BAYOG case 156

vs.

HON. ANTONIO M. NATINO (258 SCRA 378) Related Topic:

HOW JURISDICTION IS CONFERRED AND DETERMINED

Facts: Magdato had been issued a Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold over a land owned by Bayog.
Subsequently Bayog executed a so called Deed of Equitable Mortgage in favor of Santiago Pesayco.
Bayog then asked Magdato to remove his house from the land. As Magdato did not comply, Bayog and
Pesayco filed with the MCTC a complaint for Ejectment and/or Abatement of Nuisance. Magdato filed
his Answer three days late, in which he

admitted Bayog’s ownership but asserted that he was in

actual possession thereof as agricultural lessee, and further averred that the court had no jurisdiction
over the case, it being agrarian disputes.The MCTC issued an Order

holding that since MAGDATO's Answer was filed outside the reglementary period, it could not take
cognizance thereof without exceeding its jurisdiction under Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129. It then
considered "needless" for the court to resolve all pleadings subsequently filed, such as the answer; and
then claiming authority under Section 5

of the Rule on Summary Procedure, the MCTC rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs BAYOG and
Pesayco. When appealed to RTC, it ordered to set aside the final and partly executed judgment of MCTC.
Hence; Bayog filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of Rules of Court to annul the decision of the
RTC.

Issue: Whether or not the MCTC acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter in the case at bar?

Held: No. While it may be said that the MCTC correctly applied the Rule on Summary Procedure since
BAYOG's complaint for ejectment therein suppressed the fact of an agrarian relationship between him
and MAGDATO, it should not have refrained from taking cognizance of MAGDATO's Answer,although
filed late asserting that the MCTC had no jurisdiction over the case in light of the agricultural tenancy
relationship, which is clearly evidenced by their Agricultural Leasehold Contract and the Certificate of
Agricultural Leasehold issued in MAGDATO's favor by then President Marcos. While this assertion,

per se

, did not automatically divest the MCTC of its jurisdiction over the ejectment case,
nevertheless, in view of MAGDATO's defense, the MCTC should have heard and received the evidence
for the precise purpose of determining whether or not it possessed jurisdiction over the case. And upon
such hearing, if tenancy was shown to be at issue, the MCTC should have dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction.

Verily, if indeed MAGDATO were an agricultural lessee under agrarian law, then the MCTC was devoid of
jurisdiction over the ejectment case.
Case 160
Case 159
Adelino H. Ledesma v. Hon. Rafael C. Climaco

Case 158

Facts:

Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an accused in a case pending in the sala of the
respondent judge. On October 13, 1964, Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality
of Cadiz, Negros Occidental. He commenced discharging his duties, and filed a motion to withdraw from
his position as counsel de parte. The respondent Judge denied him and also appointed him as counsel de
oficio for the two defendants. On November 6, Ledesma filed a motion to be allowed to withdraw as
counsel de oficio, because the Comelec requires full time service which could prevent him from handling
adequately the defense. Judge denied the motion. So Ledesma instituted this certiorari proceeding.

Issue:

Whether or not the order of the respondent judged in denying the motion of the petitioner is a grave
abuse of discretion?

Holding:

No, Ledesma's withdrawal would be an act showing his lack of fidelity to the duty rqeuired of the legal
profession. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is burdened with conditions. The legal
profession is dedicated to the ideal of service, and is not a mere trade. A lawyer may be required to act
as counsel de oficio to aid in the performance of the administration of justice. The fact that such services
are rendered without pay should not diminish the lawyer's zeal.
Five star bus vs CA 153

One night in November 1991 at about 11pm, Ignacio Torres, while driving a bus owned by Five Star Bus
Company collided with a mini-van driven by Samuel King Sagaral II. Sagaral filed a civil action for
damages against Five Star Bus Company and Torres. The civil case dragged for four years by reason of
the bus company’s lawyer’s repeated request to reset the hearing of the case. Until the trial court issued
an order which considered the case submitted for resolution. The bus company’s lawyer filed for a
motion for reconsideration but it was denied.

The bus company’s lawyer then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals but the latter
court summarily dismissed the petition because said petition’s affidavit of non-forum shopping was not
signed by the plaintiff or any of its representatives but rather it was signed by the lawyer. The lawyer
explained that his signing was an oversight and that he was in a haste to submit the petition at the
earliest possible time in order to protect his client’s interest.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition filed by Five Star Bus Company should prosper.

HELD: No. Circular No. 28-91 issued by the Supreme Court requiring that the affidavit of non-forum
shopping should be executed and signed by the plaintiff is a strict requirement. Circular No. 28-91 has its
roots in the rule that a party-litigant shall not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in two
different tribubals, for such practice works havoc upon orderly judicial procedure. Forum shopping has
been characterized as an act of malpractice that is prohibited and condemned as trifling with the courts
and abusing their processes. It constitutes improper conduct which tends to degrade the administration
of justice. It has also been aptly described as deplorable because it adds to the congestion of the already
heavily burdened dockets of the courts.

But the Supreme Court has relaxed this rule several times prior to this case when there is substantial
compliance, why is it not relaxed in this case?

It is true that said Circular requires that it be strictly complied with but such merely underscores its
mandatory nature in that it cannot be dispensed with or its requirements altogether disregarded, but it
does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances. In
the case at bar however, the reasons provided by Five Star’s lawyer are flimsy and frail. Further, the case
has been dragging on for years and such delay is mostly attributed to Five Star’s lawyer
Salonga Vs CA case 155

"It appears that on November 26, 1991 herein private respondent filed a
complaint for specific performance with temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction with prayer for damages against herein petitioners to
enforce a memorandum of agreement that was supposedly perfected between
the parties. On November 29, 1991 petitioners received a copy of the
summons and complaint, including a copy of the restraining order issued in
the said civil case by public respondent, enjoining 'petitioners from further
operating club Ibiza,' which order was referred by petitioners to Atty. Onofre
G. Garlito, Jr., the former counsel of record (Petition, p. 8 paragraph 16).
During the scheduled hearing for injunction on December 4, 1991, only
private respondents appeared despite notice to petitioners. For disobeying the
restraining order issued on November 29, 1991, private respondent sought to
cite petitioner for indirect criminal contempt (Rollo, p. 217) during the hearing
on the civil case whereby Atty. Garlito, Jr. presented George F. Salonga in
support of the opposition to the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
On December 9, 1991, petitioners and their counsel failed to appear on the
date set for hearing the motion for issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction. Acting on private respondent's motion to submit the application for
the writ of preliminary injunction, the resolved to grant the same on December
12, 1991
In the meantime, and despite two motions for extension of time to file an
answer, no answer was filed. However, (the) trial court received on June 16,
1992 an answer purportedly dated January 14, 1992.
On January 15, 1992, petitioner's counsel move to dissolve the injunction and
set the hearing thereof on January 17, but on said latter date, only private
respondent's counsel showed up.
Due to petitioner's failure to file an answer, private respondent submitted a
third ex parte motion to declare petitioner, as defendant, in default on March
4, 1992 which was favorably acted upon on March 10, 1992
Issue:

Whether or not extrinsic fraud and denial of due process obtain in this case to justify
annulment of the default judgment rendered by the trial court against petitioners.

Ruling:
No. As the Well-settled doctrine that "a judgment can be annulled only on two (2) grounds: (a)
that the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law; or (b) that it has
been obtained by fraud."[7] Absent any of these grounds, a final and executory judgment cannot
be voided.
The Court notes that the previously enumerated negligent acts attributed to petitioner's
former counsel Garlitos were in no way shown or alleged to have been caused by private
respondents. Atty. Garlitos neither connived nor sold out to the latter.

Marcelina Gacutan-Fraile vs. Angel T.

Facts: As Atty. During the joint hearings, Atty. Pascua agreed to a continuous trial and
the hearings for both cases were finished within four days, or from February 16, 1998 to
February 19, 1998. Atty. Pascua also allowed the private respondent Domingos to
present their evidence ahead of the petitioner even if Fraile filed her case before the
Domingos filed theirs.

Subsequently, on June 2, 1998, the respondent judge rendered a decision in favor of the
Domingos.2 Atty. Pascua received a copy of the decision and on the last day for filing an
appeal, filed a Notice of Appeal and Motion for Reconsideration of the adverse decision.
In an Order dated July 23, 1998, respondent judge dismissed the Notice of Appeal and
denied the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of proof of service to the adverse party
and written explanation why service or filing thereof was not done personally, in
violation of Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 3 The pleadings likewise lacked
a notice of hearing. The Notice of Appeal also failed to comply with Sec. 5, Rule 41 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure because it failed to specify the court to which the appeal
was being taken.4 Docketing fees were also not seasonably paid upon filing of the Notice
of Appeal.5 On August 8, 1998, Atty. Pascua filed another Motion for Reconsideration,
but the motion was again denied for the same formal infirmities of the first Motion for
Reconsideration.

As Atty. Pascua did not challenge the Orders dated July 23, 1998 and August 8, 1998,
the trial court issued on October 15, 1998 a Writ of Execution of the June 2, 1998
decision. Consequently, petitioner Fraile's TCT's over the subject parcels of land were
cancelled by the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija. Appalled by the outcome of her cases,
Fraile hired another lawyer, Atty. Renato M. Esguerra, and subsequently filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the June 2, 1998 judgment citing the
procedural lapses allegedly amounting to extrinsic fraud committed by her previous
counsel, Atty. Pascua

Issue: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
ACTS OR OMISSIONS OR PROCEDURAL LAPSES BY ATTY. JORGE PASCUA IN THE
HANDLING OF PETITIONER'S CASE ARE NOT GROSS AND PALPABLE ENOUGH AS TO
CONSTITUTE EXTRINSIC FRAUD.

Ruling: Petitioner's allegation that the acts of Atty. Pascua constitute extrinsic fraud
"deliberately done in connivance with private respondents Angel and Benjamin
Domingo, designed to defeat the cause of herein petitioner and to deprive her of her right to
due process" is merely a conclusion drawn by petitioner Fraile and does not find support in the
evidence on record. To impute negligence on her counsel is one thing, to prove that such
negligence was in collusion with the private respondents is another. We cannot therefore
subscribe to petitioner Fraile's contention