MACAWIWILI GOLD MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CO., INC.

AND OMICO MINING

AND INDUSTIAL CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND PHILEX MINING
CORP.
GR. NO. 115104 | October 12, 1998 | Mendoza, J.

FACTS:
In 1992, Philex Mining Corporation filed a complaint for expropriation against petitioners
before the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet. Philex Mining sought to expropriate 21.9 hectares of
petitioners' mining areas where the latter's "Macawiwili claims" are located. Philex Mining
likewise moved for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin petitioners from
ejecting it (Philex Mining) from the mining areas sought to be expropriated.
RTC denied the application of Philex Mining for a preliminary injunction. In 1993, RTC
dismissed the complaint of Philex Mining. A motion for reconsideration was filed by Philex
Mining but was denied.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on the ground that only questions of law were
involved and, therefore, the appeal should be to the Supreme Court. However, the appellate
court denied petitioners' motion in a resolution. Without filing a motion for reconsideration,
petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari.
Respondent Philex Mining seeks the dismissal of the petition on the ground that petitioner
should have filed a motion for reconsideration giving the appellate court an opportunity to
correct itself.
Petitioners argue that the question whether respondent has a right to expropriate petitioner’s
mining areas under Sec. 59 of Presidential Decree No. 463 is a question of law. On the other
hand, Philex Mining maintains that the issues raised in its appeal are factual and, therefore, the
appellate court is the proper forum for the ventilation of the issues.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s
Motion to Dismiss Appeal.

RULING:
Yes. Rule 42 provides that appeals from judgments of the regional trial courts in the exercise of
their appellate jurisdiction must be brought to the Court of Appeals, whether the appellant
raises questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.

The rules on appeals from the judgments of the regional trial courts in civil cases may thus be
summarized as follows:

(1) Original Jurisdiction — In all cases decided by the regional trial court in the exercise of their
original jurisdiction, appeal may be made to:

(a) Court of Appeals — where the appellant raises questions of fact or mixed questions of fact
and law, by filing a mere notice of appeal.

(b) Supreme Court — where the appellant solely raises questions of law, by filing a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45.

(2) Appellate Jurisdiction

All appeals from judgments rendered by the regional trial courts in the exercise of their
appellate jurisdiction, whether the appellant raises questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions
of fact and law, shall be by filing a petition for review under Rule 42.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner vs. CRISPIN D. RAMOS and

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS
G.R. No. 181664 November 14, 2012

FACTS:
In January 2000, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and Crispin D.
Ramos (respondent) entered into a contract of sale over a portion of land affected by a bridge
construction project. As per the recitals of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the property sold is co-
owned but respondent was the sole vendee.
Accordingly, the agreed consideration of P570,000.00 was paid by DPWH to respondent by
debiting the said amount from the latter’s account with Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)
which credited such fund to the deposit/account of respondent.
Respondent was able to withdraw from the aforesaid account P100,000.00. In a letter, DPWH
requested petitioner to hold in abeyance the release of payment to respondent while it sought a
legal opinion from the DPWH Central Office in Manila. It appears that earlier, Jose, a brother of
respondent, wrote the DPWH saying that as co-owner of the property bought by DPWH, he is
also entitled to his share in the proceeds of the sale.
Under 1st Indorsement, DPWH Legal Services Director Abundo opined that:
It is worthy to mention that until now the property is still owned in common by the heirs,
therefore, all should participate or share in the proceeds of the payment.
In view of the foregoing, no release/payment should be made until such time that the issue is
settled.
Respondent filed a Complaint for "Recovery of Bank Deposit With Damages" in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Lingayen, Pangasinan against petitioner, its Branch Manager, and Field
Attorney.

Petitioner filed its Answer asserting that it was forced to litigate in a baseless suit which did not
implead DPWH as the real party defendant. With leave of court, it filed a Third-Party
Complaint against DPWH.
In its Answer, DPWH contended that it was well within its right to request that payment to
respondent be held in abeyance. Absent any actual partition, respondent cannot appropriate as
his own, that portion of Lot 7382 sought to be acquired by DPWH, which is owned pro-indiviso
by all the co-owners who are also entitled to receive their equal share of the payment. Hence,
DPWH asserted that it does not incur any liability for its action, the same being legal and
justifiable under the circumstances.

The parties agreed to submit the case for a judgment on the pleadings.
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of DPWH. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court. DPWH had separately filed a notice of
appeal but subsequently filed a motion to withdraw appeal which was granted by the CA.
However, the CA dismissed the appeal after finding that it raised only pure questions of law.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing the case.

RULING:
Yes. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the
issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is
clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.
Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such
question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine
the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of
law; otherwise it is a question of fact.

In this case, petitioner’s appeal did not raise only questions of law but also questions of fact.
Petitioner assailed not just the trial court’s alleged error in applying the law on the nature of
relation of the parties, particularly on the rights of DPWH to request withholding of release of
payment and of petitioner as depositary bank to comply with such request, but also on the
factual basis for the grant of damages (litigation and attorney’s fees) in favor of respondent. The
discretion of the court to award attorney's fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands
factual, legal, and equitable justification, without which the award is a conclusion without a
premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and conjecture.

Since the appeal raised mixed questions of law and fact, the CA clearly erred in dismissing the
case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO, LOLITO VICTORIANO,

JACOB OBANIA AND DOMINGO CABACUNGAN, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO, namely: FE,
CORAZON, JOSEFA, SALVADOR and CARMEN, all surnamed DEL MUNDO, LAND
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. ANTONIO N. ROSALES, Presiding Judge,
Branch 43, Regional Trial Court, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, Respondent.
G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005

FACTS:
Petitioners Neypes, et. Al. filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or
reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court, of
Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land
Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo.

In the course of the proceedings, both the petitioner and respondents filed several motions with
the trial court. Petitioners filed a motion to declare respondents’ in default, and the latter filed a
motion to dismiss.
The trial court dismissed petitioners’ complaint (and also the motion for reconsideration) on the
ground that the action had already prescribed. Thus, five days later, petitioners filed a notice of
appeal and paid the appeal fees. However, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding
that it was filed eight days late. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the Court of Appeals.
In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal.
They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998
since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for
reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had
elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal.

The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal
should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998
order dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the "final
order" appealable under the Rules.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision but was denied.
In this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules,

ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioners filed their notice of appeal in time.

RULING:
Yes. Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of judgment or final order to
appeal the decision of the trial court. On the 15th day of the original appeal period (March 18,
1998), petitioners did not file a notice of appeal but instead opted to file a motion for
reconsideration. According to the trial court, the MR only interrupted the running of the 15-day
appeal period. It ruled that petitioners, having filed their MR on the last day of the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal, had only one (1) day left to file the notice of appeal upon receipt
of the notice of denial of their MR. Petitioners, however, argue that they were entitled under the
Rules to a fresh period of 15 days from receipt of the final order or the order dismissing their
motion for reconsideration.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity
to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within
which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the
Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the
Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies
to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The
new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the
order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or
any final order or resolution.
Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order
denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well
within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed. Thus, petitioners seasonably
filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the
date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration).
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt
of
the Regional Trial Courts decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the final
order) denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-
day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final
and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.

ANITA C. VIANZON, Heir of the Late Lucila Candelaria Gonzales, Petitioner,

vs.
MINOPLE MACARAEG, Respondents.
G.R. No. 171107 September 5, 2012

FACTS:
The subject land formed part of the 10-hectare Lot No. 657 earlier awarded to the late Pedro. In
1950, Pedro hired Minople to work on Lot 657. In 1956, Pedro divided Lot 657 among his four
children, including Lucila. Eventually, Lucila’s undivided share became Lot No. 1222, the
subject landholding.

In 1960, Lucila and the Land Tenure Administration (LTA, now the Department of Agrarian
Reform) entered into a contract denominated as "Agreement to Sell No. 5216" involving Lot No.
1222.

After almost 30 years, or in 1989, Lucila’s representative, Anita, executed a deed of absolute sale
in favor of her daughter, Redenita. In connection with this, Minople also affixed his signature
on a document denominated as "Waiver of Right" purportedly relinquishing all his rights as
well as his interest over the same property in favor of Redenita.

Soon thereafter, Anita filed two applications to purchase the subject property – one in 1990 and
the other on August 7, 1996. Minople, however, also filed his own application to purchase the
same land on September 9, 1996. These conflicting claims were brought before the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR). The Chief of the Legal Division of the DAR Provincial Office
recommended that the subject land be "divided equally" between the two applicants since both
had been in some way "remiss in their obligations under the agrarian rules." The Officer-in-
Charge Regional Director (RD) issued a corresponding order dividing the subject property
equally between the parties. According to him, the parties were "in pari delicto, the most
equitable solution is to award the property to both of them."

Minople sought reconsideration but this was treated as an appeal by the RD and was elevated
to the DAR Secretary, who set aside the order and upheld Minople’s right over the property. In
setting aside the RD order, the DAR Secretary found that it was Minople who was the "actual
possessor/ cultivator of the lot in consideration." He pointed out that Lucila’s act of "hiring"
Minople to render service pertaining to all the aspects of farming did not only violate the old
LTA Administrative Order (A.O.) but it also contravened the very undertaking made by
Lucila’s representative and heir, Anita, in her latest sales application warranting its rejection.

Aggrieved, Anita appealed to the OP. The OP issued a minute decision affirming in toto the
Order of the DAR Secretary.

Anita then moved for reconsideration. The OP, giving weight to the "Agreement to Sell No.
5216" between Lucila and the DAR’s predecessor (the LTA), issued a resolution reversing and
setting aside its minute decision and declaring Lucila as "the legitimate and lawful purchaser/
beneficiary of the landholding in question."

Not in conformity, Minople elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for review under Rule
43. In upholding Minople’s right to the subject land, the CA anchored its Decision on Section 22
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).
According to the CA, Minople had been working on the contested lot since 1950, as a tenant and
performing all aspects of farming and sharing in the harvest of the land, in conformity with
DAR’s A.O. No. 3, Series of 1990, pursuant to the CARL.

Undaunted, Anita is now before this Court via this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court of appeals seriously erred in passing over the merits of the petition for
review filed by the respondent before the said court despite the fact that respondent therein
filed the same beyond the reglementary period for filing the same.

RULING:
No. Indeed, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and the period prescribed by law is
mandatory and jurisdictional. Necessarily, the failure to conform to the rules will render the
judgment for review final and unappealable. By way of exception, however, minor lapses are at
times disregarded in order to give due course to appeals filed beyond the reglementary period
on the basis of strong and compelling reasons, such as serving the ends of justice and
preventing a grave miscarriage thereof. The period for appeal is set in order to avoid or prevent
undue delay in the administration of justice and to put an end to controversies. It is there not to
hinder the very ends of justice itself. The Court cannot have purely technical and procedural
imperfections as the basis of its decisions. In several cases, the Court held that "cases should be
decided only after giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses."

There is no denying that the controversy between the parties involves the very right over a
considerable spread of land. In fact, it is Anita’s position that the opposing parties in this case
"have equal substantive rights over the lot in question." It was, therefore, correct on the part of
the CA not to permit a mere procedural lapse to determine the outcome of this all too important
case. It must be noted that the CA was the first level of judicial review, and coming from the
OP’s vacillating stance over the controversy, it was but correct to afford the parties every chance
to ventilate their cause. Considering further that the party who failed to meet the exacting limits
of an appeal by a mere seven days was an old farmer who was not only unlearned and
unskilled in the ways of the law but was actually an illiterate who only knew how to affix his
signature, certainly, to rule based on technicality would not only be unwise, but would be
inequitable and unjust. All told, the Court sanctions the CA ruling allowing the petition for
review of Minople.

AURORA B. GO, Petitioner, vs. ELMER SUNBANUN,* GEORGIE S. TAN, DORIS

SUNBANUN and RICHARD SUNBANUN, Respondents.
 G.R. No. 168240 February 9, 2011

FACTS:
In 2000, respondents filed a suit for damages against Aurora, her husband Sang, and Yiu-Go
Employment Agency before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu. The respondents claimed
that the spouses occupied the ground floor portion of their under a one-year lease contract and
had used the premises as the business office of Yiu-Go Employment Agency. This allegedly
increased the risk of loss by fire, and thus a breach of warranty in the fire insurance policies that
the respondents made which described the property as residential type.

Only Aurora filed her Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counter-Claim. She averred that
they already left the premises sometime in 2001 and that during the entirety of their stay, they
used the leased floor as a private residence and as a lodging house. She denied that their
employment agency held office there. She also pointed out that the lease contract was
terminated when the one-year term expired in July 1996, and that she was not privy to the
contracts of insurance since she was not informed of the contracts’ existence.

After the respondents concluded their presentation of evidence, Aurora moved that her
testimony be taken by deposition upon written interrogatories, as she was unsure as to when
she could come home to the Philippines considering that her work schedule as a court
interpreter in Hong Kong is erratic. She averred that arrangements have already been made
with the Philippine consulate in Hong Kong to take her deposition. Over the objection of the
respondents, the RTC granted Aurora’s motion in 2002. However, Aurora’s deposition was
taken in 2004 after her follow-up letter to the Philippine consulate.

Before this deposition was taken, the RTC in its Order already deemed the defendants to have
waived their right to present their evidence and considered the case submitted for resolution
since more than a year had elapsed from the date the RTC granted Aurora’s motion to have her
testimony be taken by deposition. Again, only Aurora moved for reconsideration and prayed
that the Order be recalled and instead admit the deposition. She attributed the delay of her
deposition-taking to the consulate’s fault, as she was passed from one officer to another or no
officer was available.

The RTC rendered judgment finding only Aurora liable and ordering her to pay moral
damages, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs. The trial court disregarded her two-page
transcript of deposition.

Aurora’s former counsel of record, Atty. Ycong, belatedly discovered about this adverse
judgment when he received from respondents’ counsel a Motion to Direct Issuance of Entry of
Judgment and Writ of Execution. It turned out that although he had already previously
informed the court of his new office address, the court mistakenly sent the Decision to his
former office address. Finding this point meritorious, the court denied respondents’ motion,
ruling that the judgment against Aurora has not yet attained finality as the 15-day period to
appeal, counted from March 16, 2004, has not yet lapsed.

Aurora filed her Motion for Reconsideration on the last day to file her appeal. The court in its
Order denied said motion.
Atty. Ycong received the notice of denial, thus giving his client a day left to file her appeal.
Explaining that Aurora has been busy campaigning for the local elections as she was running
for the position of town mayor in Calubian, Leyte and that he and his client have yet to discuss
the pros and cons of appealing the case, Atty. Ycong sought for the relaxation of the procedural
rules by filing an extension of 15 days to file Aurora’s notice of appeal.
The RTC denied the notice of appeal.

Accordingly, the Motion for Extension of Time to File Notice of Appeal is DENIED for lack of
merit and the Notice of Appeal is hereby declared filed out of time.

Aurora sought for reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC.

Filing her petition for certiorari with the CA by way of registered mail Aurora claimed that the
RTC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to relax the period for filing the notice of appeal.

However, the CA on dismissed the petition for being procedurally flawed.

Invoking the liberal construction of procedural rules, Aurora asked for reconsideration but was
denied.

ISSUE:
Whether the formal deficiencies in the petition before the CA may be relaxed in the interest of
justice.

RULING:
Yes. The signatures/authorizations of Sang and Yiu-Go Employment Agency in the verification
and certification on non-forum shopping are not necessary. The signatures may be dispensed
with as these parties are not involved in the petition.
Non-submission of certified true copy of the January 26, 2004 Decision and copies of the
Complaint and Answer is not fatal. Not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to
be attached, but only those which are material and pertinent that they may provide the basis for
a determination of a prima facie case for abuse of discretion.
Failure to indicate PTR and IBP Official Receipt Numbers are not fatal. The failure of
petitioner’s former counsel, Atty. Ycong, to indicate in the petition before the CA his PTR and
IBP numbers for the year 2004 was obviously an oversight.
However, whenever practicable, personal service and personal filing of pleadings are always
the preferred modes of service. Should one deviate from the general rule, it is mandatory for
him/her to submit a written explanation why the pleading was not personally filed/served.
Otherwise, the court has the discretion to consider the paper as not filed. Therefore, there was
no grave abuse on the part of the CA in exercising its discretion to dismiss Aurora’s petition.

In spite of petitioner’s error, the ‘fresh period rule’ amendment as held in Neypes v. Court of
Appeals will be applied to her benefit.
"[P]rocedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure." Neypes, which we
rendered in September 2005, has been applied retroactively to a number of cases wherein the
original period to appeal had already lapsed subsequent to the denial of the motion for
reconsideration. Aurora’s situation is no exception, and thus she is entitled to benefit from the
amendment of the procedural rules.
The denial of Aurora’s Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court’s January 26, 2004 decision
was received by her former counsel on May 6, 2004. Sans her motion for extension to file a
notice of appeal, with the fresh period rule under Neypes, she still has until May 21, 2004 to file
her notice of appeal and thus, had timely filed her notice of appeal on May 11, 2004.

ANGELINA PAHILA-GARRIDO, Petitioner,

vs.
ELIZA M. TORTOGO, LEONILA FLORES, ANANIAS SEDONIO, ADELINO MONET,
ANGIE MONET, JUANITO GARCIA, ELEONOR GARCIA, BENITA MOYA, JULIO
ALTARES, LEA ALTARES, CLARITA SABIDO, JULIE ANN VILLAMOR,JUANITA
TUALA, VICTOR FLORES III, JOHNNY MOYA, HAZEL AVANCEÑA, SONIA
EVANGELIO, and GENNY MONTAÑO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 156358 August 17, 2011

FACTS:
Domingo Pahila commenced in the MTCC in Bacolod City an action for ejectment with prayer
for preliminary and restraining order to evict several defendants, including the respondents
herein, from his properties. He amended the complaint to implead the spouses of some of the
defendants. However, he died during the pendency of the action, and his surviving spouse,
herein Angelina Pahila-Garrido, was substituted for him.

The defendants were divided into two discrete groups. The first group, represented by Atty.
Subaldo, relied on the common defense of being agricultural tenants on the land. The second
group, on the other hand, was represented by Atty. de la Fuente of the Public Attorney’s Office
(PAO) and their common defense was that the plaintiff’s title was not valid because their
respective portions were situated on foreshore land along the Guimaras Strait, and thus their
respective areas were subject to their own acquisition from the State as the actual occupants.

After the parties submitted their respective position papers, the MTCC rendered a decision in
favor of the petitioner and against the defendants except the defendant Damiana Daguno.

The prayer for preliminary injunction/restraining order is denied for lack of basis.

All the defendants appealed. The RTC in Bacolod City affirmed the decision of the MTCC.

Only the second group, which includes respondents herein, appealed the RTC’s decision to the
Court of Appeals (CA), insisting that the land was foreshore land and that the petitioner’s title
was not valid. Considering that the first group did not appeal, the RTC’s decision became final
and executory as to them.

The CA dismissed the second group’s appeal, and later denied their motion for reconsideration.
The respondents herein appealed the dismissal to the Court via a petition for certiorari (G.R.
No. 143458), but the Court rejected their recourse and issued an entry of judgment.
In the meantime, the MTCC amended its decision to correct typographical errors in the
description of the properties involved. None of the parties objected to or challenged the
corrections.
The MTCC issued the writ of execution upon the petitioner’s motion. The writ of execution was
duly served upon all the defendants, including the respondents, as the sheriff’s return of service
indicated.
The respondents filed a motion to quash against the writ of execution and its aliases, and a
motion to stay the execution of the decision and the amended decision. They anchored their
motions on the supposedly supervening finding that the lot covered by the writ of execution
was foreshore land belonging to the State. To support their contention, they presented several
administrative issuances from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR.
They argued that such supervening event directly affected the execution of the decision and its
amendment, whose continued execution affecting foreshore land would be unjust to the
occupants or possessors of the property, including themselves.
The MTCC denied the respondents’ motion to quash, observing that the cancellation of the
petitioner’s title was an event that might or might not happen, and was not the supervening
event that could stay the execution. A month later, the MTCC denied the respondents’ motion
for reconsideration.
The story would have ended then but for more than a year after the writ of execution was
served upon the defendants, the respondents, led by respondent Tortogo, and now assisted by
Atty. Leon Moya, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition (with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order) in the RTC in Negros Occidental which
was granted.
The petitioner sought a clarificatory order, moving that the TRO be vacated due to its being
effective for only twenty days and because such effectivity could neither be extended nor be
made indefinite. She complained that her hands had already been tied for a year from executing
the decision and from availing herself of the writ of demolition; and pleaded that it was time to
give her justice in order that she could already enjoy the possession of the property.

The respondents moved for the early resolution of the case and for the issuance of the writ of
prohibitory injunction.

The RTC issued the assailed writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction.

The petitioner then directly came to the Court through her so-called "petition for review on
certiorari," seeking to annul and set aside the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction issued
by the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether the judgment rendered on 12 November 2002 was a final order and should be subject
of an appeal.

RULING:
No. November 12, 2002 order of the RTC is an interlocutory order that was not subject of
appeal.
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first
disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action,
leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined,
but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided
upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to
be held and the judgment rendered.
The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: does the
order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the
case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.

The order dated November 12, 2002, which granted the application for the writ of preliminary
injunction, was an interlocutory, not a final, order, and should not be the subject of an appeal.
The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of
appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the merits of
the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily
delay the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable length of time, and will compel the
adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many
appeals as there are incidental questions raised by him and as there are interlocutory orders
rendered or issued by the lower court. An interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal,
but only after a judgment has been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being
included in the appeal of the judgment itself.

The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special
civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be
resorted to.