G.R. No.

L-22272             June 26, 1967 Codes, in the backdrop of the factual situation before Us, which further accounts for a different result
ANTONIA MARANAN, plaintiff-appellant, vs. PASCUAL PEREZ, ET AL., defendants. in the Gillaco case. Unlike the old Civil Code, the new Civil Code of the Philippines expressly makes
PASCUAL PEREZ, defendant appellant. the common carrier liable for intentional assaults committed by its employees upon its passengers, by
the wording of Art. 1759 which categorically states that
Pedro Panganiban for plaintiff-appellant.
Magno T. Bueser for defendant-appellant. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have
BENGZON, J.P., J.: acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common
carriers.
Rogelio Corachea, on October 18, 1960, was a passenger in a taxicab owned and operated by
Pascual Perez when he was stabbed and killed by the driver, Simeon Valenzuela. The Civil Code provisions on the subject of Common Carriers1 are new and were taken from Anglo-
American Law.2 There, the basis of the carrier's liability for assaults on passengers committed by its
Valenzuela was prosecuted for homicide in the Court of First Instance of Batangas. Found guilty, he drivers rests either on (1) the doctrine of respondeat superior or (2) the principle that it is the
was sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of carrier's implied duty to transport the passenger safely.3
P6,000. Appeal from said conviction was taken to the Court of Appeals.1äwphï1.ñët
Under the first, which is the minority view, the carrier is liable only when the act of the employee is
On December 6 1961, while appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals, Antonia Maranan, Rogelio's within the scope of his authority and duty. It is not sufficient that the act be within the course of
mother, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Batangas to recover damages from Perez and employment only.4
Valenzuela for the death of her son. Defendants asserted that the deceased was killed in self-
defense, since he first assaulted the driver by stabbing him from behind. Defendant Perez further Under the second view, upheld by the majority and also by the later cases, it is enough that the
claimed that the death was a caso fortuito for which the carrier was not liable. assault happens within the course of the employee's duty. It is no defense for the carrier that the act
was done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier's orders. 5 The carrier's liability here
The court a quo, after trial, found for the plaintiff and awarded her P3,000 as damages against is absolute in the sense that it practically secures the passengers from assaults committed by its own
defendant Perez. The claim against defendant Valenzuela was dismissed. From this ruling, both employees.6
plaintiff and defendant Perez appealed to this Court, the former asking for more damages and the
latter insisting on non-liability. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction As can be gleaned from Art. 1759, the Civil Code of the Philippines evidently follows the rule based
earlier mentioned, during the pendency of the herein appeal, and on May 19, 1964, final judgment on the second view. At least three very cogent reasons underlie this rule. As explained in Texas
was entered therein. (Rollo, p. 33). Midland R.R. v. Monroe, 110 Tex. 97, 216 S.W. 388, 389-390, and Haver v. Central Railroad Co., 43
LRA 84, 85: (1) the special undertaking of the carrier requires that it furnish its passenger that full
Defendant-appellant relies solely on the ruling enunciated in Gillaco v. Manila Railroad Co., 97 Phil. measure of protection afforded by the exercise of the high degree of care prescribed by the law, inter
884, that the carrier is under no absolute liability for assaults of its employees upon the passengers. alia from violence and insults at the hands of strangers and other passengers, but above all, from the
The attendant facts and controlling law of that case and the one at bar are very different however. In acts of the carrier's own servants charged with the passenger's safety; (2) said liability of the carrier
the Gillaco case, the passenger was killed outside the scope and the course of duty of the guilty for the servant's violation of duty to passengers, is the result of the formers confiding in the servant's
employee. As this Court there found: hands the performance of his contract to safely transport the passenger, delegating therewith the duty
of protecting the passenger with the utmost care prescribed by law; and (3) as between the carrier
x x x when the crime took place, the guard Devesa had no duties to discharge in and the passenger, the former must bear the risk of wrongful acts or negligence of the carrier's
connection with the transportation of the deceased from Calamba to Manila. The stipulation employees against passengers, since it, and not the passengers, has power to select and remove
of facts is clear that when Devesa shot and killed Gillaco, Devesa was assigned to guard them.
the Manila-San Fernando (La Union) trains, and he was at Paco Station awaiting
transportation to Tutuban, the starting point of the train that he was engaged to guard. In Accordingly, it is the carrier's strict obligation to select its drivers and similar employees with due
fact, his tour of duty was to start at 9:00 two hours after the commission of the regard not only to their technical competence and physical ability, but also, no less important, to their
crime. Devesa was therefore under no obligation to safeguard the passengers of the total personality, including their patterns of behavior, moral fibers, and social attitude.
Calamba-Manila train, where the deceased was riding; and the killing of Gillaco was not
done in line of duty. The position of Devesa at the time was that of another would be Applying this stringent norm to the facts in this case, therefore, the lower court rightly adjudged the
passenger, a stranger also awaiting transportation, and not that of an employee assigned defendant carrier liable pursuant to Art. 1759 of the Civil Code. The dismissal of the claim against the
to discharge any of the duties that the Railroad had assumed by its contract with the defendant driver was also correct. Plaintiff's action was predicated on breach of contract of
deceased. As a result, Devesa's assault can not be deemed in law a breach of Gillaco's carriage7 and the cab driver was not a party thereto. His civil liability is covered in the criminal case
contract of transportation by a servant or employee of the carrier. . . . (Emphasis supplied) wherein he was convicted by final judgment.

Now here, the killing was perpetrated by the driver of the very cab transporting the passenger, in In connection with the award of damages, the court a quo granted only P3,000 to plaintiff-appellant.
whose hands the carrier had entrusted the duty of executing the contract of carriage. In other words, This is the minimum compensatory damages amount recoverable under Art. 1764 in connection with
unlike the Gillaco case, the killing of the passenger here took place in the course of duty of the guilty Art. 2206 of the Civil Code when a breach of contract results in the passenger's death. As has been
employee and when the employee was acting within the scope of his duties. the policy followed by this Court, this minimal award should be increased to P6,000. As to other
alleged actual damages, the lower court's finding that plaintiff's evidence thereon was not
Moreover, the Gillaco case was decided under the provisions of the Civil Code of 1889 which, unlike convincing,8 should not be disturbed. Still, Arts. 2206 and 1764 award moral damages in addition to
the present Civil Code, did not impose upon common carriers absolute liability for the safety of compensatory damages, to the parents of the passenger killed to compensate for the mental anguish
passengers against wilful assaults or negligent acts committed by their employees. The death of the they suffered. A claim therefor, having been properly made, it becomes the court's duty to award
passenger in the Gillaco case was truly a fortuitous event which exempted the carrier from liability. It moral damages.9 Plaintiff demands P5,000 as moral damages; however, in the circumstances, We
is true that Art. 1105 of the old Civil Code on fortuitous events has been substantially reproduced in consider P3,000 moral damages, in addition to the P6,000 damages afore-stated, as sufficient.
Art. 1174 of the Civil Code of the Philippines but both articles clearly remove from their exempting Interest upon such damages are also due to plaintiff-appellant. 10
effect the case where the law expressly provides for liability in spite of the occurrence of force
majeure. And herein significantly lies the statutory difference between the old and present Civil
Wherefore, with the modification increasing the award of actual damages in plaintiff's favor to P6,000,
plus P3,000.00 moral damages, with legal interest on both from the filing of the complaint on
December 6, 1961 until the whole amount is paid, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other
respects. No costs. So ordered.