PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HSBC vs JOSE VERA and MARIANO CU UNJIENG
G.R. No. L-45685 | November 16, 1937
FACTS:
1. The criminal case, People vs Cu Unjieng was filed in the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Manila on October 15, 1931, with HSBC intervening in the case as
private prosecutor.
2. On January 8, 1934 the CFI rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing Cu
Unjieng to an indeterminate penalty ranging from four years and two months
of prision correccional to eight years of prision mayor.
3. Upon appeal, it was modified to an indeterminate penalty of from five years
and six months of prison correccional to seven years, six months and twenty-
seven days of prison mayor, but affirmed the judgments in all other respects.
4. Cu Unjieng filed a Motion for Reconsideration and four successive motions for
new trial which were all denied on December 17, 1935. Final judgment was
entered on Dec. 18, 1935. He filed for certiorari to the Supreme Court but got
denied on Nov 1936. The SC subsequently denied Cu Unjieng’s petition for
leave to file a second alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial, then
remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of judgment.
5. Cu Unjieng filed an application for probation before the trial court, under the
provisions of Act 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. He states he is
innocent of the crime; he has no criminal record; and that he would observe
good conduct in the future.
6. CFI Manila Judge Jose Vera set the petition for hearing for probation on April 5,
1937.
7. HSBC questioned the authority of Vera to hold such hearings and assailed the
constitutionality of the Probation Act since it violates the equal protection of
laws and gives unlawful and improper delegation to provincial boards.
8. Section 11 of Art 4221 states that the act shall only be applied in those
provinces wherein the probationary officer is granted salary not lower than
provincial fiscals by respective provincial boards.
9. The City Fiscal of Manila files a supplementary petition affirming issues raised
by HSBC, arguing that probation is a form of reprieve, hence Act 4221
bypasses this exclusive power of the Chief Executive. Hence this petition in
the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
The substantive and procedural issues of the case revolved around the validity of
Act 4221 – whether its provisions abdicate the principle potestas delegata non
delegare potest which is enshrined in the Constitution:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality of Act 4221 has been properly raised in
these proceedings;
2. If in the affirmative, whether or not Act 4221 is constitutional based on these
three grounds:
a. It encroaches upon the pardoning power of the executive
b. It constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
c. It denies the equal protection of the laws
HELD:
1. Yes. Constitutional questions will not be determined by the courts unless
properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a
determination of the case, lis mota. Constitutionality issues may be raised in
prohibition and certiorari proceedings, as they may also be raised in
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus proceedings. The general rule
states that constitutionality should be raised in the earliest possible
opportunity (during proceedings in initial/inferior courts). It may be said that
the state can challenge the validity of its own laws, as in this case. The well-
settled rule is that the person impugning validity must have personal and
substantial interest in the case (i.e. he has sustained, or will sustain direct
injury as a result of its enforcement). If Act 4221 is unconstitutional, the
People of the Philippines have substantial interest in having it set aside.
2.
a. No. There exists a distinction between pardon and probation. Pardoning
power is solely within the power of the Executive. Probation has an
effect of temporary suspension, and the probationer is still not exempt
from the entire punishment which the law inflicts upon him as he
remains to be in legal custody for the time being.
b. Yes. The Probation Act does not lay down any definite standards by
which the administrative boards may be guided in the exercise of
discretionary powers, hence they have the power to determine for
themselves, whether or not to apply the law or not. This therefore
becomes a surrender of legislative power to the provincial boards. It is
unconstitutional.
c. Yes. Due to the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, some
provinces may choose to adopt the law or not, thus denying the equal
protection of laws. It is unconstitutional.
In view of the foregoing, the Supreme Court declared Act No. 4221 as
unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition was, accordingly, granted,
without any pronouncement regarding costs.
RATIO:
Doctrine of Non-Delegation of Powers: Corollary of separation of powers doctrine. -
This rule which follows as a necessary corollary of the doctrine of separation of
powers prohibits the delegation of legislative power, the vesting of judicial officers
with non-judicial functions, as well as the investing on non-judicial officers with
judicial powers. Any attempt at such delegation is unconstitutional and void.
The distinction is between a delegation of power to make the law, which involves a
discretion as to what the law shall be, which delegation is void; and the delegation
of authority or discretion as to the execution of a law to be exercised under, and in
pursuance of the law, to which delegation no objection can be made.
The legislature may delegate its authority to make findings of fact, and the fact-
finding power may be conferred for putting into effect, suspending, or applying the
law. But where delegation to a fact-finding body empowers it to create the
conditions which constitute the fact, the delegation is invalid. The test of
completeness has been said to be whether the provision is sufficiently definite and
certain to enable one to know his rights and obligations thereunder.
