G.R. No.

191805 November 15, 2011

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ,
NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, PDG JESUS AME VERSOZA, LT. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, MAJ. GEN.
NESTOR Z. OCHOA, P/CSUPT. AMETO G. TOLENTINO, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, COL. REMIGIO M. DE VERA, an officer named
MATUTINA, LT. COL. MINA, CALOG, GEORGE PALACPAC under the name "HARRY," ANTONIO CRUZ, ALDWIN "BONG"
PASICOLAN and VINCENT CALLAGAN,Respondents.
x------------------------x
G.R. No. 193160
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ,
POLICE DIR. GEN. JESUS A. VERSOZA, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, BGEN. REMEGIO M. DE VERA, 1st LT. RYAN S. MATUTINA,
LT. COL. LAURENCE E. MINA, ANTONIO C. CRUZ, ALDWIN C. PASICOLAN and VICENTE A. CALLAGAN, Petitioners,
vs.
NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, Respondent.

Rodriguez, a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant organization in Cagayan Valley affiliated with
Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), filed a petition to the Supreme Court for a Writ of Amparo and Writ of Habeas Data against Pres.
Arroyo, et al. which the Court granted after having found that the petition sufficiently alleged that he was abducted, tortured and later
released by the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army.

Rodriguez alleged that the soldiers abducted him and tortured him to let him confess that he was an NPA member and to tell them the
location of the NPA camp. He was detained from September 6 to 17, 2009.

On 12 April 2010, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision. Subsequently, on 28 April 2010, respondents therein filed their Motion
for Reconsideration. Before the Court of Appeals could resolve this Motion for Reconsideration, Rodriguez filed the instant Petition for Partial
Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 191805), raising the following assignment of errors:
a. The Court of Appeals erred in not granting the Interim Relief for temporary protection order.
b. The Court of Appeals erred in saying: “(H)owever, given the nature of the writ of amparo, which has the effect of enjoining the
commission by respondents of violation to petitioner’s right to life, liberty and security, the safety of petitioner is ensured with the
issuance of the writ, even in the absence of an order preventing respondent from approaching petitioner.”
c. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that respondent Gloria Macapagal Arroyo had command responsibility.

Meanwhile, the respondents averred:

a. The Court of Appeals properly dropped then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a party-respondent, as she may not be sued in
any case during her tenure of office or actual incumbency.
b. Petitioner had not presented any adequate and competent evidence, much less substantial evidence, to establish his claim that
public respondents had violated, were violating or threatening to violate his rights to life, liberty and security, as well as his right to
privacy. Hence, he was not entitled to the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data or to the corresponding interim reliefs
(i.e. inspection order, production order and temporary protection order) provided under the rule on the writ of amparo and the rule
on the writ of habeas data

Whether former President Arroyo should be dropped as a respondent on the basis of the presidential immunity from suit

Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and habeas data cases

Who can be held accountable/responsible for extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances? Can former President Arroyo be
held accountable? Can the other respondents be held accountable?

Held:
1. The Court held that former President Arroyo should not be dropped as a respondent on the basis of presidential
immunity of suit. Presidential immunity of suit can only be availed by the President during their incumbency and tenure;
hence, it can only be availed by sitting Presidents. However, in the case at bar, former President Arroyo is no longer a
sitting President; thus, she cannot use the presidential immunity from suit to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that
would assess whether, within the context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction
of Rodriguez. Moreover, the Court emphasized that courts “should look with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of
immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right”.

2. The Court ruled that the doctrine of command responsibility may be applied in amparo proceedings to determine
whether respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez. Citing Rubrico v.
Arroyo case, the Court explained that command responsibility pertains to the “responsibility of commanders for crimes
committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or
domestic conflict.” The Court also stressed that although the doctrine was originally used in criminal proceedings, its
application has already been liberally extended to non-criminal cases. Moreover, since the amparo proceedings
ascertain responsibility or accountability, then the application of the said doctrine which speaks of “responsibility” is
justified.

3. The Court ruled affirmatively that, under the doctrine of command responsibility, the president can be held responsible or
 accountable for extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances. It, further, laid down the elements for liability under
the said doctrine:

a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the perpetrator of
the crime as his subordinate;
b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been committed; and
c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish the
perpetrators thereof.

The being of the president of the country as the commander-in-chief controlling all armed forces qualifies him as superior and the
armed forces as subordinates. Meanwhile, in the Philippines, a more liberal view has been adopted on the second element to the extent that
it suffices that the president/superior has constructive knowledge. Moreover, knowledge of the commission of irregularities, crimes or
offenses is presumed when (a) the acts are widespread within the government official’s area of jurisdiction; (b) the acts have been repeatedly
or regularly committed within his area of responsibility; or (c) members of his immediate staff or office personnel are involved. Lastly, on the
third element, it is important to note that as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the president has the power to effectively command,
control and discipline the military. Therefore, having qualified all elements, the president of the country can be held responsible or
accountable for extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances under the doctrine of command responsibility.

Applying the elements abovementioned, the Court ruled that former President Arroyo is not responsible or accountable for
Rodriguez’ abduction due to lack of substantial evidence. He only anchored his arguments on general allegation; neither was there even a
clear attempt to show that she should have known about the violation of his right to life, liberty or security, or that she had failed to
investigate, punish or prevent it.

However, the Court affirmed the CA ruling that some respondents (Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan) are
responsible or accountable for Rodriguez’ abduction after finding that the totality of evidence adduced by Rodriguez indubitably prove their
responsibility and accountability for violating his right to life, liberty and security. The doctrine of totality of evidence pertains to relevance of
the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence.