Act 3815: Revised Penal Code means of action, defense, or

communication with his fellow beings.

Article 13. Mitigating Circumstances. — The
following are mitigating circumstances: 9. Such illness of the offender as would
diminish the exercise of the will-power
1. Those mentioned in the preceding
of the offender without however
Chapter, when all the requisites
depriving him of consciousness of his
necessary to justify the act or to
acts.
exempt from criminal liability in the
respective cases are not attendant. 10. And, finally, any other circumstance of
a similar nature and analogous to
2. That the offender is under eighteen
those above mentioned.
years of age or over seventy years. In
the case of the minor, he shall be Key Theories and Doctrines in Mitigating
proceeded against in accordance with Circumstances
the provisions of Article 80.
1. Diminution of Freedom, Intelligence, or
3. That the offender had no intention to Intent: Reyes emphasizes that
commit so grave a wrong as that mitigating circumstances are rooted in a
committed. diminished capacity of the offender to
act freely, exercise full intelligence, or
4. That sufficient provocation or threat on
intend the full consequence of their
the part of the offended party
actions. The offender's actions may thus
immediately preceded the act.
demonstrate lesser perversity, which
5. That the act was committed in the justifies a reduced penalty.
immediate vindication of a grave
2. Single-Use Principle: An important
offense to the one committing the
doctrine is that a single fact cannot
felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants,
serve as the basis for more than one
descendants, legitimate, natural, or
mitigating circumstance. When one fact
adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives
gives rise to multiple mitigating
by affinity within the same degrees.
circumstances, only one can be applied,
6. That of having acted upon an impulse as the others are absorbed.
so powerful as naturally to have
3. Ordinary vs. Privileged Mitigating
produced passion or obfuscation.
Circumstances: Reyes distinguishes
7. That the offender had voluntarily ordinary mitigating circumstances,
surrendered himself to a person in which reduce the penalty within the
authority or his agents, or that he had degree prescribed by law, from
voluntarily confessed his guilt before privileged ones, which allow for a
the court prior to the presentation of reduction by one or two degrees.
the evidence for the prosecution. Privileged mitigating circumstances
reflect more profound impairment of
8. That the offender is deaf and dumb, freedom or intent.
blind or otherwise suffering some
physical defect which thus restricts his Specific Mitigating Circumstances
Incomplete Justifying or Exempting self-control due to emotional distress. The law
Circumstances allows for a reasonable delay between the
offense and the response, provided the
When some, but not all, elements of a justifying
offender's mental state remains influenced by
or exempting circumstance are present, it
the provocation.
becomes a privileged mitigating factor. For
instance, in incomplete self-defense, if unlawful Passion or Obfuscation
aggression is present but other requisites are
Passion or obfuscation considers the powerful
not, this partially justifies the act but does not
impulse that might impair the offender’s
absolve liability.
judgment, typically due to an unlawful act by
Age (Under 18 or Over 70 Years Old) the victim. However, this is not mitigating if it
arises from revenge or lawlessness. Reyes
The law assumes diminished culpability based
clarifies that this cannot coexist with vindication
on the offender’s age at the time of the crime,
of a grave offense or treachery.
not the trial. Offenders under 18 may receive
reduced penalties depending on whether they Voluntary Surrender and Confession of Guilt
acted with discernment, while those over 70
Two separate mitigating factors are recognized
benefit from a general mitigation and
here. Voluntary surrender must be spontaneous
exemption from the death penalty if imposed.
and demonstrate an intent to submit to justice,
Lack of Intent to Commit So Grave a Wrong while a confession of guilt should occur in court
(Praeter Intentionem) before evidence for the prosecution is
presented. These show a lesser degree of
This applies when an offender did not intend for
perversity, as the offender’s actions indicate
their actions to result in such severe
remorse and cooperation.
consequences. Reyes highlights that this
doctrine is inapplicable in crimes of negligence Physical Defect and Illness
or cases involving aggravating factors like
Offenders with physical disabilities or illnesses
treachery. The courts evaluate this based on
that limit their freedom of action or reduce
factors like the weapon used, injury inflicted,
their willpower are given leniency. However, the
and method of attack.
condition must be relevant to the crime; for
Provocation or Threat instance, blindness would not mitigate fraud.

Provocation reduces culpability when the Analogous Circumstances

offended party’s actions incite the offender to
The law allows for flexibility by recognizing
commit the crime. The provocation must be
circumstances analogous to those explicitly
personal, immediate, and proportionate, and
listed. Examples include acts done out of
must not be so extreme as to justify self-
jealousy or testimony for the prosecution,
defense.
reflecting mitigating conditions of impulsive
Immediate Vindication of a Grave Offense actions, similar to passion or obfuscation.

When a person commits a crime in response to

a severe insult or offense, it reflects diminished
Mitigating Circumstances

1. People v. Jaurigue, G.R. No. 384, 21 February 1946, 76 Phil. 174

On September 20, 1942, Avelina Jaurigue fatally stabbed Amado Capina in a chapel in San Pablo, Laguna.
The incident followed repeated and escalating unwanted advances by Capina, culminating in a physical
assault and rumored defamation of Jaurigue’s honor. The core issue was whether Jaurigue acted in
legitimate defense of her honor when she used deadly force. The Court ruled that while Jaurigue’s actions
were excessive given the public and secure setting, her actions were mitigated by passion, obfuscation,
and immediate surrender. Consequently, the charge was downgraded to homicide with multiple mitigating
circumstances, resulting in a reduced penalty.

Facts:

1. Background and Prior Incidents: Avelina Jaurigue and Amado Capina were residents of the same
barrio in San Pablo, Laguna. Capina had pursued Jaurigue romantically, despite her consistent
refusals. On September 13, 1942, Capina forcefully kissed and groped Jaurigue, prompting her to
arm herself for protection. Days later, on September 15, Capina intruded into her bedroom at
night, attempting further advances. He was confronted by her parents and apologized but
continued to boast of his alleged exploits with Jaurigue.

2. The Day of the Incident: On the evening of September 20, Jaurigue attended a religious service
where Capina once again approached her and inappropriately touched her thigh. Reacting to this
public assault on her honor, Jaurigue stabbed him in the neck with a fan knife, causing his death.

3. Immediate Surrender: After the incident, Jaurigue voluntarily surrendered to barrio lieutenant
Casimiro Lozada, turned over her weapon, and cooperated with the authorities.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Avelina Jaurigue acted in legitimate defense of her honor.

2. Whether or not mitigating circumstances of passion, obfuscation, lack of intent to kill, and
voluntary surrender applied.

3. Whether or not the alleged aggravating circumstance of committing the act in a place of worship
applied.

Ruling:

The Court found that Jaurigue was guilty of homicide but acknowledged multiple mitigating circumstances.
The Court ruled that:
 • Jaurigue's actions in stabbing Capina were excessive in the context, given that the chapel was well-
lit and populated, reducing the threat to her personal safety.

• Mitigating circumstances were present, specifically her voluntary surrender, immediate reaction
to a grave insult, passion and obfuscation due to repeated harassment, and the absence of intent
to kill.

• Aggravating circumstances did not apply as there was no evidence that Jaurigue intended to
commit murder upon entering the chapel.

Modified Sentence: Jaurigue’s sentence was reduced to an indeterminate penalty of two months and one
day of arresto mayor as minimum to two years, four months, and one day of prision correccional as
maximum, due to mitigating circumstances. She was also ordered to pay P2,000 to Capina's heirs.

Legal Basis:

The Court’s ruling applied the Revised Penal Code and cited precedents regarding the defense of honor.
Specifically, the Court referenced Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code for the penalty reduction and
recognized the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103). Precedent cases (e.g., People v. De la Cruz,
People v. Parana) established the principle of using reasonable means to defend honor.

Motive:

Jaurigue's motive was the defense of her honor. She acted under immediate emotional and psychological
distress due to Capina’s persistent and escalating assaults and defamation. Her decision to carry a knife
and ultimately use it was motivated by prior traumatic experiences with Capina, compounded by his public
physical assault in the chapel.

Rationale:

The Court determined that while Jaurigue acted to defend her dignity, the fatal stabbing exceeded
reasonable self-defense in a secure setting with multiple witnesses. However, the Court found her
response understandable, given her prior harassment and Capina’s actions. The evidence of Capina’s
physical and verbal harassment substantiated Jaurigue’s claim of acting under emotional distress, which
the Court deemed to mitigate her culpability.

The Court cited her restraint during previous encounters with Capina and acknowledged her immediate
surrender, showing a lack of criminal predisposition. This interpretation countered the prosecution’s claim
that her actions were premeditated and aggravated by the chapel setting. The ruling emphasized that the
mitigating circumstances collectively warranted a reduction in her penalty.
 2. People v. Narvaez, L-33466-67, 20 April 1983, 121 SCRA 389

On August 22, 1968, Mamerto Narvaez, a settler in South Cotabato, shot and killed Davis Q. Fleischer and
Flaviano Rubia, both associated with Fleischer and Co., Inc., during a dispute over the fencing of Narvaez’s
property. Narvaez argued that he acted in defense of his rights, as Fleischer and Rubia were erecting a
fence that blocked his access to the highway, which he claimed threatened his property and livelihood.
The Court of First Instance convicted Narvaez of murder, considering treachery and evident premeditation,
but offsetting these aggravating circumstances with mitigating circumstances such as voluntary surrender
and defense of his rights. The Supreme Court modified the decision, ruling that the crime was homicide,
mitigated by incomplete defense of rights, voluntary surrender, and passion and obfuscation. Narvaez was
sentenced to four months of arresto mayor, and having already been detained for fourteen years, his
immediate release was ordered.

Facts

• August 22, 1968: Fleischer and Rubia, along with laborers, began fencing property disputed
between Narvaez and Fleischer & Co. Inc., threatening to cut off access to Narvaez’s home and
rice mill.

• Narvaez, disturbed from his rest, saw the workers chiseling his house’s walls to install the fence.
He pleaded for them to stop, but Fleischer, infuriated, ordered the laborers to proceed.

• Narvaez, in a moment of intense agitation, fired his shotgun from his window, killing Fleischer and
Rubia. He subsequently surrendered to the authorities, confessing his actions.

• Narvaez contended that he acted in defense of his property rights as he was threatened by the
destruction of his house and obstruction of access to his business.

Issues

1. Whether or not Narvaez acted in lawful defense of his person and rights, thereby justifying the
killing.

2. Whether or not aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation were present
in the killing.

3. Whether or not mitigating circumstances, specifically incomplete self-defense, voluntary

surrender, and passion and obfuscation, could reduce Narvaez’s criminal liability.

Ruling

1. Defense of Rights: The court recognized Narvaez's right to defend his property against unlawful
aggression under Article 429 of the Civil Code, which permits reasonable force to prevent invasion
or usurpation of property rights. However, the force he employed was deemed excessive.

2. Aggravating Circumstances: The court ruled that the killing lacked both treachery, as Narvaez
acted spontaneously without premeditated advantage, and evident premeditation, given the
absence of evidence for planned killing.
 3. Mitigating Circumstances: The court found that Narvaez acted with passion and obfuscation,
fueled by the immediate threat to his home and business. Furthermore, his voluntary surrender
and incomplete self-defense justified a reduction in the sentence.

Motive

Narvaez's actions were driven by frustration over an ongoing land dispute with Fleischer & Co., which
sought control over land Narvaez and other settlers had cultivated for decades. Fleischer’s threat to
dismantle Narvaez’s access to his home and livelihood exacerbated Narvaez's emotions, leading to his
reaction in defense of what he believed was his rightful property.

Rationale and Legal Basis

The Supreme Court recognized Article 429 of the Civil Code, allowing property owners to use force against
illegal intrusions, but ruled that Narvaez's actions exceeded reasonable resistance. Though there was
unlawful aggression from Fleischer and Rubia, as evidenced by the damage they inflicted on Narvaez's
property, Narvaez’s response—firing his shotgun—was disproportionate.

Narvaez’s claim of self-defense (Article 11, Revised Penal Code) did not meet all legal requirements,
particularly the necessity and proportionality of means used. However, incomplete self-defense (Article
13) was recognized because the victims were unlawfully aggressive, and Narvaez was not provoked.

The Court ruled the act as homicide rather than murder, downgrading the penalty due to mitigating
circumstances. Passion and obfuscation were acknowledged, arising from Narvaez’s sense of helplessness
at the encroachment upon his rights. His voluntary surrender further lessened his liability, consistent with
Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.

Evidence and Counterarguments

The prosecution’s assertion that Narvaez had no right to resist was weakened by evidence showing
Fleischer’s actions as excessive and unlawful, supported by Article 536 and Article 539 of the Civil Code,
which protect possessors against forced dispossession. Testimonies highlighted the physical intrusion upon
Narvaez’s property, validating his right to resistance, though the Court emphasized that this resistance
should have been proportionate.
 3. People v. Ulep, G.R. No. 132547, 20 September 2000

On December 22, 1995, Buenaventura Wapili went berserk in Kidapawan, Cotabato, prompting local police
intervention. SPO1 Ernesto Ulep fatally shot Wapili, claiming self-defense and performance of duty.
However, the trial court convicted Ulep of murder, a decision modified by the Supreme Court to homicide
due to mitigating circumstances, including incomplete justifying circumstance of duty fulfillment and
voluntary surrender. The court emphasized restraint and proper judgment for police officers, sentencing
Ulep to an indeterminate prison term of 4 years, 2 months, and 10 days to 6 years, 4 months, and 20 days.

Facts: In the early hours of December 22, 1995, Buenaventura Wapili, reportedly experiencing a high fever
and behaving irrationally, became violent and unmanageable in Kidapawan, Cotabato. His brother-in-law,
Dario Leydan, and neighbors tried to restrain him, unsuccessfully. Leydan sought police assistance,
resulting in the arrival of SPO1 Ernesto Ulep, SPO1 Edilberto Espadera, and SPO2 Crispin Pillo, all armed
and on duty. Despite Ulep’s warning shot and instructions to disarm, Wapili, allegedly wielding a rattan
stool (or possibly a bolo), continued approaching the officers, prompting Ulep to open fire. After Wapili
fell to the ground, Ulep fired an additional shot into his head, killing him.

Issues:

1. Whether or not SPO1 Ernesto Ulep acted in lawful self-defense.

2. Whether or not Ulep’s actions were justified as part of his official duties.

3. Whether or not mitigating circumstances apply, specifically incomplete justification of duty

performance and voluntary surrender.

Ruling:

1. Self-defense was not valid: The court ruled that self-defense was not applicable as Wapili no
longer posed a threat when Ulep shot him in the head.

2. Justifying circumstance of duty performance was incomplete: While Ulep acted in response to a
duty, the force used was excessive, especially when Wapili was incapacitated.

3. Mitigating circumstances recognized: Due to the incomplete justifying circumstance of duty

fulfillment and Ulep’s voluntary surrender, the conviction was reduced from murder to homicide.

Petitioner: People of the Philippines

Respondent: SPO1 Ernesto Ulep

Legal Basis:

• Article 11, Paragraph 5, Revised Penal Code - Duty Fulfillment.

• Article 69, Revised Penal Code - Reduction of penalty for incomplete justification.

• Article 249, Revised Penal Code - Penalty for homicide.

Analysis:
Motive and Rationale of the Ruling: Ulep’s intent was to contain a perceived danger to the public posed
by Wapili. However, his actions went beyond the required force, indicating an intent to neutralize rather
than subdue. The court recognized that police officers in high-stress scenarios must exercise judgment
aligned with lawful authority, but Ulep’s decision to shoot Wapili in the head, when he was already
incapacitated, was unnecessary and not a consequence of duty.

Evidence and Contradictions:

• Medical Findings: The post-mortem report by Dr. Roberto Omandac showed close-range shots,
including a fatal headshot fired while Wapili was on the ground, which was inconsistent with Ulep’s
claim of immediate threat.

• Witness Testimonies: Neighbors and Wapili’s family members stated that Wapili was unarmed,
which contradicted Ulep’s assertion that Wapili was wielding a bolo.

• Police Protocol and Restraint: The court highlighted that Ulep’s companions did not intervene or
assist, suggesting that Wapili’s aggression did not justify deadly force to such an extent.

Mitigating Circumstances: The court found that Ulep met only one requirement for justifiable duty under
Article 11, Paragraph 5, indicating that while he responded appropriately by arriving at the scene, his
ultimate use of force exceeded necessity. Article 69 allowed a reduced penalty due to the incomplete
justification.
 4. Guillermo v. People, G.R. No. 153287, 20 January 2009.

On July 21, 1996, a confrontation at a restaurant in Cuartero, Capiz, led to the death of Winnie Alon. An
altercation regarding wood cutting escalated between Winnie and Arnaldo Socias, during which Winnie
allegedly attacked Noel Guillermo, a bystander, with a beer bottle. In response, Noel stabbed Winnie
multiple times, resulting in his death. Noel claimed self-defense, but the lower courts ruled that his
response was excessive and convicted him of homicide with mitigating circumstances. The Supreme Court
upheld this decision, citing the lack of reasonable proportionality in Noel’s reaction and imposing a
sentence of six years to ten years of imprisonment.

Facts

• Date & Location: The incident occurred on July 21, 1996, around 5:40 PM, at a restaurant in
Cuartero, Capiz.

• Involved Parties: Petitioner Noel Guillermo and co-accused Arnaldo Socias and Joemar Palma
were drinking at the restaurant when Winnie Alon and his group arrived. An argument broke out
between Winnie and Arnaldo over woodcutting.

• Incident: The argument escalated, and Winnie allegedly hit Noel on the head with a beer bottle.
In response, Noel stabbed Winnie three times in the neck, chest, and abdomen. Winnie later
succumbed to his injuries.

• Witnesses: Prosecution witnesses Vicente Alon and Eddie Roque supported the claim that Noel
was initially attacked, while defense witnesses, including Noel and Baby Lou Felipe, recounted that
Noel was struck by Winnie with a beer bottle, prompting him to retaliate with a knife.

Issues

1. Whether or not Noel Guillermo acted in legitimate self-defense.

2. Whether or not Noel’s response constituted reasonable means to repel aggression, satisfying
the criteria for a complete justifying circumstance.

Ruling

The Supreme Court ruled against Noel Guillermo's claim of complete self-defense, affirming his
conviction for homicide with mitigating circumstances due to incomplete self-defense. The Court imposed
an indeterminate sentence of six years of prision correccional as minimum to ten years of prision mayor
as maximum, along with a payment of P50,000 as death indemnity and an additional P50,000 as moral
damages to Winnie’s heirs.

Legal Basis
 • Article 11(1) of the Revised Penal Code: Self-defense requires unlawful aggression, reasonable
necessity of the means to prevent or repel aggression, and lack of sufficient provocation.

• Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code: When self-defense is incomplete, a penalty lower by one or
two degrees may be imposed.

Mitigating Circumstances and Rationale

Noel's plea for self-defense was only partially accepted. The Court noted that while Winnie was the initial
aggressor, Noel's response—multiple stab wounds aimed at vital parts—was disproportionate. The
circumstances did not justify the use of deadly force with a knife against an attack with a bottle. Key
elements from the decision include:

1. Unlawful Aggression: Winnie initiated the confrontation by hitting Noel with a bottle, fulfilling the
first element for self-defense.

2. Lack of Provocation: Noel did not provoke the attack; rather, he attempted to mediate between
Arnaldo and Winnie.

3. Reasonable Means: The core issue lay in the proportionality of Noel's response. The Court found
that the lethal nature of the knife attack, particularly aimed at vital areas, was excessive compared
to the threat posed by a broken bottle.

Motive

The motive was not one of premeditation but a reactionary response to Winnie’s aggression. Noel claimed
he was defending himself against a perceived threat; however, the Court found his reaction unjustifiably
excessive for self-defense.

Evidentiary Analysis

• Physical Evidence: Noel sustained minor injuries from the bottle, and witnesses corroborated that
he had not been seriously harmed before using his knife.

• Disproportionate Response: The severity and locations of the stab wounds indicated intent to kill
rather than merely to neutralize the threat. This lack of proportionality precluded a complete self-
defense ruling.

• Credibility of Testimonies: The Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s assessment of witness
credibility and evidentiary weight, noting that the testimonies presented by Noel and his
companions lacked sufficient detail to substantiate his full self-defense claim.
 5. People v. Ural, L-30801, 27 March 1974, 56 SCRA 138

On the evening of July 31, 1966, Domingo Ural, a policeman on guard duty in Buug, Zamboanga del Sur,
was seen assaulting detainee Felix Napola, eventually setting him on fire. Witness Brigido Alberto testified
that he saw Ural physically attack Napola, pouring liquid over him and igniting it. Napola suffered severe
burns, leading to his death on August 25, 1966. Ural claimed he was merely helping extinguish the flames,
yet the trial court deemed the testimony against him credible. The court convicted Ural of murder, finding
his actions to be intentional and his subsequent assistance insufficient to mitigate the crime. However, it
acknowledged that Ural had no intention to commit a fatal act, and thus recognized mitigating
circumstances in sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. The decision was affirmed upon appeal.

Facts:

On July 31, 1966, Policeman Domingo Ural, assigned to guard duty at the municipal building of Buug,
encountered detainee Felix Napola. Brigido Alberto, an eyewitness, recounted seeing Ural physically
assault Napola in his cell, then pour liquid on him and set him ablaze, causing severe burns. Napola
screamed in pain but received no immediate help. Eventually, Ural and other witnesses claimed to have
removed Napola's burning shirt. Napola later died on August 25, 1966, from complications associated with
his burns.

Issue:

Whether or not Domingo Ural should be held liable for the murder of Felix Napola, considering the
mitigating circumstance that he allegedly lacked intent to kill.

Ruling:

The court ruled that Ural was guilty of murder by means of fire, per Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
but acknowledged mitigating circumstances. His lack of intent to cause death, reflected in his partial efforts
to assist after realizing the gravity of his actions, led to the imposition of reclusion perpetua, the medium
penalty for murder.

Analysis:

1. Motive and Circumstances: The motive behind Ural's actions was inferred as punitive and abusive.
Witness Alberto described Ural as inflicting violence upon Napola, who was defenseless and in
Ural's custody, suggesting a misuse of authority rather than a planned homicide. Although
intoxicated and potentially acting out of frustration with Napola's conduct, Ural demonstrated
disregard for the detainee's life. His actions of stepping on Napola and setting him on fire, though
intended as torment, resulted fatally.

2. Legal Basis and Evidence: The court's decision was rooted in Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code,
which mandates that criminal liability arises from any voluntary act with foreseeable harmful
 consequences, even if the specific outcome was unintended. Despite Ural’s claims of merely
assisting Napola, the court deemed Alberto's eyewitness account, corroborated by the severity of
Napola’s injuries and subsequent death, more credible. This was reinforced by medical evidence
that without immediate and adequate treatment, Napola’s burns were indeed fatal.

Supporting Jurisprudence: The doctrine “he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused”
applied, holding Ural accountable for initiating the events that directly led to Napola’s death, despite his
later assistance. Similar to U.S. vs. Escalona, the court held Ural responsible for Napola’s death despite any
inadequate medical intervention, as the original harm was attributable solely to Ural’s actions.

3. Mitigating Circumstance and Rationale: The court acknowledged that Ural’s original intent did
not likely extend to homicide but to physical maltreatment, a conclusion reinforced by his attempt
to help after realizing the severity of Napola's burns. Article 13(3) of the Revised Penal Code,
stating that an offender’s lack of intent to inflict so grave a harm serves as a mitigating factor, was
applied. This acknowledgment reduced the harshness of the penalty from capital punishment to
reclusion perpetua.
 6. People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 139542, 21 June 2001, 359 SCRA 352

On October 31, 1998, a near vehicular collision between Noel Andres and Inocencio Gonzalez, Jr. at Loyola
Memorial Park led to an altercation that culminated in Gonzalez accidentally discharging a firearm, which
resulted in the death of Andres's pregnant wife, Feliber Andres, and injuries to two children, Kenneth
Andres and Kevin Valdez. The trial court convicted Gonzalez of murder, frustrated murder, and attempted
murder, finding that the shooting was attended by treachery. However, upon review, the Supreme Court
found the mitigating circumstances and ruled that Gonzalez was instead guilty of homicide for Feliber’s
death and slight physical injuries for the children’s wounds. Gonzalez’s sentence was modified accordingly.

Facts:

On October 31, 1998, around 2:30 p.m., Noel Andres and Inocencio Gonzalez, Jr. were exiting Loyola
Memorial Park when their vehicles nearly collided. Gonzalez continued driving, while Andres, frustrated,
overtook and blocked Gonzalez’s path, subsequently confronting him. The incident escalated with
Gonzalez’s son, Dino, joining the confrontation. During the argument, Gonzalez, feeling that Dino was
threatened, retrieved a gun from his car. The gun discharged, allegedly accidentally, striking Feliber Andres,
who was in the vehicle along with her son and nephew. Feliber later died on November 1, 1998. Gonzalez
claimed the shooting was unintentional, attributing it to an accidental discharge during a struggle with his
daughter Trisha.

Issues:

1. Whether or not treachery attended the shooting.

2. Whether or not mitigating circumstances should be applied in favor of Gonzalez.

3. Whether or not the crime committed was murder or homicide, given the circumstances.

Ruling:

1. Treachery: The Court ruled that treachery did not attend the shooting, as the incident occurred
impulsively, amidst a heated altercation, and Gonzalez did not deliberately adopt a mode of attack
that would eliminate the risk of retaliation.

2. Mitigating Circumstances: The Court found that mitigating circumstances, such as provocation
and obfuscation, were not sufficient to justify Gonzalez’s claim. However, Gonzalez’s lack of intent
to kill, as shown by his firing angle and the unintended victims, was acknowledged.

3. Liability: The Court modified the charges, holding Gonzalez liable for homicide for Feliber’s death
and slight physical injuries for the wounds sustained by the children. The penalties and financial
liabilities were accordingly adjusted.
Legal Basis:

1. Treachery (Article 14, par. 16, Revised Penal Code): The ruling emphasized that treachery requires
a deliberate and premeditated plan to ensure the execution of a crime without risk of retaliation,
which was absent in this impulsive altercation.

2. Complex Crimes (Article 48, Revised Penal Code): Since the incident involved a single act with
both grave and light felonies, complex crime provisions did not apply.

3. Mitigating Circumstances (Articles 13 and 15, Revised Penal Code): Although Gonzalez argued for
mitigating factors like lack of intent and obfuscation, these were found unsupported.

Motive and Rationale of the Ruling:

Gonzalez’s actions were driven by a perceived threat to his son, Dino, arising from the escalating argument
with Noel Andres. However, the Court noted that the shooting was not aimed directly at anyone inside the
vehicle, demonstrating a lack of intent to kill specific individuals. This unintended consequence and the
lack of premeditated attack led to the modification of the charge from murder to homicide.

The Court assessed the evidence carefully, examining ballistic trajectories, witness testimonies, and the
lack of visible targets through the vehicle’s tinted windows. The defense effectively argued that Gonzalez’s
impulsive firing did not constitute treachery, as it was reactionary rather than a calculated attack.

Disposition:

The Supreme Court found Gonzalez guilty of homicide, sentencing him to 8 years and 1 day to 14 years 8
months for Feliber Andres’s death, with additional penalties for slight physical injuries inflicted on Kenneth
and Kevin. The civil awards for actual damages, loss of earning capacity, and moral damages were upheld
as reasonable.
 7. People v. Pagal, L-32040, 25 October 1977, 79 SCRA 570

On December 26, 1969, in Manila, accused Pedro Pagal y Marcelino and Jose Torcelino y Torazo conspired
to commit robbery against their employer, Gau Guan, resulting in his death. The accused, after assaulting
Gau Guan with an icepick and an iron pipe, fatally injured him and took P1,281.00 in cash. The defendants
initially pleaded guilty with a request to present mitigating circumstances, namely, sufficient provocation
by the victim and acting under passion and obfuscation. The trial court sentenced them to death,
recognizing the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and evident premeditation, offset only by their
guilty plea. However, the Supreme Court modified the sentence to reclusion perpetua, ruling that only
nighttime was an applicable aggravating factor, counterbalanced by the mitigating plea.

Facts:
On December 26, 1969, Pedro Pagal y Marcelino and Jose Torcelino y Torazo, who were employed by the
victim Gau Guan, conspired to rob him. During the robbery, they demanded that Gau Guan open a "kaha
de yero" (safe) to access the cash. When he resisted, they attacked him with an icepick and iron pipe,
inflicting fatal wounds. Subsequently, they stole P1,281.00 from him. The crime was committed at night,
allegedly planned to optimize their criminal objective.

Upon arraignment, the defendants pleaded guilty but sought to introduce evidence of mitigating
circumstances, claiming they acted due to Gau Guan's provocation and in a state of intense emotional
distress.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation and passion or obfuscation
should be recognized in favor of the defendants.

2. Whether or not the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, nighttime, and

disrespect towards the victim were validly applied.

3. Whether or not the accused's guilty plea should influence sentencing.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that only nighttime could be considered as an aggravating circumstance, as it
was deliberately chosen to facilitate the crime. Evident premeditation was inapplicable since the
defendants had initially only planned to rob, and the homicide occurred as an unforeseen response to the
victim’s resistance. Disregard for the victim’s age and rank was also irrelevant since robbery with homicide
is primarily a property crime. The mitigating plea of guilty was acknowledged, reducing the penalty from
death to reclusion perpetua.
Legal Basis:

The Court cited Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, under which, if a mitigating circumstance offsets an
aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty should apply. Additionally, the Court referenced
jurisprudence on aggravating circumstances, such as People vs. Daos, and standards for considering
sufficient provocation and passion or obfuscation as mitigating factors.

Motive and Rationale of the Ruling:

The defendants contended that Gau Guan’s alleged provocation and mistreatment incited their actions,
motivating them to retaliate. However, the Court reasoned that any prior maltreatment by Gau Guan
lacked the immediacy required for the mitigating factor of sufficient provocation. Additionally, as the crime
was premeditated for theft, it could not benefit from the passion or obfuscation defense, which does not
apply when an act is planned with deliberate purpose.

The plea of guilty was accepted as a mitigating factor, reflecting an admission of guilt and acknowledgment
of the crime's circumstances, but did not excuse the underlying violence. Evidence presented included
statements made by the defendants during police investigations, confirming conspiracy and intent to rob,
not kill, prior to Gau Guan's resistance.

Conclusion:
The trial court’s decision was modified, sentencing each defendant to reclusion perpetua due to the
balance of mitigating and aggravating circumstances. The Supreme Court emphasized the absence of
sufficient provocation and disallowed additional aggravating circumstances beyond nighttime. The case
highlights the need for immediate connection between provocation and reaction for mitigating
circumstances and underscores that robbery with homicide prioritizes the property crime element, with
homicide secondary to the primary intent to rob.
 8. Urbano v. People, G.R. No. 182750, 20 January 2009

On September 28, 1993, an altercation occurred between Rodel Urbano, the petitioner, and Brigido
Tomelden, which resulted in Tomelden sustaining a blow that led to his eventual death. The primary issue
in this case is whether Urbano’s action constituted homicide and, if so, whether mitigating circumstances
should reduce his sentence. The trial court and the Court of Appeals convicted Urbano of homicide,
rejecting his contention that Tomelden's pre-existing hypertension contributed significantly to his death.
However, the Supreme Court ruled that mitigating circumstances—such as sufficient provocation by the
victim and Urbano's lack of intent to cause such grave harm—warranted a reduction in Urbano’s sentence.

Facts:
On the evening of September 28, 1993, in Barangay Poblacion, Lingayen, Pangasinan, Rodel Urbano and
his coworker, Brigido Tomelden, engaged in a heated exchange at the Lingayen Water District (LIWAD)
compound after returning from a picnic. During this confrontation, Tomelden made insulting remarks that
led Urbano to retaliate, landing a “lucky punch” on Tomelden’s face, which rendered him unconscious.
Tomelden, despite receiving medical treatment, continued to experience severe headaches and pain,
ultimately leading to his death on October 10, 1993. The autopsy report identified "cardio-respiratory
arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with resultant cerebral hemorrhage" as the cause of death.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Urbano’s punch was the proximate cause of Tomelden’s death, establishing his
criminal liability for homicide.

2. Whether or not mitigating circumstances, specifically sufficient provocation and lack of intent to
commit so grave a wrong, should reduce Urbano’s sentence.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court, presided by Justice VELASCO, JR., upheld Urbano's conviction for homicide but
modified his sentence. Recognizing two mitigating circumstances—sufficient provocation by the victim
and Urbano’s lack of intent to commit a grave offense—the Court reduced Urbano’s prison term to two
years and four months of prision correccional as the minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor
as the maximum. The civil indemnity and moral damages awarded to the heirs of the victim were affirmed.

Legal Basis:

1. Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code—Defines homicide and sets the penalty.

2. Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code—Establishes mitigating circumstances, particularly:

o Paragraph 3 (No intention to commit so grave a wrong) and

o Paragraph 4 (Sufficient provocation by the victim immediately preceding the act).

3. Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code—Applies when there are mitigating circumstances but no
aggravating circumstances, allowing the penalty to be reduced.
 4. Indeterminate Sentence Law—Used to determine the minimum and maximum terms of Urbano's
sentence.

Motive and Rationale:

The altercation stemmed from Tomelden’s insulting remarks towards Urbano. Evidence indicated that
Tomelden repeatedly provoked Urbano, even challenging him to a fight, which led Urbano to retaliate with
a single punch. Urbano, significantly smaller than Tomelden, had tried to avoid confrontation but felt
compelled to defend himself against Tomelden's aggression. The “lucky punch” inadvertently caused fatal
injuries, although Urbano did not intend to kill Tomelden.

Rationale and Evidence:

The Court determined that the evidence presented by eyewitness Orje Salazar, who witnessed Tomelden
provoking and challenging Urbano, and the autopsy findings by Dr. Daisy Arellano were sufficient to
establish the proximate cause of death as the punch delivered by Urbano. The Court found no indications
that Tomelden’s pre-existing hypertension was the direct cause of death, countering Urbano’s defense that
the hypertension was significant. The autopsy report and medical testimonies aligned with the timeline,
showing that the injury sustained from Urbano’s punch was indeed the proximate cause of death.

Mitigating Circumstances:

1. Sufficient Provocation: Tomelden’s insulting and aggressive behavior immediately prior to the
incident met the conditions of “sufficient provocation” as stipulated under Article 13, Paragraph 4
of the Revised Penal Code.

2. Lack of Intent to Commit So Grave a Wrong: Urbano’s behavior after the incident, including his
actions to aid Tomelden, suggested no intention to cause grave harm, reinforcing that the
unfortunate outcome was unintended.
 9. People v. Benito, L-32042, 13 February 1975, 74 SCRA 271

On December 12, 1969, Alberto Benito y Restubog shot and killed Pedro Moncayo, Jr. in Manila, motivated
by perceived insults and ongoing administrative conflicts. The case primarily addressed whether Benito
was entitled to mitigating circumstances, specifically for his plea of guilty, voluntary surrender, and alleged
provocation. While the Court recognized Benito’s voluntary surrender and guilty plea as mitigating factors,
it rejected claims that the victim’s remarks qualified as immediate provocation, which could further
mitigate the crime. The Court ultimately modified the original death sentence to reclusion perpetua due
to the balance of mitigating and aggravating factors.

Facts:

• On December 12, 1969, at approximately 5:30 p.m., Alberto Benito y Restubog shot Pedro
Moncayo, Jr., the Assistant Chief of Personnel Transaction at the Civil Service Commission, while
Moncayo was driving near the intersection of P. Paredes and Lepanto Streets in Manila. Benito
fired eight shots with a .22 caliber revolver, resulting in Moncayo’s death.

• Earlier that day, around 11:00 a.m., Moncayo allegedly made a derogatory remark suggesting that
the Civil Service Commission was "a hangout of thieves." Benito, who was facing administrative
charges involving dishonesty, perceived this comment as an insult directed at him.

• Benito initially pled not guilty but later, with the assistance of his counsel, changed his plea to
guilty, while intending to present evidence of mitigating circumstances. He was sentenced to death
by the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Benito’s plea of guilty and voluntary surrender should be considered as mitigating
circumstances.

2. Whether or not the alleged provocation by Moncayo’s remarks constituted immediate vindication
of a grave offense, justifying a mitigating circumstance.

Ruling:

1. Plea of Guilty and Voluntary Surrender

o The Court recognized Benito’s plea of guilty and voluntary surrender as mitigating
circumstances, in accordance with Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code. Benito’s actions
following the crime, particularly his call to the police and subsequent confession, indicated
his voluntary surrender.

2. Immediate Vindication of a Grave Offense

 o The Court rejected Benito’s claim that Moncayo’s alleged insult constituted immediate
vindication of a grave offense. The Court found that Moncayo’s remarks were general and
did not directly accuse Benito of theft. Additionally, there was a time gap of several hours
between the remark and the murder, undermining any argument for immediate
provocation. Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, which governs mitigating
circumstances, requires that provocation be both sufficient and proximate, neither of
which applied here.

The Court, therefore, upheld Benito’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt but reduced his sentence from death
to reclusion perpetua, recognizing the mitigating circumstances of his guilty plea and voluntary surrender
but finding no basis for further mitigation under immediate vindication.

Legal Basis and Rationale:

• Mitigating Circumstances (Article 13, Revised Penal Code): Benito was credited with the
mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and plea of guilty under Article 13(7) and (10),
respectively. His actions post-crime, particularly his interaction with the police and willingness to
confess, supported these considerations.

• Immediate Vindication of a Grave Offense (Article 13[5], Revised Penal Code): The Court clarified
that for provocation to qualify as a mitigating factor, it must be both sufficient and immediate.
Moncayo’s alleged statement at 11:00 a.m. was general, non-specific to Benito, and did not
constitute sufficient provocation for Benito’s retaliatory action later that afternoon. The Court also
noted that the time lapse between the statement and the murder indicated premeditation rather
than a spontaneous response to provocation.

The ruling underscored that while Benito’s motives may have stemmed from personal grievances, the
alleged insult lacked the immediacy and severity required to justify an immediate retaliatory action as a
mitigating circumstance. Thus, his actions reflected premeditated retaliation rather than an impulsive
response to grave offense.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court modified the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua due to the balance of
mitigating and aggravating circumstances. Benito’s voluntary surrender and plea of guilty were recognized
as mitigating, but the Court found no merit in his claim of provocation as an additional mitigating
circumstance. The decision serves as a precedent for the careful consideration required in evaluating
alleged provocation in claims of mitigating circumstances.

Motive Explanation:

The motive behind Alberto Benito y Restubog’s actions stemmed from a perceived insult and ongoing
personal grievances against the victim, Pedro Moncayo, Jr., related to Benito’s administrative troubles.
Benito, a former employee of the Civil Service Commission, had been dismissed following accusations
related to dishonesty and integrity, charges he attributed to Moncayo’s influence. On the morning of the
murder, Moncayo allegedly made a remark that the Civil Service Commission was "a hangout of thieves,"
which Benito took as a direct insult, believing it was aimed at him personally. This perception, combined
with Benito’s joblessness and strained reputation, fueled his anger and sense of grievance toward
Moncayo, ultimately leading him to retaliate by taking Moncayo’s life later that day.

Rationale of the Ruling:

The Supreme Court’s ruling focused on determining whether Benito’s actions warranted mitigating
circumstances beyond his guilty plea and voluntary surrender, specifically considering whether the alleged
provocation could be classified as “immediate vindication of a grave offense.” The Court rejected this
claim, concluding that Benito’s response was not immediate enough to justify his argument and reflected
premeditation instead.

1. Rejection of Immediate Vindication Claim:

o The Court examined Benito’s assertion that Moncayo’s remark was a "grave offense" that
provoked him to act in defense of his honor. However, the evidence indicated that
Moncayo’s statement was general and did not directly accuse Benito. Since the remark
was made hours before the murder, Benito had ample time to calm down and reflect,
rather than immediately retaliating.

o Evidence from the Case: The Court cited the timeline: Moncayo made the remark around
11:00 a.m. on December 12, 1969, but Benito only acted at approximately 5:30 p.m. the
same day. This delay showed that Benito’s actions were deliberate, undermining the claim
that he was driven by an overwhelming and immediate response to an insult.

o Legal Basis: Under Article 13(5) of the Revised Penal Code, for provocation to be a
mitigating factor, it must be both “sufficient” and “immediate.” Here, the time lapse
indicated that Benito’s actions were not an impulsive reaction to grave provocation but
rather the result of planned retaliation.

2. Recognition of Mitigating Circumstances of Plea of Guilty and Voluntary Surrender:

o The Court acknowledged Benito’s plea of guilty and voluntary surrender as mitigating
circumstances, which contributed to the decision to reduce his sentence.

o Evidence from the Case: After committing the crime, Benito called the police to the scene
and later admitted his role in Moncayo’s death, a clear indication of voluntary surrender.
His decision to plead guilty at trial was also seen as an acceptance of responsibility.

o Legal Basis: Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code outlines that both a plea of guilty (Art.
13[10]) and voluntary surrender (Art. 13[7]) are recognized as mitigating factors, justifying
the Court’s decision to consider these circumstances in his favor.

3. Consideration of Aggravating Circumstances:

 o Despite the mitigating factors, the Court found aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and disregard of rank, which ultimately offset the mitigating
circumstances, warranting a severe penalty.

o Evidence from the Case: Benito’s actions, including following Moncayo in his vehicle and
shooting him without warning, showed planning and calculation. The Court cited his “all-
consuming hatred” and the sequence of events leading up to the murder, indicating that
the murder was not a result of sudden provocation but a deliberate act to “take the law
into his own hands.” Additionally, although Benito was dismissed from the Civil Service,
he still regarded Moncayo as a superior, thereby showing disregard for Moncayo’s rank.

o Legal Basis: Under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, evident premeditation (Art.
14[13]) and disregard of rank (Art. 14[3]) qualify as aggravating factors, which, when
proven, can enhance the severity of a penalty.

Counter-Argument Analysis:

Benito’s primary argument was that he acted under immediate provocation due to Moncayo’s alleged
insult, which he interpreted as a personal attack. However, the Court determined that this claim lacked
immediacy and adequacy, as the insult was neither directly aimed at Benito nor severe enough to provoke
an immediate and unthinking reaction. The Court highlighted the time lapse and Benito’s behavior post-
incident as evidence that his response was calculated, not spontaneous. The evidence presented by Benito
did not satisfy the criteria under the Revised Penal Code for immediate vindication of a grave offense, as
the offense was generalized, and Benito had sufficient time to calm down after the alleged provocation.
 10. Bacabac v. People, G.R. No. 149372, 11 September 2007

On December 23, 1990, in San Joaquin, Iloilo City, a conflict erupted between two groups, ultimately
leading to a violent encounter where Hernani Quidato and Eduardo Selibio were fatally shot by armed
individuals, including police officer Ricardo Bacabac, who allegedly conspired with his co-accused. The
petitioner, Bacabac, contested his conviction, arguing that he only fired a warning shot and did not
conspire in the killing. The court found that Bacabac’s actions—arming himself and firing his weapon
amidst his associates’ aggressive assault—constituted moral support and confirmed conspiracy. The Court
ruled that mitigating circumstances, including "immediate vindication of a grave offense," were not
applicable as the initial assault on Edzel Talanquines, a minor injury, did not justify Bacabac's fatal
involvement. The Supreme Court dismissed Bacabac’s appeal, affirming the lower court's decision that
found him guilty of murder, with the aggravating factor of treachery.

Facts:
On December 23, 1990, Hernani Quidato, Eduardo Selibio, and Melchor Selibio left a dance hall in Purok
4, San Joaquin, Iloilo City. They encountered Jonathan Bacabac and Edzel Talanquines, which led to a
misunderstanding and a physical altercation. Edzel and Jonathan subsequently reported the incident to
Edzel’s father, Councilor Jose Talanquines Jr., who, along with police officer Ricardo Bacabac (petitioner)
and others, armed themselves and awaited Quidato and his companions.

Upon confrontation, Bacabac fired his armalite rifle into the air, while Jose Talanquines opened fire on the
group, resulting in the deaths of Quidato and Eduardo. Subsequently, murder charges were filed against
Bacabac, Jose Talanquines, Edzel Talanquines, Jonathan Bacabac, and Jesus Delfin Rosadio.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Ricardo Bacabac was in conspiracy with his co-accused in committing murder.

2. Whether or not treachery was present in the killing of the victims.

3. Whether or not Bacabac was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of "immediate vindication of
a grave offense."

Ruling:

1. Conspiracy: The Court held that Bacabac was part of a conspiracy, as he armed himself, fired his
weapon in support of the group's actions, and did not intervene during the attack, thereby lending
moral assistance.

2. Treachery: Treachery was established due to the sudden and coordinated assault with high-
powered weapons, preventing the victims from defending themselves.
 3. Mitigating Circumstances: The Court ruled that "immediate vindication of a grave offense" did not
apply as Edzel’s initial injury (a blow to the ear) was not grave enough, and Edzel was only
Bacabac’s nephew, not a close enough relation under Article 13, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal
Code.

Legal Basis:

The Court cited Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code to establish treachery, noting that the
method of attack made it impossible for the victims to retaliate or defend themselves. Furthermore, Article
13, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code was applied to assess mitigating circumstances, which
ultimately did not apply due to the nature of the offense and Bacabac’s relationship to Edzel.

Motive:
The motive for the attack was a desire for retribution after the initial physical confrontation involving
Bacabac’s nephew, Edzel Talanquines, and Jonathan Bacabac. This retaliatory intent was considered
insufficient for "immediate vindication" as a mitigating circumstance, as the act of retaliation involved
unnecessary and fatal violence disproportionate to the original slight injury Edzel suffered.
 11. US v. Hicks, G.R. No. 4971, 23 September 1909, 14 Phil. 217

In The United States vs. Augustus Hicks (G.R. No. 4971, September 23, 1909), Augustus Hicks, an Afro-
American man, was accused of the premeditated murder of his former mistress, Agustina Sola, a Christian
Moro woman, after she ended their relationship and began living with Wallace Current, a corporal in the
U.S. Army. On the evening of December 21, 1907, Hicks went to confront Agustina and her new partner at
her residence in Parang, Cotabato. The confrontation escalated, and Hicks, in a calculated act, shot
Agustina with a .45-caliber revolver, causing her death shortly thereafter. The Court, presided by Justice
Torres, affirmed the judgment of the lower court, finding Hicks guilty of murder with the aggravating
circumstances of treachery, premeditation, and the fact that the crime occurred in the victim’s dwelling.
The ruling emphasized the absence of mitigating circumstances, particularly rejecting Hicks's claim of
uncontrollable jealousy. The Supreme Court upheld the death penalty as a fitting punishment for the crime
committed under these circumstances.

Facts

• Relationship History: Augustus Hicks and Agustina Sola lived together illicitly from September
1902 until November 1907, when Agustina left him and began a relationship with Wallace Current,
a U.S. Army corporal.

• Incident Date: On December 21, 1907, at around 7:30 p.m., Hicks went to Agustina's residence
accompanied by a soldier named Lloyd Nickens. After a brief conversation with Agustina in the
Moro dialect, Hicks addressed Current, expressing his displeasure at their relationship.

• Confrontation and Shooting: Hicks questioned Current's relationship with Agustina. As Hicks
reached for his revolver, Current attempted to intervene, but Hicks resisted and fired, fatally
shooting Agustina in the chest. She succumbed to her injuries shortly afterward.

• Aftermath: Edward Robinson, present in the house, disarmed Hicks after a struggle. Hicks fled and
voluntarily surrendered to the chief of police, H. L. Martin, requesting to be imprisoned. Evidence
showed that he had prepared for the encounter, with several loaded cartridges and a cleaned
revolver at his disposal.

Issues

• Whether or not the killing of Agustina Sola by Augustus Hicks constituted murder with the
aggravating circumstances of treachery, premeditation, and commission in the victim's dwelling.

• Whether or not Hicks’s defense of loss of control due to jealousy qualifies as a mitigating
circumstance under the law.

Ruling
The Court found Augustus Hicks guilty of murder, qualifying the crime as aggravated by treachery,
premeditation, and commission within the victim's residence, without any mitigating circumstances. The
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision and imposed the death penalty, finding no basis to
consider Hicks’s jealousy as a mitigating factor under Article 9, paragraph 7 of the Penal Code.

Legal Basis

• Article 403, Penal Code: Defines and punishes the crime of murder.

• Qualifying Circumstance: Treachery (alevosia) was established as Hicks attacked the unarmed and
unsuspecting Agustina at close range, preventing any chance of her escape.

• Aggravating Circumstances: Premeditation (proven by Hicks’s statements and preparations before

the crime) and the commission of the crime in the dwelling of the victim.

• Mitigating Circumstance: The Court rejected Hicks's plea of loss of reason due to jealousy, as
jealousy arising from "vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions" does not mitigate criminal
responsibility under Article 9 of the Penal Code.

Petitioner and Respondent

• Petitioner: The United States

• Respondent: Augustus Hicks

Motive

Hicks’s motive stemmed from jealousy and possessiveness over Agustina Sola, who had left him for
another man. His statement to a witness that "her time had come" and his wish to see her dead rather
than in another man’s arms revealed his intent to reclaim control over her, albeit through a fatal act.

Rationale of the Ruling

Justice Torres upheld the conviction based on substantial evidence of Hicks's deliberate intent to kill
Agustina, underpinned by witness testimonies and physical evidence. The court found that Hicks
meticulously planned the crime, demonstrated by:

• Witness Testimonies: Witnesses Charles Gatchery and Eugenio R. Whited testified that Hicks
exhibited disturbed behavior on the day of the incident, explicitly stating his intention to kill
Agustina. He openly expressed a desire to see her dead rather than with another man.
• Preparation for the Crime: Evidence showed that Hicks had readied his revolver and carried
additional loaded cartridges, signifying a premeditated plan to ensure the successful execution of
his act.

• Rejection of Accidental Claim: Hicks’s claim that the shooting was accidental was dismissed due
to contradictions in the testimonies of witnesses who confirmed that Hicks aimed deliberately at
Agustina. Robinson’s intervention to disarm Hicks further corroborated the intentional nature of
the act.

• Disguised Approach: Hicks’s courteous behavior upon arrival and his calm engagement with
Agustina concealed his violent intentions, adding to the element of treachery.
 12. US v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 7094, 29 March 1912, 22 Phil. 429

On March 29, 1912, the Supreme Court of the Philippines ruled on the case of United States vs. Hilario de
la Cruz, focusing on whether mitigating circumstances were present in the defendant’s commission of
homicide. Hilario de la Cruz was convicted for the homicide of his lover, whom he discovered in the act of
infidelity with another man. The lower court sentenced him to fourteen years, eight months, and one day
of reclusion temporal, finding neither aggravating nor extenuating circumstances. However, Justice
Carson, presiding, ruled that the act was committed under the influence of "passion and obfuscation," a
mitigating circumstance under Article 9, subsection 7 of the Penal Code. Consequently, the penalty was
reduced to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal.

Facts:

Hilario de la Cruz, the defendant, was in a relationship with the deceased, whom he regarded as his querida
(lover). On discovering her engaged in intimate relations with a mutual acquaintance, he reacted violently,
leading to her death. The trial court convicted de la Cruz of homicide and imposed a penalty of fourteen
years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal, with no consideration of either aggravating or
mitigating circumstances. De la Cruz appealed, arguing that his actions were driven by an uncontrollable
impulse of passion and rage upon discovering his lover’s betrayal.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Hilario de la Cruz's actions should be mitigated by the extenuating circumstance
of "passion and obfuscation" under Article 9, subsection 7 of the Penal Code.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the extenuating circumstance of "passion and obfuscation" was applicable.
The penalty was modified to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal. The lower court's judgment
was affirmed with the modified sentence.

Legal Basis:

The legal basis for the decision lies in Article 9, subsection 7 of the Penal Code, which recognizes "passion
and obfuscation" as mitigating circumstances when a defendant acts on an overwhelming impulse that
temporarily clouds judgment.

Motive and Mitigating Circumstance:

The motive behind de la Cruz's actions was his sudden discovery of his lover’s infidelity. This unexpected
and emotionally charged revelation incited a powerful reaction fueled by betrayal, leading him to act in a
moment of intense passion and emotional disarray. Under these circumstances, the court recognized
"passion and obfuscation" as natural human reactions that temporarily impair a person's self-control,
meriting the consideration of a mitigating factor.

Rationale and Evidence Analysis:

Justice Carson distinguished this case from United States vs. Hicks, where mitigating circumstances were
denied due to the premeditated nature of the act. Unlike Hicks, where the crime was premeditated and
based on unworthy motives, de la Cruz's actions were impulsive, spurred by a sudden emotional shock
rather than deliberate intent. In the Hicks case, the defendant had acted from a place of planned
vengeance, which did not qualify for leniency.

Justice Carson referenced a precedent from the Spanish Supreme Court, which similarly acknowledged
"violent passion and obfuscation" as mitigating when a man acted impulsively after discovering his
partner’s infidelity. The court held that the circumstances in de la Cruz’s case were sufficient to produce
an overpowering emotional response that the law deems excusable to a limited extent, reducing the
punishment accordingly.

This recognition of passion and obfuscation as a mitigating factor aligned with legal precedent and
underscored the difference between premeditated vengeance and impulsive reaction, leading the court
to reduce de la Cruz’s sentence.
 13. People v. Gelaver, G.R. No. 95357, 9 June 1993, 223 SCRA 310

In People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Gelaver, G.R. No. 95357, dated June 9, 1993, the Supreme Court
upheld the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Surallah, South Cotabato, convicting Eduardo
Gelaver of parricide for the killing of his wife, Victoria Pacinabao. The appellant argued that he acted under
mitigating circumstances due to passion and obfuscation upon allegedly witnessing his wife in an intimate
act with a paramour. However, the Court found inconsistencies in Gelaver’s testimony and ruled that the
mitigating circumstance did not apply. Consequently, he was sentenced to reclusion perpetua, and the
indemnity for the heirs of the victim was increased to P50,000.00. Justice Quiason presided over the case.

Facts
On March 24, 1988, Eduardo Gelaver, armed with a knife, attacked and fatally stabbed his wife, Victoria
Pacinabao, following an alleged confrontation. Randy Mamon, a witness, reported seeing the couple
arguing, with Gelaver subsequently stabbing Victoria multiple times. Gelaver admitted to the killing but
claimed that he was provoked upon catching his wife with her paramour in an intimate act. He argued that
his actions were driven by intense emotional distress (obfuscation), which he claimed should reduce his
liability.

Gelaver further asserted that his daughter informed him of his wife’s location the day before the incident,
and upon discovering his wife with another man, an altercation ensued, resulting in Victoria’s death.
Despite his claim, the prosecution highlighted contradictions in his narrative, and the trial court noted that
his actions did not align with his defense.

Issues

1. Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation applies, given Gelaver’s
claim of witnessing his wife’s infidelity.

2. Whether or not Gelaver is entitled to a lesser penalty under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code,
which provides for exceptional circumstances in cases of spousal infidelity.

Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Eduardo Gelaver for parricide, ruling that the mitigating
circumstance of passion and obfuscation did not apply due to insufficient evidence supporting his claims
of infidelity and inconsistency in his testimony.

Legal Basis

The Court examined the applicability of Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code, which reduces the penalty
in cases where a spouse kills the other upon discovering them in an adulterous act. To qualify, the
defendant must have caught the spouse in the act of sexual intercourse, and the killing must occur
immediately after. The Court also considered Article 13, which outlines mitigating circumstances, such as
passion or obfuscation, but requires clear evidence of provocation and immediacy of the act.

Motive
Gelaver alleged that the motive behind his actions stemmed from the emotional turmoil upon witnessing
his wife’s infidelity. However, this claim was undermined by inconsistencies, such as his failure to report
the purported infidelity to the authorities and contradictory statements regarding the details of the
incident.

Rationale of the Ruling

The Supreme Court found Gelaver’s claim unconvincing due to multiple inconsistencies in his statements.
For instance, he failed to report to the police that the killing was provoked by witnessing his wife's alleged
infidelity, which the Court noted as unusual behavior for someone claiming to act under intense emotional
disturbance. Additionally, the prosecution pointed out that if the paramour had indeed been present,
there would have been a commotion, possibly with a naked man fleeing, which was not evidenced. His
daughter, Sheryl, also contradicted his claim by testifying that she had no knowledge of her mother’s
alleged infidelity or location.

The Court ruled that the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation did not apply because the
alleged provocation (the victim’s abandonment) occurred a year before the killing, which allowed sufficient
time for Gelaver to recover from any initial emotional disturbance. Citing People v. Abarca, the Court noted
that for obfuscation to apply, the provocation must be immediate to the crime. Gelaver’s lengthy period
of inaction contradicted the immediacy required for this mitigating factor.

Finally, the trial court correctly recognized the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, as Gelaver
submitted himself to authorities immediately after the killing. This factor, however, did not significantly
alter his penalty, which remained reclusion perpetua due to the failure to establish exceptional
circumstances.

Disposition
The judgment of the trial court was affirmed, with the indemnity increased to P50,000.00.
 14. People v. Bello, L-18792, 28 February 1964

In the case of The People of the Philippines vs. Guillermo Bello, the Supreme Court addressed the question
of mitigating circumstances in determining the penalty for the crime of homicide committed by Guillermo
Bello. The primary issue revolved around whether the crime should be qualified by aggravating or
mitigating factors, specifically, if Bello was entitled to the mitigating circumstances of passion and
obfuscation. Bello, motivated by jealousy and emotional turmoil upon discovering his common-law wife,
Alicia Cervantes, working as a hostess and engaging in potentially compromising behaviors, ultimately
stabbed her in a state of intoxicated distress. The Court modified the lower court’s ruling by reducing the
crime to homicide, recognizing the mitigating circumstances of passion and obfuscation and voluntary
surrender, sentencing Bello to an indeterminate penalty of six to ten years.

Facts:

1. On September 17, 1954, Guillermo Bello, a 54-year-old widower, began cohabiting with 24-year-
old Alicia Cervantes as his common-law wife.

2. By May 15, 1958, due to financial difficulties, Bello encouraged Cervantes to work as a hostess at
Maring's Place, a bar in Gumaca, Quezon.

3. Bello, deeply attached to Cervantes, often observed her movements at the bar. On May 16, he
witnessed her with another man in a movie theater, leading him to confront her about her
behavior.

4. On May 20, 1958, Bello asked Cervantes for money at Maring’s Place. When both Cervantes and
the owner Maring rebuffed him, he felt rejected and humiliated, especially when he overheard
remarks suggesting that Cervantes was involved in promiscuous activities at the bar.

5. In a state of emotional distress, Bello consumed alcohol before confronting Cervantes later that
evening at Maring's Place, where he stabbed her multiple times, leading to her death.
Subsequently, he surrendered to the police.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the crime should be considered murder due to aggravating factors or reduced to
homicide with mitigating circumstances.

2. Whether or not Bello was entitled to mitigating circumstances, specifically passion and
obfuscation, in addition to voluntary surrender.

Ruling:
The Court ruled that Bello was guilty of homicide, recognizing the mitigating circumstances of passion and
obfuscation and voluntary surrender. Consequently, his sentence was modified to an indeterminate
penalty of six to ten years in prison. The Court held that aggravating circumstances, such as treachery,
evident premeditation, and abuse of confidence, were not applicable.

Legal Basis and Rationale:

 • Legal Basis: Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code provides for mitigating circumstances, including
passion and obfuscation, which applies when the crime is committed due to a powerful emotional
reaction provoked by an act that severely offends the moral sensibilities of the accused.

• Rationale and Evidence: The Court found that Bello acted under the influence of strong passion
and emotional disturbance (obfuscation), provoked by Cervantes’s continued association with
other men as a hostess, her rejection of his entreaties to quit, and his overhearing of remarks
about her conduct. The remark that Cervantes was involved in “white slave trade” and her direct
insults toward Bello’s financial state and health deeply offended him, leading him to act out of
overwhelming jealousy and rage rather than a deliberate, calculated intent to kill.

Justice Reyes noted that the circumstances reflected a provoked reaction rather than premeditated
murder. Evidence showed that Bello did not intend to take advantage of any special confidence or
deliberately exploit his physical strength, as he was significantly older and in a weakened physical state
compared to the youthful Cervantes.

Motive:
Bello’s motive stemmed from his profound jealousy and possessiveness over Cervantes, whom he viewed
as his partner. His emotional and financial dependence on her, coupled with his desire for her loyalty,
intensified his anger upon discovering her interactions with other men. Her rejection and disdainful
comments, combined with his perception of betrayal, spurred him to act impulsively under emotional
distress.

Conclusion:
In view of the mitigating circumstances, the Court found that the crime committed was homicide rather
than murder. Bello was sentenced to six to ten years, with the aggravating circumstances initially alleged
by the lower court dismissed due to lack of substantiation. His voluntary surrender to the authorities and
the emotional turmoil under which he acted served to lessen the severity of his sentence.
 15. People v. Amaguin, G.R. Nos. 54344- 45, 10 January 1994, 229 SCRA 166

On the afternoon of May 24, 1977, Pacifico Oro invited his brothers and relatives to celebrate the town
fiesta. As they walked toward the plaza after the gathering, they were intercepted by the Amaguin
brothers—Celso, Willie, and Gildo. Celso first confronted Pacifico, initiating a sudden assault. Gildo then
joined with a slingshot, injuring Danilo, while Willie later appeared with a handgun, shooting Pacifico and
Diosdado multiple times. Hernando Oro, a witness, corroborated the violent sequence of events. The
Amaguin brothers claimed self-defense, arguing the Oro brothers initiated the conflict and they responded
accordingly. The prosecution maintained that the Amaguins’ actions were premeditated and intended to
harm the Oro brothers.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the Amaguin brothers were guilty of murder, aggravated by treachery.

2. Whether or not there was a conspiracy among the Amaguin brothers in the attack on the Oro
brothers.

3. Whether or not mitigating circumstances, particularly voluntary surrender, should be appreciated

in favor of the accused.

Ruling:

1. The Supreme Court modified the charges from murder to homicide for both Willie and Gildo
Amaguin. The Court found insufficient evidence of treachery, as the assault was not solely
intended to eliminate risk to the assailants.

2. The Court found sufficient evidence of conspiracy between Celso and Gildo, as their coordinated
actions indicated a common felonious objective. However, it did not implicate Willie as an
accomplice due to lack of evidence linking him to the conspiracy.

3. The Court acknowledged voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance, reducing the

sentences for both Willie and Gildo Amaguin. Willie was sentenced to homicide and frustrated
homicide for shooting Diosdado and injuring Pacifico, while Gildo was sentenced for two counts
of homicide for stabbing both Pacifico and Diosdado.

Petitioner:
People of the Philippines

Respondents:
Willie Amaguin and Gildo Amaguin
Legal Basis: The Court cited the Revised Penal Code, focusing on Article 249 for homicide, noting the lack
of qualifying treachery, which would otherwise have raised the charges to murder under Article 248. The
Court also applied Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code to recognize voluntary surrender as a mitigating
circumstance. Additionally, the Indeterminate Sentence Law was used to compute the appropriate
sentences for the accused.

Analysis: The Court ruled out murder due to the absence of treachery. While a frontal attack can be
treacherous if sudden and unexpected, the Amaguins attacked a group of six who could offer some
resistance, diminishing the element of treachery. The Court held that although the group received multiple
fatal injuries, the method did not specifically eliminate the risk to the assailants, as shown by injuries
sustained by both Gildo and their cousin Danny.

The motive appears to stem from pre-existing animosity and a perceived challenge to the Amaguin
brothers' dominance or standing in the community, especially evident in Celso’s challenging approach to
Pacifico, which ignited the attack.

Rationale and Evidentiary Basis: The trial court’s reliance on testimonies from prosecution witnesses,
including Hernando and Danilo Oro, was upheld by the Supreme Court. Hernando’s account directly
identified Willie as the gunman and Gildo as actively participating, which outweighed the defense’s alibi
and denials. Although defense witnesses claimed that Willie was not present, the trial judge determined
their testimony was unreliable, noting that "witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered" (People v.
Quebral).

The medico-legal findings from Dr. Tito Doromal were instrumental, as they confirmed multiple fatal stab
wounds in both Pacifico and Diosdado, attributing one fatal gunshot wound to Diosdado, thus affirming
Willie’s liability for homicide. Furthermore, voluntary surrender was acknowledged based on the criteria
established in People v. Salientes.

In summary, despite the defense's counterclaims, the corroborated eyewitness accounts and medical
evidence strengthened the prosecution's case, resulting in modified convictions with mitigating
circumstances applied.
 16. People v. Dela Cruz, L-45284, 29 December 1936, 63 Phil. 874

On May 30, 1936, in Manila, the appellant Francisco de la Cruz, along with Fernando Legaspi and three
unidentified individuals, allegedly assaulted Yu Wan, causing minor injuries and stealing P26 in cash. De la
Cruz was charged with robbery under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. He initially pleaded not guilty
but later changed his plea to guilty after some evidence had been presented by the prosecution. The court
initially sentenced him to six months and one day of prision correccional with an additional six years and
one day of prision mayor as a habitual delinquent. De la Cruz appealed, challenging the habitual
delinquency charge and seeking consideration for mitigating circumstances. Chief Justice Avanceña ruled
that, although habitual delinquency could not be considered, no mitigating circumstances were present,
and recidivism was an aggravating factor. Consequently, De la Cruz’s sentence was adjusted to six months
of arresto mayor to six years, ten months, and one day of prision mayor.

Facts

On May 30, 1936, in Manila, Francisco de la Cruz, Fernando Legaspi, and three unidentified accomplices
attacked Yu Wan. They inflicted minor injuries on him, requiring medical treatment and temporarily
preventing him from working. Additionally, the group stole P26 in cash from Yu Wan, a sum belonging to
him. De la Cruz had previously been convicted of theft and estafa, with the last conviction recorded on
July 24, 1933. Upon arraignment, De la Cruz initially pleaded not guilty but subsequently changed his plea
to guilty after two prosecution witnesses testified. The court sentenced him with additional penalties due
to habitual delinquency, which he appealed.

Issues

1. Whether or not Francisco de la Cruz qualifies as a habitual delinquent under the Revised Penal
Code.

2. Whether or not his plea of guilty constitutes a mitigating circumstance.

Ruling

1. No, the allegations in the information against Francisco de la Cruz were insufficient to consider
him a habitual delinquent as per People vs. Venus.

2. No, his plea of guilty did not qualify as a mitigating circumstance under Article 13, Subsection 7
of the Revised Penal Code, as it was made only after the prosecution presented part of its
evidence.

Legal Basis and Rationale

 • Habitual Delinquency: The court determined that De la Cruz could not be deemed a habitual
delinquent due to insufficient allegations in the information filed against him. People vs. Venus
was cited as precedent for the requirement of specific information in cases involving habitual
delinquency.

• Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances: Although De la Cruz pleaded guilty, Article 13,
Subsection 7 specifies that such a plea must be made spontaneously and before the prosecution
presents any evidence to qualify as mitigating. De la Cruz’s plea, offered after the prosecution had
begun its case, was considered a tactical choice rather than an act of genuine repentance, thus
failing to fulfill the criteria for mitigation. His prior convictions constituted recidivism, an
aggravating factor, which justified an enhanced sentence.

Motive

The primary motive for De la Cruz’s actions was financial gain, as evidenced by the robbery of P26 from
Yu Wan. This crime was likely driven by economic need or desire, which motivated the group to plan and
execute the assault and theft.

Rationale of the Ruling

Chief Justice Avanceña found that the lack of mitigating circumstances, coupled with the aggravating factor
of recidivism, warranted a higher sentence. The evidence of prior convictions underscored De la Cruz’s
pattern of criminal behavior, justifying a stringent sentence. The court dismissed his post-evidence guilty
plea as insufficient for mitigation, given that it was not made spontaneously but rather in anticipation of
an unfavorable outcome due to the strength of the prosecution's case. His partial admission, thus,
indicated a lack of sincere remorse, which, under Article 13, does not merit leniency.
 17. Canta v. People, G.R. No. 140937, 28 February 2001

Petitioner Exuperancio Canta was charged and found guilty of cattle rustling, violating P.D. No. 533, the
Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974. The case arose from the alleged theft of a black female cow owned by
Narciso Gabriel on March 14, 1986. Despite Canta's claim of ownership, the Court ruled against him, citing
falsified documents and his questionable actions. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision
but modified Canta’s sentence, recognizing a mitigating circumstance analogous to voluntary surrender,
thus adjusting his penalty to an indeterminate term of imprisonment.

Facts:

On March 14, 1986, a cow owned by Narciso Gabriel went missing under suspicious circumstances. The
cow, initially under Gabriel's half-sister’s care, was later attended by three caretakers, with Gardenio
Agapay in charge when it disappeared. Agapay traced the cow's hoof prints to Filomeno Vallejos’s home,
where he learned that Canta had taken it. Canta asserted the cow was his, claiming it was a calf obtained
from an agreement with Pat. Diosdado Villanueva. However, Gabriel provided a Certificate of Ownership,
and his caretakers confirmed the cow’s identity based on its distinctive markings.

Canta, meanwhile, produced a Certificate of Ownership antedated to February 27, 1985, which was later
proven fraudulent. He had allegedly obtained this certificate from Franklin Telen, a janitor, who later
admitted he altered the date upon Canta’s request. The trial court found Canta guilty of cattle rustling, and
this decision was upheld by the Court of Appeals with a modification to recognize a mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Exuperancio Canta took the cow in good faith, believing it was his property.

2. Whether or not the act of voluntary surrender should serve as a mitigating circumstance in favor
of Canta.

Ruling:

1. First Issue: No. The Court held that Canta’s act of taking the cow lacked good faith. His fraudulent
certificate and actions in securing the cow despite knowing it was under another’s care
demonstrated a deliberate intent to deprive the rightful owner of possession. Canta's actions
showed he intended to gain, fulfilling the elements of cattle rustling as defined under P.D. No. 533,
§2(c).

2. Second Issue: Yes. The Court recognized that Canta voluntarily brought the cow to municipal
authorities, thereby qualifying for a mitigating circumstance analogous to voluntary surrender.
Legal Basis:

• P.D. No. 533 (Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974): Defines cattle rustling as taking cattle without the
owner's consent, with or without intent to gain.

• Civil Code, Art. 433: Stipulates that an owner must resort to judicial process for property recovery,
which Canta disregarded by taking the cow himself.

• Revised Penal Code, Art. 64: Provides guidance on penalty adjustments when mitigating
circumstances are present.

Motive:

Canta claimed ownership based on a prior lost calf, suggesting a personal motive rooted in property
entitlement. However, his act of fabricating ownership documents and seizing the cow outside legal
channels undermined this claim.

Rationale:

The Court ruled that the prosecution's evidence outweighed Canta’s assertions. Testimonies from Gabriel’s
caretakers established the cow’s unique markings, aligning with Gabriel’s Certificate of Ownership, thus
proving his rightful ownership. Canta’s falsified certificate, as admitted by Telen, invalidated his claim. The
defense’s argument—that the cow suckled to the mother cow Canta brought—was deemed irrelevant, as
suckling behavior is not conclusive proof of biological connection.

Furthermore, the Court emphasized that Canta’s actions after taking the cow did not reflect good faith, as
he sought to secure ownership through deception rather than verifying with the registered owner or the
court. The mitigating circumstance was applied only because Canta eventually surrendered the cow to
municipal authorities, although this did not absolve him of criminal liability. The Court thus modified his
sentence to reflect this mitigating factor.

Decision:

The Court of Appeals' decision was affirmed with modification. Petitioner Exuperancio Canta was
sentenced to a prison term ranging from four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional
maximum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, acknowledging the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.