ALFONSO C. BINCE, JR., petitioner, vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF PANGASINAN, MUNICIPAL BOARDS OF CANVASSERS OF TAYUG AND SAN MANUEL, PANGASINAN, AND EMILIANO MICU, respondents. [G.R. Nos. 111624-25. March 9, 1995.] Ponente: KAPUNAN Facts: Petitioner Alfonso C. Bince, Jr. and private respondent Emiliano S. Micu were among the candidates in the synchronized elections of May 11, 1992 for a seat in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Pangasinan allotted to its Sixth Legislative District. Ten (10) municipalities, including San Quintin, Tayug and San Manuel, comprise the said district. During the canvassing of the Certificates of Canvass (COCs) for these ten (10) municipalities, respondent Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) on May 20, 1992, private respondent Micu objected to the inclusion of the COC for San Quintin on the ground that it contained false statements. Accordingly, the COCs for the remaining nine (9) municipalities were included in the canvass. On May 21, 1992, the PBC ruled against the objection of private respondent. From the said ruling, private respondent Micu appealed to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), which docketed the case as SPC No. 92-208.

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PABLO C. VILLABER, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and REP. DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, respondents. [G.R. No. 148326. November 15, 2001.] Ponente:

Facts: Petitioner Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cagas were rival candidates for a congressional seat in the First District of Davao del Sur during the May 14, 2001 elections. Cagas filed a consolidated petition to disqualify Villaber and to cancel the latter's certificate of candidacy for the reason that Villaber was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Manila for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and was sentenced to suffer one (1) year imprisonment. He claimed that the crime involved moral turpitude; hence, under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, he was disqualified to run for any public office. Villaber countered mainly that his conviction has not become final and executory and that it cannot be the basis for his disqualification since violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not involve moral turpitude. The Comelec disqualified Villaber as candidate and from holding any elective public office, and ruled that a conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude following the ruling of the Supreme Court in the administrative case of People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda. Villaber filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied by the Comelec en banc. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude. Held: The Supreme Court earlier ruled that the determination of whether a crime involves moral turpitude is a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute. In the case at bar, petitioner did not assail the facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime and in effect admitted all the elements of the crime for which he was convicted. Hence, the Court affirmed the decision of the Comelec and applied herein its ruling in People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda. In that case, Atty. Fe Tuanda's conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 resulted in her suspension from the practice of law on the ground that the said offense involves moral turpitude.

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CIRILO R. VALLES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ, respondents. [G.R. No. 137000. August 9, 2000.] Ponente: Purisima Facts: This is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolutions of the COMELEC, dismissing the petition for disqualification filed by petitioner against private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, in the May 1998 elections for governor of Davao Oriental. Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines. On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in Manila. Since then, she has continuously participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. She served as Provincial Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In 1992, she ran for and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Petitioner maintained that private respondent is an Australian citizen, not qualified to run for elective office, because: she is a holder of an Australian passport; and she expressly renounced her Filipino citizenship when she declared under oath in her application for alien certificate of registration and immigrant certificate of residence that she was a citizen or subject of Australia. Issue: Whether or not private respondent is disqualified from running for elective office because of her dual citizenship. Held: In dismissing the petition, the Supreme Court held that the mere fact that private respondent was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of Filipino citizenship. Renunciation must be express, to effectively result in the loss of Filipino citizenship. At most, private respondent had dual citizenship she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well. Dual citizenship as a disqualification refers to citizens with dual allegiance. Her filing of a certificate of candidacy, where she declared that she is a Filipino citizen and that she will support and defend the Philippine Constitution and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto, sufficed to renounce her foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as a dual citizen.

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MELANIO D. SAMPAYAN , DIEGO L. TURLA, JR., and LEONARDO G. TIOZON, petitioners, vs. RAUL. A. DAZA, HON. CAMILO SABIO, as Secretary of the House of Representatives, MR. JOSE MARIA TUAO, as Officer-in-Charge, Gen. Services Division of the House of Representatives, MRS. ROSALINDA G. MEDINA, as Chief Accountant of the House of Representatives, and the HON. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents. [G.R. No. 103903. September 11, 1992.] Ponente: Romero Facts: Petitioners, residents of the second Congressional District of Northern Samar filed the instant petition for prohibition seeking to disqualify respondent Raul Daza, then incumbent congressman of the same congressional district, from continuing to exercise the functions of his office, on the ground that the latter is a greencard holder and a lawful permanent resident of the United States since October 16, 1974. Petitioners allege that Mr. Daza has not, by any act or declaration, renounced his status as permanent resident, thereby violating Section 68 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (Omnibus Election Code) and Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Respondent Congressman Daza filed his comment denying the fact that he is a permanent resident of the United States; that although he was accorded a permanent residency status on October 8, 1980 as evidenced by a letter order of the District Director, US Immigration and Naturalization Service, Los Angeles, U.S.A., he had long waived his status when he returned to the Philippines on August 12, 1985. Issue: Whether or not respondent Daza should be disqualified as a member of the House of Representatives for violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. Held: The Supreme Court dismiss the instant prohibition case. First, the case is already moot and academic for it is evident from the manifestation filed by petitioners dated April 6, 1992 that they seek to unseat respondent from his position as Congressman for the duration of his term of office commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30, 1992. Secondly, jurisdiction of this case rightfully pertains to the House Electoral Tribunal. Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, it is the House Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of its members. Since petitioners challenge the qualifications of Congressman Daza, the appropriate remedy should have been to file a petition to cancel respondent Dazas certificate of candidacy before the election or a quo warranto case with the House Electoral Tribunal within ten (10) days after Dazas proclamation. Third, a writ of prohibition can no longer be issued against respondent since his term has already expired. A writ of prohibition is not intended to provide for acts already consummated. Fourth, as a de factopublic officer, 1 respondent cannot be made to reimburse funds disbursed during his term of office because his acts are as valid as those of
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a de jure officer. Moreover, as a de facto officer, he is entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. The Court Resolved to DISMISS the instant petition for being MOOT and ACADEMIC.

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his official capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. EMILIA T. BONCODIN, Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, respondents. [G.R. No. 157013. July 10, 2003.] Ponente: Bellosillo Facts: Petitioner Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, sought to declare certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 entitled, "An Act Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes" as unconstitutional. Petitioner contended that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding an election. Petitioner cited the ruling of the Court in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals to support his claim. In that case, the Court held that a "green card" holder immigrant to the United States is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence in the Philippines. Issue: Whether or not Sec. 5(d) of RA 9189 is unconstitutional. Held: The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189. According to the Court, Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the residency requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article. Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice versa; a person cannot be at the same time, both a resident and an absentee. However, under existing election laws and the countless pronouncements of the Court pertaining to elections, an absentee remains attached to his residence in the Philippines as residence is considered synonymous with domicile. Aware of the domiciliary legal tie that links an overseas Filipino to his residence in this country, the framers of the Constitution considered the circumstances that impelled them to require Congress to establish a system for overseas
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absentee voting. Thus, Section 2, Article V of the Constitution came into being to remove any doubt as to the inapplicability of the residency requirement in Section 1. It is precisely to avoid any problems that could impede the implementation of its pursuit to enfranchise the largest number of qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines that the Constitutional Commission explicitly mandated Congress to provide a system for overseas absentee voting. The Court, however, declared certain provisions of the law unconstitutional, namely, portions of Secs. 17.1, 19 and 25, as they trampled on the constitutional mandate of independence of the Commission on Elections. The Court also upheld Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 with respect only to the authority given to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for Senators and party-list representatives but not as to the power to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-President which is lodged with Congress under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. The Court likewise upheld Sec. 5 (d) of the law. It also declared that pursuant to Sec. 30 of the law the rest of the provision of said law continues to be in full force and effect.

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BENJAMIN T. LOONG, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTION

FACTS: This case stemmed from elections held in Sulu where LOONG and private respondent Tan ran for the position of Governor while petitioner Tulawie and private respondent Estino ran for Vice-Governor. The Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) recommended to the COMELEC a recanvass of the election returns of Parang and Talipao. COMELEC, accordingly, relieved all the regular members of the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) and ordered such recanvass by senior lawyers from the COMELEC office in Manila. During the re-canvass, private respondents objected to the inclusion in the canvass of the election returns of Parang. The reconstituted MBC, however, merely noted said objections and forwarded the same to respondent Provincial Board of Canvassers for resolution. Provincial Board of Canvassers denied the objections of private respondents and still included the election returns of Parang municipality. The canvass of respondent Provincial Board of Canvassers showed petitioners to have overwhelmingly won in the municipality of Parang. The private respondents filed petitions with the COMELEC regarding the inclusion of the questioned certificates of canvass and that there was failure of election in said municipality due to massive fraud Petitioners, likewise filed for failure of elections in 5 other municipalities. COMELEC ruled annulling the results of the elections in Parang as well as holding in abeyance the proclamation of the winning candidates for Governor and Vice-Governor until further orders from the Commission but dismissed other petitions for other municipalities where it was alleged that there were also badges of fraud. Issue: Ruling: COMELEC was incorrect in annulling elections of Parang, Sulu but not ordering for special elections in the same municipality. It was also incorrect in dismissing other petitions for failure of elections in other municipalities where there were also badges of fraud. The Supreme Court held that, before the COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election, two (2) conditions must concur: first, no voting has taken place in the precincts concerned on the date fixed by law or, even if there were voting, the election nevertheless resulted in a failure to elect; and, second, the votes not cast would affect the result of the election. We must add, however, that the cause of such failure of election should have been any of the following: force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes. This is an important consideration for, where the propriety of a pre-proclamation controversy ends, there may begin the realm of a special action for declaration of failure of elections. While the COMELEC is restricted, in pre-proclamation cases, to an examination of the election returns on their face and is without jurisdiction to go beyond or behind them and investigate election irregularities, the COMELEC is duty bound to investigate allegations of fraud, terrorism, violence and other analogous causes in actions for annulment of election results or for declaration of failure of elections, as the Omnibus Election Code denominates the same. Thus, the COMELEC, in the case of actions for annulment of election results or declaration of failure of elections, may conduct technical examination of election documents and compare and analyze voters' signatures and fingerprints in order to determine whether or not the elections had indeed been free, honest and clean. Needless to say, a pre-proclamation controversy is not the same as an action for annulment of election results or declaration of failure of elections
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The COMELEC was orderd to conduct special elections in the municipality of Parang, Sulu and was directed to supervise the counting of the votes and the canvassing of the results to the end that the winning candidates for Governor and Vice-Governor for the Province of Sulu be proclaimed as soon as possible.

WENCESLAO RANCAP LAGUMBAY, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CESAR CLIMACO, respondents. [G.R. No. L-25444. January 31, 1966.] Ponente: BENGZON

Facts:

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