G.R. No.

L-29462             March 7, 1929 Upon this the plaintiff seized, with his hand, the front perpendicular handpost, at the same time
IGNACIO DEL PRADO, plaintiff-appellee, placing his left foot upon the platform. However, before the plaintiff's position had become
vs. secure, and even before his raised right foot had reached the flatform, the motorman applied
MANILA ELECTRIC CO., defendant-appellant. the power, with the result that the car gave a slight lurch forward. This sudden impulse to the car
Ross, Lawrence and Selph and Antonio T. Carrascoso, jr., for appellant. caused the plaintiff's foot to slip, and his hand was jerked loose from the handpost, He therefore
Vicente Sotto for appellee. fell to the ground, and his right foot was caught and crushed by the moving car. The next day
STREET, J.: the member had to be amputated in the hospital. The witness, Ciriaco Guevara, also stated that, as
the plaintiff started to board the car, he grasped the handpost on either side with both right and left
BACKGROUND: This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by Ignacio del Prado to hand. The latter statement may possibly be incorrect as regards the use of his right hand by the
recover damages in the amount of P50,000 for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of plaintiff, but we are of the opinion that the finding of the trial court to the effect that the motorman
the defendant, the Manila Electric Company, in the operation of one of its street cars in the City of Manila. Upon slowed up slightly as the plaintiff was boarding the car that the plaintiff's fall was due in part
hearing the cause the trial court awarded to the plaintiff the sum of P10,000, as damages, with costs of suit, and the at least to a sudden forward movement at the moment when the plaintiff put his foot on the
defendant appealed.
platform is supported by the evidence and ought not to be disturbed by us.
SUMMARY: MERALCO operated street cars in Manila. One of them was Car No. 74 which was
The motorman stated at the trial that he did not see the plaintiff attempting to board the car; that
driven by its employee Teodorico Florenciano as motorman. One day, after the car took on and let off
he did not accelerate the speed of the car as claimed by the plaintiff's witnesses; and that he in fact
passengers, it headed on its course at a moderate speed. However, plaintiff-appellee Del Prado
knew nothing of the incident until after the plaintiff had been hurt and someone called to him to
approached the car by running after it to board the same. According to the testimony of one Ciriaco
stop. We are not convinced of the complete candor of this statement, for we are unable to see how a
Guevarra, Del Prado clutched onto the handrail and his left foot was on the platform but his position
motorman operating this car could have failed to see a person boarding the car under the
was not yet secure when the motorman applied power and accelerated the street car, causing Del
circumstances revealed in this case. It must be remembered that the front handpost which, as all
Prado to fall to the ground. Del Prado’s foot was crushed by the street car and was later amputated.
witness agree, was grasped by the plaintiff in attempting to board the car, was immediately on the left
side of the motorman.
The CFI awarded damages in favor of Del Prado in the amount of ₱10,000. Defendant MERALCO
appealed.
As stated, the Trial Court held in favor of Del Prado and ordered MERALCO to pay ₱10,000 in
damages
MERALCO alleges that it exercised due diligence of a good father in training its employee Teodorico
Florenciano.
ISSUE: WON MERALCO is liable for the injury sustained by Del Prado
Issue: Whether MERALCO is liable for the injury to Del Prado
RULING: It being understood, therefore, that the appealed judgment is modified by reducing the
recovery to the sum of P2,500, the judgment, as thus modified, is affirmed. So ordered, with costs
Held: Yes. The SC affirmed the judgment of the CFI. The SC held that there is no obligation on the
against the appellant.
part of a street railway company to stop its cars to let on intending passengers at other points than
those appointed for stoppage. However, although the motorman of this car was not bound to stop to
RATIO: With respect to the legal aspects of the case we may observe at the outset that there is no
let the plaintiff on, it was his duty to do act that would have the effect of increasing the plaintiff's peril
obligation on the part of a street railway company to stop its cars to let on intending
while he was attempting to board the car. The premature acceleration of the car was, in our opinion, a
passengers at other points than those appointed for stoppage. In fact it would be impossible to
breach of this duty.
operate a system of street cars if a company engaged in this business were required to stop any and
everywhere to take on people who were too indolent, or who imagine themselves to be in too great a
The SC explained the duration of responsibility of common carriers. The SC held that the relation
hurry, to go to the proper places for boarding the cars. Nevertheless, although the motorman of
between a carrier of passengers for hire and its patrons is of a contractual nature; and in failure on
this car was not bound to stop to let the plaintiff on, it was his duty to do act that would have
the part of the carrier to use due care in carrying its passengers safely is a breach of duty (culpa
the effect of increasing the plaintiff's peril while he was attempting to board the car. The
contructual) under articles 1101, 1103 and 1104 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, the duty that the
premature acceleration of the car was, in our opinion, a breach of this duty.
carrier of passengers owes to its patrons extends to persons boarding the cars as well as to those
alighting therefrom.
The relation between a carrier of passengers for hire and its patrons is of a contractual nature;
and in failure on the part of the carrier to use due care in carrying its passengers safely is a
Nevertheless, the SC mitigated the damages in favor of Del Prado, considering his contributory
breach of duty (culpa contructual) under articles 1101, 1103 and 1104 of the Civil Code.
negligence in chasing after the car in the middle of the road instead of boarding the same at the
Furthermore, the duty that the carrier of passengers owes to its patrons extends to persons
proper terminals.
boarding the cars as well as to those alighting therefrom. The case of Cangco vs. Manila
Railroad Co. (38 Phil., 768), supplies an instance of the violation of this duty with respect to a
FACTS: The appellant, the Manila Electric Company, is engaged in operating street cars in the
passenger who was getting off of a train. In that case the plaintiff stepped off of a moving train,
City for the conveyance of passengers; and on the morning of November 18, 1925, one Teodorico
while it was slowing down in a station, and at the time when it was too dark for him to see clearly
Florenciano, as appellant's motorman, was in charge of car No. 74 running from east to west on
where he was putting his feet. The employees of the company had carelessly left watermelons on
R. Hidalgo Street, the scene of the accident being at a point near the intersection of said street and
the platform at the place where the plaintiff alighted, with the result that his feet slipped and he
Mendoza Street. After the car had stopped at its appointed place for taking on and letting off
fell under the car, where his right arm badly injured. This court held that the railroad company
passengers, just east of the intersection, it resumed its course at a moderate speed under the
was liable for breach positive duty (culpa contractual), and the plaintiff was awarded damages in the
guidance of the motorman. The car had proceeded only a short distance, however, when the
amount of P2,500 for the loss of his arm. In the opinion in that case the distinction is clearly
plaintiff, Ignacio del Prado, ran across the street to catch the car, his approach being made
drawn between a liability for negligence arising from breach of contractual duty and that
from the left. The car was of the kind having entrance and exist at either end, and the movement of
arising articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code (culpa aquiliana).
the plaintiff was so timed that he arrived at the front entrance of the car at the moment when
the car was passing.
CULPA AQUILIANA VS. CULPA CONTRACTUAL
The testimony of the plaintiff and of Ciriaco Guevara, one of his witnesses, tends to shows that the
The distinction between these two sorts of negligence is important in this jurisdiction, for the reason
plaintiff, upon approaching the car, raised his hand as an indication to the motorman of his
that where liability arises from a mere tort (culpa aquiliana), not involving a breach of positive
desire to board the car, in response to which the motorman eased up a little, without stopping.
obligation, an employer, or master, may exculpate himself, under the last paragraph of article
1903 of the Civil Code, by providing that he had exercised due degligence to prevent the
damage; whereas this defense is not available if the liability of the master arises from a breach of
contrauctual duty (culpa contractual).

In the case before us, the company pleaded as a special defense that it had used all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage suffered by the plaintiff; and to
establish this contention the company introduced testimony showing that due care had been used in
training and instructing the motorman in charge of this car in his art. But this proof is irrelevant
in view of the fact that the liability involved was derived from a breach of obligation under
article 1101 of the Civil Code and related provisions. (Manila Railroad Co. vs. Compana
Transatlantica and Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co., 38 Phil., 875, 887; De Guia vs. Manila Electric
Railroad & Light Co., 40 Phil., 706, 710.)

Another practical difference between liability for negligence arising under 1902 of the Civil Code
and liability arising from negligence in the performance of a positive duty, under article 1101
and related provisions of the Civil Code, is that, in dealing with the latter form of negligence, the
court is given a discretion to mitigate liability according to the circumstances of the case (art
1103). No such general discretion is given by the Code in dealing with liability arising under article
1902; although possibly the same end is reached by courts in dealing with the latter form of liability
because of the latitude of the considerations pertinent to cases arising under this article.

DEL PRADO’S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE; DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE

As to the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, we are of the opinion that it should be treated, as in
Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359), as a mitigating circumstance under article
1103 of the Civil Code. It is obvious that the plaintiff's negligence in attempting to board the
moving car was not the proximate cause of the injury. The direct and proximate cause of the
injury was the act of appellant's motorman in putting on the power prematurely. A person
boarding a moving car must be taken to assume the risk of injury from boarding the car under
the conditions open to his view, but he cannot fairly be held to assume the risk that the
motorman, having the situation in view, will increase his peril by accelerating the speed of the
car before he is planted safely on the platform. Again, the situation before us is one where the
negligent act of the company's servant succeeded the negligent act of the plaintiff , and the
negligence of the company must be considered the proximate cause of the injury. The rule here
applicable seems to be analogous to, if not identical with that which is sometimes referred to as the
doctrine of "the last clear chance." In accordance with this doctrine, the contributory negligence
of the party injured will not defeat the action if it be shown that the defendant might, by the
exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence
of the injured party (20 R. C. L., p. 139; Carr vs. Interurban Ry. Co., 185 Iowa, 872; 171 N. W., 167).
The negligence of the plaintiff was, however, contributory to the accident and must be
considered as a mitigating circumstance.

With respect to the effect of this injury upon the plaintiff's earning power, we note that, although he
lost his foot, he is able to use an artificial member without great inconvenience and his earning
capacity has probably not been reduced by more than 30 per centum. In view of the precedents found
in our decisions with respect to the damages that ought to be awarded for the loss of limb, and more
particularly Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359); Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. (38
Phil., 768); and Borromeo vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. (44 Phil., 165), and in view of all
the circumstances connected with the case, we are of the opinion that the plaintiff will be adequately
compensated by an award of P2,500.