CASE DIGEST: Serafin v.
Lindayag
A.M. No. 297-MJ | September 30, 1975
Parties
Complainant: Avelina Serafin
Respondent: Municipal Judge Santiago Lindayag of Guiguinto, Bulacan
I. Doctrine
Under the Constitution, no person shall be imprisoned for non-payment of debt. A civil obligation like
an unpaid loan cannot be criminally prosecuted, and any judicial officer who allows or initiates such a
prosecution grossly violates this constitutional protection. A judge who issues a warrant of arrest for
failure to pay a private debt commits grave misconduct and abuse of judicial authority, warranting
removal from office.
II. Facts of the Case (Expanded)
On July 21, 1971, a criminal complaint for estafa was filed against Avelina Serafin before Municipal Judge
Santiago Lindayag by Guiguinto Chief of Police Juan Estrella at the instance of private complainants Carmelito
and Corazon Mendoza. The complaint merely alleged that Serafin borrowed ₱1,500 from the Mendozas and
failed to repay despite promises and a demand letter. No allegations of deceit, fraud, or abuse of confidence
were stated—essential elements of estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code were clearly absent.
Nevertheless, Judge Lindayag issued a warrant of arrest on the same day, finding probable cause of estafa.
Serafin was arrested on a Saturday, detained for three days because bonding companies were closed, and
was released only after posting bail on July 28, 1971.
A motion to quash the case was later filed by Serafin's counsel and was granted on September 30, 1971, with
the judge admitting the motion was "meritorious and well-taken."
Despite this, Serafin filed an administrative complaint against Judge Lindayag for gross misconduct,
leading to a reinvestigation by the Supreme Court.
During the probe, Judge Lindayag submitted allegedly amended complaints and fabricated evidence,
including falsified preliminary examination notes and affidavits, to justify his earlier issuance of the warrant.
These documents were proven to be spurious by the investigating judge.
Ruling of the RTC / Trial Judge
Issued warrant of arrest based on a criminal complaint that was civil in nature.
Later granted motion to quash the case but attempted to cover up the incident through falsified
documents.
Ruling of the Supreme Court
Found Judge Lindayag guilty of gross misconduct and incompetence.
Ordered his dismissal from the judiciary.
Referred falsified documents for investigation by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for
potential criminal prosecution.
Remedy of the Petitioner
Serafin filed an administrative complaint with the Department of Justice, later endorsed to the
Supreme Court, for illegal detention and abuse of authority.
III. Issue (Relevant to the Topic)
Whether a judge may issue a warrant of arrest based on a criminal complaint arising from a mere
unpaid debt without violating the constitutional protection against imprisonment for debt.
IV. Ruling
🔹 Legal Basis:
Article III, Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution: "No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-
payment of a poll tax."
Article 315, Revised Penal Code – Estafa requires deceit or abuse of confidence
Republic Act No. 296, Section 87 – requires municipal judges to conduct personal examination of
complainants through searching questions before issuing warrants
🔹 Supreme Court Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled that Judge Lindayag gravely abused his judicial discretion by accepting a
plainly civil case (simple loan default) as a criminal charge and issuing a warrant of arrest. The complaint
lacked any elements of fraud or deceit necessary for estafa. The judge’s actions directly violated the
constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt.
The Court found that Judge Lindayag knew or should have known the law and committed serious
misconduct by causing Serafin’s wrongful arrest and detention. His later attempt to cover up his error
with spurious documents aggravated his offense. The Court emphasized that such behavior undermines
public trust in the judiciary and warrants dismissal from service.
Court Explanation (Paragraph Format)
The Supreme Court held that the issuance of a warrant of arrest against a debtor for failure to pay a
loan is a blatant violation of the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt. The Constitution
explicitly protects individuals from being jailed merely for non-payment of financial obligations. Judge
Lindayag’s conduct in entertaining such a complaint and finding probable cause for estafa—despite the
absence of any deceit or fraudulent intent—demonstrated either gross ignorance of the law or willful disregard
of it.
The Court was further appalled by the judge’s subsequent attempt to justify his actions by submitting
forged documents that contradicted the original sworn statements. This deliberate attempt to deceive the
investigating body confirmed his unfitness to remain in office. The Supreme Court stressed that judges
must be guardians of justice and fairness, not instruments of oppression or harassment. It concluded that
Lindayag’s actions constituted grave abuse of authority, violated the fundamental rights of the
complainant, and warranted the ultimate penalty of dismissal from judicial service.
CASE DIGEST: Lozano v. Martinez
G.R. No. L-63419, et al. | December 18, 1986 | En Banc
Parties
Petitioners: Florentina A. Lozano, Luzviminda Lobaton, Antonio and Susan Datuin, Oscar Violago,
Elinor Abad, Amable and Sylvia Aguiluz, Luis Hojas
Respondents: Judges and Fiscals from various Regional Trial Courts, and in some cases, the People of
the Philippines
I. Doctrine
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) does not violate the constitutional prohibition against
imprisonment for debt or non-payment of a poll tax. The law penalizes not the failure to pay a debt, but
the act of issuing a worthless check, which is deemed injurious to public interest and thus falls within
the State’s police power. The offense is malum prohibitum—criminalized to deter conduct harmful to
commerce and public confidence.
II. Facts of the Case (Expanded)
Several criminal cases were filed under BP 22 for issuing checks subsequently dishonored for insufficient
funds. The accused in these cases sought to quash the information, claiming that BP 22 is
unconstitutional because:
1. It violates the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt.
2. It impairs freedom of contract.
3. It violates equal protection of the laws.
4. It entails undue delegation of legislative or executive power.
5. It was improperly enacted in violation of legislative procedure.
One trial court (G.R. No. 75789) granted the motion to quash, declaring BP 22 unconstitutional, while other
courts denied similar motions. These conflicting rulings led to consolidated petitions before the Supreme
Court.
Ruling of the RTC (Various Trial Courts)
Majority of trial courts upheld the constitutionality of BP 22 and denied motions to quash.
One court declared the law unconstitutional, dismissing the case on the ground that BP 22
punishes failure to pay a debt.
Ruling of the CA
Not applicable; cases were elevated directly to the Supreme Court.
Remedy of the Petitioners
Filed petitions for review and prohibition before the Supreme Court, seeking to invalidate BP 22
and stop criminal prosecutions under it.
III. Issue (Relevant to the Topic)
Does BP 22 violate the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt or non-payment of
a poll tax (Article III, Sec. 20 of the Constitution)?
IV. Ruling
🔹 Legal Basis:
Article III, Section 20, 1987 Constitution: “No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of
a poll tax.”
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
Police power doctrine in constitutional law
🔹 Supreme Court Decision:
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of BP 22, ruling that:
BP 22 penalizes not debt, but the issuance of a worthless check, which is an act against public
order, not a private contractual breach.
The gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a check despite knowledge of insufficient funds,
creating a prima facie presumption of deceit.
The law is a valid exercise of the police power of the State, aimed at curbing the harmful practice of
issuing “bouncing checks” which undermines public trust in financial instruments.
The Court emphasized that BP 22 is malum prohibitum, punishing the act of issuing a bad check, not
the failure to pay a debt.
The statute’s penalty is not unconstitutional as it is not meant to coerce debt repayment but to
deter public harm from the circulation of worthless checks.
The Court dismissed the petitions in cases where BP 22 had been upheld and reversed the decision in the
case where it had been declared unconstitutional.
Court Explanation (Paragraph Format)
The Supreme Court clarified that the constitutional provision against imprisonment for debt does not apply to
the act punished under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. While the law may have the effect of pressuring debtors to
pay, its intent is not to enforce civil obligations but to punish conduct that disrupts public confidence in
the banking and commercial systems. The act of issuing a worthless check, even if done in payment of a
pre-existing obligation, is a public offense that threatens economic stability and trust in financial transactions.
The Court emphasized that checks, unlike mere contracts, carry with them an implied representation of
sufficient funds, and their misuse harms not just the payee but society at large.
By designating the issuance of bad checks as malum prohibitum, the legislature intended to deter such
harmful behavior through penal sanctions, not to criminalize the non-payment of debts. The Court further
noted that the law provides safeguards for the accused, including a grace period to rectify the dishonor
within five banking days of notice, thereby tempering its harshness.
The Court also rejected arguments related to undue delegation, equal protection, and procedural defects
in enactment, affirming the validity of BP 22 as a reasonable exercise of the State’s police power to
protect public interest. In conclusion, the Supreme Court found that BP 22 does not violate the
constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt, and it remains a valid and enforceable law.
