyksen Tekoäly-kollokviossa 2019.
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Esitys Nuorten filosofiatapahtumassa, 2019
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Tässä esitelmässä käyn läpi Leibnizin kritiikkiä Descartesin liikkeen teoriaa kohtaan ja kerron miten tämä johti kuuluisan vis viva-kiistan syntyyn. Esitelmä pidettiin Luonnonfilosofisessa seurassa 17. 10. 2017.
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One of the features of John Locke’s moral philosophy is the idea that morality is based on our beliefs concerning the future good. In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding II, xxi, §70 Locke argues that we have to decide between the... more
One of the features of John Locke’s moral philosophy is the idea that morality is based on our beliefs concerning the future good. In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding II,
xxi, §70 Locke argues that we have to decide between the probability of afterlife and our present temptations.
in itself, this kind of decision model is not rare in 17th-century philosophy. Blaise Pascal’s Wager is a famous example of a similar idea and one might also think as various theories of theodicy as a similar deciding between pair of scales where the one cup represents good and the other evil. God would have to balance different possible worlds and choose one where there is more goodness than evil.
Leibniz was not satisfied in this kind of simple balancing. In his commentary to Locke’s Essay, Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain, II, xxi, §66 he presented an alternative
model which is based on an idea of plural, mutually conflicting inclinations. This kind of model, called as vectorial theory of rational decision by Simo Knuuttila, fits with Leibniz’s theory of the soul where volitions are formed as a kind of compromise between different desires. The two different models are compared in an implicit manner by Leibniz in chapter xxi of the book II when he criticizes Locke’s theory of uneasiness which lead us strive for the absent good. Leibniz also employs his vectorial model in the discussion concerning akractic behavior in the same chapter.
I will present these two models and show how they illustrate the theories of deliberation of Locke and Leibniz and how their moral philosophies differ, although being similar in certain respects. I will also discuss how Leibniz applies a similar kind of model in his explanation of how God chooses the best among all possible worlds.
xxi, §70 Locke argues that we have to decide between the probability of afterlife and our present temptations.
in itself, this kind of decision model is not rare in 17th-century philosophy. Blaise Pascal’s Wager is a famous example of a similar idea and one might also think as various theories of theodicy as a similar deciding between pair of scales where the one cup represents good and the other evil. God would have to balance different possible worlds and choose one where there is more goodness than evil.
Leibniz was not satisfied in this kind of simple balancing. In his commentary to Locke’s Essay, Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain, II, xxi, §66 he presented an alternative
model which is based on an idea of plural, mutually conflicting inclinations. This kind of model, called as vectorial theory of rational decision by Simo Knuuttila, fits with Leibniz’s theory of the soul where volitions are formed as a kind of compromise between different desires. The two different models are compared in an implicit manner by Leibniz in chapter xxi of the book II when he criticizes Locke’s theory of uneasiness which lead us strive for the absent good. Leibniz also employs his vectorial model in the discussion concerning akractic behavior in the same chapter.
I will present these two models and show how they illustrate the theories of deliberation of Locke and Leibniz and how their moral philosophies differ, although being similar in certain respects. I will also discuss how Leibniz applies a similar kind of model in his explanation of how God chooses the best among all possible worlds.
Kant and Leibniz on the Singularity of the Best of All Possible Worlds Section 13 Kant and the Leibnizian tradition Abstract In his early lecture note Versuch einiger Betrachtungen über den Optimismus (1759) a young supporter of... more
Kant and Leibniz on the Singularity of the Best of All Possible Worlds
Section 13 Kant and the Leibnizian tradition
Abstract
In his early lecture note Versuch einiger Betrachtungen über den Optimismus (1759) a young supporter of metaphysical optimism called Immanuel Kant tested the Leibnizian optimism by posing some counter-arguments against it only to falsify them. His counter-arguments were very inventive and they feature often in modern scholarship on Leibniz. In this paper I will present Kant’s main arguments and evaluate them. I will argue that Kant’s understanding on Leibnizian optimism is little misguided and for this reason his own positive counter-argument despite its ingeniousness is problematic. His second solution to the problem is comparable to the doctrine of metaphysical optimism, but fails also for the same reason as the first one.
Section 13 Kant and the Leibnizian tradition
Abstract
In his early lecture note Versuch einiger Betrachtungen über den Optimismus (1759) a young supporter of metaphysical optimism called Immanuel Kant tested the Leibnizian optimism by posing some counter-arguments against it only to falsify them. His counter-arguments were very inventive and they feature often in modern scholarship on Leibniz. In this paper I will present Kant’s main arguments and evaluate them. I will argue that Kant’s understanding on Leibnizian optimism is little misguided and for this reason his own positive counter-argument despite its ingeniousness is problematic. His second solution to the problem is comparable to the doctrine of metaphysical optimism, but fails also for the same reason as the first one.
Locke and Leibniz on the Balance of Reasons NWEMP, Uppsala 5-6 June 2010 Markku Roinila One of the features of John Locke’s moral philosophy is the idea that morality is based on our beliefs concerning the future good. In An Essay... more
Locke and Leibniz on the Balance of Reasons
NWEMP, Uppsala 5-6 June 2010
Markku Roinila
One of the features of John Locke’s moral philosophy is the idea that morality is based on our beliefs concerning the future good. In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding II,
xxi, §70 Locke argues that we have to decide between the probability of afterlife and our present temptations.
in itself, this kind of decision model is not rare in 17th-century philosophy. Blaise Pascal’s Wager is a famous example of a similar idea and one might also think as various theories of theodicy as a similar deciding between pair of scales where the one cup represents good and the other evil. God would have to balance different possible worlds and choose one where there is more goodness than evil.
Leibniz was not satisfied in this kind of simple balancing. In his commentary to Locke’s Essay, Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain, II, xxi, §66 he presented an alternative
model which is based on an idea of plural, mutually conflicting inclinations. This kind of model, called as vectorial theory of rational decision by Simo Knuuttila, fits with Leibniz’s theory of the soul where volitions are formed as a kind of compromise between different desires. The two different models are compared in an implicit manner by Leibniz in chapter xxi of the book II when he criticizes Locke’s theory of uneasiness which lead us strive for the absent good. Leibniz also employs his vectorial model in the discussion concerning akractic behavior in the same chapter.
I will present these two models and show how they illustrate the theories of deliberation of Locke and Leibniz and how their moral philosophies differ, although being similar in certain respects. I will also discuss how Leibniz applies a similar kind of model in his explanation of how God chooses the best among all possible worlds.
NWEMP, Uppsala 5-6 June 2010
Markku Roinila
One of the features of John Locke’s moral philosophy is the idea that morality is based on our beliefs concerning the future good. In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding II,
xxi, §70 Locke argues that we have to decide between the probability of afterlife and our present temptations.
in itself, this kind of decision model is not rare in 17th-century philosophy. Blaise Pascal’s Wager is a famous example of a similar idea and one might also think as various theories of theodicy as a similar deciding between pair of scales where the one cup represents good and the other evil. God would have to balance different possible worlds and choose one where there is more goodness than evil.
Leibniz was not satisfied in this kind of simple balancing. In his commentary to Locke’s Essay, Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain, II, xxi, §66 he presented an alternative
model which is based on an idea of plural, mutually conflicting inclinations. This kind of model, called as vectorial theory of rational decision by Simo Knuuttila, fits with Leibniz’s theory of the soul where volitions are formed as a kind of compromise between different desires. The two different models are compared in an implicit manner by Leibniz in chapter xxi of the book II when he criticizes Locke’s theory of uneasiness which lead us strive for the absent good. Leibniz also employs his vectorial model in the discussion concerning akractic behavior in the same chapter.
I will present these two models and show how they illustrate the theories of deliberation of Locke and Leibniz and how their moral philosophies differ, although being similar in certain respects. I will also discuss how Leibniz applies a similar kind of model in his explanation of how God chooses the best among all possible worlds.
Leibniz and Locke on Modes of Pleasure and Pain Chapter 20 of Book II of John Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, titled ‘Of Modes of Pleasure and Pain’ discusses emotions. Despite its brevity (the chapter consists of only... more
Leibniz and Locke on Modes of Pleasure and Pain
Chapter 20 of Book II of John Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, titled ‘Of Modes of Pleasure and Pain’ discusses emotions. Despite its brevity (the chapter consists of only four and half pages in the Nidditch-edition) it is arguably the most extensive discussion of emotions or passions available in Locke’s corpus. The same applies to Leibniz’s discussion in his commentary of Locke’s work, Nouveaux essais sur l’entedement humain (together with the following chapter 21 of book II). Together they offer a very interesting and captivating discussion of moral philosophy and good life in general with the special emphasis on knowledge and the passions.
In my paper I will discuss the views on emotions of the two philosophers and illustrate their differences by comparing their views on akrasia or weakness of the will. Locke strives to explain the emotions with a single, unifying notion of uneasiness while Leibniz’s view of the mind is much more complex and he finds more unique ways of explaining different emotions in each context. Of special interest is his account of emotions as processes where the minute perceptions we have form a certain disquiet (Leibniz’s version of Locke’s uneasiness) which affects us without our knowing the reason why. Only gradually this restless state becomes conscious and an emotion which is directed to a certain object arises.
While Locke is relying on a kind of wager (similar to Pascal’s) in his views of our moral ends, arguing in chapter 21 of book II of his Essay that we should deliberate between our present good and the future good of the afterlife, Leibniz gives a great role to intellectual emotions, arguing that the pleasure of mind or joy leads us to happiness eventually. Whereas for Locke emotions are states of mind (relating to uneasiness), for Leibniz they are based on minute perceptions which implies that they arise by degrees and affect our deliberations as one element among many. Leibniz argues that our mind is in perpetual conflict where desires (which are build from unconscious minute perceptions) and clear and distinct ideas of which we are aware of fight against each other. Leibniz thinks – like Shaftesbury later – that we can conquer our bad passions with better ones. This has its own reward as acting virtuously brings about the happiness, but it has to be sustained continuously by choosing real goods instead of the apparent ones.
Chapter 20 of Book II of John Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, titled ‘Of Modes of Pleasure and Pain’ discusses emotions. Despite its brevity (the chapter consists of only four and half pages in the Nidditch-edition) it is arguably the most extensive discussion of emotions or passions available in Locke’s corpus. The same applies to Leibniz’s discussion in his commentary of Locke’s work, Nouveaux essais sur l’entedement humain (together with the following chapter 21 of book II). Together they offer a very interesting and captivating discussion of moral philosophy and good life in general with the special emphasis on knowledge and the passions.
In my paper I will discuss the views on emotions of the two philosophers and illustrate their differences by comparing their views on akrasia or weakness of the will. Locke strives to explain the emotions with a single, unifying notion of uneasiness while Leibniz’s view of the mind is much more complex and he finds more unique ways of explaining different emotions in each context. Of special interest is his account of emotions as processes where the minute perceptions we have form a certain disquiet (Leibniz’s version of Locke’s uneasiness) which affects us without our knowing the reason why. Only gradually this restless state becomes conscious and an emotion which is directed to a certain object arises.
While Locke is relying on a kind of wager (similar to Pascal’s) in his views of our moral ends, arguing in chapter 21 of book II of his Essay that we should deliberate between our present good and the future good of the afterlife, Leibniz gives a great role to intellectual emotions, arguing that the pleasure of mind or joy leads us to happiness eventually. Whereas for Locke emotions are states of mind (relating to uneasiness), for Leibniz they are based on minute perceptions which implies that they arise by degrees and affect our deliberations as one element among many. Leibniz argues that our mind is in perpetual conflict where desires (which are build from unconscious minute perceptions) and clear and distinct ideas of which we are aware of fight against each other. Leibniz thinks – like Shaftesbury later – that we can conquer our bad passions with better ones. This has its own reward as acting virtuously brings about the happiness, but it has to be sustained continuously by choosing real goods instead of the apparent ones.
In August(?) 1697 Leibniz sent a letter to Electress Sophie of Hanover where he said that he had read a few documents on the controversy concerning disinterested love of God between Bossuet and Fénelon. He does not comment the controversy... more
In August(?) 1697 Leibniz sent a letter to Electress Sophie of Hanover where he said that he had read a few documents on the controversy concerning disinterested love of God between Bossuet and Fénelon. He does not comment the controversy in detail but wants to explain his views on the matter to Sophie as expressed in his Preface to Codex iuris gentium diplomaticus (1693) (besides discussing Christian virtues related to a recent translation of a French dialogue on the matter) .
Seven years later Leibniz wrote his Nouveaux essays sur l’entendement humain where he comments Locke’s brief discussion of passions in book II, chapter 20. In this paper I will compare Leibniz’s accounts of love in the letter to Sophie and his answer to Locke and discuss his style of argumentation. As Leibniz argues in his letter to Sophie that women (he mentions Miss de Scudery and Lady Norris) are experts on love, it is interesting to see how his answer to Locke differs from his arguments presented to Sophie and from his earlier statements in the Preface of 1693.
Seven years later Leibniz wrote his Nouveaux essays sur l’entendement humain where he comments Locke’s brief discussion of passions in book II, chapter 20. In this paper I will compare Leibniz’s accounts of love in the letter to Sophie and his answer to Locke and discuss his style of argumentation. As Leibniz argues in his letter to Sophie that women (he mentions Miss de Scudery and Lady Norris) are experts on love, it is interesting to see how his answer to Locke differs from his arguments presented to Sophie and from his earlier statements in the Preface of 1693.
In this paper I am interested in Leibniz’s response to books III-V of Spinoza’s Ethics which discuss affects, the human bondage and freedom. I attempt to find out whether Leibniz was influenced by Spinoza in his views on the relationship... more
In this paper I am interested in Leibniz’s response to books III-V of Spinoza’s Ethics which discuss affects, the human bondage and freedom. I attempt to find out whether Leibniz was influenced by Spinoza in his views on the relationship between emotions and perfection, especially the passion of joy which he closely relates to happiness and perfection. Besides comparing some texts, I will discuss Leibniz’s remarks on Spinoza’s views in his comments of Ethics and especially the Wachter notes (later titled Réfutation inédite de Spinoza by Foucher de Careil).
I will argue that due to differences on views of mind-body parallelism, Leibniz’s take on emotions is unavoidably different from Spinoza’s. Secondly, whereas Spinoza thinks that conatus is striving to persist in one’s being, Leibniz argues that the will tends towards more particular, a more perfect way of existing. Related to this is my third theme which concerns the intellectual love of God. For Leibniz, Spinoza cannot provide a motivation for self-perfection because his God is grounded in necessity rather than in goodness.
I will argue that due to differences on views of mind-body parallelism, Leibniz’s take on emotions is unavoidably different from Spinoza’s. Secondly, whereas Spinoza thinks that conatus is striving to persist in one’s being, Leibniz argues that the will tends towards more particular, a more perfect way of existing. Related to this is my third theme which concerns the intellectual love of God. For Leibniz, Spinoza cannot provide a motivation for self-perfection because his God is grounded in necessity rather than in goodness.
Leibniz distinguished between perception and apperception in several texts, but never gave an explicit definition what apperception in fact is. His descriptions include such as “consciousness, or the reflective knowledge of the inner... more
Leibniz distinguished between perception and apperception in several texts, but never gave an explicit definition what apperception in fact is. His descriptions include such as “consciousness, or the reflective knowledge of the inner state of the monad” (Principes de la nature et de la grace, fondés en raison, §4) and “reflective act which enable us to think that which is called “I”” (Monadologie, §30; PNG, §5).
In this paper I strive to think what gives rise to this reflective act in the Leibnizian philosophy of mind, especially what distinguishes it from attention which Leibniz defines as awareness in general. Some epistemological questions are involved in this distinction. Leibniz was perhaps the first to use minute, unconscious perceptions systematically in his philosophy of mind and in my interpretation of the emergence of apperception, inspired by Émilienne Naert, they play a crucial part. I will argue that apperception arises from a concretion of minute perceptions which eventually capture our attention and make us aware of the fact that we perceive something. My main source is Leibniz’s Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain (1704) where Leibniz introduces the concept of apperception and discusses it in connection to attention and memory.
I will also briefly discuss the views of Robert McRae and Mark Kulstad and criticise the latter’s interpretation, according to which also animals are capable of low-level apperception as they can use their memory to act in a pseudo-rational manner although their cognition is mostly founded on confused perceptions. In this issue I side with McRae who argues that the ego is inseparable from apperception and therefore requires innate or clear and distinct ideas.
In this paper I strive to think what gives rise to this reflective act in the Leibnizian philosophy of mind, especially what distinguishes it from attention which Leibniz defines as awareness in general. Some epistemological questions are involved in this distinction. Leibniz was perhaps the first to use minute, unconscious perceptions systematically in his philosophy of mind and in my interpretation of the emergence of apperception, inspired by Émilienne Naert, they play a crucial part. I will argue that apperception arises from a concretion of minute perceptions which eventually capture our attention and make us aware of the fact that we perceive something. My main source is Leibniz’s Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain (1704) where Leibniz introduces the concept of apperception and discusses it in connection to attention and memory.
I will also briefly discuss the views of Robert McRae and Mark Kulstad and criticise the latter’s interpretation, according to which also animals are capable of low-level apperception as they can use their memory to act in a pseudo-rational manner although their cognition is mostly founded on confused perceptions. In this issue I side with McRae who argues that the ego is inseparable from apperception and therefore requires innate or clear and distinct ideas.
Leibniz never wrote a systematic treatise on emotions. De affectibus of 1679 is the only text he ever wrote which deal s explicitly with the topic. However, this early unpublished text is hardly a treatise, it is more like a collection of... more
Leibniz never wrote a systematic treatise on emotions. De affectibus of 1679 is the only text he ever wrote which deal s explicitly with the topic. However, this early unpublished text is hardly a treatise, it is more like a collection of definitions and
reflections around the topic. While the first part of the text deals mostly with the contents of Descartes’ Passions de l’âme (1649), the second part discusses metaphysics, especially with respect to appetite or action in contrast to passion. Leibniz can be seen to struggle with Descartes’s theory of action and passion, ultimately rejecting it in favour of a more dynamic doctrine which has predecessors in Hobbes and Spinoza. It is
noteworthy that De affectibus was written shortly after Leibniz carefully read Spinoza’s posthumous works. In my paper I will reflect Leibniz’s attempts to create his own metaphysical doctrine of action and passion and to what extend he was influenced by Spinoza in his enterprise. Secondly, I will discuss to what extent this youthful writing differs from Leibniz’s mature view of emotions in his Nouveaux essais sur l’entedement
humain (1704).
reflections around the topic. While the first part of the text deals mostly with the contents of Descartes’ Passions de l’âme (1649), the second part discusses metaphysics, especially with respect to appetite or action in contrast to passion. Leibniz can be seen to struggle with Descartes’s theory of action and passion, ultimately rejecting it in favour of a more dynamic doctrine which has predecessors in Hobbes and Spinoza. It is
noteworthy that De affectibus was written shortly after Leibniz carefully read Spinoza’s posthumous works. In my paper I will reflect Leibniz’s attempts to create his own metaphysical doctrine of action and passion and to what extend he was influenced by Spinoza in his enterprise. Secondly, I will discuss to what extent this youthful writing differs from Leibniz’s mature view of emotions in his Nouveaux essais sur l’entedement
humain (1704).
Research Interests:
In Nouveaux essais Leibniz argued that there is within us an innate principle of pursuing pleasure and avoiding pain. This principle which I call moral instinct is a disposition to do good and to love other human beings. It is based on... more
In Nouveaux essais Leibniz argued that there is within us an innate principle of pursuing pleasure and avoiding pain. This principle which I call moral instinct is a disposition to do good and to love other human beings. It is based on inner experience and confused cognition and the information provided by the moral instinct is very different from other innate ideas like the idea of God which are clear and distinct. In itself the moral instinct can be compared to animal instincts, since animals strive for the good that is suitable for them.
For the intelligent being pleasure is a harmonious feeling of metaphysical perfection and in this way the moral instinct guides us to strive for (moral) perfection. In this paper my problem is related to this: supposing our perceptions of pleasure and pain are confused cognition, it is difficult to see how they can affect our will which concerns things we are aware of, that is, clear and distinct perceptions. How can one explain moral motivation in men by only pleasure and pain? One needs an additional intelligible aspect.
I think an answer can be found in Leibniz’s 1702 letter to Queen Sophie Charlotte (also called On What Is Independent Of Sense And Of Matter, GP VI, 499-508) where Leibniz discusses internal sense or imagination “which comprises at once the concepts of particular senses, which are clear but confused, and the concepts of the common sense, which are clear and distinct” (GP VI, 501). My suggestion is that when we explain the perception of perfection, we must look at the internal sense or imagination, because clear and distinct ideas are objects common to many senses.
Leibniz argues that besides sensible and imaginable (numbers and shapes, for example), there is that which is only intelligible, since it is the object of understanding alone (GP VI, 501). The distinction leads to a further classification into three levels of concepts: a) sensible only (objects produced by each sense in particular) b) at once sensible and intelligible (appertain to common sense) c) intelligible only (belong to the understanding, related to self-consciousness). To the first category one can classify the clear, but confused perceptions (images) of sounds, colors, flavors and the like. The second level of concepts consists of the concepts of the internal sense, which are common in the perceptions of the external senses. Concepts, which are intelligible only are beyond our imagination and are related to reason.
When we consider metaphysical perfection, it is clearly sensible in the sense that it is felt as something, that is, pleasure of the mind or joy (see NE II, xxi, §42). In Résumé of Metaphysics (1697) Leibniz says that “an intelligent being’s pleasure is simply the perception of beauty, order and perfection” (G VII, 290). Perfection is a harmonious feeling rather than an object of the understanding. However, it can be argued that perfection must be more than mere feeling since it motivates us morally, giving us a reason to imitate in our moral action its source, God. Thus feeling perfection is not only sensible, but also intelligible. To my mind, perfection can be compared to the ideas at once sensible and intelligible which Leibniz mentions, that is, number, magnitude, space, figure and motion which come from more than one sense. Perfection can be defined as a mathematical ratio (as variety in unity, for example). It is also noteworthy that in Specimen dynamicum Leibniz allows passion and action and the concept of forces to the realm of imagination (comp. also Monadology, §49).
Through the intelligible element perfection is related to our innate ideas, especially the clear and distinct idea of God and his perfections. Perceiving perfection corresponds with the innate ideas and can affect our volitions despite its having a sensible element. Leibniz wrote to Bayle that “The most abstract thoughts need some imagination: and when we consider what confused thoughts…are…we realize that they always involve the infinite, and not only what happens in our body but also, by means of it, what happens elsewhere” (G IV, 563-564).
The increase in universal perfection produces pleasure and decreases pain in us. When the intellect finds that a present appetition promises future pleasure, the moral instinct is directed to it or “recommends” it. If the appetition is strong enough (or changes from confused inclination or disquiet to clear and distinct passion such as the passion of hope) in its promise of forthcoming perfection, it can appeal to our will and lead to action. Similarly, when we feel pain our moral instinct “tells” us in the form of mental pain that the deed we are about to do is to be avoided. The process is in line with Leibniz’s general definition of substance in Monadology, §14-15 as including only perception and appetite, the latter striving for “better” perceptions, that is, more clear and distinct perceptions, avoiding confused and obscure perceptions (cf. NE II, xxi, §36).
In my paper I will strive to connect the moral instinct to imagination and perfection in Leibniz’s philosophy of the mind. The discussion is founded on Leibniz’s remarks in his letter to Sophie Charlotte (“On What Is Independent of Sense and of Matter”) and Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain (especially book I, i and book II, xxi). I aim to show that perception of perfection is essentially related to confused perceptions or feelings of pleasure or pain, even though it also has an intellectual element which is related to innateness. The innate principle of pursuing joy and avoiding sorrow is essential in our route to increasing perfection and its basic push or impetus is provided by the imagination.
For the intelligent being pleasure is a harmonious feeling of metaphysical perfection and in this way the moral instinct guides us to strive for (moral) perfection. In this paper my problem is related to this: supposing our perceptions of pleasure and pain are confused cognition, it is difficult to see how they can affect our will which concerns things we are aware of, that is, clear and distinct perceptions. How can one explain moral motivation in men by only pleasure and pain? One needs an additional intelligible aspect.
I think an answer can be found in Leibniz’s 1702 letter to Queen Sophie Charlotte (also called On What Is Independent Of Sense And Of Matter, GP VI, 499-508) where Leibniz discusses internal sense or imagination “which comprises at once the concepts of particular senses, which are clear but confused, and the concepts of the common sense, which are clear and distinct” (GP VI, 501). My suggestion is that when we explain the perception of perfection, we must look at the internal sense or imagination, because clear and distinct ideas are objects common to many senses.
Leibniz argues that besides sensible and imaginable (numbers and shapes, for example), there is that which is only intelligible, since it is the object of understanding alone (GP VI, 501). The distinction leads to a further classification into three levels of concepts: a) sensible only (objects produced by each sense in particular) b) at once sensible and intelligible (appertain to common sense) c) intelligible only (belong to the understanding, related to self-consciousness). To the first category one can classify the clear, but confused perceptions (images) of sounds, colors, flavors and the like. The second level of concepts consists of the concepts of the internal sense, which are common in the perceptions of the external senses. Concepts, which are intelligible only are beyond our imagination and are related to reason.
When we consider metaphysical perfection, it is clearly sensible in the sense that it is felt as something, that is, pleasure of the mind or joy (see NE II, xxi, §42). In Résumé of Metaphysics (1697) Leibniz says that “an intelligent being’s pleasure is simply the perception of beauty, order and perfection” (G VII, 290). Perfection is a harmonious feeling rather than an object of the understanding. However, it can be argued that perfection must be more than mere feeling since it motivates us morally, giving us a reason to imitate in our moral action its source, God. Thus feeling perfection is not only sensible, but also intelligible. To my mind, perfection can be compared to the ideas at once sensible and intelligible which Leibniz mentions, that is, number, magnitude, space, figure and motion which come from more than one sense. Perfection can be defined as a mathematical ratio (as variety in unity, for example). It is also noteworthy that in Specimen dynamicum Leibniz allows passion and action and the concept of forces to the realm of imagination (comp. also Monadology, §49).
Through the intelligible element perfection is related to our innate ideas, especially the clear and distinct idea of God and his perfections. Perceiving perfection corresponds with the innate ideas and can affect our volitions despite its having a sensible element. Leibniz wrote to Bayle that “The most abstract thoughts need some imagination: and when we consider what confused thoughts…are…we realize that they always involve the infinite, and not only what happens in our body but also, by means of it, what happens elsewhere” (G IV, 563-564).
The increase in universal perfection produces pleasure and decreases pain in us. When the intellect finds that a present appetition promises future pleasure, the moral instinct is directed to it or “recommends” it. If the appetition is strong enough (or changes from confused inclination or disquiet to clear and distinct passion such as the passion of hope) in its promise of forthcoming perfection, it can appeal to our will and lead to action. Similarly, when we feel pain our moral instinct “tells” us in the form of mental pain that the deed we are about to do is to be avoided. The process is in line with Leibniz’s general definition of substance in Monadology, §14-15 as including only perception and appetite, the latter striving for “better” perceptions, that is, more clear and distinct perceptions, avoiding confused and obscure perceptions (cf. NE II, xxi, §36).
In my paper I will strive to connect the moral instinct to imagination and perfection in Leibniz’s philosophy of the mind. The discussion is founded on Leibniz’s remarks in his letter to Sophie Charlotte (“On What Is Independent of Sense and of Matter”) and Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain (especially book I, i and book II, xxi). I aim to show that perception of perfection is essentially related to confused perceptions or feelings of pleasure or pain, even though it also has an intellectual element which is related to innateness. The innate principle of pursuing joy and avoiding sorrow is essential in our route to increasing perfection and its basic push or impetus is provided by the imagination.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
"Why Central Early Modern Philosophers Were Not Instutionalized Scientists? Abstract Markku Roinila The 26th Baltic Conference In History of Science It is well known that almost all of the most important European philosophers in... more
"Why Central Early Modern Philosophers Were Not Instutionalized Scientists?
Abstract
Markku Roinila
The 26th Baltic Conference In History of Science
It is well known that almost all of the most important European philosophers in the Early Modern period chose not to work in the context of the university. To mention some examples, René Descartes was supported by his legacy, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke were tutors at least parts of their lives, George Berkeley tried to establish a colony in North America, Baruch Spinoza made his living by grinding lenses and Gottfied Wilhelm Leibniz was a librarian, historiographer and a diplomat. The most well-known philosophers working in the universities at the time were perhaps Francis Hutcheson who had a chair of moral philosophy in Glasgow and, in Germany, Thomasius and Wolff, not to mention Immanuel Kant a little later.
One wonders why secured positions were not more tempting to philosophers instead of constant striving for patrons and mentors, especially as financial woes were familiar to most philosophers of the Early Modern period. There are known cases (such as Leibniz) who rejected offers on university positions and chose to find other means of support.
In this paper I discuss the significance of the scientific academies that provided possibilities to practice science outside of universities. I am especially interested in the efforts to establish academies which could hire scientists, such as the Brandenburg Academy of Sciences in Berlin, founded by Leibniz, and the French Academy of Science that was supported by the King of France.
An interesting question which is not often raised with respect to these academies is the question of political, philosophical or religious requirements. For example, the Paris academy required catholicism and subscription to Cartesian worldview while the Royal Society in London the dominance of the supporters of Newton was clear and a philosopher who was, for example, more taken by the continental vis viva-conception of nature would have felt uncomfortable in this kind of setting.
It seems to be clear that even academic societies were not always safe havens for doing science professonially. Considering some philosophers, like Antoine Arnauld and David Hume, I discuss of the various ways that philosophers were able to work independently outside of both universities and scientific societies or academies and consider how successful they were in their striving. In my paper I will utilize Mario Biagioli’s pioneering study Galileo, Courtier (1993) and studies by Carolyn Iltis, Steven Shapin and Stephen Gaukroger, to mention a few. A part of my paper will address the situation in Baltic countries, especially Sweden where philosophers like Descartes and Pufendorf were employed.
"
Abstract
Markku Roinila
The 26th Baltic Conference In History of Science
It is well known that almost all of the most important European philosophers in the Early Modern period chose not to work in the context of the university. To mention some examples, René Descartes was supported by his legacy, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke were tutors at least parts of their lives, George Berkeley tried to establish a colony in North America, Baruch Spinoza made his living by grinding lenses and Gottfied Wilhelm Leibniz was a librarian, historiographer and a diplomat. The most well-known philosophers working in the universities at the time were perhaps Francis Hutcheson who had a chair of moral philosophy in Glasgow and, in Germany, Thomasius and Wolff, not to mention Immanuel Kant a little later.
One wonders why secured positions were not more tempting to philosophers instead of constant striving for patrons and mentors, especially as financial woes were familiar to most philosophers of the Early Modern period. There are known cases (such as Leibniz) who rejected offers on university positions and chose to find other means of support.
In this paper I discuss the significance of the scientific academies that provided possibilities to practice science outside of universities. I am especially interested in the efforts to establish academies which could hire scientists, such as the Brandenburg Academy of Sciences in Berlin, founded by Leibniz, and the French Academy of Science that was supported by the King of France.
An interesting question which is not often raised with respect to these academies is the question of political, philosophical or religious requirements. For example, the Paris academy required catholicism and subscription to Cartesian worldview while the Royal Society in London the dominance of the supporters of Newton was clear and a philosopher who was, for example, more taken by the continental vis viva-conception of nature would have felt uncomfortable in this kind of setting.
It seems to be clear that even academic societies were not always safe havens for doing science professonially. Considering some philosophers, like Antoine Arnauld and David Hume, I discuss of the various ways that philosophers were able to work independently outside of both universities and scientific societies or academies and consider how successful they were in their striving. In my paper I will utilize Mario Biagioli’s pioneering study Galileo, Courtier (1993) and studies by Carolyn Iltis, Steven Shapin and Stephen Gaukroger, to mention a few. A part of my paper will address the situation in Baltic countries, especially Sweden where philosophers like Descartes and Pufendorf were employed.
"
Research Interests:
Today it is well known that Leibniz’s basic metaphysical unit, the monad, is simple, having no parts and possessing only two qualities: perception and appetite. The monads are not directly in contact with each other, including the... more
Today it is well known that Leibniz’s basic metaphysical unit, the monad, is simple, having no parts and possessing only two qualities: perception and appetite. The monads are not directly in contact with each other, including the substances that make up the mind-body composite.
These characteristics, however, were not known to most of Leibniz’s contemporaries until 1695 when he published, in the age of 49, the first full presentation of his metaphysical views in an article to Journal des savants, titled Système nouveau de la nature et de la communication des substances, aussi bien que d’union qu’il y a entre l’âme et le corps. The article raised quite a stir. Perhaps the most interesting and cunning (as well as the most benevolent) critique of Leibniz’s views was provided by a French refugee in Rotterdam, Pierre Bayle (1647-1706) who is most famous for his Dictionnaire Historique et Critique (1697).
The controversy centered on the pre-established harmony and especially the parallelism of the mind and the body. In this paper I will concentrate on the latter and follow the argumentation of both sides. Bayle gives a famous example of a dog who can feel pleasure and pain alternatively and asks how Leibniz’s can explain this sudden change in his theory. While Bayle is trying to reduce Leibniz’s views to occasionalism, Leibniz is trying to explicate his views with a concept which he hadn’t discussed at large in his public writings, the insensible, minute perception. Bayle presses Leibniz to explain the progression of thoughts with several counter-examples, arguing that his system just cannot explain sudden changes. Leibniz was trying to show Bayle that his idea of a soul is far more complex than his correspondant thought - his final word is essentially the same as in NE, written a few years later: “The soul sometimes passes from white to black or from yes to no, without knowing how, or at least into voluntary, for what is confused thoughts and its feelings produce in it we attribute to the body.”
All in all, the fascinating discussion lasted for five years and my aim in this paper is to follow the argument and reflect whether there are remains of the controversy in Leibniz’s dialogue with Locke, Nouveaux essais sur l’entendemnt humain of 1704 which discusses the same topics.
These characteristics, however, were not known to most of Leibniz’s contemporaries until 1695 when he published, in the age of 49, the first full presentation of his metaphysical views in an article to Journal des savants, titled Système nouveau de la nature et de la communication des substances, aussi bien que d’union qu’il y a entre l’âme et le corps. The article raised quite a stir. Perhaps the most interesting and cunning (as well as the most benevolent) critique of Leibniz’s views was provided by a French refugee in Rotterdam, Pierre Bayle (1647-1706) who is most famous for his Dictionnaire Historique et Critique (1697).
The controversy centered on the pre-established harmony and especially the parallelism of the mind and the body. In this paper I will concentrate on the latter and follow the argumentation of both sides. Bayle gives a famous example of a dog who can feel pleasure and pain alternatively and asks how Leibniz’s can explain this sudden change in his theory. While Bayle is trying to reduce Leibniz’s views to occasionalism, Leibniz is trying to explicate his views with a concept which he hadn’t discussed at large in his public writings, the insensible, minute perception. Bayle presses Leibniz to explain the progression of thoughts with several counter-examples, arguing that his system just cannot explain sudden changes. Leibniz was trying to show Bayle that his idea of a soul is far more complex than his correspondant thought - his final word is essentially the same as in NE, written a few years later: “The soul sometimes passes from white to black or from yes to no, without knowing how, or at least into voluntary, for what is confused thoughts and its feelings produce in it we attribute to the body.”
All in all, the fascinating discussion lasted for five years and my aim in this paper is to follow the argument and reflect whether there are remains of the controversy in Leibniz’s dialogue with Locke, Nouveaux essais sur l’entendemnt humain of 1704 which discusses the same topics.
Research Interests:
A prominent psychologist Robert Stickgold has developed a theory on fragmentative nature of dreams in his article “Dream Splicing: A New Technique For Assessing Thematic Coherence In Subjective Reports Of Mental Activity” (1994).... more
A prominent psychologist Robert Stickgold has developed a theory on fragmentative nature of dreams in his article “Dream Splicing: A New Technique For Assessing Thematic Coherence In Subjective Reports Of Mental Activity” (1994). Stickgold and his colleagues performed an experiment where ten dream reports were spliced by scissors at points where there were dramatic scene shifts in the plots and they were compared by judges to ten intact dream reports. It turned out that none of the judges could make a clear distinction between the intact dream reports and the spliced ones. The results makes us doubt that there is any thematical continuity in dreams in contrast to Freud who argued that the continuity in our dreams can last the whole night.
In my paper I will show that there are interesting connections between Stickgold’s theory of spliced dreams and accounts on dreams by John Locke (1632-1704). Locke followed Descartes in saying that dreams are a pure product of imagination and mostly extravagant and incoherent. In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding II, 1, §16-17 (1689) Locke says that we have instances of perception when we are asleep and retain the memory of the thoughts we have thought when we are awake. Thus the dreams of sleeping men are all made up of the waking man’s ideas although oddly put together.
Locke’s view is related to his criticism of Descartes: the soul does not think when we are asleep and it cannot have any feelings of pleasure and pain (II, 1, §11). If it had, the material in the dreams would be affected by the thoughts of a sleeping man, but as dreams are so wild and incoherent this is clearly not the case, although sounds, odours etc. can affect the sleeping man. Locke goes as far as to claim that the waking man and the sleeping man are two different persons.
The foundation for Locke’s theory is in his view that different sensations produce memory traces of various vividness and our dreams are build up from the most powerful mind-images in the memory. Although Locke is clear that the mind does think while asleep I would like to argue that the mind must be somehow active in stimulating the memory traces - the fragments of waking life in the memory compose a kind of puzzle which should require some kind of organizing. If I am right, Locke’s theory can be seen as an anticipation of Stickgold’s theory where during the REM-phase of the sleep the brains are activated to process and organize the “dream-stuff”, that is, fragmented material from the waking life. Although the thematic continuity of the dreams is not evident, the brains are still activated when we dream.
In my paper I will show that there are interesting connections between Stickgold’s theory of spliced dreams and accounts on dreams by John Locke (1632-1704). Locke followed Descartes in saying that dreams are a pure product of imagination and mostly extravagant and incoherent. In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding II, 1, §16-17 (1689) Locke says that we have instances of perception when we are asleep and retain the memory of the thoughts we have thought when we are awake. Thus the dreams of sleeping men are all made up of the waking man’s ideas although oddly put together.
Locke’s view is related to his criticism of Descartes: the soul does not think when we are asleep and it cannot have any feelings of pleasure and pain (II, 1, §11). If it had, the material in the dreams would be affected by the thoughts of a sleeping man, but as dreams are so wild and incoherent this is clearly not the case, although sounds, odours etc. can affect the sleeping man. Locke goes as far as to claim that the waking man and the sleeping man are two different persons.
The foundation for Locke’s theory is in his view that different sensations produce memory traces of various vividness and our dreams are build up from the most powerful mind-images in the memory. Although Locke is clear that the mind does think while asleep I would like to argue that the mind must be somehow active in stimulating the memory traces - the fragments of waking life in the memory compose a kind of puzzle which should require some kind of organizing. If I am right, Locke’s theory can be seen as an anticipation of Stickgold’s theory where during the REM-phase of the sleep the brains are activated to process and organize the “dream-stuff”, that is, fragmented material from the waking life. Although the thematic continuity of the dreams is not evident, the brains are still activated when we dream.
Research Interests: John Locke and Dreams
In his mature theory of forces, or dynamics, Leibniz equates the substantial form with the basic endeavor or primitive active force in the soul. The endeavor or conatus of the soul is modified by derivative forces, the different... more
In his mature theory of forces, or dynamics, Leibniz equates the substantial form with the basic endeavor or primitive active force in the soul. The endeavor or conatus of the soul is modified by derivative forces, the different inclinations or desires that arise from perceptions. In this way, the endeavor or the substantial form is the substantial foundation in Leibniz’s theory of personal identity.
Personal identity can be distinguished, as Udo Thiel does, into substantial and moral personal identity. While the moral identity consists of a catalogue of our virtuous deeds or sins, in the substantial level the endeavor which strives for its telos according to the final causes forms the objective, metaphysical unity of the substance which is independent of the recollection or consciousness of one’s own deeds.
In this paper I will examine cases where our erratic behavior seem to be in contradiction with the fact that our moral identity is supposed to be founded on our substantial identity, that is, on the final causes set by God, that is, metaphysical goodness or general perfection which is the common good amongst men. The derivative forces may provide the soul with vivid impressions and temptations which may lead us to deviate from our path and act irrationally which leads to metaphysical imperfection and violates the common good. In these cases the moral identity seem to be very different from the underlying substantial unity of the person if it is supposed that the private good is motivated by the common good. I will discuss this problem in the light of Nouveaux essais, II, xxvii and the correspondence with Bayle and suggest that the answer may be found in the continuity and complexity of Leibnizian doctrine of cognition.
Personal identity can be distinguished, as Udo Thiel does, into substantial and moral personal identity. While the moral identity consists of a catalogue of our virtuous deeds or sins, in the substantial level the endeavor which strives for its telos according to the final causes forms the objective, metaphysical unity of the substance which is independent of the recollection or consciousness of one’s own deeds.
In this paper I will examine cases where our erratic behavior seem to be in contradiction with the fact that our moral identity is supposed to be founded on our substantial identity, that is, on the final causes set by God, that is, metaphysical goodness or general perfection which is the common good amongst men. The derivative forces may provide the soul with vivid impressions and temptations which may lead us to deviate from our path and act irrationally which leads to metaphysical imperfection and violates the common good. In these cases the moral identity seem to be very different from the underlying substantial unity of the person if it is supposed that the private good is motivated by the common good. I will discuss this problem in the light of Nouveaux essais, II, xxvii and the correspondence with Bayle and suggest that the answer may be found in the continuity and complexity of Leibnizian doctrine of cognition.
Research Interests:
In book II, chapter 27 of New Essays on Human Understanding Philalethes and Theophilus discuss of identity and diversity. The long chapter deals with both personal identity and the principle of identity of organic things. While Locke... more
In book II, chapter 27 of New Essays on Human Understanding Philalethes and Theophilus discuss of identity and diversity. The long chapter deals with both personal identity and the principle of identity of organic things. While Locke finds the unity of a single plant to consist of cohesion of parts in one body, Leibniz relies on an enduring principle of life which he calls ‘monad’ (E II, xxvii, §4). Thus the organization of parts is not sufficient, as it is separate from individuality. Leibniz argues that the subject can change shapes. Leibniz somewhat poetically adds that in substantial beings a certain indivisible spirit animates them. Therefore organic individuals are analogous to persons – Locke agrees in this matter from his perspective. Leibniz says: “They remain perfectly ‘the same individual’ in virtue of this soul or spirit which makes them in substances which think”.
In the chapter Leibniz mentions the incessancy of a beast’s soul (II, xxvii, §9) which retains physical identity but does not include awareness. On the other hand, in NE III, ch. VI Leibniz admits that we do not know very well how plants are generated. But he is firm to assign subtantial forms to all of nature: “But the privilege should not be restricted to man alone, as though nature were put together higgledy-piggledy. There is reason to think that there is an infinity of souls, or more generally of primary entelechies, possessing something analogous to perception and appetite, and that all of them are and forever remain substantial forms of bodies.” (E III, vi, §24). This applies even to salts, minerals and metals, as Leibniz continues to argue.
In this paper I am interested in the telos of the organisms. The moral identity of a person consists of striving for virtue and wisdom. What about organisms which do not have self-consciousness? How does the substantial form or entelechy manifest its telos, its purpose? Leibniz often claims that nature is hierarchical – in Monadology, §18 he says that there is certain degree of perfection in each created thing. As the properties of perception and appetition are common to all substances, it should be evident that all strive analogously somehow (sometimes Leibniz discusses animal instincts). But how would a stone, for example, be more or less perfect? Are entelechies just ingenious machines whose purpose we do not know? The idea is easier to understand in animals which can transform, let us say, from a caterpillar to a butterfly (pre-formation theory).
Some of Leibniz’s remarks on this topic are very Aristotelian: he says that bees are meant to produce honey while men and are meant to contemplate. On the other hand, in NE III, ch. VI Leibniz admits that we do not know very well how plants are generated, for example. Indeed, there are contra-aristotelian currents in Leibniz’s later texts. In Monadology and elsewhere, Leibniz gives men a special space in the universe which gives rise to the thought that the organic beings are made for us, the special elite of living beings. Thus one would think that perfections of each natural species contribute to our happiness. The birds sing, bees make honey etc. for our pleasure. But do we really know anything about this? Very soon we come to the question of theodicy. God, the creator of substantial forms knows what are the purposes of each natural kind, and perhaps we just have to trust on his good intentions that the perfections of even of those animals we do not like or which eat us, are for the common good.
In this paper I will discuss the perfection concerning organic things or beings. My main sources are New System of Nature, New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, Monadology, Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason, correspondence with Bayle and Stahl and Theodicy.
In the chapter Leibniz mentions the incessancy of a beast’s soul (II, xxvii, §9) which retains physical identity but does not include awareness. On the other hand, in NE III, ch. VI Leibniz admits that we do not know very well how plants are generated. But he is firm to assign subtantial forms to all of nature: “But the privilege should not be restricted to man alone, as though nature were put together higgledy-piggledy. There is reason to think that there is an infinity of souls, or more generally of primary entelechies, possessing something analogous to perception and appetite, and that all of them are and forever remain substantial forms of bodies.” (E III, vi, §24). This applies even to salts, minerals and metals, as Leibniz continues to argue.
In this paper I am interested in the telos of the organisms. The moral identity of a person consists of striving for virtue and wisdom. What about organisms which do not have self-consciousness? How does the substantial form or entelechy manifest its telos, its purpose? Leibniz often claims that nature is hierarchical – in Monadology, §18 he says that there is certain degree of perfection in each created thing. As the properties of perception and appetition are common to all substances, it should be evident that all strive analogously somehow (sometimes Leibniz discusses animal instincts). But how would a stone, for example, be more or less perfect? Are entelechies just ingenious machines whose purpose we do not know? The idea is easier to understand in animals which can transform, let us say, from a caterpillar to a butterfly (pre-formation theory).
Some of Leibniz’s remarks on this topic are very Aristotelian: he says that bees are meant to produce honey while men and are meant to contemplate. On the other hand, in NE III, ch. VI Leibniz admits that we do not know very well how plants are generated, for example. Indeed, there are contra-aristotelian currents in Leibniz’s later texts. In Monadology and elsewhere, Leibniz gives men a special space in the universe which gives rise to the thought that the organic beings are made for us, the special elite of living beings. Thus one would think that perfections of each natural species contribute to our happiness. The birds sing, bees make honey etc. for our pleasure. But do we really know anything about this? Very soon we come to the question of theodicy. God, the creator of substantial forms knows what are the purposes of each natural kind, and perhaps we just have to trust on his good intentions that the perfections of even of those animals we do not like or which eat us, are for the common good.
In this paper I will discuss the perfection concerning organic things or beings. My main sources are New System of Nature, New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, Monadology, Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason, correspondence with Bayle and Stahl and Theodicy.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
In New Essays on Human Understanding, book II, chapter xxi Leibniz presents an interesting picture of the human mind as not only populated by perceptions, volitions and appetitions, but also by endeavours. The endeavours in question can... more
In New Essays on Human Understanding, book II, chapter xxi Leibniz presents an interesting picture of the human mind as not only populated by perceptions, volitions and appetitions, but also by endeavours. The endeavours in question can be divided to entelechy and effort; Leibniz calls entelechy as primitive active forces and efforts as derivative forces. The entelechy, understood as primitive active force is to be equated with a substantial form, as Leibniz says: “When an entelechy – i.e. a primary or substantial endeavour – is accompanied by perception, it is a soul” (NE II, xxi, §1; RB, 170).
What about efforts, then? One is certainly the will. In NE, II, xxi, §5 Leibniz argues that volition is the effort (conatus) to move towards what one finds good and away from what one finds bad and that this endeavor arises from the perceptions we are aware of. As an endeavour results in action unless it is prevented, from will (which is always directed to the good) and power together follows action.
However, this is not so simple. Leibniz argues that there is also a second class of efforts: “There are other efforts, arising from insensible perceptions, which we are not aware of; I prefer to call these ‘appetitions’ rather than volitions” (NE II, xxi, §5; RB, 173). Although there are appetitions of which one can be aware, usually these appetitions arise from the insensible petite perceptions and are consequently affecting us subconsciously. Now, although all minute perceptions are confused perceptions, they are always related to pleasure and displeasure and also to perfection and imperfection. From this follows that there can be different efforts present in the soul at the same time: the will which is directed to apperceived good and several separate appetitions which lead to different goals, both to those which bring about perfection and pleasure of the mind (joy) and those which bring about displeasure and imperfection (sorrow).
These efforts are not only in conflict with each other but may also be in conflict with entelechy. A typical case is perceiving a sensual pleasure. Our entelechy which is always directed to final causes (perfection) may be in conflict with several different appetitions which are related in different ways to the sensual pleasure in question. If our understanding is developed enough, our will resists the temptation posed by the pleasure (agreeing with entelechy), but if the temptation is too strong, the appetitions outweigh the will and the resulting action bring about imperfection and sorrow as it is related to imperfection.
In this paper I will argue that deliberation in the human soul is a battle of different endeavors described above: the entelechy in the soul strives according to its law-of-the-series towards its telos (perfection) and the will accompanies it by being automatically directed to the good. This thrust towards the apparent good is aided or hindered by the appetitions which can be thought as derivative forces in the Leibnizian dynamics. Depending on whether the predominant appetitions are related to good or bad desires, the deliberation succeeds or fails in achieving the real good which is the goal of human deliberation. The successs can be facilitated beforehand by developing our understanding so that we are less easily swept away by the derivative forces (NE II, xxi, §19). A central role in this task is played by strong willing. As Martha Bolton has noted in her recent paper, an essential feature of the basic, standing endeavors is that they are continuous – although the power balance in the soul changes from moment to moment, something lingers from our previous volitions. That is why Leibniz argues that we pave way for the future deliberations by our previous voluntary actions (NE II, xxi, §23). In contrast, the appetitions are temporary, fliegende Gedanken as Leibniz says in NE II, xxi, §12. Therefore there is a constant, always changing power balance between two kinds of endeavors in the soul: primitive active force versus derivative forces.
I will argue that the behavior of the forces in the soul can be understood with a vectorial model which is related to Leibniz’s early ideas of calculus of variations and which was anticipated by Arnauld and Nicole’s Port-Royal Logic. The central idea in the model is that the options are in tension towards each other and the ratio between them at each moment determines the consequent outcome. The proper relationship between the endeavors is not a simple balance, two options which exhaust each other, but a case where different efforts complement each other: “Since the final result is determined by how things weigh against one another, I should think it could happen that he most pressing disquiet did not prevail; for even If it prevailed over each of the contrary endeavours taken singly, it may be outweighed by all of them together.” Leibniz continues : “Everything which then impinges on us weighs in the balance and contributes to determining a resultant direction, almost as in mechanics” (NE II, xxi, §40; RB, 193). The different endeavors can be understood as vectors leading to different directions and the end result is a certain direction that deliberation takes.
The dynamical tension between the different endeavors presents a situation where everything affects everything and the following direction, the resulting volition follows more or less automatically. In Theodicy, §325 Leibniz describes the deliberation as follows: “One might, instead of the balance, compare the soul with a force that puts forth an effort on various sides simultaneously, but which acts only at the spot where action is easiest or there is least resistance” (Huggard, 322)
This kind of dynamical tension can be understood in terms of the calculus of variations where there are several possible variations available but where the dynamics of the situation results in the decision taking the “easiest” route which is more or less objectively good depending on the level of the deliberator’s understanding. In his comments to Bayle’s note L of “Rorarius” Leibniz says: “The soul, even though it has no parts, has within it, because of the multitude of representations of external things, or rather because of the representation of the universe lodged within it by the creator, a great number, or rather an infinite number, of variations (Woolhouse & Francks (ed.), ‘New System’ and Associated Texts, 101). This kind of deliberation is comparable to God’s choice of the best world with the difference that God’s understanding is infinite which again results in the fact that the choice is the best possible. Whereas in nature the easiest route taken is always optimal as nature is God’s creation, in men the goodness or badness of men’s actions is dependent on their state of wisdom, that is, how developed their understanding is. The more wise men are, the more metaphysical goodness or perfection follows from their actions.
What about efforts, then? One is certainly the will. In NE, II, xxi, §5 Leibniz argues that volition is the effort (conatus) to move towards what one finds good and away from what one finds bad and that this endeavor arises from the perceptions we are aware of. As an endeavour results in action unless it is prevented, from will (which is always directed to the good) and power together follows action.
However, this is not so simple. Leibniz argues that there is also a second class of efforts: “There are other efforts, arising from insensible perceptions, which we are not aware of; I prefer to call these ‘appetitions’ rather than volitions” (NE II, xxi, §5; RB, 173). Although there are appetitions of which one can be aware, usually these appetitions arise from the insensible petite perceptions and are consequently affecting us subconsciously. Now, although all minute perceptions are confused perceptions, they are always related to pleasure and displeasure and also to perfection and imperfection. From this follows that there can be different efforts present in the soul at the same time: the will which is directed to apperceived good and several separate appetitions which lead to different goals, both to those which bring about perfection and pleasure of the mind (joy) and those which bring about displeasure and imperfection (sorrow).
These efforts are not only in conflict with each other but may also be in conflict with entelechy. A typical case is perceiving a sensual pleasure. Our entelechy which is always directed to final causes (perfection) may be in conflict with several different appetitions which are related in different ways to the sensual pleasure in question. If our understanding is developed enough, our will resists the temptation posed by the pleasure (agreeing with entelechy), but if the temptation is too strong, the appetitions outweigh the will and the resulting action bring about imperfection and sorrow as it is related to imperfection.
In this paper I will argue that deliberation in the human soul is a battle of different endeavors described above: the entelechy in the soul strives according to its law-of-the-series towards its telos (perfection) and the will accompanies it by being automatically directed to the good. This thrust towards the apparent good is aided or hindered by the appetitions which can be thought as derivative forces in the Leibnizian dynamics. Depending on whether the predominant appetitions are related to good or bad desires, the deliberation succeeds or fails in achieving the real good which is the goal of human deliberation. The successs can be facilitated beforehand by developing our understanding so that we are less easily swept away by the derivative forces (NE II, xxi, §19). A central role in this task is played by strong willing. As Martha Bolton has noted in her recent paper, an essential feature of the basic, standing endeavors is that they are continuous – although the power balance in the soul changes from moment to moment, something lingers from our previous volitions. That is why Leibniz argues that we pave way for the future deliberations by our previous voluntary actions (NE II, xxi, §23). In contrast, the appetitions are temporary, fliegende Gedanken as Leibniz says in NE II, xxi, §12. Therefore there is a constant, always changing power balance between two kinds of endeavors in the soul: primitive active force versus derivative forces.
I will argue that the behavior of the forces in the soul can be understood with a vectorial model which is related to Leibniz’s early ideas of calculus of variations and which was anticipated by Arnauld and Nicole’s Port-Royal Logic. The central idea in the model is that the options are in tension towards each other and the ratio between them at each moment determines the consequent outcome. The proper relationship between the endeavors is not a simple balance, two options which exhaust each other, but a case where different efforts complement each other: “Since the final result is determined by how things weigh against one another, I should think it could happen that he most pressing disquiet did not prevail; for even If it prevailed over each of the contrary endeavours taken singly, it may be outweighed by all of them together.” Leibniz continues : “Everything which then impinges on us weighs in the balance and contributes to determining a resultant direction, almost as in mechanics” (NE II, xxi, §40; RB, 193). The different endeavors can be understood as vectors leading to different directions and the end result is a certain direction that deliberation takes.
The dynamical tension between the different endeavors presents a situation where everything affects everything and the following direction, the resulting volition follows more or less automatically. In Theodicy, §325 Leibniz describes the deliberation as follows: “One might, instead of the balance, compare the soul with a force that puts forth an effort on various sides simultaneously, but which acts only at the spot where action is easiest or there is least resistance” (Huggard, 322)
This kind of dynamical tension can be understood in terms of the calculus of variations where there are several possible variations available but where the dynamics of the situation results in the decision taking the “easiest” route which is more or less objectively good depending on the level of the deliberator’s understanding. In his comments to Bayle’s note L of “Rorarius” Leibniz says: “The soul, even though it has no parts, has within it, because of the multitude of representations of external things, or rather because of the representation of the universe lodged within it by the creator, a great number, or rather an infinite number, of variations (Woolhouse & Francks (ed.), ‘New System’ and Associated Texts, 101). This kind of deliberation is comparable to God’s choice of the best world with the difference that God’s understanding is infinite which again results in the fact that the choice is the best possible. Whereas in nature the easiest route taken is always optimal as nature is God’s creation, in men the goodness or badness of men’s actions is dependent on their state of wisdom, that is, how developed their understanding is. The more wise men are, the more metaphysical goodness or perfection follows from their actions.
Research Interests:
A chapter from my Phil Lic Thesis G. W. Leibniz's Philosophy and Practical Projects (1997).
Research Interests:
A chapter from my Lic Phil Thesis G. W. Leibniz's Philosophy and Practical Projects (1997)
Research Interests:
A Chapter of my Phil Lic Thesis Leibniz's Philosophy and Practical Projects (1997).
Research Interests:
A chapter from my Phil Lic Thesis Leibniz's Philosophy and Practical Projects (1997).
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An introduction to Leibniz's practical program from my Lic Phil Thesis Leibniz's Philosophy and Practical Projects (1997).
Research Interests:
A chapter of my Phil Lic Thesis G. W. Leibniz's Philosophy and Practical Projects (1997).
Research Interests:
This is a chapter of my Phil Lic Thesis G. W. Leibniz's Philosophy and Practical Projects (1997), giving an overview of Leibniz's character, life and works. Note that after this writing an extensive intellectual biography of Leibniz has... more
This is a chapter of my Phil Lic Thesis G. W. Leibniz's Philosophy and Practical Projects (1997), giving an overview of Leibniz's character, life and works. Note that after this writing an extensive intellectual biography of Leibniz has been published, that is, Maria Rosa Antognazza: Leibniz. A Biography. Cambridge University Press, 2011.