G.R. No.

L-21064 June 30, 1970 proceedings shall be instituted or prosecuted against the present occupants of any lot in said Tatalon
Estate, and no ejectment proceedings already commenced shall be continued, and such lot or any
portion thereof shall not be sold by the owners of said estate to any person other than the present
J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., petitioner-appellee, occupant without the consent of the latter given in a public instrument." 3 The question before the,
vs. Court, according, to the opinion penned by Justice Bautista Angelo, was: "Are the provisions embodied
THE LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL and THE AUDITOR in the amendatory Act which prescribe that upon approval of said Act no ejectment proceedings shall
GENERAL, respondents-appellants. be instituted or prosecuted against any occupant of any lot in the Tatalon Estate, or that no ejectment
proceedings already commenced shall be continued, constitutional and valid such that it may be said
Araneta, Mendoza and Papa for petitioner-appellee. that the Court of Appeals abused its discretion in denying the petitions for suspension filed by
petitioners.?" 4

Besa, Aguilar and Gancia, Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General
Frine' C. Zaballero, Solicitor Rosalio A. de Leon and Special Attorney Magno B. Pablo for respondents- Then came this portion of the opinion: "This is not the first time that this Court has been called upon to
appellants. pass upon the validity of a provision which places a landowner in the situation of losing his dominical
rights over the property without due process or compensation. We refer to the provisions of Republic
Act 2616 before they were amended by Republic Act No. 3453. Note that, as originally provided,
RESOLUTION Republic Act No. 2616 prohibited the institution of an ejectment proceeding against any occupant of
any lot in the Tatalon Estate or the continuance of one that has already been commenced after the
expropriation proceedings shall have been initiated and during the pendency of the same. On the
surface this provision would appear to be valid if the same is carried out in the light of the provisions of
our Constitution relative to cases of eminent domain, for in that case the rights of the owner of the
FERNANDO, J.: property to be expropriated are protected. But then an attempt came to circumvent that provision in an
effort to safeguard or protect the interest of some occupants of the land, which reached this Court for
adjudication, as when some occupants attempted to block their ejectment upon the plea that the
From our decision of February 18, 1970, reversing the judgment of the lower court holding that government would soon start expropriation proceedings even if no sufficient funds were appropriated
Republic Act No. 2616 as amended is unconstitutional, printed motion for reconsideration was filed by to provide compensation to the owner and even if it was not in a position to take possession of the
petitioner-appellee on March 31, 1970 reiterating its arguments as to its alleged invalidity for being estate, and so the owner contested the attempt invoking its rights under the Constitution. And this
violative of the due process and equal protection guarantees. On May 27, 1970, a detailed opposition Court upheld the contention of the owner by declaring the attempt unconstitutional." 5
to such a motion for reconsideration was filed by the Solicitor General, the Honorable Felix Q. Antonio,
on behalf of respondents-appellants. Then came a rejoinder of petitioner, on June 15, 1970, to the
pleading of the Solicitor General. The motion for reconsideration is thus ripe for determination. With The conclusion that inevitably was called for is worded thus: "It is, therefore, imperative that we
due recognition of the vigor and earnestness with which petitioner argued its motion, based on what it declare, as we now do, that Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3453 which prohibits the filing of an
considered to be our applicable decisions, the Court cannot grant the same. Our decision stands. ejectment proceeding, or the continuance of one that has already been commenced, even in the
absence of expropriation proceedings offends our Constitution and, hence, is unenforceable." 6

1. It was a unanimous Court that could not locate a constitutional infirmity vitiating Republic Act No.
2616 directing the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate in Quezon City. There are points of differences in What we said then, we reaffirm now, as was indeed evident in our decision sought to be reconsidered
the three written opinions, but there is none as to the challenged legislative act being invulnerable on but perhaps not given the importance which, in the opinion of petitioner-appellee, it was entitled to.
the grounds therein asserted to justify its sought for nullification. While, to repeat, petitioner apparently Nothing in our decision can be taken to detract in any wise from the binding force and effect of the
remains unconvinced, standing fast on the contentions to which it would seek to impart greater Cuatico ruling which declared unconstitutional Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3453.
plausibility, still the intent of the framers of the Constitutional Convention, as shown not only by the
specific provisions allowing the expropriation of landed estates, but also by the social justice provision
4. We likewise ruled that the mistake imputed to Congress in apparently recognizing the rights of
as reflected in our decisions, save possibly Republic vs. Baylosis, 1 preclude a favorable action on the
ownership in entities or individuals not possessed of the same could not invalidate the challenged
impassioned plea of petitioner for a reconsideration of our decision. At any rate, petitioner-appellee can
statute. In the same way, it cannot be made the basis for non-existent rights of ownership to the
take comfort in the separate opinion of Justice Teehankee, with which four other members of the
property in question. It is in that sense that, as noted in our decision, no fear need be entertained that
Court, including the Chief Justice, are in agreement, to enable it to raise questions, the answers to
thereby the petitioner-appellee would be adversely affected. The government certainly would not pay to
which, if its view would be sustained, would certainly afford sufficient protection to what it believes to
a party other than the owner the claim for just compensation which, under the Constitution, it is
be an unconstitutional infringement on its property rights.
required to meet. Neither, then can any party who is not in that situation have any standing
whatsoever. This much is beyond dispute. To repeat, the apprehension entertained by petitioner-
2. It may not be amiss to make more explicit and categorical what was held in our opinion that Section appellee, perhaps indicative of it, excess of caution, is without legal foundation.
4 of Republic Act No. 2616 prohibiting a suit for ejectment proceedings or the continuance of one
already commenced even in the absence of expropriation proceedings, is unconstitutional, as held
WHEREFORE, the motion for the reconsideration of our decision of February 18, 1970, filed by
in Cuatico v. Court of Appeals. 2 Greater emphasis likewise should be laid on our holding that while an
petitioner-appellee, is denied.
inaccuracy apparent on the face of the challenged statute as to the ownership of the Tatalon Estate
does not suffice to call for its invalidity, still to erase even a fanciful doubt on the matter, the statement
therein found in Section 1 of the Act that in addition to petitioner-appellee, Gregorio Araneta & Co., Inc. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ.,
and Florencio Deudor, et al. are included, cannot be understood as conferring on any juridical or concur.
natural persons, clearly not entitled thereto, dominical rights over such property in question.

3. In the aforesaid decision of Cuatico v. Court of Appeals, reference was made to the amendatory Act,
Republic Act No. 3453 to Section 4 as it originally was worded in Republic Act No. 2616, the
amendment consisting of the following: "Upon approval of this amendatory Act, no ejectment