Russian Economics

Is it possible to build a bulletproof economy in the era of globalization and economic warfares? Yes, it is; but sacrifices are needed.
This 300-page original work, written between Italy and Russia, with which I got my master's degree in Area and Global Studies for International Cooperation at the University of Turin, has only one aim: to help policy-makers of developing countries to face economic warfares and to turn life-threatening challenges into once-in-a-lifetime opportunities to growth and flourish.

Voilà plus de treize ans qu'Auchan, fleuron de la grande distribution alimentaire française, est implantée en Russie. En 2002, lors de l'ouverture de son premier hypermarché dans la banlieue de Moscou, tous les spécialistes étaient d'accord : la Russie, avec sa classe moyenne dépensière et sa croissance annuelle à deux chiffres, représentait le 'nouvel Eldorado' pour les enseignes étrangères. En effet, le pays semble avoir particulièrement réussi à Auchan, qui y emploie aujourd'hui plus de 37000 personnes dans 78 hypermarchés, 122 supermarchés Atac et 34 centres commerciaux. Toutefois, le climat politique actuel, avec notamment la crise ukrainienne et l'embargo russe des produits alimentaires occidentaux, a sérieusement changé la donne pour le groupe nordiste, qui commence à regarder la Russie d'un autre oeil.  Dans notre intervention, nous tenterons d'expliquer les raisons du succès d'Auchan en Russie, avant de nous interroger sur ses perspectives d'avenir dans le pays.

The topic of our project delves into a financial crisis in Russia, which struck the country in 2014 having the effects up to the present time. The main purpose of this project is to examine the causes of the Russian financial crisis together with the development of the state of affairs in the country. Apart from that, we will observe the consequences which the crisis had on the country, its economy, and the Russian citizens. Thus, our research question is “What were the causes and consequences of the Russian financial crisis of 2014?”.

The objective of the article is to analyze the economic effects for
Russia of pursuing political goals instead of reviving the economy and
carrying out necessary reforms. The “non-reform agenda” since the
mid-2000s means that for many years, the economy has been sliding
due to structural problems and weak institutions. These tendencies
were reinforced with the re-election of President Vladimir Putin for a
third term in 2012 and his economic agenda. Since 2014 the additional
problems of geopolitical tension, low oil prices and economic
sanctions have resulted in the economy contracting. Despite the
depressed economy the leadership keeps military expenditure at a
high level. Import substitution as a means to mitigate the economic
crisis is not convincing.
Key words: Russia, economic decline, political versus economic
goals, institutions, rent addiction, rent management, sanctions, import
substitution.

https://fr.obsfr.ru/events/12276/


Paris, Maison de la Chimie – Petit amphi (28 Rue Saint-Dominique, 75007 Paris) - 18 janvier 2022

Le 18 janvier à la Maison de la Chimie s'est tenue la présentation du Rapport annuel « Russie 2021 » pour le public français. Cet ouvrage réunit les contributions d'une soixantaine d'experts français et russes sur les thématiques qui font l'actualité de la Russie d'aujourd'hui.

Au cours de la présentation, les auteurs du rapport ont discuté des sujets les plus brûlants abordés dans l'ouvrage : l'avenir du pays à la lumière de la pandémie ; l'état du système politique après les élections du 19 septembre ; l'activisme russe en matière de politique étrangère ; les évolutions de Moscou sur les questions environnementales et énergétiques ou encore l'état des relations franco-russes.

Les auteurs suivants ont participé aux discussions :

Arnaud Dubien, directeur de l’Observatoire franco-russe

Table ronde 1 : « Entre retranchement et ouverture : quels horizons pour la politique extérieure de la Russie ? »

Modérateur : Arnaud Kalika, directeur du séminaire Russie au CNAM, directeur de la sûreté du groupe Meridiam

- Isabelle Facon, directrice adjointe de la Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS)
- Jean de Gliniasty, directeur de recherche à l’Institut des relations internationales et stratégiques (IRIS)
- Igor Delanoë, directeur adjoint de l’Observatoire franco-russe
- Tatiana Kastouéva-Jean, directrice du Centre Russie/NEI, Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
- Vera Ageeva, enseignante, Haute école d’économie (Saint-Pétersbourg), doctorante à Sciences Po’ Paris
- David Teurtrie, chargé de mission à Expertise France, chercheur associé au CREE (Institut national des langues et civilisations orientales, INALCO)

Table ronde 2 : « Dynamiques internes : une nouvelle phase ? »

Modérateur : Pavel Chinsky, directeur général de la CCI France Russie

- Jean-Robert Raviot, professeur en études russes et postsoviétiques, Université Paris Nanterre
- Clémentine Fauconnier, maître de conférences, Université de Haute-Alsace
- Jean Radvanyi, professeur émérite des Universités, INALCO
- Julien Vercueil, professeur des Universités, CREE/INALCO
- Marie-Gabrielle Bertran, doctorante en géopolitique, Université Paris 8
- Marina Pourrias, enseignante en marketing international, École supérieure d'agriculture (Angers)

La Russie est régulièrement évoquée dans l’actualité en raison des cyberattaques qui lui sont attribuées par les institutions internationales ou les États-Unis. Les entreprises russes du numérique apparaissent, elles, plus rarement dans les médias, malgré l’existence d’acteurs de poids au niveau international, tels que les groupes Yandex et VK.
      Les acteurs russes du numérique pâtissent en effet d’une réputation trouble. Les réticences des clients étrangers à acheter des solutions numériques conçues en Russie sont réelles, appuyées par le cas de l’entreprise Kaspersky Lab, qui a été accusée en 2017 d’avoir favorisé une fuite de données de la N.S.A. (National Security Agency), qui utilisait son antivirus. Le fondateur de l'entreprise, Evgenij Kasperskij, et son dircom ont démenti toute action intentionnelle, en expliquant que la fuite avait pu provenir du fonctionnement même de l’antivirus (un fonctionnement classique, partagé par la plupart des AV).
      Malgré ces explications, le Département de la Sécurité intérieure des États-Unis (DHS) a prononcé l’interdiction officielle des produits Kaspersky sur l’ensemble des infrastructures informatiques fédérales du pays. Cette interdiction a été suivie par la mise en place de mesures similaires en Lituanie, Hongrie et aux Pays-Bas en 2018, tandis que le Parlement Européen a exigé que les institutions de l’Union Européenne appliquent les mêmes mesures. Elle a été maintenue malgré la condamnation en 2018 d’un ancien contractuel de la NSA, qui avait illégalement stocké des fichiers appartenant à l’agence sur son ordinateur personnel entre 2010 et 2015. Ce sont ces fichiers qui auraient été dérobés par des pirates informatiques.
      D’autres entreprises russes de sécurité informatique, dont Positive Technologies (l'un des leaders du secteur en Russie), ont été pointées du doigt plus récemment, en avril 2021, pour leur implication supposée dans l’attaque de la plateforme Orion, commercialisée par l'entreprise étatsunienne SolarWinds. Au-delà de ces cas médiatiques, on peut se demander qui sont les principaux acteurs du numérique en Russie, et comment ils se situent actuellement sur les marchés intérieur et international.

Zwischen 2000 und 2018 gab Russlands Staatsspitze acht Pläne in Auftrag, die Orientierung für die langfristige Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik geben sollten. Umgesetzt wurden sie entweder gar nicht oder nur
zum Teil. Dass der 2018 beschlossene Plan, genannt »Prognose der sozialökonomischen Entwicklung der
Russischen Föderation bis 2036«, realisiert werden kann, ist ebenfalls unwahrscheinlich. Voraussetzung für
sein Gelingen wäre eine deutliche Verbesserung des Investitionsklimas, wofür vor allem das Vertrauen der
Unternehmer in die staatlichen Strukturen gestärkt werden müsste. Dies setzt eine Reform des politischen
Systems voraus, woran die herrschenden Kreise jedoch kein Interesse haben, weil sie dann um ihre Privilegien fürchten müssten.

One of the most visible phenomenas at international relations area are Russia’s tryings for rebuilding the superpower position. By conducting actions like : annexation of Crimea and war in Donbass, Russia tries to restore lost position, which decline with collapse of Soviet Union. Methods by which Russia do this actions are based on infrigment the territorial integrity of neighbouring states. The history of Russia territorial expansion from the Grand Duchy of Moscow shows that this country enlarged it’s territory at the expense of neighbouring countries. This expansion was continued even thought changing form
of the state, but the form was changeless – Russia conquested lands near it’s borders.
In current times Russia continues the expansion, which is logical sequence of the previous policy, and can be enduring in the future but the main reasons of this process must be searched in this country history. It can helps in understanding ongoing Russian policy, which can be the main cause of agressive behaviour in the future.

This paper investigates the process of developing and implementing Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and industrial parks in Russia. Governments commonly use SEZ policies to develop and diversify exports, create jobs, and launch technology and knowledge sharing. The industrial cluster concept is based on the significance of rivalry and supplier networks within the cluster, the combination of geographical specificities and government policies that lead to innovation and productivity growth. This study reveals that, in Russia, the government's approach in developing these initiatives has strongly interfered with business activities and prevented the vital competitive and collaborative behavior of firms within these economic zones.

Over the past 15 years, Russia’s model of political-economy has
evolved around three main channels of global economic integration: 1) export of natural resources and a national system of redistribution of export revenues; 2) financialisation, acting as a boost for domestic consumption/demand; and 3) the offshore integration of Russian capital into global capital markets. The current crisis is affecting all three channels of Russia’s global political economy. Together, reduced
export revenues, the deepening financial crisis and the dominance of offshore-sourced investments into Russia, serve as crisis transmission mechanisms, and thus constitute three sets of (inter-related) dilemmas for the Russian authorities. Four scenarios of possible development of the current situation are provided.

Ce livre propose la première synthèse en français de l'évolution économique de la Russie, depuis la révolution bolchévique jusqu'au quatrième mandat de Vladimir Poutine. Il s'agit d'une " économie politique ", c'est-à-dire d'une analyse des mutations économiques qui intègre les institutions, la politique et l'histoire.

L'auteur explicite le long processus d'effondrement du communisme et la façon dont cet héritage influence toujours l'économie russe. Il montre aussi pourquoi une transition vers le capitalisme inspirée par des économistes du mainstream anglo-saxon ne pouvait pas fonctionner et comment, avec le conflit ukrainien, la géopolitique complique aujourd'hui la recherche d'un modèle de croissance stable.

Th e article seeks to answer, from the economic point of view, the question about sources of instability of Russia’s superpower status over the last 130 years. Th e analysis of economic strengths and weaknesses of Russia is based on a comparison of three periods: the Russian Empire in 1890–1913, the Soviet Union in 1980–1991, and the Russian Federation in 2000–2020. In spite of diff erent sources of the problems, in all the three periods the Russian economy shows astonishing similarities that led to severe economic and socio-political crises. The three most important common problems are: (1) insufficient domestic savings to simultaneously finance economic modernisation and imperial policy, (2) low competitiveness, (3) dependence on the export of raw materials. Although the causes of these weaknesses were diff erent in the analysed periods and rooted in dilemmas of internal policy, their occurrence always represented a major vulnerability for Russia that manifested itself fully during the trade wars and economic blockades. In the case of the Russian Federation, the vulnerability may be reinforced by both a confrontational policy towards the West and the technological and economic changes which could transform the functioning of global energy markets.

The development of renewable energy is often treated as a purely positive outcome for the world, without consideration of the challenges that come with implementation at scale, which will inevitably follow with the process of a global energy transition. Studies on the political process of the transition to a world of renewables are scarce. This article provides a review on the geopolitical, institutional, and technological aspects of the development of renewable energy sources, including transportation and delivery of energy across national borders. At scale internationally, renewable energy will present many of the same issues as other mature sources of energy. Security, export interdependence, and the availability of source materials will all become increasingly important concerns.

C’est en juin 2014 que le gouvernement russe annonce pour la première fois son intention de remplacer tous les processeurs Intel et AMD initialement employés par l’armée et l’administration russes, par des processeurs de l’entreprise Baikal Electronics spécialement conçus à cet effet, et ainsi destinés à équiper l’ensemble du parc informatique de l’État. Dès le mois de juin 2015, en tout juste un an, les premiers exemplaires du nouveau processeur sont disponibles à la vente.

The extent of provision of a public good often relies on social awareness and public support for it. This applies, in particular, to global reduction of greenhouse gases and its relevance for mitigating climate change. We examine the concept of “public awareness” by introducing a formal model that analyzes efforts to mitigate climate change in a setting with heterogeneous countries. In the theoretical part we examine the Nash equilibrium of the contribution game. The effects of awareness and economic parameters on mitigation efforts can be disentangled, raising the possibility of linking awareness of climate change with economic wealth. The second part provides some empirical observations and offers the rankings of countries regarding awareness for climate change, as well as an empirical relationship between awareness and economic wealth.

The article presents a medium-term forecast of the development of the Russian nanoindustry, taking into account the assumed transition of the industry from the formation stage to the investment growth stage. Problems associated with the estimated output volumes of products in the Russian nanoindustry are considered, since the trends recorded in the primary statistical data are very far from reflecting the real situation due to the imperfection of the system of statistics of nano-containing products, as well as a reduction of state funding and a decline in the intensity of R&D in the industry. It is concluded that a full-fledged industry has not been yet completely formed in Russia and it actually exists only as a statistical phenomenon; in addition, the project really set different objectives from the declared creation of a breakthrough high-technology branch.

The paper is aimed at comparing the divergence of existing credit risk models and creating a synergic model with superior forecasting power based on a rating model and probability of default model of Russian banks. The paper demonstrates that rating models, if applied alone, tend to overestimate an instability of a bank, whereas probability of default models give underestimated results. As a result of the assigning of optimal weights and monotonic transformations to these models, the new synergic model of banks’ credit risks with higher forecasting power (predicted 44% of precise estimates) was obtained.

In the decade of the 2010s, the pace of economic growth in Russia slowed down to an annual rate of below 2% and most forecasts suggest that this is will be the new “normal” for the Russian economy at least in the medium-term. While politically and socially disappointing, such a growth slowdown is unavoidable due to adverse demographic trends. A combination of a shrinking working-age population and population aging must lead to a lower growth pace as compared to the period when the working-age population was still increasing and the effects of population aging were limited (the decade of the 2000s). Compensatory measures such as a gradual increase in the retirement age and an open labor migration policy, although economically positive, can only partly mitigate the negative effects of a shrinking domestic labor force. In this respect, Russia does not differ from other European countries and some Asian countries. However, demography and shrinking labor supply cannot fully explain low p...

Russia’s military spending has more than doubled since the mid-2000s. However, after peaking in 2016, with a defence budget of 4.4 per cent of GDP, the government has planned a decrease in defence spending that would result in a share in GDP of 2.5 per cent in 2020. A review of the literature that discusses the rise in military expenditure indicates that it may be attributed to Russia’s security policy ambitions, military modernization, and the political priority given to defence. The reasons for the decrease in military spending in 2017, and during the expected decline 2018-20, may be linked to the poor economic performance, but political tactics prior to the presidential elections in 2018 are also part of the explanation.

The paper examines the impact of oil price shocks on inflation, as well as the impact of the choice of the monetary policy regime on the strength of this influence. We used dynamic models on panel data for the countries of the world for 2000–2017. It is shown that the impact of changes in oil prices on inflation is carried out predominantly through the channel of exchange rate. The paper demonstrates the influence of the transition to inflation targeting on the nature of the relationship between oil price shocks and inflation. This effect is asymmetrical: during periods of rising oil prices, inflation targeting reduces the effect of the oil prices pass-through, limiting the negative effects of shock. During periods of decline in oil prices, this monetary policy regime, in contrast, contributes to a stronger pass-through, helping to reduce inflation.

It was Weber, of course, who sought to explain why capitalism first emerged in the West, as opposed to other societies that had seemingly more favorable conditions to support
capitalism. His answer that Calvinist Protestantism fostered a spirit of rigorous discipline and encouraged followers to acquire wealth as a sign that they were among God's elect opened a debate concerning the impact of religious belief on social action that, despite a lull during the second half of the twentieth century, continues to this day. Today, few question the relevance of a nation's religious tradition for its political, economic, and social development. The real question rests with which religious traditions are congruent with liberal democracy, free-market economics, and civil society, and whether or not obstacles in specific religious traditions can be overcome. Eastern Orthodoxy, and Russian Orthodox Christianity, has received significant criticism in this regard. Weber himself argued that Orthodoxy was too mystically oriented and focused on other-worldly concerns to generate a sufficient drive to capitalist accumulation. Has Russian Orthodoxy changed significantly since Weber's time that such a claim is no longer valid? With up to 80 percent of the country's population identifying with Orthodox Christianity, is Russia doomed to economic backwardness?

The macroeconomic figures of the past four years combine to a very positive picture. GDP grew at an annual rate of 9.4 % in 2003 and even of 12.3 %3 during the first half of 2004. In 2004 the Government needed to update its forecast for annual industrial output growth from 4.5 % to 14 %. Investment is increasing, inflation remains moderate. The Government’s budget execution recorded a surplus. Exports are increasing (by 27 % in 2003) and despite a simultaneous import growth the current account remains positive. A construction boom can be observed, which has in turn boosted manufacturing. In addition, rising real wages have lifted private consumption, reflected in strong trade sector growth. In 2003 foreign direct investment inflow has doubled in respect to 2002. On the basis of these figures Government institutions and investment banks use an enthusiastic language praising the “Ukrainian Miracle”. But how does it fit together with the miracle that “in 2003 the population of Ukraine ...

Brazilian economic reforms in 21st century have great importance for the international community, especially for other countries of the middle level of development. The authors­ believe that, in spite of all the difficulties and crises, Brazil has made a decisive step forward by reforming its social structure and retaining democracy. Social reforms (especially­ minimal wage) led to strengthening middle class, but also to elevating its social aspirations. At this dramatic junction the economic development of the country was aggravated by external shocks and unsuccessful budget policies. The complex interaction of social macro­economic policies in Brazil with strong external shocks gives lessons to countries with similar characteristics. The pandemic and recession of 2020–2021 have made the path of development more complicated but there is room for optimism for Brazil in the long run.

The father of the “Austrian” Marginalist revolution and founder of the so-called “Austrian School of economics”, Carl Menger, had a mixed reception during different periods of development of French economics. Somewhat welcomed in the early days, he was rather forgotten later on. Even his major works were not published in translation until recently. What is the reason for such a situation? Criticisms of classical political economy have to be understood in their French context. In comparison to other countries, this paper details the case of France, besides showing how later Austrians, such as Friedrich Hayek, found a limited audience. This comparative study of economic ideas in France must start with the reception of the views of the founder and the role and impact of adopting/adapting or rejecting his views by French scholars. What place did they find in French academia? From Carl Menger to a “Frenchified” Charles Menger, how was Austrian economic thought disseminated in France? Thi...

Nowadays the Austrian School enjoys high reputation in Italy: books by Mises, Hayek and other Austrian economists are constantly republished and reviewed with great interest, both inside and outside academic circles. The situation was very different decades ago, when just a few Italian economists devoted attention to the Austrian School. This work studies the reception of Austrian Economics in Italy, from the beginning to our days, so as to bring out, by way of comparison, relevant features of Italian economic culture. We will try to offer just an overview of the entire story, in an attempt to provide useful elements for a deeper analysis of further topics and periods.

After two turbulent decades (1980s and 1990s) when emerging-market economies were frequent victims of financial crises, in the first two decades of the 21st century their macroeconomic performance improved. Nevertheless, there were three crisis episodes that hit some of these countries: (i) the spill-over effects of the global financial crisis in 2008–2009; (ii) the consequences of the decline in commodity prices in 2014–2016 for their exporters; (iii) the turbulence in Argentina and Turkey in 2018. Currency crises in Argentina and Turkey in 2018 underlined again the key role of prudent domestic policies. Early policy correction can help to prevent a crisis and avoid its economic, social and political costs. If crisis cannot be avoided, the comprehensive anti-crisis package, including up-front monetary and fiscal adjustment, should be adopted as quickly as possible to arrest market panic and reverse negative expectations.

Industrial development case studies show that Russian regions have indeed failed, except in extremely rare cases, to strengthen their competitive power on account of well-developed economic policies. None of the regions under review was geared up for the crisis of 2014, each facing either aggravated problems or a lack of diversifi ed sale markets.

This paper investigates the process of developing and implementing special economic zones (SEZs) and industrial parks in Russia. Governments commonly use SEZ policies to develop and diversify exports, create jobs and launch technology/knowledge sharing. The industrial cluster concept is based on the significance of rivalry and supplier networks within the cluster, the combination of geographical specificities and government policies that lead to innovation and productivity growth. This study reveals that in Russia the government's approach in developing these initiatives has strongly interfered with business activities and prevented the vital competitive and collaborative behavior of firms within these economic zones.

The objectives of competition policy and the application of competition law need defining and redefining along with changing structures of the economy and the maturing of the competition authority. Market structures associated with digital technology and globalization are often not in consonance with the prevalent law framed in economic analysis of traditional product markets. Antitrust interventions by the competition authorities are caught in a bind as was the case with the Competition Commission of India and the Competition Act, 2002. The emphasis on monopolistic competition, or on oligopolistic markets, as anti-competitive, which marked the earlier days of implementation of competition laws, is at variance with the prevalent monopolistic structures of platform markets or technology firms and the market for ideas. Competition authorities are grappling with identifying anti-competitive activities of these markets which tip towards monopolistic structures. In the process there has ...

The international community has become increasingly concerned with sustainable development and particularly with preventing climate change. The COVID-19 pandemic and global recession of 2020 will exacerbate the situation not just for 2020–2021, but for many years to come. Sadly, it is a game-changer. The necessity to solve problems of poverty (energy poverty) and inequality, as well as growth and climate change mitigation, now haunts intellectuals, forecasters, and politicians. These three problems constitute the global energy trilemma (GET). There is a wide range of forecasts, scenarios, and political plans emerging after the Paris Agreement in 2015. They demonstrate concerns about the slow progress on the matter; however, they still increase the goals for 2030–2050. The global capital formation is a key tool for changes while also representing the hard-budget investment constraints. This article examines practical features of recent trends in energy, poverty, and climate change mi...

The main goal of this study is to highlight the acceptance, dissemination, interpretation, criticism and make some attempts at contributing to Austrian economics made in Bulgaria during the last 120 years. We consider some of the main characteristics of the Austrian school, such as subjectivism and marginalism, as basic components of the economic thought in Bulgaria and as incentives for the development of some original theoretical contributions. Even during the first few years of Communist regime (1944–1989), with its Marxist monopoly over intellectual life, the Austrian school had some impact on the economic thought in the country. Subsequent to the collapse of Communism, there was a sort of a Renaissance and rediscovery of this school. Another contribution of our study is that it illustrates the adaptability and spontaneous evolution of ideas in a different and sometimes hostile environment.

Most of Russia’s industrial sectors saw output in terms of volume stabilize at a low level in H1 2016. Output began to grow slowly at year’s end. The summary index of the manufacturing sector was driven by positi ve dynamics during the last few months of the year. Given that Russia’s economy is heavily reliant on oil and gas revenues and imported goods, the growth was strongly backed up by mounti ng crude prices and the year-end appreciati on of the Russian rouble.

Росстат перешел на новый классификатор экономической деятельности ОКВЭД2, что обусловливает необходимость крайне осторожной интерпретации статистики промышленного производства. Результаты расчетов, проведенных в Институте экономической политики им. Е.Т. Гайдара, свидетельствуют о сохранении в начале 2017 г. тенденций конца 2016 г.: небольшое увеличение объемов производства сопровождается близкими к нулю темпами роста большинства отраслей. Оживление в некоторых секторах является, как правило, следствием благоприятной внешнеэкономической конъюнктуры и государственного субсидирования.

In the attached file the reader will find the full text of the a Russian text Leon Petrażycki under the title: "Stocks, Speculation, and a Theory Economic Crises". As a non-economist, I understand that the author presents a theory of economic crises that in some sense combines and anticipates modern behavioral economics and Keynesism. An essay, written by an economist, will be published on a compilation (published by a US publisher) devoted to Leon Petrażycki's contributions to social sciences. Incidentally, it should be recalled that Petrażycki regarded economics as the most (scientifically) 'happy' social science of his time. We need either an essay written by a theoretical economist, who is able to assess whether this text may be in any sense useful to a contemporary economist, or an essay written by a historian of economic thought, who is able to put it into its right context. The deadline for the submission of an abstract is July 31st. For any question, please contact me at edoardo.fittipaldi@unimi.it Needless to say, understading written Russian is necessary