II. Co vs.
CA, 227 SCRA 444, 10/28/93
FACTS: Petitioner is Albino Co who in connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat a sunken
vessel delivered a check to the salvaging firm he is contract with on Sept. 1, 1983. The check was
deposited by the firm on Jan. 3, 1984 but was dishonored by the bank where it was deposited for the
reason that is already in a “closed account”.
A criminal complaint was then issued by the salvaging form against herein petitioner for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) at the Pasay RTC. The court granted a conviction
providing for prison term together with indemnification. The decision of the RTC relied heavily on the
Que doctrine which stated that “a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is
nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22” and was decided on Sept. 21, 1987. Some four years after Co’s
issuance of the “bouncing check”. To wit, at the time of the issuance of the check, there is a standing
official pronouncement made in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice (Circular No. 4) dated Dec. 15,
1981, which provides that;
2.3.4. Where issuance of bouncing check is neither estafa nor violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or secure the payment of an
obligation, whether pre-existing or not, the drawer is not criminally liable for either estafa or violation of
B.P. Blg. 22.
This is where Co anchored his appeal in the CA but the latter rejected his contentions. This prompted
Co to appeal with the SC which initially dismissed it. He filed for a motion for reconsideration. The SC
then required a comment from the Solicitor General. The Sol. Gen.’s reply was in extensive argument
against Co’s case. Co replied to this comment of the Sol. Gen. After deliberating on the parties
arguments and contentions, the Court resolved, in the interests of justice, to reinstate Co’s appeal and
adjudicate the same on its merits.
ISSUE: WON the doctrine of prospectivity of laws was violated in this case since the Que doctrine
which was the basis for Co’s conviction was decided some four years after his commission of the
offense?
HELD: YES. The administrative circular (No. 4) was subsequently reversed by another issued on
August 8, 1984 (Ministry Circular No. 12) — almost one (1) year after Albino Co had delivered the
"bouncing" check to the complainant on September 1, 1983. Said Circular No. 12, after observing inter
alia that Circular No. 4 of December 15, 1981 appeared to have been based on "a misapplication of the
deliberation in the Batasang Pambansa, . . . (or) the explanatory note on the original bill, i.e. that the
intention was not to penalize the issuance of a check to secure or guarantee the payment of an
obligation," as follows:
Henceforth, conforming with the rule that an administrative agency having interpreting authority
may reverse its administration interpretation of a statute, but that its review interpretation applies
only prospectively (Waterbury Savings Bank vs. Danaher, 128 Conn., 476; 20 a2d 455 (1941), in
all cases involving violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 where the check in question is issued
after this date, the claim that the check is issued as a guarantee or part of an arrangement to
secure an obligation collection will no longer be considered a valid defense.
However, the SC notwithstanding this reversal mentioned in outline that “judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines,"
according to Article 8 of the Civil Code. "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided," declares Article 4 of the same Code, a declaration that is echoed by Article 22 of the
Revised Penal Code: "Penal laws shall have, a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty
of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal.”
The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, has been applied in many cases. The
prospectivity principle has also been made to apply to administrative rulings and circulars. The
principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions which, "although in themselves not
laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, . . . (this being) the reason why under Article 8
of the New Civil Code, 'Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system . . .'"
So did the SC hold, for example, in Peo. v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607, 611:
It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in
1962, and Confidential Agent by the Provincial commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on
the matter was that laid down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero
(1958). 6 Our decision in People v. Mapa, 7 reversing the aforesaid doctrine, came only in 1967.
The sole question in this appeal is: should appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings in
Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reverse of the
Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? . . .
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the
laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, "Judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . ."The
interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that
law was originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled
rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim "legis interpretation
legis vim obtinet" — the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the
force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence,
hence, of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm in
question and where he was arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled
in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is
adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who
had relied on, the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the
construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishment of an act
be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.
A compelling rationalization of the prospectivity principle of judicial decisions is well set forth in the
oft-cited case of Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]. The
Chicot doctrine advocates the imperative necessity to take account of the actual existence of a statute
prior to its nullification, as an operative fact negating acceptance of "a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity.”
Thus, in the Supreme Court's decision in Tañada v. Tuvera, which declared "that presidential issuances
of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect," and as regards
which declaration some members of the Court appeared "quite apprehensive about the possible
unsettling effect . . . (the) decision might have on acts done in reliance on the validity of these
presidential decrees . . ."
Much earlier, in De Agbayani v. PNB, 38 SCRA 429 — concerning the effects of the invalidation of
"Republic Act No. 342, the moratorium legislation, which continued Executive Order No. 32, issued by
the then President Osmeña, suspending the enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary
obligations payable by war sufferers," and which had been "explicitly held in Rutter v. Esteban (93
Phil. 68 [1953]. . . (to be) in 1953 'unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute
longer . . ." As we can clearly note, the Court made substantially the same observations.
It would seem then, that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the Court's
decision of September 21, 1987 in Que v. People that a check issued merely to guarantee the
performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22 — should not be given
retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons situated, who relied on the
official opinion of the Minister of Justice that such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.
The SC further rationalized its decision by stating that it was after all a criminal action all doubts in
which, pursuant to familiar, fundamental doctrine, must be resolved in favor of the accused. Everything
considered, the Court saw no compelling reason why the doctrine of mala prohibita should override the
principle of prospectivity, and its clear implications as herein above set out and discussed, negating
criminal liability.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and of the Regional Trial Court are
reversed and set aside, and the criminal prosecution against the accused-petitioner is DISMISSED.
