COMPREHENSIVE DIGEST ON THE MAJORITY DECISIONS

OF REPUBLIC VS CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES

SERENO
Submitted by: Abigail T. Miller
__________________________________________________________

FACTS:

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by Solicitor General Jose C. Calida, filed a petition
for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare void Respondent Sereno’s
appointment as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (SC) and to oust and altogether exclude her
therefrom.

The Republic argues that (1) the Court has original jurisdiction under Section 5(1), Article VIII
of the Constitution in relation to the special civil action under Rule 66, and that quo warranto is
the proper remedy, as the Constitution does not make impeachment the exclusive mode of
unseating an impeachable officer1; (2) the petition is not time barred as prescription cannot run
against the State; and, (3) that, at the time of her appointment, CJ Sereno was not of ―proven
integrity‖ she not having filed the required SALNs asked for by the JBC.

CJ Sereno argues that (1) impeachment is the only way of unseating Members of the Supreme
Court, and that the word ―may‖ pertains to the imposable penalty after impeachment
proceedings and not to the non-exclusivity of impeachment as remedy; (2) the petition is time
barred considering that the one-year period has lapsed from her assumption of office; (3) that
public officers without pay or those who do not receive compensation are not required to file a
SALN. Thus, Respondent argues that for the years that she was on official leave without pay, she
was actually not required to file any SALN. She adds that to require the submission of SALNs as
an absolute requirement is to expand the qualifications provided by the Constitution; (4)
Respondent urges the Court to apply in her favor the case of Concerned Taxpayer v. Doblada,
Jr., which state that the non-filing of the SALN must be proven as fact by the person alleging its
absence; (5) she and the record-holding offices enjoy presumption of regularity in the
performance of their duty; (6) her appointment is a political question; (7) the SALN requirement
does not go into the requisite ―proven integrity‖ but merely an instrument in its determination;
(8) Respondent also raised the issue of forum-shopping against Petitioner.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the Court should entertain the motion for intervention.

RULING: The Court ruled that the intervention is improper.

The Court cited Hi-Tone Marketing Corp V. Baikal Realty Corp 480 Phil 545, 569 (2004). In
this case, the Court stated that the intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally
impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein, for a certain purpose which is to enable
the third party to protect or preserve a right or interest that may affect by those proceedings. The
Court ruled that, “no matter how noble” their sentiments are, the interviewer’s rights and
interests are not directly affected by the proceeding.1
a. The Court cited Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court in the ruling on Onco V. Dalisay
citing Hon. Secretary V. Northeast Freight Forwarders, Inc. and Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority v. Estanislao. The Court ruled that the remedy for
intervention is not a matter of right but rests on the sound discretion of the Court upon
compliance with the first requirement on legal interest that must be of a direct and
immediate character and the second requirement that no delay and prejudice should
result.2 The intervention of respondent Northeast Freight Forwarder’s, Inc. is valid for it
has a legal interest on the matter in litigation. It stood to be directly legally affected by
the implementation of E.O. 418 because the respondent is in the business if importing
motor vehicles inside the Subic Bay Freeport Zone.3

b. In this case, the petition of quo warranto is brought in the name of the Republic (Newman
V. United States ex Rel. Frizzle). Thus, it is vested in the people (Oakland Municipal
Improvement Language V. City of Oakland)4, and not in any private individual or group,
because disputes over title to public office are viewed as a public question of government
legitimacy and not merely a private quarrel among rival claimants. Thus, intervenors are

1
STRONG SOURCE. Hi-Tone sought intervention, asserting ownership over one of the parcels of land which Baikal
realty wants to be registered in its name. Hi-Tone stood to be adversely affected should a title covering the
contested property be issued in favor of Baikal Realty. Hi-Tone’s intervention contended that its rights may be
affected by those proceedings.
2
STRONG SOURCE. Section 1, Rule 19 if the Rules of Court provides, Who May Intervene – A person who has legal
interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court,
be allowed to intervene in the action. The Court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor’s rights may be
fully protected in a separate proceeding.
3
STRONG SOURCE. In the case of Mactan-Cebu International Airport V. Estanislao, the intervenors were denied.
Intervenors were claiming that they are the legitimate heirs of Estanislao Miñoza and Inocencia Togono and not
the original plaintiffs represented by Leila Hermosisima. It was correct. If their allegations were later proven to be
valid claims, the intervenors surely have a legal interest in the matter in litigation. However, the Court has denied
the motion for intervention due to lack of legal interest that must be substantial, material, direct, and immediate
and not simply contingent and expectant. It must be of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor
will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.
4
STRONG SOURCE. Oakland Municipal Improvement Language V. City of Oakland. In cases where Quo Waranto is
the proper remedy, the cause of action is vested in the people and in any individual or group, no matter how
affected they may be, or how much more the subject matter may touch their interests than it does other members
of the citizenry. They had no standing to sue.
 denied because the remedy of quo warranto is vested in the people and not in a a
particular group.5
c. Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides that individuals, his own name, could
only bring a quo warranto proceeding if he or she has a standing over the position. In this
particular case, the movants-intervenors are either claiming to be entitled to the
questioned position or are they the ones in charged with the usurpation thereof.6

ISSUE 2: Whether the grant of the motions for inhibitions against the Associate Justices on
the basis of actual bias is proper.

RULING: The Court ruled that there is no basis for the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court
to inhibit in the case. The Court cited the following legal sources:

a. Sereno failed to establish proof of bias and prejudice to disqualify a judge. The Court
reminded us in People V. Moreno within which it stated that, “it is a judge duty not to sit
in its trial and decision if legally disqualified; but if he judge is not disqualified, it is a
matter of official duty for him to proceed with the trial and decision of the case.”7
b. The right of party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of judge who does not appear to be
wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the case must be balanced with
the latter's sacred duty to decide cases without fear of repression. The movant must therefore
prove the ground of bias and prejudice by clear and convincing evidence to disqualify judge from
participating in particular trial. "While it is settled principle that opinions formed in the course of
judicial proceedings, based on the evidence presented and conduct observed by the judge, do not
prove personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge. 8

c. In Philippine Commercial International Bank V. Sps. Dy Hong Pi, et al., 9 the second paragraph of
Rule 137, Section 1,10 does not give judges unfettered discretion to decide whether to desist from
hearing case. The inhibition must be for just and valid causes, and in this regard, We have noted
5
WEAK SOURCE. Newman V. United States ex Rel. Frizzle. This was only cited for the purpose of tracing the nature
of quo warranto from its history which shows that it could only be prosecuted in the name of the King, and in the
case at bar, in the name of the Republic.
6
STRONG SOURCE. Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides, “When an individual may commence such
action – A person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
another may bring an action therefor in his own name.
7
STRONG SOURCE. People V. Moreno – In this case, it showed us the duty of a judge to take cognizance of the case
if he is not disqualified. Otherwise, he would run the risk of being called upon to account for his dereliction.
8
STRONG SOURCE. It is stated here that the movant must show a convincing evidence to disqualify a judge to
participate in a particular case. In the case at bar, Sereno failed to do so.
9
WEAK SOURCE. Philippine Commercial International Bank V. Sps. Dy Hong Pi. This talks about the Motion
for Inhibition filed by the defendants-movants from further hearing the case due to the continuous delay in
the proceedings which showed that the Honarable Court may not be competent enough to further hear
the case.

10
WEAK SOURCE. Rule 137, Section. This talks about the disqualification of judges who are related to
the parties within the sixth degree of consanguinity or to counsel within the fourth degree without the
written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
 that the mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially when
the charge is without basis. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct clearly indicative of
arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality. Moreover,
extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in addition to
palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself. The only exception to the
rule is when the error is so gross and patent as to produce an ineluctable inference of bad faith or
malice.

d. The Court stated that absent strong and compelling evidence establishing actual bias and
partiality on the part of the Justices whose recusal was sought, respondent's motions for inhibition
must perforce fail. Mere conjectures and speculations cannot justify the inhibition of Judge or
Justice from judicial matter. The presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role of
dispensing justice in accordance with law and evidence, and without fear or favor, should not be
abandoned without clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, it cited the ruling in
Dimo Realty Development, Inc. V. Dimaculangan that, 11 "bias and prejudice, to be considered
valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of judges, must be proved with clear and convincing
evidence. Bare allegations of partiality and prejudgment will not suffice. These cannot be
presumed, especially if weighed against the sacred obligation of judges whose oaths of office
require them to administer justice without respect to person and to do equal right to the poor and
the rich."

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

ISSUE 3: Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the instant petition for Quo Warranto.

Ruling: It was ruled that the Supreme Court has the original jurisdiction over the instant petition
for Quo Warranto. The following legal sources substantiated this decision.

a. Section 5, Article 8 of the Constitution 12 provides that the Supreme Court shall exercise
original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and
habeas corpus. This Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent
jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs, including quo warranto.

b. In the instant case, direct resort to the Court is justified considering that the action for
quo warranto questions the qualification of no less than Member of the Court. 13 The
issue of whether person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises public

11
STRONG SOURCE. Dimo Realty Development, Inc. V. Dimaculangan – Here the petition was denied
because petitioners merely alleged the arbitrary issuance of a temporary restraining order without really
showing bias or prejudice on the part of the trial judge. Such error of the trial judge, according to the CA,
of the respondent judge doesntr warrant him inhibition from the case.

12
STRONG SOURCE. It is well-settled in Section 5, Art 8 that the Supreme Court exercises the extraordinary writs
along with the CA and RTC.
13
NO SOURCE
 office is matter of public concern over which the government takes special interest as it
obviously cannot allow an intruder or impostor to occupy public position.14

ISSUE 4: Whether or not a Quo Warranto and an Impeachment can proceed

independently.

Ruling: The Court ruled that an action for Quo Warranto and an Impeachment can proceed
independently.

a. The Court ruled that quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to
determine the right or title to the contested public office or to oust the holder
from its enjoyment. In quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by
election, what is to be determined is the eligibility of the candidates elected,
while in quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by appointment,
what is determined is the legality of the appointment. 15

b. Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or

invalidly elected impeachable official may be removed from office. 16

c. Quo warranto and impeachment are, thus, not mutually exclusive remedies
and may even proceed simultaneously. The existence of other remedies
against the usurper does not prevent the State from commencing quo
warranto proceeding.17

d. The Court stated that the reliefs sought in the two proceedings are different. Under the
Rules on quo warranto, "when the respondent is found guilty of usurping, intruding into,
or unlawfully holding or exercising public office, judgment shall be rendered that such
respondent be ousted and altogether excluded therefrom."18 In short, respondent in quo
warranto proceeding shall be adjudged to cease from holding public office, which he/she

14
WEAK SOURCE. Republic of the Philippines v. Pablico Corpin, 104 Phil. 49, 53 (1958). This case and the case at
bar are different since the former talks about an elected official while the latter talks about an appointed official to
which an action for Quo Warranto is filed against.

15
NO SOURCE
16
NO SOURCE

17
WEAK SOURCE. Citizens Utilities Co. v. Super Ct., 56 Cal. App. 3d 399, 405 (1076); 18 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. (1951).
Not analogous. Petitioner seeks a writ of prohibition restraining respondent court from entertaining a quo
warranto action brought against petitioner by the People of the State of California.
 is ineligible to hold. On the other hand, in impeachment, conviction for the charges of
impeachable offenses shall result to the removal of the respondent from the public office
that he/she is legally holding.19 It is not legally possible to impeach or remove person
from an office that he/she, in the first place, does not and cannot legally hold or occupy.

ISSUE 5: Whether the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over Quo Warranto is violative of
the separation of powers.

RULING: The Supreme Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over Quo Warranto is not violative of
the separation of powers.

a. The Court cited Section 3(1) and 3(6), Article XI, of the Constitution 20 that
respectively provides that the House of Representatives shall have the

18
STRONG SOURCE. Section 9, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. This Constitutional provison laid down the relief
sought by a Quo Warranto action.

19
STRONG SOURCE. 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XI, Section 2: The President, the Vice-President, the Members of
the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from
office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed
from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

20
STRONG SOURCE. This constitutional provision lays down the jurisdiction of the HR as the initiator of
impeachment cases while the Senate as the trier and the decision maker of impeachment proceedings making it
needless to elaborate that there is no argument that the constitutionally-defined instrumentality which is given the
power to try impeachment cases is the Senate.
 exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment while the Senate shall
have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. There is no
argument that the constitutionally-defined instrumentality which is given the
power to try impeachment cases is the Senate.

b. The Court ruled in Divinagracia v. Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc.,21

that the Court's authority to issue writ of quo warranto, as complementary
to, and not violative of, the doctrine of separation of powers, as follows:

And the role of the courts, through quo warranto proceedings, neatly
complements the traditional separation of powers that come to bear in our
analysis. The courts are entrusted with the adjudication of the legal status of
persons, the final arbiter of their rights and obligations under law.

c. The Court furthered stated that its exercise of judicial review over laws does
not preclude Congress from undertaking its own remedial measures by
appropriately amending laws, the viability of quo warranto in the instant
cases does not preclude Congress from enforcing its own prerogative by
abrogating the legislative franchises of respondents should it be distressed
enough by the franchisees' violation of the franchises extended to them.22

ISSUE 6: Whether the petition is dismissible outright on the ground of prescription.

Ruling: The Court ruled that the petition is not dismissible outright on the ground of prescription
because a time prescription does not lie against the State. In the case at bar, the Solicitor General
is representing the State and its people.

a. The Court held in People ex rel. Moloney V. Pullman’s Palace Car Co. 23 that laches,
acquiescence, or unreasonable delay in the performance of duty on the part of the officers
of the State, is not imputable to the State when acting in its character as a sovereign.
b. It further held in Agcaoili V. Suiguitan 24 that the rule on prescription is not absolute in
cases where it is the State that pursues the proceeding for quo warranto.

21
STRONG SOURCE. This ruling applies to the case at bar by analogy. Both cases fall under Section 1, Rule 66 that
contemplates on the application of Quo Warranto which defines such as an “action for the usurpation of a public
office, position or franchise may be brought in the name of the Republic of the Philipines. “ The Divinagracia case
tackles on the issue of franchise while the Sereno case on usurpation of a public office.
22
NO SOURCE
23
WEAK SOURCE. This is only made a reference that when a State is acting as itself it is not estopped by delay or
time prescription .
24
STRONG SOURCE. Both cases contemnplates on the same application of the general rule on the non-application
of prescription being brought about by the State.
 c. The Rules of Court very well provided in its Section 2, Rule 66 25 that if the Solicitor
General commences the quo warranto action either (1) upon the President's directive, (2)
upon complaint or (3) when the Solicitor General has good reason to believe that there is
proof that (a) a person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
office, position or franchise; (b) a public officer does or suffers an act which is a ground
for the forfeiture of his office; or (c) an association acts as a corporation without being
legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act, he does so in the discharge of
his task and mandate to see to it that the best interest of the public and the government are
upheld. In these three instances, the Solicitor General is mandated under the Rules to
commence the necessary petition of quo warranto.

ISSUE 7: Whether or not the Respondent is eligible for the position of Chief Justice.

Ruling: The Court held that the respondent is not eligible for the position of Chief Justice due to
her lack of integrity having failed to file an incomplete number of SALNs and subsequently her
failure to submit the required number of SALNs to the JBC during her application for the
position.

The Court cited Section 17, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution 26 as it well provides the duty of
public officers to submit a declaration under oath of his or her assests, liabilities, and net worth
upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law.

A. Whether the determination of a candidate’s eligibility for nomination is the sole and
exclusive function of the JBC, and whether such determination partakes of the
character of a political question outside the Court’s supervisory and review powers.

Ruling: The Court ruled in the affirmative as to the candidate’s eligibility for nomination as the
sole and exclusive function of the JBC. The JBC, however must comply with its own rules and
must work within the bounds of the supervisory function of the Supreme Court. This is
embedded in Section 8, Article 8 of the 1987 Constitutional provision27 that the Court’s
supervisory power consists of making sure that the JBC complies with its own rules and
procedures.

It also held in Villanueva v. JBC28 that the JBC’s ultimate goal is to recommend nominees and
not simply to fill up judicial vacancies in order to promote an effective and efficient
administration of justice. It further ruled that while a certain leeway must be given to the JBC in
screening aspiring magistrates, the same does not give it an unbridled discretion to ignore
Constitutional and legal requirements.

25
STRONG SOURCE. The Rules of Court very well provides the rules.
26
STRONG SOURCE. This constitutional provision backs up the mandate of no less than the Chief Justice as a public
officer to be duty-bound.
27
STRONG SOURCE. This constitutional provision highlights the power of the Supreme Court over the JBC.
28
STRONG SOURCE. This jurisprudence highlights the analogy of both cases as it shows the main function of the
JBC.
As furthermore provided in the Canons of the New Code of Judicial Conduct as a continuing
requirement, the Code of Professional Integrity, and in the JBC- 009 Rules 29 that qualifications
under the Constitution cannot be waived or bargained away by the JBC in which one
qualification such as the possession of proven integrity must be observed as mentioned in many
administrative cases.

On the questions of policy of wisdom, the Court ruled in Tañada V. Cuenco 30 that these refer “to
those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of government.” Thus, this function of the JBC does not involve a question of
policy but simply determination, based on facts, of whether candidate possesses the requisite or
not.

B. Whether or not Respondent failed to file her SALNs mandated by the Constitution
and required by the law and its implementing rules and regulations; and if so,
whether the failure to file SALNs voids the nomination and appointment of the
Respondent Chief Justice..

Ruling: The Court ruled in the affirmative. The respondent (1) chronically failed to file her
SALNs, (2) the SALNs filed by respondent covering her years of government service in U.P.
appear to have been executed and filed under suspicious circumstances, and (3) the SALNs that
she submitted in support of her application for Chief Justice likewise bear badges of
irregularities. The above circumstances betray respondent's intention to falsely state material fact
and to practice deception in order to secure for herself the appointment as Chief Justice. 31 Thus,
it clearly shows that respondent failed not only in complying with the physical act of filing
but also committed dishonesty. This amounts to the lack of integrity, honesty and probity.32

Any member of the Judiciary who commits such violations cannot be deemed to be a person of
proven integrity. Indeed, the filing of SALN is a mandated Constitutional and statutory
requirement.

Section 17, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution 33 provides, “public officer or employee shall,
upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit declaration
under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth.”

29
STRONG SOURCES. These statutory provisions define the rules on qualifications.
30
STRONG SOURCE. The ruling in both cases hold similar views on political questions which goes beyond the
province of the judiciary. It ruled in this case that the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is not a political question.
31
NO SOURCE
32
NO SOURCE.
33
STRONG SOURCE. Provided for by the Constitution.
Sections 7 and 8 of RA 301934 require every public officer detailed and sworn statement of their
assets, liabilities.

During the Martial Law years, the obligation imposed upon public officers and employees to
declare their assets and liabilities was maintained under Presidential Decree No 379 35 as
amended by P.D. No. 41736 which is amended the contents if the statement and the manner of
providing the acquisition cost of the properties. Yet still, P.D. 379 was further amended by P.D.
No. 555.37

R.A. No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees38 was enacted and expanded the obligation to disclose by enumerating the
information required to be disclosed with regards the assets, liabilites, business interests and
financial connections; requiring the identification and disclosure iof relatives in government;
making the statemnets and disclosures available and accessible to the public; and prohibiting
certain acts. Both statutes, RA 6713 and RA 3019 39 require the submission of true, detailed, and
sworn statement of assets and liabilities.

Finally, the Court ruled in Office of the Court Administrator V. Judge Usman, 40 “while it’s true
that every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts greater demand
on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary. Hence,
judges are strictly mandated to abide with the law, the Code of Judicial Conduct and with
existing administrative policies in order to maintain the faith of our people in the administration
of justice.”

Considering all these, there is much more reason should such test of dishonesty and lack of
integrity be applied in the instant case when resopondent failed to file her SALNs for several
years and for those that she filed proved to be untruthful.41

C. Whether or not Respondent failed to comply with the submission of SALNs as

required by the JBC; and if so, whether the failure to submit SALNs to the JBC
voids the nomination and appointment of Respondent as Chief Justice

Ruling: The Court ruled in the affirmative. The respondent failed to submit the required SALNs
as to qualify for nomination pursuant to the JBC rules. The JBC required the submission of at
least ten SALNs from those applicants who are incumbent Associate Justices. Based on House
Committee on Justice Report (Page 22) 42, the JBC En Banc decided to require only the

34
STRONG SOURCE. Statutory provision that supports on the requirement for public officers detailed and sworn
SALNs.
35
STRONG SOURCE. Presidential Decree.
36
STRONG SOURCE. Presidential Decree.
37
STRONG SOURCE. Presidential Decree.
38
STRONG SOURCE. Statutory Provision.
39
STRONG SOURCES. Statutory Provisions.
40
STRONG SOURCE. The respondent judge is faced with allegations of bribery and corruption which questions his
integrity.
41
NO SOURCE.
42
STRONG SOURCE. As evident in this House Committee Report.
submission of the past ten (10) SALNs, or from 2001-2011, for applicants to the Chief Justice
position.

The minutes of the JBC deliberation43 held on July 20, 2012 show that Sereno “had not submitted
her SALNs for period of ten (10) years, (sic) that is, from 1986 to 2006.” From the foregoing
discourse, it appears that respondent was specifically singled out from the rest of the applicants
for having failed to submit single piece of SALN for her years of service in the U.P. College of
Law. This is in obvious contrast with the other shortlisted applicants who submitted SALNs, or
whose years in government service correspond to the period prior to the effectivity of R.A. No.
6713. The minutes of the JBC En Banc meeting 44 also show that Senator Escudero moved that
the determination of whether candidate has substantially complied with the requirements be
delegated to the Executive Committee.

The implication of the respondent's failure to submit to the JBC her SALNs for several years
means that her integrity was not established at the time of her application.45

The court invoked Rule 130, Section 34 of the Rules on Evidence.46 In conclusion, her proven
failure to comply with the requirement set by the JBC altogether with the respondent’s acts
manifests her lack of integrity required from a magistrate of the high court. Thus, her nomination
and appointment is void.

D. Whether or not the subsequent nomination by the JBC and the

appointment by the President cured such ineligibility in case the
Respondent is found to be ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice.

Ruling: The Court found the Respondent ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice, the
subsequent nomination by the JBC and the appointment by the President cannot cure such
ineligibility.

The Court held in Maquiling V. COMELEC 47 that “qualifications must be possessed at the time
of appointment and assumption of office and also during the officer's entire tenure as continuing
43
STRONG SOURCE. Minutes are strong evidence.
44
STRONG EVIDENCE. Minutes are strong evidence.
45
NO SOURCE.

46
STRONG SOURCE. Rules of Court. SEC. 34. Similar acts as evidence. Evidence that one did or did not do certain
thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at another time; but
it may be received to prove specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage,
and the like.

47
STRONG SOURCE. Analogous to the present case. It holds the same view on the continuous possession of a
qualification in holding a public office. The respondent having used a foreign passport voluntarily had effectively
reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen which resulted to him ineligible to bid for public office.
requirement. [Furthermore], when the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that
certain disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to serve as public officials, those
qualifications must be met before one even becomes candidate.”

The absence of the qualification means fully that the respondent is ineligible. Such ineligibility
cannot be cured by the nomination of the JBC – this is because the necessary consequence of the
Court's finding that respondent is ineligible for the position of Chief Justice and to be nominated
for said position follows as matter of course.48

Neither will the President's act of appointment cause to qualify the respondent. 49 Although the
JBC is an office constitutionally created, the participation of the President in the selection and
nomination process is evident from the composition of the JBC itself. The regular members of
the JBC are appointees of the President, including an ex officio member, the Secretary of Justice,
who serves as the President's alter ego.

What resulted was that the action of the JBC, particularly that of the Secretary of Justice as ex
officio member, is reflective of the action of the President. Such as when the JBC mistakenly or
wrongfully accepted and nominated respondent, the President, through his alter egos in the JBC,
commits the same mistake and the President's subsequent act of appointing respondent cannot
have any curative effect.50

In effect, the Court ruled in Luego v. Civil Service Commission and Central Bank v. Civil
Service Commission51 to further emphasize that “the Court surrenders discretionary appointing
power to the President, the exercise of such discretion is subject to the non-negotiable
requirements that the appointee is qualified and all other legal requirements are satisfied, in the
absence of which, the appointment is susceptible to attack.”

ISSUE 8: Whether or not Respondent is a de jure or de facto officer.

Ruling: The Court held that Respondent Sereno is a de facto officer removable through quo
warranto. Respondent lacked the Constitutional qualification, she is ineligible to hold the
position of Chief Justice and is merely holding colorable right or title thereto as a de facto
officer. To simply put it, respondent has never attained the status of an impeachable official and
her removal from the office, other than by impeachment, is justified. The remedy, therefore, of
quo warranto at the instance of the State is proper to oust respondent from the appointive
position of Chief Justice.52

48
NO SOURCE
49
NO SOURCE
50
NO SOURCE
51
STRONG SOURCES. These two cases are analogous to the case at bar as they hold the same view on the
requirement for appointees even if appointed by the President of the Republic.
52
NO SOURCE
The Court ruled in Regala V. Court of First Instance of Bataan 53 that the effect of finding that
person appointed to an office is ineligible therefor is that his presumably valid appointment will
give him color of title that confers on him the status of de facto officer.

In Tayko v. Capistrano,54 the court also defines a de facto judge as ―one who exercises the
duties of judicial office under color of an appointment or election thereto. He differs, on the one
hand, from mere usurper who undertakes to act officially without any color of right, and on the
others hand, from judge de jure who is in all respects legally appointed and qualified and whose
term of office has not expired.‖ The Tayko case also ruled that ―having at least colorable right
to the officer his title can be determined only in quo warranto proceeding or information in the
nature of quo warranto at suit of the sovereign.‖ This ruling finds suitable application in this case
since quo warranto as remedy is available against respondent who is de facto Chief Justice,
having mere colorable right thereto.

53
STRONG SOURCE. This case is similar to the present case as it hold similar views on status of persons appointed
even if ineligible.
54
WEAK SOURCE. This was only used in reference to further define a de facto officer.