Putinism

As transatlantic experts focusing on security and Russia, we recognize the confusion among policymakers who have genuine interest in Euroatlantic security after the presidential election in the United States. The Russian Federation and its proxies use an extensive toolkit to manipulate sovereign policy and decision-making in various democratic countries, both in Western and Eastern Europe. We are convinced that to challenge this tendency, a strong Euro-Atlantic cooperation is needed. A geopolitical vacuum in the region would only encourage Russian players to interfere more actively. And while Russia is calling for a friendship with the West, they are treating the West as an enemy: an easy target for information warfare and active measures. We aim to build on the US initiative (Portman-Murphy Counter-Propaganda Bill) and to enhance the synergy with the European effort. Based on the experience of hostile Russian influence in Europe, we give suggestions where the US foreign and defense policy interest and resources should be targeted in order to support and enhance the European response. We would suggest focusing on the following practical steps: 1) Create a program which will make use of existing European knowledge (mainly in think-tanks) on how democratic states can form their policy responses to massive hostile disinformation. 2) Support scholarships for fact-checkers, investigative journalists and researchers focusing on exposing and scrutinizing hostile influence operations. 3) Support non-governmental watchdog organizations which promote an agenda of digital and media literacy, critical thinking and countering disinformation and conspiracy theories, with a special focus on education. We think that the exchange of ideas and experience between the Unites States and its European allies is crucial to be able to challenge this threat. For example, strategies to win an information war or to counter hostile Russian influence have already been drafted. To downplay the importance of Europe by the US foreign policy would only exacerbate the security challenges, and would go against the vested security policy interests of the Unites States.

In einem in opendemocracy.net und später auch im Focus veröffentlichten Artikel " Was kommt nach Putin? Wie der Westen sich darauf vorbereiten sollte " vertritt Andreas Umland die Ansicht, Russland sei auf den Westen angewiesen und werde letztlich, " nach einem Kurs-und Regimewechsel " , wieder auf ihn zugehen müssen. Hierauf solle der Westen konstruktiv reagieren. Umland legt Vorschläge vor, die eine Anbindung Russlands an den Westen bedeuten würden. Er betont, Voraussetzung hierfür werde " die Bereitschaft Moskaus sein, seinen verschiedenen expansionistischen Abenteuern in Osteuropa und im Südkaukasus zu entsagen und sich auch in anderen Regionen der Welt konstruktiver zu verhalten, etwa im Nahen Osten. "
Darauf antwortet Christian Wipperfürth: Wie sollen und können die westlich-russisch Beziehungen langfristig aussehen?

An FPÖ government would put Vienna on a collision course with the EU’s liberal democratic and human rights agenda. Austria could quickly start challenging European unity on the anti-Russian sanctions. The FPÖ may also attempt to facilitate money laundering for Russia’s bureaucrats and oligarchs (which, to be sure, is already happening in Austria). Moreover, the inclusion of the far right in the Austrian government would lead to a marked strengthening of the illiberal bloc in central Europe. The enlargement of this illiberal and largely pro-Russian bloc will make the EU even more vulnerable to Moscow’s subversive influence, weaken the liberal democratic consensus in the EU, and make Europe a less unified actor in the global arena.