Strategic Behavior

The Global Financial Crisis exposed among others many frailties of Neo-Classical Economics, especially in Macroeconomics and Financial Economics. Many of these frailties come from the Neo-Classical core beliefs. These core beliefs are required to allow for formal mathematics to be employed, which itself is felt necessary to enhance the science claim of Economics. In other words, ‘Physics envy’. But how do we go about extricating Economics from the shadows of Physics? One promising avenue is in the way we handle randomness. Economics, like Physics, starts with a well-defined and fixed distribution function. Physics is very fortunate that its subjects (say atoms) are dumb—they do not behave strategically. In Economics and the social sciences, subjects can behave strategically; the same agent can be “0” at one time and “1” in the other in a stochastic way, which makes Economics hard. The core assumptions see to it that behavior is confined to a tractable sphere where mathematics is useful, say, fixed preference (type) and perfect markets. We assume that agents choose not only baskets of goods but also their type to suit the social/physical environment. This is like phenotypic plasticity in Biology only in steroids. The choice of types being done under imperfect information can lead to information cascades where agents rely only on observation of others’ behavior to guide their own. This produces herding and/or regime shifts. This may mean that Gaussian distribution can no longer reflect randomness in Economics reality.

Gender issues have been present in the traditional negotiation field for a long time, as it has become common for women to play key roles in business. However, few studies have investigated this issue in online situations. Since online negotiation is inevitable in the global business age and its context is different from that of a traditional face-to-face environment, it is valuable to have more understanding of the impact of gender differences on online negotiation. This study explores the impact of different gender dyads on how negotiators strategically respond to their counterparts’ behavior from the dyadic interaction perspective. The adopted strategy clusters include (1) distributive information, (2) integrative information, (3) claiming value, and (4) creating value. The content analysis method was applied in order to translate all negotiation transcripts into quantitative data, i.e. behavior units. The resulting behavior units belonging to the four strategy clusters were mined to find the two-sequence dyadic behavioral patterns of each negotiation dyad and then of each gender composition group. Finally, these two-sequence behavioral patterns were categorized into three appropriate strategic behavioral sequences: (1) reciprocal sequence, (2) complementary sequence, and (3) structural sequence. The results indicate that negotiators’ strategic responses to their counterparts were impacted by the genders of both the counterparts and the negotiators themselves. In general, negotiators in intra-gender dyads adopt more structural strategy and less reciprocal strategy than those in inter-gender dyads. No matter whether female or male, a negotiator will adapt his or her response strategy based on his or her counterpart’s gender.

This paper considers competition in electric networks and how the network structure affects the competition. The approach is to examine non-cooperative behavior among producers and calculate a Nash equilibrium under different market specifications. Unlike most other treatments of this problem, which utilize either Cournot or Bertrand models of competition, the model used here examines supply function competition. Two and four node networks are considered. Several results that differ from traditional economic theory are found. In both a two-node and four-node market with imperfect competition among producers, transmission constraints increase their profits (compared to an unconstrained network)—but with little or no change in consumer prices or quantities produced. This is because generators profit primarily at the expense of the owner of transmission rights. The size of the increase in profits depends on the number of firms at each node and the size of the transmission constraint. In the four-node case, an example was found in which decreasing market concentration by breaking up suppliers worsens market efficiency, even if there are no cost diseconomies. In particular, increasing competition at one node increases the consumer price at a second node, and causes an overall decrease in consumer surplus. In general, the cases presented here show that strategic behavior on electric networks may produce results that differ from those predicted by traditional economic theory due to the network structure of the problem.

Effective procedures are needed to prevent the substantial increases in adiposity that have been occurring among children and adults. Behavioral change may occur as a result of changes in variables that mediate interventions. These mediating variables have typically ...

This experimental study is intended to uncover how the meaning-checking procedure is conducted by Moroccan English as a foreign language (EFL) learners and explore the perceived impact of metacognitive strategy instruction on the way they monitor their comprehension act in textual processing. Predicated on a pre-post-test design, the study is a manifestation of the extent to which the learners' monitoring behaviour during the reading process can be subject to utter improvement through the conduct of an instructional intervention. To investigate this issue at length and provide plausible, pertinent evidence, a sample of 113 of Moroccan first-semester students majoring in English Studies were targeted. The data were elicited through the usage of such research instruments as reading comprehension texts (i.e., narrative, expository), 'self-report questionnaire' and reading comprehension tests (i.e., pre-test, post-test). The findings evinced that, owing to strategy instruction, the comprehension-checking behavior among the experimental group (n=63) significantly improved at post-test compared to the control group (n=50). Finally, some practical implications are brought forward and a few limitations confronting the study under focus are cited.

This paper presents in a simple way and using figures the partial economic analysis of how the market works. Under the normative analysis, using the Pareto efficiency concept, a series of the so called market failures or distortions are defined. Under, the positive analysis the effects of these distortions on the market and agents who participate in it are described. Distortions are grouped in three categories. The first called technologic or external distortions which are originated by sources outside of the control of 3 agents who participate in the market. The second called strategic behavior of firms which are originated by firms’ actions with regard to the market and their competitors. The third called internal to the market which are originated in the market environment where transactions takes places.

This paper combines some of the most realistic components of the competitive and strategic trade literature to examine both socially and individually optimal domestic input policies in free trade areas (FTAs). When asymmetries in the number of firms, in the number of consumers, or in production costs exist across countries, tax harmonization is not optimal and input taxes depend on the shape of the production process and the degree of imperfect competition. The presence of input tax asymmetries in a customs union or FTA does not constitute evidence of strategic behavior at the national level.