Special Operations

Major General Orde Charles Wingate formed his Long-Range Penetration Groups, or 'Chindits' in order to carry out operations against Japanese lines of communication and other vulnerable points behind their lines in occupied Burma in 1942.  These units, as of necessity, worked dispersed, in rough country, with no lines of communication of their own and just a limited number of radios to exercise command and control.  Wingate overcame these deficiencies via resupply by airdrop and by intensive training with the intention of enforcing a common tactical doctrine and procedures for many other important activities, so they could perform to his satisfaction without supervision from above.  He also practised a clear form of 'mission command' tolerating a high level of initiative from his subordinate commanders and allowing them to find their own solutions to any tactical problems they encountered.

The period 1940-41 saw British forces in North and East Africa, and the Middle East, defeat considerably larger Italian and Vichy French forces in the Western Desert, Ethiopia, Somaliland and Syria. A key factor in this was the use at the operational and tactical level of fast-moving mobile forces, operating dispersed and with considerable initiative devolved upon junior commanders. This has been put down to a range of influences - Liddell Hart, Percy Hobart, Eric Dorman-Smith, etc, but this paper demonstrates its origins in the 'small wars' practices of the inter-war years, upon which a major influence was Major General Callwell's much-cited, but not often read tome, 'Small Wars'.

Major General Orde Wingate was a highly controversial figure in his time and remains so among historians. However, his eccentric and colourful personality has drawn attention away from the nature of his military ideas, the most important of which was his concept of long range penetration, which originated from his observations of his operations in Italian-occupied Ethiopia in 1941, and evolved into the model he put into practice in the Chindit operations in Burma in 1943-44. A review of Wingate’s own official writings on this subject reveals that long range penetration combined local guerrilla irregulars, purpose-trained regular troops and airpower into large-scale offensive operations deep in the enemy rear, with the intention of disrupting his planning process and creating situation regular forces could exploit. This evolved organically from Major General Colin Gubbins’ doctrine for guerrilla resistance in enemy occupied areas, and bears some resemblance to the operational model applied by US and Allied forces, post September 2001.

From the beginning of European involvement in Africa and the Middle East to the present, working with indigenous irregular forces has been, and remains, an integral part of engagement in these regions. This article examines one aspect of this relationship: the command pathways that allowed these relationships to function. By comparing the command pathways of cases in Palestine Mandate and the Horn of Africa during the Second World War, the author explores the structures that led to success and shows the importance of such cooperation. He then applies the lessons gained to suggest a way forward for contemporary operations.

The U.S. has spent the last two decades, during its short time as the singular superpower, engaging relatively successfully in counterterrorism. However, we have now entered a new era of Great Power Competition (GPC) with adversaries; Russia and China. In the last decade, these nations have either caught up to the U.S. or have gained a slight edge in several types of warfare, while they challenge the international order created and dominated by the U.S. In particular, Russian threats loom over our NATO Baltic allies, while Chinese threats loom over the South China Sea and Taiwan. The U.S. has inadequate conventional deterrence forces ing each of these theaters and likely could not respond to crisis in each area simultaneously. Concurrently, though not allied, Russia and China have increased cooperation. It will take many years for the U.S. to build adequate conventional forces to prevent each of these adversaries from asserting their will and taking and holding the sovereign territory of our allies or partners. Yet history reveals a type pf warfare for which we and our allies and partners can prepare for immediately at little cost to add a layer of deterrence to assist in denying ultimate victory to our adversaries with scarce dedication of resources. It is a type of warfare that can asymmetrically impose costs on an occupier by forcing him to devote substantial resources to his own security while also making his political consolidation of the occupied territory very difficult if not impossible. Its methods range from violence led by an authorized organization fighting to reclaim sovereignty, to passive and peaceful activities by the general population. This method of warfare, which must be organized, trained and equipped immediately, is resistance.

Special Forces are military assets designed and trained to conduct tactical actions delivering strategic outcome out of proportion with their size and that if conducted by conventional units may have disproportionate negative impact on policy.  The aim of Special Forces is to deliver high precision at lower risk and cost than might otherwise be possible.
The very need for Special Forces has been questioned.  The author has been told at various times that Special Forces leech away the best people from the rest of an army, that there is nothing they do in general war that a well-trained infantry unit cannot do, that their role in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism would be performed better by armed police, and that they survive and prosper thanks to the ‘elite force’ image they project, yet which has been their undoing more than once thanks to the hubris it can generate.  The paper is an unapologetic rebuttal of those arguments and a case for Special Forces being a vital strategic asset performing functions others cannot.

Why have special operations forces become a key strategic tool in the conduct of modern warfare? How do these specially trained and equipped elite units function? What types of missions do they conduct?  Special Operations: Out of the Shadows addresses these questions and more in a comprehensive survey of special ops, encompassing cutting-edge research, current debates, and critical case studies.

It has been 42 years since the tragic November 1978 mass suicide/murder of American citizens at the Peoples Temple Agricultural Settlement in Jonestown, Guyana.  In the intervening four decades, so much has happened to US special operations forces and the US Air Force, brought about in large part by world events that demonstrated the unquestionable need for fully resourced, trained, and ready joint special operations forces.  This monograph tells the heretofore untold story of what the Airmen who would, a few years later, form the nucleus of Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), did to help recover the victims’ bodies – a special air operation that pushed the limits of what their training and previous combat experiences had prepared them for.  For two weeks, in the steaming jungles of Guyana, the combat controllers, aircrews, and maintenance teams demonstrated the attributes of selfless service, boldness, and humble professionalism that are now synonymous with America’s “Air Commandos.”

Most of the contemporary work pertaining religious-sectarian conflict is focused on insurgents driven by socio-economic and political grievances. In Politics and Economics of the Insurgence in Bahrain, Vladimir Remmer analyzes the political economy of religious-sectarian intra-state conflict in connection to contemporary theory of Instruments of National Power. This approach provides valuable insight on legitimization, mobilization, and operationalization of the indigenous surrogate force where nation-states and non-state actors compete for influence over target audiences for the opportunity to advance ideological and economic interests.
In search for answers to nature and persistence of the conflict, Remmer reviews organizational structure and legitimacy. He dissects pertinent economic, political, and ethno-anthropological causes.
Throughout the process, the author strongly emphasizes the Shiite community as an innocent victim of predation by an agent engaged in a political-ideological act of state-capture. The conflict mitigation recommendations evolve from discussion of select instruments of national power as a case appropriate artifice targeting root-cause of the insurgence.

This paper proposes criteria for selecting the right aircraft to make available to partner nations for their internal defense and judges three sample aircraft against those criteria to choose the best.  The aircraft evaluated are the AC-47T Fantasma, the AT-6 Texan II, and the AC-208 Caravan.

There has been a proliferation of special operations forces over the past twenty years as states seek to gain the status and capabilities that come from such units. While the importance of special operations seems apparent, research in the field is still very much in a nascent stage. The authors argue that a forum for the exchange of ideas is critical to the formation of a research community centered on special operations, and, furthermore, suggest that the planning and conduct of special operations can benefit from rigorous historical and social science research. While acknowledging that significant contributions in this regard have been made, they suggest that much of this research has remained limited in its reach and has not fostered a critical mass of scholarship in the field. They explain how the Special Operations Journal can become just such a forum and help achieve this and other objectives.

Abstract- As a strategic asset, special-operations forces (SOF) are trained, equipped, and organized to combat irregular threats. The employment of SOF is under heavy discussion among academics, decision makers, and the SOF community. This article addresses the following questions: 1) How do SOF achieve strategic effects as a policy tool of national strategy; and 2) In which types of roles and missions do SOF’s strategic value rest? This study claims that to provide strategic utility, SOF must operate independently, or at least supported by conventional forces, executing both direct-action missions and indirect-action missions. SOF’s indirect-action missions are comparatively more important than their direct-action skills. The authors applies game theory to all strategic environments, peacetime, conflict, and conventional war. Using a game-theory approach, this article presents the decrease in SOF strategic value when they are improperly employed. Military leaders and policy makers ...

Abstract: Major General Orde Charles Wingate (1903-1944) is one of the most controversial British military commanders of the last hundred years. This controversy stems from two broad sources: the first of these was his idiosyncratic and occasionally tempestuous personality; ...

As a strategic asset, special-operations forces (SOF) are trained, equipped, and organized to combat irregular threats. The employment of SOF is under heavy discussion among academics, decision makers, and the SOF community. This article addresses the following questions: 1) How do SOF achieve strategic effects as a policy tool of national strategy; and 2) In which types of roles and missions do SOF’s strategic value rest? This study claims that to provide strategic utility, SOF must operate independently, or at least supported by conventional forces, executing both direct-action missions and indirect-action missions. SOF’s indirect-action missions are comparatively more important than their direct-action skills. The authors applies game theory to all strategic environments, peacetime, conflict, and conventional war. Using a game-theory approach, this article presents the decrease in SOF strategic value when they are improperly employed. Military leaders and policy makers must emplo...

Many are fascinated by the secret, hidden world of special operations forces: their culture, their stories and adventures, what they do, how they do it, and what doing it does to them. These units can legally hide behind a veil of secrecy, and few outsiders are allowed inside to do any kind of long-term research or quality check. There is very little rigorous and comparative research on these units or access to sufficient sources and reference material. There are countless books and films on special operators. The books are often well-written and interesting, but they are mostly individual “kill and tell” memoirs about the high-end and high-order operations. And they focus almost exclusively on the key players: the big states.
The stories told in "Making Warriors in the Global Era" (Danielsen 2018) provides new insight on how warriors are made in our time: how the operators are socialized in an institutional apprenticeship, how they retain their unconventional mindset, gain skillsets, ways of communication, and leadership, and how “muted” social practices seem to keep them safe, sound, and sane. The stories are analyzed in the context of special operations units over the world, and raise questions and discussions on rather complex phenomena.

"Special Forces are military assets designed and trained to conduct tactical actions delivering strategic outcome out of proportion with their size and that if conducted by conventional units may have disproportionate negative impact on policy. The aim of Special Forces is to deliver high precision at lower risk and cost than might otherwise be possible. The very need for Special Forces has been questioned. The author has been told at various times that Special Forces leech away the best people from the rest of an army, that there is nothing they do in general war that a well-trained infantry unit cannot do, that their role in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism would be performed better by armed police, and that they survive and prosper thanks to the ‘elite force’ image they project, yet which has been their undoing more than once thanks to the hubris it can generate. The paper is an unapologetic rebuttal of those arguments and a case for Special Forces being a vital strategic asset performing functions others cannot. "

The critiques of special operations forces after the Second World War are applicable to the current quest to produce a theory of special operations today. A specific theory may be unwarranted as other, existing military theories may already prove necessary and sufficient for special operations. There are a number of individual and institutional impediments to overcome in the writing of special operations theory. Individual impediments include access to sufficient evidence, the credibility of the author and the type of theory they write, and sufficient time to produce theory. Institutional impediments are a reflection of large bureaucracies and the special operations community is not immune to their negative influence. Although special operations have a strategic value and can generate strategic effects, this does not necessarily translate into a need for theory. Institutional imperatives are likely to favor pragmatic over pure theory and co-opt such theory in the pursuit of bureaucratic agendas. In the worst possible case such coopted theory can become dogma, or a substitute for deep, critical thinking—the very raison d’être of theory.

ABSTRACT This article explores the aspects of British special operations as conducted during the Falklands War in 1982 within the context of Spulak’s theory of special operations. Specifically, it provides an evaluation of three engagements that were conducted by British special operations forces in order to confirm or refute the five characteristics of special operations as per this theory. While variances can be found and are described here, Spulak’s theory of special operations can generally be seen as present in British special operations during this conflict.

Civil wars are often the product of low-level political violence that escalates, rather than emerging ex nihilo from a peaceful society. Therefore, it is important to focus on what causes the initial pattern of violence and why it escalates. This essay integrates structural and strategic theories of political violent to develop an analytical framework of violence escalation. This framework allows us to identify critical junctures where intervention may limit or halt escalation. The framework is applied to Iraq, 2003-2006 to determine how and why violence escalated, culminating in widespread sectarian civil war in 2006.