Rule 14, Section 5-Service in Person of Defendant

Facts:
On December 5, 2003, petitioner Bobie Rose D.V. Frias, as lessor and
respondent Rolando Alcayde, as lessee, entered into a Contract of Lease
involving a residential house and lot. Respondent refused to perform any of
his contractual obligations, which had accumulated for 24 months in rental
arrearages.

This prompted petitioner to file a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer in MeTc-

Muntinlupa. On July 26, 2006, the MeTC rendered a Decision, 9 in favor of the
petitioner and ordered respondent to vacate the subject premises.
Respondent filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with Prayer for
Issuance of TRO and/or Injunction, 12 with the RTC-Muntinlupa. Respondent
averred that the MeTC’s July 26, 2006 Decision does not bind him since the
court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person. A copy of the petition for
annulment of judgment was allegedly served to the petitioner. Based on the
Officer’s Return14 dated July 27, 2007, Sheriff Tolentino caused the "service
of a Notice of Raffle and Summons together with a copy of the complaints
and its annexes" to the petitioner, through Sally Gonzales, the secretary of
petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Frias.

On September 25, 2007, respondent filed an Ex-Parte Motion, 16 to declare

petitioner in default, on the ground that despite her receipt of the summons,
she has yet to file any pleading. In the RTC’s Order 22 dated November 15,
2007, the RTC issued a TRO enjoining the MeTC from implementing its July
26, 2006 Decision. On November 29, 2007, petitioner, through her
representative, Fujita filed a Preliminary Submission to Dismiss Petition –
Special Appearance Raising Jurisdictional Issues (Preliminary Submission),
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over her person. On December 3, 2007,
the RTC issued an Order,26 granting respondent’s prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction, to enjoin the MeTC’s July 26, 2006 Decision.
On August 22, 2008, the RTC issued an Order, 31 granting petitioner’s
November 29, 2007 Preliminary Submission. The RTC ruled that the
summons and copies of the petition and its attachments were not duly
served upon petitioner, either personally or through substituted service of
summons strictly in accordance with the Rules. The RTC continued that there
is no proof that Ms. Gonzales or Atty. Frias was authorized by the petitioner
to receive summons on her behalf. On November 3, 2008, the RTC, through
Judge Juanita T. Guerrero, issued an Order, 38 granting respondent’s Motion
for Reconsideration.
Aggrieved petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari47 with the CA which was
denied for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether there was a proper service of summon to petitioner in the petition
of annulment of judgment filed by respondent in RTC-Muntinlupa.
Ruling:
No.
The Court considered the petition of annulment of judgement as action in
personam.
Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, as
in this case, the service of summons may be done by personal or substituted
service as laid out in Sections 6 76 and 777 of Rule 14. Indeed, the preferred
mode of service of summons is personal service. 78 To warrant the
substituted service of the summons and copy of the complaint, (or, as in this
case, the petition for annulment of judgment), the serving officer must first
attempt to effect the same upon the defendant in person. Only after the
attempt at personal service has become impossible within a reasonable time
may the officer resort to substituted service.
The Court reiterated the requisites of substituted service in Manotoc v. Court
of Appeals, et al, to wit:
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service

For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several

attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable
period of one (1) month which eventually resulted in failure to prove
impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3)
tries, preferably on at least two (2) different dates. In addition, the sheriff
must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that
impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted.

(2) Specific Details in the Return

The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and
circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service.

(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion

If the substituted service will be effected at defendant's house or residence,
it should be left with a person of "suitable age and discretion then residing
therein." A person of suitable age and discretion is one who has attained the
age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is considered to have enough
discernment to understand the importance of a summons.

(4) A Competent Person in Charge

If the substituted service will be done at defendant's office or regular place

of business, then it should be served on a competent person in charge of the
place.

A perusal, however, of the Officer's Return discloses that the following

circumstances, as required in Manotoc, were not clearly established: (a)
personal service of summons within a reasonable time was impossible; (b)
efforts were exerted to locate the party; and (c) the summons was served
upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing at the party's
residence or upon a competent person in charge of the party's office or place
of business.83

The Officer's Return likewise revealed that no diligent effort was exerted and
no positive step was taken to locate and serve the summons personally on
the petitioner. Sheriff Tolentino failed to show that she made several
attempts to effect personal service for at least three times on at least two
different dates. It is likewise evident that Sheriff Tolentino simply left the
"Notice of Raffle and Summons" with Ms. Gonzales, the alleged secretary of
Atty. Frias. She did not even bother to ask her where the petitioner might
be. There were no details in the Officer's Return that would suggest that
Sheriff Tolentino inquired as to the identity of Ms. Gonzales. There was no
showing that Ms. Gonzales was the one managing the office or business of
the petitioner, such as the president or manager; and that she has sufficient
knowledge to understand the obligation of the petitioner in the summons, its
importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the
summons.
 FIRST DIVISION

February 28, 2018

G.R. No. 194262

BOBIE ROSE D. V. FRIAS, as represented by MARIE REGINE F.

FUJITRA, Petitioner
vs.
ROLANDO F. ALCAYDE, Respondent

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

"Due process dictates that jurisdiction over the person of a defendant can
only be acquired by the courts after a strict compliance with the rules on the
proper service of summons."1

Challenged in this appeal is the Decision3 dated May 27, 2010 and

Resolution4 dated October 22, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA- G.R.
SP No. 109824.

The facts are as follows:

On December 5, 2003, petitioner Bobie Rose D.V. Frias, as lessor and

respondent Rolando Alcayde, as lessee, entered into a Contract of Lease
involving a residential house and lot (subject property) located at No. 589
Batangas East, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa City, for a period of one
year, starting on December 5, 2003 up until December 4, 2004, with a
monthly rental of Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000). Respondent refused to
perform any of his contractual obligations, which had accumulated for 24
months in rental arrearages as of December 2005.5

This prompted petitioner to file a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer,6 docketed

as CV Case No. 6040, with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Muntinlupa
City, Branch 80, against the respondent.7 As per the Process Server’s
Return8 dated February 14, 2006, the process server, Tobias N. Abellano
(Mr. Abellano) Tried to personally serve the summons to respondent on
January 14 and 22, 2006, but to no avail. Through substituted service,
summons was served upon respondent’s caretaker, May Ann Fortiles (Ms.
Fortiles).

On July 26, 2006, the MeTC rendered a Decision,9 in favor of the petitioner
and ordered respondent to vacate the subject premises and to pay the
petitioner the accrued rentals at 12% legal interest, plus ₱10,000 in
attorney’s fees. The dispositive portion reads, thus:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [petitioner] and

against [respondent] orderiung:

1. The [respondent] and all persons claiming right over him to immediately
vacate the subject premises located at No. 589 Batangas East, Ayala
Alabang Village, Muntinlupa City and peacefully surrender possession thereof
to the [petitionjer];

2. The [respondent] to pay the accrued rental arrearages from December

2003 up to the time he vacates property in the amount of THIRTY
THOUSAND PESOS (Php30,000.00) per month with twelve (12%) percent
legal interest; and

3. The [respondent] to pay the [petitioner] the amount of TEN THOUSAND

PESOS (Php10,000.00) as reasonable attorney’s fees and to pay the cost of
the suit.

SO ORDERED.10

On July 4, 2007, the MeTC issued an Order,11 granting petitioner’s Motion to

execute the Decision dated July 26, 2006, and denying respondent’s
Omnibus Motion thereto.

On July 25, 2007, respondent filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment

with Prayer for Issuance of TRO and/or Injunction,12 with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Muntinlupa City, Branch 203. Respondent averred that the
MeTC’s July 26, 2006 Decision does not bind him since the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over his person. Respondent likewise averred that the
MeTC lacked jurisdiction over the case for two reasons: (1) petitioners’
complaint has no cause of action for failure to make a prior demand to pay
and to vacate; and (2) petitioner’s non-referral of the case before the
barangay.13
A copy of the petition for annulment of judgment was allegedly served to the
petitioner. Based on the Officer’s Return14 dated July 27, 2007, Sheriff IV
Jocelyn S. Tolentino (Sheriff Tolentino) caused the "service of a Notice of
Raffle and Summons together with a copy of the complaints and its annexes"
to the petitioner, through Sally Gonzales (Ms. Gonzales), the secretary of
petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Daniel S. Frias (Atty. Frias).

On September 7, 2007, the RTC, through Judge Pedro M. Sabundayo, Jr.

issued an Order,15 containing therein the manifestation of respondent that he
is withdrawing his application for a TRO and is now pursuing the main case
for annulment of judgment.

On September 25, 2007, respondent filed an Ex-Parte Motion, 16 to declare

petitioner in default, on the ground that despite her receipt of the summons,
she has yet to file any pleading.17

On October 3, 2007 the petitioner filed a Special Appearance/Submission

(Jurisdiction Infirmity Raised),18 alleging among others, that respondent’s
Motion to Revive Relief re: Issuance of a TRO merits neither judicial
cognizance nor consideration.19

On October 30, 2007 the MeTC issued a Writ of Execution,20 for the purpose
of implementing its July 26, 2006 Decision.

On November 5, 2007, Sheriff III Armando S. Camacho, sent a Notice to Pay

and to Vacate21 to respondent. Attached to the notice was the October 30,
2007 Writ of Execution.

In the RTC’s Order22 dated November 15, 2007, the RTC issued a TRO
enjoining the MeTC from implementing its July 26, 2006 Decision, and
setting the hearing for respondent’s prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction.23

On November 29, 2007, petitioner, through her representative, Marie Regine

F. Fujita (Ms. Fujita), filed a Preliminary Submission to Dismiss Petition –
Special Appearance Raising Jurisdictional Issues (Preliminary Submission),
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over her person.24 She pointed out that
the defect in the service of summons is immediately apparent on the
Officer’s Return, since it did not indicate the impossibility of a personal
service within a reasonable time; it did not specify the efforts exerted by
Sheriff Tolentino to locate the petitioner; and it did not certify that the
person in the office who received the summons in petitioner’s behalf was one
with whom the petitioner had a relation of confidence ensuring that the
latter would receive or would be notified of the summons issued in her
name.25

On December 3, 2007, the RTC issued an Order,26 granting respondent’s

prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, to enjoin the
MeTC’s July 26, 2006 Decision. The RTC ruled that although Atty. Frias
maintained his special appearance, he actively participated in the
proceedings by attending the summary hearing in the prayer for the
issuance of the TRO on November 9, 2007 and November 20, 2007. The
dispositive portion reads, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court grants [respondent]’s prayer

for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Accordingly, the Court enjoins
respondent and the Court Sheriff of Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 80,
Muntinlupa City and or his deputy or duly authorized representative(s) from
implementing or enforcing the decision dated July 26, 2006 in Civil Case No.
6040 during the pendency of this action.

SO ORDERED.27

On July 25, 2008, the law office of Real Brotarlo & Real entered its
appearance as collaborating counsel for the petitioner. 28

On August 11, 2008, petitioner filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to

Dismiss Petition for Annulment of Judgment and to Set Aside and/or
Reconsider29 the RTC’s December 3, 2007 Order, reiterating in substance the
November 29, 2007 Preliminary Submission. Petitioner alleged, among
others, that the RTC’s December 3, 2007 Order violated the well-settled rule
that a writ of injunction is not proper where its purpose is to take property
out of the possession or control of one person and place the same in the
hands of another where title has not been clearly established by law. 30

On August 22, 2008, the RTC issued an Order, 31 granting petitioner’s

November 29, 2007 Preliminary Submission. The RTC ruled that the
summons and copies of the petition and its attachments were not duly
served upon petitioner, either personally or through substituted service of
summons strictly in accordance with the Rules. The RTC continued that there
is no proof that Ms. Gonzales or Atty. Frias was authorized by the petitioner
to receive summons on her behalf. Since the face of the Officer’s Return is
patently defective, the RTC ruled that the presumption of regularity of
performance of duty under the Rules does not apply. The RTC, thus, ordered
the dismissal of the petition for annulment of judgment. 32 The dispositive
portion of which reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the preliminary submission to dismiss
petition and Omnibus Motion filed by [petitioner] Bobbie Rose DV Frias are
granted and the petition for annulment of judgment filed by Rolando Alcayde
is DISMISSED. The Order of the court dated December 3, 2007 granting the
issuance of a preliminary injunction is recalled and set aside considering that
since the court has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
[petitioner], all the proceedings in this case are without any force and effect.

SO ORDERED.33

On September 4, 2008, respondent filed a Manifestation and

Motion,34 praying for the recall of the August 22, 2008 Order and/or to
maintain the status quo.

On September 15, 2008, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration 35 of

the August 22, 2008 Order.

On October 6, 2008, petitioner filed a Consolidated Opposition, 36 alleging

that the RTC held in abeyance the resolution of her November 29, 2007
Preliminary Submission, for eight (8) months until it issued its August 22,
2008 Order. She likewise alleged that there was nothing in the RTC’s
December 3, 2007 Order that categorically denied the November 29, 2007
Preliminary Submission.37

On November 3, 2008, the RTC, through Judge Juanita T. Guerrero, issued

an Order,38 granting respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration, on the ground
that he was not given an opportunity to file his Comment or Opposition to
petitioner’s August 11, 2008 Manifestation and Omnibus Motion. The
dispositive portion of the order reads, thus:

IN VIEW THEREOF, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The

Order of the Court dated August 22, 2008 is recalled and set aside. The
[respondent] is given fifteen (15) days from receipt of this order to file his
Comment or Opposition or reiterated the one he filed, on the Manifestation
and Omnibus Motion (i.) to Dismiss Petition for Annulment of judgment (ii.)
to Set Aside and /or Reconsider the Order dated December 3, 2007 and
[petitioner] Bobbie Rose D.V. Frias through his counsel is given fifteen (15)
days therefrom to file his Reply if necessary. Thereafter, said Manifestation
and Omnibus Motion is considered submitted for resolution.

SO ORDERED.39
On November 17, 2008, respondent filed a Manifestation (in compliance with
the Order dated November 3, 2008) and Supplement, 40 substantially
reiterating his September 15, 2008 Motion for Reconsideration.

On November 28, 2008, petitioner filed a Manifestation and Reply (to

Alcayde’s Comment dated August 19, 2008 and Supplement dated
November 12, 2008).41

On February 2, 2009, RTC issued an Order42 denying petitioner’s August 11,

2008 Manifestation and Omnibus Motion, the dispositive portion of which
reads, thus:

WHEREFORE, finding no reason to deviate from the Order of the Court dated
December 3, 2007, the same is hereby is hereby maintained with
modification that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction shall be issued upon
filing of a bond in the amount of Php500,000.00 by the [respondent]. For
emphasis, the Motion to Dismiss this petition for lack of jurisdiction is hereby
DENEID.

The petitioner BOBIE ROSE D, FRIAS is directed to file his ANSWER within a
non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of this Order.

SO ORDERED.43

On February 20, 2009, petitioner moved for the reconsideration 44 of the
RTC’s February 2, 2009 Order, but the same was denied in the RTC’s
Order45 dated June 5, 2009.

On July 15,2009, respondent filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Default, 46 to

declare petitioner in default for the latter’s failure to comply with the RTC’s
February 2, 2009 order requiring her to file an answer to the Petition for
Annulment of Judgment.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari47 with the CA, to which

respondent answered by way of a Comment.48 After the filing of petitioner’s
Reply,49 the CA on May 27, 2010 rendered a Decision,50 denying the
petitioner’s Petition for Certiorari for lack of merit.

The Motion for Reconsideration,51 having been denied by the CA in its

Resolution dated October 22, 2010,52 petitioner filed this Petition for Review
on Certiorari, raising the following issues:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF AP[P]EALS

ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE PAIRING JUDGE OF RTC 203 COMMITED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN NOT DISMISSING [RESPONDENT]’S PETITION FOR
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT ON A GROUND THAT THE RTC 203 DID NOT
ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITIONER.

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS

GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RTC 203 NEED NOT ACQUIRE
JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITIONER AS LONG AS SAID RTC 203 HAS
ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE RES.

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS

ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE PAIRING JUDGE OF RTC 203
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT SETTING ASIDE THE ORDER DATED
DECEMBER 3, 2007 OF THE RTC ENJOINING PETITIONER AND SHERIFF OF
THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 80 OF MUNTINLUPA CITY FROM
IMPLEMENTING ITS FINAL AND EXECUTORY DECISION DATED JULY 26,
2006.53

On the one hand, petitioner contends that the CA erred in not dismissing
respondent’s petition for annulment of judgment on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over her person. She maintains that since an annulment of
judgment is a personal action, it is necessary for the RTC to acquire
jurisdiction over her person. She likewise insists that the CA erred in not
setting aside the RTC’s Decision dated December 3, 2007.

On the other hand, the CA ruled that a petition for annulment of judgment is
not an action in personam, thus, the court need not acquire jurisdiction over
the person of the petitioner, as long as it has acquired jurisdiction over the
res, which in this case was through the filing of the petition for annulment of
judgment with the RTC. This pronouncement was adopted by the respondent
in his comment to the instant petition.

The petition meritorious.

It is elementary that courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner

once the complaint or petition is filed. On the other hand, there are two
ways through which jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent is
acquired through coercive process – either through the service of summons
upon them or through their voluntary appearance in court.

The function of summons in court actions

In the case of Guiguino Credit Cooperative, Inc. (GUCCI) v. Torres, 54 We
discussed the function of summons in court actions, in this wise –

Fundamentally, the service of summons is intended to give official notice to

the defendant or respondent that an action has been commenced against it.
The defendant or respondent is thus put on guard as to the demands of the
plaintiffs as stated in the complaint. The service of summons upon the
defendant becomes an important element in the operation of a court’s
jurisdiction upon a party to a suit, as service of summons upon the
defendant is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his
person. Without service of summons, or when summons are improperly
made, both the trial and the judgment, being in violation of due process, are
null and void, unless the defendant waives the service of summons by
voluntarily appearing and answering the suit.

When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted

himself to the jurisdiction of the court. This is not, however, always the case.
Admittedly, and without subjecting himself to the court’s jurisdiction, the
defendant in an action can, by special appearance object to the court’s
assumption on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. If he so wishes to assert
this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court, otherwise, he shall be deemed to
have submitted himself to that jurisdiction.55

Elsewhere, We declared that jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
defendant or respondent cannot be acquired notwithstanding his knowledge
of the pendency of a case against him unless he was validly served with
summons. Such is the important role a valid service of summons plays in
court actions.56

Nature of a petition for annulment

of judgment for purposes of
service of summons

For a proper perspective, it is crucial to underscore the necessity of

determining first whether the action subject of this appeal is in personam, in
rem, or quasi in rem because the rules on service of summons under Rule 14
apply according to the nature of the action.57

An action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and

obligations brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the
person, although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of,
specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in
accordance with the mandate of the court, some responsibility or liability
directly upon the person of the defendant. Of this character are suits to
compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a
pecuniary liability on him.58 The following are some of the examples of
actions in personam: action for collection of sum of money and damages;
action for unlawful detainer or forcibly entry; action for specific performance;
action to enforce a foreign judgment in a complaint for a breach of contract.

Actions in rem are actions against the thing itself. They are binding upon the
whole world.59 The phrase, "against the thing," to describe in rem actions is
a metaphor. It is not the "thing" that is the party to an in rem action; only
legal or natural persons may be parties even in in rem actions. 60 The
following are some of the examples of actions in rem: petitions directed
against the "thing" itself or the res which concerns the status of a person,
like a petition for adoption, correction of entries in the birth certificate; or
annulment of marriage; nullity of marriage; petition to establish illegitimate
filiation; registration of land under the Torres system; and forfeiture
proceedings.

A proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking to subject

the property of such persons to the discharge of the claims assailed.61 In an
action quasi in rem, an individual is names as defendant and the purpose of
the proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the obligation or loan
burdening the property.62 In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named
as defendant. But, unlike suits in rem, a quasi in rem judgment is conclusive
only between the parties.63 The following are some of the examples of
actions quasi in rem: suits to quiet title; actions for foreclosure; and
attachment proceedings.

In actions in personam, the judgment is for or against a person directly.

Jurisdiction over the parties is required in actions in personam because they
seek to impose personal responsibility or liability upon a person. 64 "In a
proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided
that the latter has jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is
acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process,
whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the
institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized
and made effective."65

Here, respondent filed a petition to annul the MeTC’s July 26, 2006 Decision,
which ordered him to vacate the premises of the subject property and to pay
the petitioner the accrued rentals thereon, in violation of the parties’ lease
contract.
Annulment of judgment, as provided for in Rule 47, is based only on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Jurisprudence, however,
recognizes lack of due process as an additional ground to annul a
judgment.66 It is a recourse that presupposes the filing of a separate and
original action for the purpose of annulling or avoiding a decision in another
case. Annulment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the
judgment sought to be annulled is rendered. 67 It is unlike a motion for
reconsideration, appeal or even a petition for relief from judgment, because
annulment is not a continuation or progression of the same case, as in fact
the case it seeks to annul is already final and executor. Rather, it is an
extraordinary remedy that is equitable in character and is permitted only in
exceptional cases.68

Annulment of judgment involves the exercise of original jurisdiction, as

expressly conferred on the CA by Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP Blg.) 129,
Section 9(2). It also implies power by a superior court over a subordinate
one, as provided for in Rule 47, wherein the appellate court may annul a
decision of the regional trial court, or the latter court may annul a decision of
the municipal or metropolitan trial court. 69

For purposes of summons, this Court holds that the nature of a petition for
annulment of judgment is in personam, on the basis of the following
reasons:

First, a petition for annulment of judgment is an original action, which is

separate, distinct and independent of the case where the judgment sought
to be annulled is rendered. It is not a continuation or progression of the
same case. Thus, regardless of the nature of the original action in the
decision sought to be annulled, be it in personam, in rem or quasi in rem,
the respondent should be duly notified of the petition seeking to annul the
court’s decision over which the respondent has a direct or indirect interest.

To consider a petition for annulment of judgment as either in rem or quasi-

in-rem, would create an absurdity wherein the petitioner would simply file
the petition in court, without informing the respondent of the same, through
a valid service of summons. This is exactly what the CA reasoned out in its
decision. The CA held that the court need only acquire jurisdiction over the
res, which was "through the institution of the petition for annulment of
judgment" with the RTC, conveniently invoking that "jurisdiction over the res
x x x is x x x acquired x x x as a result of the institution of legal proceedings
with the court."70 If left unchecked, this disposition would set a dangerous
precedent that will sanction a violation of due process. It will foil a
respondent from taking steps to protect his interests, merely because he
was not previously informed of the pendency of the petition for annulment of
judgment filed in court.

Second, a petition for annulment of judgment and the court’s subsequent

decision thereon will affect the parties alone. It will not be enforceable
against the whole world. Any judgment therein will eventually bind only the
parties properly impleaded.

Pursuant to Section 7, Rule 47,71 a judgment of annulment shall set aside

the questioned judgment or final order or resolution and render the same
null and void.

In this case, had the RTC granted the respondent’s petition, the MeTC’s July
26, 2006 judgment would have been declared a nullity. This would have
resulted to the following consequences: as to the respondent, he would no
longer be required to pay the rentals and vacate the subject property; and,
as to the petitioner, she would be deprived of her right to demand the
rentals and to legally eject the respondent. Clearly, through the RTC’s
judgment on the petition, only the parties’ interest, i.e., rights and
obligation, would have been affected. Thus, a petition for annulment of
judgment is one in personam. It is neither an action in rem nor an action
quasi in rem.

We disagree with the CA’s disquisition that since jurisdiction over the res is
sufficient to confer jurisdiction of the RTC, the jurisdiction over the person of
herein petitioner may be dispensed with. Citing the case of Villanueva v.
Nite,72 the CA concluded that the petition is not an action in personam since
it can be filed by one who was not a party to the case. Suffice it to say that
in Villanueva, this Court did not give a categorical statement to the effect
that a petition for annulment of judgment is not an action in personam.
Neither did We make a remark that said petition is either an action in re rem
or a quasi in rem. The issue in Villanueva was simply whether or not the CA
erred in annulling and setting aside the RTC’s decision on the ground of
extrinsinc fraud. Unlike in this case, there were no issues pertaining to the
proper service of summons, to the nature of a petition for annulment of
judgment or to the denial of due process by reason of a defect in the service
of summons.

We cannot likewise lend credence to the respondent’s claim that a petition

for annulment of judgment is either an action in rem or quasi in rem. Suffice
it to say that the petition cannot be converted either to an action in rem or
quasi in rem since there was no showing that the respondent attached any
of the properties of the petitioner located within the Philippines. 73
Assuming arguendo, that a petition for annulment of judgment is either an
action in rem or quasi in rem, still the observance of due process for
purposes of service of summons cannot be deliberately ignored. For courts,
as guardians of constitutional rights cannot be expected to deny persons
their due process rights while at the same time be considered as acting
within their jurisdiction.74

There was neither a valid service of summons

in person nor a valid substituted service of
summons over the person of the petitioner

At any rate, regardless of the type of action – whether it is in personam, in

rem or quasi in rem – the proper service of summons is imperative.75

Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, as

in this case, the service of summons may be donce by personal or
substituted service as laid out in Sections 676 and 777 of Rule 14. Indeed, the
preferred mode of service of summons is personal service. 78 To warrant the
substituted service of the summons and copy of the complaint, (or, as in this
case, the petition for annulment of judgment), the serving officer must first
attempt to effect the same upon the defendant in person. Only after the
attempt at personal service has become impossible within a reasonable time
may the officer resort to substituted service.79

This Court explained the nature and enumerated the requisites of

substituted service in Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, et al.,80 which We
summarize and paraphrase below:

(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service -

The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that
defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt
service.

"Reasonable time" under Section 8, Rule 14, is defined as "so much time as
is necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent
man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that should be
done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any, to the
other party."

To the plaintiff, "reasonable time" means no more than seven (7) days since
an expeditious processing of a complaint is what a plaintiff wants. To the
sheriff, "reasonable time" means 15 to 30 days because at the end of the
month, it is a practice for the branch clerk of court to require the sheriff to
submit a return of the summons assigned to the sheriff for service. Thus,
one (1) month from the issuance of summons can be considered
"reasonable time with regard to personal service on the defendant.

Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the service of summons with
due care, utmost diligence, and reasonable promptness and speed so as not
to prejudice the expeditious dispensation of justice. Thus, they are enjoined
to try their best efforts to accomplish personal service on defendant. On the
other hand, since the defendant is expected to try to avoid and evade
service of summons, the sheriff must be resourceful, persevering, canny,
and diligent in serving the process on the defendant.

For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several

attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable
period of one (1) month which eventually resulted in failure to prove
impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3)
tries, preferably on at least two (2) different dates. In addition, the sheriff
must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that
impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted.

(2) Specific Details in the Return

The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and
circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service. The efforts made
to find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly
narrated in detail in the Return. The date and time of the attempts on
personal service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the names of
the occupants of the alleged residence or house of defendant and all other
acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be
specified in the Return to justify substituted service.

(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion –

If the substituted service will be effected at defendant's house or residence,

it should be left with a person of "suitable age and discretion then residing
therein." A person of suitable age and discretion is one who has attained the
age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is considered to have enough
discernment to understand the importance of a summons. "Discretion" is
defined as "the ability to make decisions which represent a responsible
choice and for which an understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may
be presupposed." Thus, to be of sufficient discretion, such person must
know how to read and understand English to comprehend the import of the
summons, and fully realize the need to deliver the summons and complaint
to the defendant at the earliest possible time for the person to take
appropriate action. Thus, the person must have the "relation of confidence"
to the defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive or at least be
notified of the receipt of the summons. The sheriff must therefore determine
if the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of
legal age, what the recipient's relationship with the defendant is, and
whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the
summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least
notify the defendant of said receipt of summons. These matters must be
clearly and specifically described in the Return of Summons.

(4) A Competent Person in Charge -

If the substituted service will be done at defendant's office or regular place

of business, then it should be served on a competent person in charge of the
place. Thus, the person on whom the substituted service will be made must
be the one managing the office or business of defendant, such as the
president or manager; and such individual must have sufficient knowledge
to understand the obligation of the defendant in the summons, its
importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the
summons. Again, these details must be contained in the Return. [Emphasis
and italics supplied).81

A copy of Sheriff Tolentino's Return dated July 27, 2007 reads, thus:

OFFICER'S RETURN

This is to certify the on the 27th day of July 2007, the undersigned caused
the service of the Notice of Raffle and Summons together with a copy of the
complaints and its annexes, to the following defendants, to wit:

BOBBIE ROSE DV FRIAS — served thru Ms. Sally Gonzales, a secretary of

her counsel Atty. Daniel S. Frias, a person employed thereat of suitable age
and discretion to receive such court processes. Inspite of diligent efforts
exerted by the undersigned to effect personal service to the defendant, but
still no one's around at her given address.

HON. PAULINO GALLEGOS,

Presiding Judge - MTC Branch LXXX,
Muntinlupa City and Sheriff Armando
Camacho of MTC - Br. 80, Muntinlupa City –

served thru their authorized receiving clerk, Mr. Jay-R Honorica, a person
employed thereat of suitable age and discretion to receive such court
processes.
As evidenced by their signature's and stamp received appearing on the
original copy of the Notice of Raffle and Summons.1âшphi1

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, I am now returning herewith the

original copy of the Notice of Raffle and Summons to the Honorable Court of
origin, DULY SERVED, for its record's (sic) and information.

Muntinlupa City, July 27, 2007.82

A perusal, however, of the Officer's Return discloses that the following

circumstances, as required in Manotoc, were not clearly established: (a)
personal service of summons within a reasonable time was impossible; (b)
efforts were exerted to locate the party; and (c) the summons was served
upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing at the party's
residence or upon a competent person in charge of the party's office or place
of business.83

The Officer's Return likewise revealed that no diligent effort was exerted and
no positive step was taken to locate and serve the summons personally on
the petitioner.1aшphi1 Upon having been satisfied that the petitioner was
not present at her given address, Sheriff Tolentino immediately resorted to
substituted service of summons by proceeding to the office of Atty. Frias,
petitioner's counsel. Evidently, Sheriff Tolentino failed to show that she
made several attempts to effect personal service for at least three times on
at least two different dates. It is likewise evident that Sheriff Tolentino
simply left the "Notice of Raffle and Summons" with Ms. Gonzales, the
alleged secretary of Atty. Frias. She did not even bother to ask her where
the petitioner might be. There were no details in the Officer's Return that
would suggest that Sheriff Tolentino inquired as to the identity of Ms.
Gonzales. There was no showing that Ms. Gonzales was the one managing
the office or business of the petitioner, such as the president or manager;
and that she has sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the
petitioner in the summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising
from inaction on the summons.

Indeed, without specifying the details of the attendant circumstances or of

the efforts exerted to serve the summons, a general statement that such
efforts were made will not suffice for purposes of complying with the rules of
substituted service of summons.84 This is necessary because substituted
service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It is a method
extraordinary in character and hence may be used only as prescribed and in
the circumstances authorized by statute.85 Sheriff Tolentino, however, fell
short of these standards. For her failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully
comply with the requirements of substituted service, the same is rendered
ineffective. As such, the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official functions, which is generally accorded to a sheriff's return, 86 does not
obtain in this case.

Special appearance to question

a court's jurisdiction
is not voluntary appearance

In Prudential Bank v. Magdamit, Jr.,87 We had the occasion to elucidate the

concept of voluntary or conditional appearance, such that a party who
makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court's
jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its
authority, thus:

Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either

by the coercive power of legal processes exerted over his person, or his
voluntary appearance in court. As a general proposition, one who seeks an
affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court. It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that
the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for
reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with
motion for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the court's
jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional
appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge,
among others, the court's jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered
to have submitted to its authority.

Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:

(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general

rule on voluntary appearance;

(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over

the person of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set
forth in an unequivocal manner, and

(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the

jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where a pleading
or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the
court for resolution.88

Measured against these standards, it is readily apparent that the petitioner

did not acquiesce to the jurisdiction of the trial court.
The records show that the petitioner never received any copy of the the
respondent's petition to annul the final and executory judgment of the MeTC
in the unlawful detainer case. As explained earlier, the copy of the said
petition which was served to Ms. Gonzales was defective under the Rules of
Court. Consequently, in order to question the trial court's jurisdiction, the
petitioner filed the following pleadings and motions: Special Appearance
Submission (Jurisdictional Infirmity Raised); Preliminary Submission to
Dismiss Petition (Special Appearance Raising Jurisdictional Issues);
Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Dismiss Petition for Annulment of
Judgment and to Set Aside and/or Reconsider 89 the RTC's December 3, 2007
Order; Consolidated Opposition, Manifestation and Reply (to Alcayde's
Comment dated August 19, 2008 and Supplement dated November 12,
2008); and Motion for Reconsideration against the RTC's February 2, 2009
Order.

In all these pleadings and motions, the petitioner never faltered in declaring
that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person, due to invalid
and improper service of summons. It is noteworthy that when the petitioner
filed those pleadings and motions, it was only in a "special" character,
conveying the fact that her appearance before the trial court was with a
qualification, i.e., to defy the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over her person.

This Court is of the view that the petitioner never abandoned her objections
to the trial court's jurisdiction even when she elevated the matter to the CA
through her petition for certiorari. The filing of her pleadings and motions,
including that of her subsequent posturings, were all in protest of the
respondent's insistence on holding her to answer the petition for annulment
of judgment in the RTC, which she believed she was not subject to. Indeed,
to continue the proceeding in such case would not only be useless and a
waste of time, but would violate her right to due process.

In its Order dated December 3, 2007, the RTC harped on the fact that
petitioner's counsel, Atty. Frias, attended the summary hearing on
November 9, 2007 of the respondent's prayer for the issuance of a TRO.
This, however, can hardly be construed as voluntary appearance. There was
no clear intention on the part of Atty. Frias to be bound by the proceedings.
Precisely, his "special" appearance in the hearing was to challenge the RTC's
lack of jurisdiction over her client. This Court held in Ejercito, et al. v. M.R.
Vargas Construction, et al.90 that the presence or attendance at the hearing
on the application of a TRO should not be equated with voluntary
appearance, thus:

Despite Agarao's not being a party-respondent, petitioners nevertheless

confuse his presence or attendance at the hearing on the application for TRO
with the notion of voluntary appearance, which interpretation has a legal
nuance as far as jurisdiction is concerned. While it is true that an appearance
in whatever form, without explicitly objecting to the jurisdiction of the court
over the person, is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court over the
person, the appearance must constitute a positive act on the part of the
litigant manifesting an intention to submit to the court's jurisdiction. Thus, in
the instances where the Court upheld the jurisdiction of the trial court over
the person of the defendant, the parties showed the intention to participate
or be bound by the proceedings through the filing of a motion, a plea or an
answer.

Neither is the service of the notice of hearing on the application for a TRO on
a certain Rona Adol binding on respondent enterprise. The records show that
Rona Adol received the notice of hearing on behalf of an entity named JCB.
More importantly, for purposes of acquiring jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant, the Rules require the service of summons and not of any
other court processes. [Emphasis and italics supplied]. 91

As we have consistently pronounced, if the appearance of a party in a suit is

precisely to question the jurisdiction of the said tribunal over the person of
the defendant, then this appearance is not equivalent to service of
summons, nor does it constitute an acquiescence to the court's jurisdiction. 92

To recapitulate, the jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner was never
vested with the RTC despite the mere filing of the petition for annulment of
judgment. The manner of substituted service by the process server was
apparently invalid and ineffective. As such, there was a violation of due
process. In its classic formulation, due process means that any person with
interest to the thing in litigation, or the outcome of the judgment, as in this
case, must be notified and given an opportunity to defend that
interest.93 Thus, as the essence of due process lies in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence the defendant may have
in support of her defense, the petitioner must be properly served the
summons of the court. In other words, the service of summons is a vital and
indispensable ingredient of due process94 and compliance with the rules
regarding the service of the summons is as much an issue of due process as
it is of jurisdiction.95 Regrettably, as had been discussed, the Constitutional
right of the petitioner to be properly served the summons and be notified
has been utterly overlooked by the officers of the trial court.

Petition for annulment of judgment

is an improper remedy
In any event, respondent's petition to annul the MeTC's July 26, 2006
judgment cannot prosper for being the wrong remedy.

A principle almost repeated to satiety is that an action for annulment of

judgment cannot and is not a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. 96 Its
obvious rationale is to prevent the party from benefiting from his inaction or
negligence.97

In this case, it is evident that respondent failed to interpose an appeal, let

alone a motion for new trial or a petition for relief from the MeTC July 26,
2006 Decision rendering the same final and executory. Hence, the October
30, 2007 Order granting its execution was properly issued.

It is doctrinal that when a decision has acquired finality, the same becomes
immutable and unalterable.1âшphi1 By this principle of immutability of
judgments, the RTC is now precluded from further examining the MeTC
Decision and to further dwell on petitioner's perceived errors therein, i.e.,
that petitioners' complaint has no cause of action for failure to make a prior
demand to pay and to vacate; and, that petitioner failed to refer the case
before the barangay.

Resultantly, the implementation and execution of judgments that had

attained finality are already ministerial on the courts. Public policy also
dictates that once a judgment becomes final, executory, and unappealable,
the prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some
subterfuge devised by the losing party.98 Unjustified delay in the
enforcement of a judgment sets at naught the role of courts in disposing
justiciable controversies with finality.99

Verily, once a judgment becomes final, the prevailing party is entitled as a

matter of right to a writ of execution, the issuance of which is the trial
court's ministerial duty. So is it in this case.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 27, 2010
and Resolution dated October 22, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 109824, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new judgment
is rendered ordering the DISMISSAL of the respondent Rolando F. Alcayde's
petition for annulment of judgment.

SO ORDERED.

NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM

AssociateJustice
WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Associate Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes
1
 Pascual v. Pascual, 622 Phil. 307, 312 (2009).
2
 Rollo, pp. 8-31.
3
 Penned by CA Associate Justice Vicente S. E. Veloso and concurred in
by Associate Justices Francisco P. Acosta and Samuel H. Gaerlan, id. at
38-53.
4
 Id. at 54-57.
5
 id. at 74.
6
 Id. at 77-79.
7
 ld. at 39.
8
 Id. at 82.
9
 Penned by Presiding Judge Paulino Q. Gallegos, id. at 74-76.
10
 Id. at 76.
11
 Id. at 80-81.
12
 ld. at 60-73.
13
 Id. at 40.
14
 Id. at 85.
15
 Id. at 86.
16
 Id. at 87-88.
17
 Id. at 40.
18
 Id. at 89-101.
19
 Id. at 40.
20
 Id. at 113-114.
21
 Id. at 112.
22
 Id. at 122.
23
 Id. at 41.
24
 Id. at 123-151.
25
 Id. at 12, 125.
26
 Id. at 152-155.
27
 ld. at 155.
28
 Id. at 156.
29
 Id. at 158-170.
30
 Id. at 168.
31
 Id. at 180-181.
32
 Id.
33
 Id. at 181.
34
 Id. at 182-185.
35
 Id. at 186-194.
36
 Id. at 196.
37
 Id. at 196-202.
38
 Id. at 212-213.
39
 Id. at 213.
40
 Id. at 214-222.
41
 Id. at 223-231.
42
 Id. at 232-238.
43
 Id. at 238.
44
 Id. at 239-252.
45
 Id. at 256.
46
 Id. at 257-258.
47
 Id. at 259-287.
48
 Id. at 289-302.
49
 ld. at 303-322.
50
 ld. at 38-53.
51
 ld. at 323-328.
52
 Id. at 54-57.
53
 Id. at 17-18.
54
 533 Phil. 476 (2006).
55
 Id. at 488-489 citing Avon Insurance PLC v. CA,343 Phil. 849,863
(1997).
56
 Cezar v. Judge Ricafort-Bautista, 536 Phil. 1037, 1046 (2006).
57
 Gomez v. Court of Appeals, 469 Phil. 38, 47-48 (2004).
58
 Muñoz, v. Atty. Yabut, Jr., et al., 665 Phil. 488, 515-516 (2011),
citing Pineda v. Judge Santiago, 549 Phil. 560, 575 (2007).
59
 Muñoz, v. Anty. Yabut, Jr., et al., supra, at 509.
60
 De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corp., 748 Phil. 706, 725
(2014).
61
 Sps. Yu v. Pacleb, et al., 599 Phil. 354,367 (2009).
62
 Macasaet, et al. v. Co, Jr., 710 Phil. 167, 178 (2013).
63
 Portic v. Cristobal, 496 Phil. 456,464 (2005).
64
 De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corp., supra, at 725.
65
 Alba v. Court of Appeals, 503 Phil. 451, 459 (2005).
66
 Diona v. Balangue, et al., 701 Phil. 19, 30-31 (2013).
67
 Macalalag v. Ombudsman, 468 Phil. 918, 923 (2004).
68
 Nudo v. Hon. Caguioa, et al., 612 Phil. 517,522 (2009).
69
 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Kepco Ilijan Corporation, G.R.
No. 199422, June 21, 2016, 794 SCRA 193, 203.
70
 Rollo, pp. 51-52.
71
 Section. 7. Effect of judgment. - A judgment of annulment shall set
aside the questioned judgment or final order or resolution and render
the same null and void, without prejudice to the original action being
refiled in the proper court. However, where the judgment or final order
or resolution is set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the court
may on motion order the trial court to try the case as if a timely
motion for new trial had been granted therein.
72
 528 Phil. 867 (2006).
73
 Perkin Elmer Singapore PTE., Ltd. v. Dakila Trading Corp., 556 Phil.
822 (2007).
74
 Yu v. Yu, G.R. No. 200072, June 20, 2016, 794 SCRA 45, 64.
75
 De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corp., supra note 60, 706, 727
(2014).
76
 Section 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable,
the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the
defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by
tendering it to him.
77
 Section 7. Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the
defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in
the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of
the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the
copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof.
78
 De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corp., supra note 60, at 727.
79
 Macasaet, et.al. v. Co, Jr., 710 Phil. 167, 170 (2013).
80
 530 Phil. 454 (2006).
81
 Id. at 468-471.
82
 Rollo, p. 85.
83
 Robinson v. Miralles, 540 Phil. 1, 6 (2006).
84
 Guiguinto Credit Cooperative, Inc. (GUCCI) v. Torres, supra note 54,
at 486.
85
 Cezar v. Judge Ricafort-Bautista, supra note 56, at 1047.
86
 Nation Petroleum Gas Inc., v. RCBC, 766 Phil. 696 (2015).
87
 746 Phil. 649 (2014).
88
 Id. at 666, citing Philippine Commercial International Bank v.
Spouses Dy, 606 Phil. 615, 633634 (2009). Italics supplied.
89
 Rollo, pp. 158-170.
90
 574 Phil. 255 (2008).
91
 Id. at 267-268.
92
 Avon Insurance PLC v. CA., 343 Phil. 849 (1997).
93
 Borlongan v. Banco De Oro, G.R. No. 217617, April 5, 2017.
94
 Express Padala v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 202505, September 6, 2017.
95
 Borlongan v. Banco De Oro, supra.
96
 V.L. Enterprises and/or Faustino J. Visitacion v. CA, 547 Phil. 87, 92
(2007), citing Mercado v. Security Bank Corporation, 517 Phil. 690,
696 (2006).
97
 V.L. Enterprises and/or Faustino J. Visitacion v. CA, supra, at 92.
98
 Mejia-Espinoza, et al. v. Cariño, G.R. No. 193397, January 25, 2017.
99
 Id.