1. Angara v.

Electoral Commission

Facts

Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of the
National Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the National
Assembly passed a resolution confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an
election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution.
On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest against
the petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. The following day,
December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its own resolution providing that it will
not consider any election protest that was not submitted on or before December 9, 1935.
Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought the
dismissal of respondent’s protest. The Electoral Commission however denied his motion.

Issue

Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of
the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation
of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?

Ruling

[The Court DENIED the petition.]

NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly.
The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of
the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any
manner toll the time for filing election protests against members of the National Assembly, nor
prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might
prescribe.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete
and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that
power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the
National Assembly. xxx.
[T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative
in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed.
[W]here a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the
exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any
further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before
the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for
the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary
implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

2. CARMELO F. LAZATIN v. HRET

Facts:

During the canvassing of votes, Private respondent Lorenzo Timbol objected to the inclusion of
certain election returns. But since the Municipal Board of Canvassers did not rule on his
objections, he brought his case to the Commission on Elections. On May 19, 1987, the
COMELEC ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to suspend the proclamation of the
winning candidate for the first district of Pampanga. However, on May 26, 1987, the COMELEC
ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proceed with the canvassing of votes and to
proclaim the winner. On May 27, 1987, petitioner was proclaimed as Congressman-elect. Private
respondent thus filed in the COMELEC a petition to declare petitioners proclamation void ab
initio. Later, private respondent also filed a petition to prohibit petitioner from assuming office.
The COMELEC failed to act on the second petition so petitioner was able to assume office on
June 30, 1987. On September 15, 1987, the COMELEC declared petitioner's proclamation void
ab initio. Court set aside the COMELEC's revocation of petitioner's proclamation. On February
8, 1988, private respondent filed in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
Petitioner argued that the private respondent’s protest had been filed late citing Sec 250 of the
Omnibus Election Code. However the HRET filed that the protest had been filed on time in
accordance with Sec 9 of the HRET Rules.

Issue:

Whether or not the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal has jurisdiction over the case?

Ruling:

Yes, the court ruled that the petitioner’s reliance on Sec 250 of the Omnibus Election Code is
misplaced. The COMELEC’s exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials and
appellate jurisdiction over contests relating to the election of municipal and barangay officials
[Art. IX(C), Sec. 2(2)]. expressly makes the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House of
Representatives the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
their respective Members [Art. VI, Sec. 17].
The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and
regulations relative to matters within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election
protests before it, is beyond dispute. Its rule-making power necessarily flows from the general
power granted it by the Constitution. This is the import of the ruling in the landmark case of
Angara v. Electoral Commission
It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duly enjoined, every
particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also
conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. 1, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of
any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests
before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules
necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by
necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
The inescapable conclusion from the foregoing is that it is well within the power of the HRET to
prescribe the period within which protests may be filed before it. This is founded not only on
historical precedents and jurisprudence but, more importantly, on the clear language of the
Constitution itself.
Consequently, private respondent's election protest having been filed within the period
prescribed by the HRET, the latter cannot be charged with lack of jurisdiction to hear the case.

3. Aggabao vs COMELEC

Facts:

Aggabao and Miranda were Congressional candidates of the 2004 elections. During the
canvassing of COCVs (Certificate of canvass of votes) Miranda moved for the exclusion of the
copy from Municipality of Cordon on the ground that it was tampered with thus manifest errors.
The PBC (Provisional Board of Canvassers) excluded the contested COCVs; based on the results
Miranda garnered the highest votes. On appeal with COMELEC Second Division Aggabao
asserted that PBC acted without jurisdiction when it heard Miranda’s Petition for exclusion.
COMELEC En Banc directed the proclamation of Miranda as duly elected Congressman.
Aggabao filed this petition for certiorari, assailing the proclamation of Miranda. He claimed that
the COMELEC En Banc acted without jurisdiction when it ordered Miranda’s proclamation
considering that the appeal had not yet been resolved. In his Comment, Miranda moved for the
dismissal of the petition considering that the issue raised by Aggabao is best addressed to the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

Issue:

W/n the petition of Aggabao in under jurisdiction of COMELEC or HRET

Ruling:

The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns,
and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate
has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns,
and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. It is undisputed that Miranda
has already been proclaimed, taken his oath and assumed office on June 14, 2004. As such,
petitioner’s recourse would have been to file an electoral protest before the HRET. His remedy is
not this petition for certiorari.

The SC applied the same ruling in Guerrero case and Romuladez-Marcos case.
4. Limkaichong v. Comelec

Facts:

A petition was filed against the petitioner stating that she should be disqualified to run for the
position of representative of the first district of Negros Oriental alleging that she is not a natural
born citizen as she was born with Chinese parents who are Chinese citizens and that her Father
did not reach the finality of his Naturalization. The courts repeatedly dismissed the petitions for
lack of merit averring that the naturalization should be assailed in accordance with the procedure
laid down by law and the initiative of cancelling the naturalization certificate should come from
the SG or proper provincial fiscal. The petitioner was proclaimed the winner and proceeded in
discharging her duties and responsibilities in the HOR. SC points out that HRET should now
assume jurisdiction in the disqualification case since the petitioner has already taken her oath and
assumed office. Hence, the respondent filed for a motion for reconsideration.

Issue:

Whether or not HRET should assume jurisdiction over the disqualification case.

Ruling:

Yes. The SC held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own
jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the
COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation. The
party questioning his qualification should now present his case in a proper proceeding before the
HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a Member of
the House of Representatives with respect to the latter's election, returns and qualifications. The
use of the word "sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of the
OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals' jurisdiction over election contests
relating to its member.

5. Banat v. Comelec

Facts:

The petitioner, a duly accredited multi-sectoral organization, filed this petition for prohibition
alleging that RA 9369 violated Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution and also assails the
constitutionality of Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 of RA 9369 which was passed less than 4 months
before the 2007 local elections. According to petitioner, these provisions are of questionable
application and doubtful validity for failing to comply with the provisions of the Constitution.
Section 37 and 38 read as follow:

SEC. 37. Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166 is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 30. Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for the Election of President and Vice
President: The Commission en banc as the National Board of Canvassers for the election of
senators: Determination of Authenticity and Due Execution of Certificates of Canvass. —
Congress and the Commission en banc shall determine the authenticity and due execution of the
certificate of canvass for president and vice president and senators, respectively, as accomplished
and transmitted to it by the local boards of canvassers, on a showing that: (1) each certificate of
canvass was executed, signed and thumbmarked by the chairman and members of the board of
canvassers and transmitted or caused to be transmitted to Congress by them; (2) each certificate
of canvass contains the names of all of the candidates for president and vice president or senator,
as the case may be, and their corresponding votes in words and their corresponding votes in
words and in figures; (3) there exists no discrepancy in other authentic copies of the certificates
of canvass or any of its supporting documents such as statement of votes by city/municipality/by
precinct or discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in words and figures in the certificate; and
(4) there exists no discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in words and figures in the
certificates of canvass against the aggregate number of votes appearing in the election returns of
precincts covered by the certificate of canvass: Provided, That certified print copies of election
returns or certificates of canvass may be used for the purpose of verifying the existence of the
discrepancy.
"When the certificate of canvass, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province, city
of district, appears to be incomplete, the Senate President or the Chairman of the Commission, as
the case may be, shall require the board of canvassers concerned to transmit by personal
delivery, the election returns form polling places that were not included in the certificate of
canvass and supporting statements. Said election returns shall be submitted by personal delivery
within two (2) days from receipt of notice.
"When it appears that any certificate of canvass or supporting statement of votes by
city/municipality or by precinct bears erasures or alteration which may cast doubt as to the
veracity of the number of votes stated herein and may affect the result of the election, upon
requested * of the presidential, vice presidential or senatorial candidate concerned or his party,
Congress or the Commission en banc, as the case may be shall, for the sole purpose of verifying
the actual number of votes cast for president, vice president or senator, count the votes as they
appear in the copies of the election returns submitted to it.
"In case of any discrepancy, incompleteness, erasure or alteration as mentioned above, the
procedure on pre-proclamation controversies shall be adopted and applied as provided in Section
17, 18, 19 and 20.
SEC. 38. Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166 is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases in Elections for President, Vice President, Senator, and
Member of the House of Representatives. — For purposes of the elections for president, vice
president, senator, and member of the House of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall
be allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation
of election returns or the certificates of canvass, as the case may be, except as provided for in
Section 30 hereof. However, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing
body motu proprio or upon written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in
the certificate of canvass or election returns before it. DTAaCE

"Questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers may be initiated
in the board or directly with the Commission in accordance with Section 19 hereof.
"Any objection on the election returns before the city or municipal board of canvassers, or on the
municipal certificates of canvass before the provincial board of canvassers or district board of
canvassers in Metro Manila Area, shall be specifically noticed in the minutes of the respective
proceedings."
"Any person who present in evidence a simulated copy of an election return, certificate of
canvass or statement of votes, or a printed copy of an election return, certificate of canvass or
statement of votes bearing a simulated certification or a simulated image, shall be guilty of an
election offense shall be penalized in accordance with Batas Pambansa Blg. 881."

Issue:

Whether or not Sec 37 and 38 of RA 9369 impaired the power of PET and SET

Ruling:

No. In the present case, Congress and the COMELEC en banc do not encroach upon the
jurisdiction of the PET and the SET. There is no conflict of jurisdiction since the powers of
Congress and the COMELEC en banc, on one hand, and the PET and the SET, on the other, are
exercised on different occasions and for different purposes. The PET is the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice President. The
SET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
members of the Senate. The jurisdiction of the PET and the SET can only be invoked once the
winning presidential, vice presidential or senatorial candidates have been proclaimed. On the
other hand, under Section 37, Congress and the COMELEC en banc shall determine only the
authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass. Congress and the COMELEC en
banc shall exercise this power before the proclamation of the winning presidential, vice
presidential and senatorial candidates.

6. Abaya v. Comelec

Facts:

Private Respondents filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against Aangat
Tayo and its nominee, petitioner Abayon and claimed that Abayon was not eligible for a party-
list seat in the House of Representatives, since she did not represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent congressional district
representative. Abayon countered stating that COMELEC already confirmed the status of her
party list as a national multi-sectoral party-list organization representing the workers, women,
youth, urban poor, and elderly and that she indeed belonged to the women sector. She also avers
that HRET cannot assume jurisdiction since the respondent collaterally attacked the registration
of Aangat Tayo as a party-list organization, a matter that fell within the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC. It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not
Abayon who was just its nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first nominee, said
Abayon, were internal concerns of Aangat Tayo. Respondent HRET dismissed the petition
against Aangat Tayo but upheld its jurisdiction over the qualifications of petitioner Abayon. The
latter moved for reconsideration but the HRET denied the same prompting Abayon to file the
present petition for special civil action of certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not HRET has the authority to pass upon the eligibilities of the nominees of the
party-list groups that won seats in the lower house of Congress.

Ruling:

Yes. HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the
qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Party-list nominees are "elected
members" of the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET
has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district
representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and
the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives,
the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the
HRET's own jurisdiction begins.

The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the
petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its
jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.

7. Abbas V. SET (Senate Electoral Tribunal)

Facts:

On October9,1987, the Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest docketed against 22
candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987
congressional elections by the COMELEC. The SET was at the time composed of three (3)
Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators. Abbas later on filed for the disqualification
of the 6 senator members from partaking in the said election protest on the ground that all of
them are interested parties to said case. Abbas argue that considerations of public policy and the
norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass disqualification sought. To
accommodate the proposed disqualification, Abbas suggested the following amendment:
Tribunal’s Rules (Section 24) requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption of
resolutions of whatever nature is a proviso that where more than four (4) members are
disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3)
including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions.
Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for disqualification, this would, in
the context of that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only three members who
would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose disqualification is not sought.

Issue:

Whether or not Abbas’ proposal could be given due weight.

Ruling:

The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the
Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.

“Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the
remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may
be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and
the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.”

It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and Members
of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those “judicial” and “legislative” components
commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of Senators. The legislative component herein cannot be totally excluded from
participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit
and intent of the Constitution. It is not to be misunderstood in saying that no Senator-Member of
the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said
Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from
participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or
biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What SC is saying is that
in the light of the Constitution, the SET cannot legally function as such; absent its entire
membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-
Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest. The charge that
the respondent Tribunal gravely abused its discretion in its disposition of the incidents referred to
must therefore fail. In the circumstances, it acted well within law and principle in dismissing the
petition for disqualification or inhibition filed by herein petitioners. The instant petition for
certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

8. Pimentel V. HRET

Facts:

On 3 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. On 11 May 1998, in accordance with
the Party-List System Act, national elections were held which included, for the first time, the
election through popular vote of party-list groups and organizations whose nominees would
become members of the House. Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list representatives from 13
organizations, including Melvyn D. Eballe, Leonardo Q. Montemayor, Cresente C. Paez, Loretta
Ann P. Rosales and Patricia M. Sarenas from party-list groups Association of Philippine Electric
Cooperatives[5] (APEC), Alyansang Bayanihan ng mga Magsasaka, Manggagawang Bukid at
Mangingisda (ABA), NATCO Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens Action
Party (AKBAYAN), and Abanse! Pinay (ABANSE). Due to the votes it garnered, APEC was
able to send 2 representatives to the House, while the 12 other party-list groups had one
representative each. Also elected were district representatives belonging to various political
parties. Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET and CA contingent by electing its
representatives to these two constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure involves the
nomination by the political parties of House members who are to occupy seats in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Commission on Appointments (CA). From
available records, it does not appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections the party-list groups in
the House nominated any of their representatives to the HRET or the CA. As of the date of filing
of the present petitions for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction, the House contingents to the HRET and the CA were composed solely of district
representatives belonging to the different political parties. On 18 January 2000, Senator Aquilino
Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters addressed to then Senate President Blas F. Ople, as Chairman
of the CA, and to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo (now retired), as
Chairman of the HRET. The letters requested Senate President Ople and Justice Melo to cause
the restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively, to include party-list representatives to
conform to Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In its meeting of 20 January
2000, the HRET resolved to direct the Secretary of the Tribunal to refer Senator Pimentel’s letter
to the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives. On the same day, HRET Secretary
Daisy B. Panga-Vega, in an Indorsement of even date, referred the letter to House of
Representatives Secretary General Roberto P. Nazareno. On 2 February 2000, Eballe, et al. filed
with this Court their Petitions for Prohibition, Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction (with
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order) against the HRET, its Chairman and Members, and
against the CA, its Chairman and Members. They contend that, under the Constitution and the
Party-List System Act, party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET,
and 2.4 seats in the CA. They charge that the HRET, CA, et al. committed grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to act positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel. In its Resolution of 8
February 2000, the Court en banc directed the consolidation of GR 141490 with GR 141489. On
11 February 2000, Eballe et al. filed in both cases a motion to amend their petitions to implead
then Speaker Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as an additional respondent, in his capacity as Speaker of the
House and as one of the members of the CA. The Court granted both motions and admitted the
amended petitions. Senator Pimentel filed the present petitions on the strength of his oath to
protect, defend and uphold the Constitution and in his capacity as taxpayer ‘and as a member of
the CA. He was joined by 5 party-list representatives from APEC, ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN
and COOP-NATCCO as co-petitioners

Issue:

[1] Whether the present composition of the House Electoral Tribunal violates the constitutional
requirement of proportional representation because there are no party-list representatives in the
hret.

[2]: Whether the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to include party-list
representatives constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Ruling:

[1] NO. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative,
within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list
representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA.
Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the
authority to elect among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12
seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of
the Constitution, each chamber of Congress exercises the power to choose, within
constitutionally defined limits, who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of
each chamber’s respective electoral tribunal. These constitutional provisions are reiterated in
Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The
discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being
subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation.[26] However, under
the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the House
of this constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[27] Otherwise, ‘the doctrine of
separation of powers calls for each branch of government to be left alone to discharge its duties
as it sees fit.[28] Neither can the Court speculate on what action the House may take if party-list
representatives are duly nominated for membership in the HRET and the CA. The petitions are
bereft of any allegation that respondents prevented the party-list groups in the House from
participating in the election of members of the HRET and the CA. Neither does it appear that
after the 11 May 1998 elections, the House barred the party-list representatives from seeking
membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears from the available facts that the party-list
groups in the House at that time simply refrained from participating in the election process. The
party-list representatives did not designate their nominees even up to the time they filed the
petitions, with the predictable result that the House did not consider any party-list representative
for election to the HRET or the CA. As the primary recourse of the party-list representatives lies
with the House of Representatives, ‘the Court cannot resolve the issues presented by petitioners
at this time.
[2]: There is no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in response
to the letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and their internal rules, the HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to
reconstitute themselves.

9. Bondoc vs. Pineda

Facts:

In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the
NP were candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga.
Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the
remaining 6 are members of the House of Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1
member is from the NP). Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over
Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman
Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.

On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a letter
informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the
Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del
Sur to join said political party. On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of
HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the
House of Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of
Congressman Camasura to the HRET.

Issue:

Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party
therein, may change that party’s representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a
decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein.

Ruling:

The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide
an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office,
devoid of partisan consideration.

As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their
functions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independence from the
political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are
not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman
Camasura from the HRET for having cast a “conscience vote” in favor of Bondoc, based strictly
on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by
the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice
and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is,
therefore, null and void.

Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that
it violates Congressman Camasura’s right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole
judge of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the
Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET
may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member’s
congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party
he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or removal for other
valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty,
short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another.

10. Robles v HRET

Facts:
- Petitioner Virgilio Robles and private respondent Romeo Santos were candidates for the
position of Congressman of the 1st district of Caloocan City in the last May 11, 1987
congressional elections. Petitioner Robles was proclaimed the winner on December 23, 1987 in
which Robles was proclaimed the winner on Oct. 23, 1987.
- Santos filed an election protest with the HRET claiming that Robles won on electoral
fraud and called for the recounting of votes. However, he filed a Motion to Withdraw Contest but
later on filed an Urgent Motion to Disregard his Previous Motion, in which the first Motion was
not acted upon by the HRET, but the 2nd Motion was granted.
- Robles filed a petition for certiorari with a prayer for temporary restraining order
assailing the resolutions of the HRET.

Issue:

W/N the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion thus giving the supreme jurisdiction over
the matter.

Ruling:

Petition was dismissed. The Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the HRET.
The mere filing of the motion to withdraw protest on the remaining uncontested precincts,
without any action on the part of the respondent tribunal does not by itself divest the tribunal of
its jurisdiction over the case. It is an established doctrine that jurisdiction, once acquired, is not
lost at the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. The tribunal retains
the authority to grant or deny the Motion. The withdrawal only becomes effective when the
Motion is granted. To hold otherwise would permit a party to deprive the tribunal jurisdiction
already acquired

11. Arroyo vs. HRET

Facts:

After the May 11, 1992 elections, Arroyo was declared as the duly elected Congressman of the
lone district of Makati. Arroyo won by 13,559 votes over his opponent. His opponent Syjuco
protested the declaration before the HRET. Syjuco alleged that Arroyo won due to massive fraud
hence he moved for revision and recounting.
HRET gave way but during the process some HRET employees and personnel conducted some
irregularities to ensure Syjuco’s win. After some paper battles between the two, Syjuco, realizing
that mere revision and recounting would not suffice to overthrow the more than 12,000 votes
lead of Arroyo over him, revised his complaint by including and introducing in his memorandum
cum addendum that his complaint is actually based on a broader and more equitable non-
traditional determination of the existence of the precinct-level document-based anomalies and
that the revision he initially sought is just incidental to such determination.
(Note: Precinct Level Document Based Evidence: electoral documents used not only during the
actual balloting/voting stage, but also those availed of even much earlier, as early (as) the time of
the registration of voters).
The 3 justices members of the HRET ruled that such amendment is already beyond the tribunal’s
jurisdiction and the 6 representative members ruled otherwise. Consequently, by a vote of 6-3,
the HRET did not dismiss the protest filed by Syjuco and the HRET later declared Syjuco as the
winner.

Issue:

WON HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in proceeding to decide the election protest
based on private respondent's "precinct level document based anomalies/evidence" theory.

Ruling:

Yes. From his initial prayer for revision, private respondent's belated attempt to inject the
"precinct level document based anomalies/evidence" theory, he intended to completely abandon
the process and results of the revision which goes against Rule 28 of the HRET internal rules
which reads: “After the expiration of the period for filing of the protest x x x substantial
amendments which broaden the scope of the action or introduce an additional cause of action
shall not be allowed. . . . .”
Members of the Tribunal in fact had already sensed the impropriety when it issued its "show-
cause" order requiring the Syjuco to explain why his election protest should not be dismissed.
But the majority violated with open eyes its own rules when they resolved not to dismiss the
protest — a clear indication of grave abuse of discretion.
The majority members of public respondent HRET undisputedly admitted as evidence mere
photocopies of election-related documents when there is not even the slightest showing that the
original or even certified true copies thereof cannot be reasonably produced before the Tribunal.
These photocopies violate the best evidence rule.

There 2 mandatory requisites for the annulment of election returns based on fraud, irregularities
or terrorism, namely:
(1) that more than fifty percent (50%) of the total number of votes in the precinct or precincts
were involved, and
(2) that the votes must be shown to have been affected or vitiated by such fraud, irregularities or
terrorism.

In this case Public respondent HRET proceeded to annul 50,000 votes without a dint of
compliance with these requisites.

Additionally, public respondent HRET disregarded election results on several precincts on the
basis of omissions committed either through mere oversight or plain negligence on the part of
election officials or employees. These omissions, mainly administrative in nature, cannot be used
as a ground to nullify election results in the absence of a clear showing of fraud.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED, and public
respondent HRET's majority decision is SET ASIDE.
12. Lerias v. HRET

Facts:

Rosette Yniguez Lerias (Petitioner) filed her certificate of candidacy as official candidate of
UPP-KBL for the position of Representative for the district of Southern Leyte. Roger Mercado
(Respondent) was the administration candidate for the same position. During the canvassing of
votes of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC), not including the ballots from Libagon
which had been questioned by Mercado on the ground that allegedly it had been tampered with,
petitioner and respondent got the two highest votes: Mercado – 34,422 and Lerias – 34,128.

However, when it came to including the votes from Libagon, the results differed with Mercado
having 35,793 votes and Lerias with 35,939. However, the PBC ruled that their copy of the
certificate of canvass contained erasures, alterations and superimpositions and therefore, cannot
be used as basis of the canvass.

The PBC simply rejected the explanation of the members of the municipal board of canvassers of
Libagon that said corrections were made to correct honest clerical mistakes which did not affect
the integrity of the certificate and said corrections were made in the presence of the watchers of
all the nine (9) candidates for the position, including those of Mercado who offered no objection.

Lerias made an appeal to COMELEC asking that the copy of the certificate of canvass for
Libagon be used by PBC Counsel since both Lerias and Mercado agreed to use the COMELEC
copy of the said certificate as long as it is authentic. In the end, Lerias only received 1,411 votes
which is less than that stated in the copy of PBC.

Lerias filed for a petition to COMELEC reconsideration at first, then when it was not heeded, she
filed another case of annulment of proclamation. Respondent tried to reply by asserting Lerias
used fraudulent means in elections but before the initial hearing, there were unidentified armed
men who went to the municipal building of Libagon who raided and stole the ballot boxes which
contained copies of the election returns. The remaining boxes were gathered by an HRET
representative. During the case trial in HRET, Lerias presented the original copies of the
certificate of canvass of the municipal and provincial board.

The election returns showed that she got a total of 1,811 votes. Mercado showed a photocopy of
the canvass which was different from the original. HRET rejected the election returns presented
by Lerias. There were doubts on the authenticity of the election returns given that the original
copies were produced after the raid. However, after another investigation and presentation of
evidence it was declared that Lerias was the winner. The HRET majority, however, rejected the
election returns of Lerias and sustained the certificate of canvass.

Issue:

WON the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion.

Ruling:

Yes. In an election contest, the best and most conclusive evidence are the ballots themselves. But
where the ballots cannot be produced or are not available, the election returns would be the best
evidence.

Case in point, the Comelec and HRET must exercise extreme caution in rejecting returns and
may do so only upon exhaustive investigation as to the authenticity of the said document.

In light with this, under the best evidence rule, "there can be no evidence of a writing, the
contents of which are the subject of inquiry, other than the original writing itself".

It would appear that the Court sustained the use of the COMELEC’s copy of the certificate of
canvass instead of the copy of the provincial board of canvassers only to establish prima facie
(but not actually) the winner, without prejudice to a more judicious and unhurried determination
in an election protest, and because Lerias' through counsel had previously agreed conditionally
and qualifiedly to its tentative use for pre-proclamation proceedings.

The decision of this court was merely an affirmance of the action of the COMELEC and it
cannot be relied upon as a final adjudication on the merits, on the issue of the genuiness and
authenticity of the said certificate of canvass. Besides, the use of said COMELEC copy of the
certificate of canvass by the board of canvassers did not foreclose the right of Lerias to prove
that the votes attributed to have been received by her as stated, in said certificate of canvass is
not correct. Acceptance of a certificate of canvass as genuine and authentic for purposes of
canvass simply means that said certificate of canvass is genuine and authentic for the purpose of
determining the prima facie winner in the election. But the very purpose of an election contest is
to establish who is the actual winner in the election.

The Court then declares that petitioner Rosette Yniguez Lerias is the duly elected representative
of the Lone District of the Province of Southern Leyte.

13. Daza v Singson

Facts:

1. After the May 1987 Congressional Elections, the House of Representatives proportionally
apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments (COA) among the several
political parties represented in the chamber, as pursuant to Article 6, Section 18 of the
Constitution. Herein Petitioner Daza was among those chosen and listed as representative of the
Liberal Party (LP).
2. However, on 16 September 1988, Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) reorganized which
resulted to political realignment in the House; 24 members of LP resigned and joined LDP,
thereby swelling the former’s number from 159 to 17.
3. Due to such, the House revised its representatives in the COA by withdrawing the seat of
Petitioner and giving it to the newly LDP, respondent Singson.
4. Hence, petitioner filed a complaint in the Supreme Court on the ground of his removal from
the COA. Consequently, the Court issued a TRO to prevent both petitioner and respondent from
serving in the COA.
5. Petitioner contends that he cannot be removed because his appointment is permanent, citing a
ruling in Cunanan v. Tan, and asserting that the reorganization of LDP is not based on permanent
political realignment since LDP is not a duly registered pol. party.
6. On the other hand, respondent avers that the question raised by petitioner is political in nature
and beyond the jurisdiction of the court. Moreover, he invokes that nowhere in the Constitution
requires that a political party be registered to be entitled to proportional representation in the
COA.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner’s removal from the COA by the House of Representatives is legal.

Ruling:

1. First, on the jurisdictional issue, the Court held that the contention of respondent is not correct;
the Court has jurisdiction over the matter since what is involved is the legality, not the wisdom,
of the act of the chamber in removing the petitioner from the COA.
2. Second, on the issue of removal, the Court ruled that petitioner’s contention that the LDP’s
reorganization is invalid since it is not yet registered. However, on 23 November 1989, the
COMELEC en banc already affirmed the registration of the LDP.
3. On the contention that LDP has not yet passed the test of stability is likewise untenable. The
Court stated that if such theory be followed, petitioner’s party (LP) will also fall under such
category and will not be entitled representation in the COA since the Liberal Party was just
reorganized before for Pres. Roxas be able to run.
4. Further, the Court stressed that LDP had already been existing for more than a year and having
157 members in the House and 6 in the Senate is enough for it to be considered an eligible pol.
party and if petitioner’s contention be pursued, the members of LDP will be denied of
representation in the COA.

14. Coseteng v. Mitra

Facts:

1. Petitioner Anna Coseteng, the lone candidate elected to the House of Representatives under
KAIBA, wrote to Speaker Ramon Mitra to appoint her as a member of the Commission on
Appointments (CA) and House Tribunal – a request backed by nine congressmen.
2. Previously, the House elected from the Coalesced Majority parties 11 out 12 congressmen to
the CA and later on, added Roque Ablan, Jr. as the twelfth member, representing the Coalesced
Minority. Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was also organized as a party, prompting the
revision of the House majority membership in CA due to political realignments and the
replacement of Rep. Daza (LP) with Rep. Singson (LDP).
3. Congresswoman Anna Coseteng and her party KAIBA filed a Petition for Extraordinary Legal
Writs (considered as petition for quo warranto and injunction) praying that the Court declare the
election of respondent Ablan, Singson and the rest of the CA members null and void on the
theory that their election violated the constitutional mandate of proportional representation
because the New Majority (LDP) is entitled to only 9 seats and members must be nominated and
elected by their parties. She further alleged that she is qualified to sit in the CA because of the
support of 9 other congressmen from the Minority.
4. The respondent contends that the issue of CA reorganization was a political question, hence
outside the jurisdiction of the Court, was in consonance with the “proportional representation”
clause in Art VI of the Constitution and that petitioner was bound by the Majority decision since
KAIBA was part of the Coalesced Majority.

Issue:

Whether or not the members of the CA were chosen on basis of proportional representation.

Ruling:

1. Yes. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit not because issue raised was a political question
but because revision in House representation in CA was based on proportional representation.
2. The composition of the House membership shows that there are 160 LDP members in the
House, comprising 79% of the House membership. This granted them a rounded-up 10 seats in
the CA and left the remaining two to LP and KBL as the next largest parties. KAIBA, being a
member of the Coalesced Majority, is bound by the majority choices.
3. Even if KAIBA were an opposition party, its lone member Coseteng represents less than 1%
of the House of membership and, hence, does not entitle her a seat in the 12 House seats in
CA.Her endorsements from 9 other congressmen are inconsequential because they are not
members of her party and they signed identical endorsements for her rival, Cong. Verano-Yap.
There is no merit in petitioner’s contention that CA members should have been nominated and
elected by their parties because of members were nominated by their floor leaders and elected by
the House.
4. Jurisdiction issue over political question was also settled in Daza vs Singson in that the
Constitution conferred the Court with expanded jurisdiction to determine whether grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by the other
government branches.

15. Guingona vs. Gonzales

Facts:

1. After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC
senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the requirement
that each house must have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional
formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) / Total No. of Senators elected.
2. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5
members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority
floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that
Tanada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. This is also pursuant
to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the elected members of the
CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD.
Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the
compromise is against proportional representation.
Issue:

Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a party’s representation in the CoA.

Ruling:

1. It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership
on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal
interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of
application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties
is entitled.
2. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole
membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing
one other party’s fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s
representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than their proportional representation
in the Senate.
3. This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate
that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional representation of the political
parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced the
representation of one political party- either the LAKAS-NUCD or the NPC. A party should have
at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the CoA. Where there are more than
2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one member senator cannot constitutionally claim a
seat. In order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each other in order to come up with
proportional representation especially since one party may have affiliations with the other party

16. Coop vs Sangguniang Panglungsod

Facts:

A subpoena was issued to Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac (petitioners), inviting them to an
investigation to be conducted by the ad hoc committee of Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Dumaguete in connection with the operations of public utilities, specifically that of Negros
Oriental Electric Cooperative II (NORELEC II). The petitioners did not appear on the said
investigation and SP attempted to punish them for legislative contempt. The ff were assailed: 1.
validity of the subpoena dated Oct. 25, 1985; and 2. The Order issued by the ad hoc committee
directing the petitioners to show cause why they should not be punished for legislative contempt
due to their failure to appear in the said investigation. Petitioners moved to quash the subpoena
on the ff grounds: a. The power to investigate, and to order the improvement of, alleged
inefficient power lines to conform to standards is lodged exclusively with the National
Electrification Administration (NEA), and b. Neither the Charter of the City of Dumaguete nor
the Local Govt Code grants any specific power to investigate alleged inefficient power lines of
NORECO. The motion to quash was denied, hence the petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction and restraining order.

Issue:

Whether or not the Sangguniang Panlungsod has the power to mandate the testimony of
witnesses and order punishment for those who fail to observe the subpoena.

Ruling:

The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power is a matter of self-preservation as that
branch of the government vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial branch,
asserts its authority and punishes contempts thereof. The contempt power of the legislature is,
therefore, sui generis, and local legislative bodies cannot correctly claim to possess it for the
same reasons that the national legislature does. The power attaches not to the discharge of
legislative functions per se but to the character of the legislature as one of the three independent
and coordinate branches of government. The same thing cannot be said of local legislative bodies
which are creations of law. there is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the
Local Government Code (granting local legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and
the power to punish non-members for contempt. The only possible justification for the issuance
of a subpoena and for the punishment of non-members for contumacious behavior would be for
said power to be deemed implied in the statutory grant of delegated legislative power. But the
contempt power and the subpoena power partake of a judicial nature. They cannot be implied in
the grant of legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere incidents of the performance of
legislative functions. To allow local legislative bodies or administrative agencies to exercise
these powers without express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of separation of
powers. WHEREFORE, the requiring of attendance and testimony of the petitioners at an
investigation should not be punished for legislative contempt for their disobedience of said
subpoena, is declared null and void for being ultra vires.

17. Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee

Facts:

The Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG), representing the Republic of the
Philippines, filed a complaint with Sandiganbayan against Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez and
Juliette Gomez Romualdez (alleged cronies of Marcos) accusing them of the ff: 1) obtaining
control of some big business enterprises such as MERALCO, Pilipinas Shell, and PCI Bank, (2)
manipulating the formation of Erectors Holding Inc, to appear viable and borrow more capital,
reaching a total of more that P2 billion, (3) collaborating with lawyers (petitioners therein) of the
Bengzon Law Offices in concealing funds and properties, in maneuvering the purported sale of
interests in certain corporations, in misusing the Meralco Pension Fund worth P25 million, and in
cleverly hiding behind the veil of corporate entity. Sen. Enrile delivered a speech before the
Senate on the purported take-over of SolOil Inc. by Ricardo Lopa, calling upon the Senate to
look into possible violations of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corruption). The Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee then started an investigation through a hearing on May 23, 1989. Petitioners were
subpoenaed to testify on what they know re the sale of 36 corporations belonging to Benjamin
Romualdez. Lopa and Bengzon refused to testify, invoking their rights to due process, and that
their testimony may unduly prejudice the defendants and petitioners in case before the
Sandiganbayan. The Blue Ribbon Committee rejected the petitioner’s plea to be excused from
testifying and continued its investigation on the matter. The petitioners filed for prohibition with
a prayer for TRO and/or injunctive relief, claiming that the SBRC in requiring their attendance
and testimony, acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose. The Supreme Court
intervened upon a motion for reconsideration filed by one of the defendants of the civil case.

Issue/s:

1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case.

2. Whether or not the SBRC's inquiry has valid legislative purpose.
3. whether or not the civil case of Sandiganbayan is beyond the power of the SBRC to inquire
into.
4. Whether or not the inquiry violates the petitioners' right to due process.

Ruling:

1. YES. As the court held in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, the Constitution provided for an
elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the
departments of the government, and it is the judiciary that was vested of the powers to determine
the scope, nature and extent of such powers.
2. NO. The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations is specifically provided for in
Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such
inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection with any
proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to any and all
matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Senate alone.
It appears, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really "in aid
of legislation" because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the
aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo
Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter
that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature.
3. NO. It cannot be said that the contemplated inquiry on the subject of the privilege speech of
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, i.e., the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to
Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group is to be conducted pursuant to Senate
Resolution No. 212 because, firstly, Senator Enrile did not indict the PCGG, and, secondly,
neither Mr. Ricardo Lopa nor the herein petitioners are connected with the government but are
private citizens.
4. Yes. The Constitution expressly provides that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected
by such inquiries shall be respected.
It should be emphasized that the constitutional restriction does not call for the banning or
prohibition of investigations where a violation of a basis rights is claimed. It only requires that in
the course of the proceedings, the right of persons should be respected.
What the majority opinion mandates is a blanket prohibition against a witness testifying at all,
simply because he is already facing charges before the Sandiganbayan. To my mind, the
Constitution allows him to interpose objections whenever an incriminating question is posed or
when he is compelled to reveal his court defenses, but not to refuse to take the witness stand
completely.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court holds that, under the facts, including the
circumtance that petitioners are presently impleaded as defendants in a case before the
Sandiganbayan, which involves issues intimately related to the subject of contemplated inquiry
before the respondet Committee, the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is hereby
enjoined from compelling the petitioners and intervenor to testify before it and produce evidence
at the said inquiry.
 
18. Senate vs. Ermita

Facts:

The Senate Committee issued invitations to various officials of the military and the executive
department to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing covering issues on the North Rail
Project, Wire-tapping activity of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(ISAFP), and the fertilizer scandal. Executive Secretary sent a letter to the Senate requesting that
the hearing be postponed so that the officials may have ample time to prepare but the Senate
refused the request. The President then issued EO 464 which mandated that “all heads of
departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President
prior to appearing before either House of Congress”. Pursuant to this, Ermita relayed to the
Senate that that the executive and AFP officials would not be able to attend the meeting since the
President has not yet given her consent. Despite the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen.
Gudani, among all the AFP officials invited, attended the investigation. Both faced court marshal
for such attendance.

Issue:

Whether or not EO 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in the Congress.

Ruling:

Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought
in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is
privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional
requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its
reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible. Resort to any means
then by which officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge information cannot be
presumed valid.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order
No. 464 (series of 2005), "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers,
Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials
Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other
Purposes," are declared VOID. Sections 1 and 2(a) are, however, VALID.

19. Arnault v. Nazareno

Facts:

In October of 1949, the Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two parcels of
land, known as Buenavista and Tambobong estates, to resolve the apparent irregularity of the
government’s payment to Ernest Burt, a non-resident American citizen, of the total sum of
Php1.5 million for his alleged interest in the two estates which he seemed to have forfeited long
before when he failed to make his payments to the original owners.
Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the subject transactions, was one of
the witnesses summoned by the Senate to its hearings. In the course of the investigation, the
petitioner repeatedly refused to divulge the name of the person to whom he gave the amount of
Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the Php1.5 million proceeds pertaining to Ernest Burt.
Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and was committed to the custody of the
Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment until he answers the questions. He thereafter filed a
petition for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of his
detention.

Issue/s:

1. Whether or not the Senate had the power to punish Arnault for contempt for refusing to reveal
the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000.
2. Whether of not the Senate lacked authority to commit him for contempt for a term beyond its
period of legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950.
3. Whether or not the privilege against self-incrimination protected Arnault from being
questioned.

Ruling:

1. Yes, the Senate did have the power to punish Arnault for contempt. Once an inquiry is
admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the
investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to
that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry,
to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary to the
exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member;
and every question which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be
material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or investigation. The materiality of the question
must be determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect
relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is, that the necessity or lack of
necessity for legislative action and the form and character of the action itself are determined by
the sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a
fraction of such information elicited from a single question.

2. Yes, the Senate did have the authority to commit him for contempt for a term beyond its
period of legislative session. Senate is a continuing body and which does not cease to exist upon
the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as
to time to the Senate’s power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may
constitutionally be exerted as in the present case. Senate will not be disposed to exert the power
beyond its proper bounds, i.e. abuse their power and keep the witness in prison for life. If proper
limitations are disregarded, Court is always open to those whose rights might thus be
transgressed.

3. No, the privilege against self-incrimination did not protect Arnault from being questioned.
Court is satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important question, which is the name
of that person to whom witness gave the P440,000, were obviously false. His insistent claim
before the bar of the Senate that if he should reveal the name he would incriminate himself,
necessarily implied that he knew the name. Moreover, it is unbelievable that he gave P440,000 to
a person to him unknown. “Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a
refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify would be so
punishable.” Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave
the P440,000 to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latter’s verbal instruction, Court
found no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might
incriminate him.

20. Balag v. Senate of the Philippines

Facts:

On September 17, 2017, Horacio Tomas T. Castillo III (Horacio III), a first year law student of
the University of Sto. Tomas (UST), died allegedly due to hazing conducted by the Aegis Juris
Fraternity (AJ Fraternity) of the same university. The Senate Committee on Public Order and
Dangerous Drugs invited Balag and several other persons to the Joint Public Hearing, but he did
not attend. The committee then issued 2 Subpoena Ad Testificandum addressed to petitioner
directing him to appear before the committee and to testify as to the subject matter under inquiry.
When he finally attended, when asked if he was the president of AJ Fraternity, he refused to
answer the question and invoked his right against self-incrimination multiple times and thus was
cited in contempt. He was given another chance to purge himself of the contempt charge and was
asked whether he knew whose decision it was to bring Horacio III to the Chinese General
Hospital instead of the UST Hospital. Balag apologized for his earlier statement and moved for
the lifting of his contempt. He admitted that he was a member of the AJ Fraternity but he was not
aware as to who its president was because, at that time, he was enrolled in another school, after
which he again invoked his right against self-incrimination for all other question asked of him.
The committee then ruled that his contempt would remain for testifying falsely and evasively
before the committee and thereby delaying, impeding, and obstructing the inquiry. He was
placed under the custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-arms.
Balag then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction seeking to annul, set aside and
enjoin the implementation of Senate P.S. Resolution (SR) No. 504 1 and the October 18, 2017
Order 2 (Contempt Order) of the Senate Committee on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs citing
Arvin Balag in contempt.

Issue:

Did the Senate Committee act in grave abuse of discretion in conducting a legislative inquiry?

Ruling:

Yes, however the court denied the petition for being moot and academic at the time since before
that, the court had already ordered the immediate release of Balag pending resolution of the
instant petition and he was no longer detained under the Senates authority. The existence of an
actual case or controversy is a necessary condition precedent to the court's exercise of its power
of adjudication.
However, the court still resolved the case because the petition presents a critical and decisive
issue that must be addressed by Court: what is the duration of the detention for a contempt
ordered by the Senate? The court ruled that the period of imprisonment under the inherent power
of contempt of the Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the
termination of the legislative inquiry. The Senate can continuously and effectively exercise its
power of contempt during the legislative inquiry against recalcitrant witnesses, even during
recess. Such power can be exercised by the Senate immediately when the witness performs a
contemptuous act, subject to its own rules and the constitutional rights of the said witness.
During recess, the Senate will be presented from effectively conducting legislative hearings. But
the Senate may still exercise its power of contempt during legislative hearings while on recess
provided that the period of imprisonment shall only last until the termination of the legislative
injury upon the approval or disapproval of the committee Report. Thus, the Senates inherent
power of contempt is still potent and compelling even during its recess. At the same time, the
rights of the persons appearing are respected because their detention shall not be indefinite.

21. Senate v. Ermita

Facts:

Due to alleged anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project in 2005, the Senate was
prompted to conduct a public hearing to investigate. The investigating Senate committee issued
invitations to certain department heads and military officials to speak before the committee as
resource persons, but Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend
the said hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga
likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, accepted the said requests for they
were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA
issued EO 464 which took effect immediately which prohibited Department heads, Senior
officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by
the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive
privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher
and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive
privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser
are covered by the executive privilege; and such other officers as may be determined by the
President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the
president’s approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then
invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with
only 2 military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyo’s order barring military
personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani
and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial
proceedings. EO 464’s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights
and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight
functions in the implementation of laws.

Issue:

Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.

Ruling:

The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of
EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987
Constitution. The Congress’ power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI
of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either
House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may
exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the
legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to
enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body
cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions
which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not
itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to
others who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely
related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the
Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be essential not only in
the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers
only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of
legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be
held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of
legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question
hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation.
Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not
be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power
to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be
used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the
objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.
Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section
21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power
of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress
exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves
therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are
department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power — the
President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except
through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive
branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by
a long-standing custom. The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1,
limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22,
Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is
discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department
heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the
refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is
subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the
statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the
President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their
performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of
powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in
which Congress requires their appearance is ‘in aid of legislation’ under Section 21, the
appearance is mandatory.

22. Neri vs. Senate Committee

Facts:

 Petitioner disclosed that then Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") Chairman

Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN
Project.
 He then informed President Arroyo of the bribery attempt, in which she instructed him
not to accept the bribe.
 When probed by the senate, Neri refuses to give some more information regarding the
alleged bribery going on behind the NBN Project. When asked further regarding the
conversation between Neri and President Arroyo on matters of the NBN project, he calls
for Executive Privilege.
 Executive Privilege is the power of the Government to withhold information from the
public, the courts, and the Congress.
 The Senate issued a contempt order against Neri and directed his arrest and detention.
Petitioner’s claims:
 The President is entitled to the confidentiality of her correspondences. This is necessary
for the protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh
opinions in Presidential decision-making.
 If the president is not protected by the confidentiality of conversations, it will hamper her
in the effective discharge of her duties and responsibilities. It might also impair our
economic relations with China.

Senate’s defense:
1. This is a violation to the people's right to information.
2. The Congress has a need to investigate the matter as it is crucial in their legislation of a
potential bill.
3. They contend that their Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation are beyond the reach of this Court.

Ruling:

1. The right to information does not extend to matters recognized as ‘privileged information’
under the separation of powers, by which the Court meant Presidential conversations,
correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings.
2. Congress may only investigate into the areas in which it may potentially legislate or
appropriate, it cannot inquire into matters which are within the exclusive province of one of the
other branches of the government. Lacking the judicial power given to the Judiciary, it cannot
inquire into matters that are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary. Neither can it supplant the
Executive in what exclusively belongs to the Executive.
3. The Court’s exercise of its power of judicial review is warranted because there appears to be a
clear abuse of the power of contempt on the part of respondent Committees.

23. Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary

Facts:

During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of
the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders have
seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP
and declared their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation of the
President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of Article
134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4,
the Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the
officers went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the
Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation
of the State of Rebellion was issued.

In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO
NG MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18
Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out
the AFP, and that there is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v.
Hon. Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention
of the report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to
submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they
contend that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers
as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v.
President MacapagalArroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there
was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of
rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the
crime of rebellion.

Issue/s:

Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional?

Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit?

Ruling:

The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are
constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion.
The President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution
executive powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the
armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may
examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting
grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their
assertion that the President acted without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of the
report is of no merit as there was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts
or that military authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation
of the legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since the President, in declaring a state
of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief
Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the
President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers
contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since
any person may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable
under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present.

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act
that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions. Based on the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS
Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen.
Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the subject issuances. It sustained
its decision in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the powers of
Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

24. Guingona, Jr. v. Carague

Facts:

The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for
debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General
Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS amount to
P27,017,813,000.00.

The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled “
Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty,
as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), “by PD No. 1177, entitled “Revising the Budget
Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society,” and by PD
No.1967, entitled “An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic
of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by
Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.”

The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt
service, it being higher than the budget for education, therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article
XIV of the Constitution which mandates to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education.”

Issue:

Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being higher
than the budget for education.

Ruling:

No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is
mandated to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education,” it does not thereby follow that
the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives
of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.

Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an
appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt…It is not only a matter of honor
and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our
economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service
bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation
cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional.

25. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance

Facts:

Republic Act 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that
seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by
amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits questioning and
challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.

Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively from the House of
Representatives but is a mere consolidation of House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill. No. 1630
and it did not pass three readings on separate days on the Senate thus violating Article VI,
Sections 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution, respectively.

Issue:

Whether or not RA 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 24 and Art. VI, Section 26(2) of the
Constitution.

Ruling:

No. The phrase “originate exclusively” refers to the revenue bill and not to the revenue law. It is
sufficient that the House of Representatives initiated the passage of the bill which may undergo
extensive changes in the Senate.

Senate Bill No. 1630, having been certified as urgent by the President need not meet the
requirement not only of printing but also of reading the bill on separate days.

26. Alvarez v. Guingona

Facts:

On April 18, 1993, House Bill No. 8817, entitled "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago," was filed in
the House of Representatives with Representative Antonio Abaya as principal author. The
enrolled bill, submitted to the President on April 12, 1994, was signed by the Chief Executive on
May 5, 1994 as Republic Act No. 7720. When a plebiscite on the Act was held on July 13, 1994,
a great majority of the registered voters of Santiago voted in favor of the conversion of Santiago
into a city.

Issue:

Whether or not Republic Act 7720 can be said to have originated in the House of Representatives
given that the Senate passed Senate Bill No. 142, its own version of House Bill No. 8817 (Note:
These are the Congress bills for RA 7720).

Ruling:
The claim of the petitioners is untenable because the HB 8817 was FILED FIRST in the House
of Representatives BEFORE Senate Bill No. 1243. Thus, the House Bill was preclusive of the
Republic Act as well as the Senate Bill. HB 8817 was the bill that initiated the legislative process
that culminated in the enactment of RA 7720, so there was no violation of Sec 24 Article 6 of the
Constitution.

• The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the
House, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should
originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it
receives the Housebill.

• The Constitution only means that the initiative for filing must come from the HoR since
the HoR members are more sensitive to local needs and problems. Meanwhile, the Senate
approaches the same problems from a national perspective.

• The Constitution also DOES NOT prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in
anticipation of its receipt of the House bill, as long as the action of the Senate is WITHHELD
pending the receipt of the House Bill.
26. Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works

Facts:

Governor Wenceslao Pascual of Rizal instituted this action for declaratory relief, with injunction,
upon the ground that RA No. 920, which appropriates funds for public works particularly for the
construction and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals. Some of the feeder roads,
however, as alleged and as contained in the tracings attached to the petition, were nothing but
projected and planned subdivision roads, not yet constructed within the Antonio Subdivision,
belonging to private respondent Zulueta, situated at Pasig, Rizal; and which projected feeder
roads do not connect any government property or any important premises to the main highway.
The respondents' contention is that there is public purpose because people living in the
subdivision will directly be benefitted from the construction of the roads, and the government
also gains from the donation of the land supposed to be occupied by the streets, made by its
owner to the government.

Issue:

Should incidental gains by the public be considered "public purpose" for the purpose of
justifying an expenditure of the government?

Ruling:

No. It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for
anything but a public purpose. It is the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure
which must determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the interest to be
affected nor the degree to which the general advantage of the community, and thus the public
welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidental to the public or to the state,
which results from the promotion of private interest and the prosperity of private enterprises or
business, does not justify their aid by the use public money.
The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether the
statute is designed to promote the public interest, as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage
of individuals, although each advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the public.