Paternalism

Capability theorists disagree on how to determine, for normative purposes, which capabilities are to be treated as basic, with Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen taking opposite views. This paper will scrutinize this list debate. It has two aims. First, it argues that some distinction between basic and non-basic capabilities is an inherent commitment of capability theories, but that there are many more options for responding to the capability-selection problem than a procedure of democratic deliberation (Sen) or a philosophical criterion of neo-Aristotelian flourishing (Nussbaum). A whole range of possible procedures and philosophical criteria could be combined with the capability metric. Second, it responds to a forceful challenge raised by Ian Crater, who argues that capability theorists should not endorse the selection of specific capabilities as basic (either democratically or philosophically) at all. In his view this will always have paternalistic implications; instead he proposes that the maximization of 'capability as such' should be the goal. In response I distinguish wellbeing-based and autonomy-based capability theories, and argue that while Carter's challenge is valid against the former, it fails against the latter.

Epistemic paternalism is the practice of interfering with someone's inquiry, without their consent, for their own epistemic good. In this chapter, I explore the relationship between epistemic paternalism and two other epistemological theses: epistemic permissivism and standpoint epistemology. I argue that examining this relationship is fruitful because it sheds light on a series of cases in which epistemic paternalism is unjustified and brings out notable similarities between epistemic permissivism and standpoint epistemology. In most US states, it's illegal to drive without wearing one's seatbelt. Many recreational drugs are outlawed, even if used alone on one's own property. I enforce a strict no-technology policy for students in my classes. A public beach may disallow swimming without the presence of a lifeguard. These are all examples of paternalism, the practice of limiting the free choices of agents, without their consent, for the sake of promoting their best interests. Paternalism is frequently discussed in legal, ethical, and social contexts.1 A practice that has received less attention, however, is a strand of paternalism in the epistemic realm.2 So-called 'epistemic paternalism' is the practice of (i) interfering with someone's inquiry, (ii) without their consent, (iii) for their own epistemic good.3 Conditions (i) and (iii) are unique to epistemic paternalism: you can engage in paternalism without interfering with someone's inquiry, and without having a distinctly epistemic motivation for doing so, as in many of the opening examples. Nonetheless, epistemic paternalism is a strand of general paternalism. In this paper, I concern myself with the question of whether epistemic paternalism is epistemically justified. First, I discuss the definition of epistemic paternalism is more detail and clarify this question about its justification. Then, I explore how two recent epistemological theses-epistemic permissivism and standpoint epistemology-answer this question. I argue

This chapter provides a synthetic overview of the ethics of paternalism in psychotherapy with a focus on involuntary hospitalization to protect patients from self-harm. Paternalism entails the intentional overriding of someone's preferences or actions on grounds of beneficence and nonmaleficence. After the emergence of autonomy in medical ethics, paternalism is generally considered prima facie wrong, as it infringes on patient autonomy, trust, and right to informed consent. In particular, the use of paternalism in psychotherapy raises a host of complex and delicate ethical issues due to the nature of the therapeutic relationship and the difficulty to assess the autonomy of the person who will supposedly benefit from the paternalistic intervention.

Full thesis is available through the Cork Open Access Archive, here: https://cora.ucc.ie/handle/10468/12426
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Although the term ‘infantilisation’ is used across disciplines and in different contexts, its meaning is frequently unclear. Where adults are infantilized, are they treated -as- children or -like- children, or merely in some child-appropriate ways? Are they thought of as child-like, or as defective adults, or as children in the bodies of adults? Is infantilisation distinct from paternalism, or only a severe example of it? In this thesis I develop a concept and theory of infantilisation which addresses these questions. Both concept and theory are grounded in empirical studies on the infantilisation of adults in elderly care settings and of physically and cognitively disabled adults (both in care and in the community). I argue that infantilisation is conceptually distinct from paternalism, that it is an inapt conceptualization of any adult, and that the treatments which stem from it are harmful. I conclude that the infantilisation of adults – cognitively disabled or not – is both a social injustice and a conceptual failure.

In this book I offer a critical, comparative and empirically-informed defense of Islamic schools in the West. To do so I elaborate an idealized philosophy of Islamic education, against which I evaluate the very different empirical situation in the Netherlands, Belgium and the United States. I examine in detail notions of cultural identity and cultural coherence, the scope of parental authority v. a child's interests, as well as the state's hypothetical role in regulating religious schools.

À travers la promotion de ce qu’ils appellent les « nudges », Richard Thaler et Cass Sunstein prétendent jeter les bases d’une nouvelle philosophie des politiques publiques : le « paternalisme libertarien ». Les mesures associées à un tel programme réaliseraient l’exploit d’inciter les individus à prendre de meilleures décisions, dans leur intérêt bien compris, tout en préservant leur liberté de choix. Accueillis très positivement dans certains milieux politiques, vilipendés dans d’autres, les auteurs n’hésitent pas à qualifier leur approche de véritable « troisième voie1 ». Le paternalisme libertarien se présente comme un moyen d’améliorer drastiquement les politiques publiques, et ce dans de nombreux domaines.
Mais en quoi cette philosophie des politiques publiques est-elle paternaliste ? Une telle étiquette permet-elle de restituer adéquatement le débat, et de déterminer les implications normatives du vaste et ambitieux programme de recherches de l’économie comportementale ? Je cherche à montrer dans cette article que le label « paternaliste » est un choix malheureux de la part de nos auteurs : non seulement il ne permet pas de rendre compte adéquatement de leur position, mais encore, il tend une perche critique à leurs adversaires. Ce faisant, j’espère remettre en question le cadre théorique classique du débat sur les nudges, qui se réduit bien souvent à l’opposition paternalistes/antipaternalistes.
Dans ses travaux les plus récents2, Sunstein tente de répondre à certaines critiques qui lui ont été adressées, et soutient la thèse selon laquelle concevoir les politiques publiques en termes de nudges permet de pousser à un niveau plus élevé l’analyse classique des « échecs de marché » (market failures). C’est cette thèse que je me propose de décortiquer dans cet article. J’espère montrer qu’elle pointe en direction de faiblesses importantes dans la façon dont les nudges sont conceptualisés, ainsi qu’à des confusions majeures dans la manière dont les débats sur les nudges sont menés. Les débats sur les nudges, et surtout sur les leçons à tirer des recherches en économique comportementale, doivent aller dans d’autres directions, plus fécondes.

This article documents how job readiness programs-as anchors of the devolved organizational landscape of neoliberal poverty governance in the United States-endeavor to instill within the poor not simply the virtue of work, but the virtue of thrift, and thus orient them to "both sides of the paycheck." Using a comparative ethnographic study of two community-based, government-funded nonprofit job readiness programs, we show that this pedagogic focus on budgeting is central to the overall goal of conditioning clients to embrace and endure a degraded labor market. Recognizing that most participants will remain poor with or without low-wage employment, these programs suggest that it is as crafty consumers that participants may retake control of their lives. Despite the programs' differing target populations and racialized and gendered logics, both attempt to accommodate participants to the dictates of the neoliberal economic order: jobs are hard to find and, even if you get one, wages will not be enough.

W hile the patient's right to give informed consent to medical treat-ment is now well-established both in US law and in biomedical ethics, evidence continues to suggest that the concept has been poorly integrated into American medical practice, and that in many instances the ...

ARKA KAPAK YAZISI

Özgürlük nedir ve bugün özgürlüğün karşılaştığı başlıca tehditler nelerdir? Bu sorular ve daha fazlası, Svendsen'in çağdaş toplumda özgürlüğün doğasına ilişkin bu kapsamlı incelemesinde tartışılmaktadır. Konuya geniş bir çerçeveden yaklaşan Svendsen, merceğini özgürlüğün günümüzde karşılaştığı sorunlara çeviriyor. Sonuçta özgürlük, ontolojik ve metafizik yönlerinden politik ya da kişisel yönlerine kadar çok boyutlu bir olgudur.

Özgürlüğün anlaşılmasında ve uygulanmasında temel zorluk, birbirleriyle çatışan anlayışların ve politikaların varlığıdır. İşte Svendsen, özgürlüğü metafizik, politik ve etik düzeyde ele alan çeşitli düşünürleri ve teorileri ustalıkla kateden bu çalışmasında, özgürlük anlayışlarının birbirleriyle nasıl ilişkili olduğunu ve çatıştığını tartışıyor. Özgürlüğün imkânını araştırıyor ve yaşadığımız hayatın gerçek değerini anlamak için kişisel özgürlüğün gerçek tanımının, her şeyden önce kendimizi, bizim için gerçekten önemli olan şeylere adama özgürlüğü olduğu sonucuna varıyor.

Bu kitap bir özgürlük savunmasıdır. Özgürlük kavramını kuşatan zengin külliyata dair genel ve geniş bir bakış sunan, özgürlüğün gerçek doğasına dair tekrar düşünebilmek için bize yeni bir fırsat sağlayan Özgürlüğün Felsefesi, hem akademisyenler hem de genel okur için anlaşılır ve aydınlatıcı bir çalışma.

Özellikler
Cilt Durumu : Ciltsiz
Basım Tarihi : Mayıs 2021
Basım Yeri : Türkiye
Boyutlar : 13,00 x 19,50 cm
Basım Dili : Türkçe
Orijinal Dil : Norveççe
Kağıt Tipi : 2. Hamur
Sayfa Sayısı : 392
Barkod : 9786056911958
Kategoriler
Felsefe / Diğer
Katkıda Bulunanlar
Çevirmen
Murat Erşen

Kapak Tasarım
Tarık Kirpi

Hazırlayan
Ahmet Yurtkul

Nudging is a form of soft paternalism whereby governments manipulate the choice architectures of citizens to steer them toward desired outcomes (including eating better, voting more often, being less aggressive and violent, being more compassionate, living healthier, and leading more fulfilling lives). From the perspective of social activists (includ-ing moral entrepreneurs of various stripes), public health officials , social marketers, and government actors, the more subtle forms of nudging help mitigate populist backlash against nanny states which are viewed as overly aggressive and instrusive in mandating by force of law that citizens do what's best for them or face repurcussions. In his latest book, Cass Sunstein examines both the pros and cons of the use of behavioral economics by governments to nudge sometimes reluctant publics to pursue goals and establish lifestyles which experts believe will maximize life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

The challenge in maintaining patient autonomy regarding medical decision-making and confidentiality lies not only in control over information transferred to and regarding patients, but in the ambiguity of autonomy itself. Post-modernity is characterized by the recognition of not just numerous accounts of autonomy, but by the inability in a principled fashion to select one as canonical. Autonomy is understood as a good, a right-making condition, and an element of human flourishing. In each case, it can have a different content, depending in part on whether it is given a nomological or a volitional construal. Different accounts of autonomy can lead to strikingly different understandings of appropriate behavior, including the argument that one ought on behalf of autonomy to liberate individuals from the sense of autonomy they themselves affirm. In the face of competing accounts of moral probity, autonomy in a secular morality and bioethics must by default be understood in terms of the ...

В статье на основе полевых материалов и других источников рассматривается современное состояние оленеводства в Анабарском арктическом районе Республики Саха (Якутия). Оленеводство занимает важнейшее место в республиканской политике в отношении регионов проживания народов Севера. Целями этой политики являются поддержка и сохранение местной культуры, обеспечение продовольственной безопасности регионов. Ведется работа по созданию позитивного образа оленеводства на республиканском и региональном уровнях. Оленеводы Анабарского р-на выстраивают свои экономические стратегии с опорой на проводимую государством патерналистскую политику, а также активно задействуют более широкие социальные связи, предпринимательские навыки, проявившиеся в период ослабления государства в 1990-е годы. В различных контекстах в поведении оленеводов заметна амбивалентность: чередующиеся практики избегания государства, стремление к большей самостоятельности и одновременно обращение к ресурсам и авторитету государства. В статье показаны особенности хозяйственной адаптации к изменяющейся природной и социально-экономической среде. Ключевые слова: оленеводство, долганы, патернализм, Республика Саха (Якутия), рыночная экономика, предпринимательство, адаптация, свободные места.


Reindeer husbandry today occupies an important place in the policy of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) in relation to the regions of residence of the peoples of the North and also in the local municipal policy considered in the work of the Anabarsky district. The goals of the policy are to support and preserve the local culture and ensure the food security of the regions associated with reindeer herding. The reindeer breeders of Yuryung-Khaya today are building their economic strategies relying on the paternalistic policies pursued by the state, on the one hand, and actively using broader ties and entrepreneurial skills that were first demonstrated during the decline of the 1990s, on the other. In various contexts, ambivalence is manifested in the behavior of reindeer herders: alternating avoidance practices with the desire for greater autonomy and appeal to the authority of the state. Modern reindeer herders of Yuryung-Khaya to a greater or lesser extent use part of the available resources, not only to meet their primary needs, but also to improve their well-being and strengthen their household.

This article is a reply to an article by Jennifer Radden in which she argues that given certain unusual features of anorexia nervosa, it may simply not be possible to justify paternalistic intervention with such patients, even to save their lives.  In other words, we may simply have to accept that even when their practices of restricting food intake result in dangerously low body weights, their decisions must be honored in the same way that we honor preferences of other competent adults. What makes anorexia unique is the fact that many, perhaps most, adult persons with anorexia satisfy the criteria for decision-making capacity at most points in their illness. However, while it is true that it is much harder to justify intervention with competent patients, it is not impossible to offer such justifications. Here I argue that it is possible to justify limited paternalistic intervention with such patients without departing from basic liberal values.

Abstract: It has been recommended that parents monitor their children's Internet use, including what sites they visit, what messages they receive, and what they post. In this paper, I argue that parents ought not follow this advice, because to do so would violate a child's right to privacy over their on-line information exchanges. In defense of this claim, I argue that children have a right to privacy from their parents, because it respects their current capacities and fosters their future capacities for autonomy and relationships.

Despite knowledge of the projected harmful impacts of the climate crisis, there has been a long history of failure in acting sufficiently to limit anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions at a level that would avoid dangerous human interference with climate systems. The scientific community agrees that immediate and fast-acting measures must be taken to reduce carbon emissions to net zero by 2040 for a likely chance of avoiding the most dangerous impacts of the climate crisis, including risks to energy, food, and water security, extreme weather, and loss of home and livelihood to many of the world’s most vulnerable communities.

In this paper, I aim to establish paternalism as a normative governmental response to the climate crisis. I argue that on their own, people are unlikely to voluntarily make the lifestyle and behavioural changes that are necessary to limit global heating to under 1.5 °C, despite those changes being morally compelling if we are to fulfil our collective moral duty not to harm others. We should therefore and are morally justified in applying Mill’s Harm Principle, which allows us to limit an individual’s liberty in order to restrict their carbon emissions and thereby prevent or mitigate harm to others. Applying Rawls’s conception of justice, I argue that governments have a duty to ensure that the climate crisis is resolved as they relate to just society; it is this goal of justice that provides government with the political and social legitimacy to intervene. Paternalistic intervention is therefore imperative in order to ensure that lifestyle and behavioural changes are adopted with the necessary speed and efficiency to limit global carbon and greenhouse gas emissions to a level that would avoid catastrophic harm.

... Sabine Salloch · Christof Breitsameter Die vorliegende Studie entstand am lehrstuhl für Moraltheologie an der ruhr-Universität bochum. ... Die anschließende auswertung orientierte sich an den Methoden der von Juliet Corbin und anselm Strauss beschriebenen Form der ...

This chapter will focus on one aspect of the debate over nudges and paternalism that I feel has largely been neglected: a person’s interests and what we know about them. After briefly summarizing problems with nudges along epistemic, ethical, and practical lines, I will describe the nature of interests, which I maintain are complex, multifaceted, and subjective. After presenting this conception of interests, I will then examine two recent defenses of paternalism by Cass Sunstein and Sarah Conly and two particular emphases they share: the distinction between means paternalism and ends paternalism, and the rejection of perfectionism or objective theories of well-being.  I will argue that the nature of interests renders both of these positions problematic and leaves paternalism open to traditional criticisms that date back at least to John Stuart Mill.

The aim of this article is to show that criminal paternalism is not an autonomous principle of criminalization. Upon making a distinction between tutelary and despotic paternalism, it shows that the former is a manifestation of the principle of harm, while the latter is only apparently opposed to liberalism. Indeed, the criminal norms that are usually seen as despoticly paternalistic are instead expressions of either legal moralism (and should be dealt with as such) or (as is the case with tutelary paternalism) of the principle of harm. In the latter cases, the problem is that the principle of harm itself offers a far less stable ground for criminalization than anti-paternalists seem to believe. The article also provides a critical account of the anti-paternalists’ view on consent. The conclusion is drawn that what the debate on criminal paternalism actually calls for is a thorough discussion on whether individuals have a “right to make mistakes” (even when such “mistakes” consist in self-harm).

The discussion in this paper tries to views the collapse of HIH Insurance in 2001 from a different perspective of external contexts different from the extensively studied human factors in corporate management. The contexts here refer to the role of industry environment, economic state, business cycles, abusive use of reinsurance contract, and regulatory framework exist at the time. Additionally, the paper also discussed some of the issues of policymaking in relation to paternalism welfare outcome. The paper finished by offering a solution for compensation scheme to follow the concept of libertarian paternalism which allow maintenance of employers' safety incentives while also returning workers' freedom to choose packages they preferred.

Venice, and The Tempest—the action is generated by a paternal state's relationship to 'the other,' to employ a phrase meant to broadly represent the exotic and alien. In this case, the female, the Jew, and the New World. The representatives of the patriarchy must deal with the troubling representations of 'otherness' that each presents. We'll look at each in turn, showing how the Elizabethan West pivots on a deep-seeded paternalism that is at bottom a mechanism of control that seeks to suppress the 'rabble rouser' of the exotic 'other', which is typically interested not as much in usurpation as mere equality before the state. At root, paternalism is a kind of class war between the powerful and the powerless, an elaborate defense and obfuscation of the self-interest of the dominant culture against the perceived threat of the 'other'.