Torts and Damages Case Digest: Julian del Rosario v.

Manila Electric Co (1932) a child would feel to do something out of the ordinary, and the mere fact
G.R. No. L-35283 November 5, 1932 that the deceased ignored the caution of a companion of the age of 8
Lessons Applicable: Good Father of a Family (Torts and Damages) years does not, in our opinion, alter the case. But even supposing that
contributory negligence could in some measure be properly imputed to
FACTS: the deceased, — a proposition upon which the members of the court do
 August 4, 1930 2 pm: trouble developed in a wire used by Manila Electric not all agree, — yet such negligence would not be wholly fatal to the right
Company on Dimas-Alang Street for the purpose of conducting electricity of action in this case, not having been the determining cause of the
used in lighting the City of Manila and its suburbs accident.
 Jose Noguera, who had charge of a tienda nearby, first noticed that the
wire was burning and its connections smoking Culion Ice v. Philippine Motors (G.R. No. L-32611)
o the wire parted and one of the ends of the wire fell to the ground Facts: Culion Ice and Fish was the registered owner of the motor schooner,
among some shrubbery close to the way Gwendoline, which it uses for its fishing trade. In order to save costs in running the
o Noguera went to the nearby garage and asked Jose Soco, the boat, Culion Ice decided to have the engine changed from gasoline consumer to
timekeeper, to telephone the Malabon station of the Manila a crude oil burner. Quest, general manager of Philippine Motors, a domestic
Electric Company corporation engaged in machinery engines and motors, agreed to do the job.
 2.25 p.m.: Soco transmitted the message and the station told him that they Upon inspection, Quest came to conclusion that a carburetor needed to be
would send an inspector installed. In the course of the work, it was observed that the carburetor was flooding
 4 p.m.: neighborhood school was dismissed and the children went home and that the gasoline and other fuel was trickling freely to the floor but this concern
o Saturnino Endrina made a motion as if it touch the wire was dismissed by Quest. During the boat’s trial run, the engine stopped and upon
o Jose Salvador, happened to be the son of an electrician and his being started, a back fire occurred which then instantly spread and finally engulfed
father had cautioned him never to touch a broken electrical wire, Gwendoline. The crew members safely escaped but Gwendoline was destroyed.
as it might have a current Culion Ice moved for the recovery of the damages against Philippine Motors. The
o Alberto del Rosario said that "I have for some time been in the trial court ruled for Culion Ice. Philippine Motor asserts that the accident was not
habit of touching wires" and so feeling challenged put out his due to the fault of Quest.
index finger and touch the wire
 He immediately fell face downwards, exclaiming "Ay! Issue: Whether or not Quest was negligent.
madre"
 The end of the wire remained in contact with his body HELD: YES. When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things
which fell near the post requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit
 A crowd soon collected, and some one cut the wire and the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts
disengaged the body to do. The proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in fixing the engines
 Upon arrival at St. Luke's Hospital he was of automobiles and tractors, but it does not appear that he was experienced in the
pronounced dead. doing of similar work on boats. For this reason, possibly the dripping of the mixture
 Trial Court: absolved Manila Electric Company form the tank on deck and the flooding of the carburetor did not convey to his
ISSUE: W/N Manila Electric Company should be held liable for negligence that mind an adequate impression of the danger of fire. But a person skilled in that
caused the death of Alberto particular sort of work would, we think have been sufficiently warned from those
circumstances (risks) to cause him to take greater and adequate precautions
HELD: YES. judgment appealed from is therefore reversed and the plaintiff will against the danger. In other words Quest did not use the skill that would have been
recover of the defendant the sum of P1,250, with costs of both instances exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines on boats. There was
 The engineer of the company says that it was customary for the company here, in our opinion, on the part of Quest, a blameworthy antecedent inadvertence
to make a special inspection of these wires at least once in six months, and to possible harm, and this constitutes negligence. The burning of the Gwendoline
that all of the company's inspectors were required in their daily rounds to may be said to have resulted from accident, but this accident was in no sense an
keep a lookout for trouble of this kind. unavoidable accident. It would not have occurred but for Quest’s carelessness or
lack of skill. The test of liability is not whether the injury was accidental in a sense,
 presumption of negligence on the part of the Manila Electric
but whether Quest was free from blame.
Company from the breakage of this wire has not been overcome, and it is
in our opinion responsible for the accident
 It is doubtful whether contributory negligence can properly be imputed to
the deceased, owing to his immature years and the natural curiosity which

1
BPI V. CA consideration. They closed their eyes to the suspicious large amount withdrawals
216 SCRA 51 made over the counter as well as the opening of the account.

FACTS: Someone who identified herself to be Fernando called up Torts and Damages Case Digest: Wright v. Manila Electric (1914)
BPI, requesting for the pre- G.R. No. L-7760 October 1, 1914
termination of her money market placement with the bank. The person who Lessons Applicable: Intoxication (Torts and Damages)
took the call didn't bother to verify with Fernando’s office if
whether or not she really intended to preterminate her money market FACTS:
placement. Instead, he relied on the verification stated by the caller. He  August 8, 1909 night time: Wright who was intoxicated drove in his calesa
proceeded with the processing of the termination. Thereafter, the caller and as his horse leap forward along the rails of the Manila Electric
gave delivery instructions that instead of delivering the checks to her office, company and it fell
it would be picked up by her niece and it indeed happen as such. It o Wright was thrown and got injured
was found out later on that the person impersonated Fernando and her  that the ties upon which the rails rested projected from one-third to one-
alleged niece in getting the checks. The dispatcher also didn't bother to get half of their depth out of the ground making the tops of the rails some 5 or
6 inches or more above the level of the street
the promissory note evincing the placement when he gave the checks
to the impersonated niece. This was aggravated by the fact that this
 RTC: both parties were negligent, but that the plaintiff's negligence was not
as great as defendant's and under the authority of the case of Rakes vs. A.
impersonator opened an account with the bank and deposited the subject
G. & P. Co. apportioned the damages and awarded Wright a judgment
checks. It then withdrew the amounts. of P1,000
ISSUE: W/N Wright's negligence contributed to the 'principal occurrence' or 'only to
The day of the maturity of the money market placement happened and the his own injury (NOT contributory) thereby he cannot recover
real Fernando surfaced herself. She denied preterminating the money market
placements and though she was the payee of the checks in issue, HELD: NO. Affirmed
she didn't receive any of its proceeds. This prompted the bank to  Mere intoxication is not in itself negligence. It is but a circumstance to be
surrender to CBC the checks and asking for reimbursement on alleged considered with the other evidence tending to prove negligence. It is the
forgery of payee’s indorsements. general rule that it is immaterial whether a man is drunk or sober if no want
of ordinary care or prudence can be imputed to him, and no greater
HELD: The general rule shall apply in this case. Since the payee’s indorsement degree of care is required than by a sober one.
has been forged, the instrument is wholly inoperative. However,  Manila Electric or its employees were negligent by reason of having left the
underlying circumstances of the case show that the general rule on forgery isn’t rails and a part of the ties uncovered in a street where there is a large
applicable. The issue as to who between the parties should bear the amount of travel
loss in the payment of the forged checks necessitates the determination of  If the Wright had been prudent on the night in question and had not
attempted to drive his conveyance while in a drunken condition, he would
the rights and liabilities of the parties involved in the controversy in relation to
certainly have avoided the damages which he received
the forged checks.
 Both parties were negligent and both contributed to the resulting
damages, although the Wright, in the judgment of the court, contributed
The acts of the employees of BPI were tainted with more negligence if not criminal
in greater proportion to the damages
than the acts of CBC. First, the act of disclosing information about the money
 no facts are stated therein which warrant the conclusion that the Wright
market placement over the phone is a violation of the General was negligent
Banking Law. Second, there was failure on the bank’s part to even compare o It is impossible to say that a sober man would not have fallen from
the signatures during the termination of the placement, opening the vehicle under the conditions described
of a new account with the specimen signature in file of Fernando. And  It having been found that the plaintiff was not negligent, it is unnecessary
third, there was failure to ask the surrender of the promissory note evidencing to discuss the question presented by the appellant company with
the placement. reference to the applicability of the case of Rakes vs. A. G. & P. Co. and
we do not find facts in the opinion of the court below which justify a larger
The acts of BPI employees was the proximate cause to the loss. Nevertheless, verdict than the one found.
the negligence of the employees of CBC should be taken also into Dissenting Opinion by Carson:

2
  if the case is to be decided on the findings of fact by the trial judge, these under their authority, legal guardianship or power, unless they prove that there was
findings sufficiently establish the negligence of Wright no blame or negligence on their part.
o The fact finding of the RTC judge, the fact that there is negligence
though not fully sustained should be assumed that there were Should there be no person having them under his authority, legal guardian, or
evidentiary facts disclosed which were sufficient to sustain that power, if such person be insolvent, the said lunatics, imbeciles, or minors shall
there is negligence answer with their own property, excepting that part which is exempted for their
support in accordance with the civil law.
Torts and Damages Case Digest: US v. Baggay (1911)  even when they hold the accused exempt from criminal liability, must fix
G.R. No. 6659 September 1, 1911 the civil liability of the persons charged with watching over and caring for
Lessons Applicable: Insanity (Torts and Damages) him or the liability of the demented person him self with his property for
reparation of the damage and indemnification for the harm done
FACTS: o UNLESS: the offended party or the heirs of the person murdered
 October 14, 1909: During the holding a song service called "buni", the non- expressly renounce such reparation or indemnification
Christian Baggay Jr. attacked a woman Bil-liingan with a bolo inflicting a
serious wound on her head causing her to die immediately. MARINDUQUE IRON MINES AGENTS, INC v WCC (1956)
o He inflicted the same to the women named Calabayan, Agueng, [G.R. No. L-8110. June 30, 1956.] MARINDUQUE IRON MINES AGENTS, INC., Petitioner,
Quisamay, Calapini, and on his own mother, named Dioalan. vs. THE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, THE HEIRS OF PEDRO
 February 15 MAMADOR and GERONIMO MA. COLL, Respondents.
o provincial fiscal filed a complaint for murder
 This cause was instituted separately from the other FACTS:
for lesiones On August 23, 1951, at 6:00 a.m. in Bo. Sumangga, Mogpog, Marinduque, the
 RTC: Baggay was suffering from mental aberration and was exempt from deceased Mamador together with other laborers of the Respondent-corporation,
criminal liability but obliged to indemnify the heirs if the murdered woman,
(Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc.) boarded a truck belonging to the latter, which
Bil-liingan, in the sum of P1,000, to pay the costs in the case and to be
was then driven by one Procopio Macunat, also employed by the corporation, and
confined in an institution for the insane until further order of the court.
on its way to their place of work at the mine camp at Talantunan, while trying to
 court declared said appeal out of order and dismissed it
overtake another truck on the company road, it turned over and hit a coconut
 counsel for Baggay resorted to this court with a petition praying that a writ
tree, resulting in the death of said Mamador and injury to the others.”
be issued directing judge Chanco, to admit the appeal and forward it, at
the same time annulling all action taken for execution of the judgments Procopio Macunat was prosecuted, convicted and sentenced to indemnify the
rendered in the causes for murder and for lesiones heirs of the deceased. (Criminal Case No. 1491). He has paid nothing however, to
 Attorney-General: writ inappropriate and that it should be remedy the latter.
of mandamus
ISSUE: W/N Baggay was exempt from criminal liability making him exempt from civil DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: (1) Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner:
liability as well confirmed the referee’s award of compensation to the heirs of Pedro Mamador for
his accidental death.
HELD: NO.
 Article 17 of the Penal Code states: ISSUE: What is the effect of the deceased’s having violated the employer’s
Every person criminally liable for a crime or misdemeanor is also civilly liable prohibition against laborers riding the haulage trucks
 Article 18 of the same code says:
The exemption from criminal liability declared in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 7, and 10 of article 8 RULING: No. There is no doubt that mere riding on haulage truck or stealing a ride
does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced, subject to thereon is not negligence, ordinarily. It couldn’t be, because
the following:
transportation by truck is not dangerous per se. It is argued that there was notorious
(1) In cases 1, 2, and 3, the persons who are civilly liable for acts committed by a
negligence in this particular instance because there was the employer’s
lunatic or imbecile, or a person under 9 years of age, or over this age and under
15, who has not acted with the exercise of judgment, are those who have them prohibition.
However there is practical unanimity in the proposition that violation of a rule
promulgated by a Commission or board is not negligence per se; but it may be

3
evidence of negligence. Section 6 provides as follows: alleged that plaintiff parked his truck in a manner which occupied a part of the
“Sec. 6. Liability of third parties. — In case an employee suffers an injury for which highway and he did not even put a warning sign.
compensation is due under this Act by any other person besides his employer, it
shall be optional with such injured employee either to claim compensation from his Subsequently, a third-party complaint was filed by the defendant against his insurer,
employer, under this Act, or sue such other person for damages, in accordance the Travellers Multi Indemnity Corporation; that the third-party plaintiff [Isidro],
with law; and in case compensation is claimed and allowed in accordance with without admitting his liability to the plaintiff, claimed that the third-party defendant
this Act, the employer who paid such compensation or was found liable to pay the [Travellers] is liable to the former for contribution, indemnity and subrogation by
same, shall succeed the injured employee to the right of recovering from such virtue of their insurance contract which covers the insurer's liability for damages
person what he paid: Provided, That in case the employer recovers from such third arising from death, bodily injuries and damage to property. The Insurance
person damages in excess of those paid or allowed under this Act, such excess shall company argued that it is only liable for the amount agreed in the policy and the
be delivered to the injured employee or any other person entitled thereto, after complaint was premature since no claim was made to it.
deduction of the expenses of the employer and the costs of the proceedings. The
sum paid by the employer for compensation or the amount of compensation to The RTC ruled in favor of the Petitioners. The CA reversed the decision, stating that
which the employee or his dependents are entitled, shall not be admissible as it is the petitioners who were negligent since they did not exercise caution by
evidence in any damage suit or action.” putting warning signs that their truck is park on the shoulder of the highway.
It is the Petitioner’s contention that Criminal Case No. 1491 and its outcome
constituted an election by the employee (or his heirs) to sue the third person, such Issue: Whether or not Isidro is liable as employer of Serrano.
election having the effect of releasing the employer. However, Criminal Case No.
1491 was not a suit for damages against the third person, it being alleged, without Ruling: Yes! The SC held that the CA erroneously appreciated the evidence. It was
contradiction that the heirs did not intervene therein and have not so far received proven that the petitioner placed a warning sign within 3 to 4 meters from their truck
the indemnity ordered by the court. in the form of a lighted kerosene lamp. The existence of this warning sings was
Indemnity granted the heirs in a criminal prosecution of the “other person” does corroborated by Serrano, respondent's driver, and further stated that when he saw
not affect the liability of the employer to pay compensation. a parked truck, he kept on stepping on the brake pedal but it did not function. Thus
As to the alleged “amicable settlement,” it consists of an affidavit wherein, for the despite this warning signs, the truck recklessly driven by Serrano and owned by
sum of 150 pesos, Mamador’s widow promised “to forgive Macunat for the wrong Respondent Isidro bumped the truck of petitioner.
committed and not to bring him before the authorities for prosecution.” Upon
making such promise — Petitioner argues — she elected one of the remedies, The private respondent is sued under Art. 2176 in relation to Art. 2180, paragraph 5,
(against the third person) and is barred from the other remedy (against the of the Civil Code. In the latter, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a
employer). The contention may not be sustained, inasmuch as all the widow servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
promised was to forego the offender’s criminal prosecution. Note further that a negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the
question may be raised whether she could bind the other heirs of the deceased. servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection, or both. Such
Layugan vs. IAC; Torts- vicarious liability of owner of a truck presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure and consequently, may be
G.R. No. 73998 November 14, 1988 rebutted. If follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the
court that in the selection and in the supervision he has exercised the care and
Facts: Pedro T. Layugan filed an action for damages against Godofredo Isidro, diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is
alleging that while at Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, the Plaintiff and a relieved from liability. In disclaiming liability for the incident, the private respondent
companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck which was parked along the stresses that the negligence of his employee has already been adequately
right side of the National Highway; that defendant's truck, driven recklessly by overcome by his driver's statement that he knew his responsibilities as a driver and
Daniel Serrano bumped the plaintiff, that as a result, plaintiff was injured and that the truck owner used to instruct him to be careful in driving.
hospitalized where he incurred and will incur more expenses as he recuperates
from said injuries; Plaintiff's right leg was amputated and that because of said We do not agree with the private respondent in his submission. In the first place, it
injuries he would be deprived of a lifetime income. is clear that the driver did not know his responsibilities because he apparently did
To free themselves from liability, defendants Isidro [owner] and Serrano [driver] not check his vehicle before he took it on the road. If he did he could have
averred that he knows his responsibilities as a driver and further contends that it was discovered earlier that the brake fluid pipe on the right was cut, and could have
the negligence of plaintiff that was the proximate cause of the accident. They repaired it and thus the accident could have been avoided. Moveover, to our

4
mind, the fact that the private respondent used to intruct his driver to be careful in A blood count showed that Mrs. Villegas had [an] infection... inside her abdominal
his driving, that the driver was licensed, and the fact that he had no record of any cavity. The result of all those examinations impelled Dr. Kho to suggest that Mrs.
accident, as found by the respondent court, are not sufficient to destroy the finding Villegas submit to another surgery to which the latter agreed.
of negligence of the Regional Trial Court given the facts established at the trial. The When Dr. Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs. Villegas she found whitish-yellow
private respondent or his mechanic, who must be competent, should have discharge inside, an ovarian cyst on each of the left and right ovaries which gave
conducted a thorough inspection of his vehicle before allowing his driver to drive out pus, dirt and pus behind the uterus, and a piece of rubber materials on the right
side of the uterus
it.
This piece of rubber material which Dr. Kho described as a "foreign body" looked
like a piece of a "rubber glove"... this foreign body was the cause of the infection
In the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case, we hold that Isidro failed to of the ovaries
prove that the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of his The piece of rubber allegedly found near private respondent Flotilde Villegas'
employees which would exculpate him from solidary liability with his driver to the uterus was not presented in court, and although Dr. Ma. Salud Kho testified that she
petitioner. But even if we concede that the diligence of a good father of a family sent it to a pathologist in Cebu City for examination,[8] it was not mentioned in the...
was observed by Isidro in the supervision of his driver, there is not an iota of pathologist's Surgical Pathology Report.
evidence on record of the observance by Isidro of the same quantum of diligence unluckily I don't know where the rubber was.
in the supervision of his mechanic, if any, who would be directly in charge in Dr. Victoria Batiquin's testimony that when she confronted Dr. Kho regarding the
maintaining the road worthiness of his (Isidro's) truck. But that is not all. There is piece of rubber, "Dr. Kho answered that there was rubber indeed but that she threw
paucity of proof that Isidro exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in it away."... the trial court held in favor of the petitioners herein.
the selection of his driver, Daniel Serrano, as well as in the selection of his mechanic, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court
The petitioners prefer the trial court's interpretation of the above testimony, i.e., that
if any, in order to insure the safe operation of his truck and thus prevent damage to
Dr. Kho's knowledge of the piece of rubber was based on hearsay.
others. Accordingly, the responsibility of Isidro as employer treated in Article 2180,
paragraph 5, of the Civil Code has not ceased. Issues: We find that the focal point of the instant appeal is the appreciation of Dr.
DR. VICTORIA L. BATIQUIN v. CA, GR No. 118231, 1996-07-05 Kho's testimony.
Facts: Dr. Batiquin was a Resident Physician at the Negros Oriental Provincial
Hospital, Dumaguete City... she was also the Actg. Head of the Department of Ruling: The phrase relied upon by the trial court does not negate the fact that Dr.
Obstetrics and Gynecology at the said Kho saw a piece of rubber in private respondent Villegas' abdomen, and that she
Hospital. sent it to a laboratory and then to Cebu City for examination by a... pathologist.
Mrs. Villegas... submitted to Dr. Batiquin for prenatal care as the latter's private Although hearsay, Dr. Batiquin's claim was not objected to, and hence, the same
patient is admissible[27] but it carries no probative value.
Dr. Batiquin... with the assistance of Dr. Doris Teresita Sy... and O.R. Nurse Arlene Nevertheless, assuming otherwise, Dr. Batiquin's statement cannot belie the fact
Diones and some student nurses that Dr.
Villegas... after 45 minutes Mrs. Villegas delivered her first child Kho found a piece of rubber near private respondent Villegas' uterus.
Plaintiff remained confined at the Hospital... during which period of confinement whether she threw it away or sent it to Cebu City, we are not justified in distrusting
she was regularly visited... by Dr. Batiquin. her as to her recovery of a piece of... rubber from private respondent Villegas'
Soon after leaving the Hospital Mrs. Villegas began to suffer abdominal pains and abdomen... he trial court failed to recognize that the assertions of Drs. Batiquin and
complained of being feverish... consulted Dr. Batiquin at the latter's polyclinic who Sy were denials or negative testimonies. Well-settled is the rule that positive
prescribed for her certain medicines testimony is stronger than negative testimony.[33] Of course, as the petitioners...
Mrs. Villegas was given a Medical Certificate by Dr. Batiquin on October 31, 1988 . advocate, such positive testimony must come from a credible source, which leads
. . certifying to her physical fitness to return to her work us to the second assigned error.
The abdominal pains and fever kept on recurring Dr. Kho as a credible witness. Dr. Kho was frank throughout her turn on the
When the pains become unbearable and she was rapidly losing weight she witness stand. Furthermore, no... motive to state any untruth was ever imputed
consulted Dr. Ma. Salud Kho at the Holy Child's Hospital in against Dr. Kho, leaving her trustworthiness unimpaired.
Dumaguete City her positive testimony [that a piece of rubber was indeed found in private
Upon examination she felt an abdominal mass one finger below the umbilicus... respondent Villegas' abdomen] prevails over the negative testimony in favor of the
which she suspected to be either a tumor of the uterus or an ovarian cyst, either of petitioners.
which could be cancerous. the rule of res ipsa loquitur comes to fore.

5
The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable presumption or inference that defendant was of Magno and that the company was at fault and guilty of negligence because
negligent, which arises upon proof that [the] instrumentality causing injury was in although the electric wire had been installed long before the construction of the
defendant's exclusive control, and that the accident was one which ordinary house the electric company did not exercise due diligence. Hence, this petition.
does... not happen in absence of negligence.
[a] rule of evidence whereby negligence of [the] alleged wrongdoer may be Issue: WON Manila Electric Co., is gulity of negligence.
inferred from [the] mere fact that [the] accident happened provided [the]
character of [the] accident and circumstances attending it... reasonably to belief...
Ruling : Decision of the CA reversed.
absence of negligence it would not have occurred and that thing which caused
injury is shown to have been under [the] management and control of [the] alleged
wrongdoer... the happening of an injury permits an... inference of negligence Ratio: A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such
where plaintiff produces substantial evidence that [the] injury was caused by an remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the
agency or instrumentality under [the] exclusive control and management of occassion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such
defendant, and that the occurrence [sic] was such that in the ordinary course of prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient
things would not... happen if reasonable care had been used. cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such
peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence condition or occassion.
may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof
of negligence. RAMOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 124354. December 29, 1999.
not a rule of... substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural
convenience.
FACTS: Erlinda Ramos underwent a surgical procedure to remove stone from her
not intended to and does not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable
negligence on the party charged. It... merely determines and regulates what shall gall bladder (cholecystectomy). They hired Dr. Hosaka, a surgeon, to conduct the
be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a surgery at the De Los Santos Medical Center (DLSMC). Hosaka assured them that
breach of the duty of due care. he would find a good anesthesiologist. But the operation did not go as planned,
can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct Dr. Hosaka arrived 3 hours late for the operation, Dra. Gutierrez, the anesthesiologist
evidence is absent and not... readily available. “botched” the administration of the anesthesia causing Erlinda to go into a coma
all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine are present... entire proceedings of the and suffer brain damage. The botched operation was witnessed by Herminda Cruz,
cesarean section were under the exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. In this light, the sister in law of Erlinda and Dean of College of Nursing of Capitol Medical Center.
private respondents were bereft of direct evidence... since aside from the
cesarean section, private respondent Villegas underwent no... other operation The family of Ramos (petitioners) sued the hospital, the surgeon and the
which could have caused the offending piece of rubber to appear in her uterus, it anesthesiologist for damages. The petitioners showed expert testimony showing
stands to reason that such could only have been a by-product of the cesarean that Erlinda's condition was caused by the anesthesiologist in not exercising
section... petitioners, in this regard, failed to overcome the presumption... of
reasonable care in “intubating” Erlinda. Eyewitnesses heard the anesthesiologist
negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
saying “Ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang
the vital role the medical profession plays in the lives of the people,[37] and State's
compelling interest to enact measures to protect the public from "the potentially tiyan.”
deadly effects of... incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake
to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma." Diagnostic tests prior to surgery showed that Erlinda was robust and fit to undergo
Through her tortious conduct, the petitioner endangered the life of Flotilde Villegas, surgery.
in violation of her profession's rigid ethical code and in contravention of the legal
standards set forth for professionals, in the general,[40] and members of the The RTC held that the anesthesiologist ommitted to exercise due care in intubating
medical profession,[41] in particular. the patient, the surgeon was remiss in his obligation to provide a “good
MANILA ELECTRIC CO. vs. REMOQUILLO, et als. anesthesiologist” and for arriving 3 hours late and the hospital is liable for the
Facts: Efren Magno went to repair a ¨media agua¨ of the house pf his brother-in- negligence of the doctors and for not cancelling the operation after the surgeon
law. Whilw making the repair, a galvanized iron roofing which was holding came failed to arrive on time. The surgeon, anesthesiologist and the DLSMC were all held
into contact with the electric wire of the petitioner Manila Electric Co. strung jointly and severally liable for damages to petitioners. The CA reversed the decision
parallel to the edge of the ¨media agua¨ and 2 1/2 feet from it. He was of the Trial Court.
electrocuted and died as a result thereof. In an action for damages brought by the
heirs of Magno against manila Electric Co. the CA awarded damages to the heirs

6
ISSUES: Whether or not the private respondents were negligent and thereby caused PLDT v. CA and Sps. Antonio and Gloria Esteban
the comatose condition of Ramos. 1989 / Regalado / Petition for review on certiorari of CA resolution
Defenses against charge of negligence > Plaintiff’s negligence is proximate cause
HELD: Yes, private respondents were all negligent and are solidarily liable for the
damages. FACTS: Sps. Esteban were riding their jeep along the inside lane of Lacson Street
where they resided [at 25km/hr as Antonio Esteban claimed; CA said jeep ran fast;
RATIO: Res ipsa loquitur – a procedural or evidentiary rule which means “the thing if the jeep braked at that speed, the spouses would not have been thrown against
or the transaction speaks for itself.” It is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the the windshield]. The jeep abruptly swerved from the inside lane, then it ran over a
occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken
inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system. Antonio failed to
case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation, notice the open trench which was left uncovered because of the darkness and the
where ordinarily in a medical malpractice case, the complaining party must lack of any warning light or signs. The spouses were thrown against the windshield.
present expert testimony to prove that the attending physician was negligent. Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms, legs and face, leaving a
permanent scar on her cheek, while Antonio suffered cut lips. The jeep’s windshield
This doctrine finds application in this case. On the day of the operation, Erlinda was also shattered.
Ramos already surrendered her person to the private respondents who had PLDT denies liability, contending that the injuries sustained by the spouses
complete and exclusive control over her. Apart from the gallstone problem, she were due to their own negligence, and that it should be the independent
was neurologically sound and fit. Then, after the procedure, she was comatose and contractor L.R. Barte and Co. [Barte] who should be held liable. PLDT filed a third-
brain damaged—res ipsa loquitur!—the thing speaks for itself! party complaint against Barte, alleging that under the terms of their agreement,
PLDT should not be answerable for any accident or injuries arising from the
Negligence – Private respondents were not able to disprove the presumption of negligence of Barte or its employees. Barte claimed that it was not aware, nor was
negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the it notified of the accident, and that it complied with its contract with PLDT by
proximate cause of her condition. One need not be an anesthesiologist in order to installing the necessary and appropriate signs.
tell whether or not the intubation was a success. [res ipsa loquitur applies here]. The RTC ruled in favor of the spouses. CA reversed RTC and dismissed the spouses’
Supreme Court also found that the anesthesiologist only saw Erlinda for the first time complaint, saying that the spouses were negligent. Later, it set aside its earlier
on the day of the operation which indicates unfamiliarity with the patient and decision and affirmed in totoRTC’s decision. (SC declared this later decision null
which is an act of negligence and irresponsibility. and void. The first decision already became final and executory because no
appeal was taken seasonably.)
The head surgeon, Dr. Hosaka was also negligent. He failed to exercise the proper
authority as the “captain of the ship” in determining if the anesthesiologist observed ISSUE AND HOLDING: WON PLDT is liable for the injuries sustained by Sps.
the proper protocols. Also, because he was late, he did not have time to confer Esteban. NO
with the anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery.
RATIO: The accident which befell the spouses was due to the lack of diligence of
The hospital failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of Antonio, and was not imputable to the negligent omission on the part of PLDT. If the
a good father of the family in hiring and supervision of its doctors (Art. 2180). The accident did not happen because thejeep was running quite fast on the inside
hospital was negligent since they are the one in control of the hiring and firing of lane and for some reason or other it had to swerve suddenly to the right and had
their “consultants”. While these consultants are not employees, hospitals still exert to climb over the accident mound, then Antonio had not exercised the diligence
significant controls on the selection and termination of doctors who work there of a good father of a family to avoid the accident. With the drizzle, he should not
which is one of the hallmarks of an employer-employee reationship. Thus, the have run on dim lights, but should have put on his regular lights which should have
hospital was allocated a share in the liability. made him see the accident mound in time. The mound was relatively big and
visible, being 2-3 ft high and 1-1/2 ft wide. Also, he knew of the existence and
location of the mound, having seen it many previous times.
Damages – temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or The negligence of Antonio was not only contributory to his and his wife’s
compensatory damages in instances where the injury is chronic and continuing. injuries but goes to thevery cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its
determining factors, and therebyprecludes their right to recover damages. The

7
perils of the road were known to the spouses. By exercising reasonable care and Here, the CA held that private respondent’s case came under the
prudence, Antonio could have avoided the injurious consequences of his act, even exception because private respondent was unaware of petitioner’s negligence
assuming arguendo that there was some alleged negligence on the part of PLDT. when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Private
The omission to perform a duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the respondent filed the civil complaint for damages using the police investigation
site of the excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the report to support her complaint may just be an afterthought after receiving a copy
said omitted act would have prevented the injury. As a resident of Lacson Street, of the Memorandum of the Prosecutor’s Office dismissing the criminal complaint for
insufficiency of evidence. This court is more inclined to believe appellee’s
he passed on that street almost everyday and had knowledge of the presence
allegation that she learned about appellant’s negligence only after she applied
and location of the excavations there; hence, the presence of warning signs could
for and received the benefits under ECC. This is a mistake of fact that will make this
not have completely prevented the accident. Furthermore, Antonio had the last case fall under the exception
clear chance to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes Payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor
to PLDT. Code shall be deducted therefrom. In all other respects, the Decision of the Court
A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of of Appeals is AFFIRMED
proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof, otherwise, his
action must fail. The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively GREGORIO GENOBIAGON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
established by competent evidence. In this case, there was insufficient evidence to PHILIPPINES, respondents.
prove any negligence on the part of PLDT. What was presented was just the self-
serving testimony of Antonio and the unverified photograph of a portion of the FACTS : On December 31,1959, at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening, a rig driven by
scene of the accident. The absence of a police report and the non-submission of appellant bumped an old woman who was crossing T. Padilla St., Cebu City, at the
a medical report from the hospital where the spouses were allegedly treated have right side of T. Padilla Market. The appellant's rig was following another at a distance
not even been explained. of two meters.
The old woman started to cross when the first rig was approaching her, but as
Consunji v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2001
appellant's vehicle was going so fast not only because of the steep down-grade of
the road, but also because he was trying to overtake the rig ahead of him, the
FACTS: Jose A. Juego was crushed to death when the platform he was then on appellant's rig bumped the old woman, who as a consequence, fell at the middle
board and performing work, fell. And the falling of the platform was due to the of the road.
removal or getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the connecting The appellant continued to drive on, but a by-stander, one Vicente
points of the chain block and platform but without a safety lock.1 Mangyao, who just closed his store in market in order to celebrate the coming of
Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a the New Year, and who saw the incident right before him, shouted at the appellant
complaint for damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The to stop. He ran after appellant when the latter refused to stop. Overtaking the
employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits appellant, Mangyao asked him why he bumped the old woman and his answer
from the State Insurance Fund. RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria was, 'it was the old woman that bumped him.'
Juego. On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
decision of the RTC in toto. D. M. Consunji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision. RTC Ruling: The trial court found petitioner guilty of the felony charged and
sentenced him to "suffer an indeterminate penalty of three (3) months of arresto
ISSUE: Whether or not Maria Juergo can still claim damages with D.M. Consunji mayor as minimum to one (1) year, one (1) month and eleven (11) days of prision
apart from the death benefits she claimed in the State Insurance Fund. correccional as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of Rita Banzon Cabrera the sum
HELD: Yes. The respondent is not precluded from recovering damages under the of P6,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, not to exceed 1/3 of
civil code. the principal penalty and to pay the costs".
As a general rule a claimant has a choice of either to recover from the
employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmen’s Compensation Act or to CA Ruling The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which convicted the
prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tort fees or for higher damages but accused but increased his civil liability to P12,000.
he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously. But There is an exception
is where a claimant who has already been paid under the Workmen’s Petitioner Contends: Petitioner states that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding
Compensation Act may still sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis of that the reckless negligence of the victim was the proximate cause of the accident
supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy. which led to her death.
The choice of the first remedy based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, nullifies the
choice as it was not an intelligent choice.

8
ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of contributory negligence may apply in criminal foreman swears that he repeated the prohibition before the starting of this
cases. particular load. On this contradiction of proof we think that the preponderance is
in favor of the defendant's contention to the extent of the general order being
SC RULING. NO. The alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if any, does not made known to the workmen. If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff in placing
exonerate the accused. "The defense of contributory negligence does not apply himself in danger contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate, although
in criminal cases committed through reckless imprudence, since one cannot allege not as its primary cause.
the negligence of another to evade the effects of his own negligence."
The petitioner's contention that the Court of Appeals unjustly increased his civil
Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between the event itself,
liability to P12,000, is devoid of merit. The prevailing jurisprudence in fact provides
that indemnity for death in homicide or murder is P30,000 . Accordingly, the civil without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim
liability of the petitioner is increased to P30,000. not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing under review was the
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed with modification as to the civil displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. this produced the event
liability of the petitioner which is hereby increased to P30,000. Costs against giving occasion for damages — that is, the sinking of the track and the sliding of
petitioner. the iron rails.

RAKES v ATLANTIC [G.R. No. 1719. January 23, 1907.] M. H., RAKES, plaintiff-appellee, 1. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES. — In order to enforce the liability of an employer
vs. THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY, defendant-appellant. for injuries to his employee, it is not necessary that a criminal action be first
prosecuted against the employer or his representative primarily chargeable with
FACTS: The plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the employment of the accident. No criminal proceeding having been taken, the civil action may
the defendant, was at work transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to the proceed to judgment.
company's yard near the malecon in Manila. Plaintiff claims that but one hand car
was used in this work. The defendant has proved that there were two immediately 2. LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER TO WORKMEN. — The responsibility of an employer to his
following one another, upon which were piled lengthwise seven rails, each employee of a fellow-servant of the employee injured, is not adopted in Philippine
weighing 560 pounds, so that the ends of the rails lay upon two crosspieces or sills jurisprudence.
secured to the cars, but without side pieces or guards to prevent them from slipping
off. According to the testimony of the plaintiff, the men were either in the rear of 3. FELLOW-SERVANT RULE. — Sua cuique culpa nocet. The doctrine known as the
the car or at its sides. According to that defendant, some of them were also in front, "Fellow-servant rule," exonerating the employer where the injury was incurred
hauling by a rope. At a certain spot at or near the water's edge the track sagged, through the negligence of a fellow-servant of the employee injured, is not adopted
the tie broke, the car either canted or upset, the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, in Philippine jurisprudence.
breaking his leg, which was afterwards amputated at about the knee.
Southeastern College Inc vs CA (torts)
ISSUE: Whether the company is liable
Facts: After a typhoon a complaint of culpa aquiliana was filed against the School
HELD: Yes. The negligence of the plaintiff, contributing to the accident, to what for the reason that one of their buildings was considered a structural hazard and
extent it existed in fact and what legal effect is to be given it. In two particulars is the reason of inhabitability of the nearby houses .The complaint is rooted to the
he charged with carelessness: claim that the school has a defective roofing structure and that they have been
First. That having noticed the depression in the track he continued his work; and remiss on the maintenance of such building. The school (petitioner) averred that
Second.That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead of subject school building had withstood several devastating typhoons and other
along the boards, either before or behind it. calamities in the past, without its roofing or any portion thereof giving way; that it
The Court ruled that His lack of caution in continuing at his work after noticing the has not been remiss in its responsibility to see to it that said school building, which
slight depression of the rail was not of so gross a nature as to constitute negligence, houses school children, faculty members, and employees, is "in tip-top condition";
barring his recovery under the severe American rule. While the plaintiff and his and furthermore, typhoon "Saling" was "an act of God and therefore beyond
witnesses swear that not only were they not forbidden to proceed in this way, but human control" such that petitioner cannot be answerable for the damages
were expressly directed by the foreman to do so, both the officers of the company wrought thereby, absent any negligence on its part.
and three of the workmen testify that there was a general prohibition frequently
made known to all the gang against walking by the side of the car, and the

9
 Ong about the cause of the collapse of the ceiling of their theater cannot be
Issue: Whether or not the destruction of the nearby houses was caused by a equated as an act of God. To sustain that proposition is to introduce sacrilege in
fortuitous event. our jurisprudence."

Held: It was held that petitioner has not been shown negligent or at fault regarding Having interposed it as a defense, it had the burden to prove that the collapse was
the construction and maintenance of its school building in question and that indeed caused by force majeure. It could not have collapsed without a cause.
typhoon "Saling" was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by private That Mr. Ong could not offer any explanation does not imply force majeure.
respondents' house.
Verily, the post-incident investigation cannot be considered as material to the
GOTESCO v CHATTO [G.R. No. 87584. June 16, 1992.] GOTESCO INVESTMENT present proceedings. What is significant is the finding of the trial court, affirmed by
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. GLORIA E. CHATTO and LINA DELZA CHATTO, the respondent Court, that the collapse was due to construction defects. There was
respondents. no evidence offered to overturn this finding. The building was constructed barely
four (4) years prior to the accident in question. It was no shown that any of the
FACTS: In the afternoon of June 4, 1982 plaintiff Gloria E. Chatto, and her 15-year causes denominated as force majeure obtained immediately before or at the time
old daughter, plaintiff Lina Delza E. Chatto went to see the movie 'Mother Dear' at of the collapse of the ceiling. Such defects could have been easily discovered if
Superama I theater, owned by defendant Gotesco Investment Corporation. They only petitioner exercised due diligence and care in keeping and maintaining the
bought balcony tickets but even then were unable to find seats considering the premises. But as disclosed by the testimony of Mr. Ong, there was no adequate
number of people patronizing the movie. Hardly ten (10) minutes after entering the inspection of the premises before the date of the accident. His answers to the
theater, the ceiling of its balcony collapsed. The theater was plunged into darkness leading questions on inspection disclosed neither the exact dates of said inspection
and pandemonium ensued. Shocked and hurt, plaintiffs managed to crawl under nor the nature and extent of the same. That the structural designs and plans of the
the fallen ceiling. As soon as they were able to get out to the street they walked to building were duly approved by the City Engineer and the building permits and
the nearby FEU Hospital where they were confined and treated for one (1) day. certificate of occupancy were issued do not at all prove that there were no defects
The next day, they transferred to the UST hospital. Plaintiff Gloria Chatto was treated in the construction, especially as regards the ceiling, considering that no testimony
in said hospital from June 5 to June 19 and plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto from June 5 was offered to prove that it was ever inspected at all. It is settled that: "The owner
to 11. Due to continuing pain in the neck, headache and dizziness, plaintiff went to or proprietor of a place of public amusement impliedly warrants that the premises,
Illinois, USA in July 1982 for further treatment (Exh. "E") She was treated at the Cook appliances and amusement devices are safe for the purpose for which they are
County Hospital in Chicago, Illinois. She stayed in the U.S. for about three (3) months designed, the doctrine being subject to no other exception or qualification than
during which time she had to return to the Cook County Hospital five (5) or six (6) that he does not contract against unknown defects not discoverable by ordinary
times. or reasonable means." This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that: "Where
a patron of a theater or other place of public amusement is injured, and the thing
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: that caused the injury is wholly and exclusively under the control and management
(1) Trial Court: ordered the defendant, herein petitioner, to pay the plaintiff Lina of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of events
Delza E. Chatto would not have happened if proper care had been exercised, its occurrence raises
a presumption or permits of an inference of negligence on the part of the
ISSUE: Whether Gotesco is liable defendant." That presumption or inference was not overcome by the petitioner.

HELD: Yes. Petitioner's claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the theater's balcony As gleaned from Bouvier's definition of and Cockburn's elucidation on force
was due to force majeure is not even founded on facts because its own witness, majeure, for one to be exempt from any liability because of it, he must have
Mr. Jesus Lim Ong, admitted that "he could not give any reason why the ceiling exercised care, i.e., he should not have been guilty of negligence.
collapsed."
Clearly, there was no authoritative investigation conducted by impartial civil and Servando vs. Philippine Steam Navigation Co 117 SCRA 832
structural engineers on the cause of the collapse of the theater's ceiling. Jesus Lim
Ong is not an engineer, he is a graduate of architecture from the St. Louie (sic) Facts: Clara Uy Bico and Amparo Servando loaded on board a vessel owned by
University in Baguio City. It does not appear he has passed the government Philippine Steam Navigation cargoes consisting of 1,528 cavans of rice and 44
examination for architects. (TSN, June 14, 1985, p. 4) In fine, the ignorance of Mr. cartons of colored paper for carriage from Manila to Pulupandan, Negros

10
Occidental. Bills of lading were issued by Philippine Navigation. The cargoes were Not unless the loss or damage is caused by the negligence of the carrier, the
discharged in Negros Occidental Bureau of Customs Warehouse as complete and common carrier shall not be liable for such caused by force majeures, accidents
in good order. of sea, war and public enemies.

At about 2:00 PM of the same day, the Customs warehouse was razed by a fire of This is a mere reiteration of Article 1174.
unknown origin, destroying the cargoes. The claims for the value of said goods were
rejected by Philippine Steam, herein respondent. Lower Court ordered Philippine Furthermore, the storage of the goods in the Customs warehouse while waiting
Steam to pay Servando damages, including legal interest from filing of the case. withdrawal by the petitioners was made with their knowledge and consent. Since
They also awarded damages to Uy Bico the sum for the portion of the cargo which the warehouse belonged to and maintained by the government, it would be unfair
was not recovered by her. The legal basis of the lower court for its decision if Article to impute negligence to Philippine Steam, having no control over the same. There
1736: is also no proof or showing that the fire can be imputable to the negligence of its
employees. Judgment appealed is set aside.
Common carriers have the duty to observe extraordinary diligence from the
moment the goods are unconditionally placed in their possession until the same Afialda vs. Hisole
are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee or to the 85 Phil 67 (November 29, 1949)
person who has a right to receive them, without prejudice to the provisions of Article
1738 Facts: Loreto Afialda was employed by Hisole spouses as caretaker of their
carabaos. While tending to the animals, he was gored by one of them and later
It held that the delivery to the Bureau of Customs is not the constructive delivery as died as a consequence. His sister then filed a complaint against the spouses Hisole.
contemplated in Article 1736, thus the common carrier continues to be responsible. The spouses filed a motion to dismiss, which the court granted. Plaintiff now seeks
to hold defendants liable under art. 1905 of the Civil Code which states that “The
Issue: Whether or not FIRE is a fortuitous event, absolving Respondents of any possessor of an animal or the one who uses the same, is liable for any damages it
liability? may cause, even if such animal should escape from him or stray away. This liability
shall cease only in case the damage should arise from force majeure or from the
Held: Yes. The burning of the warehouse was an extraordinary event independent fault of the person who may have suffered it.”
of the will of the respondents. The following characteristics of caso fortuito are
present. 1. the cause of the unforeseen event must be Issue: Whether or not the owner of the animal is liable when the damage is caused
to its caretaker.
which constitutes the 'caso fortuito', or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to
avoid; 3. the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to Held: No. The owner of an animal is answerable only for damages caused to a
fulfill his obligation in a normal manner.4. the obligor must be free from any stranger, and that damage caused to the caretaker of the animal the owner would
participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor. When the be liable only if he had been negligent or at fault under art. 1902 of the Civil Code.
proximate cause of loss is a fortuitous event or force majeure, the obligor is exempt In the case at bar, the animal was in the custody of the
from liability. This is provided for by Article 1174 of the Civil Code. caretaker. It was the caretaker’s business to try to prevent the animal from causing
injury or damage to anyone, including himself. Being injured by the animal was one
Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he
declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the must take the consequences. There was no allegation of negligence on the part of
assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not the Hisole spouses. Thus, they are not liable.
be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
Ilocos Norte Electric Company (INEL Co.)vs. Court of Appeals
It should also be pointed out that in the Bill of Lading (BOL) existing on the cargoes, 179 SCRA 5 (November 6, 1989)
the responsibility of the carrier has been limited as provided by Clause 14.:
FACTS: In the evening of July 28 until the early morning of of June 29, 1967, typhoon
'Gening' buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte and brought heavy rains and
flooding. Between 5:30-6:00AM, Isabel Lao Juan (Nana Belen) along with Aida

11
Bulong and Linda Estavillo ventured out of her house and traversed waist-deep the latter with electric current whenever the switch is on. INELCO then conjectures
flood to proceed to a store, which she owns to check if her merchandise have that the switch must have been left on, causing the deceased electrocution when
been damaged. Suddenly, Nana Belen screaamed 'ay!' and quickly sank into the she tried to open her gate.
water. The two girls attempted to help but fear dissuaded them because on the
spot where the deceased sank, they saw an electric wire dangling from a post and The CFI ruled in favor of INELCO. CA reversed.
moving in snake-like fashion in the water. Ernesto dela Cruz tried to go to Nana
Belen but he turned back because the water was grounded. Ernesto informed Issues: (1) Whether or not the deceased died of electrocution. (2) Whether or not
Antonio Yabes that his mother in law had been electrocuted and together they petitioner INELCO may be held liable for the death of Isabel Lao Juan.
went to the City Hall of Laoag to request the police to ask INELCO to cut off the (3) Whether or not the maxim volenti non fit injuria can be applied in the case at
current. Subsequently, the search for the body began and such was found two bar.
meters from an electric post.
In another place at about 4:00 A.M., Engineer Antonio Juan of the Held:
NAPOCOR noticed certain fluctuations in their electric meter which indicated such (1) YES. The nature of the wounds as described by the witnesses who saw them
abnormalities as grounded or short-circuited lines. He then went out for inspection can lead to no other conclusion than that they were burns and there was nothing
and saw grounded and disconnected lines which were hanging from posts to the else in the street where the victim was wading thru which could cause a burn
ground. Since there were no INELCO linemen in sight, he decided to go to the except the dangling live wire of petitioner company. In the issue of the burglar
INELCO office but it was closed. On the way to INELCO, he passed by Guerrero St. deterrent, the suggestion of petitioner that the switch was left on is mere
and saw and electric wire about 30 meters long and the other end of the wire was speculation, not backed up with evidence.
seeming to play with the current of the water. At about 8:00 A.M., he went out for (2) YES. While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God
inspection again and learned about the death of Nana Belen. He tried to help for which no person may be held responsible, it was not said eventuality which
revive the deceased but his efforts proved futile. He also noticed a hollow wound directly caused the victim's death. It was through the intervention of petitioner's
on the left palm of the victim. In the afternoon, he went on an inspection trip again negligence that death took place. As stated by Engr. Juan in his testimony, he saw
and the wire that he saw on Guerrero St. earlier was no longer there. no INELCO lineman and that the office of INELCO was closed. The SC held that in
times of calamities, extraordinary diligence requires a supplier of electricity to be in
Dr. Castro examined the body of the deceased at around 8:00 A.M. and noted constant vigil to prevent or avoid any probable incident that might imperil life or
that the skin was grayish or cyanotic which indicated death by electrocution. The limb. The petitioner was negligent in seeing to it that no harm is done to the general
wound on the left palm was an electrically charged wound or a first degree burn. public. Furthermore, the court held that when an act of God combines or concurs
The certificate of death prepared by Dr. Castro stated the cause of death as with the negligence of the defendant (in this case the petitioner) to produce an
'circulatory shock electrocution'. injury, the defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own
negligent conduct or omission.
An action for damages was instituted by the heirs of the deceased. INELCO,
through its officers and employees who testified, claims that on and even before Ramos, et al vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I., et al 19 SCRA 289 (1967)
June 29, their electric system did not suffer from any defect that might constitute
hazard to life and property. Moreover, it was alleged that the lines and devices Facts: The car owned by Placido Ramos, while being driven by his son Augusto,
were newly installed and they had installed safety devices to prevent injuries to collided with a truck-tractor and trailer of Pepsi Cola, driven by i Andres Bonifacio.
persons and damage to property in case of natural calamities. INELCO also alleged Ramos filed a case at the CFI of Manila against Pepsi. CFI found Bonifacio negligent
that they had 12 linesmen charged with the duty of checking the areas assigned and declared that Pepsi Cola failed to exercise the due diligence of a good father
to them. Fabico Abijero even testified that in the early morning of June 29, he of a family to prevent the damage. Pepsi and Bonifacio are held solidarily liable to
passed by the intersection of Guerrero and Rizal streets and did not see any broken pay P2,638.50 actual damages, P2,000 moral damages, P2000 exemplary
wires. He said that what he saw were many people fishing out the body of the damages and P1,000 Atty. fees.
deceased. INELCO also presented Dr. Briones who said that without an autopsy, no
doctor or medico-legal can speculate the cause of death. Moreover, he said that CA affirmed the decision of CFI regarding Bonifacio but absolved Pepsi Cola from
cyanosis (lack of oxygen circulating in the blood) appears only in a live person. liability stating that Pepsi has sufficiently proved due diligence in the selection of its
INELCO also said that the deceased was negligent because she installed a burglar employees.
deterrent by connecting a wire from the main house to the iron gate, thus charging

12
ISSUE: Whether or not Pepsi Cola exercised due diligence in the selection of its diligent in supervising them as shown by the evidence. The CA modified the said
driver. ruling, holding MMTC solidarily liable with the other defendants. According to the
CA, MMTC failed to substantiate its allegations that it exercised the diligence of the
Held: Yes. When it was proven that the employer had carefully examined the erring good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees. It pointed
driver as to his qualifications, experience and record of service, such evidence is out the fact that Garbo and Bautista failed to present documentary evidence to
sufficient to show that the employer exercised the diligence of a good father of a support their claims, such as the clearances and test results of Leonardo or the
family in the selection of the driver and rebuts the juris tantum presumption that the written guidelines. As such, the testimonies fall short of the required evidentiary
employer was negligent. Juan Anasco, personnel manager of Pepsi stated that quantum.
before Bonifacio was hired, his background, experience, physical capacity was Issue: Whether or not the evidence of MMTC is sufficient to show that it
checked. Also, he was asked to submit clearance and also asked to take exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
theoretical and practical driving examination. Pepsi was also a member of the of its employees.
Safety Council.
Held: No. The SC agrees with the ruling of the CA.
Petitioner can no longer assail the credibility of Anasco. Findings of CA are binding
on SC. A motion for reconsideration was made stating that respondents violated In civil cases, the degree of evidence required of a party in order to support
the Motor vehicle law. It was said that the truck was overweight and running his claim is preponderance of evidence, or that evidence adduced by one party
beyond the speed limit and that it was not equipped with a rear vision mirror and which is more conclusive and credible than that of the other party. It is, therefore,
with a helper. Such allegations failed to show their basis. Patrolman Pahate did not incumbent on the plaintiff who is claiming a right to prove his case. Corollary,
affirm such allegations. Also, a special permit may be granted for overweight trucks defendant must likewise prove its own allegation to buttress its claim that it is not
and the absence of such permit was not proven. In Quasi delicts, the motor vehicle liable. In fine, the party, whether plaintiff or defendant, who asserts the affirmative
owner is not an absolute owner against all damages caused by its driver. The of the issue has the burden of presenting at the trial such amount of evidence
owner’s responsibility ceases once it proves that it has observed the diligence of a required by law to obtain a favorable judgment. In the case at bar, petitioner's
good father of a family to prevent the damages. attempt to prove it diligentissimi patris familias in the selection and supervision of
employees must fail as it
Metro Manila Transit Corp. (MMTC) vs. CA 223 SCRA 521 June 21, 1993
documentary, which might obviate the apparent biased nature of the
Facts: Appellant Nenita Custodio boarded a jeepney driven by defendant Agudo testimony. MMTC only gave oral testimonies as its evidence, no documentary proof
Calebag and owned by his co-defendant Victorino Lamayo. The jeepney collided was submitted upon request to further bolster its defense. The mere formulation of
with an MMTC bus at the intersection of DBP Avenue and Honeydew Road. MMTC various company policies on saftey without showing that they were being
bus was driven by defendant Godofredo Leonardo. Both drivers failed to slow complied with is not sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising from
down or blow their horns. As a result of said incident, Custodio was thrown out negligence of its employees.
through the windshield and sustained serious physical injuries. She was sent to the
hospital and regained consciousness only after a week. The SC does not find the evidence presented by petitioner sufficiently
Appellant, assisted by parents, filed a claim for damages. Defendants convincing to prove the diligence of a good father of a family. Hence, applying
denied the material allegations. MMTC for its part presented Milagros Garbo, its Art. 2180 in relation to Art. 2176, petitioner is held solidarily liable with the other
training officer, and Christian Bautista, its transport supervisor, as two of its witnesses. defendants.
Garbo testified that the company's bus drivers undergo a series of training
programs, examinations, clearances, interviews and seminars for their selection. Kramer vs. Court of Appeals 178 SCRA 518 (October 13, 1989)
Bautista on the other hand, testified that he ensured the drivers were in proper
uniform, briefed in traffic rules and regulations and fit to drive before the start of Facts: On April 8, 1976, F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by the petitioners was
duty. navigating its way from Marinduque to Manila. Somewhere near Maricabon Island
The trial court found both drivers negligent for non-observance of and Cape Santiago, the boat collided with an inter-island vessel, the M/V Asia
appropriate traffic rules and regulations and for failure to take the usual Philippines, owned by the private respondent Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc.
precautions when approaching an intersection. It however, absolved MMTC,
stating that it was careful and diligent in selecting its employees and strict and

13
 F/B Marjolea sank, taking with it its fish catch. The captains of both vessels petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court, the payments made
filed their respective marine protests with the Board of Marine Inquiry of the under the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages
Philippine Coast Guard. The Board conducted an investigation for the purpose of that may be decreed in their favor.
determining the proximate cause of the maritime collision. On October 19, 1981,
the Board concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea and its fish catch was Bataclan vs. Medina G.R. No. L-10126 (1957)
attributable to the negligence of the employees of the private respondent who
were on board the M/V Asia Philippines during the collision. The findings made by Facts: Bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation, operated by its owner, Mariano
the Board served as the basis of a subsequent Decision of the Commandant of the Medina, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by
Philippine Coast Guard dated April 29, 1982 wherein the second mate of the M/V Conrado Saylon. Among the passengers were Juan Bataclan. While the bus was
Asia Philippines was suspended from pursuing his profession as a marine officer. running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst causing the
vehicle to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and
On May 30, 1985, the petitioners instituted a Complaint for damages turned turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus, others had to be
against the private respondent in the RTC. The private respondent helped or pulled out, while the three passengers seated beside the driver, namely
Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia
G.R. No. L-30642 (April 30, 1985) Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus. After half an hour, came about
ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on
FACTS: Several miners, who, while working at the copper mines underground one end. These men presumably approached the overturned bus, and almost
operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that immediately, a fire started, consuming the bus, including the four passengers
buried them in the tunnels of the mine. The heirs of the deceased claimed their trapped inside. It would appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak
benefits pursuant to the Workmen’s Compensation Act before the Workmen’s and escape from the gasoline tank on the side of the chassis, spreading over and
Compensation Commission. They also petitioned before the regular courts and sue permeating the body of the bus and the ground under and around it, and that the
Philex for additional damages, pointing out in the complaint 'gross and brazen lighted torch brought by one of the men who answered the call for help set it on
negligence on the part of Philex in failing to take necessary security for the fire.
protection of the lives of its employees working underground'. Philex invoked that The heirs of the deceased brought an action to recover from Mariano
they can no longer be sued because the petitioners have already claimed benefits Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, which, Philex insists, holds jurisdiction over
provisions for remedies. Issue: Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the
overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus, including himself and
ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of the deceased have a right of selection between his co-passengers who were unable to leave it.
availing themselves of the worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act
and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, Held: The Court held that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this
moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of that negligence or fault of for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on
the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions. its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected;
that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help,
HELD: The court held that although the other petitioners had received the benefits made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning),
bringing an action before the regular court because they became cognizant of the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural
the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural
miners only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid
aware of said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its and effect the rescue requested from them.
negligence, they would not have sought redress under the Workmen’s In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected
Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of
choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which its passengers and the call for outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus
nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The case should therefore be can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is driver and
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. However, should the its conductor.

14
 According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road In the case at bar, the evidence on record does not clearly show that the
walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the hacking.
that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have The evidence merely confirms that the wound, which was already healing at the
leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got infected with
aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be tetanus. However, as to when the wound was infected is not clear. There is a
smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection
conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers (failure to take the necessary precautions against tetanus) may have been the
not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. proximate cause of Javier's death.

Urbano vs. IAC G.R. No. L-72964) (1988) Phoenix Construction vs. IAC 148 SCA 353 (L-652095) (1987)

Facts: Petitioner, Filomeno Urbano quarreled with Marcelino Javier because the Facts: In the early morning of 15 November 1975 — at about 1:30 a.m. — private
latter opened the irrigation canal which caused the flooding of the place where respondent Leonardo Dionisio was driving his way home from a cocktails-and-
Urbano's palay was stored. Urbano hacked the right palm of Javier with a bolo and dinner meeting with his boss. During the cocktails phase of the evening, Dionisio
caused an incised wound that was later treated. Urbano and Javier agreed on an had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had
amicable settlement and petitioner paid for the hospital bills. just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets at
Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home, and was proceeding down General
22 days later, Javier was rushed to the hospital, he had a locked jaw and Lacuna Street, when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He
was having convulsions, caused by tetanus toxin. The doctor noticed that the switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck
wound was infected. The next day, Javier died. Petitioner was charged with looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car.
homicide and was later found guilty by the trial court. The IAC affirmed the
conviction. Petitioner filed a motion for new trial based on the affidavit of the The dump truck, owned by and registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix
barangay captain that Javier was found catching fish on the irrigation canal, 10 Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was parked on the right hand side of General Lacuna
days prior to his death. Street facing the oncoming traffic. The dump truck was parked askew in such a
manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking
Issue: Whether or not the inflicting of the wound by petitioner was only a remote,
and not a proximate, cause. warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear. The
dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando
Held: The inflicting of the wound is only a remote cause and petitioner cannot be Carbonel, its regular driver, with the permission of his employer Phoenix, in view of
held liable therefor. A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an work scheduled to be carried out early the following morning, Dionisio claimed that
action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his
to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between car smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some
such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated and physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown"
efficient cause of injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for and loss of two gold bridge dentures.
such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because
of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First Instance of
independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the Pampanga basically claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was
circumstances, which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause. him by his employer Phoenix. Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other hand, countered
The incubation period of tetanus, ranges from 2 to 56 days. However, over that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast
80 percent of patients become symptomatic within 14 days. A short incubation at the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his
period indicates severe disease, and when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of headlights on and without a curfew pass. Phoenix also sought to establish that it
injury, the mortality rate approaches 100 percent. (NOTICE that it took Javier 22 had exercised due care in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver.
days, from the time of the hacking, before he had symptoms of Tetanus)

15
Issue: Whether or not the proximate cause of the accident is the negligence of the maneuvers. When the vessel reached the landmark, one-half mile from the
driver or the negligence of Dionisio. pier, Gavino ordered the engine stopped. When the vessel was already
about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped.
Held: It was the negligence of the truck driver. The legal and proximate cause of
the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful — or negligent manner in
Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. The left
which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner anchor, with two (2) shackles, were dropped. However, the anchor did not
Carbonel. , the collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and take hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A
foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence. commotion ensued between the crew members. After Gavino noticed that
the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines half-astern. Abellana,
The truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was
who was then on the pier apron, noticed that the vessel was approaching
rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The collision between the dump
truck and the private respondent's car would in an probability not have occurred
the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold.
had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or Gavino thereafter gave the “full-astern” code. Before the right anchor and
reflector devices. The improper parking of the dump truck created an additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into
unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier as well as
having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our view, the vessel.
Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver’s
negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening
or independent cause.
ISSUES:
(1) Is the pilot of a commercial vessel, under compulsory pilotage, solely
Respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the liable for the damage caused by the vessel to the pier, at the port of
"immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of destination, for his negligence?;
due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages
(2) Would the owner of the vessel be liable likewise if the damage is
though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts.
caused by the concurrent negligence of the master of the vessel and the
TRIVIA: Did the headlights of Dionisio really turned off unexpectedly, as he claims? pilot under a compulsory pilotage?
Remember, this happened during Martial law years when curfews were in effect. It
was 1:30 AM and Dinisio was drunk. Excellent! HELD:
(1) Generally speaking, the pilot supersedes the master for the time being
FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY vs. in the command and navigation of the ship, and his orders must be obeyed
COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY in all matters connected with her navigation. He becomes the master pro
hac vice and should give all directions as to speed, course, stopping and
FACTS: reversing anchoring, towing and the like. And when a licensed pilot is
M/V PAVLODAR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping employed in a place where pilotage is compulsory, it is his duty to insist
Company (FESC), arrived at the Port of Manila and was assigned Berth 4 on having effective control of the vessel or to decline to act as pilot.
of the Manila International Port, as its berthing space. Gavino, who was Under certain systems of foreign law, the pilot does not take entire charge
assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots’ Association to conduct the of the vessel but is deemed merely the adviser of the master, who retains
docking maneuvers for the safe berthing, boarded the vessel at the command and control of the navigation even in localities where pilotage
quarantine anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge, with the master is compulsory. It is quite common for states and localities to provide for
of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. After a briefing of Gavino by compulsory pilotage, and safety laws have been enacted requiring vessels
Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the vessel lifted approaching their ports, with certain exceptions, to take on board pilots
anchor from the quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the Manila duly licensed under local law. The purpose of these laws is to create a
International Port. The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for docking body of seamen thoroughly acquainted with the harbor, to pilot vessels

16
seeking to enter or depart, and thus protect life and property from the Facts: Agapito Custodio was a passenger of an LTB Bus. He was hanging on the left
dangers of navigation. Upon assuming such office as a compulsory pilot, side of the bus because it was full of passengers. A truck owned by Subido which
Capt. Gavino is held to the universally accepted high standards of care was coming from the opposite direction sideswiped the LTB bus and injured
and diligence required of a pilot, whereby he assumes to have skill and Custodio who died as a result thereof. Both drivers were found negligent- the LTB
knowledge in respect to navigation in the particular waters over which his bus driver for having allowed a passenger to ride on the running board of the bus
license extends superior to and more to be trusted than that of the master. and the driver of the truck for running at a considerable speed while negotiating a
He is not held to the highest possible degree of skill and care but must sharp curb and running on the middle instead of on the right side of the road. The
have and exercise the ordinary skill and care demanded by the owner and the driver of the truck contended that the proximate cause of the
circumstances, and usually shown by an expert in his profession. Under death of Custodio was the negligence of the driver of the LTB bus who allowed
extraordinary circumstances, a pilot must exercise extraordinary care. In Custodio to ride on the running board of the LTB bus.
this case, Capt. Gavino failed to measure up to such strict standard of care
and diligence required of pilots in the performance of their duties. As the Issue: Is there concurrent liability here in this case at bar? How does the
pilot, he should have made sure that his directions were promptly and negligence of both parties affect the liability of both?
strictly followed.

(2) The negligence on the part of Capt. Gavino is evident; but Capt. Kabancov is Held: Although the negligence of the carrier (LTB bus) and its driver is
no less responsible for the allision. The master is still in command of the vessel independent, in its execution, of the negligence of the truck driver and its owner,
notwithstanding the presence of a pilot. A perusal of Capt. Kabankov’s both acts of negligence are the proximate cause of death of Agapito Custodio. In
testimony makes it apparent that he was remiss in the discharge of his duties as fact the negligence of the first two(2) would not have produced this result without
master of the ship, leaving the entire docking procedure up to the pilot, instead the negligence of petitioners herein (the owner and driver of the truck). What is
of maintaining watchful vigilance over this risky maneuver. The owners of a more, petitioner’s negligence was the last, in point of time, for Custodio was on
vessel are not personally liable for the negligent acts of a compulsory pilot, but the running board of the carrier’s bus sometime before petitioner’s truck came
by admiralty law, the fault or negligence of a compulsory pilot is imputable to from the opposite direction, so that, in this sense petitioner’s truck had the last
the vessel and it may be held liable therefor in rem. Where, however, by the clear chance.” The owner and the driver of the truck were held jointly and severally
provisions of the statute the pilot is compulsory only in the sense that his fee liable, together with the LTB bus and its driver, to the heirs of Custodio.
must be paid, and is not in compulsory charge of the vessel, there is no
exemption from liability. Even though the pilot is compulsory, if his negligence Bataclan vs. Medina
was not the sole cause of the injury, but the negligence of the master or crew
contributed thereto, the owners are liable. But the liability of the ship in rem FACTS: Bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation, operated by its owner,
does not release the pilot from the consequences of his own negligence. The Mariano Medina, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven
master is not entirely absolved of responsibility with respect to navigation by Conrado Saylon. Among the passengers were Juan Bataclan. While the bus was
when a compulsory pilot is in charge. Except insofar as their liability is limited or running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst causing
exempted by statute, the vessel or her owners are liable for all damages caused the vehicle to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and
by the negligence or other wrongs of the owners or those in charge of the turned turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus, others had to be
vessel. As a general rule, the owners or those in possession and control of a helped or pulled out, while the three passengers seated beside the driver, namely
vessel and the vessel are liable for all natural and proximate damages caused to Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia
persons or property by reason of her negligent management or navigation. Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus. After half an hour, came
about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on
Subido vs. Custodio one end. These men presumably approached the overturned bus, and almost

17
 immediately, a fire started, consuming the bus, including the four passengers trapped because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light
inside. It would appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and
from the gasoline tank on the side of the chassis, spreading over and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers
permeating the body of the bus and the ground under and around it, and that the should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue
lighted torch brought by one of the men who answered the call for help set it on requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be
fire. expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of
some of its passengers and the call for outside help. What is more, the burning of
Held: There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier the bus can also in part be conductor.
is liable. The only question is to what degree. The trial court was of the opinion
that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road
bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus, including himself and his co- walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known
passengers who were unable to leave it; that at the time the fire started, Bataclan, that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must
though he must have suffered physical injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive, have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus,
and so damages were awarded not for his death, but for the physical injuries this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area,
suffered by him. We disagree. A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the
in Volume 38, pages 695- 696 of American jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs- conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers
appellants in their brief. It is as follows: not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Said negligence on the part of the
agents of the carrier come under the codal provisions above-reproduced,
. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all Philippine Rabbit vs. IAC and Casiano Pascua et al.
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately G.R. No. 66102-04 (August 30, 1990)
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under
such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary Facts: On the eve of Christmas 1966, seven passengers boarded a jeepney bound
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act for Pangasinan via Dau. Manalo drove the jeep owned by Magune and Carreon.
or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
Reaching Tarlac, the right wheel of the jeep was detached resulting to its 180
It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a degree turn invading the other lane with the jeep’s front facing south. The bus
passenger, merely causing him physical injuries, if through some event, driven by Del Rosario collided with the jeepney resulting in the death of three
unexpected and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or passengers and physical injuries to some. Manalo was convicted of Multiple
if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the passenger is Homicide and Serious Physical Injuries. Manalo did not appeal. Three Civil Cases
burned to death, one might still contend that the proximate cause of his death fro Damages docketed 1136; 39-40 was filed anchored on the contractual liability
was the fire and not the overturning of the vehicle. But in the present case under of the jeepney owner and Philippine Rabbit’s liability based on quasidelict. Trial
the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate to hold that the court decided against the jeepney operator as well as the joint liability of his
proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the Insurance Agency for Actual and Moral Damages. The Trial Court based its
vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the decisions on the following:
gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men
with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the (1) Testimony of passenger Pascua alleging that the driver was running really fast.

passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that (2) Unrebutted testimony of Police Inspector on the sharp angle track marks of

18
the jeep; the observation of the skid marks. (3) Manalo’s Conviction on the criminal victims and heirs. The driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the
complaint (4) Application of res ipsa loquitor, attesting to the collision happening carrier in breach of contract as provided in Article 2180 and to make driver jointly
on the right of way of the bus. and severally liable is to make the carrier’s liability a personal one and not explicit.

CA reversed decision. It ordered Plaintiff bus operator and driver to pay Rodrigueza vs. Manila Railroad Co.
jointly and severally the damages awarded. It based its decisions
primarily on 1.) the doctrine of last clear chance. 2.) presumption of the
Facts: Manila Railroad Co. operates a line through the district of Daraga. As one of
responsibility of the vehicle on the rear end to avoid collision with the
its trains passed over the line, sparks were emitted from the smokestack of the
vehicle in front. 3.) the substantial test concluding Bus driver negligent by
locomotive, and fire was communicated to four houses nearby, and they were
not making an effort to avoid accident and being the physical force causing entirely consumed. All of these houses were of light construction except that of
the injury and death of passengers. Rodrigueza’s, which was of strong materials, though the roof was covered with
nipa and cogon. The fire occurred immediately after the passage of the train, and
Issue: Who has liability over the injuries and death of victims? a strong wind was blowing it. It doesn’t appear whose house caught fire first,
though Manila railroad claimed that it was first communicated to Rodrigueza’s
Held: The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the house and spread to the others. The plaintiffs claim that Manila Railroad was
jeepney operator for failure to exercise precautions needed. The carrier negligent in the following manners: a. in failing to exercise proper supervision
is presumed to have been at fault unless it is caso fortuito or that he over the employees in charge of the locomotive; b. in allowing the locomotive
has observed extra-ordinary diligence as provided in Articles 1733,55- which emitted these sparks to be operated without having the smokestack
56. Negligence was proven based on the testimony-evidences adduced by protected by some device for arresting sparks; c. in using in its locomotive
the trial court. Bataan fuel, a fuel of known inferior quality which upon combustion, produces
Last clear chance cannot be applied. It does not aride where a sparks in great quanity. Manila Railroad, on the other hand, argued that
Rodrigueza’s house stood partly within the limits of the land owned by it, thogh
passenger demands responsibility under culpa contractual. A negligent driver
and its owner cannot be exempted on the ground that the other party was likewise exactly how far away from the company’s track does not appear. It also claimed
of notifying Rodrigueza to get his house off the land of the
guilty of negligence. The substantial factor test is testing whether the actor’s
conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another. THE FACT THAT THE company, and that Rodrigueza did not comply.
ACTOR NEITHER FORESAW NOR SHOULD HAVE FORESEEN THE EXTENT OF HARM
Issue: Who should be liable?
OR MANNER IN WHICH THE EVENT
OCCURRED DOES NOT PREVENT HIS LIABILITY. However, this test does not Held: Manila Railroad should be liable. Whether or not the fire may have been
apply. The court does not fault Reyes for not having avoided such sicne communicated through Rodrigueza’s house, or directly from the locomotive is
no other options are available to him. The other lane even though empty immaterial. With regards to the position of Rodrigueza’s house, there is no proof
was narrow and covered with tall grass. The wheels of the bus were also that Rodrigueza unlawfully intruded upon the railroad’s property in the act of
clear of the roadwasy except the outher left that hit the jeep. This clearly building his house. Rodrigueza may have assumed the risk of loss that might have
shows the attempt to hit the jeep. Inability to avoid the jeep must have resulted from fires occasioned by the defendant’s locomotives if operated and
been due to the limitations of options.
managed with ordinary care. But he cannot be held to have assumed the risk of
IAC decision is set aside. The Trial Court decision is Reinstated with
any damage that might result from the unlawful negligent acts of Manila
Modification that only the Operator and the Insurance Company is liable for the

19
Railroad. Nobody is bound to anticipate and defend himselfagainst the that it was the Ford Escort car which "invaded and bumped the lane of the truck
possible negligence of another. The circumstances cannot be imputed to him driven by Ruben Galang and, as counterclaim, prayed for the award of attorney's
fees, actual and liquidated damages, moral damages and business losses.
as contributory negligence destructive of his right of action because, a) that
condition was not created by himself, b) his house remained on the ground by In the second civil case, private respondents first filed a motion to
toleration and therefore with the consent of the Railroad co., and c) even dismiss on grounds of pendency of another action and failure to implead an
supposing the house to be improperly there, this fact would not justify the indispensable party, Ruben Galang, the truck driver; they also filed a motion to
consolidate the case with the first civil case pending before Branch III of the same
defendant company in negligently destroying it.
court, which was opposed by the plaintiffs. Both motions were denied by Judge
McKee vs. IAC Capulong. In the criminal case, a judgment of conviction was rendered against
Ruben Galang. Subsequently, Judge Mario Castañeda, Jr. dismissed the two (2)
Facts: A cargo truck driven by Ruben Galang and owned by private civil cases and awarded the private respondents moral damages, exemplary
respondents Tayag and Manalo was travelling southward from Angeles City damages and attorney's fees. Ruben Galang appealed the judgment of conviction
to San Fernando, Pampanga, bound for Manila. On the other hand, a Ford but it was affirmed. Plaintiffs (McKee) on the other hand, appealed the dismissal
Escort car driven by Jose Koh, was on its way to Angeles City from San of the civil cases to the appellate court.
Fernando. When the northbound car was about 10 meters away from the
southern approach of the bridge, 2 boys suddenly darted from the right side The appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court. The decision is
of the road and into the lane of the car. The boys were moving back and anchored principally on the respondent Court's findings that it was Ruben
forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other side or turn back. Galang's inattentiveness or reckless imprudence which caused the accident. The
Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered appellate court further said that the law presumes negligence on the part of the
the lane of the truck; he then switched on the headlights of the car, applied defendants (private respondents), as employers of Galang, in the selection and
the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. Before he could do supervision of the latter; it was further asserted that these defendants did not
so, his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the allege in their Answers the defense of having exercised the diligence of a good
truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge. The said collision
father of a family in selecting and supervising the said employee. Private
resulted to the death of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee, and Loida Bondoc, and
respondents filed a motion for reconsideration alleging improper appreciation
physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee, and Araceli
Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort. In the statement of Ruben of facts and on the basis of which, respondent court affirmed the trial court's
Galang to the investigating police officers immediately after the accident, he decision in dismissing the civil cases. Petitioners filed a motion for
admitted that he was travelling at 30 miles per hour (48 kph). reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition.

Two civil cases for damages were filed before the CFI of Pampanga. The Issue: Whether or not Jose Koh's negligence was the proximate cause of the
first civil case was for damages for the death of Jose Koh. The second civil case, accident.
on the other hand, was for the damages for the death of one and a half year old Kim
Koh McKee and the physical injuries sustained by George and Araceli. About a Held: NO. The respondent Court held that the fact that the car improperly invaded
month later, a charge of reckless imprudence resulting to multiple homicide, the lane of the truck and that the collision occurred in said lane gave rise to the
physical injuries and damage to property was filed against Ruben Galang and presumption that the driver of the car, Jose Koh, was negligent. On the basis of this
was raffled in the same court where the second civil case was assigned. In their presumed negligence, the appellate court immediately concluded that it was Jose
Answer with Counterclaim for the first civil case, private respondents asserted Koh's negligence that was the immediate and proximate cause of the collision.

20
 Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear
This is an unwarranted deduction as the evidence for the petitioners chance finds application here. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts
convincingly shows that the car swerved into the truck's lane because as it which states that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat
approached the southern end of the bridge, two boys darted across the road from the the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of
right sidewalk into the lane of the car. Jose Koh's entry into the lane of the truck was reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the
necessary in order to avoid what was, in his mind at that time, a greater peril- negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the person who had the last clear
death or injury to the two boys. Such act can hardly be classified as negligent. No chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the
negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent consequences thereof
man would have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car
away from where they were even if this would mean entering the opposite lane.
Manila Electric vs. Remonquillo
Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural course to take particularly
HELD: A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such
where the vehicle in the opposite lane would be several meters away and could
remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion
very well slow down, move to the side of the road and give way to the oncoming car.
by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or
remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive unrelated, and efficient cause of
Moreover, under what is known as the emergency rule, "one who suddenly finds
the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition
himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the
or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent
best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty
cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent
of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may
negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which
appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds
result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or
himself is brought about by his own negligence." Although it may be said that
condition is the proximate cause. (45 C.J. p. 931.)
the act of Jose Koh, if at all negligent, was the initial act in the chain of events, it
cannot be said that the same caused the eventual injuries and deaths because of
the occurrence of a sufficient intervening cause, the negligent act of the truck Urbano vs. IAC
driver, which was the actual cause of the tragedy. The entry of the car into the lane Issue: Whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier
of the truck would not have resulted in the collision had the latter heeded the was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for
emergency signals given by the former to slow down and give the car an Javier's death.
opportunity to go back into its proper lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving
to the far right of the road, which was the proper precautionary measure under Held: Medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body
the given circumstances, the truck driver continued at full speed towards the car. depends on the incubation period of the disease. In the case at bar, Javier
suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which
Moreover, the truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. He Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After
himself said that his truck was running at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour along 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like
the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980, he died.
kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a
vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already
traffic regulation. Clearly, therefore, it was the truck driver's subsequent infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier
negligence in failing to take the proper measures and degree of care necessary to should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the
avoid the collision which was the proximate cause of the resulting accident. symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or
more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound.

21
 Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, of the highway. All of this happened while the truck was descending and the bus
however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible was ascending the inclined part of the road. The two vehicles sideswiped each
conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the other at each other's left side ripping off the said wall of the bus from the driver's
seat to the last rear seat.
severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's
wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident.
Due to the impact, several passengers of the bus were thrown out and
Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been
died as a result of the injuries they sustained. The heirs sued the respective
infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
owners and drivers of both the bus company and the truck. The trial concluded
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and
that the negligent acts of both drivers contributed to or combined with each
logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v.
other in directly causing the accident, thus the liability of the two drivers for their
Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof
negligence is solidary.
that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond
reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility The driver and owner of the truck appealed, the Court of Appeals, in
that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later resolving the motion for reconsideration, absolved the owner and driver of the
or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, truck based on the doctrine of last clear chance, saying that the bus driver had
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038). the last clear chance to avoid the accident and that it is his negligence which
was the proximate cause of mishap.
Picart vs. Smith
Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance is correctly applied.
Held: The last clear chance was passed unto the defendant driving the
Held: NO. The doctrine of Last Clear Chance is not applicable in this case.
automobile. It was his duty to bring the car to an immediate stop or upon seeing
no other persons were on the bridge to take the other side and pass far away from The doctrine of last clear chance, stated broadly, is that—the negligence of the
the pony to avoid collision. Instead of doing this, Smith ran straight on until he was plaintiff does not preclude recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it
almost upon the horse. When Smith exposed the horse and rider to this danger he appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence might have
was negligent in the eye of the law. Under the circumstances, the law is that the avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's
person who has the last clear chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do negligence. In other words, the doctrine of last clear chance means that even
is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence though a person's own acts may have placed him in a position of peril, and an injury
of the other party. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by results, the injured person is entitled to recovery.
reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The The practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is held
law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of liable to a negligent plaintiff, if he (the defendant) were aware of the plaintiff’s
ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. peril, or should have been aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due care, had in
fact an opportunity to avoid the accident. And this is true even if the plaintiff is
Bustamante vs. Court Of Appeals grossly negligent.

The principle of last clear chance applies in a suit between the owners and
Facts: A bus was traversing an inclined road. The bus driver saw, from 30 meters
away, a sand and gravel truck fast approaching with its front wheels wiggling. The drivers of colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands
bus driver also observed that the truck was heading towards his lane. Not minding responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be
this circumstance and believing that truck driver was merely joking, the bus inequitable to exempt the negligent driver and its owners on the ground that the other
driver shifted from 4th to 3rd gear to gain more power and speed in order to
driver was likewise guilty of negligence.
overtake a Kubota hand tractor being pushed by a person along the shoulder

22
 The Court is convinced that the respondent Court committed an error of law HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that private respondent Dionisio's
in applying the doctrine of last clear chance as between the defendants, since the case negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause"
at bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a suit of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently
Dionisio may recover damages though are subject to mitigation by the courts
brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of the
(Article 2179, Civil Code of the Philippines).
colliding vehicles. Therefore, the respondent court erred in absolving the owner and driver
of the cargo truck from liability. Obiter Dictum by Justice Feliciano:

Phoenix and Carbonel also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last
Phoenix Construction Inc. vs. IAC clear chance" doctrine. The theory here of petitioners is that while the petitioner
FACTS: On November 15, 1975 (During the period of Martial Law) at truck driver was negligent, private respondent Dionisio had
approximately 1:30 AM, Leonardo Dionisio, driving his Volkswagen car, was on his the "last clear chance" of avoiding the accident and hence his injuries, and that
way home to Makati from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss where had Dionisio having failed to take that "last clear chance" must bear his own injuries
taken "a shot or two" of liquor. alone. The last clear chance doctrine of the common law was imported into our
jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith but it is a matter for debate whether, or to what
Dionisio alleged that while he was crossing the intersection of General extent, it has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Lacuna and General Santos Streets in Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home,
when his car’s headlights suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on The historical function of that doctrine of last clear chance was to mitigate the
"bright" and thereupon saw a Ford dump truck looming some two and a half
harshness of another common law doctrine— that of contributory negligence. The
meters away. The Ford dump truck, owned and operated by Phoenix
common law rule of contributory negligence prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who
Construction Inc. was parked askew partly blocking and facing the way of
was also negligent, even if the plaintiff's negligence was relatively minor as compared
incoming traffic. There were neither lights nor any so-called "early warning"
devices or reflectors set anywhere near the dump truck. The dump truck had, with the wrongful act or omission of the defendant.
earlier that evening, been driven home by Carbonel, its regular driver.
The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant
Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had
left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is
collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has to
scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures. play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as
an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in
Dionisio commenced an action for damages claiming that the legal and article 2179 of the civil code.
proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel
had parked the dump truck. Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear chance" that may be
extracted from its common law matrix and utilized as a general rule in negligence
Phoenix and Carbonel countered that the proximate cause of cases in a civil law jurisdiction like ours? We do not believe so. Under Article 2179,
Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast while under the the task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine whose negligence-the
influence of liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew pass. plaintiff's or the defendant's-was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. That
Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due care in the selection task is not simply or even primarily an exercise in chronology or physics, as the
and supervision of the dump truck driver. petitioners seem to imply by the use of terms like "last" or "intervening" or
"immediate." The relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the
ISSUE: Whether or not the last clear chance doctrine should be applied, defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may
therefore exculpating Phoenix from paying damages. be taken into account.

23
 stopped on its wheels on the road.
Of more fundamental importance is the nature of the negligent act or omission of
each party, and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or A civil suit was filed by the wife of Calibo against Zacarias and the owner
omission for the rest of the community. The petitioners urge that the truck driver of the truck. The lower court dismissed the case, and accepted the argument
(and therefore his employer) should be absolved from responsibility for his own that even if there was negligence on the part of Zacarias who intruded about
prior negligence because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with that increased 25 centimeters to the lane of Calibo, the latter had the last clear chance to avoid
diligence which had become necessary to avoid the peril precisely created by the accident.
the truck driver's own wrongful act or omission. To accept this proposition is to
come too close to wiping out the fundamental principle of law that a man must The Court of Appeals reversed the decision on the ground that
respond for the foreseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission Zacarias saw the jeep already at about 150 meters and Zacarias did not have a
(NOTE: Parking the truck askew facing incoming traffic). Our law on quasi-delicts driver’s license at the time of the incident.
seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them
among the members of society. To accept the petitioner’s proposition must ISSUE: To whose negligence is the accident imputable?
tend to weaken the very bonds of Society.
HELD:. The evidence indicates that it was Engineer Calibo’s negligence that was
NOTE: The point in assigning this case is for students to realize that the the proximate cause of the accident. Assuming there was antecedent
common law concepts of “last clear chance” and “contributory negligence” are negligence on the part of Zacarias, Calibo had the last clear chance to avoid the
counter-intuitive. Interestingly, contributory negligence in our jurisdiction does accident.
not mean that the plaintiff can no longer recover, but while he may recover, the
liability of person ultimately responsible is mitigated. This is clearly visible from
our treatment of contributory negligence in Art. 2179, which states: Both drivers had a full view of each other's vehicle from a distance of one
hundred fifty meters. Both vehicles were travelling at a speed of approximately thirty
Art. 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and kilometers per hour. The survivors of the jeep admitted that the truck was already at a full
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was stop when they collided with it. The logical conclusion is that the driver of the jeep had
only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the the last clear chance to avoid the accident, while at that distance of thirty meters away
defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the from the truck, by stopping in his turn or swerving his jeep away from the truck, either of
courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. (n) which he had sufficient time to do while running at a speed of only thirty kilometers per
hour. In those circumstances, his duty was to seize that opportunity to avoid the mishap,
Glan People’s Lumber And Hardware vs. IAC not merely rely on a supposed right to expect the truck to swerve and leave him a clear
path.
FACTS: Engineer Orlando T. Calibo was driving a Davao city-bound jeep owned
by the Bacnotan Consolidated Industries, Inc. Also aboard the jeep were
Agripino Roranes, and Maximo Patos. The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as a valid and complete
defense to accident liability today as it did when invoked and applied in the 1918
A cargo truck driven by Paul Zacarias and loaded with cement bags, GI case of Picart vs Smith.
sheets and plywood was coming from the opposite direction and bound for South
Cotabato. Just after the truck went across a bridge, it collided with the jeep and as a Philippine Bank of Commerce v CA (Lipana)
consequence, Engineer Calibo died while Roranes and Patos sustained physical
injuries. Zacarias was unhurt. Facts: Rommel’s Marketing Corporation (RMC) maintained two separate current
accounts with the Pasig Branch of PBCom in connection with its business of
As a result of the impact, the left side of the truck was slightly damaged selling appliances. From May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976, Romeo Lipana, RMC’s GM,
while the left side of the jeep, including its fender and hood, was extensively claims to have entrusted RMC funds in the form of cash totaling P304,979.74 to his
damaged. After the impact, the jeep fell and rested on its right side on the secretary, Irene Yabut, for the purpose of depositing said funds to RMC’s account
asphalted road a few meters to the rear of the truck, while the truck was with PBCom. It turned out, that these deposits were not credited to RMC's account

24
but were instead deposited to the PBCom account of Yabut's husband, Bienvenido slips prepared and presented by Ms. Yabut, despite the glaring fact that the duplicate
Cotas. copy was not completely accomplished contrary to the self-imposed procedure of
the bank with respect to the proper validation of deposit slips, original or
Irene Yabut would accomplish two copies of the deposit slip, an
duplicate, as testified to by Ms. Mabayad herself. Negligence here lies not only
original and a duplicate. The original showed the name of her husband as
on the part of Ms. Mabayad but also on the part of the bank itself in its
depositor and his current account number. On the duplicate copy was written
lackadaisical selection and supervision of Ms. Mabayad. This was exemplified
the account number of her husband but the name of the account holder was left
in the testimony of Mr. Romeo Bonifacio, then Manager of the Pasig Branch of
blank. PBC's teller, Azucena Mabayad, would validate and stamp both the original
the petitioner bank and now its Vice- President, to the effect that, while he
and the duplicate of these deposit slips retaining only the original copy despite the
ordered the investigation of the incident, he never came to know that blank
lack of information on the duplicate slip. The second copy was kept by Irene Yabut
deposit slips were validated in total disregard of the bank's validation
allegedly for record purposes. After validation, Yabut would then fill up the name of
procedures.
RMC in the space left blank in the duplicate copy and change the account number
written thereon and make it appear to be RMC's account number. She made
her company believe that the amounts she deposited were being credited to its It was this negligence of Ms. Azucena Mabayad, coupled by the
account when, in fact, they were being deposited in the account of her husband. negligence of the petitioner bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller,
which was the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private respondent,
During the entire period, PBCom had been regularly furnishing RMC with and not the latter's act of entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, as insisted
monthly statements showing its current account balances. Unfortunately, it was by the petitioners.
never the practice of Romeo Lipana to check these monthly statements reposing
complete trust and confidence to PBCom and to his secretary. Upon discovery of the Consolidated Bank vs. Court Of Appeals
loss of its funds, RMC demanded from petitioner bank the return of its money.
FACTS: : LC Diaz and Co. (Diaz) is an accounting firm. Diaz has a savings
account with Consolidated Bank (the predecessor of Solidbank). In 1991, Diaz,
Issue: Whether or not there was contributory negligence on the part of RMC.
through its cashier, Macaraya, filled up a savings (cash) deposit slip for PhP900.00
and check deposit slip for PhP50.00. Macaraya instructed the firm’s messenger,
Held: In the case at bench, there is no dispute as to the damage suffered by the
Ismael Calapre, to deposit the money with Solidbank. Macaraya also gave
private respondent (plaintiff in the trial court) RMC in the amount of P304,979.74.
Calapre the Solidbank passbook. Calapre went to Solidbank and presented to
It is in ascribing fault or negligence which caused the damage where the parties point Teller No. 6 the two deposit slips and the passbook. Since the transaction took
to each other as the culprit. time and Calapre had to make another deposit for L.C. Diaz with Allied Bank, he
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, left the passbook with Solidbank. When Calapre returned to Solidbank to retrieve
guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human the passbook, Teller No. 6 informed him that “somebody got the passbook.”
affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man Calapre went back to L.C. Diaz and reported the incident to Macaraya.
would do.
Macaraya, together with Calapre, went to Solidbank. When Macaraya
Picart v. Smith, provides the test by which to determine the existence
asked for the passbook, Teller No. 6 told her that someone got the passbook but she
of negligence in a particular case which may be stated as follows: Did the could not remember to whom she gave it to. Failing to g retrieve the passbook,
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution Macaraya returned to LC Diaz and reported the matter. The next day, L.C. Diaz’
which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, CEO, Luis Diaz, called up the bank to stop any transaction involving the stolen
then he is guilty of negligence. passbook. Diaz learned that an unauthorized withdrawal of 300,000 was made on
same day the passbook was stolen. The withdrawal slip bore the signatures of
Applying the above test, it appears that the bank's teller, Ms. Azucena authorized signatories, who denied signing the same. A certain Noel Tamayo
Mabayad, was negligent in validating, officially stamping and signing all the deposit received the PhP300,000.

25
 reduced.
In 1992, Diaz demanded from Solidbank the return of his money. The trial court
ruled in favor of the bank, saying that possession of the passbook raises the Vestil vs. IAC
presumption of ownership and payments made upon production of the
passbook shall have the same effect as if made to the depositor. Noel Tamayo,
Facts: On July 29, 1975, Theness Tan Uy was bitten by a dog while she was playing
at the time of the withdrawal, had possession of the passbook and the withdrawal
slip which bore signatures matching the specimen signatures in the bank. The with a child of Purita and Agustin Vestil in the house of the late Vicente
trial court, using the rules on contractual obligations, said that the bank acted with Miranda, the father of Purita. Thenese was rushed to the Hospital, where she was
care and observed the rules on savings account when it allowed the withdrawal , treated for "multipte lacerated wounds on the forehead" and administered an anti-
concluding that Diaz’s negligence was the proximate cause of the loss. The Court rabies vaccine. She was discharged after nine days but was readmitted a week later
of Appeals reversed, saying that the teller of the bank should have been more due to "vomiting of saliva." On August 15, 1975, the child died. The cause of
careful in allowing the withdrawal. It said that although L.C. Diaz was negligent
death was certified as broncho- pneumonia.Theness developed hydrophobia, a
in allowing a messenger to make its deposits and said messenger left the
symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog bites, and asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, a
passbook, by applying the last clear chance doctrine, the proximate cause of the
loss is attributable to the bank. complication of rabies, which ultimately caused her death.

The Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable as the
Issue: Is the last clear chance doctrine applicable in this case? Who is the proximate
possessors of the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter. The Uys claim
cause of the loss?
that the Vestils are liable for the death of Theness, since they own the dog that bit
Held: The rules on simple loan or mutuum apply in this case, hence, the bank was her. While the Vestils contend that the dog belonged to the deceased Vicente
liable for breach of contract and not by virtue of a quasi-delict. Accordingly, the Miranda, and that it was a tame animal, and that in any case no one had
negligence of the bank is classified as Culpa contractual AND NOT Culpa Aquilana, witnessed it bite Theness.
and therefore, the Last clear chance doctrine is inapplicable. Because of a bank’s
nature of business, a fiduciary relationship is deemed written into every deposit Issue: Whether or not the Vestils are liable for the damage caused by the dog.
agreement. This imposes a higher degree of diligence than “a good father of
a family”. While this does not convert the contract into a trust agreement, the Held: ART. 2183 states “The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of
law requires of banks a higher standard of integrity and performance in the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape
complying with its obligations under the contract. or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from
force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.
While the passbook is in the bank’s hands, the law imposes a high degree of
diligence in safeguarding the passbook. In culpa contractual, once the plaintiff
proves breach on the part of the defendant, there is the presumption that the The obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the
latter was negligent or at fault. The burden shifts to the defendant to prove that he negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the
was not negligent. But in culpa aquiliana, the plaintiff has the burden of proving animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of
the defendant’s negligence. Tellers must return the passbook only to the depositor social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service
or his authorized representative. Solidbank is bound by the negligence of its
must answer for the damage which such animal may cause.
employees under the principle of respondeat superior. And the defense of
exercising the diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is not a
complete defense in culpa contractual unlike in culpa aquiliana. Had the While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still
passbook not fallen into the hands of the impostor, the loss would not have part of Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were
occurred. Hence, the proximate cause of the loss the bank’s negligence in not its possessors at the time of the incident in question. The Vestils’ contention that
returning the passbook to Calapre. But L.C. Diaz was guilty of contributory
they could not be expected to exercise remote control of the dog is not
negligence in allowing a withdrawal slip signed by its authorized signatories to
fall into the hands of an impostor. Thus, the liability of Solidbank should be acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even

26
 if the animal should "escape or be lost" and so be removed from his control. And it Jose Dingcong, the surviving co-renter and manager of the hotel, had
does not matter either that the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child complete possession of the house, and consequently must also be responsible for the
into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame damages caused. As a co-lessee and manager of the hotel, the Dingcongs have to answer
ones as long as they cause injury. As for the belated allegations that Theness for the damage caused by things that thrown or falling from the hotel (Art. 1910 of the
provoked the dog, the Vestils forget that the deceased was only three years old at Codigo Civil).
the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have
done to the animal. The Dingcongs likewise failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the
family to prevent the damages. They knew that the pipes of the hotel were under
There is evidence showing that Theness and her family regularly went to repair, as managers, they should have presumed that the guest Echivarria would
the house of the Vestils once or twice a week. The Court finds that the link between use the faucet, but only provided a bucket to deal with the problem of the leaks.
the dog bites and the certified cause of death has been satisfactorily established.
The obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the
Afable vs. Singer Sewing Machine Company
negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the
FACTS: Leopoldo Madlangbayan was a collector for the Singer Sewing.
animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of
Machine Company in the district of San Francisco del Monte, outside of the limits of
social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must
the City of Manila. He was supposedly residing in his district according to the
answer for the damage which such animal may cause.
records of the company. His compensation was on a commission basis of eight
percent on all collections made by him.
Dingcong vs. Kanaan One Sunday, Leopoldo, while riding a bicycle, was ran over and killed in
Facts: The Dingcong brothers leased the upper floor of house owned by Emilia the City of Manila by a truck driven by Vitaliano Sumoay. It appears that Leopoldo
Saenz, where they established and managed the Central Hotel. A guest by the
had moved to Teodora Alonso St. in Manila without notifying the company and that
name of Francisco Echivarria occupied Room No. 10 of the hotel for P30. Kanaan,
on the other hand, occupies the ground floor the house of Saenz and where they at the time of his death he was returning home after making some collections in
established a store named "American Bazaar" dedicated to the buy and sell of San Francisco del Monte. According to the practice of the company, if collectors
articles and merchandise. made collections on Sunday they were required to deliver the amount collected to
the company the next morning. The widow and children of Leopoldo brought an
Echivarria, before going to bed, let his faucet leak while the pipes of the action to recover from Singer under Act No. 3428 (Workmen’s Compensation Act)
hotel were undergoing repairs. A bucket was placed underneath the leaking
faucet to catch the dripping water, but still the bucket overflowed. Water seeped Issue: May the heirs of Leopoldo recover from the corporation considering the
through the floor and the merchandise in the bazaar below got wet and caused nature of his employment and the manner of the injury?
damages worth around P1,000.00 (considerable amount in 1941). The Kanaans
brought an action for damages against the managers, the brothers Dingcong, and Held: No. The accident which caused the death of the employee was not due to and
Echivarria. During trial one of the Dingcong brothers died, but suit continued
in pursuance of his employment. At the time that he was run over by the truck,
against the surviving Dingcong.
Leopoldo was not in pursuance of his employment, but was on his way home after
Issue: Whether or not Jose Dingcong and Francisco Echevarria are liable for he had finished his work for the day and left the territory where he was authorized
damages. to make collections for the defendant.

Held: Francisco Echevarria, the hotel guest, is liable for being the one who, by his The employer is not an insurer "against all accidental injuries which might happen
negligence in leaving the faucet open, caused the water to spill on the ground and to an employee while in the course of the employment", and as a general rule an
wet the articles and merchandise of the Kanaans. employee is not entitled to recover from personal injuries resulting from an accident

27
 that befalls him while going to or returning from his place of employment, because such adulterated.
an accident DOES NOT arise out of and in the course of his employment.
Because of this, the canteen had to close down due to the big drop in its sales of soft
"The words 'arising out of' refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and are drinks. On Geronimo filed a complaint for damages against Coca cola. Coca-Cola
descriptive of its character, while the words 'in the course of' refer to the time, moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of failure to exhaust administrative
remedies and prescription. According to Coca-Cola, under the law on sales on
place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place. By the use of
breach of warranty, more particularly Article 1561 , the action should have been
these words it was not the intention of the legislature to make the employer
brought within six months from the delivery of the goods.
an insurer against all accidental injuries which might happen to an employee Coca cola moved to dismiss on the basis of failure to exhaust all
while in the course of the employment, but only for such injuries arising from or administrative remedies and prescription. It contends that the existence of a
growing out of the risks peculiar to the nature of the work in the scope of the contractual relation between the parties (arising from the contract of sale) bars the
workman’s employment or incidental to such employment, and accidents in which it application of the law on quasi-delicts and that since Geronimo’s cause of action
is possible to trace the injury to some risk or hazard to which the employee is exposed arose from the breach of implied warranties, the complaint should have been filed
within six months from delivery of the soft drinks pursuant to Article 1571 of the Civil
in a special degree by reason of such employment. Risks to which all persons similarly
Code. Geronimo claims that the cause of action is based on injury to her right and
situated are equally exposed and not traceable in some special degree to the particular
can be brought within four years pursuant to Article 1146 of the civil code.
employment are excluded.
Has the action prescribed? Can Geronimo’s action based on quasi-delict exist
Issue:
Furthermore, it appears that the deceased had never notified the defendant despite the pre-existing contract of sale?
corporation of his change of residence from San Francisco del Monte to Manila, and
Held: While it may be true that the pre-existing contract between the parties may, as a
that the company did not know that he was living in Manila on the day of the accident. general rule, bar the applicability of the law on quasi-delict, the liability may itself be
Neither does the company did not require its employees to work on Sunday, or furnish or deemed to arise from quasi-delict, i.e., the act which breaks the contract may also be a quasi-
require its agents to use bicycles. These are additional reasons for holding that the accident delict.
was not due to and in pursuance of the employment of the deceased. If the deceased
saw fit to change his residence from San Francisco del Monte to Manila and to make use In Singson vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands," this Court stated: "We have
of a bicycle in going back and forth, he did so at his own risk, as the company did not repeatedly held, however, that the existence of a contract between the parties does
furnish him a bicycle or require him to use one; and if he made collections on Sunday, he did not bar the commission of a tort by the one against the other and the consequent
not do so in pursuance of his employment, and his employer is not liable for any injury recovery of damages therefor. Indeed, this view has been, in effect, reiterated in a
comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France vs. Carrascosa, involving an airplane
sustained by him. passenger who, despite his first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-
class accommodation and compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment,
was held entitled to recover damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort on
Coca Cola Bottlers vs. Ca the latter's part, for, although the relation between the passenger and a carrier is
contractual both in origin and nature x x x the act that breaks the contract may also
Facts: Lydia Geronimo is the proprietress of a school canteen. On August 12, 1989, a be a tort.'''
group of parents complained before Geronimo that they found fibrous material in the
bottles of Coke and Sprite that their children bought from her store. Geronimo Otherwise put, liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence
examined her stock and found that there were indeed fibrous materials in the of contractual relations. Therefore, Geronimo has four years to file the case, reckoned
unopened soda bottles. She brought the bottles to the Department of Health from the time the cause of action accrued.
Regional Office and was informed that the soda samples she sent were

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