DONATO v.

LUNA
ART. 36 – Prejudicial Question

LEONILO C. DONATO, petitioner, v.

A case for annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy
case against the accused only if it is proved that the petitioner’s consent to such marriage was
obtained by means of duress, violence, and intimidation in order to establish that his act in the
subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as such the same cannot be the basis for
conviction.

FACTS: On 23 January 1979, the City Fiscal of Manila acting thru Assistant City Fiscal Amado
Cantor filed an information for bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Donato with the CFI of
Manila. The information was filed based on the complaint of private respondent Paz Abayan.

On 28 September 1979, before Donato’s arraignment, Abayan filed with the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Manila a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage
with Donato contracted on 26 September 1978. The civil case was based on the ground that
Abayan consented to entering into the marriage without knowing that Donato was already
married to Rosalinda Maluping on 30 June 1978.

In said civil case, Donato interposed the defense that his second marriage (with Abayan) was
void because (1) it was solemnized without a marriage license and (2) that Abayan employed
force, violence, intimidation, and undue influence to obtain Donato’s consent to the marriage.
Prior to the solemnization of the second marriage, Donato and Abayan had lived together as
husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for five years, as evidenced by a joint affidavit
executed by them on 26 September 1978, for which reason, the requisite marriage license was
dispensed with pursuant to Art. 76 of the Civil Code.

Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of the criminal case for bigamy, Donato filed a
motion to suspend the proceedings of the said case, contending that the abovementioned civil
case seeking the annulment of his second marriage raises a prejudicial question which must
first be determined or decided before the criminal case can proceed.

Hon. Artemon Luna (Judge, CFI of Manila) denied the said motion for suspension. His basis for
denial is the ruling laid down in the case of Landicho v. Relova. Subsequently, a motion for
reconsideration was filed by Donato, citing as one of his grounds for suspension the ruling laid
down in the case of De la Cruz v. Ejercito, which was a much later case than Landicho. Said
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, the present petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction.
DONATO v. LUNA
ART. 36 – Prejudicial Question

ISSUE: Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the CFI of Manila should be
suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court on the ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question.

RULING: No. The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in this case.

A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of which
question is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. It is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to
suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately
related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined. A prejudicial question usually comes into play in
a situation where a civil action and a criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue
raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in a criminal case.

The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in this case. The issue before the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not
determinative of Donato’s guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was
Donato’s second wife, Paz Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of the second
marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit.

Donato raised the argument that the second marriage should have been declared null and void
on the ground of force, threats, and intimidation allegedly employed against him by Abayan only
sometime later when he was required to answer the civil case for annulment of the second
marriage.

The doctrine in Landicho v. Relova may be applied in this case. Said case states that:

The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused
in a bigamy case does not mean that prejudicial questions are automatically raised in
civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the criminal case. In order that the case of
annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against
the accused, it must be shown that the petitioner’s consent to such marriage must be the
one that was obtained by means of duress, force, and intimidation to show that his act
on the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for
the crime of bigamy.

Pursuant to Landicho v. Relova, Donato cannot apply the rule on prejudicial questions since a
case for annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case
against the accused only if it is proved that the petitioner’s consent to such marriage was
obtained by means of duress, violence, or intimidation in order to establish that his act in the
DONATO v. LUNA
ART. 36 – Prejudicial Question

subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as such the same cannot be the basis for
conviction. The preceding elements do not exist in this case.

As to Donato’s contention that De la Cruz v. Ejercito is a later case and as such it should be the
one applied to this case, the Court cannot agree. The situation in this case is markedly different.
In De la Cruz v. Ejercito, it was accused Milagros dela Cruz who was charged with bigamy and
was also the one who filed an action for annulment on the ground of duress, as compared from
this case wherein it was private respondent Abayan, Donato’s second wife, who filed a
complaint for annulment.

ADDN. NOTES:

Donato merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to evade the prosecution of the criminal
case. Prior to Donato’s second marriage on 26 September 1978, he had been living with
Abayan as husband and wife for more than five years without the benefit of marriage. Thus,
Donato’s contention that his consent was obtained by Abayan thru force, violence, intimidation,
and undue influence in entering a second marriage is belied by the fact that both Donato and
Abayan executed an affidavit which stated that they had lived together as husband and wife
without benefit of marriage for five years.

Another event which militates Donato’s contentions is the fact that it was only when the civil
case for annulment was filed on 28 September 1979, or more than the lapse of one year from
the solemnization of the second marriage that Donato came up with the story that his consent to
the marriage was secured thru the use of force, violence, intimidation, and undue influence.
Donato also continued to live with Abayan until November 1978, when Abayan left their abode
upon learning that Leonilo Donato was already previously married.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.