22. CULION ICE, FISH AND ELECTRIC CO vs. PHIL.

MOTORS CORPORATION
Facts:
The plaintiff and defendant are domestic corporations; and at the time of the
incident with which we are here concerned, H.D. Cranston was the representative of
the plaintiff in the City of Manila. At the same time the plaintiff was the registered
owner of the motor schooner Gwendoline, which was used in the fishing trade in the
Philippine Islands. Thereafter, Cranston decided to have the engine on
the Gwendoline changed from a gasoline consumer to a crude oil burner, expecting
thereby to effect economy in the cost of running the boat. He therefore made
known his desire to McLeod & Co., a firm dealing in tractors, and was told by Mc
Kellar, of said company, that he might make inquiries of the Philippine Motors
Corporations, which had its office on Ongpin Street, in the City of Manila. Cranston
accordingly repaired to the office of the Philippine Motors Corporation and had a
conference with C.E. Quest, its manager, who agreed to do the job, with the
understanding that payment should be made upon completion of the work. In the
course of the preliminary work upon the carburetor and its connections, it was
observed that the carburetor was flooding, and that the gasoline, or other fuel, was
trickling freely from the lower part to the carburetor to the floor. This fact was called
to Quest's attention, but he appeared to think lightly of the matter and said that,
when the engine had gotten to running well, the flooding would disappear. A
moment later a back fire occurred in the cylinder chamber. This caused a flame to
shoot back into the carburetor, and instantly the carburetor and adjacent parts were
covered with a mass of flames, which the members of the crew were unable to
subdue. They were therefore compelled, as the fire spread, to take to a boat, and
their escape was safely effected, but theGwendoline was reduced to a mere hulk.
Issue:
Whether or not the loss of the boat was chargeable to the negligence and lack of
skill of Quest.
Held:
It results that the judgment appealed from, awarding damages to the plaintiff in the
amount of P9,850, with interest, must be affirmed; and it is so ordered, with costs
against the appellant.
Ordinarily a back fire from an engine would not be followed by any disaster, but in
this case the leak along the pipe line and the flooding of the carburetor had created
a dangerous situation, which a prudent mechanic, versed in repairs of this nature,
would have taken precautions to avoid. The back fire may have been due either to
the fact that the spark was too advanced or the fuel improperly mixed.
In this connection it must be remembered that when a person holds himself out as
being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for
negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the
particular work which he attempts to do. The proof shows that Quest had had ample
experience in fixing the engines of automobiles and tractors, but it does not appear
that he was experienced in the doing of similar work on boats. A person skilled in
that particular sort of work would, we think have been sufficiently warned from
those circumstances to cause him to take greater and adequate precautions against
the danger. In other words Quest did not use the skill that would have been

exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines on boats. There was
here, in our opinion, on the part of Quest, a blameworthy antecedent inadvertence
to possible harm, and this constitutes negligence. The burning of
the Gwendoline may be said to have resulted from accident, but this accident was in
no sense an unavoidable accident. It would not have occured but for Quest's
carelessness or lack of skill. The test of liability is not whether the injury was
accidental in a sense, but whether Quest was free from blame.
We therefore see no escape from the conclusion that this accident is chargeable to
lack of skill or negligence in effecting the changes which Quest undertook to
accomplish; and even supposing that our theory as to the exact manner in which
the accident occurred might appear to be in some respects incorrect, yet the origin
of the fire in not so inscrutable as to enable us to say that it was casus fortuitus.
23. CANGCO vs. MANILA RAILROAD CO
Facts:
At the time of the occurrence, the plaintiff arose from his seat in the second classcar where he was riding and, making, his exit through the door, took his position
upon the steps of the coach, seizing the upright guardrail with his right hand for
support. On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station
there is a cement platform which begins to rise with a moderate gradient some
distance away from the company's office and extends along in front of said office for
a distance sufficient to cover the length of several coaches. As the train slowed
down another passenger, named Emilio Zuiga, also an employee of the railroad
company, got off the same car, alighting safely at the point where the platform
begins to rise from the level of the ground. When the train had proceeded a little
farther the plaintiff Jose Cangco stepped off also, but one or both of his feet came in
contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under
him and he fell violently on the platform. His body at once rolled from the platform
and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and
lacerated. It appears that after the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved
forward possibly six meters before it came to a full stop. The accident occurred
between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark night, and as the railroad station was lighted
dimly by a single light located some distance away, objects on the platform where
the accident occurred were difficult to discern especially to a person emerging from
a lighted car. The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious
condition, and it appeared that the injuries which he had received were very
serious. He was therefore brought at once to a certain hospital in the city of Manila
where an examination was made and his arm was amputated. Cangco then sued
Manila Railroad on the ground of neglilgence. Manila Railroad contended however
that the proximate cause of the accident was that Cangco placed the obstruction on
the road.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a contributing negligence on the part of the plaintiff.
Held:
In considering the situation thus presented, it should not be overlooked that the
plaintiff was, as we find, ignorant of the fact that the obstruction which was caused
by the sacks of melons piled on the platform existed; and as the defendant was

bound by reason of its duty as a public carrier to afford to its passengers facilities
for safe egress from its trains, the plaintiff had a right to assume, in the absence of
some circumstance to warn him to the contrary, that the platform was clear. The
place, as we have already stated, was dark, or dimly lighted, and this also is proof of
a failure upon the part of the defendant in the performance of a duty owing by it to
the plaintiff; for if it were by any possibility concede that it had right to pile these
sacks in the path of alighting passengers, the placing of them adequately so that
their presence would be revealed.
As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff in this case the following circumstances are to be noted: The company's
platform was constructed upon a level higher than that of the roadbed and the
surrounding ground. The distance from the steps of the car to the spot where the
alighting passenger would place his feet on the platform was thus reduced, thereby
decreasing the risk incident to stepping off. The nature of the platform, constructed
as it was of cement material, also assured to the passenger a stable and even
surface on which to alight. Furthermore, the plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and
agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while
the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble
person. In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such
act that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly the
age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily
affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be considered. Women, it has
been observed, as a general rule are less capable than men of alighting with safety
under such conditions, as the nature of their wearing apparel obstructs the free
movement of the limbs. Again, it may be noted that the place was perfectly familiar
to the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and of the train at this station.
There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the
length of the step which he was required to take or the character of the platform
where he was alighting.
24. PLDT vs. CA
Facts:
The jeep which spouses Esteban ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open
trench, thereby sustaining injuries. The trench was an excavation was allegedly
undertaken for the installation of conduit systems of PLDT. Antonio Esteban also
alleges that he failed to notice the mound of earth and the trench since there were
no adequate warning signs and it was dark at that time. Having sustained injuries,
they filed a claim for damages against PLDT. PLDT for its part, denies liability
contending that the injuries were caused by the negligence of Antonio Esteban.
Furthermore, PLDT contends that if an entity should be held responsible, it
should be L.R. Barte and Co., an independent contractor who undertook the
construction of the trench and the installation of the conduit system. As such, PLDT
filed a third-party complaint against Barte alleging that, under the terms of their
agreement, PLDT should in no manner be answerable for any accident or injuries
arising from the negligence or carelessness of Barte or any of its employees.
Issue:
Whether or not PLDT and L.R. Barte and Co. are liable

Held:
Private Respondents negligence was not merely contributory but goes to the very
cause of the accident, hence, he has no right to recover damages for the injuries
which he and his wife suffered. Private respondent cannot recover notwithstanding
the negligence he imputes on PLDT considering that he had the last clear chance
to avoid the injury. One who claims damages for the negligence of another has the
burden of proof to show existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof.
25. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs CA
Facts:
Plaintiffs filed a complaint against respondent for the lost of lives and destruction of
properties due to the negligence of the latter in releasing water from Angat dam
during the typhoon Kading. Benjamin Chavez, being the supervisor at that time of
a multi-purpose hydroelectric plant in the Angat River at Hilltop, Norzagaray,
Bulacan, failed to exercise due diligence in monitoring the water level at the dam.
NPCs allegations were as follows:
1) the NPC exercised due care, diligence and prudence in the operation and
maintenance of the hydroelectric plant;
2) the NPC exercised the diligence of a good father in the selection of its employees;
3) written notices were sent to the different municipalities of Bulacan warning the
residents therein about the impending release of a large volume of water with the
onset of typhoon "Kading" and advise them to take the necessary precautions;
4) the water released during the typhoon was needed to prevent the collapse of the
dam and avoid greater damage to people and property;
5) in spite of the precautions undertaken and the diligence exercised, they could still
not contain or control the flood that resulted and;
6) the damages incurred by the private respondents were caused by a fortuitous
event or force majeure and are in the nature and character of damnum absque
injuria. By way of special affirmative defense, the defendants averred that the NPC
cannot be sued because it performs a purely governmental function.
The trial court dismissed the complaints as against the NPC on the ground that the
provision of its charter allowing it to sue and be sued does not contemplate actions
based on tort. Its decision on 30 April 1990 dismissing the complaints "for lack of
sufficient and credible evidence. Court of Appeals reversed the appealed decision
and awarded damages in favor of the private respondents. Based on the findings
that From the mass of evidence extant in the record, We are convinced, and so hold
that the flash flood on October 27, 1978, was caused not by rain waters (sic), but by
stored waters (sic) suddenly and simultaneously released from the Angat Dam by
defendants-appellees, particularly from midnight of October 26, 1978 up to the
morning hours of October 27, 1978.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is negligent?
Whether or not the notices of warning were insufficient?
Whether or not The damages suffered was not DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA?

Held:
We declared therein that the proximate cause of the loss and damage sustained by
the plaintiffs therein who were similarly situated as the private respondents herein
was the negligence of the petitioners, and that the 24 October 1978 "early
warning notice" supposedly sent to the affected municipalities, the same notice
involved in the case at bar, was insufficient. The petitioners were guilty of "patent
gross and evident lack of foresight, imprudence and negligence in the management
and operation of Angat Dam," and that "the extent of the opening of the spillways,
and the magnitude of the water released, are all but products of defendantsappellees' headlessness, slovenliness, and carelessness."
To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, for a breach
of an obligation due to an "act of God," the following must concur: (a) the cause of
the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the
event must be either unforseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to
render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a moral manner; and (d)
the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the
creditor.. Accordingly, petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the act of God or force
majeure to escape liability for the loss or damage sustained by private respondents
since they, the petitioners, were guilty of negligence. The event then was not
occasioned exclusively by an act of God or force majeure; a human factor
negligence or imprudence had intervened. The effect then of the force majeure in
question may be deemed to have, even if only partly, resulted from the
participation of man. Thus, the whole occurrence was thereby humanized, as it
were, and removed from the laws applicable to acts of God.
26. LBC vs. CA
Facts:
At about 11:30 am of 15 Nov 1987, Rogelio Monterola was traveling on board his
Suzuki motorcycle towards Mangaggoy on the right lane along a dusty road in Bislig,
Surigao del Sur. At about the same time, a cargo van of LBC, driven by petitioner
herein, Tano, Jr., was coming from the opposite direction on its way to Bislig Airport.
When Tano was approaching the airport entrance on his left, he saw two vehicles
racing against each other from the opposite direction. Tano stopped the van and
waited for the 2 vehicles to pass by. The dust made the visibility extremely bad.
Instead of waiting Tano started to make a sharp left turn and when he was about to
reach the center of the right lane, the motorcycle driven by Monterola suddenly
emerged from the dust and smashed head-on against the LBC van. Monterola died.
Issue:
Whether or not the negligence of Monterola is the proximate cause of the accident.
Held:
The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of petitioner Tano, who,
despite poor visibility, hastily executed a left turn w/o waiting for the dust to settle.
Petitioners poorly invoke the doctrine of "last clear chance." In the instant case, the

victim was travelling along the lane where he was rightl supposd to be. The incident
occured in an instant. No apreciable time had elapsed that could have afforded the
victim a last clear opportunity to avoid the collision. However, the deceased was
contributorily negligent in evidently speeding.
The SC agrees w the CA that there was contributory negligence on the victim's part
that warrants a mitigation of petitioner's liability for damages.
27. AFRICA vs. CALTEX
Facts:
In the afternoon of March 18, 1948, a fire broke out at the Caltex service station at
the corner of Antipolo St. and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline was
being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of
the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted. The fire spread to and
burned several houses. The owners, among them petitioner spouses Africa and heirs
of Ong, sued respondents Caltex Phil., Inc., the alleged owner of the station, and
Mateo Boquiren, the agent in charge of its operation, for damages. The CFI and CA
found that the petitioners failed to prove negligence of the respondents, and that
there was due care in the premises and with respect to the supervision of their
employees.

Issue:
Whether or not, without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur should apply so as to presume negligence on the part of the
respondents.
Held:
Yes. Res ipsa loquitur literally means the thing or transaction speaks for itself. For
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply, the following requisites should be present:
(a) the accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
someones negligence; (b) it is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive
control of the defendant or defendants; and (c) the possibility of contributing
conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. In the case at bar,
the gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under
the control of respondents. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the
neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could have known how the fire
started were respondents and their employees, but they gave no explanation
thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened
because of want of care. The negligence of the employees was the proximate cause
of the fire, which in the ordinary course of things does not happen. Therefore, the
petitioners are entitled to the award for damages
28. F.F. CRUZ and CO vs. CA
Facts:

The furniture manufacturing shop of petitioner in Caloocan City was situated

adjacent to the residence of private respondents. Sometime in August 1971, private
respondent Gregorio Mable first approached Eric Cruz, petitioner's plant manager,
to request that a firewall be constructed between the shop and private respondents'
residence. The request was repeated several times but they fell on deaf ears. In the
early morning of September 6, 1974, fire broke out in petitioner's shop. Petitioner's
employees, who slept in the shop premises, tried to put out the fire, but their efforts
proved futile. The fire spread to private respondents' house. Both the shop and the
house were razed to the ground. The cause of the conflagration was never
discovered. The National Bureau of Investigation found specimens from the burned
structures negative for the presence of inflammable substances. Subsequently,
private respondents collected P35,000.00 on the insurance on their house and the
contents thereof. On January 23, 1975, private respondents filed an action for
damages against petitioner.
Isssue:
Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable in this case
Held:
1. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, whose application to the instant case petitioner
objects to, may be stated as follows:
Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be
under the management of the defendant or his servants and the
accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if
those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant,
that the accident arose from want of care. [Africa v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc.,
G.R. No. L-12986, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 448.]
The law is clear and needs no interpretation. Having been indemnified by their
insurer, private respondents are only entitled to recover the deficiency from
petitioner. On the other hand, the insurer, if it is so minded, may seek
reimbursement of the amount it indemnified private respondents from petitioner.
This is the essence of its right to be subrogated to the rights of the insured, as
expressly provided in Article 2207. Upon payment of the loss incurred by the
insured, the insurer is entitled to be subrogated pro tanto to any right of action
which the insured may have against the third person whose negligence or wrongful
act caused the loss. Under Article 2207, the real party in interest with regard to the
indemnity received by the insured is the insurer . Whether or not the insurer should
exercise the rights of the insured to which it had been subrogated lies solely within
the former's sound discretion. Since the insurer is not a party to the case, its
identity is not of record and no claim is made on its behalf, the private respondent's
insurer has to claim his right to reimbursement of the P35,000.00 paid to the
insured. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals
is hereby AFFIRMED with the following modifications as to the damages awarded for
the loss of private respondents' house.

29. BATIQUIN vs CA
Facts:
Dr. Batiquin was a Resident Physician at the Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital,
Dumaguete City from January 9, 1978 to September 1989. Between 1987 and
September, 1989 she was also the Actg. Head of the Department of Obstetrics and
Gynecology at the said Hospital. Mrs. Villegas is a married woman who submitted to
Dr. Batiquin for prenatal care as the latter's private patient sometime before
September 21, 1988. In the morning of September 21, 1988 Dr. Batiquin, with the
assistance of Dr. Doris Teresita Sy who was also a Resident Physician at the same
Hospital, C.I. and O.R. Nurse Arlene Diones and some student nurses performed a
simple cesarean section on Mrs. Villegas at the Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital
and after 45 minutes Mrs. Villegas delivered her first child, Rachel Acogido, at about
11:45 that morning. Thereafter, Plaintiff remained confined at the Hospital until
September 27, 1988 during which period of confinement she was regularly visited
by Dr. Batiquin. On September 28, 1988, Mrs. Villegas checked out of the Hospital . .
. and on the same day she paid Dr. Batiquin, thru the latter's secretary, the amount
of P1,500.00 as "professional fee" . . . . Soon after leaving the Hospital Mrs. Villegas
began to suffer abdominal pains and complained of being feverish. She also
gradually lost her appetite, so she consulted Dr. Batiquin at the latter's polyclinic
who prescribed for her certain medicines . . . which she had been taking up to
December, 1988. The abdominal pains and fever kept on recurring and bothered
Mrs. Villegas no end and despite the medications administered by Dr.
Batiquin. When the pains become unbearable and she was rapidly losing weight she
consulted Dr. Ma. Salud Kho at the Holy Child's Hospital in Dumaguete City on
January 20, 1989.
Upon examination she felt an abdominal mass one finger below the umbilicus which
she suspected to be either a tumor of the uterus or an ovarian cyst, either of which
could be cancerous. Dr. Kho to suggest that Mrs. Villegas submit to another surgery
to which the latter agreed. When Dr. Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs. Villegas she
found whitish-yellow discharge inside, an ovarian cyst on each of the left and right
ovaries which gave out pus, dirt and pus behind the uterus, and a piece of rubber
materials on the right side of the uterus embedded on [sic] the ovarian cyst, 2
inches by 3/4 inch in size. This piece of rubber material which Dr. Kho described as a
"foreign body" looked like a piece of a "rubber glove" . . . and which is [sic] also
"rubber-drain like . . . . It could have been a torn section of a surgeon's gloves or
could have come from other sources. And this foreign body was the cause of the
infection of the ovaries and consequently of all the discomfort suffered by Mrs.
Villegas after her delivery on September 21, 1988. The piece of rubber allegedly
found near private respondent Flotilde Villegas' uterus was not presented in court,
and although Dr. Ma. Salud Kho testified that she sent it to a pathologist in Cebu

City for examination, it was not mentioned in the pathologist's Surgical Pathology
Report.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a medical malpractice employed in the case
Held:
While the petitioners claim that contradictions and falsities punctured Dr. Kho's
testimony, a reading of the said testimony reveals no such infirmity and establishes
Dr. Kho as a credible witness. Dr. Kho was frank throughout her turn on the witness
stand. Furthermore, no motive to state any untruth was ever imputed against Dr.
Kho, leaving her trustworthiness unimpaired. Considering, however that we have
assessed Dr. Kho to be a credible witness, her positive testimony [that a piece of
rubber was indeed found in private respondent Villegas' abdomen] prevails over the
negative testimony in favor of the petitioners.
As such, the rule of res ipsa loquitur comes to fore. In the instant case, all the
requisites for recourse to the doctrine are present. First, the entire proceedings of
the cesarean section were under the exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. In this light,
the private respondents were bereft of direct evidence as to the actual culprit or the
exact cause of the foreign object finding its way into private respondent Villegas'
body, which, needless to say, does not occur unless through the intervention of
negligence. Second, since aside from the cesarean section, private respondent
Villegas underwent no other operation which could have caused the offending piece
of rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to reason that such could only have
been a by-product of the cesarean section performed by Dr. Batiquin. The
petitioners, in this regard, failed to overcome the presumption of negligence arising
from resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Dr. Batiquin is therefore liable for
negligently leaving behind a piece of rubber in private respondent Villegas'
abdomen and for all the adverse effects thereof.
As a final word, this Court reiterates its recognition of the vital role the medical
profession plays in the lives of the people, and State's compelling interest to enact
measures to protect the public from "the potentially deadly effects of incompetence
and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for
disease or trauma." Indeed, a physician is bound to serve the interest of his
patients "with the greatest of solicitude, giving them always his best talent and
skill." Through her tortious conduct, the petitioner endangered the life of Flotilde
Villegas, in violation of her profession's rigid ethical code and in contravention of the
legal standards set forth for professionals, in the general, [40] and members of the
medical profession, in particular.

30. BONIFACIO vs. BLTB

Facts:
In 1964, Jovito Bonifacio, Sr., together with his wife (plaintiff Rosario Santos de
Bonifacio) and neighbor Agustin Angeles, used to bathe in the Pansol hot springs at
Los Baos, Laguna, twice a week. They made such trips in his 1962 Mercedes Benz
car with plaintiff Alberto Concepcion as his driver, a duly licensed driver since 1946.
About 4:00 oclock in the morning of February 27, 1964, the four of them left Barrio
Sumilang, Pasig, bound for the Pansol hot springs in Los Baos, Laguna. Jovito, Sr.
was seated beside his driver Alberto Concepcion; while Agustin Angeles was seated
on the left side of the rear seat with plaintiff Rosario Santos Vda. de Bonifacio to his
right. Alberto Concepcion was driving the car on the right lane facing Los Baos at
the rate of 30 miles per hour because the concrete road was slippery as it was then
drizzling. After going down the overpass or bridge and negotiating the curve after
the said bridge at Barrio Landayan, San Pedro Tunasan, Laguna, Alberto Concepcion
saw a cargo truck parked on the left portion of the concrete highway without any
parking lights. It was about 5:20 a.m., still dark and raining. While he was about 15
meters from the said parked cargo truck, he saw for the first time the oncoming LTB
passenger bus No. 136 bearing 1964 plate No. PUB-1276, about 200 meters away
from him and about 185 meters behind the parked cargo truck. Said bus was then
driven at a very fast clip by the defendant Sergio de Luna. Because he was on his
right lane, Alberto Concepcion continued on his way at the rate of 30 miles per hour.
The parked truck was entirely on the left lane and about one (1) meter from the
center, of the concrete highway. His Mercedes Benz was passing alongside the
parked truck and about 70 cm. from the center of the road. Just as he was about to
pass beyond the parked truck, the oncoming LTB bus suddenly swerved to its left
towards the right lane of the Mercedes Benz and collided with the Mercedes Benz.
The place of collision was about 10 meters from the parked truck. The impact
caused the Mercedes car to swerve to the right shoulder of the road facing Los
Baos, as Alberto slammed his brakes, and the Mercedes car stopped on the right
shoulder, which is about two meters wide: while the LTB bus made a complete Uturn and finally stopped on the left lane of the concrete highway facing Los Baos or
the direction where it came from. It was filled with about 40 passengers then. The
left front part of the Mercedes Benz was smashed .
Issue:
Whether or not the employer of the guilty driver responsible for the fault of the
latter
Held:
Taking up the questions seriatim, we find that the court below correctly held that
the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the L.T.B. bus driver, de
Luna, who failed to take the necessary precautions demanded by the
circumstances. He admitted that when the mishap occurred, it was still dark, and as
it was raining, requisite prudence required that de Luna should be more careful than
usual, and slacken his pace, for the wet highway could be expected to be slippery.
Even assuming that the presence of the parked cargo truck did constitute an
emergency, although it was in plain view, still, if de Luna had not been driving
unreasonably fast, his bus would not have skidded to the left and invaded the lane
of the oncoming car when he applied his brakes. His having failed to see the parked
cargo truck until he was only 50 meters from it also justifies the inference that he
was inattentive to his responsibility as a driver. That he did not know that anyone

else was using the road is no defense to his negligent operation of his vehicle, since
he should be especially watchful in anticipation of others who may be using the
highway; and his failure to keep a proper lookout for persons and objects in the line
to be traversed constitutes negligence.
Appellants stress that the trial court should be held disqualified because the counsel
for plaintiffs-appellees had been a classmate of the trial judge. Admittedly, this is
not a legal ground for disqualification. To allow it would unnecessarily burden other
trial judges to whom the case would be transferred. Ultimately, confusion would
result, for under the rule advocated, a judge would be barred from sitting in a case
whenever one of his former classmates (and he could have many) appeared. Nor
have the appellants successfully shown here that bias distorted the judgment or
conduct of the challenged trier of the case. That he should question defense
witnesses more closely than those of the plaintiffs is but natural, since defendants
evidence varies from proof already on record. A desire to get at the truth is no proof
of bias or prejudice.

31. BUSTAMANTE vs. CA

Facts:
At about 6:30 in the morning of April 20, 1983, a collision occurred between a gravel
and sand truck, with Plate No. DAP 717, and a Mazda passenger bus with Motor No.
Y2231 and Plate No. DVT 259 along the national road at Calibuyo, Tanza, Cavite. The
front left side portion (barandilla) of the body of the truck sideswiped the left side
wall of the passenger bus, ripping off the said wall from the driver's seat to the last
rear seat.Due to the impact, several passengers of the bus were thrown out and
died as a result of the injuries they sustained, Among those killed were the
following:
1. Rogelio Bustamante, 40, husband of plaintiff Emma Adriano Bustamante
and father of plaintiffs Rossel, Gloria, Yolanda, Ericson, and Ederic, all
surnamed Bustamante;
2. Maria Corazon Jocson, 16, daughter of plaintiffs spouses Salvador and
Patria Jocson;
3. Jolet C. Ramos, 16, daughter of plaintiffs spouses Jose and Enriqueta
Ramos;
4. Enrico Himaya, 18, son of plaintiffs spouses Narciso and Adoracion Himaya;
and
5. Noel Bersamina, 17, son
Commemoracion Bersamina.

of

plaintiffs

spouses

Jose

and

Ma.

During the incident, the cargo truck was driven by defendant Montesiano and
owned by defendant Del Pilar; while the passenger bus was driven by defendant
Susulin. The vehicle was registered in the name of defendant Novelo but was owned
and/or operated as a passenger bus jointly by defendants Magtibay and Serrado,

under a franchise, with a line from Naic, Cavite, to Baclaran, Paranaque, Metro
Manila, and vice versa, which Novelo sold to Magtibay on November 8, 1981, and
which the latter transferred to Serrado (Cerrado) on January 18, 1983.Immediately
before the collision, the cargo truck and the passenger bus were approaching each
other, coming from the opposite directions of the highway. While the truck was still
about 30 meters away, Susulin, the bus driver, saw the front wheels of the vehicle
wiggling. He also observed that the truck was heading towards his lane. Not
minding this circumstance due to his belief that the driver of the truck was merely
joking, Susulin shifted from fourth to third gear in order to give more power and
speed to the bus, which was ascending the inclined part of the road, in order to
overtake or pass a Kubota hand tractor being pushed by a person along the
shoulder of the highway. While the bus was in the process of overtaking or passing
the hand tractor and the truck was approaching the bus, the two vehicles
sideswiped each other at each other's left side. After the impact, the truck skidded
towards the other side of the road and landed on a nearby residential lot, hitting a
coconut tree and felling it.
Issue:
Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable to this case
Held:
The respondent court adopted the doctrine of "last clear chance." The doctrine,
stated broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery
for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by
exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious
consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. In other
words, the doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own
acts may have placed him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the injured
person is entitled to recovery. As the doctrine is usually stated, a person who has
the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the
negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is
considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident.
practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is held liable to a
negligent plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing
himself in peril, if he, aware of the plaintiffs peril, or according to some authorities,
should have been aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due case, had in fact an
opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident.
The doctrine cannot be extended into the field of joint tortfeasors as a test of
whether only one of them should be held liable to the injured person by reason of
his discovery of the latter's peril, and it cannot be invoked as between defendants
concurrently negligent. As against third persons, a negligent actor cannot defend by
pleading that another had negligently failed to take action which could have
avoided the injury. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED; the appealed judgment
and resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
judgment of the lower court is REINSTATED with the modification on the indemnity
for death of each of the victims which is hereby increased to P50,000.00 each.

32. EXCONDE vs CAPUNO

Facts:
Dante Capuno, son of Delfin Capuno, was accused of double homicide through
reckless imprudence for the death of Isidoro Caperina and Amado Ticzon on March
31, 1949 in the Court of First Instance of Laguna (Criminal Case No. 15001). During
the trial, Sabina Exconde, as mother of the deceased Isidoro Caperina, reserved her
right to bring a separate civil action for damages against the accused. After trial,
Dante Capuno was found guilty of the crime charged and, on appeal, the Court
Appeals affirmed the decision. Dante Capuno was only (15) years old when he
committed the crime. In line with her reservation, Sabina Exconde filed the present
action against Delfin Capuno and his son Dante Capuno asking for damages in the
aggregate amount of P2,959.00 for the death of her son Isidoro Caperia.
Defendants set up the defense that if any one should be held liable for the death of
Isidoro Caperina, he is Dante Capuno and not his father Delfin because at the time
of the accident, the former was not under the control, supervision and custody, of
the latter. This defense was sustained by the lower court and, as a consequence it
only convicted Dante Capuno to pay the damages claimed in the complaint. From
decision, plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals but the case was certified to us
on the ground that the appeal only involves questions of law.
It appears that Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts Organization and a
student of the Bilintawak Elementary School situated in a barrio in the City of San
Pablo and on March 31, 1949 he attended a parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal in said
city upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. From the school Dante, with
other students, boarded a jeep and when the same started to run, he took hold of
the wheel and drove it while the driver sat on his left side. They have not gone far
when the jeep turned turtle and two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidore
Caperia, died as a consequence. It further appears that Delfin Capuno, father of
Dante, was not with his son at the time of the accident, nor did he know that his son
was going to attend a parade. He only came to know it when his son told him after
the accident that he attended the parade upon instruction of his teacher.
Issue:
Whether or not defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable, jointly and
severally with his son Dante, for damages resulting from the death of Isidoro
Caperia caused by the negligent act of minor Dante Capuno.
Held:
We find merit in this claim. It is true that under the law above quoted, "teachers or
directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or
apprentices while they are under their custody", but this provision only applies to an
institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution. Here
Dante capuno was then a student of the Balintawak Elementary School and as part
of his extra-curricular activity, he attended the parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal
upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. And it was in connection with that
parade that Dante boarded a jeep with some companions and while driving it, the
accident occurred. In the circumstances, it is clear that neither the head of that

school, nor the city school's supervisor, could be held liable for the negligent act of
Dante because he was not then a student of an institute of arts and trades as
provided by law.
The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father, and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor children
who live with them, is obvious. This is necessary consequence of the parental
authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of
supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them and instructing
them in proportion to their means", while, on the other hand, gives them the "right
to correct and punish them in moderation. The only way by which they can relieve
themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent the damage. This defendants failed to prove.

33. VESTIL vs. IAC

Facts:
On July 29, 1915, Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of
the petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil, at
F. Ramos Street in Cebu City. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where
she was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead" and administered
an anti-rabies vaccine by Dr. Antonio Tautjo. She was discharged after nine days but
was readmitted one week later due to "vomiting of saliva." The following day, on
August 15, 1975, the child died. The cause of death was certified as bronchopneumonia.
Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable
to them as the possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their
daughter. The Vestils rejected the charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the
deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and that in any case no one
had witnessed it bite Theness. After trial, Judge Jose R. Ramolete of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants and dismissed the complaint.
Issue:
In the proceedings now before us, Purita Vestil insists that she is not the owner of
the house or of the dog left by her father as his estate has not yet been partitioned
and there are other heirs to the property.
Held:
Pursuing the logic of the Uys, she claims, even her sister living in Canada would be
held responsible for the acts of the dog simply because she is one of Miranda's
heirs. However, that is hardly the point. What must be determined is the possession
of the dog that admittedly was staying in the house in question, regardless of the
ownership of the dog or of the house.
Article 2183 reads as follows:
The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for
the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. 'This
responsibility shall cease only in case the damages should come from force
majeure from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.

Thus, in Afialda v. Hisole, a person hired as caretaker of a carabao gored him to

death and his heirs thereupon sued the owner of the animal for damages. The
complaint was dismissed on the ground that it was the caretaker's duty to prevent
the carabao from causing injury to any one, including himself.
While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of
Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its
possessors at the time of the incident in question. She was the only heir residing in
Cebu City and the most logical person to take care of the property, which was only
six kilometers from her own house. Moreover, there is evidence showing that she
and her family regularly went to the house, once or twice weekly, according to at
least one witness, and used it virtually as a second house. Interestingly, her own
daughter was playing in the house with Theness when the little girl was bitten by
the dog. The dog itself remained in the house even after the death of Vicente
Miranda in 1973 and until 1975, when the incident in question occurred. It is also
noteworthy that the petitioners offered to assist the Uys with their hospitalization
expenses although Purita said she knew them only casually.