CASE DIGEST
A) ATTY. ARISTOTLE T. DOMINGUEZ VS. BANK OF COMMERCE, AS
PURPORTED TRANSFEREE OF TRADERS ROYAL BANK AND SPS.
CARMELO, JR. AND ELIZABETH AFRICA, G.R NO. 225207, (29
SEPTEMBER 2021)
FACTS:
In 2007, Respondent Carmelo Africa Jr. and his brothers Carlos and Chito secured the
services of Petitioner herein, Atty. Aristotle T. Dominguez (“Dominguez”) to prevent
Bank Of Commerce (“BOC”) from gaining possession of their family homes in Marikina,
Antipolo and Quezon City. Dominguez charged P250,000.00 or one percent of the
redemption price as his acceptance fee.
Meanwhile, BOC filed a Petition for Cancellation of Adverse Claim on TCT 473882 and
473883. This petition was opposed by Sps. Carmelo and Elizabeth Africa (“Sps. Africa”)
through Dominguez. BOC manifested that there is an ongoing settlement between them
to which Sps. Africa did not interpose any objections. Dominguez filed a Request for
Admission of the afore-stated manifestation. After a month, Dominguez manifested that
he withdrew as counsel for Sps. Africa as oppositors in the Petition for Cancellation of
Adverse Claim.
In 2013, Dominguez filed a Motion to Fix Attorney’s Fees and to Approve Charging
Attorney’s Lien with Motion for Production of Compromise Agreement.
On 28 January 2013, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled to hold the resolution of the
said motion in abeyance until a resolution in the Petition for Cancellation of Adverse
Claim is rendered.
Dominguez moved to reconsider said Order but was denied by the RTC on 16 September
2013 holding that the claim for attorney’s fees should be claimed in a separate civil
action.
Dominguez elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) through a Petition for
Certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.
The CA dismissed the Petition of Dominguez arguing on the basis of the following:
1.Trial courts cannot adjudicate money claims in petition for cancellation of adverse claim
and are limited only in determination of propriety of adverse claim.
2. The trial court could not grant monetary award especially a lien on the judgment in the
form of attorney’s fees as said petition is incapable of pecuniary estimation and his
claim for attorney’s fees should be subject of a separate civil action.
3. It also affirmed the trial court’s findings that the compromise agreement will not affect
the nature of a petition for cancellation of adverse claim since it was never part of the
proceedings nor subject of the trial court’s approval.
Dominguez filed then the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE:
1.Whether or not the trial court can adjudicate money judgment in a petition for
cancellation of adverse claim.
2. Whether or not the claim for attorney’s fees should be pursued in a separate action
rather than in the petition for cancellation of adverse claim.
3. Whether or not the Compromise Agreement can be used as basis for the claim of
Dominguez’s attorney’s fees even if it was part of the proceedings in the petition for
cancellation of adverse claim.
4. Whether or not the money judgment and execution in the main case are conditions
sine qua non in charging lien as security for payment of attorney’s fees.
RULING:
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As to all issues raised herein, the Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative and granted the
Petition. The case was remanded to the trial court for computation of attorney’s fees
based on quantum meruit.
In petitions for cancellation of
adverse claim, trial courts are not
precluded from adjudicating
matters involving attorney’s fees.
This is to obviate multiplicity of suits. Sec. 70 of Property Registration Decree does not
limit the issues that may be resolved by the trial court in a petition for cancellation of
adverse claim. In fact, in other cases such as determination of just compensation,
probate of a will and foreclosure of mortgage, the Supreme Court had permitted the
counsel to interpose his claim for attorney’s fees and lien in the same action. However,
the lawyer may also choose to file an entirely separate action for enforcement of his
attorney’s fees.
A compromise agreement
between the counsel’s client and
the adverse party is one of the
factors in determining the
counsel’s lawful fees for the legal
services he rendered.
As to third issue, the Compromise Agreement could be used as one of the basis in fixing
the amount of attorney’s fees for the legal services that a lawyer rendered. If no money
judgment was rendered pursuant to the Compromise Agreement, the attorney’s fees
would be fixed based on quantum meruit.
Considering that Dominguez was able to prove the rendition of legal services to Sps.
Africa, he is entitled to attorney’s fees and the case will be remanded to the trial court
for proper determination of his fees based on quantum meruit.
In charging lien to secure
attorney’s fees, money judgment
and execution are necessary.
As to the last issue, the Court ruled that a money judgment and execution are necessary
in order to charge or enforce attorney’s lien. However, it is necessary that the lawyer
comply with these two conditions 1) he registered his lien on the records of the court, 2)
he caused a written notice to such effect to be delivered to his client and to the adverse
party. It would be absurd to charge a lien without judgment or resolution of the case as
there is absence of basis for the determination of legal fees.
B) GAW CHIN TY ET. AL VS. ANTONIO GAW CHUA, GR NO. 212598 (29
SEPTEMBER 2021)
FACTS:
Sps. Gaw Chin Ty and Chua Giok See purchased a parcel of land covered by TCT
420866. They registered it in the name of their eldest son, Respondent Antonio Chua
(“Antonio”) as it is a Chinese custom. Thereafter, they entrusted the original owner’s
duplicate copy to their second eldest son, one of the herein Petitioners, Vicente Chua.
(“Vicente”)
Claiming that Antonio lost the original owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 420866, he
filed a petition for the issuance of a new/ reconstituted owner’s duplicate copy with the
RTC of Malabon.
On 15 August 2000, the RTC granted the petition, declared the owner’s duplicate copy of
TCT No. 420866 as null and void and ordered the issuance of a new/ reconstituted
owner’s duplicate of copy of TCT 420866 in the name of Antonio.
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On 27 August 2001, Petitioners Gaw Chin Ty and her children with Chua Giok See,
namely, Vicente, Robert, Manuel, Alejandro, Mario and Jacqueline, thereafter filed a
Notice of Adverse Claim and was inscribed on 31 August 2001.
On 21 April 2009, Respondent filed a complaint against Vicente for physical injury in
Brgy. 250, Manila City. No settlement was reached causing the issuance of a Certificate
to File Action.
On 24 June 2009, Antonio filed a petition for cancellation of the adverse claim and were
ordered to undergo mediation. The case was set for pre-trial in view of the failed
mediation.
On 23 September 2009, Petitioners filed a petition to annul the new/ reconstituted
owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 420866 based on the fact that the title is not lost but
merely in their possession and that Respondent Antonio knew this fact.
During pre-trial, Antonio acknowledged the existence of TCT 420866 after it was
presented by the Petitioners but disputed its authenticity. Despite opportunity to prove
his claim that it was spurious, he was not able to rebut the presumption of regularity in
the issuance of the Registry of Deeds.
The RTC granted the Petition and nullified TCT No. 420866. Antonio moved to
reconsider but was denied. He appealed before the Court of Appeals and reversed the
RTC decision. The latter dismissed the petition to annul reconstituted title without
prejudice considering that parties, as family members failed to undergo mediation
proceedings as condition precedent in filing the Petition to Annul Reconstituted TCT
420866.
Petitioners filed the Petition for review on Certiorari to assail the Resolution of the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal on the ground of failure to comply with a condition
precedent for exerting earnest efforts toward compromise between family members, was
valid.
RULING:
No. The petition was granted, the Resolution of the CA is reversed and set aside. The
Decision of RTC Malabon City is reinstated. The new owner’s duplicate copy of TCT
420866 is declared null and void.
The issue on the validity of the issuance of a new/ reconstituted owner’s duplicate copy
cannot be the subject of compromise. Article 151 of the Family Code, as a ground for
dismissal without prejudice under Section 1 (j) of Rule 16, is not applicable.
The court rendering the decision to grant the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate title, if
said title is not lost or destroyed in the first place, has no jurisdiction to order the
issuance of a new owner’s duplicate title. The decision may be attacked any time.
The validity of a new owner’s duplicate title is an issue that goes beyond the private
interests of the family members because it relates to the Torrens system of registration
of property and can affect public confidence on the certificates of title of property issued
by the RD.
The parties in this case, while family members, cannot compromise on the jurisdiction
of the RTC which issued the decision to grant the new owner’s duplicate title. Failure to
exert earnest efforts toward compromise is not fatal to the institution of the petition for
annulment of the new owner’s duplicate title.
C) THE LINDEN SUITES, INC. VS MERIDIEN FAR EAST PROPERTIES,
INC. GR NO. 211969 (04 OCTOBER 2021)
FACTS:
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On 18 November 2005, Petitioner Linden Suites, Inc (“Linden”) filed a Complaint for
Damages against Respondent Meridien Far East Properties (“Meridien”) before RTC
Branch 70, Pasig City on the ground that while Petitioner was doing excavation works
for the construction of Linden Suites in Ortigas, Pasig City, it discovered that the
concrete retaining wall of the adjacent building, One Magnificent Mile (OMM) owned by
Respondent, encroached on its property line.
Respondent Meridien undertook to remove the encroachment but was unable to finish
it, prompting Petitioner Linden to finish the demolition. Petitioner Linden incurred the
amount of P3,980,468.50 for the cost of demolition but respondent Meridien refused to
pay, which led to the filing of the complaint.
RTC adjudged respondent liable for the cost of demolition, actual and compensatory
damages and attorney’s fees. Respondent Meridien appealed and the CA affirmed the
RTC decision but deleted the award of actual and compensatory damages. An entry of
judgment was subsequently issued.
Petitioner Linden filed a motion for writ of execution before the RTC which was
subsequently granted.
On 5 and 14 of April 2010, Sheriff Boco attempted to serve the writ on Respondent in its
office address in Makati City but failed. He was advised to serve it at Mandaluyong City
being the registered address of the Respondent in its GIS but upon service thereof, he
was told by the Legal and Administrative Officer of Meridien East Realty and
Development Corporation (“MERDC”) that it was Meridien Development Group Inc
(“MDGI”) and not respondent which owned said office. Thus, the writ was returned
unserved.
Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Examine Judgment Obligor before RTC of Pasig
City, the trial court that rendered the final judgment because it observed that the 2006
GIS of Respondent and 2009 GIS of MERDC stated the same set of officers. Petitioner
prayed that Respondent’s officers be directed to appear before the court for an
examination of the income and properties owned by respondent for the satisfaction of
the RTC Decision. Petitioner also sought the grant by the trial court of other reliefs as
are just and equitable.
The RTC denied Petitioner’s motion and ruled that Respondent’s officers cannot be
subjected to an examination as they do not reside in its territorial jurisdiction. Also, it
would be violative of the doctrine of separate juridical entity to call upon the officers to
ascertain the properties and income of respondent.
Petitioners moved to reconsider but was denied. Thus, it elevated the matter to the
Court of Appeals through Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The CA dismissed the petition for lack of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
RTC, arguing that a judgment obligor cannot be compelled to appear before a court
outside the province in which he resides or is found. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but was denied.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC as the court that rendered judgment on Petitioner’s
complaint, can examine Respondent’s officers.
RULING: Yes. The Petition is granted. The Resolution of the CA is reversed and set
aside. The RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for
examination of respondent’s officers.
The RTC as the judgment court
has supervisory control over the
execution of its judgment.
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Its supervisory control over the case ensures the enforcement of a party’s rights or
claims that it has duly recognized. Rule 39 of the Rules of Court lays down available
remedies for the satisfaction of a judgment, including the enforcement of a writ of
execution, which the winning party may avail of before the judgment court. Among the
remedies available to such party to fully enforce the writ of execution is the examination
of judgment obligor.
A judgment obligee is entitled, as
a matter of right, to an order of
the court which rendered
judgment if the writ of execution
issued against the judgment
obligor was returned unsatisfied,
in whole or in part.
In this case, when the writ of execution returned unserved, it was imperative for the
judgment court to issue an order for the examination of respondent. Such order would
have ensured the satisfaction of the judgment all the more so as it had already attained
finality. The RTC, pursuant to its residual authority, should have issued auxiliary writs
and employed processes and other means necessary to execute its final judgment. It also
disregarded the general prayer for “other reliefs just and equitable” by the petitioner.
The RTC’s denial also curtailed the execution of its very own final judgment, despite
respondent’s liability having been duly recognized by the court.
The doctrine of separate juridical
personality is inapplicable in the
case at bench.
There is also no violation of the doctrine of separate juridical personality because
petitioner wanted the officers to be examined not for the purpose of passing unto them
the liability of respondent as its judgment obligor, but in order to satisfy the final
judgment by ascertaining the properties and income of respondent which can be
subjected for execution.
D) CAT REALTY CORPORATION VS DEPT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
CENTER FOR AGRARIAN REFORM EMPOWERMENT &
TRANSFORMATION, INC. ALTERNATIVE COMMUNITY-CENTERED
ORGANIZATION FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT (ACCORD) BENJAMIN DE
VERA JR AND TENORIO GARCIA, GR NO. 208399, (23 JUNE 2021)
FACTS:
Central Azucarera de Tarlac, the predecessor in interest of petitioner CAT Realty
Corporation (“CAT Realty”), filed a petition for conversion of 23 parcels of agricultural
land with an area of 386.7992 hectares located in Bayambang, Pangasinan (subject
property). Then DAR Secretary Estrella (“Sec. Estrella”) issued the Order dated 04
September 1975 (“Conversion Order”) granting the conversion and declaring the subject
property as suitable for residential, commercial, industrial and other urban purposes.
On 15 December 2004, Respondents filed a petition for revocation of the conversion
order on the ground that CAR Realty and its predecessor in interest failed to develop the
subject property and remains agricultural in use.
Then DAR Sec. Pangandamanan issued an Order dated 02 August 2006 partially
revoking the Conversion order and directed the municipal agrarian reform officer to
proceed with the acquisition of the portions of the subject property that were still
agriculturally viable under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. CAT Realty
moved for reconsideration of the partial revocation order which was granted. DAR
Secretary reinstated the Conversion Order on the ground that CAT Realty was able to
comply with the condition to pay disturbance compensation by giving the tenants a
subdivision. It also found that there was no specific period for CAR Realty to develop the
subject property.
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Private respondents moved to reconsider which was again granted and reinstated the
partial revocation of the Conversion Order. DAR Secretary reiterated that CAT Realty
did not substantially carry out its purpose to convert the land to commercial, industrial
and residential uses.
CAT Realty sought reconsideration but was denied. DAR Secretary ruled that majority of
the subject property was still agricultural and no substantial improvement was
introduced by the petitioner. Thereafter it filed a petition for review before the Court of
Appeals (‘CA”) under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
The CA denied CAT Realty’s petition and adopted DAR’s factual findings that there was
no substantial development on the subject property and that the same was still used for
agricultural purposes. Thus, there was no compliance with the conversion order.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, the instant Petition for
review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the DAR’s partial revocation of the
conversion order, effectively allowing DAR to put the undeveloped areas of the subject
property under the coverage of agrarian reform.
RULING:
Yes. The Petition is granted. The Resolution of the CA is reversed and set aside. The
Order dated 04 September 1975 of the Sec of DAR is reinstated.
The Order dated 04 Sept.
1975 declaring the subject
property as suitable for non-
agricultural purposes has
long attained finality
Under Sec. 46 of Art. VIII of the 2002 Comprehensive Rules on Land Use Conversion, a
petition for revocation must be filed within ninety (90) days from discovery of the facts
which warrant the revocation or withdrawal, but not more than one (1) year from
issuance of the conversion order. In Berboso v CA, the Supreme Court (“SC”) held that
once final and executory, an order for land conversion can no longer be questioned. In
Berboso, the conversion order was sustained considering that it was only after 17 years
from the issuance of the conversion order that the parties decided to assail it.
In this case, private respondents are barred by estoppel from seeking the revocation of
the final conversion order since it was almost 30 years when they assailed the order.
CAT Realty complied with the
conditions under the
Conversion Order
There was no valid cause for revocation as Petitioners sufficiently complied with the
conditions stated therein, such as, payment of the disturbance compensation to the
tenants and it was also observed that partial development was made on one third of the
subject property. Moreover, the conversion order as well as the prevailing law at the
time of issuance, did not set a period within which the owner should completely develop
the subject property.
The subject property cannot
be subject to agrarian reform
after being declared that it is
suitable for non-agricultural
use prior to the effectivity of
RA 6657 on 15 June 1988
For lands converted prior to 15 June 1988 or the date when CARL took effect, DAR is
bound by such conversion. It was therefore error to include the undeveloped portions of
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the subject property within the coverage of the CARL. The subject property is beyond
the coverage of the CARL having been converted before the effectivity of RA 6657.
