Mill Fire Protection

Fire Risk

Fire risk in general is the product of probability of occurrence and severity. Mill fire risk is related to mill
design, operating practices and fire protection systems performance.

The majority of mill fires occur while mills are operating. The probability of a mill fire occurring for the
most part is directly related to operating practices and parameters, such as rolling speed, reduction, coil
and coolant temperature, coolant flammability, and metal alloy, temper and edge quality. A small
portion of the probability is related to equipment design, such as the shape roll and coolant spray nozzle
arrangement. Similarly, a small number of fires are related to maintenance activities, such as hot work,
incorrect component re-assembly or installation, and cleaning methods and materials. The probability of
a fire occurring has nothing to do with fire protection systems performance. It is directly related to how
the mill is built, operated and maintained.

Fire protection systems treat symptoms and not causes of fires. Severity of a fire is directly related to
fire protection systems performance. Performance in turn is a function of system design and
maintenance. Fire protection systems must be properly designed for the hazard presented by the
particular type of mill. For example, CO2 systems used on cold mills are not appropriate protection for
hot mills due to the three-dimensional, atomized, spray fire associated with high-pressure hydraulic
systems.

Second, a fire extinguishing system will not be effective if it does not cover the entire area that may be
involved in a fire. Inadequate coverage can result in a system being overtaxed from the outset or re-
ignition occurring once system discharge is complete.

Third, mill fire protection systems are electro-mechanical. Each component has a certain risk of failure,
which can render a system ineffective. Hence, system design must maximize reliability. Where risk of
failure is unacceptably high, back-up systems must be provided. As with all electro-mechanical systems,
reliability is enhanced by the selection of proven equipment, and a rigorous program of inspection,
testing and preventive maintenance.

Mill Fire Protection Performance Objectives

The performance objective is to minimize the following:
1) Frequency of fires
2) Physical damage
3) Interruption to production
4) Life safety risk to personnel.

(1) Minimize Frequency of Fires

The greatest impact in minimizing the frequency of mill fires will be through process control and
equipment design. The majority of foil mill fires are the result of strip breaks. Some of the variables
influencing this include edge quality, shape roll segment measurement, coolant spray nozzle positioning,
reduction, and coolant and coil temperature. If the frequency of strip breaks can be reduced so will be
the number of fires. Each mill has a unique set of operating practices and equipment design. Their
relationship with fire occurrence is a complex one and beyond the scope of this section.
 (2) Minimize Physical Damage
Minimizing physical damage once a fire starts is directly related to the reliability of the fire extinguishing
system to operate in the first place, the speed with which the system actuates and extinguishing agent is
applied, and the effectiveness of the agent.
(3) Minimize Interruption to Production
The impact on production is directly related to the time required to repair the physical damage, place
fire protection systems back in service and restart the mill.
(4) Minimize Life Safety Risk
The risk to life safety comes from exposure to products of combustion and the extinguishing system,
namely CO2. The risk can be minimized through a combination of fire protection systems design and
personnel training.

Foil Mill Fire Protection

Hazards
The fire hazard associated with cold mills and foil mills using petroleum base roll coolant is the coolant
itself. Up to 4,000 litres per minute (1,057 gpm) of coolant can be sprayed onto a mill. Within the mill
this creates a flammable mixture of hydrocarbon vapours and oxygen. This mixture is readily ignited by
heat generated from strip breaks, cobbles, static discharges, overheated bearings and other sources.
The coolant does not present the combustible residue hazard of hot mills. The frequency of fires is a
function of mill design, metal alloy and temper, rolling practices, roll coolant flammability
characteristics, mill control system reliability and operator skill.

The more a mill is enclosed for fume exhaust effectiveness the more rapid is the fire spread. Flammable
coolant vapors can ignite and engulf the mill in as little as three to four seconds. The fire can easily
spread to the fume exhaust system.

Fires that are not extinguished quickly result in coolant in the sump continuing to burn. This exposes the
mill to high heat, which easily damages control, coolant and hydraulic equipment, and the rolls.

Fires in coolant and hydraulic rooms and cellars typically involve spills or leaks of liquids. Without fixed
suppression systems, fires can spread rapidly over the entire area.

Foil Mill Area Fire Protection

The severity of foil mill fires is a function of the speed of operation and the effectiveness of fire
extinguishing systems. The objective is to control the coolant fire as fast as possible. Rapid fire
suppression will result in no damage to the mill.
The CO2 system shall protect the following:
 Mill stands, gearboxes, drive spindles and the area between the rear of mill and motor room
wall.
 Screw downs and hydraulic gauge control components on top of the mill.
 Open and covered pits, including exit and entry, roll change and sump.
 Cable ducts, trenches and tunnels connecting with any open or covered pit associated with the
mill.
 Hydraulic units adjacent to the mill.
 Belt wrapper.
The carbon dioxide system must have the storage capacity of at least three complete discharges of the
system and the mill must not be run without at least a quantity of carbon dioxide equal to two
discharges being in the system. It is advisable to have the storage capacity considerably greater than the
minimum required so as not to have the mill down while waiting to refill the system.

There are two types of carbon dioxide systems:

(1) High-pressure (2) low-pressure.

High-pressure systems consist of multiple cylinders, from 45 to 75 kg capacities, arranged so as to

discharge simultaneously into a manifold.
Low-pressure systems consist of a single, refrigerated, bulk storage tank holding up to thirty-one tons.
Both are equally capable of rapidly discharging carbon dioxide and extinguishing a fire.

However, high-pressure systems are not cost-effective when the amount of carbon dioxide to be stored
exceeds approximately three tones due to the large number of cylinders required.

Furthermore, mills protected with low-pressure systems using properly sized tanks can be restarted
much more quickly than high pressure equipped mills. The system will still contain adequate carbon
dioxide for at least another two discharges. In high-pressure systems, if there are only two sets of
cylinders on line, the mill cannot be restarted until the empty cylinders have been removed and
replaced with full ones. The downtime on low pressure protected mills can be as little as thirty minutes
while on high pressure protected mills it can be many hours.

More importantly, based on Alcan/Novelis statistics maintained from 1981 through 2001, high- pressure
systems have a failure rate nine times that of low-pressure systems. A high-pressure system has many
more components that must successfully operate for the system to discharge the total amount of
carbon dioxide required. Overall, low-pressure systems have a 0.3% failure rate and high-pressure
systems 2.8%. Refer to Figure for details.

A “failure’ is defined as the fire not being extinguished with single or multiple discharges and back-up
systems (water-spray, sprinklers or hoses) being required to complete extinguishment.

A “malfunction” is defined as one or more components of the system and related, interlocked mill
functions (dampers, fans, etc.) not operating properly. However, the fire was extinguished with single or
multiple discharges and portable extinguishers. Back-up systems were not required to complete
extinguishment.

FAILURES MALFUNCTIONS
ACTIVATIONS
# % # %
LOW PRESSURE 6684 21 0.3 34 0.5
HIGH PRESSURE 1061 30 2.8 43 4.1
TOTAL 7745 51 0.7 77 1.0
CO2 System Failure and Malfunction Rates 1981-2001