Pre-established Harmony

Recent developments within phenomenology have brought to light the indebtedness of phenomenological scientific philosophy to Ancient Greek philosophy. The recent trend that builds on the ancient precedents found in the theories of forms, for example, has demonstrated the importance of the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle for contemporary manifestations of the development of phenomenological eidetic science. This thesis builds on three parallel developments in the phenomenology of time that equally indicate the significance of the ancient Hellenic exact mathematical science of spherical cosmology for the further propagation of phenomenological philosophy. The hypothesis of the infinite sphere gives phenomenology an external foundation capable of accounting for the constitution of the phenomenal universe, possible worlds, and the harmonic continuum of life spanning the inner and outer cosmos. Phenomenological cosmology offers a unified metaphysical framework for first philosophy and the special sciences, with particularly interesting implications for empirical cosmology and theoretical physics. Phenomenology of the spheres brings these phenomenological cosmological insights together in the geometric comprehension of the infinite sphere.

In the 1970s the Chilean biologist Francisco Varela developed a systems theory of life as autopoietic, or self-creating, on the formal basis of the mathematician George Spencer-Brown's 1969 book Laws of Form. Although Varela saw the great power and simplicity of Spencer-Brown' s calculus, he appropriated Spencer-Brown's calculus by adding a third law to the original two laws of form. This law makes self-reference explicit, and I'll argue that it is a redundant addition because self-reference is already implied by indication. The addition of this redundancy has the effect of separating the transcendental realm of constitutive operations from the natural realm of effects. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka's phenomenology of life as ontopoiesis, on the other hand, succeeds in developing a theory of life on the formal ontological basis prepared by Husserl's phenomenology, transcendental logic, and the living tradition of a mathesis universalis. Tymieniecka's phenomenological theory of life is a breakthrough to life's inner workings, and rests on an ontologically robust foundation. By drawing attention to the calculus behind the calculus, I hope to initiate the interpretation of Spencer-Brown's calculus of indications as an important manifestation of the mathesis universalis, and apply the interpretation to the place prepared by Tymieniecka's phenomenology of ontopoiesis.

In recent years a certain emphasis has been put by some scholars on Leibniz’s concern about empirical sciences and the relations between such concern and the development of his mature metaphysical system. In this paper I focus on Leibniz’s interest for the microscope and the astonishing discoveries that such instrument made possible in the field of the life sciences during the last part of the Seventeenth century. The observation of physical bodies carried out by the “magnifying glasses” revealed a matter swarming everywhere with life and activity, contrary to the cartesian and atomistic view of matter as something sterile and passive. Moreover, the discovery of uncountable complete “animalcula” living in the smallest drop of water provided evidence for the idea of the preformation of every organism. During his lifetime, Leibniz was extremely watchful about the new microscopical discoveries and came into contact with some of the major “observers” of his time, such as Hooke, Leeuwenhoek, Swammerdam and Malpighi. Relying both on some passages in Leibniz’s texts and on recent critical studies, I will argue that important aspects of his metaphysics have been strongly affected by the empirical observation of the “invisible world” which the microscope made possible. In the last part of the paper I show how the concept of “preformation”, originally drawn from the context of the life sciences, comes to play in Leibnizʼs philosophy a very general role, going far beyond the scope of biology and shaping important aspects of his overall philosophical system.

Since the demise of logical positivism accusations of talking nonsense in philosophy have mainly been made by Wittgensteinians.  But some of these latter are as free with words like 'nonsense', 'senseless' and 'meaningless' as any logical positivist.  One such is Rupert Read, who is prepared to write off the whole of metaphysics as nonsense.  Condemnations of this sort have in recent years largely been ignored by other philosophers, which is surprising in view of their apparent importance.  It is equally surprising that the evident problems with accusations of talking nonsense have been largely ignored by those who are still prepared to make them.

The Russian philosopher Nikolai Onufrievich Lossky (1870–1965) considered himself a Leibnizian of sorts. He accepted parts of Leibniz’s doctrine of monads, although he preferred to call them “substantival agents” and rejected the thesis that they have neither doors nor windows. In Lossky’s own doctrine, monads have existed since the beginning of time, they are immortal, and can evolve or devolve depending on the goodness or badness of their behavior. Such evolution requires the possibility for monads to reincarnate into the bodies of creatures of a higher level on the scala perfectionis. According to this theory, a monad can evolve by being progressively reincarnated multiple times through a sort of process of metamorphosis from the level of the most elementary particles all the way up to the level of human beings or even higher. Lossky argues that the works of Leibniz contain scattered elements of such a systematic doctrine of reincarnation. He attempts to reconstitute this doctrine in an article that appeared both in Russian and German in 1931. The Russian version, “Ученiе Лейбница о перевоплощенiи какъ метаморфозѣ” (“Uchenie Lejbnica o perevoploshhenii kak metamorfoze”), was published in the Сборникъ Русскаго института въ Прагѣ (Sbornik Russkago instituta v Pragě), vol. 2, 1931, pp. 77-88. The German version appeared under the title “Leibniz’ Lehre von der Reinkarnation als Metamorphose,” in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 40, n. 2, 1931, pp. 214-226. The content of the Russian and German versions is roughly the same, except for the omission, in the German version, of a mention of David Hume in the second sentence and of one paragraph and a half at the end of the article. The following is a translation of this article. I translated the text from the Russian version, which was in all appearances written first, but I also took the German version into account. The original pagination is added in angle brackets. Angle brackets are used wherever the additions are mine. — Frédéric Tremblay

This paper explores the connections between Wolff’s system and the birth of philosophical anthropology. Sections 1-2 consider Wolff’s view on the disciplinary status of anthropology and his influence on Halle’s school of philosophical medicine (esp. J. G. Krüger). Sections 3-5 focus on Hanov’s treatise on general anthropology (1768) and the tension between his professed Wolffian inspiration and his holistic concern for the union of soul and body. Hanov’s ambiguous attitude towards Wolff is part of a widespread reaction against psychophysical parallelism.

The doctrine of pre-established harmony is given an interpretation in terms of mathematical equivalence. This has three advantages: it is eminently clear and fruitful; it was assumed by Euler, one of the foremost heirs of Leibnizian thinking; it is at the very least part of what Leibniz seems to mean.

I will give an overview of the fascinating communication between G. W. Leibniz and Pierre Bayle on pre-established harmony and sudden change in the soul which started from Bayle’s footnote H to the article “Rorarius” in his Dictionnaire historique et critique (1697) and ended in 1706 with Bayle’s death. I will compare the views presented in the communication to Leibniz’s reflections on the soul in his partly concurrent Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain (1704) and argue that many topics in the communication with Bayle are discussed with more details in Nouveaux essais. I also argue that the communication helped Leibniz to respond to Locke’s views concerning uneasiness in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, II, xxi. Bayle himself, however, was not able to completely understand Leibniz’s views on spontaneity as he was unaware of the contents of the Nouveaux essais, especially the systematic role of petites perceptions in Leibniz’s philosophy of mind. I will also reflect on whether the controversy could have ended in agreement if it would have continued longer.

Today it is well known that Leibniz’s basic metaphysical unit, the monad, is simple, having no parts and possessing only two qualities: perception and appetite. The monads are not directly in contact with each other, including the substances that make up the mind-body composite. 
  These characteristics, however, were not known to most of Leibniz’s contemporaries until 1695 when he published, in the age of 49, the first full presentation of his metaphysical views in an article to Journal des savants, titled Système nouveau de la nature et de la communication des substances, aussi bien que d’union qu’il y a entre l’âme et le corps. The article raised quite a stir. Perhaps the most interesting and cunning (as well as the most benevolent) critique of Leibniz’s views was provided by a French refugee in Rotterdam, Pierre Bayle (1647-1706) who is most famous for his Dictionnaire Historique et Critique (1697).
  The controversy centered on the pre-established harmony and especially the parallelism of the mind and the body. In this paper I will concentrate on the latter and follow the argumentation of both sides. Bayle gives a famous example of a dog who can feel pleasure and pain alternatively and asks how Leibniz’s can explain this sudden change in his theory. While Bayle is trying to reduce Leibniz’s views to occasionalism, Leibniz is trying to explicate his views with a concept which he hadn’t discussed at large in his public writings, the insensible, minute perception. Bayle presses Leibniz to explain the progression of thoughts with several counter-examples, arguing that his system just cannot explain sudden changes. Leibniz was trying to show Bayle that his idea of a soul is far more complex than his correspondant thought - his final word is essentially the same as in NE, written a few years later: “The soul sometimes passes from white to black or from yes to no, without knowing how, or at least into voluntary, for what is confused thoughts and its feelings produce in it we attribute to the body.”
  All in all, the fascinating discussion lasted for five years and my aim in this paper is to follow the argument and reflect whether there are remains of the controversy in Leibniz’s dialogue with Locke, Nouveaux essais sur l’entendemnt humain of 1704 which discusses the same topics.

A abordagem de Kant das diferentes teorias da causalidade que se confrontam no debate científico e filosófico de sua época é caracterizada, por um lado, pela referência a suas fontes mais diretas e, por outro lado, pela tendência à elaboração de uma perspectiva original , que não é totalmente redutível a estas mesmas fontes. Neste contexto, um dos primeiros pontos focais é representado pela referência a Leibniz, muitas vezes mediada por autores como Wolff e Baumgarten, o que, a propósito, leva o próprio Kant a por vezes acreditar esteja posicionando-se contra as teorias de Leibniz, ao passo que, na realidade, ele está, por exemplo, atacando uma tese de Wolff ou de um discípulo de Wolff. Isto acontece com menor frequência no que diz respeito a Baumgarten, que em muitos aspectos é um leibniziano mais ortodoxo do que Wolff. Uma outra linha de interpretação tende a salientar o emprego, por parte parte de Kant, das posições de Crusius como um meio para contrastar o formalismo wolffiano. Contudo, mesmo que o desacordo de Kant com Crusius seja em geral mais oculto e implícito, ele é muitas vezes agudo e determina, também, o surgimento de posições autônomas e originais no pensamento de Kant. O ponto de partida e o constante pressuposto na análise deste panorama é o que o próprio Kant (falando de ontologia) definiu como o " vestíbulo da metafísica " (cf. FM, AA 20: 260). Neste caso, o vestíbulo é o texto através do qual Kant enfrenta a tradição metafísica, ou seja, a Metaphysica de Baumgarten, que Kant emprega durante toda a sua carreira acadêmica como manual para suas lições de metafísica. É por isto que vamos começar a partir deste texto.