Tony Levitas
Brown University, Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Department Member
- Subnational Government, Education Finance and Management, Fiscal federalism and decentralization, Political Science, Chinese Politics, Brazilian Politics, and 8 moreDemocracy as Local development, Nationalism, Race and Ethnicity, Globalization, Migration Studies, Migration, Ethnicity, and Public Policyedit
- I currently teach public policy at Brown University. Prior to coming to Brown, I spent 25 years in post communist Eur... moreI currently teach public policy at Brown University. Prior to coming to Brown, I spent 25 years in post communist Europe helping ministries, local government associations, and reform coalitions answer two questions: What should local governments do? And where should the get the money to pay for it. I continue to work on these subjects and am currently writing a history of intergovernmental fiscal relations in the U.S.edit
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Польща стала однією з держав Європи, що мають більший ступінь децентралізації. Наразі третина всіх державних витрат зосереджена в руках місцевого самоврядування, що також досягло значних результатів у модернізації інфраструктури країни та... more
Польща стала однією з держав Європи, що мають більший ступінь децентралізації. Наразі третина всіх державних витрат зосереджена в руках місцевого самоврядування, що також досягло значних результатів у модернізації інфраструктури країни та реорганізації системи шкільної освіти. Цей успіх не можна віднести на рахунок широких активних дій громадськості, адже децентралізація в Польщі явно була “революцією згори”. Так само не можна стверджувати, що цей успіх обумовлений впровадженням правил, які, за загальною думкою, сприяють посиленню підзвітності в децентралізованій системі влади в державах, оскільки органи місцевого самоврядування в Польщі не є фінансово самодостатніми, й велика кількість їхніх повноважень залишається слабко визначеними. Натомість успіх Польщі обумовлений низкою інституцій, що призначені навчати, професіоналізувати, дисциплінувати та посилювати можливості та повноваження новообраних місцевих еліті Ці інституції можуть свідчити про те, що запорука створення ефективних органів місцевого самоврядування може полягати не стільки в “правильному визначенні правил” чи забезпеченні прав і можливостей громадян брати участь у власному врядуванні, скільки в інституціях, що спонукають органи місцевого самоврядування здійснювати моніторинг власної діяльності, будучи вбудованими в регуляторну структуру держави.
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Research Interests: Geology, Local Government and Local Development, Politics of Ukraine, Decentralisation processes and development issues, Decentralization, and 15 moreUkraine, Decentralisation, Local State and Decentralisation, Dezentrale Systeme, Post Soviet Studies, Fiscal Decentralisation, Decentralization of government and local governance, Education decentralization, Fiscal Decentralization, Decentralisation and Local Governance, Democratization In Ukraine, Euromaidan, Post Soviet Politics, ukraine decentalisation, and Reforms in Ukraine
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This paper reviews local government finances in Albania on the eve of the government’s plan to decrease the number of municipalities from 373 to 61. The paper argues that without changes in the current intergovernmental finance system,... more
This paper reviews local government finances in Albania on the eve of the government’s plan to decrease the number of municipalities from 373 to 61. The paper argues that without changes in the current intergovernmental finance system, territorial consolidation is unlikely to be accompanied by improved service delivery. This is because Albanian local governments are underfunded and receive less revenue than their counterparts in the region measured both as a percentage of total public revenues and of GDP. The current intergovernmental finance regime is also “over-equalizing” and is depriving the country’s larger jurisdictions -- particularly Tirana -- of the resources they need to build network infrastructure. These problems cannot be resolved by the efficiency gains that should come from consolidation. Nor is better property tax collection fix likely to transform the situation. Instead, the national government needs to provide municipalities with new grants and transfers. One possibility here is to introduce income tax sharing, a reform that would also make it possible to anchor the equalization system in an objective measure of relative wealth. Eventually, income tax shares could be transformed into local surcharges.
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The purpose of this note is to help both local and national government officials think through possible strategies for addressing one of the fundamental issues facing Serbian municipalities today: How do Serbian local governments increase... more
The purpose of this note is to help both local and national government officials think through possible strategies for addressing one of the fundamental issues facing Serbian municipalities today: How do Serbian local governments increase the revenues they need to improve their public infrastructure while simultaneously creating an environment favorable to private investment and local economic development? This is a dilemma that local governments face throughout the world but which is particularly pressing in many developing and transition countries where local governments must address huge deficits in urban infrastructure without at the same time over taxing their business communities upon which their future growth depends. It is also of particular importance in Nis, the third largest city in Serbia and the economic engine of the southern and least developed part of the country.
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This note reviews the changes in the composition and distribution of hromada revenue caused by Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. It then discusses the implications of those changes in relationship to the Ministry... more
This note reviews the changes in the composition and distribution of hromada revenue caused by Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. It then discusses the implications of those changes in relationship to the Ministry of Finance's current proposal that hromada's share of the Personal Income Tax (PIT) paid on military wages be returned to the central budget in 2024 to help defray the costs of the war effort. Its main points can be summarized as follows.
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Резюме Дана аналітична довідка присвячена огляду змін у структурі та розподілі доходів територіальних громад, обумовлених повномасштабним російським вторгненням в Україну в лютому 2022 році. Тут також розглядаються наслідки цих змін у... more
Резюме
Дана аналітична довідка присвячена огляду змін у структурі та розподілі доходів територіальних громад, обумовлених повномасштабним російським вторгненням в Україну в лютому 2022 році. Тут також розглядаються наслідки цих змін у відношенні до чинної пропозиції Міністерства фінансів України стосовно того, щоб частка податку на доходи фізичних осіб (ПДФО) із грошового забезпечення військовослужбовців, яка наразі спрямовується у бюджети територіальних громад, у 2024 році зараховувалася до державного бюджету задля фінансового забезпечення потреб армії та фронту. Нижче представлені основні тези даного огляду.
• Вражаючим фактом є те, що попри повномасштабну російську агресію, загальні доходи громад у період з 2021 по 2022 роки залишаються стабільними. Така сукупна стабільність має три основні джерела: збільшення частки ПДФО, що спрямовується в бюджети громад, з 60% до 64%; інфляція, завдяки якій номінальний обсяг надходжень зберігається на однаковому рівні; та стрімке зростання надходжень ПДФО, що сплачується з грошового забезпечення військовослужбовців. Разом ці чинники компенсували зниження загальної економічної активності, значні урізання обсягів субвенцій та дотацій з державного бюджету та зменшення надходжень від інших податків і зборів.
• Натомість зазначена загальна стабільність доходів приховує істотне зниження не лише доходів окремих територіальних громад, але й загальної рівності та справедливості системи міжурядових фінансових відносин: доходи найбідніших 20% громад знизилися на 15% при зростанні частки загальних доходів, що припадає на бюджети 40% громад з вищим рівнем забезпеченості.
• Основним чинником цих дедалі більших диспропорцій є посилення ролі ПДФО, який сплачується з грошового забезпечення військовослужбовців, що наразі становить 15% доходів громад, у поєднанні з тим фактом, що зарахування ПДФО військовослужбовців здійснюється за місцем розташування військової частини. Зарахування ПДФО військовослужбовців “за місцем роботи” призвело до того, що деякі громади, в основному більші за розміром, почали одержувати набагато більші обсяги надходжень, тоді як інші, в основному менші, опинилися в ситуації величезного скорочення доходів.
Дана аналітична довідка присвячена огляду змін у структурі та розподілі доходів територіальних громад, обумовлених повномасштабним російським вторгненням в Україну в лютому 2022 році. Тут також розглядаються наслідки цих змін у відношенні до чинної пропозиції Міністерства фінансів України стосовно того, щоб частка податку на доходи фізичних осіб (ПДФО) із грошового забезпечення військовослужбовців, яка наразі спрямовується у бюджети територіальних громад, у 2024 році зараховувалася до державного бюджету задля фінансового забезпечення потреб армії та фронту. Нижче представлені основні тези даного огляду.
• Вражаючим фактом є те, що попри повномасштабну російську агресію, загальні доходи громад у період з 2021 по 2022 роки залишаються стабільними. Така сукупна стабільність має три основні джерела: збільшення частки ПДФО, що спрямовується в бюджети громад, з 60% до 64%; інфляція, завдяки якій номінальний обсяг надходжень зберігається на однаковому рівні; та стрімке зростання надходжень ПДФО, що сплачується з грошового забезпечення військовослужбовців. Разом ці чинники компенсували зниження загальної економічної активності, значні урізання обсягів субвенцій та дотацій з державного бюджету та зменшення надходжень від інших податків і зборів.
• Натомість зазначена загальна стабільність доходів приховує істотне зниження не лише доходів окремих територіальних громад, але й загальної рівності та справедливості системи міжурядових фінансових відносин: доходи найбідніших 20% громад знизилися на 15% при зростанні частки загальних доходів, що припадає на бюджети 40% громад з вищим рівнем забезпеченості.
• Основним чинником цих дедалі більших диспропорцій є посилення ролі ПДФО, який сплачується з грошового забезпечення військовослужбовців, що наразі становить 15% доходів громад, у поєднанні з тим фактом, що зарахування ПДФО військовослужбовців здійснюється за місцем розташування військової частини. Зарахування ПДФО військовослужбовців “за місцем роботи” призвело до того, що деякі громади, в основному більші за розміром, почали одержувати набагато більші обсяги надходжень, тоді як інші, в основному менші, опинилися в ситуації величезного скорочення доходів.
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Since 1989, Poland has become one of the most decentralized states in Europe. Local government now control a third of all public expenditures. They have also delivered the goods modernizing the country’s infrastructure and restructuring... more
Since 1989, Poland has become one of the most decentralized states in Europe. Local government now control a third of all public expenditures. They have also delivered the goods modernizing the country’s infrastructure and restructuring its schools. This success cannot be attributed to widespread civic engagement because decentralization in Poland was clearly a “revolution from above�?. Nor can it be attributed to the implementation of rules typically thought to enhance accountability in decentralized polities because the Polish local governments do not finance themselves and many of their responsibilities remain poorly defined. Instead, I argue that this success is due to the creation of meso-level institutions which integrated local governments into the regulatory structure of the state. Their design and operation suggests that the promise of decentralized governance lies less in “getting the rules right�? than in constructing institutions that encourage their renegotiation and adjustment.
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Research Interests: Local Government and Local Development, Politics of Ukraine, Decentralisation processes and development issues, Decentralization, Ukraine, and 15 moreDecentralisation, Local State and Decentralisation, Dezentrale Systeme, Post Soviet Studies, Fiscal Decentralisation, Decentralization of government and local governance, Education decentralization, Fiscal Decentralization, Decentralisation and Local Governance, Democratization In Ukraine, Euromaidan, Post Soviet Politics, Ukraine Reform policy, ukraine decentalisation, and Reforms in Ukraine
This note examines the revenue and expenditure responses of local governments to the decrease in their revenues caused by the current economic downturn and by the Government of Serbia?s suspension of the transfer system put in place by... more
This note examines the revenue and expenditure responses of local governments to the decrease in their revenues caused by the current economic downturn and by the Government of Serbia?s suspension of the transfer system put in place by the 2006 Local Government Finance Law (LGFL). The fiscal analysis shows that in response to the elimination of the transfer system, local governments significantly raised their own revenues. Most of this growth came from better collection of the property tax from households and better collection of the land use fee from businesses. Not surprisingly, local investment spending plummeted 26 percent between 2007 and 2009 and virtually disappeared among the worst-off local governments.
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Decentralization in Macedonia was conceived of in two different phases, allowing for an asymmetric allocation of fiscal powers. During the first phase, all local governments were assigned the responsibility to deliver only a few ? mainly... more
Decentralization in Macedonia was conceived of in two different phases, allowing for an asymmetric allocation of fiscal powers. During the first phase, all local governments were assigned the responsibility to deliver only a few ? mainly communal ? local government functions. After fulfillment of specific conditions and approval by the central government, local governments in Macedonia would be allowed to take on their broader functional responsibilities. Using a detailed dataset of local government finances, this study analyzes the evolution of local government revenues and expenditures in Macedonia and highlights the main problems of the country's intergovernmental finance system.
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This paper reviews the flow of resources to pre-university educational institutions in Estonia and analyzes the relationship between these resources and the performance of the education system as a system.
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This study analyzes the funding of local governments in Macedonia today, and whether the current intergovernmental fiscal system provides adequate funding to the local government level. The study relies on a new local government finance... more
This study analyzes the funding of local governments in Macedonia today, and whether the current intergovernmental fiscal system provides adequate funding to the local government level. The study relies on a new local government finance database to present a picture of how local government finances have evolved over the last three years, and provides a concrete proposal for initial reforms that would improve the adequacy, efficiency, and equity of intergovernmental financial relations in Macedonia.
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Decentralization projects in developing and transitional countries are typically accompanied by efforts to increase the own-revenue powers of local governments. Both the literature of fiscal federalism and the practices of donors and... more
Decentralization projects in developing and transitional countries are typically accompanied by efforts to increase the own-revenue powers of local governments. Both the literature of fiscal federalism and the practices of donors and domestic reformers often see the strengthening these powers as critically important to the success of local government reform initiatives. The recent history of Albanian intergovernmental finance reform, however, suggests that there can be too much of a good thing: Placing the enhancement of local government tax powers at the center of decentralization projects can not only crowd out?theoretically and practically?critically important efforts to develop stable, predictable, and adequate transfer systems, but can also be politically self-blocking. In this paper, we use the Albanian case to illustrate why in developing countries with highly skewed tax bases there are good reasons to focus first on stabilizing transfer systems, and only secondarily on expan...
The purpose of this note is to help both local and national government officials think through possible strategies for addressing one of the fundamental issues facing Serbian municipalities today: How do Serbian local governments increase... more
The purpose of this note is to help both local and national government officials think through possible strategies for addressing one of the fundamental issues facing Serbian municipalities today: How do Serbian local governments increase the revenues they need to improve their public infrastructure while simultaneously creating an environment favorable to private investment and local economic development? This is a dilemma that local governments face throughout the world but which is particularly pressing in many developing and transition countries where local governments must address huge deficits in urban infrastructure without at the same time over taxing their business communities upon which their future growth depends. It is also of particular importance in Nis, the third largest city in Serbia and the economic engine of the southern and least developed part of the country.
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Ukraine is currently debating whether personal income tax (PIT) should be shared with local governments according to where taxpayers work, live, or some combination of the two. This brief argues that Ukraine should share PIT with local... more
Ukraine is currently debating whether personal income tax (PIT) should be shared with local governments according to where taxpayers work, live, or some combination of the two. This brief argues that Ukraine should share PIT with local governments on the basis of where taxpayers live and vote. The first part explains why contrary to popular belief Ukraine is not currently sharing PIT with local governments according to where people work. The second, reviews why virtually all European countries that share significant amounts of PIT with local governments do so according to where taxpayers live and vote. The conclusion explains why the national government needs to build an information system that it currently does not have to allocate PIT by either place of work or residence. And it argues that given that the costs of moving to either system are similar, there should be little question that Ukraine should adopt one based on where taxpayers reside. Finally, we outline the steps that would need to be taken to move to a residency-based system arguing that this can be done by FY 2023 so long as PIT is-at least initially-allocated according to a simple declaration of the local government in which a taxpayer lives, and not their legally registered addresses.
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There is currently an intense debate in Ukraine over whether the personal income tax (PIT) should be shared with local governments by where taxpayers work, according to where they live, or by some combination of the two. The article... more
There is currently an intense debate in Ukraine over whether the personal income tax (PIT) should be shared with local governments by where taxpayers work, according to where they live, or by some combination of the two. The article argues Ukraine should share PIT with local governments on basis of where taxpayers live and vote, and for the same reason that this is how PIT is shared with local governments in virtually all of Europe: To ensure the responsiveness and accountability of local governments by aligning the economic interests of their residents as taxpayers with their political interests in democracy as voters.
The first part of the article explains why contrary to popular belief Ukraine is not now currently sharing PIT with local governments according to where people work. This is because the national government has been relying on firms to allocate the PIT of their employees to the local governments in which they work, and many large multiunit firms have never done this. Instead, they typically return the PIT payments of employees who work in branch units not to the local governments in which those units are located, but to the local governments in which they are legally registered.
As a result, the PIT payments of many citizens are being returned to local governments from whom they receive no services and for which they did not vote. This is obviously unfair. It also overfunds big cities in which most large multiunit firms are legally registered at the expense of the local governments in which their employees work (or live), unnecessarily increasing the need for equalization payments. Equally importantly, firms should not be responsible for divvying up public revenues. Instead, in any state worth its salt, this should be the responsibility of the state treasury. Or put another way, whether PIT is to be allocated by place of work or place of residency, the national government must develop an information and data processing system for PIT sharing that it currently does not have.
The second part of the article reviews why virtually all but one of the twenty-odd European countries that share significant amounts of PIT with local governments do so according to where taxpayers live and vote. The first reason for this is that because PIT is –at least in theory-- a tax on a citizen’s total income –income that can come from multiple sources and locations—it’s legal origin can only reasonable be identified as the taxpayer’s place of residence. The second reason is that most of the services that local governments pay for are for their residents, not people who commute to them for work. And third, and most importantly, the best way to ensure that voters are interested in holding their local governments accountable is by making it clear to them that it is their taxes that their local governments are spending.
The last section of the article explains why the national government needs to build an information and data processing system that it currently does not have to allocate PIT by either place of work or place of residence. It also explains why any new system will require an upward adjustment of Kyiv’s PIT share, as well as phase-in provisions to prevent shocks to local government budgets. As such, it argues the technical and political costs of allocating PIT by place of residency and place of employment are the same, and therefore there should be no question about what Ukraine should do: Like the rest of Europe, Ukraine should allocate PIT by where taxpayers live and vote to increase local government accountability. Finally, the article outlines the steps that the policy makers must take to allocate PIT by place of residence by fiscal year 2023 and argues that this can be done so long as PIT is –at least initially— not allocated by peoples’ legal place of residence, but instead according to simple declarations of the local government in which they actually live.
The first part of the article explains why contrary to popular belief Ukraine is not now currently sharing PIT with local governments according to where people work. This is because the national government has been relying on firms to allocate the PIT of their employees to the local governments in which they work, and many large multiunit firms have never done this. Instead, they typically return the PIT payments of employees who work in branch units not to the local governments in which those units are located, but to the local governments in which they are legally registered.
As a result, the PIT payments of many citizens are being returned to local governments from whom they receive no services and for which they did not vote. This is obviously unfair. It also overfunds big cities in which most large multiunit firms are legally registered at the expense of the local governments in which their employees work (or live), unnecessarily increasing the need for equalization payments. Equally importantly, firms should not be responsible for divvying up public revenues. Instead, in any state worth its salt, this should be the responsibility of the state treasury. Or put another way, whether PIT is to be allocated by place of work or place of residency, the national government must develop an information and data processing system for PIT sharing that it currently does not have.
The second part of the article reviews why virtually all but one of the twenty-odd European countries that share significant amounts of PIT with local governments do so according to where taxpayers live and vote. The first reason for this is that because PIT is –at least in theory-- a tax on a citizen’s total income –income that can come from multiple sources and locations—it’s legal origin can only reasonable be identified as the taxpayer’s place of residence. The second reason is that most of the services that local governments pay for are for their residents, not people who commute to them for work. And third, and most importantly, the best way to ensure that voters are interested in holding their local governments accountable is by making it clear to them that it is their taxes that their local governments are spending.
The last section of the article explains why the national government needs to build an information and data processing system that it currently does not have to allocate PIT by either place of work or place of residence. It also explains why any new system will require an upward adjustment of Kyiv’s PIT share, as well as phase-in provisions to prevent shocks to local government budgets. As such, it argues the technical and political costs of allocating PIT by place of residency and place of employment are the same, and therefore there should be no question about what Ukraine should do: Like the rest of Europe, Ukraine should allocate PIT by where taxpayers live and vote to increase local government accountability. Finally, the article outlines the steps that the policy makers must take to allocate PIT by place of residence by fiscal year 2023 and argues that this can be done so long as PIT is –at least initially— not allocated by peoples’ legal place of residence, but instead according to simple declarations of the local government in which they actually live.
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Approximately 30 percent of all local government revenues in Serbia come from shared sales taxes. In the immediate future, the Government will have to replace sales taxes with a value added tax in order to meet EU norms. This will require... more
Approximately 30 percent of all local government revenues in Serbia come from shared sales taxes. In the immediate future, the Government will have to replace sales taxes with a value added tax in order to meet EU norms. This will require a fundamental overhaul of Serbia’s intergovernmental finance system because unlike sales tax, the VAT cannot be shared on an
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... economic weekly, HVG, for letting me use its own archives and Gyorgyi Kocsis. whose investigative reporting on nomenklatura privatization was an invaluable source. Roza Hodosan helped me with obtaining legislative documents. It was my... more
... economic weekly, HVG, for letting me use its own archives and Gyorgyi Kocsis. whose investigative reporting on nomenklatura privatization was an invaluable source. Roza Hodosan helped me with obtaining legislative documents. It was my good fortune to meet Anna Szekacs ...
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This is the fifth edition of the report prepared by the NALAS Fiscal Decentralization Task Force, as an ongoing effort to provide policy-makers and analysts with reliable comparative data on municipal finances and intergovernmental fiscal... more
This is the fifth edition of the report prepared by the NALAS Fiscal Decentralization Task Force, as an ongoing effort to provide policy-makers and analysts with reliable comparative data on municipal finances and intergovernmental fiscal relations in South-East Europe.
This edition covers the period 2006-2014. As before, the report tries to both capture regional trends, and major developments in particular countries/entities. This year, the report also includes short descriptions of property tax systems in the region, partly based on the findings of the NALAS Second Summer School of Local Governments and Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations which held in Ohrid, in August 2015 and focused on property taxation in SEE. A novelty in this edition is chapter on gender mainstreaming in fiscal decentralization.
This edition covers the period 2006-2014. As before, the report tries to both capture regional trends, and major developments in particular countries/entities. This year, the report also includes short descriptions of property tax systems in the region, partly based on the findings of the NALAS Second Summer School of Local Governments and Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations which held in Ohrid, in August 2015 and focused on property taxation in SEE. A novelty in this edition is chapter on gender mainstreaming in fiscal decentralization.
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Chapter reviews local government budget reform in Poland during the 1990s and the legal and financial foundation of Poland's surprisingly powerful and independent municipal goverments
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W rozdziale tym dowodzimy, że w Polsce potrzebne jest sproblematyzowane, pragmatyczne podejście do reformy szkolnictwa na poziomie lokalnym. W czym rzecz, wyjaśniamy sukcesywnie, w kolejnych częściach rozdziału. Najpierw poddajemy... more
W rozdziale tym dowodzimy, że w Polsce potrzebne jest sproblematyzowane, pragmatyczne podejście do reformy szkolnictwa na poziomie lokalnym. W czym rzecz, wyjaśniamy sukcesywnie, w kolejnych częściach rozdziału. Najpierw poddajemy krytycznej analizie dwa konkurencyjne modele reformy oświatowej wyłaniające się z amerykańskiej i polskiej literatury dotyczącej New Public Management, nowego zarządzania w sektorze publicznym (dalej – NPM). Następne omawiamy skrótowo teoretyczne podstawy pragmatycznego podejścia do reformy sektora publicznego. I na koniec pokazujemy, co mogłoby ono oznaczać dla polskich samorządów pragnących reformować oświatę w pierwszych dziesięcioleciach XXI wieku.
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This paper situates the decentralization of education responsibilities to local governments in Albania against broader European trends. It then analyzes how preschools are currently managed and financed and based on this analysis makes... more
This paper situates the decentralization of education responsibilities to local governments in Albania against broader European trends. It then analyzes how preschools are currently managed and financed and based on this analysis makes specific policy recommendations on how the regulation and financing of this crucial function can be improved.
Among other things it argues that the future of early childhood education in Albania is now inextricably linked to the future of municipal management and finance. Policy makers need to look at early childhood education through a municipal lens and to municipal finance and management through the lens of early childhood education.
Among other things it argues that the future of early childhood education in Albania is now inextricably linked to the future of municipal management and finance. Policy makers need to look at early childhood education through a municipal lens and to municipal finance and management through the lens of early childhood education.
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This paper reviews the flow of resources to pre-university educational institutions in Estonia and analyzes the relationship between these resources and the performance of the education system as a system.
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A not so fictional account of major public finance reforms in Bosnia-Hercegovina
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This presentation discusses the strengths and weakness of Ukraine's system of fiscal equalization.
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paper discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the Ukrainian system of fiscal equalization and makes recommendations about how it might be made for effective and efficient
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Ukrainian version of presentation on the fundamental problems of the way personal income tax is shared with local governments in Ukraine
English Version of presentation on fundamental problems with the way Personal Income Tax is shared with local government in Ukraine