G.R. No.
L-8325 March 10, 1914
C. B. WILLIAMS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
TEODORO R. YANGCO, defendant-appellant.
The steamer Subic, owned by the defendant, collided with the
lunch Euclid owned by the plaintiff, in the Bay of Manila at an early hour on the
morning of January 9, 1911, and the Euclid sank five minutes thereafter. This
action was brought to recover the value of the Euclid.
The court below held from the evidence submitted that the Euclid was worth at
a fair valuation P10,000; that both vessels were responsible for the collision;
and that the loss should be divided equally between the respective owners,
P5,000 to be paid the plaintiff by the defendant, and P5,000 to be borne by the
plaintiff himself. From this judgment both defendant and plaintiff appealed.
After a careful review of all the evidence of record we are all agreed with the
trial judge in his holding that the responsible officers on both vessels were
negligent in the performance of their duties at the time when the accident
occurred, and that both vessels were to blame for the collision. We do not
deem it necessary to review the conflicting testimony of the witnesses called by
both parties, the trial also having inserted in his opinion a careful and critical
summary and analysis of the testimony submitted to him, which, to our minds,
fully and satisfactorily disposes of the evidence are set forth in the following
language (translated):
In view of the negligence of which the patron Millonario (of defendant's
vessel) has been guilty as well as that imputable to the patron of the
launch Euclid, both contributed in a decided manner and beyond all doubt
to the occurrence of the accident and the consequent damages resulting
therefrom in the loss of the launch Euclid.
With a little diligence which either of the two patrons might have
practiced under the circumstances existing at the time of the collision, if
both had not been so distracted and so negligent in the fulfillment of their
respective duties, the disaster could have been easily avoided, since the
sea was free of obstacles and the night one which permitted the patron
Millonario to distinguish the hull of the launch twenty minutes before the
latter entered upon his path . . .
There is proven, therefore, the negligence of which the patron of
the Euclid has been guilty.
If the negligence by which the patron of the launch Euclid has contributed
to the cause of the accident and to the resulting damages is patent, none
the less so is the negligence of the patron of the steamer Subic, Hilarion
Millonario by name, as may be seen from his own testimony which is here
copied for the better appreciation thereof.
It will be seen that the trial judge was of opinion that the vessels were jointly
liable for the loss resulting from the sinking of the launch. But actions for
damages resulting from maritime collisions are governed in this jurisdiction by
the provisions of section 3, title 4, Book III of the Code of Commerce, and
among these provisions we find the following:
ART. 827. If both vessels may be blamed for the collision, each one shall
be liable for its own damages, and both shall be jointly responsible for the
loss and damages suffered by their cargoes.
In disposing of this case the trial judge apparently had in mind that portion of
the section which treats of the joint liability of both vessels for loss or damages
suffered by their cargoes. In the case at bar, however, the only loss incurred
was that of the launch Euclid itself, which went to the bottom soon after the
collision. Manifestly, under the plain terms of the statute, since the evidence of
record clearly discloses, as found by the trail judge, that "both vessels may be
blamed for the collision," each one must be held may be blamed for it own
damages, and the owner of neither one can recover from the other in an action
for damages to his vessel.
Counsel for the plaintiff, basing his contention upon the theory of the facts as
contended for by him, insisted that under he doctrine of "the last clear
chance," the defendant should be held liable because, as he insists, even if the
officers on board the plaintiff's launch were negligence in failing to exhibit
proper lights and in failing to take the proper steps to keep out of the path of
the defendant's vessel, nevertheless the officers on defendant's vessel, by the
exercise of due precautions might have avoided the collision by a very simple
manuever. But it is sufficient answer to this contention to point out that the
rule of liability in this jurisdiction for maritime accidents such as that now
under consideration is clearly, definitely, and unequivocally laid down in the
above-cited article 827 of the Code of Commerce; and under that rule, the
evidence disclosing that both vessels were blameworthy, the owners of either
can successfully maintain an action against the other for the loss or injury of
his vessel.
In cases of a disaster arising from the mutual negligence of two parties, the
party who has a last clear opportunity of avoiding the accident,
notwithstanding the negligence of his opponent, is considered wholly
responsible for it under the common-law rule of liability as applied in the courts
of common law of the United States. But this rule (which is not recognized in
the courts of admiralty in the United States, wherein the loss is divided in
cases of mutual and concurring negligence, as also where the error of one
vessel has exposed her to danger of collision which was consummated by he
further rule, that where the previous application by the further rule, that where
the previous act of negligence of one vessel has created a position of danger,
the other vessel is not necessarily liable for the mere failure to recognize the
perilous situation; and it is only when in fact it does discover it in time to avoid
the casualty by the use of ordinary care, that it becomes liable for the failure to
make use of this last clear opportunity to avoid the accident. (See cases cited
in Notes, 7 Cyc., pp. 311, 312, 313.) So, under the English rule which
conforms very nearly to the common-law rule as applied in the American
courts, it has been held that the fault of the first vessel in failing to exhibit
proper lights or to take the proper side of the channel will relieve from liability
one who negligently runs into such vessels before he sees it; although it will
not be a defense to one who, having timely warning of the danger of collision,
fails to use proper care to avoid it. (Pollock on Torts, 374.) In the case at bar,
the most that can be said in support of plaintiff's contention is that there was
negligence on the part of the officers on defendant's vessel in failing to
recognize the perilous situation created by the negligence of those in charge of
plaintiff's launch, and that had they recognized it in time, they might have
avoided the accident. But since it does not appear from the evidence that they
did, in fact, discover the perilous situation of the launch in time to avoid the
accident by the exercise of ordinary care, it is very clear that under the above
set out limitation to the rule, the plaintiff cannot escape the legal consequences
of the contributory negligence of his launch, even were we to hold that the
doctrine is applicable in the jurisdiction, upon which point we expressly reserve
our decision at this time.
The judgment of the court below in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant should be reserved, and the plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed
without day, without costs to either party in this instance. So ordered.
