9. Tanada vs. HRET, GR No.

217012, 03/01/2016

FACTS:

Petitioner Wigberto R. Tañada, Jr., (Wigberto) and respondents

Angelina D. Tan (Angelina) and Alvin John S. Tañada (Alvin
John) were contenders for the position of Member of the House
of Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon Province in
the just concluded May 13, 2013 National Elections. Wigberto
ran under the banner of the Liberal Party; Alvin John was the
official congressional candidate of Lapiang Manggagawa;
while Angelina was fielded by the National People Coalition.

On October 10, 2012, Wigberto filed before the COMELEC two

separate petitions: first, to cancel Alvin John CoC; and, second,
to declare him as a nuisance candidate.

The COMELEC First Division dismissed both petitions for lack

of merit.The COMELEC En Banc upheld COMELEC First
Division ruling. However, in SPA No. 13-056 (DC), it granted
the motion for reconsideration and cancelled Alvin John's CoC
for having committed false material representations
concerning his residency in accordance with Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code (OEC) of the Philippines.

On May 15, 2013, Wigberto filed a 2nd Motion for Partial

Reconsideration 14 of the COMELEC En Banc ruling in SPA
No. 13-057 (DC) on the ground of newly discovered
evidence.He alleged that Alvin John candidacy was not bona
fide because: (a) Alvin John was merely forced by his father to
file his CoC; (b) he had no election paraphernalia posted in
official COMELEC posting areas in several barangays of
Gumaca, Quezon Province; (c) he did not even vote during the
May 13, 2013 National Elections; and (d) his legal
representation appeared to have been in collusion with the
lawyers of Angelina. Wigberto filed with the COMELEC En
Bank an Extremely Urgent Motion to Admit Additional and
Newly Discovered Evidence and to Urgently Resolve Motion
for Reconsideration and an Urgent Manifestation and
Supplemental thereto. These motions, however, remained un-
acted upon until the filing of the present petition before the
Court on May 27, 2013.Thus, in order to avoid charges of
forum-shopping, said motions were withdrawn by Wigberto.

Despite Alvin John CoC due to his material representations

therein, his name was not deleted from and thus, remained
printed on the ballot, prompting Wigberto to file a motion with
the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Quezon Province (PBOC)
asking that the votes cast in the name of Alvin John be credited
to him instead. The PBOC, however, denied Wigberto motion.
Consequently, the PBOC canvassed the votes of all three
contenders separately, and thereafter, on May 16, 2013,
proclaimed Angelina as the winning candidate for the position
of Member of the House of Representatives for the 4th district
of Quezon Province.

Wigberto filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Annul the

Proclamation of Angelina. Wigberto then filed certiorari case
against the COMELEC En Banc Resolution declaring Alvin
John not a nuisance candidate.

On July 3, 2013, Wigberto filed a Manifestation informing the

Court that he had caused the filing of an Election Protest Ad
Cautelam Before the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET).

ISSUE: Whether or not Alvin John was not a nuisance

candidate under Section 69 of the OEC and that the votes cast
in favor of Alvin John be credited to him?

HELD: HRET has jurisdiction over the issues.

POLITICAL LAW: jurisdiction of House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution

provides: The Senate and the House of Representatives shall
each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal, shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom
shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the
Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral
Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

Case law states that the proclamation of a congressional

candidate following the election divests the COMELEC of
jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the proclaimed representative in favor of the
HRET. The phrase election, returns and qualifications refers to
all matters affecting the validity of the contestee title. In
particular, the term section refers to the conduct of the polls,
including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral
campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; returns
refers to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of
the winners, including questions concerning the composition
of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election
returns; and qualifications refers to matters that could be
raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed
winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy
of his CoC.

In the foregoing light, considering that Angelina had already

been proclaimed as Member of the House of Representatives
for the 4th District of Quezon Province on May 16, 2013, as
she has in fact taken her oath and assumed office past noon
time of June 30, 2013, the Court is now without jurisdiction to
resolve the case at bar. As they stand, the issues concerning
the conduct of the canvass and the resulting proclamation of
Angelina as herein discussed are matters which fall under the
scope of the terms lection and returns as above-stated and
hence, properly fall under the HRET sole jurisdiction.

Petition for review on certiorari is DISMISSED.

10. Dimapilis-Baldoz vs. COA, GR No. 199114, July 16,

2013

FACTS:

Labrador was the former Chief of the POEAs Employment

Services Regulation Division (ESRD). On May 2, 1997, then
Labor Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing (Quisumbing)
ordered his dismissal from service as he was found to have
bribed a certain Madoline Villapando, an overseas Filipino
worker, in the amount ofP6,200.00 in order to expedite the
issuance of her overseas employment certificate.

Aside from the foregoing administrative proceedings, a

criminal case for direct bribery was instituted against
Labrador in view of the same infraction. Consequently, on
August 31, 1999, the Sandiganbayan (SB) promulgated a
Decision,convicting him of the aforementioned crime.
Labrador applied and was subsequently granted probation
which then suspended te execution proceedings.

The SB, however, withheld the approval of the

recommendation that the probation be terminated and
Labrador be discharged from its legal effects and, instead,
issued a Resolution stating that Labradors application for
probation was, in fact, erroneously granted due to his previous
appeal from his judgment of conviction, in violation of Section
4 of the Probation Law.

Almost a year later, or on February 7, 2005, COA State Auditor

IV, Crescencia L. Escurel, issued an Audit Observation
Memorandum which contained her audit observations on the
various expenditures of the POEA pertaining to the payment of
salaries and benefits to Labrador for the period covering
August 31, 1999 to March 15, 2004. Consequently, it ordered
Dimapilis-Baldoz, among other POEA employees, personally
liable for the salaries and other benefits unduly received by
Labrador in the amount ofP1,740,124.08, paid through various
checks issued from August 1999 to March 15, 2004.

ISSUES: Whether or not grave abuse of discretion attended

the COAs disallowance in this case.

Whether or not Dimapilis may be held liable for the salaries

paid to Labrador

HELD: No.

Political Law- COA has the authority to rule on the

legality of the disbursement of government funds.

COAs exercise of its general audit power is among the

constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and
balance system inherent in our form of government.
Furthermore, it has also been declared that the COA is
endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and
disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or
unconscionable expenditures of government funds.

Pursuant to its mandate, the COA disallowed the

disbursements pertaining to the personnel benefits paid to
Labrador, reasoning that the latter should have stopped
reporting for work as early as June 28, 2000 when the denial of
his appeal from the SBs August 31, 1999 Decision rendered his
conviction for the crime of direct bribery final and executory,
notwithstanding the grant of his application for probation. In
this regard, it opines that the period of disallowance should be
reckoned from May 3, 2000 which is the date the SBs August
31, 1999 Decision had become final and executory.

Significant to the determination of the appropriate period of

the disallowance is the undisputed fact that, pursuant to an
order issued by then Labor Secretary Quisumbing, Labrador
had already been made to suffer the administrative penalty of
dismissal from service on May 2, 1997, which was long before
the SB convicted him of direct bribery on August 31, 1999. As
a matter of law, a department secretarys decision confirming
the removal of an officer under his authority is immediately
executory, even pending further remedy by the dismissed
public officer.

Applying these principles to the case at bar, no grave abuse of

discretion can be attributed to the COA in fixing the reckoning
point of the period of disallowance at May 3, 2000, since
records are bereft of any showing that it had any knowledge of
Labradors prior dismissal on May 2, 1997. To hold otherwise
would be simply antithetical to the concept of grave abuse of
discretion, much less countenance a speculative endeavor.

Remedial Law- presumption of good faith

It is a standing rule that every public official is entitled to the

presumption of good faith in the discharge of official duties,
such that, in the absence of any proof that a public officer has
acted with malice or bad faith, he should not be charged with
personal liability for damages that may result from the
performance of an official duty

While admitting that Labrador did indeed continue to report

for work despite the SBs August 31, 1999 Decision convicting
him of direct bribery, these antecedents show that she merely
acted in good faith and lawfully exercised her duties when she
approved the payment of Labradors salaries, wages, and other
personnel benefits for the period beginning August 31, 1999 to
March 2, 2004.

To elucidate, while the COA correctly affirmed the

disallowance of the salaries and benefits which Labrador
unduly received when he continued to hold office despite his
conviction, the liability for refund cannot be imposed upon
Dimapilis-Baldoz because she had no knowledge or any
reasonable indication that the payment of salaries to Labrador
was actually improper. Two important incidents impel this
conclusion: first, Labradors 201 File with the POEA was
without any record of the SB case; and second, Dimapilis-
Baldoz was only apprised of his conviction when her office was
furnished a copy of the SBs March 2, 2004 Resolution which
ordered the revocation of Labradors probation. In addition,
Dimapilis-Baldozs good faith is further strengthened by the
fact that she lost no time in issuing the Separation Order as
soon as she was apprised of Labradors situation. Thus, absent
any proof to the contrary, it cannot be gainsaid that Dimapilis-
Baldoz's approval was spurred only by the honest belief that
the payment of salaries disbursed to Labrador was due and
owing to him.

COA ruling affirmed with modification as to the personal

liability of Dimapilis.